European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Rosamund Shreeves.

This year’s International Women’s Day takes place under the dual shadow of the Covid-19 pandemic and the unfolding crisis of Russia’s re-invasion of Ukraine. Both have spotlighted women’s grit and determination and their contributions to society, not least the true value of their care and emotional work. They also highlight the absolute necessity of adopting responses that are gender-sensitive and shaped with women’s participation.

A gender-sensitive humanitarian response to the Ukraine crisis

Two weeks ago, women in Ukraine were simply living their lives, studying, innovating, sitting in parliament, participating in local government, civil society, and the arts. They were already dealing with ‘ordinary’ barriers to gender equality, the impacts of eight years of conflict in the east of the country and the gendered social and economic consequences of the Covid-19 pandemic. Many were on the frontline of the health crisis. Today, many more are on the frontline of a war zone, giving birth in bomb shelters and basements, taking up arms, reporting at considerable risk to their lives, and fleeing their homes to bring their children and families to safety. Many have faced or will face multiple internal displacements inside Ukraine, while women and children make up the overwhelming majority of the refugees crossing into neighbouring countries.

Aside from the horrific consequences of attacks on civilian populations, the human rights of women and girls are at heightened risk during conflict. There is also evidence that including women in conflict resolution helps to ensure that their specific situations and needs are taken into account and to achieve more sustainable outcomes. In the current situation, the international community is highlighting the urgent need to safeguard access to medical care for pregnant women, provide safe and regular pathways to safety for all women and girls, irrespective of their nationality, ethnicity and religion, and ensure meaningful participation of women in negotiations, in line with UN resolution 1325 on women, peace and security. While welcoming the outpouring of support from private individuals, associations working on the ground are calling for coordinated action to register and accompany women and girls, and for sexual, reproductive and maternal health services and services to prevent and respond to gender-based violence to be set up in Ukraine and along the refugee routes. They also stress the need for statistics on the gender, age and disability status of refugees to inform responses. At the EU level, measures adopted so far to help those fleeing Russian aggression, include guidelines on simplifying border controls for vulnerable groups and immediate temporary protection in the EU, with rights to a residence permit, the possibility to work, housing, and access to social welfare, medical assistance and education.

A gender-sensitive recovery from the Covid-19 pandemic

If this were a ‘normal’ International Women’s Day, Irpin and the other municipalities and cities across Ukraine that are signatories to the European Charter for Equality of Women and Men in Local Life, would have been free to focus on rebuilding after the pandemic like their counterparts in the rest of Europe. Research by the EU agencies for gender equality (EIGE) and working and living conditions (Eurofound) shows that the Covid-19 crisis is having negative impacts on women’s employment, caring responsibilities, work-life balance and mental wellbeing. Unlike the financial crisis of 2008-2010, there have been high job losses in female-dominated service sectors responsible for much of the recent growth in women’s employment, as well as in the male-dominated sectors typically hit by recessions. Job losses and furloughing have been especially high among low-paid women workers. In addition, the Covid-19 crisis has had an unprecedented impact on unpaid work. Over the successive pandemic waves, closures of schools, nurseries, and day-care facilities for disabled and elderly people have shifted responsibility for care back to families. While men have taken on part of the additional unpaid work, women have shouldered the lion’s share, particular in the later stages of the pandemic. EIGE and the OECD find a connection between this increase, particularly for mothers, and the fact that women have been more likely than men to drop out of the labour market. This is echoed by the results of a special Eurobarometer survey on women and Covid-19 commissioned by the European Parliament to mark International Women’s Day. Of the 26 741 women across the EU who took part, a quarter (25 %) say that the increase in work at home meant that they were not able to do as much paid work as they wanted to, while 21 % say that they have decided to permanently reduce the amount of time they allocate to paid work. An even higher share say that the Covid-19 crisis has had an impact on their work-life balance (44 %) and that restrictions have significantly affected their mental health (41 %).

The extent of the negative impact of the Covid-19 crisis on the social and economic situation of women has triggered a debate on the urgent need to take a gender-sensitive approach in recovery policies. In this context, the establishment of the EU’s biggest financial instrument supporting recovery in the Member States – the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) – is an opportunity to channel the extraordinary resources to the measures that contribute to advancing gender equality. It is also a chance to put into practice the EU’s long-standing commitments regarding the need to mainstream gender across different policies and apply gender budgeting principles to EU spending, to ensure that women and men benefit equally from investment. Economists have demonstrated that switching recovery investment from the traditional focus on construction and manufacturing to the care sector would create more jobs for both women and men, and provide a better economic stimulus. A study for the European Parliament recommends that at least 30 % of the EU funding provided through the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) should go to investment in the care economy, to put it on an even footing with the allocations of 37 % and 30 % for the green and digital transitions. In line with the RRF Regulation, all the national recovery and resilience plans adopted to date declare gender equality to be a horizontal objective, to be given consideration in all measures. However, not all Member States have included dedicated reforms or investments explicitly addressing gender-related challenges, or indicating women as the main beneficiaries.

Position of the European Parliament

In its resolution of 1 March 2022 on the Russian aggression against Ukraine, the European Parliament called for special emphasis on the needs of women and children in humanitarian responses, including evacuations to safety. Its Committee for Women’s Rights and Gender Equality has modified the agenda of its event for International Women’s Day to address the situation in Ukraine, alongside the initial focus on exploring ambitious recovery policies. Parliament’s resolution on the gender perspective in the Covid‑19 crisis and post-crisis period addresses the harmful gendered and intersectional impacts of the pandemic and sets out recommendations for overcoming them. Parliament is clear that current and future challenges will require ‘a gender-sensitive approach, with gender mainstreaming and gender budgeting principles reflected in all aspects of the pandemic response’. It is also calling for gender-responsive use of recovery funding, including investment in the care sector.

Related EPRS publications for International Women’s Day

• Russia’s war on Ukraine: Assisting Ukrainians at the EU’s borders, EPRS At a glance briefing, 4 March 2022
• Women in foreign affairs and international security: Still far from gender equality, EPRS briefing, March 2021
• Beyond the pandemic: The potential of ambitious gender equality policy, EPRS At a glance briefing, March 2022 (available in 24 languages)
• Maternity and paternity leave in the EU, EPRS infographic, March 2022
• Equal pay for equal work between men and women: Pay transparency and enforcement mechanisms, EPRS legislative briefing, March 2022
• Topical digest: gender equality, February 2022 (links to EPRS publications on gender equality, including the gender dimensions of the Covid-19 crisis, the recovery and resilience facility and migration and asylum)

Related EPRS multimedia

• Video: Gender equality in the Recovery and Resilience Facility
• Video: Equal pay for equal work between men and women
• Video: Covid-19 increases women’s unpaid care work

Written by Claudia Vinci.

Up until Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the EU and Russia were important trade partners trading in a wide variety of goods, including agri-food products. Russia was the fifth largest importer of EU goods in 2020, despite the disruption of trade relations caused by the first Ukraine crisis in 2014. Furthermore, Russia is a major global exporter of several commodities, including sunflower oil, wheat and barley.

Background

The Russian Federation is one of the EU’s main trading partners, with the total volume of trade estimated at €173.7 billion in 2020 (Figure 1). Russia was the fifth importer of EU goods in 2020, while the EU is the first supplier to the Russian market, providing machinery and transport equipment, chemicals, manufactured goods, and agricultural products and raw materials, for a total value of €79 billion. Russia’s exports to the EU were led by fuel and mining products, agricultural products and raw materials, chemicals, and iron and steel, totalling almost €95 billion.

Figure 1 – EU trade in goods with the world and Russia (2020)

The 1997 bilateral partnership and cooperation agreement (PCA) is the general framework for EU-Russia trade relations. Negotiations for a new EU-Russia agreement, initiated in 2008, were suspended in 2014 owing to the first Ukraine crisis. In 2012, Russia joined the World Trade Organization (WTO), and EU-Russia trade relations have since been defined by the multilateral WTO rules. Since Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in March 2014, the EU has progressively imposed restrictive measures towards Russia; these led in the same year, as retaliation, to a Russian ban on selected agricultural products from the EU and some third countries, namely Australia, Canada, Norway and the United States. Although overall EU trade with Russia has continued, and even increased, from 2017 onwards, trade flows in agri-food products have decreased, as shown in Figure 2. On 24 February 2022, Russia launched an unprovoked attack on Ukraine, followed by a full-scale invasion. EU countries have since adopted unprecedentedly tough sanctions.

Figure 2 – EU trade with Russia: Agricultural products (2020) Agri-food trade figures

Trade with the Russian Federation represents 3.7 % of overall EU exports in agri-food products, and 1.4 % of overall agri-food imports. The main products imported from Russia, in terms of overall value, are residues and waste from the food industries, including oilcakes and feed components (32.3 %), oilseeds (19.1 %), animal or vegetable fats and oils (9.9 %), beverages (7.0 %), cereals (6.5 %), and other products (25.2 %). Concerning exports from the EU to Russia, the main categories are beverages (21.2 %), edible preparations (9.3 %), residues and waste from the food industries (8.0 %), oilseeds (7.4 %), live trees and other plants (7.3 %), cocoa (7.3 %), and other products (39.5 %).

Figure 3 – EU trade with Russia: Agricultural trade by product (2020)

In terms of categories of products for which a significant part of EU agri-food trade is linked to Russia (see Figure 3, share of dependency), figures show that almost 19 % of ‘other feed and feed ingredients’ imported to the EU come from Russia, as well as almost 8 % of sugar (other than beet and cane), and slightly more than 6 % of imported wheat. As for EU exports, more than half of total EU exports of soya beans are exported to Russia, as are more than 20 % of total EU exports of cocoa beans, oilseeds, eggs and honey, and cut flowers and plants. With regard to agri-food global exports, Russia is a major producer and exporter of sunflower oil (28.6 % of global exports), wheat (18 %), barley (15.4 %), and corn (2.3 %).

The impact of the Russia-Ukraine war in agri-food markets is still being evaluated; judging from both countries’ share in main agri-food commodities and fertilisers, it is expected to be considerable.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘EU-Russia trade in agri-food products‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Jakub Przetacznik with Linda Tothova.

Although Russia’s invasion of Ukraine began on 24 February 2022, it was preceded by long and repetitive military build-ups at the border, as well as by joint Russian-Belarusian military exercises on Belarusian territory. While Ukraine defends its territory with a much more motivated army, it is nevertheless smaller than and not as well equipped as the Russian forces. Military aid is being provided by EU Member States and other like-minded countries, including the United States, Canada and United Kingdom.

The attack

Russian forces entered Ukraine mainly around the country’s borders with Russia and Crimea, while Kyiv was attacked via Belarusian territory. The offensive has been much slower than Russia initially appeared to expect. As of 20:00 CET on 3 March 2022, Russia had taken control of land along the northern and south-eastern Ukrainian border with Russia, as well border regions north-west of Crimea. Russia has occupied only one regional capital to date (Kherson, 290 000 inhabitants). Russia also bombed cities including Kyiv, Kharkiv, Chernihiv and the Azov Sea city of Mariupol, which is reportedly ‘near to humanitarian catastrophe’.

The invasion is a flagrant violation of United Nations Charter Article 2 (4) prohibiting ‘use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state’. Ukraine, which is not a member of any military alliance, defends itself in accordance with UN Charter Article 51 establishing an inherent right to individual or collective self-defence in case of an armed attack against a UN member.

Balance of power Ukraine and Russia: Armed forces (2021)

With 900 000 troops, the Russian armed forces are over four times greater in number than the Ukrainian forces, which consisted of 196 000 troops in 2021. The Russian army can deploy 280 000 troops, with other armed forces, such as the navy, or the 180 000-strong command and support structures, being limited in scope for use in the war on Ukraine. It is estimated that there are currently 150 000 Russian soldiers present in Ukraine, while around 20 000 remain ready in reserve. Crucially, however, the Russian army is better equipped. Prior to the invasion, Russia disposed of 15 857 armoured combat vehicles, in comparison to Ukraine’s 3 309 – almost five times more, as well as over ten times the number of aircraft (1 391) compared with the Ukrainians (132). In January 2022, Ukraine reorganised its Territorial Defence Forces (TDF) with a new reserve force, which in mid-February 2022 were reportedly aiming at reaching 1.5‑2 million members. The actual number of TDF soldiers is unknown. In stark contrast to questions regarding the morale of the Russian army, the Ukrainian forces are highly motivated.

Cyber aspects
In the weeks preceding the war, Russia attacked Ukrainian websites in the context of its hybrid war on the country. In the past, cyber-attacks have cut off electricity networks in Kyiv. However, such attacks are not currently being seen, leading to speculation, with possible explanations ranging from Ukrainians protecting their information technology (IT) network, to possible use of Ukrainian IT infrastructure by Russian military forces. However, cyber-attack remains possible. At the same time, Ukraine has so far been able to communicate effectively with the world to provide information about the situation in the country. Ukraine is mobilising its compatriots to attack Russian websites related to the Kremlin-through the ‘Ukraine IT Army’, while other independent groups (including Anonymous and Cyber Partisans), have declared responsibility for attacks against Russia’s banks, state media and a Belarusian railway network used to move troops from Russia to Ukraine.

Russia’s military expenditure is traditionally high, equalling US$62.2 billion in 2021 – over 14 times greater than Ukraine’s US$4.3 billion. Following Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014, Russian military expenditure reached as much as 5.4 % of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2016, and has fallen below 4 % of GDP only twice. Ukraine, with its smaller economy, decided to invest its resources more peacefully, with military expenditure averaging 3.2 % of GDP in 2014‑2020, although still well above EU levels.

NATO response

A meeting of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Heads of State and Government issued a statement on Russia’s attack on Ukraine on 25 February 2022, expressing solidarity with the Ukrainian people and their democratically elected institutions, and condemning Russia’s full-scale invasion, described as a ‘terrible strategic mistake, for which Russia will pay a severe price, both economically and politically, for years to come’. As invasion has consequences for NATO’s deterrence and defence posture, consultations under Article 4 of the NATO Treaty have taken place, and defensive land and air forces in eastern NATO countries, as well as maritime assets across the NATO area, have been deployed. The commitment to collective defence under Article 5 of the NATO Treaty has been reconfirmed. The NATO Secretary General invited Finland, Sweden and the EU to join the meeting.

During a 24 February 2022 press briefing, US President Joe Biden stressed that there will not be a direct military confrontation between the USA and Russian forces. However, if the conflict extends to the Euro-Atlantic area, the USA ‘will defend every inch of NATO territory’ and meet its Article 5 commitments. The statement was followed by deployment of additional US troops to European NATO states.

EU response

The European Council immediately condemned ‘the Russian Federation’s unprovoked and unjustified military aggression against Ukraine’, calling for an immediate ceasefire and withdrawal of Russian forces. This was followed by a series of EU sanctions. Among the financial assistance to Ukraine, the Council approved two decisions providing Ukraine with €500 million for military aid and equipment. In a historic move, the EU will provide €450 million (CFSP 2022/338), to be financed by the European Peace Facility, for military equipment designed to deliver lethal force. A further €50 million (CFSP 2022/339) is for equipment and supplies not designed to deliver lethal force, such as personal protective equipment, first aid kits and fuel. A majority of EU Member States are delivering weapons or military aid in some form to Ukraine.

European Parliament position

In its resolution of 1 March 2022, the Parliament condemned Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine and demanded that Russia cease all military activities and withdraw from the country. The Parliament called on EU Member States to accelerate provision of defensive weapons for Ukraine. The Parliament also supported increased EU-Ukraine intelligence cooperation regarding the ongoing war and called for the EU institutions to work towards granting Ukraine EU candidate country status. However, mutual defence and solidarity clauses in the EU Treaties only apply to Member States.

Article 42(7) TEU (Mutual defence clause) obliges EU Member States to aid and assist ‘by all means in their power’ a Member State that has become a ‘victim of armed aggression on its territory’. Article 222 TFEU (Solidarity clause) stipulates that EU members ‘shall act jointly’ upon request by the relevant state authorities, if another Member State suffers a terrorist attack, natural or man-made disaster.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Russia’s war on Ukraine: Military balance of power‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Sidonia Mazur.

While Ukraine has received considerable support from the EU and European financial institutions since 2014, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, launched on 24 February 2022, has triggered a historic and twofold mobilisation of EU funds – for humanitarian action and military support. The European Commission has announced over €500 million in financing for humanitarian aid and the Council has decided to use the off-budget European Peace Facility (EPF) to assist Ukraine with €500 million in military aid. For the first time, the EU will direct its funds, €450 million, towards purchasing lethal weapons for a country at war, through the EPF. Should this funding prove insufficient, however, further mobilisation of the EU budget might be necessary. In its 1 March 2022 resolution, the European Parliament announced that it expects the EU and EU Member States ‘to activate any EU budget instruments available’.

State of play

Ukraine has developed a strong partnership with the European Union since 2014, including the signing and implementation of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement. The EU has assisted Ukraine financially, with EU and European financial institutions allocating over €17 billion in grants and loans to Ukraine to support the implementation of a broad reform agenda. This includes €5.6 billion via five macro financial assistance programmes. The EU has allocated more than €193 million in humanitarian aid to Ukraine since 2014, to assist victims of the armed conflict in the east of Ukraine. The EU has also provided grants worth €200 million to help Ukraine fight the Covid‑19 pandemic.

The Russian military invasion of Ukraine has aggravated the existing humanitarian crisis in the east of Ukraine and triggered a new catastrophe. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, over 1 million refugees have already fled Ukraine to neighbouring countries, mainly Poland, Hungary, Moldova, Slovakia, Romania and Russia. The European Commission estimates that up to 6.5 million people might be displaced, leading as many as 3.5 million to seek international protection, mainly in the EU. Many more millions will face extreme conditions while remaining in Ukraine.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has caused a paradigm shift in the EU’s approach to financing lethal military equipment. For the first time, the EU will purchase lethal weapons. The financial tool enabling this acquisition is the new European Peace Facility.

Since the beginning of 2022, the military threat to Ukraine has weighed heavily on investor confidence, causing a steady outflow of capital that has endangered Ukraine’s economic and financial stability.

EU response Humanitarian assistance

As the humanitarian situation in Ukraine deteriorates, the European Commission is providing emergency assistance. On 28 February 2022, the Commission announced €90 million for emergency aid programmes to help civilians in Ukraine and those displaced to Moldova. This EU humanitarian aid will provide food, water, health, shelter and help cover people’s basic needs.

The EU Civil Protection Mechanism has been activated, with offers from Member States including essential medical care items and civil protection support.

On 1 March 2022, the European Commission announced an additional €500 million from the EU budget for humanitarian aid in Ukraine and for refugees from Ukraine. It should be noted that the entire EU budget allocation for humanitarian aid worldwide for 2022 is slightly over €2 billion.

Military assistance

Under Article 41(2) TEU, the EU budget cannot be used to finance expenditure having military or defence implications, meaning common foreign and security policy (CFSP) operations outside the EU. However, Article 41(2) TEU also provides that such expenditure can be charged to the Member States. The novel European Peace Facility (EPF), created in 2021, is a financial tool outside the EU budget, financed by EU Member States based on a distribution key linked to gross national income. Using the EPF enables the EU to provide the armed forces of partner countries with infrastructure and equipment, including weapons. On 28 February 2022, the Council published its decision ((CFSP) 2022/338) on an assistance measure under the EPF for the supply of military equipment and platforms designed to deliver lethal force to the Ukrainian Armed Forces. The amount decided is €450 million for lethal arms and lethal assistance. It should be noted that the total budget for the EPF for 2022 is €540 million. This constitutes a paradigm shift, as the European Union is financing the acquisition of arms for the first time. Austria, Ireland and Malta are not participating in this measure.

At the same time the Council adopted a decision (CFSP) 2022/339 on an assistance measure under the EPF to provide the Ukrainian Armed Forces with €50 million in support. The measure shall finance the provision of equipment and supplies not designed to deliver lethal force, such as personal protective equipment, first aid kits and fuel. All EU Member States will participate.

European Parliament response

The European Parliament strongly condemns the Russian Federation’s aggression and invasion of Ukraine. In its resolution of 1 March 2022, the Parliament called ‘for the EU and its Member States to continue providing the strongest possible economic and financial support to Ukraine, as well as macro-financial and technical assistance wherever needed, including in defence- and security-related areas, to activate any EU budget instruments available and to develop a long-term strategy to support Ukraine’s efforts in strengthening the resilience of its democratic institutions and economy’. Moreover Parliament called for ‘the EU institutions to work towards granting EU candidate status to Ukraine, in line with Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union and on the basis of merit, and, in the meantime, to continue to work towards its integration into the EU single market along the lines of the Association Agreement’.

On 16 February, the European Parliament approved a €1.2 billion macro-financial loan to help Ukraine cover its external financing needs in 2022. Even before the 24 February Russian invasion, Ukraine faced significant economic challenges, which will worsen even further under the current circumstances. The loan is expected to be paid out to Ukraine during the next 12 months, in two tranches, the first being due in March 2022.

Possible further developments

The EU is equipped with a plethora of programmes aimed at supporting EU external action. These programmes are financed mainly by the EU budget. As the situation in Ukraine evolves, different elements of this system can be mobilised. The same applies to the financing of the needs relating to facilitating the welcome for refugees from Ukraine in the EU.

If the financing needs related to supporting Ukraine and those fleeing the invasion go beyond the multiannual financial framework 2020-2027 (MFF) agreement, there might be a need to use flexibility or even revise the MFF spending ceilings. This is a political and budgetary process that would need to involve both the Council and the European Parliament.

(The figures used in this briefing reflect the situation as of 3 March 2022 at 18:00 CET.)

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Russia’s war on Ukraine: EU budget response‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Carla Stamegna and Lasse Boehm.

As a system for standardised payment instructions and messaging services, SWIFT has become the basis for most global financial transactions. On 2 March 2022, the Council decided to cut seven Russian banks from the SWIFT network, as part of a wider sanctions package, including sanctions against Russia’s central bank.

State of play

The Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) is a global provider of secure financial messaging services, linking more than 11 000 banks worldwide. A co-operative society under Belgian law, it is owned by its members and headquartered in La Hulpe, Belgium. Formed in 1973, SWIFT has replaced the Telex technology then widely used by banks to communicate instructions relating to cross-border money and security transfers.

In 2021, SWIFT’s FIN messaging service recorded an average of 42 million messages per day, making it the backbone of the world’s financial infrastructure. Through SWIFT’s standardised messages, banks, custodians, investment institutions, central banks, market infrastructures and corporate clients can connect with one another to make payments or settle trades. SWIFT thereby sets the standard mandatory and optional data elements for payments, such as the business identifier code, known as a ‘BIC’ or ‘SWIFT code’.

Russia has developed its own SWIFT-type ‘Financial Messaging System of the Bank of Russia’ (SPFS). In operation since 2014, it has around 400 users and operates within Russia. Russia could also use other financial messaging systems, which nevertheless do not match SWIFT in market reach. One example is the Chinese ‘Cross-Border Interbank Payment System’ (CIPS), set-up in 2015, under the supervision of the People’s Bank of China.

EU response

Parliament had already called for the EU to consider ‘the exclusion of Russia from the SWIFT payment system’ to deter Russian authorities from further aggression, in its recommendation to the Council of 16 September 2021. On 2 March 2022, the Council of the European Union decided to prohibit the provision of SWIFT services to seven Russian banks: Bank Otkritie, Novikombank, Promsvyazbank, Rossiya Bank, Sovcombank, VNESHECONOMBANK (VEB), and VTB BANK. This will take effect from 12 March 2022. The prohibition will also apply to any legal person, entity or body established in Russia whose proprietary rights are more than 50 % directly or indirectly owned by these banks.

Sberbank, Russia’s largest lender and Gazprombank were not included in the list of sanctioned banks, as both banks are the main counterparts for payments for Russian oil and gas. However, Sberbank was ordered to close its European arm by the European Central Bank (ECB), which assessed that the bank is likely to fail.

Other sanctions against Russia’s financial sector, taken on 2 March 2022, include:

• prohibition of investment or participation in projects co-financed by the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF), the Russian sovereign wealth fund established in 2011;
• a ban on the sale, supply, transfer or export of euro denominated banknotes to Russia or to any natural or legal person, entity or body in Russia, including the government and the Central Bank of Russia, or for use in Russia.

The Council had already decided on sanctions against Russia’s central bank on 28 February 2022. These include the prohibition of all transactions related to the management of reserves or assets of the Central Bank of Russia. These sanctions will prevent Russia’s central bank from accessing a significant part of its reserves denominated in euros and dollars. The EU has also imposed further sanctions targeting individuals and economic sectors.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Russia’s war on Ukraine: Cutting certain Russian banks off from SWIFT‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clare Ferguson.

Following Parliament’s extraordinary plenary session on Ukraine on 1 March 2022, Members return to Strasbourg for the March plenary session, with a number of related issues on the agenda, including a debate with the Prime Minister of Estonia, Kaja Kallas on the security situation, scheduled for Wednesday. In the meantime, the EU has pressed ahead with new sanctions and certain banks are now cut from SWIFT. The EU is also moving fast to counter the implications for energy and agricultural trade. Parliament is due to hear Council and Commission statements on the deterioration of the refugee situation as a consequence of the uneven military balance of power in the Russian aggression against Ukraine. Parliament expects that all measures will be underpinned by a robust EU budgetary response.

The European Parliament resolution on the Russian aggression against Ukraine called for an end to ‘golden visas’ for wealthy Russians. The invasion has highlighted the problematic consequences of issuing ‘golden visas’ (residence in return for investment) or ‘golden passports’ (nationality in return for financial investment). However, a considerable number of EU countries offer these schemes to those (estimated at over 132 000 people between 2011 and 2019) who are wealthy enough to pay. While investment received is estimated at €21.4 billion, the schemes bear obvious risks to sincere cooperation between EU countries, and commodify EU rights, as well as posing security, corruption, money laundering, and tax avoidance risks. Parliament has expressed concern regarding these schemes since 2014, and Members return to the issue on Monday evening when they are expected to consider a legislative-initiative report from the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE). The committee demands that the Commission come up with proposals to phase out citizenship by investment schemes completely, and propose new laws to harmonise and govern the rules on residence by investment schemes.

Parliament has also long criticised countries who attempt to influence elections and other democratic processes in EU countries. Russia and China are among best-known sources of foreign interference, but over 80 countries spread disinformation online. In a debate scheduled for Tuesday morning, Members will hear the conclusions of a report on external attempts to influence elections and other democratic processes in EU countries from Parliament’s Special Committee on Foreign Interference (INGE). The committee’s report summarises the EU’s main vulnerabilities to foreign interference, witnessed in several recent elections, and recommends a comprehensive EU strategy to develop resilience. Greater awareness of the problem should be encouraged through media literacy, by closing loopholes that allow foreign financing of political parties, and through stronger sanctions for foreign actors who interfere with our democracies.

A political, economic, social and cultural life, where freedom of expression and of association are respected, is one guarantee of a resilient civic society. Parliament is concerned that the EU civic space has deteriorated, particularly since the pandemic, with some governments hindering civil society organisations’ participation in democratic life. On Monday, Members are expected to debate a LIBE committee own-initiative report, advocating new measures, including a specific EU strategy, to protect and boost civil society organisations in the EU. The report underlines that the strategy should align with EU action in other fields, including on racism. Members are then scheduled to consider a Culture and Education Committee own-initiative report on the role of culture, education, media and sport in the fight against racism. Considering the 2020 EU action plan on racism, the committee underlines the action still needed to combat stereotypes, develop inclusive education, raise awareness of the history of racism and ensure fair representation of ethnic minorities in the media. The committee insists that adequate resources be made available to ensure that the ambitions can be realised, and calls for the Commission to act on discrimination in sport. The committee also urges EU countries to take effective measures to prevent the media from spreading hate speech and false narratives about particular ethnic groups.

The world celebrates international women’s day on 8 March, and Ukrainian writer Oksana Zaboujko is due to address Parliament on Tuesday lunchtime. Fittingly – given the consequences of war for women – Parliament is then scheduled to debate elements driving gender parity in EU external policy. Members are scheduled to consider a report prepared by the Women’s Rights and Gender Equality (FEMM) and the Development (DEVE) Committees, on the third EU gender action plan, which seeks to mainstream gender equality in external policy. The report welcomes integration of the EU action plan on women, peace and security into GAP III, as well as the inclusion of climate change considerations, among other things. However, regretting the Council’s failure to endorse GAP III, it also criticises the omission of issues including women’s access to natural resources; sexual exploitation and violence; and the inclusion of women in mediation processes. Finally, it calls for more EU action to counter the effects of the pandemic on women, and greater focus on gender equality in trade and investment policy.

On Wednesday afternoon, Members turn to the EU’s climate ambitions and the eighth environment action programme – the framework for EU environmental policy to 2030. Parliament is expected to vote on a draft agreement reached between the co-legislators, setting the priorities for EU objectives targeting a sustainable economy. While the aim is to ensure that environmental measures do not perpetuate social and gender inequalities, and to phase out fossil fuel and other harmful subsidies, the agreement does not set the specific 2025 and 2027 deadlines requested by Parliament. A key issue in attaining climate goals and energy independence is coping with uneven wind and solar power generation. Here, Parliament supports the introduction of a legislative framework to ensure that the batteries we turn to in support of renewable energy are themselves sustainable. Members are also scheduled to consider Parliament’s position at first reading on Wednesday afternoon, on European Commission proposals for a regulation concerning batteries and waste batteries. The Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI) Committee’s report calls for higher ambition, with a wider scope to include e-bike and other light transport batteries, and greater diligence throughout the battery lifecycle, from manufacture to recycling. The vote in plenary should set Parliament’s negotiating position and open the way for interinstitutional negotiations to begin.

Finally, Members return to the subject of agricultural statistics on Tuesday afternoon, to consider adoption at first reading of the agreed text on the proposed overhaul of the regulation on economic accounts for agriculture, formalising regional agricultural data reporting. During the negotiations, Parliament’s Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development (AGRI) underlined the need to ensure cost efficient data collection and avoid redundancy in data reporting.

Written by Costica Dumbrava.

Russia’s military invasion of Ukraine has already pushed over a million people to seek refuge in neighbouring countries. The EU and its Member States have strongly condemned the aggression and mobilised to aid Ukraine. The EU has also adopted measures to help people, mostly women and children, fleeing Russian aggression, while ensuring proper management of the EU’s external borders. These measures include a proposal to grant EU-wide temporary protection to people arriving from Ukraine, guidelines to assist border guards carrying out checks at the EU-Ukraine borders, and support from specialised EU agencies.

Situation at the EU borders with Ukraine

As of 3 March 2022, the United Nations refugee agency, UNHCR, estimated that about 1 million people had fled Ukraine to neighbouring countries, mainly Poland, Hungary, Moldova, Slovakia and Romania. The European Commission estimates that up to 6.5 million persons may be displaced by the conflict, leading to as many as 3.5 million people seeking international protection in the EU in the next two years. With 4 million people expected to seek protection in neighbouring countries and further 12 million people inside Ukraine in need of relief and protection, this is rapidly unfolding into a major humanitarian crisis.

EU response

The EU and its Member States have strongly condemned the ‘unprovoked and unjustified military aggression against Ukraine’ and swiftly agreed on sanctions against the Russian Federation. They also stepped-up assistance to Ukraine and increased humanitarian aid to refugees in Moldova (in cooperation with UN humanitarian agencies). On 24 February 2022, the European Council called for progress on preparedness and readiness at all levels and invited the Commission to put forward contingency measures. On 27 February, the Presidency of the Council decided to activate fully the EU integrated political crisis response arrangements for monitoring and operational coordination.

Temporary protection for people fleeing Ukraine

As requested by the Council, on 2 March 2022, the Commission proposed to activate the application of the Temporary Protection Directive (Directive 2001/55/EC) to grant immediate temporary protection in the EU to people fleeing the war in Ukraine. This will allow displaced persons to enjoy harmonised rights across the EU, including a resident permit, the possibility to work, housing, and access to social welfare, medical assistance and means of subsistence. Temporary protection does not equal refugee status, but it will not prevent the people concerned from applying for international protection. The measures will also allow Member States to manage the influx of people efficiently, coordinate with the other Member States (through the EU Migration Preparedness and Crisis Management Mechanism Network), and reduce the immediate impact on their asylum systems.

The Temporary Protection Directive enables Member States to provide protection and rights to people in need of immediate protection (for two years maximum). The Council can establish the existence of a mass influx of displaced persons by Council decision, adopted by a qualified majority, upon a proposal from the Commission. The European Parliament must be informed of the decision. Although the directive was invoked several times in the past (e.g., in 2011 and 2015), it has never been activated. Under the new pact on migration and asylum, the Commission proposed to replace the Temporary Protection Directive with a regulation addressing broader situations of force majeure in the field of migration and asylum. The proposal has yet to be adopted. Management of EU external borders

As beneficiaries of EU visa-free travel, Ukrainian nationals can enter and stay in the EU for 90 days without a visa. On 2 March, the Commission put forward operational guidelines on external border management at EU-Ukraine borders, to help Member States’ border guards to manage arrivals efficiently and assist people in need, whilst maintaining a high level of security checks. The guidelines clarify the facilitation available to border guards under the Schengen Borders Code, in particular:

• simplification of border controls for certain categories of persons (e.g., vulnerable persons);
• the possibility to organise border controls outside border crossing points;
• special derogation from the fulfilment of entry conditions based on humanitarian grounds;
• special arrangements for rescue services, police, fire brigades, border guards and seafarers to cross the borders, regardless of their nationality;
• the establishment of emergency support lanes to ensure access and return of organisations providing humanitarian aid for people in Ukraine.

The Commission emphasised that this facilitation at the external borders should not come at the expense of Member States’ internal security and public policy. For example, whereas Member States may suspend the application of entry bans (alerts in the Schengen Information System) based on migratory grounds, they should not disregard entry bans issued on the basis of security reasons.

The Schengen Borders Code allows border guards to temporarily relax border checks at external borders ‘as a result of exceptional and unforeseen circumstances’ (Article 9). Member States can authorise non-EU nationals to enter their territory on humanitarian grounds (Article 6(5)(c)), even if they do not fulfil all entry conditions (e.g. people unable to present a valid passport or visa). They can also decide to perform border checks during or after the transport of the travellers to a safe location, and not at the border crossing point. Support from EU agencies

As emphasised by the Commission’s border guidelines, Member States can benefit from European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) support, including through the deployment of standing corps to assist with border checks (e.g. registration in Eurodac), and providing border monitoring (e.g. satellite imagery and aerial surveillance). Frontex has activated crisis response teams to coordinate its support for Member States in the event of increasing numbers of people fleeing Ukraine. As of 2 March 2022, it has already responded to a request for support from Romania. Member States can also request help from migration management support teams, made up of staff from Frontex, the EU Agency for Asylum (EASO), Europol and other agencies.

The European Border and Coast Guard Regulation enables a Member State facing disproportionate migratory challenges at EU external borders to request technical and operational reinforcement from migration management support teams composed of experts from Union bodies, offices and agencies (Article 40). Position of the European Parliament

In its resolution of 1 March 2022, the European Parliament strongly condemned ‘the Russian Federation’s illegal, unprovoked and unjustified military aggression against and invasion of Ukraine’ and called on the Commission and the Member States to provide further emergency humanitarian assistance for Ukraine. Parliament welcomed the Council’s commitment to activate the Temporary Protection Directive, having previously called for the Temporary Protection Directive to be triggered in relation to the mass influx of refugees from Syria and other conflict areas (e.g. in 2013 and 2015).

Parliament urged the Council to divide responsibility for the reception of the refugees who arrive at the EU’s external borders equally among the Member States. It called on the Council and the Commission to provide extra funding for the frontline countries, as they are the primary points of entry for Ukrainian refugees. It also urged the Commission to establish a solidarity mechanism to relocate Ukrainian refugees from frontline EU countries to other Member States. Parliament reminded all Member States of their responsibility to uphold the fundamental rights of all asylum seekers. Parliament also called for the EU institutions to work towards granting EU candidate status to Ukraine, in line with Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Russia’s war on Ukraine: Assisting Ukrainians at the EU’s borders‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Martin Russell.

Outraged by Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine, EU countries have adopted unprecedentedly tough sanctions, in cooperation with partners such as the US, Canada and the UK. Although Russia will partially adapt, these measures are expected to cause major disruption and isolate the country from the global economy.

Pre-2022 EU Ukraine-related sanctions against Russia

After Russia’s March 2014 annexation of Crimea and support for Donbas separatists, the EU adopted numerous sanctions against Russia. These include targeted measures (asset freezes, visa bans) against some 160 individuals (including Russian politicians and military officers) and 40 organisations responsible for violations of Ukrainian sovereignty. There are also sectoral sanctions: severe restrictions on EU lending to five major Russian state-owned banks, three oil companies and three arms manufacturers; an arms embargo, and a ban on exports of dual-use (civilian/military) items to Russian defence companies; and a ban on providing innovative extractive technology and services, used by Russian companies to develop deep-water, Arctic and shale oil reserves.

New sanctions triggered by Russia’s attack on Ukraine

On 24 February 2022, Russia launched an unprovoked attack on Ukraine. Earlier in February, US officials predicted that an invasion could claim up to 50 000 Ukrainian civilian lives, together with 25 000 military casualties on the Ukrainian side and 10 000 for Russia, while displacing up to 5 million people. According to the United Nations, as of 1 March 2022, at least 136 civilians had been killed and 400 injured, with the real toll probably much higher. At the time of writing one million refugees have left the country.

The invasion was preceded by months of debate on Europe’s response to expected Russian aggression. Given the damage that further sanctions would cause to their own economies, there were some doubts as to how far EU leaders were prepared to go. However, the scale and the brutality of the attack, as well as its worrying implications for European security, have highlighted the need for harsher measures.

Four new sanctions packages

The EU adopted sanctions on 23 February after Russia’s decision to recognise the two ‘People’s Republics’ of Donetsk and Luhansk as independent states, followed by three packages of much harsher measures after the start of the invasion, on 25 February, 28 February and 2 March. These include:

• targeted individual sanctions against Russian President Vladimir Putin, senior government ministers including defence minister Sergey Shoigu and Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, members of the National Security Council, oligarchs in the oil, banking and finance sectors, propagandists such as Margarita Simonyan, head of the RT news channel, and all 351 Russian parliamentarians (out of 450) who voted for recognition of the two territories;
• bans on: financial transactions with all state-controlled banks (70 % of Russia’s banking sector); trading in shares of Russian state-owned companies; financial deposits from Russia in EU banks exceeding €100 000; accounts belonging to Russian clients in EU banks; the sale of euro-denominated securities to Russian clients; transactions with the Russian Central Bank; supply of euro banknotes to Russia; participation in Russian Direct Investment Fund projects;
• exclusion of seven banks from the SWIFT financial messaging system. However, the list includes only one of Russia’s top five banks (VTB, the second largest by total assets);
• energy sector: a ban on exports of services and technology used by Russian oil refineries;
• aviation sector: a ban on the sale of all aircraft, spare parts and equipment to Russian airlines. Russian planes, including private jets, are banned from EU airspace and EU airports;
• restrictions on exports of high-tech goods with potential military applications, such as electronics, computers, information security, telecoms, sensors and lasers, navigation and avionics equipment, not only to military companies, but to all Russian purchasers;
• a ban on broadcasts by Kremlin propaganda channels RT and Sputnik.

Sanctions coordination, and further restrictive measures:

Like the previous sanctions of 2014, these measures have been coordinated with the USA, Canada, and the UK. Together with the EU, the latter three countries have frozen Russian international reserves, banned Russian planes, restricted technology exports, and adopted targeted sanctions against elite figures. The four partners have committed to ending ‘golden passports’ for wealthy Russians connected to the Russian government. Following the example of the UK and Canada, the EU and USA are considering a ban on Russian ships. Czechia is one of the EU countries that have already stopped issuing visas to Russian citizens, and there are calls for other Member States to follow suit.

Western companies have taken some initiatives of their own that go beyond sanctions compliance. Shell and BP have announced that they will sell off their Russian assets. Apple and Jaguar Land Rover will stop selling products in Russia, while MSC and Maersk will no longer ship containers to Russia.

Consequences of new sanctions

Previous EU and Western sanctions adopted in 2014 were targeted at a narrow group of strategic companies and sectors. Their objective was not to cripple the Russian economy but to slow down long-term growth. After an initial shock, Russian banks and energy companies adapted to the new situation; energy production and exports have now reached record levels. Nevertheless, there are signs that sanctions have imposed significant costs: foreign investment is down, and according to some estimates, Russia may be losing around 1 % of GDP growth per year.

The latest sanctions are more similar to Washington’s post-2018 ‘maximum pressure‘ campaign against Iran, in that they aim at a much broader impact. Without access to SWIFT, Russian traders will find it difficult to send and receive international financial transfers, obstructing the oil and gas exports on which the Russian economy so crucially depends (however, it is still unclear whether this ban will include energy exports). Whereas previous sanctions targeted elites rather than ordinary Russians, the new measures, such as the ban on Russian flights and heavy restrictions on visas, could make travel almost impossible for everyone in the country. With the ban on aviation exports, Russia could run out of spare parts for its commercial air fleet, three quarters of which originate from Western countries, in just a few months. Technology export restrictions will hold back economic modernisation, and financial restrictions will isolate Moscow from international markets.

Since the invasion, the Russian rouble has lost 30 % of its value against the euro and share markets have crashed, forcing Moscow’s stock exchange to close. In a bid to prop up the rouble, Russia’s Central Bank raised interest rates sharply, from 9.5 to 20 %; the latter move will hurt heavily indebted Russian households, which had already seen disposable incomes decline to a 12-year low even before the conflict. Moscow has US$630 billion in international reserves, giving it some scope for cushioning the impact of economic shocks, but around half of these reserves are now frozen by Western sanctions.

The longer-term impact is less clear. Russia proved more resilient to previous sanctions than expected, and there is a limit to how far EU countries are prepared to go in restricting energy trade, given that many of them depend on Russian supplies. For the time being, gas exports continue to flow, including via Ukraine. In 2014, to overcome Western restrictions on exports of dual use goods for the defence sector, Russia looked to domestic manufacturers and Chinese imports for replacements. Yet such alternatives are often of inferior quality and can take years to develop. Furthermore, it is not clear whether Chinese producers will want to risk secondary sanctions from the USA, which is by far their biggest export market.

In the short term, EU countries are unlikely to stop buying gas from Russia, which supplies over 40 % of their imports. However, in the long term, sanctions could spur more determined diversification efforts; Germany, which is currently the biggest importer, has already put the Nord Stream 2 pipeline on hold and announced plans to build two LNG terminals.

European Parliament: in its 1 March 2022 resolution on Russian aggression against Ukraine, Parliament welcomes the EU’s swift adoption of sanctions, but calls for further measures against Russia and Belarus, including total exclusion from SWIFT, a ban on exports of all high-tech products, and a ban on Russian shipping.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Russia’s war on Ukraine: New EU sanctions‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marcin Grajewski.

Russia invaded Ukraine on 24 February, launching the biggest military offensive in Europe since World War II. Moscow’s incursion into the territory of its south-western neighbour and attempts to capture major cities – notably Kyiv, the capital – have met with firm resistance, thwarting President Vladimir Putin’s reported plans for a quick conquest and installation of a subservient government. The United States, the European Union and many other countries have imposed harsh sanctions on Russia, including attempting to cut some Russian banks off from international payments systems and limiting the Russian central bank’s access to financial markets, as well as launching trade curbs, assets freezes and other restrictions. Many NATO countries have promised to deliver weapons to support Ukrainian fighters. For the first time, the EU has announced plans to send military equipment to a third country. Putin has moved Russia’s nuclear force on to ‘special alert’, sparking fear and renewed condemnation across the world. Hundreds of thousands have already fled Ukraine to escape the war.

This note gathers links to the recent publications and commentaries from many international think tanks on Russia’s attack on Ukraine. Reports from before the invasion can be found in a previous item of the ‘What think tanks are thinking’ series.

Russia invades Ukraine
Centre for European Policy Studies, February 2022

Putin must face war crime charges
European Policy Centre, February 2022

A watershed moment in European history: Decision time for the EU
European Policy Centre, February 2022`

EU ‘hybrid power’ to face the Russian threat
European Policy Centre, February 2022

Europe’s post-Cold War order is no more
Instituto Affari Internazionali, February 2022

Russia invades Ukraine: The dangerous weakness of a military superpower
Egmont, February 2022

Ukraine and the importance of resistance
International Institute for Strategic Studies, February 2022

War in Ukraine: A lesson in strategic grammar
Institut français des relations internationales, February 2022

The Kremlin’s gas wars
Bruegel, February 2022

Expert insights: Russia and Ukraine
Clingendael, February 2022

War of obsession: Why Putin is risking Russia’s future
European Council on Foreign Relations, February 2022

International law and the invasion of Ukraine
European Council on Foreign Relations, February 2022

Views from the capitals: Russia’s war on Ukraine
European Council on Foreign Relations, February 2022

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine changes everything
Carnegie Europe, February 2022

Ukraine has finally prompted the West to shift course on Putin
Atlantic Council, February 2022

Ukraine war: Vladimir Putin has gambled everything and lost
Atlantic Council, February 2022

The day when history changed: Choices and consequences for Europe’s future relation to Russia
European Centre for International Political Economy, February 2022

Ukraine is severe test of China’s new axis with Russia
Chatham House, February 2022

Ukraine: Debunking Russia’s legal justifications
Chatham House, February 2022

Moscow’s fabrication of excuses for renewed war
Chatham House, February 2022

Russian invasion of Ukraine
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, February 2022

Putin’s moves are hardly ‘chess thumping’
Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, February 2022

Around the halls: Implications of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine
Brookings Institution, February 2022

Could Ukraine be Putin’s Afghanistan?
Brookings Institution, February 2022

What does the war in Ukraine mean for Africa?
Brookings Institution, February 2022

Why Putin’s war with Ukraine is a miscalculation
Council on Foreign Relations, February 2022

How the world can influence Putin’s fateful choices in Ukraine
Council on Foreign Relations via The Boston Globe, February 2022

The economic consequences of the Ukraine war
Peterson Institute for International Economics via The Project Syndicate, February 2022

Ukraine and the importance of resistance
International Institute for Strategic Studies, February 2022

The fight for Europe’s future is being fought in the streets of Ukraine
Martens Centre, February 2022

Turkey’s response to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine
Polish Institute of International Affairs, February 2022

NATO reacts to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine
Polish Institute of International Affairs, February 2022

Russian society on their country’s invasion of Ukraine
Polish Institute of International Affairs, February 2022

Russian disinformation regarding the attack on Ukraine
Polish Institute of International Affairs, February 2022

Russia’s war against Ukraine: The status after three days
Eastern Studies Centre, February 2022

Russian invasion of Ukraine: What’s next?
Casimir Pulaski Foundation, February 2022

Putin, Ukrainians, and the right to asylum
Institute of International and Strategic Relations, February 2022

Latin America and the war in Ukraine
Institute of International and Strategic Relations, February 2022

Zäsur in Europa: Putins Krieg
Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, February 2022

Stronger sanctions on Russia: Essential, but not a strategy
Centre for European Reform, February 2022

Read this briefing on ‘War in Ukraine‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Lasse Boehm.

Russia is by far the largest exporter of oil, natural gas and coal to the EU. Already before the crisis, natural gas prices had increased significantly. The current crisis is likely to have a major impact on price levels in Europe. The EU will need to see how to increase its energy independence, using some of the building blocks of the Green Deal.

State of play

According to the European Commission quarterly gas market report, the share of Russian pipeline gas in EU gas imports was 41 % in the third quarter of 2021. Oil and gas are particularly important for Russia, funding just over a third of its federal budget in 2021 (RUB9.1 billion out of RUB25.3 billion total revenue).

The European Union’s dependence on energy imports has increased in recent years due to lower domestic production of non-renewable energy (coal, gas, oil and nuclear), combined with stable energy demand. In 2020, the EU imported well over half (57.5 %) of its energy, ranging from 97.6 % for Malta to 10.5 % in Estonia. In terms of energy source, 97 % of oil and petroleum products, 83.6 % of natural gas, and 35.8 % of solid fossil fuels were not produced by the EU, but had to be imported.

With the Green Deal, the EU has already implicitly taken steps to reduce this dependency – albeit over a long period, stretching at least until 2050, when the EU wants to be climate-neutral, as set out in the 2021 European Climate Law. With EU climate policy aimed at rapidly reducing carbon emissions, many EU Member States have already announced that coal will be or is already being phased out for electricity production. At the same time, the EU increased the share of renewables to 22.1 % of energy consumed in 2020, two percentage points more than anticipated. However, natural gas in particular is often regarded as a necessary source of energy for the transition period, thanks to its being cleaner than coal and its ability to provide a flexible buffer in case of a shortfall in renewable energy due to lack of sunshine or wind.

Russian gas is transported to Europe via pipelines. Soviet-era pipelines via Belarus and Ukraine have been complemented by Nord Stream (2011/2012) and Turkish Stream (2020). The share of gas transit via Ukraine, which accounted for over 60 % of Russia’s pipeline deliveries to the EU and United Kingdom in 2009, fell to 25 % in 2021. Nord Stream and its recent sister pipeline Nord Stream 2 run underneath the Baltic Sea to Germany, bypassing eastern Europe. Each has a capacity of 55 billion cubic metres of gas per year. Nord Stream 2 is fully built, but not authorised for operation (see below). Nord Stream 1 is owned and operated by Nord Stream AG, headquartered in Switzerland. Russia’s Gazprom owns a 51 % stake in the project, while the rest is owned by German, Dutch and French energy companies. Nord Stream 2 is owned and operated by Nord Stream 2 AG, with Gazprom as the sole shareholder and western European energy companies as financial investors.

Natural gas prices in Europe rose considerably during the second half of 2021, already well before the current crisis in Ukraine, not least due to a strong surge in post-pandemic demand. On 21 December 2021, prices reached a peak of €180 per megawatt-hour, having hovered below €50 per megawatt-hour throughout the summer. This came in the wake of comparatively low levels of natural gas storage.

EU response (in coordination with partners)

On 22 February 2022, on the eve of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the German government announced suspension of the authorisation process for Nord Stream 2, by withdrawing the supply security report previously submitted to its national regulator, the Bundesnetzagentur. As of 27 February 2022, Russian gas is still flowing towards Europe, but the future of Europe’s gas supply from Russia could become uncertain, whether due to a politically-motivated interruption of deliveries, uncertainty over energy payments under the sanctions imposed on Russia, or damage to the Ukraine pipelines due to fighting.

Possible further developments

The energy mix used in a country is a national competence and current events might lead some Member States to prioritise a particular energy source or prolong the lifespan of power plants otherwise scheduled for closure.

Given potentially continuing uncertainty over Russia’s oil and gas supplies to Europe, the EU will need to accelerate moves towards diversifying its supply and increasing its energy independence. These steps could focus on the following building blocks, some of which also align with the EU’s efforts to combat climate change and are part of the Green Deal:

• Gas storage should be maximised before the onset of the next winter. This poses the question of a possible strategic reserve. Gas market rules are currently undergoing revision in the European Parliament in the form of the December 2021 ‘gas markets and hydrogen package‘, which includes the proposed revision of the EU gas regulation and EU gas directive.
• Should Russian natural gas supplies be shut off, liquefied natural gas (LNG) will likely play a key role, as other producers such as Norway or the Netherlands cannot significantly increase their production. The EU27 currently has a total annual LNG import capacity of 156 billion cubic metres (bcm) (see table). The biggest share of this capacity lies in Spain, but the Iberian Peninsula’s connection to the rest of the European gas grid is limited. Other major LNG importers include France, Italy, the Netherlands and Belgium.

EU27 annual regasification capacity of LNG large-scale import terminals (bcm(N)/year)

• Renewable energy: While EU Member States are free to decide on their energy mix, key policy tools at EU level include the proposed revision of the Renewable Energy Directive. The European Commission is proposing to increase the target for the 2030 share of renewable energy, such as biomass, wind or solar power, from the current 32 % to 40 % of final energy consumption. The draft act is now under negotiation in the European Parliament. Even with a higher share of renewables, a flexible non-renewable electricity generation capacity will likely be necessary to cover prolonged periods without wind or sunshine.
• Energy efficiency: To rapidly lower demand for Russian oil and gas, the EU also needs to decrease overall energy consumption. The current Energy Efficiency Directive envisages 32.5 % energy savings by 2030, compared with a business-as-usual scenario. A new proposal tabled by the European Commission last year and under consideration in the European Parliament seeks to increase this goal by a further 9 % in energy savings.
• Infrastructure: supply policies need to be matched by infrastructure allowing electricity and gas to flow unhindered in the European market. The adequacy of the plans for electricity and gas interconnections should be reassessed in the light of emerging supply risks.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Russia’s war on Ukraine: Implications for EU energy supply‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Suzana-Elena Anghel.

On 17-18 February 2022, EU Heads of State or Government met for an informal European Council meeting, followed by a summit with African Union (AU) leaders. During their informal meeting, EU leaders focused on the Russia-Ukraine crisis – urging Russia to engage on a path of de-escalation, reaffirming their support for Ukraine, displaying unity and willingness to work together with partners, in particular NATO, and calling for a diplomatic solution to the crisis. Meeting with their African counterparts, EU leaders looked to renew the EU‑AU partnership and adopted a joint declaration announcing an Africa-Europe investment package of €150 billion, for health and education and support for ‘a common agenda for manufacturing vaccines’.

Background

On 17-18 February 2022, EU leaders met with their African counterparts for a long-planned summit, twice postponed because of the pandemic. The Russia-Ukraine crisis, the direct result of the progressive build-up of Russian troops (around 170 000 troops at the time of writing) on the borders with Ukraine, led the President, Charles Michel, to call an informal European Council meeting, which preceded but, being brief, did not overshadow, the EU-AU summit. Ukraine is currently a matter of utmost concern for the EU, the US and NATO, as Russia’s assertiveness and recently expressed ‘demands for security guarantees’ have called the entire European security architecture into question. However, concerns regarding Russia’s behaviour go beyond Ukraine. They encompass the EU’s neighbourhood more broadly, and the Sahel, where the Wagner Group has been and continues to be active. The EU has recently imposed sanctions on this ‘Russia-based unincorporated private military entity’.

The informal meeting of members of the European Council Pre-summit developments

The informal European Council meeting was announced on Twitter one day in advance, and no invitation letter was circulated, given the short notice, as well as the sensitivity of the subject and the highly volatile situation on the Russian-Ukrainian border. However, preparations were well under way in the week preceding the summit. First, the President of the European Council, Charles Michel, held a series of calls with various smaller groups of Heads of State or Government on the Russia-Ukraine crisis, and all Member States were kept fully informed of the diplomatic attempts to de-escalate the crisis. Second, following a call with President Michel, the Lithuanian President, Gitanas Nauseda, tweeted that he was ‘ready to discuss’ Russia ‘next week’ at the European Council. Third, speaking in the European Parliament’s plenary debate on Russia, the day before the informal European Council, President Michel mentioned that EU leaders would have the ‘opportunity to express Europe’s firmness, unity and strength in upholding our values’ as well as support for the people of Ukraine, on the margins of the EU-AU summit.

Main results of the informal European Council meeting

The informal meeting had four main objectives: to build unity; to express support for a diplomatic solution to the crisis; to reiterate the EU’s unwavering support for Ukraine; and to prepare the EU’s response in the event of a further escalation of the crisis, notably to discuss sanctions.

Building unity

President Michel stressed that the informal European Council meeting offered an opportunity for EU leaders to express their unity within the EU and with NATO. According to the Prime Minister of the Netherlands, Mark Rutte, EU leaders reiterated their support for the territorial integrity of Ukraine and stressed that they were united, calling – jointly with the US, the UK, Canada and NATO – on Russia to de-escalate. The High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Josep Borrell, stressed that the EU and NATO were coordinating their positions and responses. Unity in the European Council on the issue dates back to 2014, when Russia illegally annexed Crimea. The EU introduced sanctions, renewed regularly, for failure to implement the Minsk Agreements. Having spent much of the past decade operating in crisis mode, the European Council is fully aware of the importance of unity and the price of non-coordination in times of crisis.

Supporting a diplomatic solution to the crisis

The French President, Emmanuel Macron, and the German Chancellor, Olaf Scholz, informed their fellow leaders of the status of the latest negotiations undertaken in the Normandy Format, the main European negotiation channel with Russia and Ukraine, instituted back in 2014. Besides this, in an attempt to help defuse the crisis, both France and Germany have held bilateral talks with Russia and with Ukraine at head of state or government level. Diplomatic efforts undertaken in other multilateral forums, such as the NATO-Russia Council and the OSCE, have EU support. In addition, the US has conducted bilateral talks with Russia, in close cooperation with its European allies and on the basis of the principle ‘nothing about you, without you’ formulated by US President Joe Biden during a call with the President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelenskyy. The Prime Minister of Estonia, Kaja Kallas, stressed the common line maintained by the transatlantic community as well as NATO’s staunch commitment to its ‘open-door policy’. The Prime Minister of Italy, Mario Draghi, stressed that all channels of dialogue, whether bilateral or multilateral, were being and should continue to be used in a coordinated manner and that, following a Ukrainian request, his country was ready to facilitate a meeting on its soil between the leaders of Ukraine and Russia, should both parties agree.

Supporting Ukraine

In addition to diplomatic support for Ukraine, the EU has also increased its aid to Ukraine, pledging €1.2 billion in emergency macro-financial assistance to ‘mitigate the effects’ of the crisis with Russia.

Being prepared for further escalation

The informal meeting was not about immediate decisions but about preparing, in a united and coordinated manner, joint decisions in the event of further escalation of the crisis. Several EU leaders pointed to the mixed signals coming from Russia, stressing that, at that moment, there was no evidence of troop withdrawal from the Ukrainian border, and that the Duma’s vote in favour of ‘the formal recognition of Donetsk and Luhansk as independent republics’ was not a sign of de-escalation. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen briefed EU leaders on the package of sanctions that the EU would be ready to put forward when appropriate. However, further clarification was needed with respect to the threshold set for triggering the EU’s response. Nevertheless, EU leaders stressed that ‘full scale invasion was not the threshold – lower-level aggression by Russia could also justify fresh sanctions’.

The EU-AU summit

The EU-AU summit, initially scheduled for 2020, was ‘very much awaited’, as stressed by Estonia’s Prime Minister, Kaja Kallas. In attendance were the 27 EU leaders, over 40 African leaders, European Parliament President Roberta Metsola, European Central Bank President Christine Lagarde, and representatives of other international organisations. Several African countries – Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mali and Sudan – currently suspended from the African Union, were not represented at the summit.

The focus of the summit was on renewed partnership and prosperity, summed up in the motto: ‘Africa and Europe: A joint vision for 2030’. The aim was to achieve ‘concrete deliverables’, represented by the chosen format of seven thematic round tables on: 1) financing growth; 2) health systems and vaccine production; 3) agriculture and sustainable development; 4) education, culture and vocational training, migration and mobility; 5) private-sector support and economic integration; 6) peace, security and governance; and 7) climate change and energy transition, digital and transport. The EU Member States’ refusal to waive intellectual property rights for vaccine production sparked most sensitivities, overshadowing negotiations on the joint declaration, for which common language was nonetheless agreed.

The security situation in the Sahel was considered at a separate summit convened by French President Emmanuel Macron the previous day. A common declaration was adopted stating that European states contributing to Operation Barkane and the Tauba Task Force would withdraw their forces from Mali, as the ‘political, operational and legal’ conditions for their engagement were no longer met.Message from the European Parliament President: President Metsola stressed that the EU and AU were ‘bound by common challenges, such as security, energy and reduction of poverty’, and that the two continents needed to move from ‘aid to partnership’ and ‘talk to each other as equals’ about opportunities.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Outcome of the meetings of EU leaders on 17-18 February 2022‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Suzana-Elena Anghel.

On 24 February 2022, at a special European Council meeting following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, EU leaders delivered a message of unity and determination, acknowledging ‘the European aspirations and the European choice of Ukraine’ and reiterating the EU’s support to the territorial integrity of the country. They condemned Russia’s continued violation of international law, and stressed that Russia ‘will be held accountable for its actions’. EU leaders also approved politically a new package of sanctions, which ‘bites but does not deter’. Key restrictions linked to gas supply and to access to the SWIFT payment system, a measure supported by the European Parliament, did not find a consensus. The EU institutions were also asked to prepare a new set of ‘individual and economic sanctions’ targeted at Belarus.

1. Background

On 24 February 2022, EU leaders met to express the Union’s support for Ukraine and its people, to discuss further political, financial and humanitarian assistance, and to uphold the EU’s commitment to an international order based on rules and norms, as well as to agree on a new set of sanctions against Russia. The meeting took place on the very day Russia launched its full-scale military operation against Ukraine, violating international law and plunging Europe into potentially the most severe security crisis since World War II. The President of the European Council, Charles Michel, stressed that he had not been aware of the date and timing of Russia’s invasion when he called the special meeting. In his invitation letter, President Michel, set four objectives for the meeting, namely to: i) take stock of the latest developments; ii) consider how to protect the rules-based international order; iii) discuss the next steps in dealing with Russia and in holding ‘Russia accountable for its actions’; and iv) further support Ukraine and its people.

The special European Council meeting took place exactly a week after the EU leaders had discussed the Ukraine-Russia crisis informally on 16 February 2022. At that meeting, they had built unity on and support for a common and coordinated response to Russia’s offensive actions, reiterated the Union’s support for Ukraine’s territorial integrity, and prepared possible next steps in the event of the crisis escalating. They also increased aid to Ukraine by €1.2 billion, in the form of emergency macro-financial assistance aimed at lessening the effects of the crisis. EU leaders discussed a package of sanctions which, in the interim, were adopted by written procedure in the Council after Russia’s ‘recognition of the non-government controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts of Ukraine and sending of troops into the region’.

2. Russia’s full-scale military operation against Ukraine

At dawn, on 24 February 2022, on the pretext of a ‘special military operation’ in the Donbass, Russia launched a full-scale military attack on strategic locations in major cities across Ukraine, sparking anti-war protests including across Russia (see Figure 1). The invasion occurred a few days after Russia’s recognition, in violation of international law, of the independence of the self-proclaimed Donetsk

Russia’s military attack on Ukraine

(DPR) and Luhansk (LPR) republics, where a Russian so-called ‘peacekeeping’ force was sent earlier in the week. In response to the attack, Ukraine cut diplomatic ties, declared martial law and called on all its citizens of an age to do what is necessary to protect the country.

Before escalating into a full-scale war, the Ukraine-Russia crisis started in autumn 2021 with a progressive military build-up, which ended up in a force of nearly 200 000 Russian troops being positioned (in Russia and Belarus) on Ukraine’s borders. Intensive diplomatic talks at multilateral level (OSCE, NATO-Russia Council and in the Normandy Format) and bilateral level took place in recent weeks without changing the course of events. Since December 2021, EU leaders have closely monitored the situation in and around Ukraine (see Figure 2).

European Council’s monitoring of Russia’s actions in and around Ukraine

In December 2021, in an attempt to strengthen its sphere of influence over its neighbourhood, Russia requested ‘security guarantees’ from NATO, including an end to the Alliance’s ‘open door policy’ and a limitation and repositioning (away from Russia’s borders) of assets (weapons and personnel) of member states that had joined before 1997. Russia was thus contesting Ukraine’s right to freely choose its alliances and also NATO’s ability to shape its own defence policy.

Through such assertiveness and aggressiveness, Russia, which has recently engaged in a rapprochement with China, has in effect called into question the entire European security architecture as defined by the Helsinki Final Act. Moreover, the UN Security Council, which Russia has chaired this February, risked being paralysed, endangering global security. The result has in fact been strengthened unity within NATO, which has refused to end its ‘open door policy’ and is further strengthening its eastern flank. However, major geopolitical consequences are to be expected from the war. As outlined by EU High Representative Josep Borrell, the survival of the ‘post-war multilateral “acquis”‘, with ‘the UN, international law and universal rights’ at its core, is at stake. Analysts argue that Russia and China ‘share a commitment to creating a ‘post-West’ global order’ based on their interests and ‘conducive to authoritarian rule’ and that the US and their allies need to ‘develop a free world defence strategy‘, enabling democratic values and the rules-based international order to be protected.

3. Initial reactions of the EU and the international community

On 25 February 2022, the UN Security Council (UNSC) voted on a resolution ‘condemning Russia’s attack in Ukraine’. This was vetoed by Russia, while China, India and the United Arab Emirate abstained. High Representative Josep Borrell stressed that the resolution would be submitted to the UN General Assembly and that he was working to forge ‘an alliance of people who want to protect the sovereignty of nations’.

Meeting in a video-conference format, the G7 leaders called on ‘the Russian Federation to stop the bloodshed, to immediately de-escalate and to withdraw its forces from Ukraine’. They condemned Belarus’s involvement and expressed unity with Ukraine, NATO and the EU. The OSCE Permanent Council also held an extraordinary meeting, where Josep Borrell stressed the EU’s readiness to set ‘both sectoral and individual restrictive measures’ together with partners.

After an extraordinary meeting of the North Atlantic Council, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg condemned Russia’s ‘brutal act of war’, expressed support to Ukraine and said that NATO had activated its defence plans. He confirmed that NATO would protect all its territory and increase its land, air and sea presence on the eastern flank. In addition, President Michel, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, and Jens Stoltenberg jointly expressed the EU’s and NATO’s unity.

The US President, Joe Biden, announced ‘additional strong sanctions’ against Russia, stressing that the US had closely coordinated the measures with allies representing more than ‘half of the global economy’. This will limit Russia’s possibility to trade in dollars, euros and yen, impact its industrial capacity and cut almost half of its high-tech imports.

In an unprecedented move, the members of the European Council issued a joint statement ahead of their special meeting, in which they condemned ‘in the strongest possible terms Russia’s unprecedented military aggression against Ukraine’ as well as Belarus’s involvement.

4. European Council special meeting: Principal results

The European Council meeting started with an address by the President of the European Parliament, Roberta Metsola, as well as, by video-conference, the President of Ukraine, Volodomyr Zelenskyy. President Michel said that ‘it was a moment of grave seriousness, dignity, cool heads’ and that EU leaders had ‘welcomed and saluted the courage of the Ukrainian people’.

Confirming unity and supporting the rules-based international order

EU leaders expressed their support for the territorial integrity of Ukraine, its right to choose its own path and alliances, and ‘unwavering support for the territorial integrity of Georgia and of the Republic of Moldova’. Moreover, the EU would mobilise the international community in support of the international order based on the UN Charter and international law.

Sanctions

President Michel stressed that EU leaders had agreed on an ‘additional package of massive sanctions, which will be painful for the Russian regime’, as well as to the preparation of a new package targeting Belarus. The Prime Minister of Belgium, Alexander de Croo, stressed that ‘we don’t need sanctions that bark, we need sanctions that bite’, while the Prime Minister of Latvia, Krišjānis Karinš, pointed out that sanctions needed ‘to deter’ in order to be effective. This deterrence element was lacking, as two key measures relating to gas supply and access to the SWIFT international payments system were not included. The new set of sanctions was closely coordinated with the EU’s partners (US, UK, Canada, Norway, Japan, South Korea and Australia) and was adopted in Council on 25 February 2022. The following day, an agreement was reached ‘to cut some Russian banks from SWIFT’.

Financial sector: President von der Leyen stressed that 70 % of the Russian banking market and key state-owned companies, including defence companies, were targeted. The aim was to ‘increase Russia’s borrowing costs, raise inflation, and gradually erode Russia’s industrial base’. The sanctions package also targets the Russian elite by ‘curbing their deposits’.

Energy, transport and technology: President von der Leyen stressed energy was the ‘key area’ to hurt the Russian state. EU sanctions will hit the oil sector (€24 billion in export revenues in 2019) and ‘make it impossible for Russia to upgrade its oil refineries’. The sale of aircraft spare parts and equipment to Russian airlines will be banned, targeting a crucial industrial and connectivity sector. She added that three quarters of the Russian commercial airline fleet was built in the EU, US and Canada. In coordination with partners, access to cutting-edge technologies will also be limited.

Visas: President von der Leyen announced that diplomats, privileged groups and the business community would no longer have ‘privileged access’ to the EU. After the European Council, a consensus was reached to place Vladimir Putin and Sergey Lavrov on the list of sanctioned persons.

Support for Ukraine

The Prime Minister of Latvia, Krišjānis Karinš, stressed that Ukraine needed financial support but also military aid. The President of France, Emmanuel Macron, announced that France would offer an extra €300 million to Ukraine (beyond the EU’s €1.2 billion financial assistance) and supply material to the population and the military. Several EU Member States, including the Baltic countries and the Netherlands, announced the provision of military aid to Ukraine, whilst President Michel indicated the EU would provide humanitarian support and that countries bordering Ukraine were preparing to receive Ukrainian refugees.

A strategically autonomous EU

Reducing the EU’s energy dependency and increasing strategic autonomy were core issues for discussion, which EU leaders will revert to in March 2022. As President Michel stressed, they also agreed to ‘beef up’ security and defence capabilities in coordination with NATO. Main message of the European Parliament President: President Roberta Metsola insisted on firmness with Russia, and said ‘it is right and sensible to adopt massive, unprecedented, severe sanctions on Russia’. She called for Russia’s exclusion from SWIFT, a measure the European Parliament supports, welcomed the suspension of the certification of Nord Stream 2, and stressed the wider need to reduce EU dependence on Russian gas.

Read this briefing on ‘Outcome of the special European Council meeting of 24 February 2022‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Rosamund Shreeves.

This year’s International Women’s Day will, once again, be held in the shadow of the coronavirus pandemic, which has exposed and exacerbated existing gender inequalities. To mark the occasion, Parliament’s Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality (FEMM) is hosting a meeting with national parliaments on 3 March 2022, to explore the potential of gender-sensitive recovery policies, spotlighting inter-related issues around unpaid care work, teleworking and wellbeing.

Impacts of the coronavirus pandemic on gender equality

Before the pandemic, gender equality was advancing in most of the areas measured by the EU’s gender equality index, and the less gender-equal Member States were catching up with the most gender-equal ones. The pandemic has put these advances at risk. Issues brought into sharp focus include the gender dimensions of the increase in unpaid care work, the accelerated shift to remote working and the impacts of both these developments on wellbeing and mental health.

Unpaid care work

The gap in time spent doing unpaid care work was already one of the widest and most persistent of the gender gaps measured in the gender equality index. The pandemic has led to an unprecedented shift of this work to the private sphere, due to the extra time family members are spending at home, and closures of, or irregular access to, nurseries, schools and support services. Surveys conducted by Eurofound show that men’s contribution has increased, but women have shouldered the lion’s share of the additional housework, childcare and schooling, even when they are in paid work. The gender care gap is one of the key reasons why women are more likely than men to be in part-time, low-paid and precarious jobs, or out of the labour market altogether. This has undermined their financial security during the Covid‑19 crisis, particularly as these jobs have been more likely to be terminated or furloughed. Research shows that the additional unpaid care work is adding pressures on women – especially working mothers with school-age or younger children – to reduce their working hours or disengage from the labour market.

Teleworking

The pandemic has accelerated the shift to remote working. At EU level, the share of employed people working from home doubled from 5.4 % to 12 % between 2019 and 2020. There is a gender divide, with shares of 5.7 % for women and 5.2 % for men in 2019, rising to 13 % and 11.2 % in 2020. Teleworking is often seen as a way of introducing more flexible working patterns that can contribute to work-life balance and help parents, especially mothers, to stay in or re-enter paid employment. However, the experience of teleworking during the pandemic has also highlighted its potential limitations. The blurring of boundaries between work and home life can lead to more rather than less conflict between work and home, particularly if teleworking is seen a way of resolving childcare issues. There is also a risk that if the gender care gap is not addressed, normalisation of teleworking will open up a further gap between men going back to working on-site and women working at home to meet care responsibilities, with implications for their training opportunities, career advancement and pay.

Wellbeing

Both the increase in unpaid care work and the shift to teleworking have implications for wellbeing. Eurofound and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) find that the additional unpaid care work has had significant impacts on women’s work-life balance and mental health, increasing rates of anxiety and depression. Teleworking can also have adverse effects on mental health, since it can be associated with longer working hours and greater work intensity, resulting in work-related stress and sleep disorders, which are reported to be higher in women.

Avenues for an ambitious gender-sensitive recovery

From the outset of the coronavirus pandemic, there have been calls to ensure that policy responses contribute to gender equality and the EU’s resilience to future shocks. One key recommendation is to ensure systematic gender mainstreaming in all policies intended to address the immediate economic and social damage and the move to a more sustainable and digital society. There are also recommendations for more targeted policies:

• Closing the gender care gap: The European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE) is calling for a two-pronged approach of promoting more equal sharing of unpaid care work between women and men and ensuring access to affordable provision of formal care. Concrete measures could include extending parental leave and incentivising fathers to take it; and investing in the care sector, including improvements to pay, career prospects and working conditions for care workers.
• Establishing a gender-sensitive framework for teleworking: The International Labour Organization (ILO), the Council of the European Union and the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) recommend that teleworking policies should be developed in conjunction with other policies to ensure work-life balance, equal training and career opportunities, address the gender gap in digital skills and prevent violence and harassment. To avoid teleworking cementing the gender care gap, companies could set mandatory telework days.
• Making use of recovery funding to invest in a care-led recovery: Unlike in the case of the 2008 economic and financial crisis, recovery from the Covid‑19 pandemic is expected to be supported by expanding public investment. Economists have demonstrated that switching recovery investment from the traditional focus on construction and manufacturing to the care sector would create more jobs for both women and men and provide a better economic stimulus. A study for the European Parliament recommends that at least 30 % of the EU funding provided through the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) should go to investment in the care economy, to put it on an even footing with the allocations of 37 % and 30 % for the green and digital transitions.

Action at EU level

EU legislation aimed at addressing the gender gap in unpaid care and facilitating work-life balance by establishing new rights to parental and carers’ leave, is due to be transposed into national law in 2022. The European Commission also intends to propose a new European care strategy, which is expected to include revised EU targets on childcare provision, and recommendations on long-term care. The European Pillar of Social Rights and the related action plan adopted in 2021 already establish parents’ right to access care services as a key principle. The EU gender equality strategy for 2020-2025 identifies closing gender gaps in caring roles as a priority and urges the Member States to invest in childcare. There is scope for them to do so using EU recovery and structural funding, this being a specific objective of the ESF+ programme.

European Parliament positions

In January 2021, Parliament adopted a resolution on the gender perspective in the Covid‑19 crisis and post-crisis period, addressing the harmful gendered and intersectional impacts of the pandemic and setting out recommendations for overcoming them. Parliament is clear that current and future challenges will require ‘a gender-sensitive approach, with gender mainstreaming and gender budgeting principles reflected in all aspects of the pandemic response’. Parliament has consistently called for better provision of affordable childcare, drawing attention to its role in improving outcomes for children, enabling parents – particularly mothers – to enter, stay in or return to employment, and achieving gender equality. Parliament has called on Member States to use EU funding programmes, including recovery funding, to invest in childcare services. It has also called specifically for investment in the care sector and for a new care deal for Europe. Parliament has highlighted the urgent need to consider the risks posed by the increase of teleworking during the pandemic for people with caring responsibilities, particularly women, and called for gender aspects to be addressed in the context of the right to disconnect. Parliament has made recommendations for addressing the gender dimension of mental health in connection with the gender care gap and work-life balance.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Beyond the pandemic: The potential of ambitious gender equality policy‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Issam Hallak.

The Lisbon Treaty entered into force in 2009, providing the European Union (EU) with exclusive competence in the area of ‘direct investment’, as part of the common commercial policy. This covers the conclusion of international investment agreements (IIAs), which typically aim to protect and/or liberalise foreign direct investment. Since then, the EU has ratified protection IIAs (or provisions in trade agreements) with Canada, Singapore and Vietnam.

Early on, concerns were raised as to the specific EU competence. Opinions requested from the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) established that the EU had neither exclusive competence in portfolio international investments (which, unlike direct investments, provide limited control over a firm) nor in the investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanism – two domains covered by EU protection IIAs. EU Member State approval on these provisions was therefore needed. Moreover, to tackle stakeholders’ general misgivings about the ISDS system – currently based on arbitral tribunals and perceived by some as insufficiently transparent and predictable – the EU is actively contributing to the multilateral talks to reform the current system, the objective being to establish a fully fledged ‘multilateral investment court’ with an appeal tribunal and its own judges.

Furthermore, EU Member States have protection IIAs with other Member States in place (intra-EU IIAs), which envisage arbitral ISDS mechanisms. However, the CJEU ruled in 2018 that arbitral decisions between Member States are incompatible with EU law, and most Member States have agreed to terminate their intra-EU IIAs, raising major stakeholder concerns; the European Commission has launched an initiative to address these with a proposal for a regulation.

Finally, for security reasons, the EU has also implemented EU- and domestic-level mechanisms to screen, coordinate and exchange information about direct investment entering the EU.

The European Parliament is preparing an own-initiative report on EU international investment policy.

Read this briefing on ‘EU international investment policy: Looking ahead‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

ISDS decisions initiated since 2000 with decisions in favour of investors; total awards (in current billion US dollars, left scale) and number of cases (right scale) EU Member States’ IIAs with third countries that have been signed (and entered in force) since 2009

Written by Anna Caprile.

In July 2021, the European Commission adopted its communication on the new EU forest strategy for 2030, pursuing the biodiversity and climate neutrality objectives enshrined in the European Green Deal and the EU biodiversity strategy for 2030. The strategy aims to improve the quantity and quality of EU multi-functional forests, by reversing negative trends and increasing their resilience against the high uncertainty brought about by climate change. The strategy has sparked heated debate amongst various stakeholders and policy-makers.

A new strategy for EU forests EU Forests – Key facts
· In 2020, forests covered 38 % of total EU land area (159 million hectare (ha)), representing approximately 5 % of the world’s forests.
· Forest coverage ranges from 66 % in Finland to 1.5 % in Malta.
· Forest area of the EU has been increasing since 2010, at a pace of 0.3 million ha per year (2010‑2015) and then 0.2 million ha per year (2015‑2020).
· The 2020 State of Europe’s Forests report concluded that, on average, the condition of European forests is deteriorating.
· There are 16 million private and public EU forest owners: 60 % of the forest area is privately owned, and 40 % publicly owned.
Source: European Commission.

The work on a new strategy to replace the previous 2013 EU forest strategy began in October 2020 with a roadmap consultation, followed by an open public consultation, which ended in April 2021, incorporating meetings with stakeholders and evidence from the impact evaluation of the previous strategy.

The 16 July 2021 new EU forest strategy, a flagship element of the European Green Deal and a key action under the EU biodiversity strategy for 2030, is seen as a strategic component to achieve the EU’s biodiversity objectives, as well as its greenhouse gas emission reduction target of at least 55 % by 2030 and subsequent climate neutrality by 2050. The strategy aims to improve the quantity and quality of EU forests, reversing negative trends and adapting EU forests to the new conditions, weather extremes and high uncertainty brought about by climate change. The strategy includes a set of regulatory, financial and voluntary measures for 2021‑2030, with the multi-functional role of forests at its core.

The measures proposed in the strategy, to be reviewed in 2025, include:

• promoting sustainable forest management (SFM), including by encouraging the sustainable use of wood-based resources;
• providing financial incentives for forest owners and managers to adopt environmentally friendly practices, such as those linked to carbon storage and sequestration;
• improving the size and biodiversity of forests, including by planting 3 billion new trees by 2030;
• promoting alternative forest industries, such as ecotourism, as well as non-wood products, such as cork, honey and medicinal plants;
• encouraging the take-up of financial support under the common agricultural policy (CAP), which can help forests and forest-based industries mitigate against climate change;
• providing education and training for people working in forest-based industries and making these industries more attractive to young people;
• establishing a legally binding instrument for ecosystem restoration, and a new legislative proposal on EU forest observation, reporting and collection;
• protecting the EU’s remaining primary and old-growth forests.

Council conclusions

In November 2021, the Council adopted conclusions on the strategy, after several rounds of deliberations. Member States welcomed the publication of the strategy and ‘its increased ambition for the contribution of forest through their multifunctional role to the European Green Deal and … 2030 Agenda’ They nevertheless stressed the need to strike a balance between the environmental, social and economic aspects of sustainable forest management, as well as the importance of maintaining the diversity of forests and forest management practices in different Member States and regions, respecting their competences in the area. Moreover, the Member States expressed doubts about the added value of developing national strategic plans for forestry, as envisaged in the Commission’s communication, and encouraged the use of existing international monitoring and reporting processes. Finally, ministers recommended that the existing Standing Forestry Committee (SFC) remain the main forum for discussion, reinforcing its role in the implementation of the strategy.

Advisory Committees

The European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) adopted its opinion on the new EU forest strategy in December 2021 (rapporteur Simo Tiainen, Diversity Europe-Group III, Finland). While the Committee acknowledged that the forest strategy addresses economic and social opportunities, it stressed that a more comprehensive approach is necessary, including concrete proposals on how to remunerate the non-commercial ecosystems services provided by forests. The EESC emphasised the need to avoid one-size-fits-all solutions and the importance of making decisions at the right level, in accordance with competences and the principle of subsidiarity. The European Committee of the Regions (CoR) is preparing an opinion on the strategy, after undertaking a written stakeholder consultation.

Stakeholder positions

The European Forest Owners and Managers, in an October 2021 statement, expressed concern about a strategy it considered not sustained by the realities on the ground, and lacking due consideration of the great diversity of EU forests. They pointed out that ‘conserving biodiversity, restoring ecosystems and increasing carbon sinks are the dominant elements within the strategy …, resulting in lack of coherence with climate and growth objectives’. Furthermore, they noted that, under the new strategy, the European Commission takes responsibility for a number of areas so far managed by Member States, and regretted the fact that forest owners and managers had not been involved in the development of payments for ecosystems services.

Fern, an organisation dedicated to EU forest protection, welcomed several aspects of the new strategy, such as a new legislative proposal for EU forest monitoring and data collection and a reinforced EU forest governance mechanism. However, when analysing its impact in the context of the whole ‘fit for 55’ package, Fern concluded that the pressure on forests will likely increase over time. Other environmental non-governmental organisations, such as the World Wide Fund For Nature (WWF), welcomed the adoption of the strategy and its overall goals, while regretting that some components appear to be weakened in the final version compared to previous drafts, shifting towards voluntary measures and lacking clear safeguards to prevent intensified forest management and harvesting.

Parliament position

In its 2020 resolution on the ‘European forest strategy – the way forward’, the European Parliament set out its priorities for a revised post-2020 strategy. The Parliament called for an ambitious, independent and self-standing EU forest strategy, aligned with the European Green Deal and the biodiversity strategy for 2030. It stressed the need to give full political support to the forestry sector, acknowledging the multifunctional role played by forests and ensuring adequate financial instruments combining EU, national and private funding, where the EU strategy should act as a bridge between national policies and broad EU objectives and programmes. The EP called for recognition of the role of forestry, agro-forestry and forest-based industries in the post-2020 CAP, and in the implementation of the European Green Deal. These principles were further reflected in the Parliament’s resolution on the ‘EU biodiversity strategy for 2030‘, as well as in its position during the negotiations on the post-2022 CAP, on which EU legislators reached a deal in 2021.

The European Parliament has decided to draw up an own-initiative report on the new EU forest strategy. For further information, see the EP Legislative Train Schedule page on The New EU Forest Strategy 2030.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘New EU forest strategy for 2030‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Citizens often turn to the European Parliament to ask how the European Union (EU) helps provide opportunities for citizens to study and learn abroad. Erasmus+ is the EU’s integrated education programme. Aiming to improve people’s skills and employability, it is open to people of all ages and occupations. The programme follows-up on many prior initiatives, which it combined and integrated.

Erasmus+: content and beneficiaries

Erasmus+ provides opportunities for students, staff, trainees, teachers, volunteers and others. Its benefits are available to all EU citizens, as well as non-EU citizens depending on their location. A distinction is made between programme countries (all EU countries as well as some others such as Iceland and Norway) who can take part in the whole Erasmus+ programme, and partner countries (non-EU countries such as Russia and China) who are only eligible for some parts of the programme, which are subject to specific conditions.

Both individuals and organisations can apply to take part in Erasmus+, although individuals most often apply and take part through an organisation such as their school or university.

Erasmus+ is built on three key actions:

• Individual mobility: this includes activities such as studying abroad for a certain amount of time during university studies, or volunteering in another participating country;
• Cooperation for innovation and the exchange of best practices: this provides funding for organisations to work together and improve their practices, for example through meetings between educational institutions in different countries;
• Policy development: this funds and can promote organisations in line with EU policies – international youth organisations promoting cooperation, for example.

Erasmus+ 2021-2027

The 2021-2027 Erasmus+ programme, adopted in May 2021, doubles the funding of the previous programme, bringing it to over €26 billion. It is expected to contribute to establishing a European Education Area by 2025.

Additionally, the new programme is more sustainable and more inclusive, with improved access for people who had fewer opportunities in previous programmes. This includes people with disabilities, or those with financial difficulties in accessing educational opportunities. The programme also simplifies administrative procedures for small-sized organisations, and promotes the learning of digital skills.

The EU is aware that European programmes dedicated to young people are still inaccessible to those with fewer opportunities. To address this, the European Commission adopted measures to increase the inclusiveness and diversity of Erasmus+ in October 2021. Measures to support participants include preparatory visits, language support, enhanced mentoring or personalised coaching.

Following its exit from the EU, the United Kingdom has chosen not to take part in the 2021-2027 Erasmus+ programme. While some projects with multi-annual funding in which the UK takes part are still being phased out, the UK now has non-associated third country status. This means that only limited opportunities with worldwide eligibility will be available to UK citizens and organisations.

European Year of Youth 2022

In December 2021, the EU decided to make 2022 the European Year of Youth. The year will focus on re-establishing a positive outlook for young Europeans negatively affected by the Covid‑19 pandemic, by organising youth-focused and youth-centric activities and initiatives across all EU countries in 2022.

The European Year of Youth will include conferences, initiatives promoting youth participation in policy-making, and awareness-raising campaigns on a more inclusive, green and digital EU, as well as research into the situation of young Europeans. Further information is available in the Parliament and Commission press releases.

Further information

• Erasmus +, European Parliament
• Education and Vocational Training, European Parliament, Factsheet
• Erasmus 2021-2027: The Union programme for education, training, youth and sport, European Parliamentary Research Service, Briefing, July 2021
• Impact of the Erasmus+ programme, European Parliamentary Research Service, Briefing, April 2020
• Erasmus+: More than just mobility, European Parliamentary Research Service, At A Glance, September 2019

Keep sending your questions to the Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (Ask EP)! We reply in the EU language that you use to write to us.

Written by Luisa Antunes with Laia Delgado Callico.

Artificial intelligence (AI) was at the core of the response to the Covid‑19 pandemic, which in turn contributed to accelerating the development of AI. These technological advances carry benefits, risks, ethical issues and societal implications, which must be addressed when discussing policy options in AI governance.

On 12 February 2022, the European Parliament’s Panel for the Future of Science and Technology (STOA) organised an event entitled ‘Ethical issues in the Covid‑19 pandemic: The case of digital health applications’. This online workshop included a presentation of an STOA study on AI in healthcare, followed by a discussion panel on the related ethical, regulatory and policy challenges.

European Parliament Vice-President and STOA Chair Eva Kaili (S&D, Greece) opened the event, highlighting STOA’s commitment to technology as a fundamental means for ensuring EU citizens’ wellbeing.

Presentation of the STOA study ‘Artificial intelligence in healthcare: Applications, risks, ethical and societal impacts’

Karim Lekadir, Researcher, Director of the AI in Medicine Lab at the University of Barcelona (Spain) and principal author of the study, presented the main healthcare benefits of AI, including improvement of diagnosis and triage prediction, enhanced risk prediction and disease prevention, personalised treatment, optimisation of surgical intervention outcomes and self-care management.

Professor Lekadir provided guiding principles and policy options for the trustworthy application of AI in healthcare. The use of AI requires a holistic multi-criteria approach, based on principles of accuracy, robustness, fairness, usability, explainability, durability and traceability. The risks and biases can only be identified and minimised in a systematic manner, with a merged stakeholder approach, involving more research and education, where clinicians are kept at the centre of decision-making, using AI as a support, rather than a replacement tool, and ensuring a feedback loop for AI to learn from its mistakes.

Panel discussion on digital health tools: Governance and practice

STOA Panel member Anna Michelle Asimakopoulou (EPP, Greece) introduced the panellists and moderated the discussion.

Effy Vayena, Professor of Bioethics at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zürich and Chair of the Hellenic Commission for Bioethics and Technoethics, addressed the use of digital health applications in Covid‑19 contact tracing and their low adoption rate among citizens. In her view, the transparency and lack of public accountability of the companies behind these apps are an issue, making governance essential to ensure their acceptance and their success with the public.

Alessandro Blasimme, Senior Scientist, Health Ethics and Policy Lab, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zürich, discussed the development of AI during the Covid‑19 pandemic and associated ethical issues, including prioritisation of healthcare access. Although there are already EU regulatory instruments and operational standards in place, they still do not operate coherently. He argued that regulation alone is insufficient to safeguard and promote responsible innovation in healthcare, which would benefit from an ‘ethics-by-design’ and principle-based approach.

Timo Minssen, Professor of Law and Founding Director of the Centre for Advanced Studies in Biomedical Innovation Law at the University of Copenhagen, stressed the importance of incorporating ‘lessons learnt’ from the current pandemic in the guidelines for preparedness for the prevention and management of future pandemics. This will require healthcare applications that are efficient and globally accessible and deployable. Nevertheless, geopolitical context and competitive interests complicate the regulation of these applications.

Elettra Ronchi, Senior Policy Consultant in Digital Health and Data Governance with the World Health Organization (Europe office), highlighted the key role that timely and reliable data collection played in the Covid‑19 response. An effective public health response depends on data governance that addresses privacy and data protection measures, as well as health information system gaps. To inspire public trust, the collection and sharing of personal data should be evidence-based, proportionate to the risks, limited in time and implemented with full transparency.

During the Q&A session, Professor Lekadir stressed that validation and evaluation of health applications should run in parallel with their development to ensure accuracy of AI decisions. Patient engagement is essential in this process in order to gain public trust. Dr Ronchi remarked how legislation is still not fully adapted to the digital era and raised the importance of ‘regulatory sandboxes’ to keep up with AI development. In addition, public trust is linked to disinformation and the current ‘infodemic’ has undermined the global response to the pandemic. Professor Minssen stressed the importance of multidisciplinary discussions between regulatory, social and technical experts, while also highlighting the importance of technology sustainability. Dr Blassime reflected on the importance of open and pluralistic discussions of ethical risks to accompany the regulatory framework. Professor Vayena called for transparency in the use of technology and a procedure to translate consensus into processes and mechanisms to act upon these values and ethical principles.

Anna Michelle Asimakopoulou concluded the event, reiterating that public trust in these technologies is key. The full recording of the event is available here.

Your opinion counts for us. To let us know what you think, get in touch via stoa@europarl.europa.eu.

Written by Marie Lecerf (1st edition).

Equal pay for equal work is one of the European Union’s founding principles, enshrined in Article 157 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). However, the implementation and enforcement of this principle remain a challenge. Due to a lack of pay transparency, pay discrimination often goes undetected and victims face difficulties in making a claim for redress.

On 4 March 2021, the European Commission adopted a legislative proposal on binding pay transparency measures. The proposed directive to strengthen the application of the principle of equal pay for equal work or work of equal value between men and women through pay transparency and enforcement mechanisms focuses on measures to ensure pay transparency, and better access to justice for victims of pay discrimination. The Council agreed its approach on the proposal on 6 December 2021. On 7 September 2021, the co-rapporteurs from the European Parliament’s Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality (FEMM) and Committee on Employment and Social Affairs (EMPL), jointly responsible for the file, presented their draft report. On 15 November 2021, the joint committee took stock of the 1 090 amendments tabled. A negotiating position will be agreed after the joint committee vote on the draft report, expected in March 2022.

Versions

• February 2022: Equal pay for equal work between men and women: Pay transparency and enforcement mechanisms (1st edition)

Equal pay for equal work between men and women (pay transparency and enforcement mechanisms) Committees responsible:Women’s Rights and Gender Equality (FEMM) and Employment and Social Affairs (EMPL)COM(2021) 0093Co-rapporteurs:Rafaela Samira (Renew Europe, the Netherlands)
Kira Marie Peter-Hansen (Greens/EFA, Denmark)2021/0050(COD)Next steps expected:Vote on the draft report in committeeOrdinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on
equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’)

Written by Clare Ferguson and Katarzyna Sochacka.

The February 2022 plenary session in Strasbourg took place at a time of considerable international tension. Members debated statements by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the Commission, Josep Borrell (HR/VP), on EU-Russia relations, European security and Russia’s military threat against Ukraine. Parliament debated Council and Commission statements on the cyber-surveillance of politicians, prosecutors, lawyers and journalists, and others in EU Member States. Members also debated the HR/VPs statement on EU-Africa relations, and in a formal sitting, heard an address by Iván Duque Márquez, President of Colombia. A debate was held on the consequences of the European Court of Justice ruling on rule of law conditionality. Parliament celebrated the 20th anniversary of the euro, in the presence of Christine Lagarde, President of the European Central Bank.

Charging of heavy goods vehicles for the use of certain infrastructures

To reduce CO2 emissions and alleviate congestion, the EU proposes to change and extend the long-standing rules on charging heavy goods vehicles for using infrastructure such as roads and bridges. While national governments set vehicle charges, the ‘Eurovignette’ system aims to ensure no discrimination or market distortion. Members approved at second reading the Council’s position, following the agreement between the co-legislators, to focus charges on distance travelled, rather than time taken. Charges will be extended to lighter vehicles, with reductions to encourage use of low-emission vehicles. The approval confirms Parliament’s Committee on Transport and Tourism (TRAN) demands for transparency, with Member States required to report regularly on the charges they levy and on the use of the revenue.

Protection of workers from risks related to exposure to carcinogens at work

Members debated and adopted the provisional agreement reached during interinstitutional negotiations on the fourth update of the legislation protecting workers from carcinogens, mutagens and other harmful substances that may cause health issues, such as infertility (reprotoxins). The agreed text sets stricter occupational exposure limits for hazardous substances, where Parliament’s Committee on Employment and Social Affairs (EMPL) negotiators have succeeded in including a requirement for the European Commission to present an action plan to set limits for at least 25 substances by the end of 2022.

Strengthening Europe in the fight against cancer

Members debated the report concluding the work of Parliament’s Special Committee on Beating Cancer (BECA) – strengthening Europe in the fight against cancer – making recommendations aimed at combating the second most common cause of death in the EU. These include stronger EU action on risk factors, such as alcohol and tobacco consumption, wider screening, and more funding for research. To ensure that access to cancer treatment is fair and accessible, the report advocates facilitating access to clinical trials and innovative treatment, better management of medicine shortages, and transparency on pharmaceutical pricing. Parliament also calls for better protection of patients’ rights through a Europe-wide ‘right to be forgotten’.

Common foreign and security policy and common security and defence policy

The EU’s common foreign and security policy (CFSP) sets the framework for EU action outside the Union. In a joint debate, Members discussed implementation of both the CFSP and the common security and defence policy (CSDP), discussing the Foreign Affairs (AFET) Committee’s 2021 annual reports. Noting the need to strengthen multilateral partnerships, AFET calls for an enhanced EU role in peace mediation, and better use of the existing sanctions provisions. While focused on the EU neighbourhood, the report welcomes opportunities to advance multilateral and bilateral agreements through partnerships with strategic players, such as the USA. Climate change is considered a particular threat, and the report supports measures to further European strategic sovereignty in key enabling technologies, in view of the green and digital transitions. The report highlights the geopolitical challenges of Russian and Chinese actions, and applauds progress on the Strategic Compass. The AFET report on CSDP focuses on the EU’s security and defence doctrine. It urges a more action-oriented policy, a stronger EU defence sector, and underlines the need for greater Parliamentary scrutiny of CSDP action.

Human rights and democracy in the world

Democracy and human rights are Parliament’s first priorities in all its activities, and Members debated and adopted the 2021 AFET annual report on human rights and democracy. The report calls for firm opposition to the decline in democracy and rising authoritarianism worldwide, exacerbated during the pandemic. It highlights the need for better, results-oriented multilateral coordination to counter democratic erosion and to uphold human rights. In particular, the committee calls for support for the United Nations and respect for human rights in migration situations. It stresses the need to protect rights and freedoms, to counter the effect of the pandemic on women, and to promote fair access to vaccines, among other things. The AFET report also underlines the continuing fight against corruption and disinformation in elections, as well as the need to ensure trade and development agreements uphold human rights.

A statute for European cross-border associations and non-profit organisations

Mutual societies, associations, foundations and social enterprises often face multiple legal and administrative challenges when operating across EU borders. Parliament debated and adopted a legislative-initiative resolution from the Legal Affairs (JURI) Committee, calling on the Commission to propose legislation on minimum EU standards for cross-border associations and non-profit organisations. Enabling these organisations to obtain legal personality should help them face challenges, such as national legal provisions that leave them open to discriminatory and unjustified restrictions on access to resources.

A European strategy for offshore renewable energy

As climate change exacerbates crisis and conflict, steps to limit damage to the environment continue in line with the EU’s climate ambition. Parliament debated a Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE) own-initiative report on the EU offshore renewable energy strategy, an important element of the European Green Deal. The report calls for the EU to increase production of renewable energy, underlining that greater infrastructure investment, research and development is needed, as well as more cooperation between EU countries. The report proposes that the scope of the offshore renewables market is widened to all EU sea basins, with streamlined permits and maritime spatial plans, and a more effective market design.

Implementation report on on-farm animal welfare

Parliament has long echoed citizens’ concerns about animal welfare, demanding action to ensure that the high standards demanded by EU laws are respected in all EU countries. Members debated a Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development (AGRI) own-initiative implementation report on farm animal welfare calling for updated rules based on scientific data, impact assessments and a species-by-species approach that covers all species. The committee warns that implementation should be uniform, and urges extension of the legislation to cover issues such as battery-caged hens.

Implementation of the Toy Safety Directive

Members debated a Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO) own-initiative report, examining implementation of, and proposing improvements to, the Toy Safety Directive. The IMCO committee sees a need for even greater precaution regarding chemicals, particularly endocrine disruptors, in toys, and calls for stricter surveillance and enforcement. The report also calls for legislation to cover ‘connected toys’ and to ensure that non-compliant toys are removed from online marketplaces.

Opening of trilogue negotiations

Members confirmed, without vote, a mandate for negotiation from the Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) Committee on the proposal for a regulation ensuring financial stability in the banking system (on the prudential treatment of global systematically important institutions).

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Plenary round-up – February 2022‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marcin Grajewski.

Russia’s military build-up around Ukraine, as well as fears of an armed conflict between the two countries, have highlighted the importance of the on-going debate about how to strengthen the European Union’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). On 17 February, the European Parliament adopted resolutions calling for a more ambitious CSDP, to counter threats such as terrorism, cyber-attacks, exploitation of migration for political purposes, and foreign interference. The Parliament has also welcomed the work of governments on the Strategic Compass, a long-term plan for the EU to become a better provider of security, to act faster and more decisively to protect EU values and interests, and to contribute to international peace. The adoption of the Compass would also help the EU to achieve a stronger degree of strategic autonomy.

This note gathers links to the recent publications and commentaries from many international think tanks on European defence and security. Recent reports on the Ukrainian crisis can be found in a previous item from the ‘What think tanks are thinking’ series.

Could EU-endorsed ‘coalitions of the willing’ strengthen EU security policy?
Centre for European Reform, February 2022

The EU’s Strategic Compass is a defining moment for European defense
Atlantic Council, February 2022

Hybrid warfare is not synonymous with cyber: The threat of influence operations
Egmont, February 2022

The crisis of European security: What Europeans think about the war in Ukraine
European Council on Foreign Relations, February 2022

Elevating the EU’s added value as a security provider
Foundation for Progressive European Studies, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Fondation Jean-Jaurès, January 2022

EU strategic autonomy: A perennial pipe dream?
European Policy Centre, January 2022

Strategic autonomy: Not without integration
Egmont, Foundation for Progressive European Studies, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Fondation Jean-Jaurès, January 2022

Uncharted and uncomfortable in European defence
Clingendael, January 2022

Multi-layered actions? Sustaining partnerships in the EU integrated approach to conflicts and crises
Centre for European Policy Studies, January 2022

In the shadow of war: Ukraine and the limits of a ‘geopolitical’ EU
Centre for European Policy Studies, January 2022

Where next for EU security policy in the Asia-Pacific?
International Institute for Security Studies, January 2022

Never-ending divorce: The role of UK-EU security cooperation after Brexit
European Council on Foreign Relations, January 2022

Multipolarity and EU Foreign and Security Policy: Divergent approaches to conflict and crisis response
Istituto Affari Internazionali, December 2021

Construire l’autonomie stratégique de l’Europe face à la Chine
Institut Jacques Delors, December 2021

The EU’s defence ambitions: Understanding the emergence of a European defence technological and industrial complex
Carnegie Europe, December 2021

Is the EU about to build its own military capacity? Thanks to Germany, the jury’s still out
Atlantic Council, December 2021

The EU as a global actor in the Indo-Pacific
Atlantic Council, December 2021

The future of European strategy in a changing geopolitical environment
The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, December 2021

EU defence projects: Balancing member states, money and management
Centre for European Policy Studies, December 2021

Russia’s threat to invade Ukraine and Europe’s soft power
Centre for European Policy Studies, December 2021

Dealing with the neighbours: The case for an affiliate membership of the European Union and a new Security Council
European Policy Centre, December 2021

Strategic Compass: New bearings for EU security and defence?
European Union Institute for Security Studies, December 2021

Strategic Autonomy: Views from the North
Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies, December 2021

Is the European peace facility really about peace?
Centre for European Reform, December 2021

Autonome EU-Finanzsanktionen: Wege zum wirkungsvollen Einsatz
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, December 2021

The need for cooperative security In Europe
Brussels Schools of Governance, December 2021

An architecture fit for strategic autonomy
Foundation for Progressive European Studies, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Fondation Jean-Jaurès, November 2021

Unpacking open strategic autonomy
Clingendael, November 2021

Regional fragmentation and EU Foreign and Security Policy
Istituto Affari Internazionali, November 2021

Not yet fit for the world: Piecemeal build-up of EU military, cyber and intelligence assets
Istituto Affari Internazionali, November 2021

Europe’s high-end military challenges: The future of European capabilities and missions
Centre for Strategic and International Studies, November 2021

Britain and France should stand together
Centre for European Reform, November 2021

Bridging the Channel: The UK’s nuclear deterrent and its role in European security
Centre for European Reform, November 2021

Kill the battlegroups
Egmont, November 2021

Seven steps to European defence, Transatlantic equilibrium, and global Europe
Egmont, October 2021

The European Army: The future of Europe’s defence or an economic windfall in disguise?
József Knowledge Centre, October 2021

On defence, the ball is in Europe’s court
Centre for European Reform, October 2021

L’autonomie stratégique, cet obscur objet du désir
Institut de relations internationales et stratégiques, October 2021

Countering hybrid threats
Clingendael, October 2021

Bridging the Channel: How Europeans and the UK can work together on defence capability development
Centre for European Reform, October 2021

After Afghanistan and AUKUS: What next for European defence?
Centre for European Reform, October 2021

Building European strategic autonomy vs. Turkish strategic depth: Macron’s diplomatic gamble
Institut français des relations internationales, October 2021

The V4 towards a new NATO Strategic Concept and the EU Strategic Compass
Europeum, József Knowledge Centre, Casimir Pulaski Foundation, Slovak Security Policy Institute, October 2021

The EU’s security and defence policy: In search of a compass
Centre for Eastern Studies, September 2021

Sharing the burden, sharing the secrets: The future of European intelligence cooperation
Clingendael, September 2021

Emerging challenges for European security and defence
International Institute for Security Studies, September 2022

AUKUS and the EU: A snub for the bloc?
Egmont, September 2021

The AUKUS agreement: What repercussions for the European Union?
Fondation Robert Schuman, September 2021

Read this briefing on ‘European defence and security‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.