European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Ralf Drachenberg.

Summary

The European Council consists of the Heads of State or Government of the 27 EU Member States, as well as the President of the European Council and the President of the European Commission. It became a formal European Union (EU) institution, with a full-time President, under the Treaty of Lisbon. Although it does not exercise legislative functions, the European Council’s role – to ‘provide the Union with the necessary impetus for its development’ and to define its ‘general political directions and priorities’ – has developed rapidly over the past twelve years. The European Council President has a crucial role to play in this context.

The first term of Charles Michel, the incumbent President, comes to an end on 31 May 2022. Based on previous cycles, the decision on the (re-)election of the European Council President for the period from July 2022 to November 2024 is expected to be taken at the last formal European Council meeting before the end of the current mandate.

This briefing provides answers to some of the most frequently asked questions on the office of President of the European Council, in particular the position’s role and the election process. It also provides examples from the mandates of the three office holders to date.

1. When was the permanent office of President of the European Council created?

The office of full-time President was introduced in 2009 with the Lisbon Treaty – at the same time as the European Council became a fully fledged EU institution. It replaced the previous rotating presidency of the European Council, held by the Head of State or Government of the Member State holding the presidency of the Council of the European Union (Council of Ministers), which continues to chair most Council formations. The office was created, among other reasons, to bring more continuity and coherence to the European Council’s work.

This updates an October 2016 EPRS Briefing, ‘The choice of the President of the European Council: Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ)’.

2. What is the role of the European Council President?

The role of the President is set out in Article 15(6) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), which specifies that the President of the European Council:

• chairs the European Council and drives forward its work;
• ensures the preparation and continuity of the work of the European Council in cooperation with the President of the Commission, and on the basis of the work of the General Affairs Council;
• endeavours to facilitate cohesion and consensus within the European Council;
• presents a report to the European Parliament after each formal meeting of the European Council.

The President of the European Council also ensures the external representation of the EU on issues concerning its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), without prejudice to the powers of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.

Herman Van Rompuy, the first full-time President of the European Council, described his role as follows:

The European Council is generally considered to be the highest political authority in the Union but the job description and formal competences of its President are rather vague, even meagre. A lot therefore depends on what you do with it or make of it! I can put it differently: everything what was not foreseen formally, had to be created informally.

3. Is the President a member of the European Council?

The European Council’s President, just like the President of the European Commission, is a member of the European Council. Article 15 TEU states that ‘the European Council shall consist of the Heads of State or Government of the Member States, together with its President and the President of the Commission’. The difference between these two categories of members is that, as opposed to the Heads of State or Government, the two presidents do not have voting rights; thus, according to Article 235(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), ‘where the European Council decides by vote, its President and the President of the Commission shall not take part in the vote’.

4. How long is the President’s term of office?

Article 15(5) TEU states that the term of office of the President of the European Council is two and a half years. The same person can be re-elected once. Prior to 31 May 2022, the Heads of State or Government will need to decide whether or not to appoint Charles Michel for a second term as President, or choose someone else to succeed him. In both cases, the (re-)election process is the same. Based on previous practice, the decision is expected to be taken at the last formal European Council meeting before 31 May 2022, i.e. the spring meeting, on 24-25 March.

5. Who can replace the President if necessary?

There is no Vice-President of the European Council to provide support to the President or take over in the event that were necessary. In case of illness or death, or if the President’s term is ended due to impediment or serious misconduct in accordance with Article 15(5) TEU, the member of the European Council representing the Member State holding the rotating Council presidency replaces the President of the European Council until the election of his or her successor (Article 2(4) of the European Council Rules of Procedure).

6. Who proposes the candidate(s) for the office of President?

Neither the Treaties nor the European Council’s Rules of Procedure specify who is officially in charge of steering the nomination process and proposing the names of possible candidates. For the election and re-election of Herman Van Rompuy, it was the leader of the Member State holding the rotating Council presidency (the Swedish and Danish Prime Ministers, respectively) who collected proposals from the Heads of State or Government and sounded out the views of the other EU leaders. When considering his successor, the President himself was crucial in the selection process and proposed Donald Tusk as candidate, after seeking out the opinion of the Heads of State or Government.

When considering the re-election of Donald Tusk, it was the Head of State or Government of the Member State holding the rotating presidency at the time (i.e. the Prime Minister of Malta), who sounded out the views of the European Council members and chaired this agenda point. When looking for a successor in 2019, the process was coordinated by Donald Tusk.

7. How does the election process work?

The election of the President of the European Council is decided by qualified majority voting (Article 15(5) TEU). Using the same procedure, the European Council can also terminate his or her term of office in the case of an impediment or serious misconduct.

While decision-making by consensus is sought, this has not always been achieved. For Donald Tusk’s re-election on 9 March 2017, the Polish government voted against re-electing him, while all the others voted in favour. As a protest against Donald Tusk’s re-election, the then Polish Prime Minister, Beata Szydło, refused to agree on the conclusions, which can only be adopted by consensus; thus, for the first time, the European Council meeting ended with ‘conclusions by the President of the European Council’, as opposed to the standard European Council conclusions.

During the process of selecting his successor (and other high-level appointments at the start of the 2019 institutional cycle), Donald Tusk stressed that these decisions were to be taken by consensus, if possible, but that he ‘would not shy away from putting [them] to the vote’ if needed.

The election of the European Council’s President, as opposed to that of the Commission President and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (as a member of the College of Commissioners), does not need the European Parliament’s approval (see Table 1).

PositionTreaty articleEuropean Council roleEuropean Parliament rolePresident of the European Commission17(7) TEUPropose candidateElect candidatePresident of the European Council15(5) TEUElectNoneHigh Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy18(1) TEUAppoint (with agreement of the President of the Commission)Part of the approval of the College of CommissionersTable 1 – Treaty-based roles of the European Council and the European Parliament for high-level appointments 8. Who has held the office to date?

To date, three individuals have held the office of President of the European Council: Herman Van Rompuy, Donald Tusk and Charles Michel. Herman Van Rompuy was 62 years old at the start of him term of office as President (in 2009), while Donald Tusk was 57 (2014) and Charles Michel was 43 (2019).

Figure1 – Office holders, their European political party affiliation, Member State and date of (re-)election 9. What are the criteria for choosing the President?

Prior to the Lisbon Treaty, there was no choice for the members of the European Council as to who should hold the presidency, as it was automatically the Head of State or Government of the Member State holding the rotating presidency who carried out this role. The changes introduced with Lisbon gave them the possibility to choose the person who they believed would be most suitable to hold this office.

When choosing the future President of the European Council, EU leaders take into account other factors besides the candidates’ professional experience and performance to date. Attention may notably be paid to ensuring a certain balance between political forces in the EU, Member States and gender.

This balance is partially reflected and formalised in Declaration (No 6) on Article 15(5) and (6), Article 17(6) and (7) and Article 18 TEU, which states that ‘in choosing the persons called upon to hold the offices of President of the European Council, President of the Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, due account is to be taken of the need to respect the geographical and demographic diversity of the Union and its Member States’. During the nomination process for the EU’s new institutional leadership in 2019, Donald Tusk stressed that the nominations should reflect the EU’s demography and geographical balance, but also gender and political balances.

Unlike in previous cases, the election of Charles Michel as President of the European Council in 2019 was part of a package agreed at the special European Council meeting of 30 June-3 July 2019, which also included the positions of President of the European Commission, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and President of the European Central Bank (the latter not being a political appointment).

Figure 2 – Overview of high-level office-holders since the 2009 European Parliament elections 10. What factors determine whether a President is re-elected?

When the President seeks re-election, his or her prospects depend on various factors, including how successful or unsuccessful their first term in office has been; how many supporters or critics they may have in the European Council; the extent of political support in their home country; the existence of any strong or obvious alternative candidates; and the party political balance in the European Council at the time.

11. Can the President of the European Council hold other offices?

While the Treaty clearly states that the European Council President ‘shall not hold a national office’ (Article 15(6) TEU), it does not specify that it is forbidden to hold another European office. In fact, Herman Van Rompuy, Donald Tusk and Charles Michel each also served as President of the Euro Summit while President of the European Council.

The Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (TSCG) lays down that ‘the President of the Euro Summit shall be appointed by the Heads of State or Government of the Contracting Parties whose currency is the euro by simple majority at the same time as the European Council elects its President and for the same term of office’ (Article 12 TSCG). It does not specify that the President of the Euro Summit must come from a country that is part of the euro area. Donald Tusk (Poland) was President of the Euro Summit, but did not come from a country that was part of the euro area.

Merging the positions of President of the European Council and President of the European Commission

As argued by academics and mentioned in the European Parliament’s February 2017 resolution on improving the functioning of the EU, building on the potential of the Lisbon Treaty, the Treaties leave open the possibility for the offices of Presidents of the European Council and of the European Commission to be held concurrently by the same person.

In his 2017 State of the Union address, then Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker proposed to merge the offices of the Presidents of the European Commission and of the European Council into a ‘double-hatted President‘, as ‘Europe would be easier to understand if one captain was steering the ship’. He added that ‘having a single President would better reflect the true nature of our European Union as both a Union of States and a Union of citizens’.

Read this briefing on ‘Role and election of the President of the European Council: Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ)‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Katarzyna Sochacka and Clare Ferguson.

As the March I 2022 plenary session in Strasbourg took place just two weeks after Russia launched its war on Ukraine, security and economic issues were high on the agenda. Members held a debate with Kaja Kallas, Prime Minister of Estonia, on the EU’s role in a changing world and the security situation in Europe, and debated Council and Commission statements on the deterioration of the situation of refugees fleeing Ukraine. Celebrating International Women’s Day, Members heard an address by Ukrainian author, Oksana Zabuzhko. Members also debated a number of other Commission statements: on the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina; on transparency and standards in public access requests; on the need for EU action on sustainable textiles and on chronic kidney disease. Members approved the establishment of three temporary committees: a special committee on Covid‑19; an inquiry committee on the use of Pegasus and equivalent surveillance spyware; and the continuation for a second one-year term of the work of the Special Committee on Foreign Interference in all Democratic Processes in the EU, including Disinformation (INGE). Several debates and votes on legislative files took place, inter alia on the European Semester, batteries and battery waste and the general Union environment action programme to 2030.

Batteries and waste batteries

Members debated an Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI) Committee report on a European Commission proposal for a regulation on batteries and waste batteries. The ENVI committee’s report calls for even higher ambition, with a wider scope to include e-bike and other light transport batteries, and greater diligence throughout the battery lifecycle, from manufacture to recycling. Members adopted Parliament’s first-reading position, setting Parliament’s negotiating position and opening the way for interinstitutional negotiations to begin.

General Union environment programme to 2030

Members debated the EU’s climate ambitions and the eighth environment action programme – the framework for EU environmental policy to 2030. Parliament adopted the provisional agreement reached between the co-legislators, setting the priorities for EU objectives targeting a sustainable economy. The aim is to accelerate the transition to a climate-neutral economy, whilst ensuring that environmental measures do not perpetuate social and gender inequalities, and to phase out fossil fuel and other harmful subsidies.

Regional economic accounts for agriculture

Members considered, and adopted at first reading, the agreed text on the proposed overhaul of the regulation on economic accounts for agriculture, formalising regional agricultural data reporting. During the negotiations, Parliament’s Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development (AGRI) underlined the need to ensure cost-efficient agricultural data collection and avoid redundancy in data reporting.

Citizenship and residence by investment schemes

A considerable number of EU countries have offered citizenship and residence by investment schemes to those (estimated at over 132 000 people between 2011 and 2019) who are wealthy enough to pay. While investment received is estimated at €21.4 billion, the schemes bear obvious risks to sincere cooperation between EU Member States, and commodify EU rights, as well as posing security, corruption, money laundering, and tax avoidance risks. Parliament has expressed concern regarding these schemes since 2014, and Members returned to the issue to consider and adopt a legislative-initiative report from the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE). The committee report demands that the Commission come up with proposals to phase out citizenship by investment schemes completely, and propose new laws to harmonise and govern the rules on residence by investment schemes.

Foreign interference in democratic processes in the EU

Parliament has criticised countries who attempt to influence elections and other democratic processes in EU countries. Russia and China are among the best-known sources of foreign interference, but over 80 countries spread disinformation. Members heard the conclusions of the report on external attempts to influence elections and other democratic processes in EU countries from Parliament’s Special Committee on Foreign Interference (INGE). Parliament adopted a resolution based on the committee’s report, which summarises the EU’s main vulnerabilities to foreign interference, witnessed in several recent elections, and recommends a comprehensive EU strategy to develop resilience. Greater awareness of the problem should be encouraged through media literacy, by closing loopholes that allow foreign financing of political parties, and through stronger sanctions for foreign actors who interfere with our democracies. Parliament later voted to continue this work in a new special committee mandate for the coming year.

Shrinking space for civil society in Europe

A political, economic, social and cultural life in which freedom of expression and of association are respected is one guarantee of a resilient civil society. Parliament is concerned that the EU civic space has deteriorated, particularly since the pandemic, with some governments hindering civil society organisations’ participation in democratic life. Members debated and adopted a LIBE committee own-initiative report, advocating new measures, including a specific EU strategy, to protect and boost civil society organisations in the EU. The report underlines that the strategy should align with EU action in other fields, including on racism.

Role of culture, education, media and sport in the fight against racism

Members also considered and adopted a Culture and Education Committee own-initiative report on the role of culture, education, media and sport in the fight against racism. Considering the 2020 EU action plan on racism, the committee underlines the action still needed to combat stereotypes, develop inclusive education, raise awareness of the history of racism and ensure fair representation of ethnic minorities in the media. The committee insists that adequate resources be made available to ensure that the ambitions can be realised, and calls for the Commission to act on discrimination in sport. The committee also urges EU countries to take effective measures to prevent the media from spreading hate speech and false narratives about particular ethnic groups.

EU gender action plan III

Parliament debated elements driving gender parity in EU external policy. Members considered and adopted a report prepared by the Women’s Rights and Gender Equality (FEMM) and the Development (DEVE) Committees, on the third EU gender action plan, which seeks to mainstream gender equality in external policy. The report welcomes integration of the EU action plan on women, peace and security into GAP III, as well as the inclusion of climate change considerations, among other things. However, regretting the Council’s failure to endorse GAP III, it also criticises the omission of issues including women’s access to natural resources; sexual exploitation and violence; and the inclusion of women in mediation processes. Finally, it calls for more EU action to counter the effects of the pandemic on women, and greater focus on gender equality in trade and investment policy.

Opening of trilogue negotiations

Members confirmed, without vote, a mandate for negotiation from the Fisheries (PECH) Committee on the proposal for a regulation laying down conservation and management measures applicable in the Western and Central Pacific Convention Area.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Plenary round-up – March I 2022‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marcin Grajewski.

Many politicians and analysts have been arguing in recent years that, being highly vulnerable to external shocks, the European Union should boost its ‘strategic autonomy’ and/or develop a higher degree of ‘European sovereignty’. These concepts encompass a greater potential for independence, self-reliance and resilience in a wide range of fields – such as defence, security and trade, as well as in industrial, digital, economic, migration and health policies.

Russia’s military offensive in Ukraine gives this issue great urgency. In energy, the European Commission has now published plans to cut EU dependency on Russian gas by two-thirds this year and end its reliance on Russian supplies of the fuel well before 2030. And the debate is moving on to ideas and projects involving significantly more integration, solidarity and stronger joint security and defence. The EU’s strategic compass, a medium-term defence and security strategy, is being quickly updated to take into account the biggest armed conflict in Europe since World War II.

This note offers links to recent commentaries, studies and reports from international think tanks on the European issues related to European strategic autonomy and sovereignty.

The European Peace Facility: Supporting Ukraine and bolstering the EU’s strategic responsibility
Centre for European Policy Studies, March 2022

The EU and the Ukraine war: Making sense of the rise of a ‘geopolitical’ Union
Istituto Affari Internazionali, March 2022

What Russia’s war in Ukraine means for Europe
Carnegie Europe, March 2022

Russia’s war against Ukraine ends Europe’s self-deception
Carnegie Europe, March 2022

European strategic autonomy in light of Ukraine
Clingendael, February 2022

Why the Ukraine crisis should push the UK and EU into a tighter embrace on security policy
Centre for European Policy Studies, February 2022

Could EU-endorsed ‘coalitions of the willing’ strengthen EU security policy?
Centre for European Reform, February 2022

Global Gateway: Positioning Europe for a sustainable future
Clingendael, February 2022

The return of US leadership in Europe: Biden and the Russia crisis
Istituto Affari Internazionali, February 2022

Ukrainian crisis: Rethinking security in Europe
Notre Europe: Jacques Delors Institute, February 2022

The UK must not dismiss European ‘strategic autonomy’
Chatham House, February 2022

Elevating the EU’s added value as a security provider
Foundation for Progressive European Studies, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Fondation Jean-Jaurès, January 2022

EU strategic autonomy: A perennial pipe dream?
European Policy Centre, January 2022

The European Army project: The answer to the Union’s strategic shrinkage?
Europeum, January 2022

Strategic autonomy: Not without integration
Egmont, Foundation for Progressive European Studies, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Fondation Jean-Jaurès, January 2022

Strategic Compass: Towards EU space strategy for security and defence
Polish Institute for International Affairs, January 2022

In the shadow of war: Ukraine and the limits of a ‘geopolitical’ EU
Centre for European Policy Studies, January 2022

Construire l’autonomie stratégique de l’Europe face à la Chine
Institut Jacques Delors, December 2021

The future of European strategy in a changing geopolitical environment
The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, December 2021

Strategic Autonomy: Views from the North
Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies, December 2021

Strategic Compass: New bearings for EU security and defence?
European Union Institute for Strategic Studies, December 2021

Europe’s Strategic Compass: Merits and shortcomings
Istituto Affari Internazionali, December 2021

Multipolarity and EU Foreign and Security Policy: Divergent approaches to conflict and crisis response
Istituto Affari Internazionali, December 2021

The Global Gateway: A real step towards a stronger Europe in the world?
Bruegel, December 2021

The need for cooperative security In Europe
Brussels School of Governance, December 2021

European strategic autonomy in defence
Rand Corporation, November 2021

European reactions to AUKUS and implications for EU strategic autonomy
Istituto Affari Internazionali, November 2021

Instruments of a strategic foreign economic policy
Bruegel, Kiel Institute for the World Economy, DIW Berlin, November 2021

An architecture fit for strategic autonomy
Foundation for Progressive European Studies, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Fondation Jean-Jaurès, November 2021

Unpacking open strategic autonomy
Clingendael, November 2021

An architecture fit for strategic autonomy: Institutional and operational steps towards a more autonomous EU external action
Foundation for European Progressive Studies, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Fondation Jean Jaures, November 2021

European strategic autonomy and Spain’s interests
Real Instituto Elcano, November 2021

L’autonomie stratégique, cet obscur objet du désir
Institut de relations internationales et stratégiques, October 2021

Building European strategic autonomy vs. Turkish strategic depth: Macron’s diplomatic gamble
Institut français des relations internationales, October 2021

Seven steps to European defence, Transatlantic equilibrium, and Global Europe
Egmont, October 2021

The Strategic Compass: Entering the fray
Egmont, September 2021

Europe’s open strategic autonomy
European Trade Union Institute, September 2021

Read this briefing on ‘EU strategic autonomy in the context of Russia’s war on Ukraine‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marcin Cesluk-Grajewski and Nicola Censini.

On Tuesday 22 February 2022, the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) organised a conference on ‘Wellbeing and Covid‑19: Life in the pandemic’.

The event, moderated by Jutta Schulze‑Hollmén, Director of Human Resources at EPRS, followed the publication of an OECD report analysing the immediate implications of the pandemic for people’s lives and livelihoods in the industrialised world. Michal Šimečka (Renew, Slovakia), Vice-President of the European Parliament opened the conference and set the scene, recalling the severe economic and social toll Covid‑19 has inflicted. During his speech, he said that ”while a useful concept, GDP does not provide a sufficiently detailed picture of the living conditions that ordinary people experience”. It is necessary, instead, ”to dwell more on the human dimension of the disease”, notably issues such as work-life balance, health, family life, education and safety, as well as a rapidly growing number of cases of depression and the feeling of social exclusion.

In her presentation, Carrie Exton, OECD Senior Expert on Well-Being Data Insights and Policy Practice, accurately highlighted some significant social and economic inequalities that emerged during the pandemic and how these are shaping and orienting people’s daily lives. At European level, the overall picture is not so optimistic. In addition to providing interesting data on jobs, health, work-life balance, safety and more, she said people suffered from increased levels of fear, worry and depression. Such feelings are a direct result of health-related anxieties, such as the possibility of being hospitalised or dying, worries about the financial situation, the complications arising from domestic family arrangements during times of lockdown and restrictions on activities and social connectedness. While negative mental health consequences affect all ages, young people in particular have been found to be at high risk of developing poor mental health. Specific groups have been particularly hard hit, including health and care workers, people with pre-existing mental health problems, and women.

During her presentation, Carrie Exton also examined the role that wellbeing evidence can play in supporting governments” pandemic recovery efforts and in redesigning policy content from a more multidimensional perspective. Proper work-life balance, culture and civil engagement are indeed important for life satisfaction. It is therefore important that institutions start to deal with these problems as soon as possible. If mental and physical wellbeing is not addressed, there might also be both mid- and long-term consequences for our societies. That is’ why it is important to actively involve citizens and stimulate the debate on what policies and tools are needed to achieve these goals.

The conference then continued with an open discussion, with the participation of Céline Nieuwenhuys, who advises the Belgian government as Secretary General of the Federation of Social Services for Brussels and Wallonia, and Miquel Oliu Barton, Visiting Fellow at the Bruegel think tank and Adviser to the French and Spanish governments.

Céline Nieuwenhuys pointed out that crises such as pandemics often lead to divisions in a society, and governments should therefore act to bridge them, notably by taking care of the most vulnerable people’. In particular, she appealed to institutions and companies to remain open to citizens, with an individual welcome at a front desk, where time is taken to solve individual problems. In her opinion, the backlash against vaccinations might have resulted in many people losing trust in governments, or even democracy in general. She also said teleworking from home was welcomed by many, but was hated by a significant part of society, for example, single mothers who had to work while also caring for their children who had to stay at home, or those with cramped spaces. She added that tele-education was not a good solution for students.

Miquel Oliu Barton, noted that ‘the right policies should seek to overcome dichotomies such lockdowns and the erosion of trust in the government and science’. While presenting his research on Covid‑19 certificates, he pointed out that governments did not greatly improve security, but they did a lot to incentivise people to get vaccinated. The vaccination uptake grew massively since the adoption of this too. Anti-Covid policies should have been better coordinated among EU Member States, he said. The coordination worked in the economic response to the pandemic, but not in health and mobility’.

In conclusion, Petra Claes, Head of Medical Preparedness and Crisis Management at the European Parliament, described how the pandemic affected the Parliament and the concrete measures taken to prevent the spread of coronavirus in recent months.

To watch this event online, please click here.

You can find the next coming EPRS online events here.

Written by Matthew Parry and Ionel Zamfir.

International condemnation of Moscow’s war on Ukraine has reached far beyond Europe, as evidenced by overwhelming support for a United Nations (UN) resolution condemning the invasion. Several countries have gone further and joined the EU in adopting sanctions against Russia or sending military aid to Ukraine.

Broad international condemnation of Russia’s invasion at the UN

On 2 March 2022, the UN General Assembly (UNGA) convened in a special session and adopted, with a broad majority (141 votes in favour, to 5 against, with 35 abstentions and 12 absentees), resolution ES‑11/1 reaffirming Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and calling for the unconditional withdrawal of Russian forces from Ukraine. The text largely resembles the draft resolution vetoed earlier by Russia in the UN Security Council (UNSC). Unlike UNSC resolutions, UNGA resolutions cannot be vetoed, but are non-binding. Besides Russia and Belarus, the world’s least democratic regimes – Eritrea, North Korea and Syria – also voted against the UNGA resolution. Several countries that abstained (in particular China and Pakistan, but also South Africa) emphasised the need to address the security interests of both parties to the conflict. In Africa, 17 countries abstained, including those importing Russian arms, those where the Russian Wagner Group is active, and two of the continent’s most stable democracies, Senegal and South Africa. In Latin America, unsurprisingly, authoritarian regimes with traditional strong ties with Russia – Cuba and Nicaragua – abstained, along with Bolivia and El Salvador. In Asia, India and Vietnam, both importers of Russian arms, also abstained. Some countries have called for fair treatment of third countries’ nationals at Ukraine’s borders in light of reported incidents of discrimination.

Sanctions adopted against Russia

Both the EU and the United States (US) had promised before the war that Russia would pay a steep financial price for any attack on Ukraine, and have since coordinated their restrictive measures against Russia. In four rounds of sanctions, adopted on 23 February after Russia’s recognition of the two so-called ‘People’s Republics’ of Donetsk and Luhansk, and on 25 February, 28 February and 2 March after the start of the war, the EU imposed restrictions on individuals, including Vladimir Putin and senior Russian ministers; on financial transactions with all state-controlled banks; and on trade with the energy and aviation sectors, among others. Russian aeroplanes are banned from EU airspace and EU airports. US sanctions imposed from 21 February to 3 March include restrictions on Russian state banks; full blocking sanctions on numerous Russian financial institutions and businesses, including the parent company of Russia’s Nord Stream 2 natural gas pipeline project and senior Russian and Belarussian political and business figures; and export controls on US technology. Moreover, EU countries, the US and others agreed to cut out certain Russian banks from the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) financial transactions service. Discussions are ongoing in the US and the EU on a full ban on Russian oil imports.

Other countries joined the EU and the US in imposing sanctions. On 28 February, Switzerland announced a break with its long-standing policy of neutrality to mirror EU financial sanctions on Russia. On 1 and 2 March, the United Kingdom (UK) published regulations introducing new financial, trade and shipping sanctions against Russia. In addition, several allies or strategic partners of the US in the Asia-Pacific region imposed sanctions, namely Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan, with Japan’s sanctions, while less far-reaching than those imposed by the EU and the US, marking a departure from previous practice. Some of the countries that voted for the UNGA resolution, such as Brazil or Turkey, have however criticised the sanctions imposed on Russia, for different reasons.

Commitment of military aid to Ukraine

Both the EU (from the off-budget European Peace Facility) and the US paired sanctions with commitments of military aid to Ukraine in the form of money and weapons (but, so far, have neither sent combat troops nor made moves to impose a no-fly zone over Ukraine).

Most EU Member States have committed to provide defence aid, including Germany, which prior to the conflict refused to send lethal aid, as well as historically neutral Ireland, Austria, Finland and Sweden (albeit non-lethal aid in the case of the former two). These countries have been joined by non-EU countries such as Australia, Canada, North Macedonia and the UK.

Table 1: International reactions to Russia’s war on Ukraine

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Russia’s war on Ukraine: International reactions‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Martin Russell.

After a period of relative freedom in the 1990s allowed the emergence of civic activism in Russia, repression has now come full circle. Under Vladimir Putin’s power vertical, space for independent voices has narrowed. Like the political opposition and the media, civil society is now increasingly subordinate to the state.

Repressive legislation has gradually circumscribed the activities of non-governmental organisations (NGOs). As part of a more general drive to exclude external influences after a wave of post-election protests in 2011, in 2012 Russia adopted a Foreign Agent Law, whose scope since then has been progressively expanded to include media and individual activists as well as NGOs. A second Undesirable Organisations Law from 2015 excludes numerous international NGOs from the country.

While the Foreign Agent Law does not actually ban Russian NGOs from receiving foreign support, it makes it much harder for them to operate and has forced many to close down. The number of organisations concerned is relatively small, but it includes many of the country’s most prominent activists. Vaguely worded legislation puts large swathes of civil society at risk of falling foul of the law, a significant deterrent to activism.

Repressive legislation has created a divide between officially tolerated ‘social’ NGOs, whose activities and values are more closely aligned with the Kremlin’s agenda, and ‘political’ NGOs. Conditions for the latter have become increasingly hostile, leaving little room for political activism.

Read the complete briefing on ‘‘Foreign agents’ and ‘undesirables’: Russian civil society in danger of extinction?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Micaela del Monte.

The military invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation has pushed hundreds of thousands of people to flee the country and seek shelter in neighbouring countries. With each passing hour, the humanitarian situation is deteriorating both within and outside the country. Several Ukrainian cities have reportedly lost access to water, heating, electricity and basic supplies, while the civilian population is at risk of shelling and violence. While outside Ukraine’s borders, the international humanitarian community has quickly mobilised to provide support, the scale of the situation remains challenging.

Humanitarian situation

As of 8 March 2022, the United Nations Refugee Agency, UNHCR, estimated that more than 1.73 million people have fled from Ukraine to neighbouring countries – mainly to Poland, which alone welcomed around 1 million people, but also to Hungary, Moldova, Romania and Slovakia. Mostly women and children are seeking shelter and protection from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. As the days pass, the conflict is generating casualties, destruction and displacement within and outside Ukraine’s borders, causing one of the largest European humanitarian crises in recent times. The EU has stepped in to help civilians affected by the war in Ukraine, for instance with emergency aid programmes that will cover some basic needs, assistance at the EU borders, and activation of the Temporary Protection Directive (Directive 2001/55/EC). Civil society has shown great solidarity as well, to the point that some argue that this is the ‘biggest show of European mobilisation in recent years’. Nevertheless, the EU institutions recognise that humanitarian needs are expected to be enormous. Even if it is difficult to verify precisely the number of deaths and injured, overall the human costs of the ongoing invasion are already too high. Faced with this humanitarian situation, the Council of Europe has taken action as well. Both Ukraine and Russia have been Council of Europe members, since 1995 and 1996 respectively.

Council of Europe measures

On 21 February 2022, the Council of Europe’s Secretary-General, Marija Pejčinović Burić, strongly condemned the recognition by the Russian Federation, in violation of international law, of the ‘People’s Republics’ of Donetsk and Luhansk. Along the same lines, a few days later, the representatives of the 47 member states of Council of Europe held an extraordinary meeting, urging Russia ‘to immediately and unconditionally cease its military operations in Ukraine’; another extraordinary meeting was convened to examine the possibility of taking appropriate measures, ‘including under Article 8 of the Statute of the Council of Europe‘. The latter provides for the possibility to suspend a Council of Europe member from its right of representation in the event of serious violation of the principles set out in Article 3. The members of the Council of Europe must accept the principles of the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms, and ‘collaborate sincerely and effectively in the realisation of the aim of the Council’. While suspension is a temporary measure, Article 8 also provides the possibility for the Committee of Ministers to decide on the expulsion of a member in the case of non-compliance with this request.

On 25 February 2022, the Council of Europe decided to adopt Article 8 measures and suspended, with immediate effect, the Russian Federation from its rights of representation in the Committee of Ministers and the Parliamentary Assembly. However, as the Council of Europe clarified, Russia remains accountable under the European Convention on Human Rights, and the Russian judge, Mikhail Lobov, remains on the European Court of Human Rights, meaning the Court will still be able to receive complaints from Russian citizens.

This is not the first time the Council of Europe has taken action against Russia. Back in 2014, in the aftermath of the Russian annexation of Crimea, a Council of Europe resolution strongly condemned Russia’s military aggression, the ensuing annexation of Crimea and the violation of fundamental rights. Moreover, it called on Russia to withdraw its troops from Crimea immediately. Because this did not happen, a subsequent resolution suspended, inter alia, the Russian delegation’s voting rights and right to participate in election observation missions. In response, Russia suspended its contribution to the Council of Europe’s budget, causing organisational difficulties to the institution (Russia is one of the five major contributors to the Council of Europe’s budget). Eventually, in 2019, the Council of Europe voted to restore Russia’s voting rights, a decision criticised by some.

European Court of Human Rights

Ukraine and the Russian Federation are state parties to the European Convention on Human Rights, and the Strasbourg-based European Court of Human Rights is the international court competent to rule on individual or state applications alleging violations of the convention. On 28 February 2022, Ukraine introduced a request before the court – application number 11055/22, Ukraine v Russia (X) – asking for interim measures against the Russian Federation. The request referred to ‘massive human-rights violations being committed by the Russian troops in the course of the military aggression against the sovereign territory of Ukraine’. The following day, the court granted these measures according to Rule 39 of the court’s Rules. According to the court’s press release, the decision was taken because the Russian military action against Ukraine gives rise to a real and continuing risk of serious violations of the civilian population’s rights under the European Convention on Human Rights, in particular its Articles 2 (right to life), 3 (prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment) and 8 (right to respect for private and family life).

The European Court of Human Rights also asked Russia to abstain from attacking civilians, schools and hospitals, and to ensure the safety of the medical personnel and buildings within the territory under attack. Moreover, the court recalled that 2014 interim measures in relation to Russian alleged violations of the European Convention on Human Rights in Crimea, in the context of Ukraine and the Netherlands v Russia (case numbers 8019/16, 43800/14 and 28525/20), remain in force. Although it is too early to assess these interim measures’ effectiveness, it has been noted that interim measures have already been used in relation to situations of armed conflict in the past. The scholar argues that, to determine whether a state party has complied with the interim measures, one should assess whether that same party upholds the convention.

Interim measures

Although interim measures are envisaged in the court’s rules, and not in the European Convention on Human Rights, the state parties are obliged to comply with them: Rule 39 provides for the possibility to adopt such measures at the request of a party, any other person concerned, or of the court’s own motion. According to the court’s case law, interim measures are granted only where there is ‘an imminent risk of irreparable harm’, for instance in cases of expulsion and extradition. The court has also granted interim measures in the event of armed conflicts in the context of inter-state cases, when it considers that an armed conflict gives rise to a risk of serious violations of the European Convention on Human Rights.

European Parliament position

In its resolution of 1 March 2022, the European Parliament strongly condemned ‘the Russian Federation’s illegal, unprovoked and unjustified military aggression against and invasion of Ukraine’. The Parliament recalled that ‘attacks against civilians and civilian infrastructure as well as indiscriminate attacks are prohibited under international humanitarian law and therefore constitute war crimes’. It called on the European Commission, the Member States and United Nations humanitarian agencies to provide humanitarian assistance to the civilian population. The Parliament took note of the numerous reports about ‘violations of international humanitarian law committed by Russian troops, including indiscriminate shelling of living areas, hospitals and kindergartens’, and recalled that, since 2014, more than 14 000 people have lost their lives in a ‘conflict fomented by the Russian Federation in eastern Ukraine’.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Russia’s war on Ukraine: Council of Europe and European Court of Human Rights measures‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Karin Jacobs.

International Women’s Day on 8 March 2022 marks an occasion to reflect on the position of women as workers in the EU transport sector. Women only represent on average around 16 % (2020) of total employees in the different transport sectors and modes (land, water and air). In view of growing labour shortages in this important economic sector, worsened by the coronavirus pandemic, this share needs to increase, according to experts.

Context

One of the barriers to greater participation of women as workers in the transport sector is gender stereotyping, i.e. a generalisation about what is considered typically male or female work, for instance truck driving. The transport sector is known for its overall low quality of work and contracts. Working patterns are often unsuited to women’s needs as regards work-life balance and time flexibility. The sector is known for relatively low wages, poor career prospects, and limited training participation of women. Moreover, there is often a lack of appropriate workplace facilities in terms of safety and security, and of adequate tools and procedures to deal with sexual harassment. Women are under-represented in all parts of the transport sector (e.g. piloting, planning, designing, management, research and innovation). A 2021 study done for the European Parliament confirms that employment in the transport sector remains relatively unattractive for women, and recommends appropriate EU policy interventions, including funding, to tackle the problem. As the increasing labour shortages in the EU transport sector have been exacerbated by the pandemic, they call for particular attention. For instance, 2021 data from the International Road Transport Union (IRU) suggest that global driver shortages reached 17 % for bus and coach drivers and 10 % for truck drivers. Another 2021 research paper affirms that the EU lacks 400 000 truck drivers and is now reaching a critical point, whereby this could have an effect on the evolution of transport prices.

Figure 1 shows the differences in women’s employment in the land, water and air sectors of EU transport. While most of the women, in absolute terms, work in land transport (over 770 000), they only account for a 14.6 % share of the entire workforce in that subsector. In comparison, the share of female employment is much higher in air transport, where women represent 42.5 % of the workforce. In water transport, 20 % of workers are women, mainly on ferries and in cruises. In some of these sectors, changes in women’s employment are under way, and one can detect a small increase in the 2020 figures, compared with 2016. Nevertheless, further attention is needed, in particular in land and water transport.

EU action

While policies in the area of employment are the competence of EU Member States, the European Commission can support and complement national action. One of the first initiatives the Commission launched to strengthen women’s employment and equal opportunities in the transport sector was the 2017 ‘More women in transport – EU platform for change’. The platform serves as a forum to discuss and exchange relevant measures and best practice, and promotes women in transport professions by raising awareness on equality issues. In parallel, the Commission proposed new rules on work-life balance and flexible working arrangements to encourage a better division of caring responsibilities between women and men; now adopted, Directive 2019/1158/EU will apply from August 2022 to all workers who are parents or carers. In its 2020 gender equality strategy, the Commission affirmed that a gender equality perspective would have to be integrated into all EU policies as well as into EU funding programmes. Its sustainable and smart mobility strategy outlined the new opportunities linked to the transport sector’s digital transformation, including an improved working environment and better-quality jobs that could become more attractive for women. The Commission also promised to issue recommendations for the transition to automation and digitalisation, to mitigate their impact on the entire transport workforce, apply equality mainstreaming to its future transport-related policy initiatives, and continue to support stakeholder cooperation and exchange of good practice. Reacting to repeated calls from the European Parliament and the Council, in March 2021 the Commission proposed a directive on equal pay for equal work and on pay transparency (building on Directive 2006/54/EC), still to be negotiated by Parliament and Council.

European Parliament position

In a 2015 resolution, the Parliament called on the Commission to revise the recast Directive 2006/54/EC in line with its recommendations on equal pay and representation of female workers. This was followed in subsequent years by frequent parliamentary questions from various political groups. In its 2019 resolution on women’s rights and gender equality in the EU, the Parliament called inter alia for ‘real action’ to close the gender pay gap, and for targeted initiatives to address gender segregation and women’s access to labour markets. In another 2019 resolution, on the proposed directive on work-life balance for parents and carers, the Parliament insisted on requirements for equal treatment of men and women at work, which ensures guaranteed income and flexible working arrangements, and addressed the issue of stereotyping. More specific to the transport sector, during the negotiations leading up to the 2020 regulation on driving and resting periods, the Parliament insisted on the importance of having gender-friendly accommodation and better sanitary facilities at resting places. In 2020 and 2021, the Parliament also held the European Gender Equality Week, which contributed to the goal of women’s empowerment and gender equality. This has led to more visibility to and recognition of gender mainstreaming in all policy areas, including transport.

Earlier in 2022, the Parliament’s Committees on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality (FEMM) and on Transport and Tourism (TRAN) held a joint hearing on ‘Ensuring that European transportation works for women’, debating the outcomes of the study on women and transport mentioned above. Labour market participation of women is among the topics explored by the study, which points to the current lack of gender-disaggregated data within Member States. It recommends improving the share of women working in the transport sector by promoting higher social standards at EU level and measures targeting a better work-life balance, as well as dedicated education and training. Furthermore, it suggests that EU funding be regularly monitored for gender achievements – something that is already done, for instance in connection with the European Social Fund (ESF+). A further Parliament-requested study from 2021, on relaunching transport and tourism after the pandemic, mentions, specifically in relation to transport workers, the possibility to attract more female truck drivers by promoting higher social standards, safe and secure truck parking places, better resting places, and improved work-life balance measures.

Looking ahead

In recent years, there has been growing attention within the EU to the issue of gender equality, including as regards women in the transport sector. This trend has been reflected in EU strategies both of a sectoral and horizontal nature, and increasingly also in EU legislation. For its part, the European Parliament has contributed to keeping this topic high up on the EU political agenda.

The increased focus on gender issues in employment is starting to have an impact on the transport sector, which faces growing labour shortages and seeks ways to attract more younger workers as well as women to the workforce. Streamlining gender issues systematically – both in further EU action and funding – is expected to attract more women to work in this important economic sector.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Women in Transport‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Figure 1: Number and share of women employed in transport out of total employment, by transport modality, in the EU-27

Written by Rosamund Shreeves.

This year’s International Women’s Day takes place under the dual shadow of the Covid-19 pandemic and the unfolding crisis of Russia’s re-invasion of Ukraine. Both have spotlighted women’s grit and determination and their contributions to society, not least the true value of their care and emotional work. They also highlight the absolute necessity of adopting responses that are gender-sensitive and shaped with women’s participation.

A gender-sensitive humanitarian response to the Ukraine crisis

Two weeks ago, women in Ukraine were simply living their lives, studying, innovating, sitting in parliament, participating in local government, civil society, and the arts. They were already dealing with ‘ordinary’ barriers to gender equality, the impacts of eight years of conflict in the east of the country and the gendered social and economic consequences of the Covid-19 pandemic. Many were on the frontline of the health crisis. Today, many more are on the frontline of a war zone, giving birth in bomb shelters and basements, taking up arms, reporting at considerable risk to their lives, and fleeing their homes to bring their children and families to safety. Many have faced or will face multiple internal displacements inside Ukraine, while women and children make up the overwhelming majority of the refugees crossing into neighbouring countries.

Aside from the horrific consequences of attacks on civilian populations, the human rights of women and girls are at heightened risk during conflict. There is also evidence that including women in conflict resolution helps to ensure that their specific situations and needs are taken into account and to achieve more sustainable outcomes. In the current situation, the international community is highlighting the urgent need to safeguard access to medical care for pregnant women, provide safe and regular pathways to safety for all women and girls, irrespective of their nationality, ethnicity and religion, and ensure meaningful participation of women in negotiations, in line with UN resolution 1325 on women, peace and security. While welcoming the outpouring of support from private individuals, associations working on the ground are calling for coordinated action to register and accompany women and girls, and for sexual, reproductive and maternal health services and services to prevent and respond to gender-based violence to be set up in Ukraine and along the refugee routes. They also stress the need for statistics on the gender, age and disability status of refugees to inform responses. At the EU level, measures adopted so far to help those fleeing Russian aggression, include guidelines on simplifying border controls for vulnerable groups and immediate temporary protection in the EU, with rights to a residence permit, the possibility to work, housing, and access to social welfare, medical assistance and education.

A gender-sensitive recovery from the Covid-19 pandemic

If this were a ‘normal’ International Women’s Day, Irpin and the other municipalities and cities across Ukraine that are signatories to the European Charter for Equality of Women and Men in Local Life, would have been free to focus on rebuilding after the pandemic like their counterparts in the rest of Europe. Research by the EU agencies for gender equality (EIGE) and working and living conditions (Eurofound) shows that the Covid-19 crisis is having negative impacts on women’s employment, caring responsibilities, work-life balance and mental wellbeing. Unlike the financial crisis of 2008-2010, there have been high job losses in female-dominated service sectors responsible for much of the recent growth in women’s employment, as well as in the male-dominated sectors typically hit by recessions. Job losses and furloughing have been especially high among low-paid women workers. In addition, the Covid-19 crisis has had an unprecedented impact on unpaid work. Over the successive pandemic waves, closures of schools, nurseries, and day-care facilities for disabled and elderly people have shifted responsibility for care back to families. While men have taken on part of the additional unpaid work, women have shouldered the lion’s share, particular in the later stages of the pandemic. EIGE and the OECD find a connection between this increase, particularly for mothers, and the fact that women have been more likely than men to drop out of the labour market. This is echoed by the results of a special Eurobarometer survey on women and Covid-19 commissioned by the European Parliament to mark International Women’s Day. Of the 26 741 women across the EU who took part, a quarter (25 %) say that the increase in work at home meant that they were not able to do as much paid work as they wanted to, while 21 % say that they have decided to permanently reduce the amount of time they allocate to paid work. An even higher share say that the Covid-19 crisis has had an impact on their work-life balance (44 %) and that restrictions have significantly affected their mental health (41 %).

The extent of the negative impact of the Covid-19 crisis on the social and economic situation of women has triggered a debate on the urgent need to take a gender-sensitive approach in recovery policies. In this context, the establishment of the EU’s biggest financial instrument supporting recovery in the Member States – the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) – is an opportunity to channel the extraordinary resources to the measures that contribute to advancing gender equality. It is also a chance to put into practice the EU’s long-standing commitments regarding the need to mainstream gender across different policies and apply gender budgeting principles to EU spending, to ensure that women and men benefit equally from investment. Economists have demonstrated that switching recovery investment from the traditional focus on construction and manufacturing to the care sector would create more jobs for both women and men, and provide a better economic stimulus. A study for the European Parliament recommends that at least 30 % of the EU funding provided through the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) should go to investment in the care economy, to put it on an even footing with the allocations of 37 % and 30 % for the green and digital transitions. In line with the RRF Regulation, all the national recovery and resilience plans adopted to date declare gender equality to be a horizontal objective, to be given consideration in all measures. However, not all Member States have included dedicated reforms or investments explicitly addressing gender-related challenges, or indicating women as the main beneficiaries.

Position of the European Parliament

In its resolution of 1 March 2022 on the Russian aggression against Ukraine, the European Parliament called for special emphasis on the needs of women and children in humanitarian responses, including evacuations to safety. Its Committee for Women’s Rights and Gender Equality has modified the agenda of its event for International Women’s Day to address the situation in Ukraine, alongside the initial focus on exploring ambitious recovery policies. Parliament’s resolution on the gender perspective in the Covid‑19 crisis and post-crisis period addresses the harmful gendered and intersectional impacts of the pandemic and sets out recommendations for overcoming them. Parliament is clear that current and future challenges will require ‘a gender-sensitive approach, with gender mainstreaming and gender budgeting principles reflected in all aspects of the pandemic response’. It is also calling for gender-responsive use of recovery funding, including investment in the care sector.

Related EPRS publications for International Women’s Day

• Russia’s war on Ukraine: Assisting Ukrainians at the EU’s borders, EPRS At a glance briefing, 4 March 2022
• Women in foreign affairs and international security: Still far from gender equality, EPRS briefing, March 2021
• Beyond the pandemic: The potential of ambitious gender equality policy, EPRS At a glance briefing, March 2022 (available in 24 languages)
• Maternity and paternity leave in the EU, EPRS infographic, March 2022
• Equal pay for equal work between men and women: Pay transparency and enforcement mechanisms, EPRS legislative briefing, March 2022
• Topical digest: gender equality, February 2022 (links to EPRS publications on gender equality, including the gender dimensions of the Covid-19 crisis, the recovery and resilience facility and migration and asylum)

Related EPRS multimedia

• Video: Gender equality in the Recovery and Resilience Facility
• Video: Equal pay for equal work between men and women
• Video: Covid-19 increases women’s unpaid care work

Written by Claudia Vinci.

Up until Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the EU and Russia were important trade partners trading in a wide variety of goods, including agri-food products. Russia was the fifth largest importer of EU goods in 2020, despite the disruption of trade relations caused by the first Ukraine crisis in 2014. Furthermore, Russia is a major global exporter of several commodities, including sunflower oil, wheat and barley.

Background

The Russian Federation is one of the EU’s main trading partners, with the total volume of trade estimated at €173.7 billion in 2020 (Figure 1). Russia was the fifth importer of EU goods in 2020, while the EU is the first supplier to the Russian market, providing machinery and transport equipment, chemicals, manufactured goods, and agricultural products and raw materials, for a total value of €79 billion. Russia’s exports to the EU were led by fuel and mining products, agricultural products and raw materials, chemicals, and iron and steel, totalling almost €95 billion.

Figure 1 – EU trade in goods with the world and Russia (2020)

The 1997 bilateral partnership and cooperation agreement (PCA) is the general framework for EU-Russia trade relations. Negotiations for a new EU-Russia agreement, initiated in 2008, were suspended in 2014 owing to the first Ukraine crisis. In 2012, Russia joined the World Trade Organization (WTO), and EU-Russia trade relations have since been defined by the multilateral WTO rules. Since Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in March 2014, the EU has progressively imposed restrictive measures towards Russia; these led in the same year, as retaliation, to a Russian ban on selected agricultural products from the EU and some third countries, namely Australia, Canada, Norway and the United States. Although overall EU trade with Russia has continued, and even increased, from 2017 onwards, trade flows in agri-food products have decreased, as shown in Figure 2. On 24 February 2022, Russia launched an unprovoked attack on Ukraine, followed by a full-scale invasion. EU countries have since adopted unprecedentedly tough sanctions.

Figure 2 – EU trade with Russia: Agricultural products (2020) Agri-food trade figures

Trade with the Russian Federation represents 3.7 % of overall EU exports in agri-food products, and 1.4 % of overall agri-food imports. The main products imported from Russia, in terms of overall value, are residues and waste from the food industries, including oilcakes and feed components (32.3 %), oilseeds (19.1 %), animal or vegetable fats and oils (9.9 %), beverages (7.0 %), cereals (6.5 %), and other products (25.2 %). Concerning exports from the EU to Russia, the main categories are beverages (21.2 %), edible preparations (9.3 %), residues and waste from the food industries (8.0 %), oilseeds (7.4 %), live trees and other plants (7.3 %), cocoa (7.3 %), and other products (39.5 %).

Figure 3 – EU trade with Russia: Agricultural trade by product (2020)

In terms of categories of products for which a significant part of EU agri-food trade is linked to Russia (see Figure 3, share of dependency), figures show that almost 19 % of ‘other feed and feed ingredients’ imported to the EU come from Russia, as well as almost 8 % of sugar (other than beet and cane), and slightly more than 6 % of imported wheat. As for EU exports, more than half of total EU exports of soya beans are exported to Russia, as are more than 20 % of total EU exports of cocoa beans, oilseeds, eggs and honey, and cut flowers and plants. With regard to agri-food global exports, Russia is a major producer and exporter of sunflower oil (28.6 % of global exports), wheat (18 %), barley (15.4 %), and corn (2.3 %).

The impact of the Russia-Ukraine war in agri-food markets is still being evaluated; judging from both countries’ share in main agri-food commodities and fertilisers, it is expected to be considerable.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘EU-Russia trade in agri-food products‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Jakub Przetacznik with Linda Tothova.

Although Russia’s invasion of Ukraine began on 24 February 2022, it was preceded by long and repetitive military build-ups at the border, as well as by joint Russian-Belarusian military exercises on Belarusian territory. While Ukraine defends its territory with a much more motivated army, it is nevertheless smaller than and not as well equipped as the Russian forces. Military aid is being provided by EU Member States and other like-minded countries, including the United States, Canada and United Kingdom.

The attack

Russian forces entered Ukraine mainly around the country’s borders with Russia and Crimea, while Kyiv was attacked via Belarusian territory. The offensive has been much slower than Russia initially appeared to expect. As of 20:00 CET on 3 March 2022, Russia had taken control of land along the northern and south-eastern Ukrainian border with Russia, as well border regions north-west of Crimea. Russia has occupied only one regional capital to date (Kherson, 290 000 inhabitants). Russia also bombed cities including Kyiv, Kharkiv, Chernihiv and the Azov Sea city of Mariupol, which is reportedly ‘near to humanitarian catastrophe’.

The invasion is a flagrant violation of United Nations Charter Article 2 (4) prohibiting ‘use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state’. Ukraine, which is not a member of any military alliance, defends itself in accordance with UN Charter Article 51 establishing an inherent right to individual or collective self-defence in case of an armed attack against a UN member.

Balance of power Ukraine and Russia: Armed forces (2021)

With 900 000 troops, the Russian armed forces are over four times greater in number than the Ukrainian forces, which consisted of 196 000 troops in 2021. The Russian army can deploy 280 000 troops, with other armed forces, such as the navy, or the 180 000-strong command and support structures, being limited in scope for use in the war on Ukraine. It is estimated that there are currently 150 000 Russian soldiers present in Ukraine, while around 20 000 remain ready in reserve. Crucially, however, the Russian army is better equipped. Prior to the invasion, Russia disposed of 15 857 armoured combat vehicles, in comparison to Ukraine’s 3 309 – almost five times more, as well as over ten times the number of aircraft (1 391) compared with the Ukrainians (132). In January 2022, Ukraine reorganised its Territorial Defence Forces (TDF) with a new reserve force, which in mid-February 2022 were reportedly aiming at reaching 1.5‑2 million members. The actual number of TDF soldiers is unknown. In stark contrast to questions regarding the morale of the Russian army, the Ukrainian forces are highly motivated.

Cyber aspects
In the weeks preceding the war, Russia attacked Ukrainian websites in the context of its hybrid war on the country. In the past, cyber-attacks have cut off electricity networks in Kyiv. However, such attacks are not currently being seen, leading to speculation, with possible explanations ranging from Ukrainians protecting their information technology (IT) network, to possible use of Ukrainian IT infrastructure by Russian military forces. However, cyber-attack remains possible. At the same time, Ukraine has so far been able to communicate effectively with the world to provide information about the situation in the country. Ukraine is mobilising its compatriots to attack Russian websites related to the Kremlin-through the ‘Ukraine IT Army’, while other independent groups (including Anonymous and Cyber Partisans), have declared responsibility for attacks against Russia’s banks, state media and a Belarusian railway network used to move troops from Russia to Ukraine.

Russia’s military expenditure is traditionally high, equalling US$62.2 billion in 2021 – over 14 times greater than Ukraine’s US$4.3 billion. Following Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014, Russian military expenditure reached as much as 5.4 % of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2016, and has fallen below 4 % of GDP only twice. Ukraine, with its smaller economy, decided to invest its resources more peacefully, with military expenditure averaging 3.2 % of GDP in 2014‑2020, although still well above EU levels.

NATO response

A meeting of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Heads of State and Government issued a statement on Russia’s attack on Ukraine on 25 February 2022, expressing solidarity with the Ukrainian people and their democratically elected institutions, and condemning Russia’s full-scale invasion, described as a ‘terrible strategic mistake, for which Russia will pay a severe price, both economically and politically, for years to come’. As invasion has consequences for NATO’s deterrence and defence posture, consultations under Article 4 of the NATO Treaty have taken place, and defensive land and air forces in eastern NATO countries, as well as maritime assets across the NATO area, have been deployed. The commitment to collective defence under Article 5 of the NATO Treaty has been reconfirmed. The NATO Secretary General invited Finland, Sweden and the EU to join the meeting.

During a 24 February 2022 press briefing, US President Joe Biden stressed that there will not be a direct military confrontation between the USA and Russian forces. However, if the conflict extends to the Euro-Atlantic area, the USA ‘will defend every inch of NATO territory’ and meet its Article 5 commitments. The statement was followed by deployment of additional US troops to European NATO states.

EU response

The European Council immediately condemned ‘the Russian Federation’s unprovoked and unjustified military aggression against Ukraine’, calling for an immediate ceasefire and withdrawal of Russian forces. This was followed by a series of EU sanctions. Among the financial assistance to Ukraine, the Council approved two decisions providing Ukraine with €500 million for military aid and equipment. In a historic move, the EU will provide €450 million (CFSP 2022/338), to be financed by the European Peace Facility, for military equipment designed to deliver lethal force. A further €50 million (CFSP 2022/339) is for equipment and supplies not designed to deliver lethal force, such as personal protective equipment, first aid kits and fuel. A majority of EU Member States are delivering weapons or military aid in some form to Ukraine.

European Parliament position

In its resolution of 1 March 2022, the Parliament condemned Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine and demanded that Russia cease all military activities and withdraw from the country. The Parliament called on EU Member States to accelerate provision of defensive weapons for Ukraine. The Parliament also supported increased EU-Ukraine intelligence cooperation regarding the ongoing war and called for the EU institutions to work towards granting Ukraine EU candidate country status. However, mutual defence and solidarity clauses in the EU Treaties only apply to Member States.

Article 42(7) TEU (Mutual defence clause) obliges EU Member States to aid and assist ‘by all means in their power’ a Member State that has become a ‘victim of armed aggression on its territory’. Article 222 TFEU (Solidarity clause) stipulates that EU members ‘shall act jointly’ upon request by the relevant state authorities, if another Member State suffers a terrorist attack, natural or man-made disaster.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Russia’s war on Ukraine: Military balance of power‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Sidonia Mazur.

While Ukraine has received considerable support from the EU and European financial institutions since 2014, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, launched on 24 February 2022, has triggered a historic and twofold mobilisation of EU funds – for humanitarian action and military support. The European Commission has announced over €500 million in financing for humanitarian aid and the Council has decided to use the off-budget European Peace Facility (EPF) to assist Ukraine with €500 million in military aid. For the first time, the EU will direct its funds, €450 million, towards purchasing lethal weapons for a country at war, through the EPF. Should this funding prove insufficient, however, further mobilisation of the EU budget might be necessary. In its 1 March 2022 resolution, the European Parliament announced that it expects the EU and EU Member States ‘to activate any EU budget instruments available’.

State of play

Ukraine has developed a strong partnership with the European Union since 2014, including the signing and implementation of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement. The EU has assisted Ukraine financially, with EU and European financial institutions allocating over €17 billion in grants and loans to Ukraine to support the implementation of a broad reform agenda. This includes €5.6 billion via five macro financial assistance programmes. The EU has allocated more than €193 million in humanitarian aid to Ukraine since 2014, to assist victims of the armed conflict in the east of Ukraine. The EU has also provided grants worth €200 million to help Ukraine fight the Covid‑19 pandemic.

The Russian military invasion of Ukraine has aggravated the existing humanitarian crisis in the east of Ukraine and triggered a new catastrophe. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, over 1 million refugees have already fled Ukraine to neighbouring countries, mainly Poland, Hungary, Moldova, Slovakia, Romania and Russia. The European Commission estimates that up to 6.5 million people might be displaced, leading as many as 3.5 million to seek international protection, mainly in the EU. Many more millions will face extreme conditions while remaining in Ukraine.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has caused a paradigm shift in the EU’s approach to financing lethal military equipment. For the first time, the EU will purchase lethal weapons. The financial tool enabling this acquisition is the new European Peace Facility.

Since the beginning of 2022, the military threat to Ukraine has weighed heavily on investor confidence, causing a steady outflow of capital that has endangered Ukraine’s economic and financial stability.

EU response Humanitarian assistance

As the humanitarian situation in Ukraine deteriorates, the European Commission is providing emergency assistance. On 28 February 2022, the Commission announced €90 million for emergency aid programmes to help civilians in Ukraine and those displaced to Moldova. This EU humanitarian aid will provide food, water, health, shelter and help cover people’s basic needs.

The EU Civil Protection Mechanism has been activated, with offers from Member States including essential medical care items and civil protection support.

On 1 March 2022, the European Commission announced an additional €500 million from the EU budget for humanitarian aid in Ukraine and for refugees from Ukraine. It should be noted that the entire EU budget allocation for humanitarian aid worldwide for 2022 is slightly over €2 billion.

Military assistance

Under Article 41(2) TEU, the EU budget cannot be used to finance expenditure having military or defence implications, meaning common foreign and security policy (CFSP) operations outside the EU. However, Article 41(2) TEU also provides that such expenditure can be charged to the Member States. The novel European Peace Facility (EPF), created in 2021, is a financial tool outside the EU budget, financed by EU Member States based on a distribution key linked to gross national income. Using the EPF enables the EU to provide the armed forces of partner countries with infrastructure and equipment, including weapons. On 28 February 2022, the Council published its decision ((CFSP) 2022/338) on an assistance measure under the EPF for the supply of military equipment and platforms designed to deliver lethal force to the Ukrainian Armed Forces. The amount decided is €450 million for lethal arms and lethal assistance. It should be noted that the total budget for the EPF for 2022 is €540 million. This constitutes a paradigm shift, as the European Union is financing the acquisition of arms for the first time. Austria, Ireland and Malta are not participating in this measure.

At the same time the Council adopted a decision (CFSP) 2022/339 on an assistance measure under the EPF to provide the Ukrainian Armed Forces with €50 million in support. The measure shall finance the provision of equipment and supplies not designed to deliver lethal force, such as personal protective equipment, first aid kits and fuel. All EU Member States will participate.

European Parliament response

The European Parliament strongly condemns the Russian Federation’s aggression and invasion of Ukraine. In its resolution of 1 March 2022, the Parliament called ‘for the EU and its Member States to continue providing the strongest possible economic and financial support to Ukraine, as well as macro-financial and technical assistance wherever needed, including in defence- and security-related areas, to activate any EU budget instruments available and to develop a long-term strategy to support Ukraine’s efforts in strengthening the resilience of its democratic institutions and economy’. Moreover Parliament called for ‘the EU institutions to work towards granting EU candidate status to Ukraine, in line with Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union and on the basis of merit, and, in the meantime, to continue to work towards its integration into the EU single market along the lines of the Association Agreement’.

On 16 February, the European Parliament approved a €1.2 billion macro-financial loan to help Ukraine cover its external financing needs in 2022. Even before the 24 February Russian invasion, Ukraine faced significant economic challenges, which will worsen even further under the current circumstances. The loan is expected to be paid out to Ukraine during the next 12 months, in two tranches, the first being due in March 2022.

Possible further developments

The EU is equipped with a plethora of programmes aimed at supporting EU external action. These programmes are financed mainly by the EU budget. As the situation in Ukraine evolves, different elements of this system can be mobilised. The same applies to the financing of the needs relating to facilitating the welcome for refugees from Ukraine in the EU.

If the financing needs related to supporting Ukraine and those fleeing the invasion go beyond the multiannual financial framework 2020-2027 (MFF) agreement, there might be a need to use flexibility or even revise the MFF spending ceilings. This is a political and budgetary process that would need to involve both the Council and the European Parliament.

(The figures used in this briefing reflect the situation as of 3 March 2022 at 18:00 CET.)

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Russia’s war on Ukraine: EU budget response‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Carla Stamegna and Lasse Boehm.

As a system for standardised payment instructions and messaging services, SWIFT has become the basis for most global financial transactions. On 2 March 2022, the Council decided to cut seven Russian banks from the SWIFT network, as part of a wider sanctions package, including sanctions against Russia’s central bank.

State of play

The Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) is a global provider of secure financial messaging services, linking more than 11 000 banks worldwide. A co-operative society under Belgian law, it is owned by its members and headquartered in La Hulpe, Belgium. Formed in 1973, SWIFT has replaced the Telex technology then widely used by banks to communicate instructions relating to cross-border money and security transfers.

In 2021, SWIFT’s FIN messaging service recorded an average of 42 million messages per day, making it the backbone of the world’s financial infrastructure. Through SWIFT’s standardised messages, banks, custodians, investment institutions, central banks, market infrastructures and corporate clients can connect with one another to make payments or settle trades. SWIFT thereby sets the standard mandatory and optional data elements for payments, such as the business identifier code, known as a ‘BIC’ or ‘SWIFT code’.

Russia has developed its own SWIFT-type ‘Financial Messaging System of the Bank of Russia’ (SPFS). In operation since 2014, it has around 400 users and operates within Russia. Russia could also use other financial messaging systems, which nevertheless do not match SWIFT in market reach. One example is the Chinese ‘Cross-Border Interbank Payment System’ (CIPS), set-up in 2015, under the supervision of the People’s Bank of China.

EU response

Parliament had already called for the EU to consider ‘the exclusion of Russia from the SWIFT payment system’ to deter Russian authorities from further aggression, in its recommendation to the Council of 16 September 2021. On 2 March 2022, the Council of the European Union decided to prohibit the provision of SWIFT services to seven Russian banks: Bank Otkritie, Novikombank, Promsvyazbank, Rossiya Bank, Sovcombank, VNESHECONOMBANK (VEB), and VTB BANK. This will take effect from 12 March 2022. The prohibition will also apply to any legal person, entity or body established in Russia whose proprietary rights are more than 50 % directly or indirectly owned by these banks.

Sberbank, Russia’s largest lender and Gazprombank were not included in the list of sanctioned banks, as both banks are the main counterparts for payments for Russian oil and gas. However, Sberbank was ordered to close its European arm by the European Central Bank (ECB), which assessed that the bank is likely to fail.

Other sanctions against Russia’s financial sector, taken on 2 March 2022, include:

• prohibition of investment or participation in projects co-financed by the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF), the Russian sovereign wealth fund established in 2011;
• a ban on the sale, supply, transfer or export of euro denominated banknotes to Russia or to any natural or legal person, entity or body in Russia, including the government and the Central Bank of Russia, or for use in Russia.

The Council had already decided on sanctions against Russia’s central bank on 28 February 2022. These include the prohibition of all transactions related to the management of reserves or assets of the Central Bank of Russia. These sanctions will prevent Russia’s central bank from accessing a significant part of its reserves denominated in euros and dollars. The EU has also imposed further sanctions targeting individuals and economic sectors.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Russia’s war on Ukraine: Cutting certain Russian banks off from SWIFT‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clare Ferguson.

Following Parliament’s extraordinary plenary session on Ukraine on 1 March 2022, Members return to Strasbourg for the March plenary session, with a number of related issues on the agenda, including a debate with the Prime Minister of Estonia, Kaja Kallas on the security situation, scheduled for Wednesday. In the meantime, the EU has pressed ahead with new sanctions and certain banks are now cut from SWIFT. The EU is also moving fast to counter the implications for energy and agricultural trade. Parliament is due to hear Council and Commission statements on the deterioration of the refugee situation as a consequence of the uneven military balance of power in the Russian aggression against Ukraine. Parliament expects that all measures will be underpinned by a robust EU budgetary response.

The European Parliament resolution on the Russian aggression against Ukraine called for an end to ‘golden visas’ for wealthy Russians. The invasion has highlighted the problematic consequences of issuing ‘golden visas’ (residence in return for investment) or ‘golden passports’ (nationality in return for financial investment). However, a considerable number of EU countries offer these schemes to those (estimated at over 132 000 people between 2011 and 2019) who are wealthy enough to pay. While investment received is estimated at €21.4 billion, the schemes bear obvious risks to sincere cooperation between EU countries, and commodify EU rights, as well as posing security, corruption, money laundering, and tax avoidance risks. Parliament has expressed concern regarding these schemes since 2014, and Members return to the issue on Monday evening when they are expected to consider a legislative-initiative report from the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE). The committee demands that the Commission come up with proposals to phase out citizenship by investment schemes completely, and propose new laws to harmonise and govern the rules on residence by investment schemes.

Parliament has also long criticised countries who attempt to influence elections and other democratic processes in EU countries. Russia and China are among best-known sources of foreign interference, but over 80 countries spread disinformation online. In a debate scheduled for Tuesday morning, Members will hear the conclusions of a report on external attempts to influence elections and other democratic processes in EU countries from Parliament’s Special Committee on Foreign Interference (INGE). The committee’s report summarises the EU’s main vulnerabilities to foreign interference, witnessed in several recent elections, and recommends a comprehensive EU strategy to develop resilience. Greater awareness of the problem should be encouraged through media literacy, by closing loopholes that allow foreign financing of political parties, and through stronger sanctions for foreign actors who interfere with our democracies.

A political, economic, social and cultural life, where freedom of expression and of association are respected, is one guarantee of a resilient civic society. Parliament is concerned that the EU civic space has deteriorated, particularly since the pandemic, with some governments hindering civil society organisations’ participation in democratic life. On Monday, Members are expected to debate a LIBE committee own-initiative report, advocating new measures, including a specific EU strategy, to protect and boost civil society organisations in the EU. The report underlines that the strategy should align with EU action in other fields, including on racism. Members are then scheduled to consider a Culture and Education Committee own-initiative report on the role of culture, education, media and sport in the fight against racism. Considering the 2020 EU action plan on racism, the committee underlines the action still needed to combat stereotypes, develop inclusive education, raise awareness of the history of racism and ensure fair representation of ethnic minorities in the media. The committee insists that adequate resources be made available to ensure that the ambitions can be realised, and calls for the Commission to act on discrimination in sport. The committee also urges EU countries to take effective measures to prevent the media from spreading hate speech and false narratives about particular ethnic groups.

The world celebrates international women’s day on 8 March, and Ukrainian writer Oksana Zaboujko is due to address Parliament on Tuesday lunchtime. Fittingly – given the consequences of war for women – Parliament is then scheduled to debate elements driving gender parity in EU external policy. Members are scheduled to consider a report prepared by the Women’s Rights and Gender Equality (FEMM) and the Development (DEVE) Committees, on the third EU gender action plan, which seeks to mainstream gender equality in external policy. The report welcomes integration of the EU action plan on women, peace and security into GAP III, as well as the inclusion of climate change considerations, among other things. However, regretting the Council’s failure to endorse GAP III, it also criticises the omission of issues including women’s access to natural resources; sexual exploitation and violence; and the inclusion of women in mediation processes. Finally, it calls for more EU action to counter the effects of the pandemic on women, and greater focus on gender equality in trade and investment policy.

On Wednesday afternoon, Members turn to the EU’s climate ambitions and the eighth environment action programme – the framework for EU environmental policy to 2030. Parliament is expected to vote on a draft agreement reached between the co-legislators, setting the priorities for EU objectives targeting a sustainable economy. While the aim is to ensure that environmental measures do not perpetuate social and gender inequalities, and to phase out fossil fuel and other harmful subsidies, the agreement does not set the specific 2025 and 2027 deadlines requested by Parliament. A key issue in attaining climate goals and energy independence is coping with uneven wind and solar power generation. Here, Parliament supports the introduction of a legislative framework to ensure that the batteries we turn to in support of renewable energy are themselves sustainable. Members are also scheduled to consider Parliament’s position at first reading on Wednesday afternoon, on European Commission proposals for a regulation concerning batteries and waste batteries. The Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI) Committee’s report calls for higher ambition, with a wider scope to include e-bike and other light transport batteries, and greater diligence throughout the battery lifecycle, from manufacture to recycling. The vote in plenary should set Parliament’s negotiating position and open the way for interinstitutional negotiations to begin.

Finally, Members return to the subject of agricultural statistics on Tuesday afternoon, to consider adoption at first reading of the agreed text on the proposed overhaul of the regulation on economic accounts for agriculture, formalising regional agricultural data reporting. During the negotiations, Parliament’s Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development (AGRI) underlined the need to ensure cost efficient data collection and avoid redundancy in data reporting.

Written by Costica Dumbrava.

Russia’s military invasion of Ukraine has already pushed over a million people to seek refuge in neighbouring countries. The EU and its Member States have strongly condemned the aggression and mobilised to aid Ukraine. The EU has also adopted measures to help people, mostly women and children, fleeing Russian aggression, while ensuring proper management of the EU’s external borders. These measures include a proposal to grant EU-wide temporary protection to people arriving from Ukraine, guidelines to assist border guards carrying out checks at the EU-Ukraine borders, and support from specialised EU agencies.

Situation at the EU borders with Ukraine

As of 3 March 2022, the United Nations refugee agency, UNHCR, estimated that about 1 million people had fled Ukraine to neighbouring countries, mainly Poland, Hungary, Moldova, Slovakia and Romania. The European Commission estimates that up to 6.5 million persons may be displaced by the conflict, leading to as many as 3.5 million people seeking international protection in the EU in the next two years. With 4 million people expected to seek protection in neighbouring countries and further 12 million people inside Ukraine in need of relief and protection, this is rapidly unfolding into a major humanitarian crisis.

EU response

The EU and its Member States have strongly condemned the ‘unprovoked and unjustified military aggression against Ukraine’ and swiftly agreed on sanctions against the Russian Federation. They also stepped-up assistance to Ukraine and increased humanitarian aid to refugees in Moldova (in cooperation with UN humanitarian agencies). On 24 February 2022, the European Council called for progress on preparedness and readiness at all levels and invited the Commission to put forward contingency measures. On 27 February, the Presidency of the Council decided to activate fully the EU integrated political crisis response arrangements for monitoring and operational coordination.

Temporary protection for people fleeing Ukraine

As requested by the Council, on 2 March 2022, the Commission proposed to activate the application of the Temporary Protection Directive (Directive 2001/55/EC) to grant immediate temporary protection in the EU to people fleeing the war in Ukraine. This will allow displaced persons to enjoy harmonised rights across the EU, including a resident permit, the possibility to work, housing, and access to social welfare, medical assistance and means of subsistence. Temporary protection does not equal refugee status, but it will not prevent the people concerned from applying for international protection. The measures will also allow Member States to manage the influx of people efficiently, coordinate with the other Member States (through the EU Migration Preparedness and Crisis Management Mechanism Network), and reduce the immediate impact on their asylum systems.

The Temporary Protection Directive enables Member States to provide protection and rights to people in need of immediate protection (for two years maximum). The Council can establish the existence of a mass influx of displaced persons by Council decision, adopted by a qualified majority, upon a proposal from the Commission. The European Parliament must be informed of the decision. Although the directive was invoked several times in the past (e.g., in 2011 and 2015), it has never been activated. Under the new pact on migration and asylum, the Commission proposed to replace the Temporary Protection Directive with a regulation addressing broader situations of force majeure in the field of migration and asylum. The proposal has yet to be adopted. Management of EU external borders

As beneficiaries of EU visa-free travel, Ukrainian nationals can enter and stay in the EU for 90 days without a visa. On 2 March, the Commission put forward operational guidelines on external border management at EU-Ukraine borders, to help Member States’ border guards to manage arrivals efficiently and assist people in need, whilst maintaining a high level of security checks. The guidelines clarify the facilitation available to border guards under the Schengen Borders Code, in particular:

• simplification of border controls for certain categories of persons (e.g., vulnerable persons);
• the possibility to organise border controls outside border crossing points;
• special derogation from the fulfilment of entry conditions based on humanitarian grounds;
• special arrangements for rescue services, police, fire brigades, border guards and seafarers to cross the borders, regardless of their nationality;
• the establishment of emergency support lanes to ensure access and return of organisations providing humanitarian aid for people in Ukraine.

The Commission emphasised that this facilitation at the external borders should not come at the expense of Member States’ internal security and public policy. For example, whereas Member States may suspend the application of entry bans (alerts in the Schengen Information System) based on migratory grounds, they should not disregard entry bans issued on the basis of security reasons.

The Schengen Borders Code allows border guards to temporarily relax border checks at external borders ‘as a result of exceptional and unforeseen circumstances’ (Article 9). Member States can authorise non-EU nationals to enter their territory on humanitarian grounds (Article 6(5)(c)), even if they do not fulfil all entry conditions (e.g. people unable to present a valid passport or visa). They can also decide to perform border checks during or after the transport of the travellers to a safe location, and not at the border crossing point. Support from EU agencies

As emphasised by the Commission’s border guidelines, Member States can benefit from European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) support, including through the deployment of standing corps to assist with border checks (e.g. registration in Eurodac), and providing border monitoring (e.g. satellite imagery and aerial surveillance). Frontex has activated crisis response teams to coordinate its support for Member States in the event of increasing numbers of people fleeing Ukraine. As of 2 March 2022, it has already responded to a request for support from Romania. Member States can also request help from migration management support teams, made up of staff from Frontex, the EU Agency for Asylum (EASO), Europol and other agencies.

The European Border and Coast Guard Regulation enables a Member State facing disproportionate migratory challenges at EU external borders to request technical and operational reinforcement from migration management support teams composed of experts from Union bodies, offices and agencies (Article 40). Position of the European Parliament

In its resolution of 1 March 2022, the European Parliament strongly condemned ‘the Russian Federation’s illegal, unprovoked and unjustified military aggression against and invasion of Ukraine’ and called on the Commission and the Member States to provide further emergency humanitarian assistance for Ukraine. Parliament welcomed the Council’s commitment to activate the Temporary Protection Directive, having previously called for the Temporary Protection Directive to be triggered in relation to the mass influx of refugees from Syria and other conflict areas (e.g. in 2013 and 2015).

Parliament urged the Council to divide responsibility for the reception of the refugees who arrive at the EU’s external borders equally among the Member States. It called on the Council and the Commission to provide extra funding for the frontline countries, as they are the primary points of entry for Ukrainian refugees. It also urged the Commission to establish a solidarity mechanism to relocate Ukrainian refugees from frontline EU countries to other Member States. Parliament reminded all Member States of their responsibility to uphold the fundamental rights of all asylum seekers. Parliament also called for the EU institutions to work towards granting EU candidate status to Ukraine, in line with Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Russia’s war on Ukraine: Assisting Ukrainians at the EU’s borders‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Martin Russell.

Outraged by Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine, EU countries have adopted unprecedentedly tough sanctions, in cooperation with partners such as the US, Canada and the UK. Although Russia will partially adapt, these measures are expected to cause major disruption and isolate the country from the global economy.

Pre-2022 EU Ukraine-related sanctions against Russia

After Russia’s March 2014 annexation of Crimea and support for Donbas separatists, the EU adopted numerous sanctions against Russia. These include targeted measures (asset freezes, visa bans) against some 160 individuals (including Russian politicians and military officers) and 40 organisations responsible for violations of Ukrainian sovereignty. There are also sectoral sanctions: severe restrictions on EU lending to five major Russian state-owned banks, three oil companies and three arms manufacturers; an arms embargo, and a ban on exports of dual-use (civilian/military) items to Russian defence companies; and a ban on providing innovative extractive technology and services, used by Russian companies to develop deep-water, Arctic and shale oil reserves.

New sanctions triggered by Russia’s attack on Ukraine

On 24 February 2022, Russia launched an unprovoked attack on Ukraine. Earlier in February, US officials predicted that an invasion could claim up to 50 000 Ukrainian civilian lives, together with 25 000 military casualties on the Ukrainian side and 10 000 for Russia, while displacing up to 5 million people. According to the United Nations, as of 1 March 2022, at least 136 civilians had been killed and 400 injured, with the real toll probably much higher. At the time of writing one million refugees have left the country.

The invasion was preceded by months of debate on Europe’s response to expected Russian aggression. Given the damage that further sanctions would cause to their own economies, there were some doubts as to how far EU leaders were prepared to go. However, the scale and the brutality of the attack, as well as its worrying implications for European security, have highlighted the need for harsher measures.

Four new sanctions packages

The EU adopted sanctions on 23 February after Russia’s decision to recognise the two ‘People’s Republics’ of Donetsk and Luhansk as independent states, followed by three packages of much harsher measures after the start of the invasion, on 25 February, 28 February and 2 March. These include:

• targeted individual sanctions against Russian President Vladimir Putin, senior government ministers including defence minister Sergey Shoigu and Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, members of the National Security Council, oligarchs in the oil, banking and finance sectors, propagandists such as Margarita Simonyan, head of the RT news channel, and all 351 Russian parliamentarians (out of 450) who voted for recognition of the two territories;
• bans on: financial transactions with all state-controlled banks (70 % of Russia’s banking sector); trading in shares of Russian state-owned companies; financial deposits from Russia in EU banks exceeding €100 000; accounts belonging to Russian clients in EU banks; the sale of euro-denominated securities to Russian clients; transactions with the Russian Central Bank; supply of euro banknotes to Russia; participation in Russian Direct Investment Fund projects;
• exclusion of seven banks from the SWIFT financial messaging system. However, the list includes only one of Russia’s top five banks (VTB, the second largest by total assets);
• energy sector: a ban on exports of services and technology used by Russian oil refineries;
• aviation sector: a ban on the sale of all aircraft, spare parts and equipment to Russian airlines. Russian planes, including private jets, are banned from EU airspace and EU airports;
• restrictions on exports of high-tech goods with potential military applications, such as electronics, computers, information security, telecoms, sensors and lasers, navigation and avionics equipment, not only to military companies, but to all Russian purchasers;
• a ban on broadcasts by Kremlin propaganda channels RT and Sputnik.

Sanctions coordination, and further restrictive measures:

Like the previous sanctions of 2014, these measures have been coordinated with the USA, Canada, and the UK. Together with the EU, the latter three countries have frozen Russian international reserves, banned Russian planes, restricted technology exports, and adopted targeted sanctions against elite figures. The four partners have committed to ending ‘golden passports’ for wealthy Russians connected to the Russian government. Following the example of the UK and Canada, the EU and USA are considering a ban on Russian ships. Czechia is one of the EU countries that have already stopped issuing visas to Russian citizens, and there are calls for other Member States to follow suit.

Western companies have taken some initiatives of their own that go beyond sanctions compliance. Shell and BP have announced that they will sell off their Russian assets. Apple and Jaguar Land Rover will stop selling products in Russia, while MSC and Maersk will no longer ship containers to Russia.

Consequences of new sanctions

Previous EU and Western sanctions adopted in 2014 were targeted at a narrow group of strategic companies and sectors. Their objective was not to cripple the Russian economy but to slow down long-term growth. After an initial shock, Russian banks and energy companies adapted to the new situation; energy production and exports have now reached record levels. Nevertheless, there are signs that sanctions have imposed significant costs: foreign investment is down, and according to some estimates, Russia may be losing around 1 % of GDP growth per year.

The latest sanctions are more similar to Washington’s post-2018 ‘maximum pressure‘ campaign against Iran, in that they aim at a much broader impact. Without access to SWIFT, Russian traders will find it difficult to send and receive international financial transfers, obstructing the oil and gas exports on which the Russian economy so crucially depends (however, it is still unclear whether this ban will include energy exports). Whereas previous sanctions targeted elites rather than ordinary Russians, the new measures, such as the ban on Russian flights and heavy restrictions on visas, could make travel almost impossible for everyone in the country. With the ban on aviation exports, Russia could run out of spare parts for its commercial air fleet, three quarters of which originate from Western countries, in just a few months. Technology export restrictions will hold back economic modernisation, and financial restrictions will isolate Moscow from international markets.

Since the invasion, the Russian rouble has lost 30 % of its value against the euro and share markets have crashed, forcing Moscow’s stock exchange to close. In a bid to prop up the rouble, Russia’s Central Bank raised interest rates sharply, from 9.5 to 20 %; the latter move will hurt heavily indebted Russian households, which had already seen disposable incomes decline to a 12-year low even before the conflict. Moscow has US$630 billion in international reserves, giving it some scope for cushioning the impact of economic shocks, but around half of these reserves are now frozen by Western sanctions.

The longer-term impact is less clear. Russia proved more resilient to previous sanctions than expected, and there is a limit to how far EU countries are prepared to go in restricting energy trade, given that many of them depend on Russian supplies. For the time being, gas exports continue to flow, including via Ukraine. In 2014, to overcome Western restrictions on exports of dual use goods for the defence sector, Russia looked to domestic manufacturers and Chinese imports for replacements. Yet such alternatives are often of inferior quality and can take years to develop. Furthermore, it is not clear whether Chinese producers will want to risk secondary sanctions from the USA, which is by far their biggest export market.

In the short term, EU countries are unlikely to stop buying gas from Russia, which supplies over 40 % of their imports. However, in the long term, sanctions could spur more determined diversification efforts; Germany, which is currently the biggest importer, has already put the Nord Stream 2 pipeline on hold and announced plans to build two LNG terminals.

European Parliament: in its 1 March 2022 resolution on Russian aggression against Ukraine, Parliament welcomes the EU’s swift adoption of sanctions, but calls for further measures against Russia and Belarus, including total exclusion from SWIFT, a ban on exports of all high-tech products, and a ban on Russian shipping.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Russia’s war on Ukraine: New EU sanctions‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marcin Grajewski.

Russia invaded Ukraine on 24 February, launching the biggest military offensive in Europe since World War II. Moscow’s incursion into the territory of its south-western neighbour and attempts to capture major cities – notably Kyiv, the capital – have met with firm resistance, thwarting President Vladimir Putin’s reported plans for a quick conquest and installation of a subservient government. The United States, the European Union and many other countries have imposed harsh sanctions on Russia, including attempting to cut some Russian banks off from international payments systems and limiting the Russian central bank’s access to financial markets, as well as launching trade curbs, assets freezes and other restrictions. Many NATO countries have promised to deliver weapons to support Ukrainian fighters. For the first time, the EU has announced plans to send military equipment to a third country. Putin has moved Russia’s nuclear force on to ‘special alert’, sparking fear and renewed condemnation across the world. Hundreds of thousands have already fled Ukraine to escape the war.

This note gathers links to the recent publications and commentaries from many international think tanks on Russia’s attack on Ukraine. Reports from before the invasion can be found in a previous item of the ‘What think tanks are thinking’ series.

Russia invades Ukraine
Centre for European Policy Studies, February 2022

Putin must face war crime charges
European Policy Centre, February 2022

A watershed moment in European history: Decision time for the EU
European Policy Centre, February 2022`

EU ‘hybrid power’ to face the Russian threat
European Policy Centre, February 2022

Europe’s post-Cold War order is no more
Instituto Affari Internazionali, February 2022

Russia invades Ukraine: The dangerous weakness of a military superpower
Egmont, February 2022

Ukraine and the importance of resistance
International Institute for Strategic Studies, February 2022

War in Ukraine: A lesson in strategic grammar
Institut français des relations internationales, February 2022

The Kremlin’s gas wars
Bruegel, February 2022

Expert insights: Russia and Ukraine
Clingendael, February 2022

War of obsession: Why Putin is risking Russia’s future
European Council on Foreign Relations, February 2022

International law and the invasion of Ukraine
European Council on Foreign Relations, February 2022

Views from the capitals: Russia’s war on Ukraine
European Council on Foreign Relations, February 2022

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine changes everything
Carnegie Europe, February 2022

Ukraine has finally prompted the West to shift course on Putin
Atlantic Council, February 2022

Ukraine war: Vladimir Putin has gambled everything and lost
Atlantic Council, February 2022

The day when history changed: Choices and consequences for Europe’s future relation to Russia
European Centre for International Political Economy, February 2022

Ukraine is severe test of China’s new axis with Russia
Chatham House, February 2022

Ukraine: Debunking Russia’s legal justifications
Chatham House, February 2022

Moscow’s fabrication of excuses for renewed war
Chatham House, February 2022

Russian invasion of Ukraine
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, February 2022

Putin’s moves are hardly ‘chess thumping’
Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, February 2022

Around the halls: Implications of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine
Brookings Institution, February 2022

Could Ukraine be Putin’s Afghanistan?
Brookings Institution, February 2022

What does the war in Ukraine mean for Africa?
Brookings Institution, February 2022

Why Putin’s war with Ukraine is a miscalculation
Council on Foreign Relations, February 2022

How the world can influence Putin’s fateful choices in Ukraine
Council on Foreign Relations via The Boston Globe, February 2022

The economic consequences of the Ukraine war
Peterson Institute for International Economics via The Project Syndicate, February 2022

Ukraine and the importance of resistance
International Institute for Strategic Studies, February 2022

The fight for Europe’s future is being fought in the streets of Ukraine
Martens Centre, February 2022

Turkey’s response to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine
Polish Institute of International Affairs, February 2022

NATO reacts to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine
Polish Institute of International Affairs, February 2022

Russian society on their country’s invasion of Ukraine
Polish Institute of International Affairs, February 2022

Russian disinformation regarding the attack on Ukraine
Polish Institute of International Affairs, February 2022

Russia’s war against Ukraine: The status after three days
Eastern Studies Centre, February 2022

Russian invasion of Ukraine: What’s next?
Casimir Pulaski Foundation, February 2022

Putin, Ukrainians, and the right to asylum
Institute of International and Strategic Relations, February 2022

Latin America and the war in Ukraine
Institute of International and Strategic Relations, February 2022

Zäsur in Europa: Putins Krieg
Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, February 2022

Stronger sanctions on Russia: Essential, but not a strategy
Centre for European Reform, February 2022

Read this briefing on ‘War in Ukraine‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Lasse Boehm.

Russia is by far the largest exporter of oil, natural gas and coal to the EU. Already before the crisis, natural gas prices had increased significantly. The current crisis is likely to have a major impact on price levels in Europe. The EU will need to see how to increase its energy independence, using some of the building blocks of the Green Deal.

State of play

According to the European Commission quarterly gas market report, the share of Russian pipeline gas in EU gas imports was 41 % in the third quarter of 2021. Oil and gas are particularly important for Russia, funding just over a third of its federal budget in 2021 (RUB9.1 billion out of RUB25.3 billion total revenue).

The European Union’s dependence on energy imports has increased in recent years due to lower domestic production of non-renewable energy (coal, gas, oil and nuclear), combined with stable energy demand. In 2020, the EU imported well over half (57.5 %) of its energy, ranging from 97.6 % for Malta to 10.5 % in Estonia. In terms of energy source, 97 % of oil and petroleum products, 83.6 % of natural gas, and 35.8 % of solid fossil fuels were not produced by the EU, but had to be imported.

With the Green Deal, the EU has already implicitly taken steps to reduce this dependency – albeit over a long period, stretching at least until 2050, when the EU wants to be climate-neutral, as set out in the 2021 European Climate Law. With EU climate policy aimed at rapidly reducing carbon emissions, many EU Member States have already announced that coal will be or is already being phased out for electricity production. At the same time, the EU increased the share of renewables to 22.1 % of energy consumed in 2020, two percentage points more than anticipated. However, natural gas in particular is often regarded as a necessary source of energy for the transition period, thanks to its being cleaner than coal and its ability to provide a flexible buffer in case of a shortfall in renewable energy due to lack of sunshine or wind.

Russian gas is transported to Europe via pipelines. Soviet-era pipelines via Belarus and Ukraine have been complemented by Nord Stream (2011/2012) and Turkish Stream (2020). The share of gas transit via Ukraine, which accounted for over 60 % of Russia’s pipeline deliveries to the EU and United Kingdom in 2009, fell to 25 % in 2021. Nord Stream and its recent sister pipeline Nord Stream 2 run underneath the Baltic Sea to Germany, bypassing eastern Europe. Each has a capacity of 55 billion cubic metres of gas per year. Nord Stream 2 is fully built, but not authorised for operation (see below). Nord Stream 1 is owned and operated by Nord Stream AG, headquartered in Switzerland. Russia’s Gazprom owns a 51 % stake in the project, while the rest is owned by German, Dutch and French energy companies. Nord Stream 2 is owned and operated by Nord Stream 2 AG, with Gazprom as the sole shareholder and western European energy companies as financial investors.

Natural gas prices in Europe rose considerably during the second half of 2021, already well before the current crisis in Ukraine, not least due to a strong surge in post-pandemic demand. On 21 December 2021, prices reached a peak of €180 per megawatt-hour, having hovered below €50 per megawatt-hour throughout the summer. This came in the wake of comparatively low levels of natural gas storage.

EU response (in coordination with partners)

On 22 February 2022, on the eve of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the German government announced suspension of the authorisation process for Nord Stream 2, by withdrawing the supply security report previously submitted to its national regulator, the Bundesnetzagentur. As of 27 February 2022, Russian gas is still flowing towards Europe, but the future of Europe’s gas supply from Russia could become uncertain, whether due to a politically-motivated interruption of deliveries, uncertainty over energy payments under the sanctions imposed on Russia, or damage to the Ukraine pipelines due to fighting.

Possible further developments

The energy mix used in a country is a national competence and current events might lead some Member States to prioritise a particular energy source or prolong the lifespan of power plants otherwise scheduled for closure.

Given potentially continuing uncertainty over Russia’s oil and gas supplies to Europe, the EU will need to accelerate moves towards diversifying its supply and increasing its energy independence. These steps could focus on the following building blocks, some of which also align with the EU’s efforts to combat climate change and are part of the Green Deal:

• Gas storage should be maximised before the onset of the next winter. This poses the question of a possible strategic reserve. Gas market rules are currently undergoing revision in the European Parliament in the form of the December 2021 ‘gas markets and hydrogen package‘, which includes the proposed revision of the EU gas regulation and EU gas directive.
• Should Russian natural gas supplies be shut off, liquefied natural gas (LNG) will likely play a key role, as other producers such as Norway or the Netherlands cannot significantly increase their production. The EU27 currently has a total annual LNG import capacity of 156 billion cubic metres (bcm) (see table). The biggest share of this capacity lies in Spain, but the Iberian Peninsula’s connection to the rest of the European gas grid is limited. Other major LNG importers include France, Italy, the Netherlands and Belgium.

EU27 annual regasification capacity of LNG large-scale import terminals (bcm(N)/year)

• Renewable energy: While EU Member States are free to decide on their energy mix, key policy tools at EU level include the proposed revision of the Renewable Energy Directive. The European Commission is proposing to increase the target for the 2030 share of renewable energy, such as biomass, wind or solar power, from the current 32 % to 40 % of final energy consumption. The draft act is now under negotiation in the European Parliament. Even with a higher share of renewables, a flexible non-renewable electricity generation capacity will likely be necessary to cover prolonged periods without wind or sunshine.
• Energy efficiency: To rapidly lower demand for Russian oil and gas, the EU also needs to decrease overall energy consumption. The current Energy Efficiency Directive envisages 32.5 % energy savings by 2030, compared with a business-as-usual scenario. A new proposal tabled by the European Commission last year and under consideration in the European Parliament seeks to increase this goal by a further 9 % in energy savings.
• Infrastructure: supply policies need to be matched by infrastructure allowing electricity and gas to flow unhindered in the European market. The adequacy of the plans for electricity and gas interconnections should be reassessed in the light of emerging supply risks.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Russia’s war on Ukraine: Implications for EU energy supply‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Suzana-Elena Anghel.

On 17-18 February 2022, EU Heads of State or Government met for an informal European Council meeting, followed by a summit with African Union (AU) leaders. During their informal meeting, EU leaders focused on the Russia-Ukraine crisis – urging Russia to engage on a path of de-escalation, reaffirming their support for Ukraine, displaying unity and willingness to work together with partners, in particular NATO, and calling for a diplomatic solution to the crisis. Meeting with their African counterparts, EU leaders looked to renew the EU‑AU partnership and adopted a joint declaration announcing an Africa-Europe investment package of €150 billion, for health and education and support for ‘a common agenda for manufacturing vaccines’.

Background

On 17-18 February 2022, EU leaders met with their African counterparts for a long-planned summit, twice postponed because of the pandemic. The Russia-Ukraine crisis, the direct result of the progressive build-up of Russian troops (around 170 000 troops at the time of writing) on the borders with Ukraine, led the President, Charles Michel, to call an informal European Council meeting, which preceded but, being brief, did not overshadow, the EU-AU summit. Ukraine is currently a matter of utmost concern for the EU, the US and NATO, as Russia’s assertiveness and recently expressed ‘demands for security guarantees’ have called the entire European security architecture into question. However, concerns regarding Russia’s behaviour go beyond Ukraine. They encompass the EU’s neighbourhood more broadly, and the Sahel, where the Wagner Group has been and continues to be active. The EU has recently imposed sanctions on this ‘Russia-based unincorporated private military entity’.

The informal meeting of members of the European Council Pre-summit developments

The informal European Council meeting was announced on Twitter one day in advance, and no invitation letter was circulated, given the short notice, as well as the sensitivity of the subject and the highly volatile situation on the Russian-Ukrainian border. However, preparations were well under way in the week preceding the summit. First, the President of the European Council, Charles Michel, held a series of calls with various smaller groups of Heads of State or Government on the Russia-Ukraine crisis, and all Member States were kept fully informed of the diplomatic attempts to de-escalate the crisis. Second, following a call with President Michel, the Lithuanian President, Gitanas Nauseda, tweeted that he was ‘ready to discuss’ Russia ‘next week’ at the European Council. Third, speaking in the European Parliament’s plenary debate on Russia, the day before the informal European Council, President Michel mentioned that EU leaders would have the ‘opportunity to express Europe’s firmness, unity and strength in upholding our values’ as well as support for the people of Ukraine, on the margins of the EU-AU summit.

Main results of the informal European Council meeting

The informal meeting had four main objectives: to build unity; to express support for a diplomatic solution to the crisis; to reiterate the EU’s unwavering support for Ukraine; and to prepare the EU’s response in the event of a further escalation of the crisis, notably to discuss sanctions.

Building unity

President Michel stressed that the informal European Council meeting offered an opportunity for EU leaders to express their unity within the EU and with NATO. According to the Prime Minister of the Netherlands, Mark Rutte, EU leaders reiterated their support for the territorial integrity of Ukraine and stressed that they were united, calling – jointly with the US, the UK, Canada and NATO – on Russia to de-escalate. The High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Josep Borrell, stressed that the EU and NATO were coordinating their positions and responses. Unity in the European Council on the issue dates back to 2014, when Russia illegally annexed Crimea. The EU introduced sanctions, renewed regularly, for failure to implement the Minsk Agreements. Having spent much of the past decade operating in crisis mode, the European Council is fully aware of the importance of unity and the price of non-coordination in times of crisis.

Supporting a diplomatic solution to the crisis

The French President, Emmanuel Macron, and the German Chancellor, Olaf Scholz, informed their fellow leaders of the status of the latest negotiations undertaken in the Normandy Format, the main European negotiation channel with Russia and Ukraine, instituted back in 2014. Besides this, in an attempt to help defuse the crisis, both France and Germany have held bilateral talks with Russia and with Ukraine at head of state or government level. Diplomatic efforts undertaken in other multilateral forums, such as the NATO-Russia Council and the OSCE, have EU support. In addition, the US has conducted bilateral talks with Russia, in close cooperation with its European allies and on the basis of the principle ‘nothing about you, without you’ formulated by US President Joe Biden during a call with the President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelenskyy. The Prime Minister of Estonia, Kaja Kallas, stressed the common line maintained by the transatlantic community as well as NATO’s staunch commitment to its ‘open-door policy’. The Prime Minister of Italy, Mario Draghi, stressed that all channels of dialogue, whether bilateral or multilateral, were being and should continue to be used in a coordinated manner and that, following a Ukrainian request, his country was ready to facilitate a meeting on its soil between the leaders of Ukraine and Russia, should both parties agree.

Supporting Ukraine

In addition to diplomatic support for Ukraine, the EU has also increased its aid to Ukraine, pledging €1.2 billion in emergency macro-financial assistance to ‘mitigate the effects’ of the crisis with Russia.

Being prepared for further escalation

The informal meeting was not about immediate decisions but about preparing, in a united and coordinated manner, joint decisions in the event of further escalation of the crisis. Several EU leaders pointed to the mixed signals coming from Russia, stressing that, at that moment, there was no evidence of troop withdrawal from the Ukrainian border, and that the Duma’s vote in favour of ‘the formal recognition of Donetsk and Luhansk as independent republics’ was not a sign of de-escalation. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen briefed EU leaders on the package of sanctions that the EU would be ready to put forward when appropriate. However, further clarification was needed with respect to the threshold set for triggering the EU’s response. Nevertheless, EU leaders stressed that ‘full scale invasion was not the threshold – lower-level aggression by Russia could also justify fresh sanctions’.

The EU-AU summit

The EU-AU summit, initially scheduled for 2020, was ‘very much awaited’, as stressed by Estonia’s Prime Minister, Kaja Kallas. In attendance were the 27 EU leaders, over 40 African leaders, European Parliament President Roberta Metsola, European Central Bank President Christine Lagarde, and representatives of other international organisations. Several African countries – Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mali and Sudan – currently suspended from the African Union, were not represented at the summit.

The focus of the summit was on renewed partnership and prosperity, summed up in the motto: ‘Africa and Europe: A joint vision for 2030’. The aim was to achieve ‘concrete deliverables’, represented by the chosen format of seven thematic round tables on: 1) financing growth; 2) health systems and vaccine production; 3) agriculture and sustainable development; 4) education, culture and vocational training, migration and mobility; 5) private-sector support and economic integration; 6) peace, security and governance; and 7) climate change and energy transition, digital and transport. The EU Member States’ refusal to waive intellectual property rights for vaccine production sparked most sensitivities, overshadowing negotiations on the joint declaration, for which common language was nonetheless agreed.

The security situation in the Sahel was considered at a separate summit convened by French President Emmanuel Macron the previous day. A common declaration was adopted stating that European states contributing to Operation Barkane and the Tauba Task Force would withdraw their forces from Mali, as the ‘political, operational and legal’ conditions for their engagement were no longer met.Message from the European Parliament President: President Metsola stressed that the EU and AU were ‘bound by common challenges, such as security, energy and reduction of poverty’, and that the two continents needed to move from ‘aid to partnership’ and ‘talk to each other as equals’ about opportunities.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Outcome of the meetings of EU leaders on 17-18 February 2022‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Suzana-Elena Anghel.

On 24 February 2022, at a special European Council meeting following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, EU leaders delivered a message of unity and determination, acknowledging ‘the European aspirations and the European choice of Ukraine’ and reiterating the EU’s support to the territorial integrity of the country. They condemned Russia’s continued violation of international law, and stressed that Russia ‘will be held accountable for its actions’. EU leaders also approved politically a new package of sanctions, which ‘bites but does not deter’. Key restrictions linked to gas supply and to access to the SWIFT payment system, a measure supported by the European Parliament, did not find a consensus. The EU institutions were also asked to prepare a new set of ‘individual and economic sanctions’ targeted at Belarus.

1. Background

On 24 February 2022, EU leaders met to express the Union’s support for Ukraine and its people, to discuss further political, financial and humanitarian assistance, and to uphold the EU’s commitment to an international order based on rules and norms, as well as to agree on a new set of sanctions against Russia. The meeting took place on the very day Russia launched its full-scale military operation against Ukraine, violating international law and plunging Europe into potentially the most severe security crisis since World War II. The President of the European Council, Charles Michel, stressed that he had not been aware of the date and timing of Russia’s invasion when he called the special meeting. In his invitation letter, President Michel, set four objectives for the meeting, namely to: i) take stock of the latest developments; ii) consider how to protect the rules-based international order; iii) discuss the next steps in dealing with Russia and in holding ‘Russia accountable for its actions’; and iv) further support Ukraine and its people.

The special European Council meeting took place exactly a week after the EU leaders had discussed the Ukraine-Russia crisis informally on 16 February 2022. At that meeting, they had built unity on and support for a common and coordinated response to Russia’s offensive actions, reiterated the Union’s support for Ukraine’s territorial integrity, and prepared possible next steps in the event of the crisis escalating. They also increased aid to Ukraine by €1.2 billion, in the form of emergency macro-financial assistance aimed at lessening the effects of the crisis. EU leaders discussed a package of sanctions which, in the interim, were adopted by written procedure in the Council after Russia’s ‘recognition of the non-government controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts of Ukraine and sending of troops into the region’.

2. Russia’s full-scale military operation against Ukraine

At dawn, on 24 February 2022, on the pretext of a ‘special military operation’ in the Donbass, Russia launched a full-scale military attack on strategic locations in major cities across Ukraine, sparking anti-war protests including across Russia (see Figure 1). The invasion occurred a few days after Russia’s recognition, in violation of international law, of the independence of the self-proclaimed Donetsk

Russia’s military attack on Ukraine

(DPR) and Luhansk (LPR) republics, where a Russian so-called ‘peacekeeping’ force was sent earlier in the week. In response to the attack, Ukraine cut diplomatic ties, declared martial law and called on all its citizens of an age to do what is necessary to protect the country.

Before escalating into a full-scale war, the Ukraine-Russia crisis started in autumn 2021 with a progressive military build-up, which ended up in a force of nearly 200 000 Russian troops being positioned (in Russia and Belarus) on Ukraine’s borders. Intensive diplomatic talks at multilateral level (OSCE, NATO-Russia Council and in the Normandy Format) and bilateral level took place in recent weeks without changing the course of events. Since December 2021, EU leaders have closely monitored the situation in and around Ukraine (see Figure 2).

European Council’s monitoring of Russia’s actions in and around Ukraine

In December 2021, in an attempt to strengthen its sphere of influence over its neighbourhood, Russia requested ‘security guarantees’ from NATO, including an end to the Alliance’s ‘open door policy’ and a limitation and repositioning (away from Russia’s borders) of assets (weapons and personnel) of member states that had joined before 1997. Russia was thus contesting Ukraine’s right to freely choose its alliances and also NATO’s ability to shape its own defence policy.

Through such assertiveness and aggressiveness, Russia, which has recently engaged in a rapprochement with China, has in effect called into question the entire European security architecture as defined by the Helsinki Final Act. Moreover, the UN Security Council, which Russia has chaired this February, risked being paralysed, endangering global security. The result has in fact been strengthened unity within NATO, which has refused to end its ‘open door policy’ and is further strengthening its eastern flank. However, major geopolitical consequences are to be expected from the war. As outlined by EU High Representative Josep Borrell, the survival of the ‘post-war multilateral “acquis”‘, with ‘the UN, international law and universal rights’ at its core, is at stake. Analysts argue that Russia and China ‘share a commitment to creating a ‘post-West’ global order’ based on their interests and ‘conducive to authoritarian rule’ and that the US and their allies need to ‘develop a free world defence strategy‘, enabling democratic values and the rules-based international order to be protected.

3. Initial reactions of the EU and the international community

On 25 February 2022, the UN Security Council (UNSC) voted on a resolution ‘condemning Russia’s attack in Ukraine’. This was vetoed by Russia, while China, India and the United Arab Emirate abstained. High Representative Josep Borrell stressed that the resolution would be submitted to the UN General Assembly and that he was working to forge ‘an alliance of people who want to protect the sovereignty of nations’.

Meeting in a video-conference format, the G7 leaders called on ‘the Russian Federation to stop the bloodshed, to immediately de-escalate and to withdraw its forces from Ukraine’. They condemned Belarus’s involvement and expressed unity with Ukraine, NATO and the EU. The OSCE Permanent Council also held an extraordinary meeting, where Josep Borrell stressed the EU’s readiness to set ‘both sectoral and individual restrictive measures’ together with partners.

After an extraordinary meeting of the North Atlantic Council, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg condemned Russia’s ‘brutal act of war’, expressed support to Ukraine and said that NATO had activated its defence plans. He confirmed that NATO would protect all its territory and increase its land, air and sea presence on the eastern flank. In addition, President Michel, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, and Jens Stoltenberg jointly expressed the EU’s and NATO’s unity.

The US President, Joe Biden, announced ‘additional strong sanctions’ against Russia, stressing that the US had closely coordinated the measures with allies representing more than ‘half of the global economy’. This will limit Russia’s possibility to trade in dollars, euros and yen, impact its industrial capacity and cut almost half of its high-tech imports.

In an unprecedented move, the members of the European Council issued a joint statement ahead of their special meeting, in which they condemned ‘in the strongest possible terms Russia’s unprecedented military aggression against Ukraine’ as well as Belarus’s involvement.

4. European Council special meeting: Principal results

The European Council meeting started with an address by the President of the European Parliament, Roberta Metsola, as well as, by video-conference, the President of Ukraine, Volodomyr Zelenskyy. President Michel said that ‘it was a moment of grave seriousness, dignity, cool heads’ and that EU leaders had ‘welcomed and saluted the courage of the Ukrainian people’.

Confirming unity and supporting the rules-based international order

EU leaders expressed their support for the territorial integrity of Ukraine, its right to choose its own path and alliances, and ‘unwavering support for the territorial integrity of Georgia and of the Republic of Moldova’. Moreover, the EU would mobilise the international community in support of the international order based on the UN Charter and international law.

Sanctions

President Michel stressed that EU leaders had agreed on an ‘additional package of massive sanctions, which will be painful for the Russian regime’, as well as to the preparation of a new package targeting Belarus. The Prime Minister of Belgium, Alexander de Croo, stressed that ‘we don’t need sanctions that bark, we need sanctions that bite’, while the Prime Minister of Latvia, Krišjānis Karinš, pointed out that sanctions needed ‘to deter’ in order to be effective. This deterrence element was lacking, as two key measures relating to gas supply and access to the SWIFT international payments system were not included. The new set of sanctions was closely coordinated with the EU’s partners (US, UK, Canada, Norway, Japan, South Korea and Australia) and was adopted in Council on 25 February 2022. The following day, an agreement was reached ‘to cut some Russian banks from SWIFT’.

Financial sector: President von der Leyen stressed that 70 % of the Russian banking market and key state-owned companies, including defence companies, were targeted. The aim was to ‘increase Russia’s borrowing costs, raise inflation, and gradually erode Russia’s industrial base’. The sanctions package also targets the Russian elite by ‘curbing their deposits’.

Energy, transport and technology: President von der Leyen stressed energy was the ‘key area’ to hurt the Russian state. EU sanctions will hit the oil sector (€24 billion in export revenues in 2019) and ‘make it impossible for Russia to upgrade its oil refineries’. The sale of aircraft spare parts and equipment to Russian airlines will be banned, targeting a crucial industrial and connectivity sector. She added that three quarters of the Russian commercial airline fleet was built in the EU, US and Canada. In coordination with partners, access to cutting-edge technologies will also be limited.

Visas: President von der Leyen announced that diplomats, privileged groups and the business community would no longer have ‘privileged access’ to the EU. After the European Council, a consensus was reached to place Vladimir Putin and Sergey Lavrov on the list of sanctioned persons.

Support for Ukraine

The Prime Minister of Latvia, Krišjānis Karinš, stressed that Ukraine needed financial support but also military aid. The President of France, Emmanuel Macron, announced that France would offer an extra €300 million to Ukraine (beyond the EU’s €1.2 billion financial assistance) and supply material to the population and the military. Several EU Member States, including the Baltic countries and the Netherlands, announced the provision of military aid to Ukraine, whilst President Michel indicated the EU would provide humanitarian support and that countries bordering Ukraine were preparing to receive Ukrainian refugees.

A strategically autonomous EU

Reducing the EU’s energy dependency and increasing strategic autonomy were core issues for discussion, which EU leaders will revert to in March 2022. As President Michel stressed, they also agreed to ‘beef up’ security and defence capabilities in coordination with NATO. Main message of the European Parliament President: President Roberta Metsola insisted on firmness with Russia, and said ‘it is right and sensible to adopt massive, unprecedented, severe sanctions on Russia’. She called for Russia’s exclusion from SWIFT, a measure the European Parliament supports, welcomed the suspension of the certification of Nord Stream 2, and stressed the wider need to reduce EU dependence on Russian gas.

Read this briefing on ‘Outcome of the special European Council meeting of 24 February 2022‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.