European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Matthew Parry.

The EU has joined partners at the World Trade Organization in imposing import and export bans and other trade restrictions to punish Russian and Belarussian elites and degrade Russia’s military and industrial capacity. Now it is proposing to support Ukraine by temporarily scrapping all tariffs and quotas on Ukrainian imports.

EU trade with Belarus, Russia and Ukraine before the war Share of goods trade among partners, 2021

Of the three countries to the EU’s immediate east, Russia was by far the EU’s most important trading partner, and its fifth largest, when it launched its war on Ukraine. While it accounted for only 5.9 % of the EU’s external goods trade (exports plus imports) in 2021, Russia is nevertheless one of the EU’s most important suppliers of coal, gas and, especially, oil: in 2020, Russia provided almost 45 % of EU mineral fuel imports in euro terms, with crude oil imports accounting for more than three quarters of these imports. The EU is now phasing in a ban on Russian coal imports, however, and debating one on Russian oil imports. Belarus and Ukraine made up only very small shares of the EU’s external goods trade in 2021 – 0.03 % and 1.2 % respectively. Belarus’ main exports to the EU are wood, mineral products and base metals. Ukraine’s exports to the EU include raw materials such as iron, steel, mining products and agricultural products, chemical products, and machinery.

The EU represented a much larger share of the external goods trade of Russia (35.9 %), Belarus (19.9 %) and Ukraine (39.5 %), making the EU the most important partner for both Russia and Ukraine. EU exports to Russia in 2021 consisted mainly of machinery and equipment, motor vehicles, pharmaceuticals, electrical equipment and machinery, and plastics. The EU was also a critical source of investment in Russia, accounting for 48 % of foreign direct investment (FDI) into Russia in 2019. In 2021, the EU’s main exports to Belarus were machinery, chemicals and transport equipment. Exports to Ukraine were mainly machinery and transport equipment, chemicals, and manufactured goods. Since 1997, EU-Russia trade relations have been framed by the trade-related provisions of the bilateral Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) and, since 2012, Russia’s membership of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Belarus is not a WTO member. Ukraine joined in 2008. An EU-Ukraine association agreement, including a ‘deep and comprehensive free trade area’ (DCFTA), has been provisionally applied since 2016, during which time the EU has become Ukraine’s most important trading partner, ahead of both Russia and China.

Plurilateral joint statement at the WTO

On 14 March 2022, the EU, together with Canada, Japan, the United Kingdom (UK), the United States (US) and nine other WTO members issued a plurilateral joint statement at the WTO on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine with the support of Belarus. The statement expresses solidarity with Ukraine, condemns the invasion as a violation of international law and the UN Charter, and calls on Russia to stop its military aggression immediately and withdraw its forces. It also makes clear the signatories’ intention to disregard Russia’s rights and privileges as a fellow WTO member for the purposes of trade, including – but not limited to – ‘most-favoured-nation’ (MFN) treatment of products and services exported by Russia. In addition, the signatories say that they consider the WTO accession process for Belarus suspended in light of that country’s material support for the invasion.

Consequences under international trade law
MFN treatment is a principle that applies to trade between WTO members, and is one of the founding principles of the WTO and its predecessor agreements: it is provided for in the first article of the 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). It also appears in the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS, Article 2) and the Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS, Article 4). Under Article I of the original GATT agreement, ‘any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any contracting party to any product originating in or destined for any other country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the territories of all other contracting parties’. This means that trade privileges granted by a member to another member, such as the elimination or lowering of customs duties or other trade barriers, must be applied universally to all WTO members, with some exceptions (such as in the case of free trade agreements (FTAs) between members, and special market access privileges granted unilaterally to developing countries). Since Russia neither identifies as a developing country nor has an FTA in place with the EU or any of the other 13 joint statement signatories, its exports depend on MFN-based market access.
Without citing it explicitly, the arguments put forward in the joint statement also refer to another important qualification of the MFN principle, namely the security exceptions under GATT Article XXI, which allow members to take trade measures to protect their security interests ‘in time of war or other emergency in international relations’, and to pursue their ‘obligations under the [UN] Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security’. The provision’s invocation in other contexts is controversial, but some analysts conclude that any WTO dispute settlement panel constituted in this case is unlikely to rule against the joint statement’s signatories. The first-ever ruling by a WTO panel on the invocation of GATT Article XXI, in 2019, concerned a dispute between Russia and Ukraine, in which Russia cited the article to justify trade restrictions affecting Ukraine. Trade measures taken by the EU and its partners against Russia and Belarus

Rather than prepare new tariff schedules for Russia and Belarus, the European Commission has applied trade restrictive measures in the form of import and export bans on the two countries under the common foreign and security policy. These include import bans on some Russian and Belarussian steel products, coal, cements, rubber products and wood; on Russian spirits, alcohol and seafood; and on Belarusian potash products. They also include export bans on luxury goods favoured by Russian elites, and on products worth an annual €10 billion for which Russia is highly dependent on EU imports, including quantum computing, advanced semiconductors, sensitive machinery, transportation and chemicals. The total value of all export sanctions imposed on Russia so far is €22.8 billion, 25 % of the EU’s pre-war exports.

A number of EU partners and co-signatories of the WTO plurilateral joint statement have imposed trade restrictions on Russia in the form of both import and export bans and tariff increases. The US, less dependent than the EU on Russian energy imports, has banned all Russian and Belarusian oil, liquefied natural gas and coal imports, and introduced export controls on technologies such as semiconductors, computers, telecommunications, lasers, and equipment for the oil and gas industries. It has also raised tariffs on certain fuels and metals. Similar measures have been introduced by Canada, Japan and the UK.

EU trade measures in support of Ukraine

On 27 April 2022, the European Commission published a proposal for a regulation suspending for one year all import duties and quotas on Ukrainian exports to the EU, including anti-dumping and safeguard measures in place on Ukrainian steel exports. The regulation would supplement trade concessions granted under the EU-Ukraine DCFTA, by immediately eliminating tariffs on, for example, agricultural products, fertilisers, aluminium articles and cars, and is aimed at bolstering Ukraine’s external trade in the face of significant wartime disruption, including Russia’s blockade of Ukraine’s Black Sea ports. The EU is working with Member States to redirect Ukraine’s exports through land-based ‘solidarity lanes‘, by liberalising conditions for truck drivers and making available EU transportation infrastructure. The day the proposal was published, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), in which the EU is a shareholder, announced a €100 million increase in its trade finance assistance to Ukraine. As Ukraine is also a major exporter of cereals and cooking oils, part of the additional EBRD funding is focused on food security.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Russia’s war on Ukraine: EU trade policy‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Luisa Antunes and Clément Evroux.

This paper is one of 11 policy responses set out in a new EPRS study which looks first at 15 risks facing the European Union, in the changed context of a world coming out of the coronavirus crisis, but one in which a war has been launched just outside the Union’s borders. The study then looks in greater detail at 11 policy responses the EU could take to address the risks outlined and to strengthen the Union’s resilience to them. It continues a series launched in spring 2020, which sought to identify means to strengthen the European Union’s long-term resilience in the context of recovery from the coronavirus crisis. Read the full study here. The issue in short: The challenge and the existing gaps Cases and variants of concern Cases

As of 7 March 2022, 450 million cases and 6 million deaths had been reported worldwide since the start of the pandemic. Of these, 115 million cases and 1 million deaths had been recorded in the EU. Although alarming, these numbers are still an underestimation, as vaccination and the emergence of new variants have led to an increase in asymptomatic cases and, consequently, to under-reporting and under-ascertainment. On a positive note, vaccination figures continue to grow, with 64 % citizens worldwide already having received at least one vaccine dose, and 75 % in the EU.

Variants

Four ‘variants of concern’ are currently circulating worldwide: Omicron, first identified in South Africa in November 2021; Delta, first identified in India in December 2020, and Beta and Gamma, first identified in September 2020 in South Africa and Brazil, respectively.

In addition, keeping the pandemic in check involves the constant monitoring of new ‘variants of interest‘ that could pose a future threat to global public health. At the moment, these include Mu, first identified in Colombia, and Lambda, from Peru. Both currently only show sporadic transmission in the EU and have an unknown impact on Covid-19 disease severity.

Omicron, currently the dominant variant in the EU, has emerged too recently for its epidemiology and pathogenicity to be fully understood. It seems to carry a five-fold higher risk of reinfection compared with the previous dominant variant, Delta. It is also more transmissible than Delta. This could be due to mutations in the spike protein that allow it to escape the host immunity more easily, as well as its increased ability to colonise the upper respiratory tract. In contrast, Omicron seems to show reduced disease severity compared with Delta, partly on account of slower growth in lung tissue. Four Omicron sub-lineages are currently in circulation. BA.1 is the current prevalent sub-lineage and BA.2 is steadily emerging worldwide, with the possibility of overcoming BA.1 in the coming months and delaying a current downward curve heading out to the summer. Several differences in the spike protein composition separate BA.1 from BA.2, with BA.2 reproducing twice as fast as BA.1 and seemingly more transmissible.

‘Long Covid’

Although the figures for infection cases, hospital occupancy and deaths are continuing to fall modestly in the EU, with Omicron seeming to cause less severe symptoms overall compared with previous variants, one aspect of the disease that is still not totally clear is the persistence of Covid‑19‑associated symptoms over more than three months (commonly defined as ‘Long Covid’). Reports differ depending on the methods used, but more than half of infected people have reported experiencing at least one chronic complication following Covid-19 infection, including type 1 diabetes, myocarditis and reduced respiratory capacity. In addition, many patients report extreme fatigue, memory issues, ‘brain fog’, tinnitus and depression. Research will continue to ascertain the biological causes and the full extent of the Covid-19 health impact, years into the pandemic. What is certain is that Covid-19 has the capacity to affect virtually all the organs of the body, to varying degrees of severity, and that these symptoms are a result of the viral capacity to infect the central nervous system, heart and lungs. Possible risk factors include type 2 diabetes, circulating SARS-CoV-2 mRNA fragments, Epstein-Barr virus viremia and specific autoantibodies. The differences between variants are not clear. However, vaccination has been shown to protect against ‘Long Covid’.

Medium-term scenarios

It is difficult to predict when the Covid-19 pandemic will evolve into an endemic state. The main factors involved are the parallel ‘race’ between increased immunity due to both natural recovery from infection and vaccination campaigns, and the emergence of new variants potentially able to escape acquired immunity. The World Health Organization (WHO) optimistically predicts an end to the acute phase of infection this year, if vaccination campaigns continue and the global vaccination rate reaches at least 70 % in the coming months.

Varied levels of vaccine distribution worldwide could hamper these plans, as higher topical virus circulation will serve as a hotbed for the emergence of new variants with the potential to escape immunity. In this regard, it could be argued that vaccine equity is an urgent goal that transcends local population needs and serves a common global interest of leading the way out of the pandemic.

Once it reaches an endemic state, Covid-19 could see an annual seasonal curve similar to that of influenza, with an autumn-winter peak in the EU. This tendency to seasonality has already started to emerge and is influenced by lower temperatures and intermediate relative humidity, which allow the virus to survive and remain in suspension in smaller water particles for longer periods of time, especially in closed environments with little aeration. Disease severity will depend on individual risk, affecting mostly the elderly, the immunocompromised and the unvaccinated. Of note, circulation in animal reservoirs, including domestic cats and dogs, could lead to the repeated emergence of new, immuno-resistant variants.

Preparedness and management

Crisis preparedness and management will depend on three main factors: the detection and surveillance of new variants; vaccination and therapeutic options; and voluntary protective behaviours (mask wearing, social distancing and isolation when showing symptoms or infection detected).

Surveillance

A possible solution for the under-reporting that arises with the asymptomatic cases that are more prevalent with Omicron is the surveillance of waste water. This strategy of random sampling allows continuous monitoring of viral circulation levels and the detection of new variants, while removing the logistical and socioeconomic burden of long-term active PCR (polymerase chain reaction) monitoring. It could be used in conjunction with more active monitoring in cases of sporadic local outbreaks, which will be a likely future scenario for Covid-19. In addition, it would concomitantly allow other common human pathogens to be monitored.

Vaccines and immunity

Vaccination has been shown to be successful in reducing the risk of severe and lethal Covid-19 (60‑70 % probability of protection from Omicron, with no decline). It also helps alleviate less severe symptoms, but with less probability and stability over time: protection from Omicron drops from 60 % to 10 % after five months, for both second and third doses; it is lower compared with other variants and wanes faster.

A fourth vaccine dose has been found to be useful in managing the disease, as it doubles protection against infection and quadruples protection against severe infection. However, even with variant-targeted vaccines, full protection has never been verified. Therefore, other protection measures, such as mask wearing, ventilation, and distancing, continue to be fundamental to preventing transmission and consequently dampening disease severity.

Therapeutics

A few treatment options for potential over-the-counter use are currently under review by the European Medicines Agency (EMA). Paxlovid, an antiviral pill developed by Pfizer, has received conditional marketing authorisation from EMA and is already being rolled out in the UK. It has shown 90 % efficacy in preventing hospitalisation and death. Lagevrio, a second antiviral option developed by Merck, is currently under marketing evaluation by EMA. Unfortunately, it shows only 30 % efficacy in preventing infection and could have associated mutagenic risks.

For severe and critically-ill patients requiring hospitalisation, several types of medicinal products are already available and at use in hospitals. These are classified as systemic corticosteroids, immunomodulatory agents, monoclonal antibodies against SARS-CoV-2 and antivirals.

Antibiotics will continue being prescribed for patients with suspected bacterial co-infections or secondary infections, which are quite rare.

Convalescent plasma, that is, the administration of plasma with antibodies from patients who have recovered from Covid-19, has not been recommended by the WHO, as its benefits are unproven.

Medium-term scenarios

It is difficult to predict when the Covid-19 pandemic will evolve into an endemic state. The main factors involved are the parallel ‘race’ between increased immunity due to both natural recovery from infection and vaccination campaigns, and the emergence of new variants potentially able to escape acquired immunity. The World Health Organization (WHO) optimistically predicts an end to the acute phase of infection this year, if vaccination campaigns continue and the global vaccination rate reaches at least 70 % in the coming months.

Varied levels of vaccine distribution worldwide could hamper these plans, as higher topical virus circulation will serve as a hotbed for the emergence of new variants with the potential to escape immunity. In this regard, it could be argued that vaccine equity is an urgent goal that transcends local population needs and serves a common global interest of leading the way out of the pandemic.

Once it reaches an endemic state, Covid-19 could see an annual seasonal curve similar to that of influenza, with an autumn-winter peak in the EU. This tendency to seasonality has already started to emerge and is influenced by lower temperatures and intermediate relative humidity, which allow the virus to survive and remain in suspension in smaller water particles for longer periods of time, especially in closed environments with little aeration. Disease severity will depend on individual risk, affecting mostly the elderly, the immunocompromised and the unvaccinated. Of note, circulation in animal reservoirs, including domestic cats and dogs, could lead to the repeated emergence of new, immuno-resistant variants.

Preparedness and management

Crisis preparedness and management will depend on three main factors: the detection and surveillance of new variants; vaccination and therapeutic options; and voluntary protective behaviours (mask wearing, social distancing and isolation when showing symptoms or infection detected).

Surveillance

A possible solution for the under-reporting that arises with the asymptomatic cases that are more prevalent with Omicron is the surveillance of waste water. This strategy of random sampling allows continuous monitoring of viral circulation levels and the detection of new variants, while removing the logistical and socioeconomic burden of long-term active PCR (polymerase chain reaction) monitoring. It could be used in conjunction with more active monitoring in cases of sporadic local outbreaks, which will be a likely future scenario for Covid-19. In addition, it would concomitantly allow other common human pathogens to be monitored.

Vaccines and immunity

Vaccination has been shown to be successful in reducing the risk of severe and lethal Covid-19 (60‑70 % probability of protection from Omicron, with no decline). It also helps alleviate less severe symptoms, but with less probability and stability over time: protection from Omicron drops from 60 % to 10 % after five months, for both second and third doses; it is lower compared with other variants and wanes faster.

A fourth vaccine dose has been found to be useful in managing the disease, as it doubles protection against infection and quadruples protection against severe infection. However, even with variant-targeted vaccines, full protection has never been verified. Therefore, other protection measures, such as mask wearing, ventilation, and distancing, continue to be fundamental to preventing transmission and consequently dampening disease severity.

Therapeutics

A few treatment options for potential over-the-counter use are currently under review by the European Medicines Agency (EMA). Paxlovid, an antiviral pill developed by Pfizer, has received conditional marketing authorisation from EMA and is already being rolled out in the UK. It has shown 90 % efficacy in preventing hospitalisation and death. Lagevrio, a second antiviral option developed by Merck, is currently under marketing evaluation by EMA. Unfortunately, it shows only 30 % efficacy in preventing infection and could have associated mutagenic risks.

For severe and critically-ill patients requiring hospitalisation, several types of medicinal products are already available and at use in hospitals. These are classified as systemic corticosteroids, immunomodulatory agents, monoclonal antibodies against SARS-CoV-2 and antivirals.

Antibiotics will continue being prescribed for patients with suspected bacterial co-infections or secondary infections, which are quite rare. Convalescent plasma, that is, the administration of plasma with antibodies from patients who have recovered from Covid-19, has not been recommended by the WHO, as its benefits are unproven.

Existing policy responses European health union package

The European health union initiative draws on the lessons learned from the pandemic. It aims to strengthen the EU’s health security framework, while also reinforcing the crisis preparedness and response role of key EU agencies. It is composed of a set of legislative and non-legislative acts[i] that are all directly relevant to the tasks and governance of the Health Emergency Preparedness and Response Authority (HERA).

HERA has been set up to strengthen the EU’s ability to prevent, detect, and rapidly respond to cross-border health emergencies, by ensuring the development, manufacturing, procurement, and equitable distribution of key medical countermeasures (i.e. vaccines and therapeutics). An early milestone of this cooperation is VACCELERATE, the first EU-wide network for Covid-19 vaccine trials, launched as part of the HERA incubator. Preparedness efforts also include forming resilient industrial capacities to ensure timely and commensurate supply of counter-measures. HERA will establish EU FAB, a network of ‘ever-ready’ multi-technology production capacities for vaccine and therapeutics manufacturing in the EU. The objective is to unlock a production capacity of 700 million doses of vaccine, of which 50 % within six months following the breakout of a crisis situation.

HERA activities will cover preparedness and crisis phases. This will lead to governance based on two main operation modes (preparedness and crisis). This calls for smooth interplay with other EU institutions and agencies (such as the EMA or the ECDC), Member States and stakeholders. Through their recovery and resilience plans, Member States are expected to contribute further to resilience and preparedness.

Future cross border health threats could also be of a non-infectious nature. HERA will conduct a technology review and gap analysis on antimicrobial resistance (AMR) medical countermeasures (expected towards the end of 2022). These new capabilities complement the Commission’s EU ‘one health’ action plan against AMR, which aims to promote best practices for antimicrobials and boost research and innovation. The European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) also plays a key role in fighting AMR by monitoring resistance in food and animals. For this it uses data from Member States, and provides independent scientific advice on risk assessments in collaboration with the ECDC and EMA. HERA also plans to monitor human-made threats such as a bio-terrorism, including chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) threats.

Tackling the infodemic

The Covid-19 pandemic broke out at a time when the profile and impact of misinformation and disinformation are facilitated by various trends, including digitalisation. The EU had already adopted initiatives to tackle the phenomenon. For instance, in 2016, the Commission and the High Representative/Vice-President of the Commission (HR/VP) set out a joint framework on countering hybrid threats. The Covid-19 pandemic magnified the global reach and risks of this trend, to the extent that the WHO adopted the concept of ‘infodemic‘ (i.e. too much information including false or misleading information in digital and physical environments during a disease outbreak). In 2021, the Commission included ‘improving the coordination and sophistication against disinformation’ as one of the top 10 lessons drawn from the pandemic.

Figure 38: Responding better to future pandemics Obstacles to implementation Beyond pandemics

It is important to bear in mind the threat of risk aggregation, between risks to health and other risks identified in this report. For example, semiconductor supply chain interruption (and in an extreme situation, collapse of the internet) could have a major impact on health systems, and vice versa, as seen during the Covid-19 pandemic. In this regard, the EU Chips Act will pool resources and provide a new framework to ensure security of supply, and HERA plans ensure the availability of critical technologies and production sites for medical countermeasures. Furthermore, the risk of extreme weather events brought about by climate change, like the floods seen across the Benelux region and Germany in 2021, could cause widespread fatalities.

This further highlights the need for a single EU approach to health, as the health of the human population and of the planet go hand in hand. Similarly, international conflicts may hamper the effectiveness of the international dimension of the EU’s vaccine strategy. Acting together as ‘Team Europe‘, the EU, its Member States, and financial institutions, in particular the European Investment Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, is expected to invest over €3 billion to help secure 1.8 billion doses of vaccines for 92 low and middle-income countries in 2021 and 2022.

Policy proposals by experts and stakeholders

HERA has been commented on by several stakeholders’ organisations. The European Public Health Alliance (EPHA) has stressed the global relevance of HERA’s activities. According to EPHA, HERA’s results should, where relevant, reflect the public good dimension, as well as ensuring affordability, accessibility and availability. A network of 19 pan‑European organisations representing patients, consumers, health professionals, and civil society, coordinated by the European Alliance for Responsible R&D and Affordable Medicines, have voiced their preference for an inclusive and transparent governance scheme, to allow all interested actors to take part, including patients.

Under the Conference on the Future of Europe, European Citizens’ Panel 3: ‘Climate change and the environment / Health’ adopted several recommendations relevant to HERA, including for instance recommendation 43, which will be taken forward to the Conference Plenary: ‘We recommend that the European Union increases its budget dedicated for joint research and innovation projects in the area of health (without budget cuts in other EU health-related programmes). This would also strengthen European scientific and research institutions overall’.

Position of the European Parliament Health Emergency Preparedness and Response Authority (HERA)

While supporting the aims of HERA in general terms, Parliament – in its October 2021 resolution on EU transparency in the development, purchase and distribution of Covid-19 vaccines – criticised the Commission’s decision to refrain from using the ordinary legislative procedure through Article 168 TFEU in setting up HERA, thus failing to establish HERA as a fully-fledged independent agency subject to the same scrutiny requirements as other agencies, such as the EMA and the ECDC. The Parliament regretted ‘the fact that the Commission’s approach, which has led to Parliament being excluded from designing and overseeing the work of HERA, can be regarded as yet another shortcoming that has undermined transparency and accountability for public spending and decision-making in the area of public health’.

Parliament further stressed the importance of accountability, including parliamentary monitoring of HERA, in its November 2021 resolution on a pharmaceutical strategy for Europe. None of the European health union proposals and initiatives has been subject to a formal impact assessment. In this context, the Parliament’s monitoring competence, such as budgetary control, will be key to assessing the effectiveness and efficiency of the European health union’s implementation, including HERA’s activities. However, the evaluation framework developed under the health union differs significantly from that established under the US Pandemic and All Hazards Preparedness Act. While the US legislator ensures congressional oversight of the evaluation by including several provisions that require the assistant secretary for preparedness and response also to report annually to the ‘relevant committees of Congress’, the European Parliament committees are not mentioned in connection with a review of HERA. Article 8 of the Commission decision establishing HERA mentions only an obligation for the Commission to report to the European Parliament, to the Council and to the HERA Board on a review of implementation of HERA’s operations by 2025.

In terms of HERA’s mandate, Parliament has adopted various resolutions that either make direct reference to, or offer relevant guidance on, HERA. In its July 2021 resolution on trade-related aspects and implications of Covid-19, the Parliament emphasised the key role played by public sector resources, allowing pharmaceutical companies to de-risk the whole vaccine value chain; it also considered that a multilateral intellectual property rights (IPR) framework could offer the protection and incentives that are critical for preparedness against future pandemics. In its May 2021 resolution on accelerating progress and tackling inequalities towards ending AIDS as a public health threat by 2030, Parliament encouraged the Commission and the Member States to explore the decoupling of research and development spending from the price of medicines, for instance through the use of patent pools, open source research, and grants and subsidies. In its above-mentioned November 2021 resolution on a pharmaceutical strategy, Parliament considered that HERA should initiate and support the development of innovation, establish an EU-level list of medicinal products of major therapeutic interest, facilitate their production within the EU, promote their joint purchase, and build up strategic stocks of these medicines.

In November 2021, the Parliament reflected further on HERA when adopting its first reading position on the proposal for a regulation on serious cross-border threats to health. In particular, the Parliament adopted several amendments aimed at ensuring HERA’s visibility in different key processes and schemes established, and at facilitating the coordination with the set of bodies to be established under the proposal for a regulation on the emergency framework of measures for ensuring the supply of crisis-relevant medical countermeasures.

Infodemic

The European Parliament has been tackling the infodemic situation since the early phase of the Covid-19 pandemic. With the resolution of 17 April 2020, it stressed that disinformation surrounding Covid-19 is a major public health problem and that everyone should have access to accurate and verified information.

In its resolution of 24 November 2021 on a pharmaceutical strategy for Europe, the Parliament stressed the importance of strategic public information, to facilitate the dissemination of knowledge and solutions, beyond the health dimension of the ‘infodemic’.

Furthermore, with its resolution of 11 November 2021 on ‘Strengthening democracy, media freedom and pluralism’, it highlighted that independent and high quality journalism and civil society organisations play a crucial role as guardians of democracy and the rule of law by holding power to account and fighting disinformation and misinformation.

Health beyond the Covid-19 pandemic

The rising incidence of non-communicable diseases (NCDs) places a major burden on European healthcare systems, costing €700 billion in treatment each year. The development of the EU’s capabilities for health monitoring, research, and data analysis through the European health union could contribute to better understanding and coordination to combat NCDs. For example, cancer is the second leading cause of mortality in the EU (after cardiovascular diseases), with 2.6 million diagnoses and 1.2 million deaths every year. To address this, one main pillar of the European health union is Europe’s beating cancer plan, which will have a budget of €4 billion to improve early detection, ensure equal access to diagnosis and treatment, and improve quality of life of patients and survivors. MEPs on the Special Committee on Beating Cancer (BECA) considered this plan ‘a first step towards a real European Health Union’. At its final meeting, BECA Members voted overwhelmingly in favour of the rapporteur’s report, which contains over 1 500 amendments to the plan, arranged across 10 proposals.

Other NCDs, such as obesity, cardiovascular diseases, and mental health disorders, do not currently have dedicated EU action plans. Nevertheless, other proposed initiatives under the European health union, such as the pharmaceutical strategy and the European Health Data Space, will help to fight these by ensuring, respectively, access to affordable medicines, and better cross-border access and interoperability of health data that could underpin medical research and innovation.

In focus
Managing the risks of the Covid-19 pandemic remains a challenge, not least because of the emergence of new variants, and unequal worldwide vaccination distribution.
While EU vaccination rates have reached three quarters of the population, new SARS-CoV-2 variants keep emerging in the EU. Although these variants appear to be generally less severe, they still pose challenges to health systems: the risk of reinfection is enhanced and transmissibility appears to be higher than with previously dominant variants. At the same time, new variants are likely to continue to emerge until strategies for worldwide vaccination are effective.
Furthermore, the frequency and effects of ‘Long Covid’ (defined as the persistence of SARS-CoV-2-associated symptoms for more than three months) are still under evaluation, requiring further investigation.
Although several drugs to treat SARS-CoV-2 infection have been approved and show effectiveness, vaccination remains the most effective tool against the emergence of new variants and to limit the effects of long Covid. The implementation of a globally effective vaccine strategy therefore remains key to enhancing Europe’s resilience.
If measures are successful, it is expected that SARS-CoV-19 – while still present – will enter a stage of seasonality, characterised by higher case numbers in the winter months, similar to the flu.
To achieve this and manage the pandemic, rethinking present surveillance and monitoring schemes, ensuring the distribution of vaccines worldwide and implementing an action plan against disinformation and misinformation could be important milestones. Possible action

Written by Alex Wilson.

This paper is one of 11 policy responses set out in a new EPRS study which looks first at 15 risks facing the European Union, in the changed context of a world coming out of the coronavirus crisis, but one in which a war has been launched just outside the Union’s borders. The study then looks in greater detail at 11 policy responses the EU could take to address the risks outlined and to strengthen the Union’s resilience to them. It continues a series launched in spring 2020, which sought to identify means to strengthen the European Union’s long-term resilience in the context of recovery from the coronavirus crisis. Read the full study here. The issue in short: The challenge and the existing gaps

Defined by the International Energy Agency as ‘reliable, affordable access to all fuels and energy sources’, energy security is vital to the EU’s economy. However, lacking sufficient energy reserves of its own, the EU is critically dependent on imports. In 2020, these covered well over half (57 %) of the EU’s energy needs – a figure which rises to 97 % for oil and 84 % for natural gas.

Heavy reliance on imports creates vulnerabilities. Past risks were highlighted by the 1973 crisis, when an embargo led by Arab oil producers caused oil prices to quadruple, resulting in high inflation, a deep recession and episodes of social unrest. In 2009, Russian gas producer Gazprom halted supplies through Ukraine, leaving several EU countries including Bulgaria and Romania with a severe shortfall for nearly two weeks in the depths of winter. Questions about the reliability of Europe’s main gas supplier were raised again in 2021, when Gazprom’s refusal to supply more than the contractual minimum left European reserves depleted and exacerbated a ‘gas crunch‘, in which surging prices caused hardship to consumers and put dozens of energy companies out of business. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 threatens to further disrupt gas supplies to Europe. The war prompted Germany to suspend certification of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, and obliged the EU as a whole to find ways to drastically reduce their reliance on energy imports from Russia. The European Commission has proposed a reduction of two-thirds in EU energy imports from Russia by the end of 2022. Reflecting these risks, the European Parliament/Normandy Region’s Normandy Index identifies energy insecurity as Europe’s main external vulnerability.

In the longer run, a major benefit of the transition to renewable sources, together with enhanced energy efficiency measures, is that Europe should become less dependent on imported fossil fuels. Nevertheless, short- and medium-term trends are rather less favourable. In view of the need to cut carbon emissions, most EU countries are phasing out coal use in power production, while post-Fukushima safety concerns have accelerated the end of nuclear power in several Member States. Nevertheless, there is a considerable way to go in terms of developing and commercialising energy storage technologies that can accommodate the variable nature of renewable energy production (in particularly solar and wind power). This means the EU will continue to rely on gas for heating and to a lesser extent for electricity production in the coming years. The transport sector in Europe is also far from decarbonised and heavily reliant on oil based products. Gas imports have in fact been rising as the EU’s own production dries up, with the main EU producing country (The Netherlands) intent on ending its gas production in 2022. Russia has become the EU’s main energy supplier in recent years, responsible for around 45% of gas and coal imports, and around 25% of oil imports. It is likely to remain Europe’s dominant supplier in the gas sector for some time, given that Norway and Algeria (the EU’s second and third largest suppliers) do not have the capacity to replace it, and it remains unclear how much gas the EU can expect to receive from gas fields in Azerbaijan. This means future supply diversification will rely heavily on Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG). LNG offers a key advantage over pipeline supplies because it can be more flexibly shipped in from a wider range of producer countries, including strategic allies such as the USA, without the need for pipelines. However, LNG is generally more expensive than pipeline gas, especially at times of high global demand, while its production and transport system makes it more polluting. Furthermore, access to LNG requires Member States to build dedicated import terminals and integrate these into their gas networks, as well as those of neighbouring countries.

Since the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, energy dependence on Russia has been highlighted as a major geopolitical risk for Europe, which also helps to finance Russian aggression, something that the EU needs to address collectively and as a matter of priority. Over the past 15 years, the EU has made some progress in terms of diversifying gas supplies and better integrating national gas markets (e.g. through enhanced interconnection capacity), so that supply disruptions can be addressed through burden sharing, reverse flows and other tools. This progress is underpinned by EU legislation on security of gas supply, intergovernmental agreements in the energy sector, and the third gas package. Reform of the third gas package and security of gas supply regulation lie at the heart of the hydrogen and decarbonised gas markets package, proposed by the Commission in December 2021, whose primary aim is to help gas markets deliver on the clean energy transition.

Whereas EU legislation has in the past focused on market functioning and diversification of supply, the more recent emphasis has been to transform energy markets in a way that aligns with the EU’s ambitious climate goals. Rather less emphasis has been placed on the price of energy paid by consumers, with the assumption being that lower energy prices would naturally flow from sustainable, functioning and integrated energy markets. Yet as described in Chapter 3, energy prices in the EU rose sharply in 2021 due in large part to the economic recovery from the Covid-19 crisis, and have shot up even further in 2022 because of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This has led to broader price inflation and a cost of living crisis. While guaranteeing physical energy supplies remains the highest priority, there are growing concerns about how energy is priced in the EU and the mechanisms in place to ensure that consumers (especially vulnerable ones) can afford their energy supplies. The risks otherwise are of growing energy poverty and negative impact on economic growth, as energy use accounts for a high and growing share of consumer spending.

Existing policy responses EU action

The Security of Gas Supply (SoGS) regulation constitutes the main EU framework for ensuring that Member States plan and cooperate closely on security of supply and can support neighbouring countries in the event of a supply disruption. Potential policy responses under the SoGS regulation, which was revised in 2017, include closer regional cooperation over managing energy supplies in a crisis, physical diversion of supplies to help neighbouring countries, and prioritisation of essential services and supplies to households across the EU. Gas security in Europe is further enhanced by measures to ensure the EU has a role in scrutinising intergovernmental agreements and some commercial contracts in the energy field with third countries, and ensuring that EU law also applies to pipelines with third countries. While gas is the biggest concern in terms of security of supply, the EU also has legislation to ensure all Member States develop minimum oil reserves, and takes measures to guarantee security of electricity supply in the event of an unexpected disruption.

Growing national concerns around the rise of energy prices in 2021, discussed extensively in the European Council and in meetings of energy and finance ministers, led to the European Commission adopting a toolbox (October 2021) of targeted interventions that Member States could take to counter these price rises in a way that did not undermine the single market in energy. These include temporary reductions in energy taxes, social payments to vulnerable consumers, and actions to prevent disconnections such as a temporary deferral of payments. Furthermore, the Commission proposed a revision of the SoGS regulation that included greater coordination of gas storage at EU level and voluntary joint purchasing of strategic gas stocks. These suggestions were included as part of the hydrogen and decarbonised gas markets package in December 2021.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has pushed the issue of energy dependency to the fore, with a growing realisation that the EU can no longer rely on Russia as its main energy supplier, and should take concrete actions to curb its energy imports immediately. The Commission proposed a joint European action, entitled REPowerEU (8 March 2022), designed to reduce fossil fuel imports from Russia by 2/3 in 2022, with the goal of making Europe independent from Russian fossil fuels well before 2030. Permitted actions include a relaxation of state aid rules for businesses affected by high energy prices, the possibility of windfall taxes on energy companies that have benefited from the price crisis, and the diversification of gas supplies through greater LNG import capacity and the delivery of alternative pipeline routes. The informal meeting of the European Council on 10-11 March 2022 issued the Versailles Declaration that seeks progress in reducing EU energy dependency on Russia in particular. On 23 March 2022, the Commission proposed an expedited and targeted revision of the SoGS regulation that would require all Member States to fill their gas storage levels to at least 80 % of capacity by 1 November 2022 (rising to 90% in subsequent winters), introduce solidarity mechanisms between Member States when it comes to accessing stored gas, and require certification of all gas storage operators, including those owned by third countries (e.g. Russia). The overarching aim is to ensure that Europe can cope with any potential interruption of Russian gas supplies over the next winter. According to a 2022 report from the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER), actual gas in storage in the EU-27 was only around 20 % of annual consumption (as at 1 October 2021), with filling-in levels of only 72 % and particularly low storage levels in sites owned by Gazprom. The ACER report lends support to the idea of urgent EU action on gas storage.

Alongside these concerns about energy dependency, Member States are increasingly alarmed at the consequences of high energy prices (also an element of security of supply, according to the IEA definition), and some now strongly object to the marginal pricing model used for the EU electricity market, which sets the energy price according to the most expensive source used in energy consumption. In normal times, marginal pricing can be a transparent tool that is useful for incentivising renewable sources, especially those like solar and wind power with low operating costs. Yet in times of great market disruption, marginal pricing can mean that electricity users have had to pay high energy bills based on the cost of gas rather than the most common source for energy generation (e.g. nuclear energy in France). This has prompted several Member States to demand a more thorough overhaul of EU energy market rules, including a new system of setting energy prices that places a lower financial burden on consumers. In the European Council meeting of 24-25 March 2022, Member States agreed to fill in gas storage sites and phase out Russian oil, gas and coal imports as soon as possible, and work together on the voluntary common purchase of gas, LNG and hydrogen. Member States also agreed on the need for new measures to combat the rapid increase in energy prices, inter alia by calling on the Commission ‘to submit proposals that effectively address the problem of excessive electricity prices’.

Figure 36: Strengthening energy security National level initiatives

EU Member States have undertaken a number of actions to help their consumers, especially vulnerable ones, cope with a period of exceptionally high energy prices. This includes reductions in energy taxes, imposing price caps on energy bills, and making financial support available for more vulnerable consumers. The Bruegel think-tank has mapped out the various national policies that Member States are taking to address energy price rises. The war in Ukraine has prompted Member States to go much further and look for ways to sharply and rapidly reduce their dependence on fossil fuel imports from Russia. Some Member States such as France and Belgium have decided to prolong the life of nuclear reactors that are currently scheduled for closure, although Germany has taken a different approach and intends to continue with closing nuclear power plants but invest more heavily in renewables. Poland is accelerating its strategy to reduce dependence on Russian energy imports, ending its gas supply contract with Russia by the end of 2022 and replacing this with gas imports via its dedicated LNG terminal. Poland could also end its supply contract for Russian oil in 2023, and make more use of its indigenous coal resources to replace natural gas in the short term. Switching to coal is an option for other countries with coal reserves or coal fired power stations, even if the highly polluting effects of coal mean that its use needs to be completely phased out in the medium term. For its part Germany has suspended certification of the NS2 pipelines, and has authorised the development of new LNG import terminals, as important steps towards reducing its dependence on gas supplied from Russia. The big and ongoing question is whether the EU as a whole will cease all energy imports from Russia, and thus follow the line taken by the USA and the UK, as well as the Baltic States inside the EU.

EU action with external partners/international organisations

The EU’s 2016 Global Strategy makes it a priority to ‘strengthen relations with reliable energy-producing and transit countries’. The Commission will adopt a new EU strategy on external energy relations in May 2022, which should take into account REPowerEU and the broader European response to the war in Ukraine. Two important multilateral frameworks for EU external energy relations are the International Energy Agency, which the EU participates in directly through the Agency’s Governing Board, and the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT), that governs commercial relations between energy producing and consuming countries. Whereas the IEA is a valuable forum for energy dialogue and research, its membership is limited to OECD countries that are mostly net energy consumers. The IEA has an important role in monitoring emergency oil stocks and releasing these to guarantee security of supply, but it does not have comparable powers to ensure security of gas supply. The ECT represents both net energy producing and consuming countries, but its membership is geographically limited and many major energy suppliers (e.g. Russia, Norway, Australia) and net consumers (China and most Asian countries) are not parties. The EU is seeking to reform the ECT in a way that would make it more compatible with the green energy transition and more effective in addressing problems relating to increasingly globalised energy markets.

Since 2006, the EU has been part of an Energy Community with neighbouring countries (currently, the six western Balkan countries that are not EU Member States together with Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova), several of which are important transit countries for EU gas supplies from Russia and Azerbaijan, and face similar challenges to the EU in terms of dependence on Russian imports. Energy Community members have adopted key European energy laws, such as the second and third legislative packages on gas and electricity markets, helping them to become more energy secure and integrate at least partially with the EU’s internal energy market. However, there is still a long way to go: as of 2021, member countries had implemented just over half of the laws included in their Energy Community commitments.

Given the tense state of relations with Moscow, the EU is now actively seeking to reduce its reliance on energy supplies from Russia. Germany has already taken an important step in this direction by not approving the Nord Stream 2 pipeline for operation (see in focus). The EU has nevertheless maintained bilateral energy dialogues with several other supplier and transit countries, such as Algeria, Turkey and Azerbaijan. The EU has significant energy cooperation with Ukraine; in 2019 it mediated a five-year gas transit agreement between Kyiv and Moscow, while Ukraine is a leading member of the Energy Community and has become more closely aligned with the EU energy acquis. In 2021, Germany committed to establish a Green Fund in support of the Ukrainian energy sector, with at least US$1 billion of investments, as part of an agreement with the US. This could be a useful template for future EU support for the Ukrainian energy sector.

Obstacles to implementation

There is no legal obstacle to strengthening energy security at EU level – this is a specific EU competence under Article 194 TFEU, which provides an explicit legal basis for EU energy policies. Yet competence over the structure of energy supply, the choice of energy sources (‘energy mix’), and the conditions for exploiting energy resources, all reside with the Member States (also according to Article 194 TFEU). Member States are therefore primarily responsible for ensuring security of supply within their territory. The focus of EU action – such as the SoGS regulation – is to ensure that Member States do not penalise neighbouring countries when they take legitimate measures to guarantee their own energy supplies, and come to their support if supplies are interrupted.

The extent to which EU energy systems are coordinated is also a matter of political will. Member States remain free not only to decide which energy sources to use (or prohibit), but also how to organise their infrastructure and secure their own (usually bilateral) contracts with supply countries. While the EU now has a scrutiny role over intergovernmental agreements and some commercial contracts in the energy field, and has developed the right to apply single market rules to pipelines with third countries, this remains far from the pooling of energy sovereignty that may now be necessary at EU level. Given the secular decline in EU fossil energy production, Member States have sometimes sought to jostle for preferential relations and contractual terms with supply countries, leading to policy choices that are not consistent with Europe’s long term interest and which has so far prevented the EU from effectively speaking with one voice in external energy relations.

Past disputes between Member States over the Nord Stream 2 pipelines highlight the extent to which Member States’ decisions on energy infrastructure could become politicised and negatively impact EU security of supply. The Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 brought into relief the close interdependency and common challenges faced by Member States in the energy field, as well as the common need to reduce dependency on energy imports from countries that constitute a geopolitical threat to Europe. Perhaps the Ukraine crisis will deliver the political will that is necessary for Member States to coordinate more closely on their energy mixes and supply infrastructure, take strategic decisions in close consultation with their neighbours, and map a path out of energy dependency that is compatible with the transition to climate neutrality by 2050. This will necessarily include the promotion of renewable energy sources and energy efficiency measures that can sharply curb imports of fossil fuels and promote cleaner alternatives. It is now even more evident that for the EU and its Member States, climate action and energy security are two sides of the same coin, and concerted actions to support one will in the longer run reinforce the other.

Policy proposals by experts and stakeholders

The think tank Bruegel has set out scenarios for how Europe could prepare for a winter without Russian gas supplies. Bruegel argues that even limited Russian gas imports bolster Gazprom and thus support the Putin regime. No Russian imports is a possible scenario that could be realised by maximising alternative pipeline supplies, LNG imports and storage capacity, although even this along would be insufficient to fully replace Russian gas supplies. Diversification of supply would therefore need to be accompanied by a sharp decrease in energy demand, which can be achieved by greater energy efficiency, lower heating, and prioritising certain types of energy demand above others. Similarly, Bruegel argues that cutting off Russian coal and oil imports would lead to a temporary adjustment that is painful but would ultimately be better than continued dependence.

The International Energy Agency argues that Europe can cut its dependence on Russian gas (currently at 155bcm per year) by around a third (50 bcm) within a year, according to its 10-point plan. The IEA proposes not signing any more contracts for Russian gas and doing everything possible to diversify supply routes. This must be accompanied by ramping up renewable energy production and energy efficiency actions. Minimum gas storage obligations would need to be introduced and a windfall profits taxed introduced on energy producers, consistent with the REPowerEU action proposed by the European Commission. Alongside these measures, the IEA proposes a thermostat reduction of 1C in heating that would reduce energy consumption alone by 10bcm within a year. The IEA has proposed a similar 10-point plan to end dependence on Russian oil globally, and has consistently argued for the importance of energy efficiency in curbing consumption and reducing dependence on fossil fuel imports, thus enhancing energy security.

The International Renewable Energy Agency has set out the global measures, necessary to deliver on the goals of the Paris Climate Change Agreement, in particular the ambition to limit global warming to 1.5C by 2050. This would involve a drastic reduction in fossil fuel consumption (and their imports) by means of ramping up renewable energy production and energy efficiency measures.

Ember, E3G, RAP and Bellona have produced a joint analysis, which concludes that the EU can end its dependence on Russian gas by 2025, without stalling the phase-out of coal and without having to build any new gas infrastructure. These environmental think-tanks instead suggest fully implementing the EU’s Fit for 55 plan, removing existing barriers to domestic wind and solar growth, and incentivising demand-side responses to promote energy efficiency and renewables.

Position of the European Parliament

In its December 2015 resolution on the EU’s Energy Union, the Parliament highlights the risks of over-dependence on Russia, an unreliable supplier which uses energy as a political weapon. It notes the importance of energy for the sovereignty of EU and Eastern Partnership countries. Third country suppliers must follow EU energy law. In energy relations with third countries, EU countries should negotiate with one voice, and consider mechanisms for collective gas purchasing. The EU needs a more coherent approach to external energy security, not least through coordination between the EU High Representative and the relevant Commissioners.

The September 2021 recommendation on EU-Russia political relations criticises the Nord Stream 2 pipeline as divisive, incompatible with the greenhouse gas emissions goals of the European Green Deal, and unnecessary given spare capacity in existing pipelines. It therefore calls for an immediate halt to the pipeline and a European strategy to end dependence on commodity imports from Russia.

The March 2022 resolution on the Russian aggression against Ukraine calls for imports of oil, gas and coal from Russia to be restricted, and for the Nord Stream 2 pipeline to be abandoned. Diversifying energy sources should be a priority, expanding LNG terminals and supply routes, unbundling gas storage, and increasing energy efficiency and the speed of the clean energy transition. Energy prices should be carefully monitored and appropriate measures taken to mitigate any negative economic and social impacts that emerge, while all cooperation with Russia in the nuclear field should cease.

The April 2022 resolution on Ukraine calls for an immediate full embargo on Russian imports of oil, coal, nuclear fuel, and gas, and for both Nord Stream 1 and 2 pipelines to be completely abandoned, accompanied by a plan to continue ensuring the EU’s security of energy supply in the short-term. The Parliament’s resolution also calls for common strategic energy reserves and energy purchasing mechanisms to be established at EU level, with the aim of increasing energy security while reducing external energy dependency and price volatility. The resolution also calls for work to be started on creating a gas union, based on common purchases of gas by Member States.

In focus: Nord Stream 2
Nord Stream 2 (NS2) illustrates the extent to which energy security has been a bone of contention between the EU and the USA, and a source of division among EU Member States. While the European Commission and the Parliament have been critical of NS2 since its conception, in 2019 Commission President Ursula von der Leyen also criticised US extra-territorial sanctions on the pipeline, due to the threat they posed to European companies carrying out legitimate business. However, the two sides are now in agreement that a Russian invasion of Ukraine requires a halt to the project. Despite initial hesitation, in February 2022 Germany put approval procedures on hold, pending further developments. In the same month, a large delivery of US LNG helped to address Europe’s shortfall: according to von der Leyen, EU countries now have enough gas to last them for the rest of the winter. Even when the war in Ukraine eventually ceases, it remains dubious whether NS2 can ever receive certification to operate. This represents a considerable cost of ‘stranded assets’ not only for Russia’s Gazprom but also for various EU energy companies and local governments that had invested their resources in the project. This emphasises the importance of not repeating similar mistakes in future. Possible action

Written by Monika Kiss.

This paper is one of 11 policy responses set out in a new EPRS study which looks first at 15 risks facing the European Union, in the changed context of a world coming out of the coronavirus crisis, but one in which a war has been launched just outside the Union’s borders. The study then looks in greater detail at 11 policy responses the EU could take to address the risks outlined and to strengthen the Union’s resilience to them. It continues a series launched in spring 2020, which sought to identify means to strengthen the European Union’s long-term resilience in the context of recovery from the coronavirus crisis. Read the full study here. The issue in short: the challenge and the existing gaps

The European Union already has an outstanding level of social security compared to the rest of the world. While the EU constitutes less than 6 % of the world’s population and 20 % of global gross domestic profit (GDP), it accounts for at least 40 % of global public spending on social protection. According to Eurostat, In the EU‑27 in 2020, expenditure on social protection stood at 22.0 % of GDP, at 41.3 % of total global public spending and at €2 943 billion. While the European social model is undoubtedly a unique achievement, it has to be adapted to the challenges of the future to maintain its long-term sustainability.

The coronavirus pandemic, and the ensuing healthcare and lockdown measures taken to limit its spread had far-reaching and lasting consequences for the economy, as well as for society. Forced closures and reduced economic activities led to income losses (and, as a consequence, in-work poverty) or unemployment for a significant part of the population. In some cases, tax-benefit systems and support measures such as short-time work schemes significantly reduced losses in disposable income. However, some households lost a significant part of their income and were exposed to the risk of poverty. They also had to cope with work-life balance problems and a sudden need for adequate digital equipment for teleworking and home-schooling. Social groups who were already vulnerable before the coronavirus – such as migrants, poorer communities and disabled people – were disproportionately impacted by the lockdowns and other responses deployed to tackle the health crisis.

The pandemic has accelerated digitalisation and automation and exacerbated tendencies, problems and risks related to them. Many companies and self-employed people chose to go digital, with a rapid uptake in teleworking, which turned out to be an especially viable option for office employees, despite having its own challenges (for instance the need for technical equipment and technical support, or time management and work-life balance problems). Analysis shows that more highly educated and urban populations (in particular in capital regions), were better placed to work from home. Companies have accelerated the digitalisation of their customer and supply-chain interactions and their internal operations by three to four years. The share of digital or digitally enabled products in their portfolios has accelerated by seven years.

The rapidly increasing digitalisation raises a series of questions and brings new challenges, in terms of the need for equipment and infrastructure (such as computers and other hardware, broadband internet), but also for at least basic digital skills. In this respect, statistics show growing inequalities between areas, skill levels, age groups and sectors, further disadvantaging, for instance, workers living in rural areas, older workers with a lower level of digital skills, or those who cannot afford adequate digital equipment. According to data from the Digital Skills and Jobs Coalition, about 42 % of Europeans today still do not have a basic level of digital skills. Upskilling and reskilling of workers, especially as regards to digital skills is therefore essential. Without upskilling measures adapted to individuals’ needs and opportunities, an insurmountable gap could emerge between social and age groups, as well as between regions or among Member States.

The EU population is also ageing. The decline in the numbers of live births and increasing longevity are changing steadily the population’s age profile. Consequently, the old age dependency ratio[i] is on the rise, meaning that EU social security pension systems of the EU have to be reconsidered. The question of setting a minimum wage framework to close regional gaps is one of the most analysed and debated economic topics in recent years. The pandemic and the related healthcare and lockdown measures also accelerated the spread of new forms of work: platform work or on-call or portfolio work, for example. To protect workers in atypical work forms from higher risks of unemployment and uncertain social security during crises, stronger emphasis could be placed on the legislation for non-standard work forms and for the self-employed, who were, according to data, the most affected by the pandemic.

Existing policy responses

The European Pillar of Social Rights (or ‘Social Pillar’) was jointly proclaimed and signed by the European Commission, the European Parliament and the Council at the Gothenburg Social Summit in November 2017. It aims to uphold 20 principles and rights, structured around three categories: equal opportunities and access to the labour market; fair working conditions; and social protection and inclusion. The Social Pillar is accompanied by a Social Scoreboard, which initially had 14 headline indicators and 21 secondary indicators in 12 areas, measuring progress in the EU Member States in relation to the principles. The scoreboard was used for the first time in the 2018 European Semester, one of the main parts of the EU’s economic governance framework. In June 2019, as part of the Pillar’s roll-out initiatives, the European Parliament and Council adopted the Directive on transparent and predictable working conditions, addressed insufficient protection for workers in more precarious jobs, while limiting burdens on employers and maintaining labour market adaptability.

In November 2019, the Council adopted the Recommendation on access to social protection for workers and the self-employed. It stresses that ‘in some Member States, certain categories of workers, such as short- and part-time workers, seasonal workers, on-demand workers, platform workers and those on temporary agency contracts or traineeships are excluded from social protection schemes’.

In response to the pandemic’s impact and its implications for health policy, the social sphere and the labour market (un- and underemployment, social security system inadequacy, lack of social protection of workers on non-standard work forms), the Commission launched a new recovery plan on 27 May 2020. This plan highlighted the necessity of a fair and inclusive recovery, paying particular attention to fighting unemployment, improving skills (including digital skills), supporting pay transparency and a fair minimum wage, and taking further steps against tax evasion and avoidance.

In March 2021, the von der Leyen Commission published an action plan on the Social Pillar, setting out concrete initiatives to implement its principles. The action plan called for the mobilisation of all available EU policy tools, ranging from funding programmes and the European Semester, to legislation and policy recommendations in support of Member States’ actions. The action plan also revised the Social Scoreboard to reflect the current political priorities and the recent and upcoming initiatives. It also proposed headline targets for 2030, namely bringing the proportion of people aged 20 to 64 in employment up to at least 78 %, increasing the percentage of adults who participate in training every year to at least 60 %, and reducing the number of people at risk of poverty or social exclusion by at least 15 million. The responsibility for delivering on these targets is shared by the EU institutions, national, regional and local authorities, social partners and civil society. Funding will be ensured via the 2021‑2027 multiannual financial framework and Next Generation EU, in particular the Recovery and Resilience Facility, with monitoring under the European Semester. Concrete initiatives in the framework of the action plan include an EU strategy on the rights of the child together with a European child guarantee scheme; a recommendation on effective active support for employment after the coronavirus crisis (EASE); and a platform of collaboration against homelessness. The European Commission also published a proposal on improving the working conditions of platform workers on 9 December 2021.

The European Commission put forward several initiatives to fulfil its objective of a European education area by 2025. Following the new European skills agenda and the European education area communications, adopted respectively in July and September 2020, the Commission issued two key proposals in December 2021. These aim at improving lifelong learning and employability and reducing skills mismatch and include: a Council recommendation on individual learning accounts, which should help ‘close existing gaps in the access to training for working age adults and empower them to successfully manage labour market transitions’, and a European approach to micro-credentials, with the goal of empowering workers ‘to up- and reskill throughout their entire lives and making sure that all learning experiences are properly valued’. The new digital Europe programme will contribute to advanced digital skills development, while the updated Digital education action plan 2021‑2027 aims at improving digital skills for all − a need made clear during the coronavirus crisis, with technology used at an unprecedented scale in education and training.

The increase in telework and digital platforms also raises issues of privacy and data use. At EU level, employees’ privacy is already protected by the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which requires employees’ consent for the use of tracking software or applications. The issue is also raised in the proposal on improving working conditions for platform workers, which pleads for transparency in digital labour platforms’ use of algorithms, by introducing a requirement for human monitoring to ensure fairness and accountability in algorithmic management, as well as the respect of working conditions.

In the context of the economic and social crisis engendered by the Covid‑19 outbreak, a minimum wage is increasingly considered a useful instrument to ensure fair wages and social inclusion. On 28 October 2020, the European Commission published a proposal on fair minimum wages. The proposed directive aims at promoting collective bargaining on wages in all Member States. For the countries where statutory minimum wages exist, it aims at ensuring that Member States put in place conditions to set statutory minimum wages at adequate levels, while taking account of socio-economic conditions, as well as regional and sectoral differences. Furthermore, the proposed directive aims at promoting compliance, as well as strengthening proportionate enforcement and monitoring in all Member States. The European Parliament adopted its report on 25 November 2021.Interinstitutional negotiations are ongoing.

Figure 34: Building a European social model for the 21st century National level initiatives

Social security systems can differ significantly from one Member State to another. National governments are free to determine the features of their own social security systems (benefits provided, conditions for eligibility, calculation of benefits, contributions to be paid). These systems are governed by Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 (currently under revision) on the coordination of social security systems with regard to sickness, maternity and paternity, family, invalidity, unemployment and pre-retirement benefits, and in respect of work-related accidents and diseases, and old-age pensions, as well as Regulation (EC) 987/2009 on the procedure for implementing the former regulation.

Member States can also decide on the scope of legislation on working conditions and social security coverage of workers. They decide whether and to what extent they include workers in atypical work forms, for example. Another example is the employment status of platform workers. The binary system (employed or self-employed) is challenged by the specific characteristics of platform work and bogus self-employment. Ireland, for instance, classifies workers on the basis of a series of tests laid down in case law, while Spain enacts a legal presumption that delivery platform workers are employees. The adoption of the directive on improved working conditions of platform workers will, however, unify this situation in the EU.

The implementation of the Social Pillar’s principles is also primarily a task of the Member States, carried out in close cooperation with social partners and with the support of EU policy tools. These can be ‘hard’ tools (legislation and, economic governance), or ‘soft’ tools (policy development through mutual learning and guidance). Establishing the specific amount of a fair minimum wage, for instance, is a Member State competence, even if mandatory at EU level. Measures to combat demographic decline, or measures and initiatives to provide socially vulnerable people with adequate digital tools is also a Member State competence. Concerning upskilling and reskilling, in particular in the digital area, concrete initiatives are often taken at local or regional level, but backed by a series of EU plans, such as the digital education action plan or the skills agenda, and EU-funding, such as the European Social Fund Plus or the digital Europe programme.

Obstacles to implementation

With internet and digital technologies playing an increasingly important role in our daily lives, the digitalisation of Europe has become one of the EU’s priorities for the coming decade. Yet while the EU is making good progress towards its digital transformation, progress is uneven, with clear differences visible across Europe’s regions. Even though closing this digital divide is of outmost importance, geographical conditions in some regions hinder the expansion of broadband internet or 5G, for instance in mountainous areas, on islands and in outermost regions. Peripheral regions are often also in a less financially advantageous situation, meaning digital development might be an insurmountable obstacle for them. People living in rural areas can also suffer from the paradox of the digital territorial divide: while rural areas need better digital connectivity to make up for their geographical isolation, they actually tend to have lower levels of digital connectivity, with the result that people living in these areas are less digitally connected.

Improving digital connectivity can also tackle tech poverty, (lack of access to technology, training, skills and experience needed due to lack of financial means). However, the digital upskilling of older people also encounters obstacles, such as a lack of access to digital devices or the internet, as well as a lack of skills, self-confidence, motivation and interest, and the onset of physical or cognitive impairments, making digital engagement more challenging.

Further continuing teleworking also poses some dangers. As remote work can be provided from anywhere (except for on-location services), it could lead to outsourcing and social dumping (hiring workers in Member States where wages are lower, or employing workers residing in non-EU countries). This can lead to unfair competition and could be prevented by legislative means.

Policy proposals by experts and stakeholders

Bruegel highlights that social protection arrangements vary greatly among EU countries in terms of efficiency, equity and universality, but also within Member States across different modes of work. For instance, portability of benefits between EU Member States already exists for employees under Regulations (EC) 883/2004 and 987/2009, but not for self-employed workers. Member States could therefore ensure that these entitlements are accumulated, preserved and transferable across all types of employment and different economic sectors – even when individuals accumulate several different employment statuses. The European Commission could also promote consensus and convergence among EU countries on the classification of self-employment, and could identify and promote best practices implemented by Member States. Due to digitalisation, work will be quite different from that for which academic training prepared people. According to Bruegel, this means that schools and training programmes will have to focus not only on the specific narrow skills needed for today’s jobs, but also on broader skills, such as foreign languages, which contribute to flexibility in the future, and that can be applied in many different ways.

Demographic changes mean the EU funding model for social protection is under threat, due to the declining share of the working-age population (contributing to the welfare system), compared to the increasing number of pensioners, who live longer. Under these conditions, it is difficult to expand social coverage to all forms of work (implying increased social protection costs), while there is a shrinking funding base. An unconventional solution, a ‘robot tax‘, has been considered, inter alia by Microsoft.[i] Such a robot tax could be then used to pay for the re-skilling of human workers who have lost their jobs due to automation. However, this idea is controversial, as it could also hinder innovation, reducing European competitiveness and possibly leading to distortions in relative investments in capital versus human labour.

Individual learning accounts (ILAs) are flagship actions under the new European skills agenda and important means to endorse lifelong learning. In its position on ILAs, stakeholders’ association Digital Europe stresses that: ILAs should be available for all working-age individuals, but differentiated. They are financed through four sources: individual contribution, Member States’ public funding, EU funding, and employers’ contributions. Training systems within the ILAs should be specifically designed around adults’ needs to conciliate work, private and family life.

Position of the European Parliament

The European Parliament has always been active in the development of EU action in the field of employment and social policy. Parliament has repeatedly called for a more active social policy, and has supported the Commission’s proposals in this area. On 17 December 2020, the European Parliament adopted a resolution on ‘A strong social Europe for just transitions’. It called for a key social programme, including a strategic framework for achieving a sustainable, fair and inclusive social Europe by 2030. This means incorporating the social pillar within the EU Treaties and adding a protocol providing social rights at the same level as economic freedoms within the single market. It also involved the adoption of a sustainable development and social progress pact, to ensure social and sustainable targets are mandatory, which still has to be put in practice. It also stressed the importance of a revised European Globalisation Adjustment Fund.

The European Parliament has followed the situation of workers in atypical work forms closely in recent years. On 16 September 2021, an own-initiative resolution was adopted on ‘fair working conditions, rights and social protection for platform workers – New forms of employment linked to digital development’. The resolution pleaded for improved working conditions for platform workers, who should benefit from the same rights and social protection as other workers. Parliament argues that an employment relationship should be presumed in the case of platform workers, reversing the burden of proof. Platform workers should benefit from essential and transparent information regarding working conditions and the calculation of fees, and a healthy and safe working environment, with transparent algorithms and data management. The resolution also highlights the right of platform workers to basic training to be provided by the platform and the importance of recognising their skills. The Commission proposal on ‘Improving the working conditions of platform workers’, published on 9 December 2021, includes essential points of the Parliament’s resolution.

The spread of digital technologies and related forms of work, pressures of connectivity at any time and place and high workloads can lead to increased stress levels for workers. Directives at EU level could be useful to help protect workers’ mental health, by securing a right to disconnect at specific times of the day. On 21 January 2021, the European Parliament adopted a legislative-initiative resolution, calling on the Commission to put forward a legislative proposal to secure the right to disconnect. In its resolution of 4 February 2022, on mental health in the digital world of work, the Parliament points out that the pandemic and increased use of digital technologies in the world of work exacerbated problems related to workers’ mental health and emphasises the strong need for a comprehensive EU mental health strategy, taking a cross-sectional approach to mental health issues. In its resolution of February 2019 on a comprehensive European industrial policy on artificial intelligence and robotics, the European Parliament stressed that education curricula must be adapted to automation, including through the establishment of new learning paths and the use of new delivery technologies.

In October 2019, the European Parliament adopted a resolution on employment and social policies in the euro area, calling on the Commission to put forward a legal instrument to ensure that every worker in the Union has a fair minimum wage, which can be set according to national traditions, or through collective agreements or legal provisions. Following this resolution, the European Commission published a proposal on fair minimum wages on 28 October 2020.

In focus
Digital technologies play an increasingly important role in our lives, and the Covid‑19 pandemic further accelerated this phenomenon. However, as different parts of society are not able to adapt themselves in the same way and to the same extent to these technologies, existing social inequalities are also further accentuated. People in low-income households and those belonging to vulnerable social groups are statistically less likely to possess the required technologies (such as broadband internet) and devices than people with higher and more stable incomes. From the point of view of digital connectivity (infrastructure that is needed to deliver digital services) differences between Member States, as well as between different regions in the same Member State, or between rural and urban areas, are obvious. The adequate use of digital technologies requires at least basic digital skills. Demographic breakdowns underline these differences between generations. For instance, according to the Digital Economy and Society Index (DESI), 80 % of young individuals (aged 16‑24) had at least basic digital skills in 2021. In contrast, only 33 % of those aged 55‑74 and 30 % of retired or inactive people possess basic digital skills. There is a need to tackle the risk of an even broader digital divide in these groups. The twin transitions – digital and green – are central elements of the Recovery and Resilience Fund and to Europe’s approach to recovering from Covid‑19. Digital technologies have played an essential role in maintaining economic and social life throughout the pandemic and they are a key factor for a successful transition to a sustainable, post-pandemic economy and society. The RRF Regulation therefore requires that each Member State devotes at least 20 % of the allocation received for its Recovery and Resilience Plan (RRP) to measures fostering the digital transition and/or addressing the resulting challenges. Priority areas include investment in digital public services, digitalisation of businesses, and human capital (digital skills development and online learning, including digital skills in curricula). Other EU instruments that could help narrow the digital divide are the digital education action plan, as well as several actions under the updated skills agenda related to EU support for national upskilling and lifelong learning. It is also important to develop digital connectivity at EU and Member State level. The digital part of the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF Digital) will support and catalyse both public and private investments in digital connectivity infrastructures between 2021 and 2027. It will support investments devoted to safe, secure, and sustainable high-performance infrastructure, in particular Gigabit and 5G networks across the EU. Possible action

Written by Liselotte Jensen and Stefano Spinaci.

This paper is one of 11 policy responses set out in a new EPRS study which looks first at 15 risks facing the European Union, in the changed context of a world coming out of the coronavirus crisis, but one in which a war has been launched just outside the Union’s borders. The study then looks in greater detail at 11 policy responses the EU could take to address the risks outlined and to strengthen the Union’s resilience to them. It continues a series launched in spring 2020, which sought to identify means to strengthen the European Union’s long-term resilience in the context of recovery from the coronavirus crisis. Read the full study here. The issue in short: The challenge and the existing gaps

Human-induced climate change is happening, and the impacts are being felt around the globe. As presented in the risk section above, global warming is increasing the frequency and intensity of extreme weather events and altering standard seasonal climatic conditions in some regions. This results in multiple threats to people, property and society overall.

With current projections, the agreed goal of the universal Paris Agreement to limit global warming to well below 2, preferably to 1.5 degrees Celsius (˚C) compared with pre-industrial levels, will be missed. The difference between 1.5 ˚C and 2 ˚C is significant as it pertains to the threat of climate change impacts. An overshoot of the 2 ˚C goal is likely to result in long-lasting and irreversible risks, including loss of ecosystems and potentially tipping point events leading to a significant change in the world’s physical climate system.

In the sixth assessment report (2021) of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), five emission scenarios are presented along with their associated warming projections over time. Only the low or very low emission scenarios are considered capable of keeping global warming within the 2 ˚C goal. All scenarios are expected to overshoot the 1.5 ˚C ambition in the 2041-2060 period. It is important to note that for the very low emission scenario, the overshoot is expected to be minimal and temporary, with global warming reverting below 1.5 ˚C towards the end of this century.

Considering the potential cascading effects on people, the economy and societal systems from changing climatic conditions and volatile climate phenomena, as presented in the risk scenarios on page 25, and supported by the February 2022 IPCC report on impacts, adaptation and vulnerability, the EU must ensure policy responses suitable for the challenges ahead.

Policy responses need to mitigate the root cause of the increased risks – climate change – and at the same time build resilience and preparedness at all levels of society, thereby reducing vulnerabilities.

The EU is a frontrunner when it comes to climate action and is increasingly stepping up its efforts in the field of sustainable finance; on both accounts, international cooperation is however crucial. In an interconnected global system of different players and agendas, driving forward a transition while attempting to build resilience to systemic risks is an ever-evolving challenge. The scale of the task to increase overall systemic resilience becomes evident when reading also the chapters on ‘greater strategic autonomy for European industry‘ and ‘consolidating strategic ties with democracies‘.

The turn of events currently witnessed with Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine leaves the EU at a critical junction. The security risk associated with EU’s dependence on Russian energy sources has become all too evident. Many call for an immediate stop of energy imports from Russia, but how fast is it feasible to divert into other sources, and what will they be?

In a world where inaction and prolonged policy processes on climate change have been environmentalists’ main critique for years, will this sudden push to change Europe’s energy dependence fuel a green transition, or undermine it?

Existing policy responses

The types of risks that policy responses need to address can be divided into three groups: first, the physical risks connected to loss of life or property because of extreme weather events; second, the transition risk to the value held in various types of assets in an economy under transformation; and third, potential systemic risks to the economic and financial systems. As seen in the extreme weather events scenarios, physical risks can induce further transition risks and accumulate impacts that can ultimately pose a threat at the systemic level.

EU action

Climate action is established in Article 191 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) as one of the objectives of EU environment policy. The EU and its Member States are signatories to the 2015 Paris Agreement, and major parts of the EU climate and energy legislative framework towards 2030 were revised between 2015 and 2018. As part of the European Green Deal (EGD), the EU Climate Law was adopted in July 2021, setting a new 2030 target on emissions reduction, and making climate neutrality by 2050 legally binding.

To align the climate and energy acquis to the now binding ‘at least’ net 55 % emissions reduction by 2030 compared with 1990 levels, the European Commission put forward 18 legislative proposals in its ‘fit for 55‘ package in July and December 2021. The package includes, among other things, proposals to raise 2030 renewable energy as well as energy efficiency targets across the EU, to which the co-legislators – the European Parliament and Member States through the Council – would need to agree.

In terms of mitigating climate change, the EU Climate Law Article 4 further obliges the Commission to propose in a legislative initiative, following the global stocktake on climate action planned to finalise in 2023 (see below), a binding emission-reduction target for 2040. The proposal must be accompanied by a carbon budget report indicating the total volume of net greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions expected to be emitted in the 2030-2050 period, without jeopardising European commitments in the Paris Agreement.

The climate challenge poses risks to both natural and human systems at varying levels. Natural hazards mainly pose physical risks to people’s health and security as well as to property and assets. Civil protection cooperation is enshrined in TFEU Article 196 and the solidarity clause in Article 222, under which the Union and its Member States act in a spirit of solidarity if a Member State is the victim of a disaster. The EU’s civil protection mechanism (UCPM) is a key part of Europe’s efforts in disaster preparedness and response. The Copernicus Emergency Management Service lends support, via satellite imagery and geospatial data, to civil protection interventions. Recently the Council concluded that disaster preparedness and prevention measures needed to be strengthened in view of the threat of increased extreme events due to climate change.

Increasing the resilience of the EU’s economy and society to climate change requires large investments and improved risk management. This in turn demands a financial system resilient to climate change impacts. The EU has taken significant action in the field of green and sustainable finance. Before the 2020 European Green Deal investment plan, the 2018 action plan on financing sustainable growth, integrated by the 2021 strategy for financing the transition to a sustainable economy, laid down the foundations of the EU sustainable finance framework. The framework is based on three building blocks: the EU taxonomy; disclosures; and a toolbox including benchmarks, standards and labels.

The July 2020 EU Taxonomy Regulation, is the centrepiece of the EU sustainable finance architecture; its classification system helps to both channel investment into climate action, and guide the integration of climate risks into the management of financial institutions such as banks, insurance companies and pension funds. It plays a pivotal role for legislative and non-legislative initiatives in areas such as labelling, disclosures and prudential rules. The EU taxonomy is established through delegated acts, determining which activities should be considered as sustainable and contributing to the fight against climate change, and be reported as such. The European Parliament is currently scrutinising a delegated act in which the Commission proposes to consider as eligible certain activities in the nuclear and gas sectors.

EU regulatory and non-regulatory initiatives on disclosures aim to improve transparency on risk factors, including climate risks and their effects on financial stability. In this domain, the Sustainable Finance Disclosure Regulation came into effect in March 2021, while the Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (CSRD), presented by the Commission in April 2021, is at an advanced stage of negotiations between the co-legislators. In the meantime, sustainability reporting is regulated by the Non-financial Reporting Directive, which entered into force in December 2014, supported by the guidelines on reporting climate-related information, published in June 2019. In the toolbox, the EU Climate Benchmarks Regulation has applied since April 2020, and the July 2021 proposal on an EU green bond standard is with the co-legislators. Both aim to ease the development of sustainable investments, while preventing greenwashing.

EU action to improve the financial sector’s resilience to climate risks also includes the review of EU banking rules (the Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR) and Directive (CRD IV)), and the review of the EU insurance rules (the Solvency II review), both proposed by the Commission in autumn 2021. The Commission proposals, currently examined by the co-legislators, ask banks and insurance companies to systematically identify, disclose and manage sustainability risks, i.e. environmental, social and governance (ESG) risks, as part of their risk management. While larger EU insurers have already had to conduct climate scenario and stress tests, the new proposal is set to embed climate risk analysis in most insurers. In April 2021, the Commission amended existing delegated regulations under Solvency II and the Insurance Distribution Directive to ensure integration of sustainability factors and risks in (re-)insurance undertaking’s management, products and services.

In the banking sector, the European Central Bank (ECB) is increasingly considering climate change in its activities of banking supervision and monetary policy. After publishing a guide on climate-related and environmental risks for banks in November 2020, and the state of climate and environmental risk management in the banking sector in November 2021, the ECB launched in January 2022 a supervisory climate risk stress test to assess how prepared banks are for dealing with financial and economic shocks stemming from climate risk. In July 2021, the ECB presented its action plan to include climate change considerations in its monetary policy strategy, which should deliver macroeconomic modelling and assessment of implications for monetary policy transmission, and statistical data for climate change risk analyses.

Given the key role played by the insurance sector for financial stability and resilience to climate risks, the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) has made sustainable finance a strategic priority in its 2022-2024 work-programme. Its aim is to increase the insurance sector’s climate resilience by acting in key areas of activity: prudential framework, risk assessment, disclosures, supervision, climate protection gap, use of open source modelling and data, and international convergence. In addition, EIOPA will conduct centralised climate stress tests in the (re‑)insurance sector, as tasked by the Commission.

National level initiatives

In the EU, several Member States had adopted national climate laws before the adoption of the EU Climate Law. Some have set higher 2030 targets or aim to reach climate neutrality sooner than 2050.

Member States and the sub-national levels play a key role in building resilience to climate change impacts, whether it concerns urban planning, public expenditure, construction and industrial permissions, nature conservation, or disaster preparedness and response capacities and training. To foresee risks and ensure resilience adequately requires know-how and the latest data on risk assessments, considering future climate projections. In the EU, Member States and institutions share these kinds of insights on the Climate-ADAPT platform and collaborate through the UCPM’s knowledge network and joint exercises to support national-level preparedness. Research and innovation for resilient cities and implementation of nature-based solutions often occur at national and sub-national levels, while key climate partnerships in various sectors are driven by countries in which the sectors are most prevalent. Russia’s war on Ukraine has highlighted the vulnerability of the EU’s energy supply dependency on Russia, with Denmark being the first Member State to announce its ambition to phase out Russian gas supply completely as soon as possible. On 8 March 2022, the Commission adopted the RePowerEU communication presenting the aim to wean Europe off Russian gas. It includes measures to be implemented at the national and citizen levels, such as energy savings, rooftop solar panels, and heat pump installation. Accelerating renewables, in particular hydrogen for industry, and strengthening the internal energy market interconnections while increasing gas storage are other key measures. The national level will play a pivotal role, as under TFEU Article 194(2), Member States have the right to decide on their own energy mix and supply structures, which only unanimity among Member States in the Council can affect (Article 192(2c)). Key projects would not only include accelerated renewables roll-out, but also seek to increase resilience through cross-border connections, such as from the Iberian peninsula to the continent, or gas pipeline connections for example to Poland.

Figure 32: Key measures in efforts to climate-proof the EU EU action with external partners/international organisations

The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was established in 1992 to prevent dangerous climate change. Continued climate negotiations have so far not been successful in halting global GHG emissions or the associated global warming. The 2015 universal Paris Agreement – with its specific targets to limit global warming, and sections on mitigation, adaptation, and financial support and mechanisms to support the work – was a breakthrough in UNFCCC negotiations. However, only at the 26th Conference of Parties (COP26) to the UNFCCC, held in Glasgow in November 2021, was the Paris rulebook for implementation finalised.

The EU has taken significant steps to influence the transition not only internally but also externally, and actively negotiates for increased climate ambitions globally. The February 2022 Council conclusions called on EU climate diplomacy to support third countries in developing carbon markets and further step up its work to turn intentions into implementation through green partnerships and alliances. The Council repeated the EU’s intention to provide further climate finance, including through the Global Gateway initiative, to build resilience and stability in vulnerable third countries, urging partners to contribute.

Against the backdrop of the latest IPCC warnings, COP26 in the Glasgow Climate Pact named this decade the ‘critical decade’ during which accelerated action must be ensured. Under Article 14 of the Paris Agreement, a first global stocktake will be undertaken in 2023 to assess collective progress to achieving the agreement’s purpose and deliver on its targets.

In October 2019, the EU and seven third countries launched the International Platform on Sustainable Finance (IPSF) with the aim to exchange best practices, compare initiatives and enhance international cooperation. Together, the current 18 IPSF members represent 55 % of GHG emissions and global gross domestic product (GDP), and 50 % of the world population. The EU is also present in the Network for Greening the Financial System (NGFS), a group of more than 100 central banks and supervisors worldwide working to share best practices on climate risk management in the financial sector. EIOPA is also member of the International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS), and of the Sustainable Insurance Forum (SIF), international networks of insurance supervisors and regulators working to integrate climate risks into their activities and into the insurance sector.

Obstacles to implementation

Geopolitical events can reframe the assessment of risks and their impacts, and may thus significantly redirect certain policies. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has led to the RePowerEU communication, which aims to accelerate renewables, but will also heavily invest in energy security measures (see Chapter 18 on energy security). This risks further lock-ins to new gas supplies or investment to increase new pipeline capacities, or postponement of coal’s phase out, potentially creating further lock-ins, ultimately slowing the green transition. EU leaders and co-legislators will need to balance the desire to cut energy dependence from Russia with the risk of undermining the business case for future energy autonomy through renewables.

Furthermore, climate change’s threat to global food security is exacerbated by the war between two countries that together supply 29 % of global wheat exports. Disrupted food and fertiliser supply chains could weaken the environmental integrity of the expected EU taxonomy delegated act on agriculture because of food security concerns raised, while other world events could affect future delegated acts.

The EU has been a consistent actor on mitigating climate change, delivering well beyond its 20 % GHG emissions-reduction target for 2020 compared with 1990. The efficacy of the Union’s climate policies internally may however weaken its climate-diplomacy position externally. Over the past 30-year period, the EU has gone from a 15 % share of global emissions to around 8 % in 2018. Only significant global action will change the current global warming trajectory.

The EU’s share of global emissions is production-based; this does not take import-related emissions from trade into account. The need to address also consumption-based emissions becomes evident when looking at the difference in emissions reduction achieved depending on the variable chosen. Beyond the multilateral level in the UNFCCC, the EU has taken steps through its trade agreements, but also in legislative proposals such as the ‘fit for 55’ package, the carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM), and the proposal to limit EU-driven deforestation so as to address the overseas emissions and negative climate impacts of trade to the EU.

Energy-related investments, including transport, will need an estimated additional annual € 350 billion to meet the EU’s 2030 emission-reduction target, alongside the €130 billion needed for other environmental goals. These amounts are too big to be covered by public funding; a flow of private capital is needed to close the gap. The EU has taken significant action to facilitate this, and it is considered a global leader in mainstreaming climate factors in the financial system, thanks also to innovative sustainable finance regulations. The future success of the EU in this field will depend to a great extent on the EU taxonomy’s fate. Any possible obstacle to its development can jeopardise the implementation of many other sustainable finance instruments, strictly dependent on its pivotal role. As the European Court of Auditors has noted, the effectiveness of the EU taxonomy and labelling schemes will largely depend on their voluntary take-up, and whether their credibility is backed up by adequate verification. This may prove challenging given the number and complexity of taxonomy criteria. Competing taxonomies or other jurisdiction standards pose a risk to the EU taxonomy’s impact on global investment trends. In this, the taxonomy’s complex structure, and the need to update it continuously according to the scientific and technological evolution, could affect its usability and become its Achilles’ heel. Other challenges could come from the need to ensure alignment with sectoral regulations, and from the risk of greenwashing or potentially pursuing other policy objectives.

In focus: The role of data in climate-proofing
Data are crucial to improve climate resilience and crisis preparedness, as they enable better accuracy of climate risk assessment, forecasting and modelling, and are key to early warning systems. Some datasets provide insights on extreme climate events, shedding light on direct and indirect causes, behavioural trends and consequences, such as loss of life, damage to infrastructure, and costs of emergency response and recovery. Others can help analyse the protection gap by measuring hazard (intensity and frequency of events), exposure (assets that are present at the location involved), vulnerability (susceptibility of the objects to the impact) and insurance coverage.
The 2021 EU climate adaptation strategy announced a series of initiatives to collect more and better climate intelligence data, and to make them available to policy-makers, supervisory authorities, and financial and economic actors (including citizens). The aim is to make any new investment and policy decision climate-informed and future-proof. Among other things, the Commission will extend the scope of public access to environmental information in the INSPIRE Directive to include climate-related risk and losses data. It will promote and support the use of its risk data hub to harmonise data recording and collection, and promote national-level public-private partnership.
Insurance companies have been collecting data and developing risk-zoning mapping systems for decades, and so the Commission has tasked EIOPA with exploring – alongside the industry – how best to improve the collection of uniform and comprehensive insured loss data, not least through its catastrophe risk expert network. EIOPA aims to provide open access through a data hub for the European level.
Digitalisation and technological innovation, such as big data, artificial intelligence, machine learning, high-performance computing, geospatial mapping and the internet of things, can help to enrich the variety and quality of data available and their analysis, including through capturing and developing continuous data flows and information. The Commission is delivering on this by means of initiatives under its priority ‘A Europe fit for the digital age‘ and through financing research projects, as for example on climate intelligence. Among others, the EU data act, which the Commission proposed in February 2022, aims to provide means for public-sector bodies to access and use data held by the private sector that are necessary for specific public-interest purposes, for instance to develop insights with a view to responding quickly and securely to a public emergency. Policy proposals by experts and stakeholders

To build resilience against ‘green swan’ events as presented in the risk paper on page 26, Finance Watch proposes to use the Prudential Regulation’s pillar I – capital requirements with regard to capital reserves as the most effective tool among the three prudential pillars. More specifically, Finance Watch proposes to increase the risk weight for exposures to fossil fuels both in the banking (CRR II) and the insurance sectors (Solvency II). Finance Watch asks the Commission to promote the adoption of similar prudential requirements globally, as well.

When it comes to addressing the protection gap in the insurance sector, Insurance Europe considers it necessary to make tackling under-insurance of natural climate risks a priority for Member States. Insurance Europe suggests establishing more public-private partnerships to share insights, and having Member States actively promote insurance as a way to providing cover for natural perils.

A 2021 collaboration between Carnegie Europe and the Open Society European Policy Institute produced an in-depth report on EU climate security in a global world, exploring how the EGD’s multiple strands should link more directly with EU external action to deliver on the EU’s commitment to be a stronger geopolitical player. The report identifies various shortcoming in the EU’s approach to climate security and climate action through its external relations, and proposes ecological diplomacy adjustments in four areas, ultimately referring to the need for – and the EU’s responsibility in – bringing this about and resetting the global architecture for international cooperation.

The combined threat to food security from climate change and the war in Ukraine have led Copa-Cogeca to suggest crop cultivation on all available land as part of an EU food shield. The aim is to prevent disruptions in the food supply chain, although this would likely undermine carbon sequestration, while the increased production would increase GHG emissions from agriculture. On 23 March 2022, the Commission decided to derogate from greening obligations temporarily and allow for food crop production on fallow land that is part of the 2022 ecological focus areas.

Position of the European Parliament

The European Parliament has spoken out on the need to fight and contain the threat of global warming before it is too late. Across various resolutions, the Parliament has consistently highlighted the need for strong climate diplomacy, calling for increased global ambitions faced with the ongoing climate and environment emergency. As co-legislator, the European Parliament will have a key role in ensuring a legal framework fit to deliver the climate targets set in the Climate Law, and build resilience through other related files from the EGD. In its 2018 resolution on the Commission action plan on sustainable finance, the Parliament agreed on the financial sector’s essential role as regards sustainability, and on the need for policies to correct market failures. It pointed out that the inaccurate assessment or misleading presentation of climate and other environmental risks of financial products can constitute a risk to market stability. The Parliament also emphasised that the identification, management and disclosure of these risks are an integral part of consumer protection and financial stability, and should therefore fall under the mandate and supervisory duties of the European supervisory authorities. In its climate diplomacy resolution, the Parliament said it was ‘convinced that an EU financial system which contributes to climate mitigation and incentivises investments in clean technologies and sustainable solutions will be a role model for other countries and could help them to implement similar systems’.

Through a legislative own-initiative resolution adopted in October 2020, the European Parliament called on the Commission to propose an EU legal framework to halt and reverse EU-driven global deforestation. The legislative proposal has in the meantime been tabled, as mentioned above, and contains several of Parliament’s recommendations. In March 2021, the Parliament adopted an own-initiative resolution on the CBAM, ahead of the Commission proposal. Parliament stressed the role of the CBAM in helping to reach climate objectives and finance the delivery of EGD ambitions.

Possible action

Written by Györgyi Mácsai (Members’ Research Service) and Igor Tkalec (GlobalStat, EUI).

The UK was a European Union Member State from 1973 until 31 January 2020. For reasons of comparability and consistency, the historical data for the ‘EU-27’ in this infographic covers all current Member States, regardless of whether they were Member States at the time concerned.

Main types of services in EU trade with UK Main types of products in EU trade with UK Top EU MS trade partners of UK Main trade partners of EU and UK EU trade history with UK UK portfolio investment assets UK FDI and remittances UK public finances, monetary and financial data UK unemployment rate and female labour force participation UK GDP per capita and GDP growth

Read this ‘infographic’ on ‘United Kingdom: Economic indicators and trade with EU‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Rachele Rossi.

This year marks both the 60th anniversary of the EU’s common agricultural policy (CAP) and a crucial turning point in its way of functioning, with a new delivery model in place that will kick in from 2023. The timeline below highlights major legislative and policy developments that have shaped the CAP over the past six decades.

ORIGINS OF THE CAP 1958The Treaty of Rome places agriculture at the heart of the activities of the new European Economic Community and tasks it with achieving increased agricultural productivity, a fair standard of living for farmers, availability of supplies, stabilised markets and a secure supply chain with reasonable prices.1962After complex negotiations, the first legislative acts launch the CAP into being, establish the Common Market Organisations (CMOs) in cereals, pork, poultry, wine, and fruit and vegetables, and the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF). A system of guarantees based on support for producer prices is set up to ensure the sale of agricultural output.1965The Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN) starts gathering data on the income and business activities of farms; a year later the Farm Structure Surveys (FSS) starts gathering data on the structure of agricultural holdings. These two longest-standing sources of statistical information on EU agriculture have contributed to informing policy decision-making to this day.1968Since by now self-sufficiency has not only been reached but has also largely been exceeded, the focus shifts to creating greater balance between the measures targeting agricultural markets and those aimed at modernising agricultural structures. Agriculture 1980, or the Mansholt Plan (named after Sicco Mansholt, the Dutch European Commissioner for agriculture from 1958 to 1972), is adopted to this end.1972Three socio‑structural directives introduce incentives for the modernisation of farms, for retirement from farming, and for the provision of advice and training to farmers.1984A quota system to limit over-production and manage supplies is introduced for products such as milk. Producers exceeding their quota are now required to pay a surplus levy.1985The Green Paper on the CAP’s perspectives puts forward ideas for further debate, such as the reduction of price support and the diversification of measures supporting agricultural incomes. These ideas include the recognition that besides ensuring our food supplies, agriculture contributes to the maintenance of the social fabric in rural areas, the protection of land, and the conservation of natural resources. REFORMING THE CAP 1992The MacSharry reform (named after Ray MacSharry, the Irish European Commissioner for agriculture from 1989 to 1992) introduces a new approach to support for farmers, the aim being to reduce the CAP budget, cut over-production and comply with the obligations under international trade agreements. The reform effects a gradual shift from unlimited guaranteed prices and grants to compensatory income aid based on farmland area or livestock numbers. Accompanying measures focus on support for environmental protection, afforestation of agricultural land and early retirement from farming.1999The Agenda 2000 programme paves the way to CAP and EU regional policy reform, and seeks to strengthen the EU’s capacity to receive new members and continue to abide by the World Trade Organization’s rules on international trade. The programme equips the CAP with a second pillar dedicated to rural development and introduces a more general approach to agriculture and rural development based on improving agricultural competitiveness, providing alternative sources of income to people living in rural areas, and strengthening social cohesion in rural communities.2003The Fischler reform (named after Franz Fischler, the Austrian European Commissioner for agriculture from 1995 to 2004), also referred to as the ‘mid-term review’, overhauls the CAP. It introduces the innovative single payment scheme (SPS), a single farm payment that removes the link between subsidies and volumes of production for a large share of CAP support. The SPS builds on farmers’ historical entitlements to CAP payments, on the ‘cross-compliance’ rules that farmers had to observe with regard to the environment, animal welfare, plant protection, and food safety, and on the ‘modulation’ approach where funds are shifted to rural development by reducing transfers to larger farms.2007The European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF) and the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) replace the EAGGF. A single CMO replaces the existing 21 CMOs.2008Though not as radical as previous reforms, a ‘health check’ of the CAP is carried out to make it simpler and more effective. The initiative involves adapting market support, increasing modulation, and addressing challenges such as climate change and the protection of biodiversity and natural resources.2009The Treaty of Lisbon introduces the ordinary legislative procedure for the EU agricultural policy. Henceforth, the European Parliament and the Council will co-legislate on reforms on an equal footing.2013The reform for the 2014-2020 CAP seeks to respond to new societal demands placed on the CAP to deliver public goods alongside its original objectives. This reform addresses concerns such as climate change, the sustainable use of natural resources, animal welfare, and food safety, by greening CAP farm payments and incentivising the fairer distribution of funds (for example, for smaller farms and young farmers) and increased spending on rural development projects.2015Following the progressive increase of the quotas since 2009, the end of dairy quotas allows farmers to expand their production based on the market demand for milk products. Along the same lines, the end of sugar quotas in 2017 removes limitations on how much EU producers can put on the market. TOWARDS THE FUTURE CAP 2018The European Commission adopts the post-2020 CAP legislative proposals. These put forward a new delivery model for the future CAP, typified by greater flexibility as to how the Member States would apply the policy at local level, while preserving its common dimension.2019The European Green Deal sets out the EU’s commitment to tackling climate and environment-related challenges by acting in a number of policy areas, including agri-food policies.2020In line with the Green Deal roadmap, the ‘farm to fork’ and biodiversity strategies are unveiled. Together with the Green Deal, these strategies set quantified targets for EU farming and rural areas, calling for an additional effort in the already demanding interinstitutional negotiations on the 2018 CAP reform proposals. In the absence of an agreement on the future CAP, a transitional regulation extends most of the existing CAP rules until the end of 2022.2021After extensive negotiations, the Parliament and Council agree on the 2023-2027 CAP legislative framework and adopt it at the end of the year. The future CAP envisages a fairer distribution of funds, higher green ambitions and a more results-oriented approach. The farm payment scheme is renamed as basic income support for sustainability (BISS). Eco-schemes are introduced to reward farmers for environmental care and climate action. A new tool – the CAP strategic plan – now allows Member States to specify how CAP funds will address local needs to achieve measurable results on common objectives.
The European Commission’s communication on A long-term vision for the EU’s rural areas is a significant policy development – it puts the specific issues and challenges faced by rural areas at the core of a wide‑ranging set of actions that go beyond the scope of the CAP.2022The Commission services analyse the CAP strategic plans in a structured dialogue with the Member States, aiming at timely approval of the strategic plans for their implementation as of 1 January 2023. The reformed CAP is seen as a key policy in moving towards more sustainable food systems. For more information on the CAP’s evolution, see the EPRS publications on agriculture and rural development and the European Parliament’s factsheets on the common agricultural policy.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘1962-2022: The EU common agricultural policy at 60‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Maria-Margarita Mentzelopoulou.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has forced millions of people, mostly women and children, to flee the country or they have become displaced within Ukraine’s borders, resulting in one of the largest European humanitarian crises in recent times. The chaos generated by the conflict has exponentially increased the risk of human trafficking and exploitation, especially of the most vulnerable persons.

The risk of trafficking and exploitation

The United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR) estimates that, since the beginning of the war on 24 February, more than 5.5 million people have fled Ukraine, seeking refuge in neighbouring countries – mainly Poland, Hungary, Moldova, Romania and Slovakia – and over 7.7 million have been internally displaced. The sheer scale of the destruction and the civilian casualties caused by the war have led to one of the largest European humanitarian crises in recent times. UNICEF estimates that no less than 7.5 million children have been impacted by the war in Ukraine. As men aged 18 to 60 are not allowed to leave the country, it is mostly women and children who are seeking protection abroad. Thanks to the activation of the Temporary Protection Directive, which grants immediate protection and rights to those arriving in the European Union (EU) from Ukraine, there is little to no incentive for Ukrainians to seek help from migrant smugglers. However, women and children – in particular unaccompanied ones – are still at higher risk of violence and abuse, including human trafficking, smuggling and illegal adoption. In fact, even before the war, Ukrainians had been among the most frequent victims of trafficking into the EU, perpetrated by criminal networks operating between Ukraine and countries in Europe and central Asia. Moreover, the high numbers of orphans and children born through surrogate mothers in Ukraine, who have not been picked up by their parents, also face an increased risk of abduction or forced adoption. Due to mass displacement and chaos, the number of missing children is also expected to increase.

The International Organization for Migration (IOM) has warned of the high risk of human trafficking and sexual exploitation of the population in distress, but also of the financial insecurity suffered by certain children who are unaccompanied (UAMs) and by women who have been separated from their partners and support networks. Many children are without parental care, either because they have become separated from their families or because they were living in institutional care or boarding schools when the Russian invasion started. Therefore, while welcoming the support of individuals offering transport and accommodation, associations working on the ground are calling for coordinated action to inform, register and accompany women and children and vet potential hosts. Poorer men not wishing to be conscripted may also be a potential target of traffickers. The UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has called for strengthening anti-trafficking efforts, including the early detection and prevention of related criminal activity and the identification and protection of victims. Eurochild provides daily reports of alleged violations of children’s rights. For children who remained in the country, this would include, inter alia, killing and wounding, no adequate access to medical care, trafficking, and lack of access to education. UNICEF has published advice to the relevant authorities, aid workers and volunteers on protecting displaced and refugee children in and outside Ukraine from human trafficking, child labour, sexual exploitation, illegal adoption and aggravated smuggling. UNICEF has also warned that displaced girls are at particular risk of gender-based violence.

EU action to protect people at risk who are fleeing Ukraine

The EU has immediately stepped in to help civilians affected by the war in Ukraine, by activating the Temporary Protection Directive (Directive 2001/55/EC) and launching emergency aid programmes that cover basic needs and offer assistance at the EU borders. On 16 March, the Commission put forward operational guidelines to support Member States in applying the directive, including dedicated chapters on children, UAMs and trafficking of human beings. The Commission strongly encourages the Member States to put in place adequate prevention measures targeting persons fleeing Ukraine. These include provision of information on the risks of trafficking, awareness-raising among the key professionals likely to come into contact with potential victims, training and instructions to the relevant law enforcement and border authorities, as well as improving early detection, assistance and support to victims. The Commission underscores that protecting migrant children arriving from Ukraine is a top priority for the EU, and that particular attention should be paid to UAMs, separated and orphan children. On 23 March, the Commission encouraged the Member States again to be ‘particularly vigilant’ about children at risk of being trafficked or abducted, highlighting the importance of identification and registration.

At the extraordinary meeting of the Justice and Home Affairs Council on 28 March, the Commission presented a 10-point plan on stronger European coordination on welcoming people fleeing the war in Ukraine. The plan will include standard operating procedures and uniform guidelines for the reception and support of children. The Commission is also to develop specific procedures for the transfer of unaccompanied minors. A joint anti-trafficking plan, based on the EU strategy on combatting trafficking in human beings (2021-2025), will address the risks of trafficking and ensure support for potential victims. A number of relevant measures were also considered, including the creation of a common registration system with support from eu-LISA. The EU Anti-trafficking Coordinator has also been active since the beginning of the invasion, maintaining close contact with the network of national anti-trafficking coordinators and Europol. The latter is actively participating in the human trafficking task force and has deployed experts and guest officers to support local law enforcement authorities in the EU Member States bordering Ukraine. The Commission has also called for using EU funds to prevent trafficking.

The Council of Europe’s Group of Experts on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings (GRETA) has likewise warned of the danger faced by people fleeing Ukraine of falling victim to human trafficking and exploitation. There are already reports of traffickers targeting UAMs fleeing Ukraine; many such children are currently unaccounted for following the hasty evacuation of orphanages and foster homes. In addition, on 4 May GRETA also published a guidance note with relevant recommendations.

European Parliament’s response

The European Parliament Intergroup on Children’s Rights, during a mission to Poland’s border with Ukraine, called for a centralised robust registration system at the border and for the creation of safe passages and humanitarian corridors for children. On 29 March, the Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality (FEMM) had an exchange of views with the Commissioner for Home Affairs, Ylva Johansson, on the situation of Ukrainian women and children. MEPs expressed concerns about the humanitarian situation and the risk of human trafficking and sexual abuse, such as the use of rape as a weapon, and called on the Member States and the EU to swiftly identify and prosecute the trafficking networks profiting from sexual exploitation of women refugees. On 4 April, during a joint debate, the Committees on Development (DEVE) and on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) discussed with Commissioners Johansson and Janez Lenarčič the implementation of the Temporary Protection Directive and humanitarian assistance to the displaced population, in particular children (more than 2 million children have already fled Ukraine).

In the plenary debate of 5 April, Commissioners Šuica and Johansson once again underlined the risk of human trafficking and stressed the need to prioritise efficient registration of all UAMs and separated children with the help of national authorities. Moreover, the Legal Affairs (JURI) and Employment (EMPL) Committees held a joint meeting on 21 April to address the risk of illegal adoption of Ukrainian children from institutional care. The European Parliament’s Coordinator on Children’s Rights, Vice-President Ewa Kopacz, has repeatedly stressed the risks faced by children escaping the conflict, and launched common actions with the European Network of Ombudspersons for Children (ENOC) and the EU Network on Children’s Rights, calling for measures to prevent trafficking and improve registration processes at EU level. Finally, MEPs adopted a resolution during the May I plenary session, expressing their concerns about the increasing number of reports of human trafficking, sexual violence, exploitation, rape, and abuse of women and children fleeing the war in Ukraine.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Russia’s war on Ukraine: The risk of trafficking of human beings‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Micaela Del Monte and David de Groot.

More than two months into the Russian aggression against Ukraine, there is no sign of it ending – on the contrary, the news show the conflict and the atrocities committed on Ukrainian soil intensifying. The war has pushed millions of people to flee the country, or they have been displaced within Ukraine’s borders, resulting in one of the largest European humanitarian crises in recent times. With each passing day, the chaos engendered by the war increases the risk of violence and exploitation exponentially, in particular for the most vulnerable, including women, children, Roma people, and members of the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersexual (LGBTI) community.

Humanitarian situation of people fleeing Ukraine and being displaced

As of 2 May 2022, the United Nations Refugee Agency, UNHCR, estimated that over 5 million people have fled from Ukraine to neighbouring countries – mainly to Poland, which alone welcomed around 3 million people, but also to Hungary, Moldova, Romania and Slovakia. Moreover, 7.7 million people have been displaced within Ukraine’s borders. Mostly women and children are seeking shelter and protection from Russia’s war against the country. As the days go by, the conflict is generating ever more casualties, destruction and displacement inside and outside Ukraine, giving rise to one of the greatest humanitarian crises in Europe of recent times. The UNCHR reports that, as of 2 May 2022, the UN Human Rights Commissioner (OHCHR) had recorded as many as 6 469 civilian casualties in the country: 3 153 killed and 3 316 injured. However, the OHCHR considers that the actual figures might be higher, because information from areas experiencing ongoing hostilities is delayed, and the reports need corroboration. According to the Council on Foreign Relations think-tank, the Ukraine crisis has triggered the ‘biggest show of European mobilisation in recent years’. The EU promptly activated, for the first time ever, the Temporary Protection Directive, coordinated the largest operation of the EU civil protection mechanism to date, and stepped up financial assistance to Ukraine. (Since the 2014 annexation of Crimea and occupation of eastern Ukraine, the EU and its Member States have disbursed a total of €1.4 billion in humanitarian aid to help affected civilians in Ukraine.) The EU also proposed to use cohesion funds to help Member States welcome people fleeing Ukraine. Nevertheless, the situation remained challenging, with the human cost far too high. Indeed, the mass displacement and the ensuing turmoil in Ukraine have raised serious concerns about human rights violations inside and outside the country, in particular of those belonging to vulnerable groups, including women, children, unaccompanied minors, the Roma, and also LGBTI people.

Specific risks facing Ukrainian LGBTI people in times of conflict

In the aftermath of Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the media and non-governmental organisations have highlighted how a combination of xenophobia and anti-LGBTI positions may have particularly severe impacts on the LGBTI community during hostilities. ILGA-Europe stressed that existing discrimination and violence against LGBTI people may be aggravated during armed conflicts, and new challenges may arise. For instance, trans and intersex people in Ukraine do not have identification documents with gender markers matching their gender identity; and they may lose access to hormone replacement therapy or other medical treatments. Some may be unable to leave the country, as trans women, non-binary people registered ‘male’ at birth, and trans men are considered ‘men’ and – being potential recruits – are not allowed to leave Ukraine. If recruited, trans people face a higher risk of harassment and violence. The Equal Rights Coalition (ERC), an intergovernmental body of 42 member states committed to protecting the LGBTI community’s rights, expressed its concerns about the ‘additional dangers’ faced by LGBTI people seeking protection from the conflict in Ukraine. ERC stressed that displaced LGBTI people are often marginalised, and may even be excluded from evacuation and emergency responses.

In 2021, a UNHCR discussion paper on ‘LGBTIQ+ Persons in Forced Displacement and Statelessness’ already highlighted some of the risks LGBTI people may face. These are, in particular, discrimination, harassment, abuse, bullying, and physical, emotional and sexual violence, including, but not limited to, murder, rape, torture, and psychiatric and psychological ‘so-called conversion therapies‘. As the discussion paper also mentioned, in some circumstances, frontline registration staff may not always be aware of an LGBTI person’s particular circumstances, or an LGBTI person may refrain from sharing their personal situation for fear of violence and discrimination. Some of the challenges identified had already existed long before the conflict began. For instance, although homosexuality is legal in Ukraine (albeit neither same-sex partnerships nor adoptions by same-sex couples are legally possible), research from the Pew Research Centre revealed that, in 2019, 69 % of those surveyed in Ukraine said homosexuality should not be accepted. In April 2022, a UN expert urged all interested parties to pay particular attention to the needs of LGBTI and gender-diverse refugees, asylum-seekers, internally displaced and undocumented people. He also recalled that the LGBTI community is most vulnerable to ‘acts of stigmatisation, harassment and violence’ during armed conflicts, and in particular at checkpoints, border crossings, reception centres and health facilities. At the same time, he welcomed civil society organisations’ support for LGBTI and gender-diverse people. Along similar lines, Christophe Lacroix, the general rapporteur on the rights of LGBTI people within the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), observed that human rights violations, including sexual violence, against LGBTI people already happen in times of peace, and all the more during war, often remaining unreported and unpunished. Trans and gender-diverse people face additional problems in accessing appropriate medical care and crossing borders, because of lack of appropriate identity documents. According to Lacroix, the conflict in Ukraine is particularly difficult for LGTBI people considering the geopolitical situation, suffice to recall Russia’s repeated breaches of the European Convention on Human Rights, and LGBTI rights violations in Chechnya and Belarus.

European Parliament position

In a resolution of 1 March 2022, the European Parliament strongly condemned ‘the Russian Federation’s illegal, unprovoked and unjustified military aggression against and invasion of Ukraine’, and recalled that ‘attacks against civilians and civilian infrastructure as well as indiscriminate attacks are prohibited under international humanitarian law and therefore constitute war crimes’. It also called on the Commission, the Member States and UN agencies to offer Ukraine’s civilian population humanitarian assistance. Parliament stressed the need to pay particular attention to vulnerable groups, minorities, and women and children, because they are particularly affected in armed conflicts. In a 2021 recommendation to the Council, Commission and High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the Commission on the direction of EU–Russia political relations, Parliament stressed that the ‘LGBTI+ community in various parts of the Russian Federation faces extensive discrimination, including harassment, torture, imprisonment and killings’. It also underlined that the situation was particularly worrying in Chechnya, ‘which in 2017 started its purge of LGBTI+ people, detaining and torturing dozens and killing at least two, leading to many people seeking safe refuge abroad’.

That same year, Parliament’s resolution on the implementation of the EU association agreement with Ukraine stressed that LGBTI people, feminist activists and Roma people were still faced with discrimination, and continuously subjected to hate speech and violent attacks. In a May 2017 resolution, Parliament expressed its deep concern at the reports of arbitrary detention and torture of men ‘perceived to be gay in the Republic of Chechnya in the Russian Federation’. In a recommendation of 16 September 2021, Parliament considered that the LGBTI+ community in various parts of the Russian Federation faces extensive discrimination, including harassment, torture, imprisonment and killings. Parliament stressed that the situation was particularly dangerous in Chechnya, which in 2017 started its purge of LGBTI+ people, detaining and torturing dozens and killing at least two, which led to many seeking safe refuge abroad. Back in 2014, the European Parliament’sLGBTI Intergroup had issued a statement on the alarming situation of LGTBI people in Ukraine, in particular following the Russian annexation of Crimea. The Intergroup reported the LGTBI community as being subject to the Russian ‘anti-propaganda’ law.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Russia’s war on Ukraine: The situation of LGBTI people‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by CLare Ferguson and Katarzyna Sochacka.

Russia’s war on Ukraine was again at the top of the agenda for the May I 2022 plenary session in Strasbourg. Members held three important debates related to the war: on the social and economic consequences for the EU and reinforcing the EU’s capacity to act, on EU preparedness against cyber-attacks following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and on the impact on the EU transport and tourism sectors. Parliament debated Commission and Council statements on threats to the safety of journalists and media freedom, marking the annual World Press Freedom Day, on ongoing hearings under Article 7(1) TEU regarding Poland and Hungary, on the state of play of EU-Moldova cooperation, on building a wall on the Poland–Belarus border in the Białowieża primeval forest, and on threats to stability, security and democracy in western Africa and the Sahel. The follow up of the Conference on the Future of Europe was also debated. Following on from recent reforms to the structure of the plenary agenda, and in particular the return of question time with the Commission, Members discussed Europe’s energy autonomy – the strategic importance of renewables and energy interconnections and efficiency – with Commissioner Kadri Simson. A debate entitled ‘This is Europe’ was held with the Prime Minister of Italy, Mario Draghi, and other Heads of State or Government are expected to take part in future plenary sessions. Among the other debates held were those on the discharge for the 2020 budget, the EU action plan for organic agriculture, distortive foreign subsidies, the 2021 annual report on competition policy, and on artificial intelligence in a digital age.  

Discharge 2020

As every year, Members carry out democratic oversight of spending under the EU budget, and in a joint debate considered 53 reports examining whether EU institutions, agencies and other bodies complied with the rules and the principles of sound financial management in their 2020 expenditure. Firstly, Members followed the Committee on Budgetary Control (CONT) recommendation that Parliament grant discharge to the European Commission and to all six executive agencies, which are responsible for the bulk of EU budget spending. It also granted separate discharge for the European development funds. The committee insisted that the Commission act to end violations of the rule of law and to use the tools it has to make payment of EU funding conditional on respect for EU values. It also highlighted the risk of a continuing gap between the high level of commitments and the amount of payments made. It made recommendations concerning monitoring of expenditure and detection of fraud.

On discharge for the other EU institutions, Members postponed, following the CONT committee recommendation, the decision on granting discharge for the European Council and Council, and for the Economic and Social Committee, with the committee to table new reports within six months. The committee decried the European Council and Council’s refusal to disclose how it has spent EU taxpayers’ money, a situation that has persisted since 2009. It also criticised the European Council’s interference in the legislative process, when it has no legislative role. The committee criticised the re-appointment of a member investigated for harassment to the Economic and Social Committee. While the committee had recommended postponing discharge, Members voted to grant discharge to the Court of Auditors, while demanding clarification on the payment of allowances at the Court of Auditors, following media reports of misuse. Parliament then granted discharge to 9 joint undertakings and 31 of the 32 EU decentralised agencies, where action has largely been taken to remedy previous shortcomings. Members however postponed the discharge for the European Border and Coast Guard Agency until the agency has addressed the findings of an EU Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) investigation regarding harassment, misconduct and migrant pushbacks, and has shared the outcome with Parliament.

Strengthening Europol’s mandate

New technologies are altering the security domain, providing both an opportunity to enhance EU action to counter serious crime and terrorism and a challenge to protecting personal data. Parliament approved the provisional agreement resulting from interinstitutional negotiations on the proposal to strengthen Europol‘s mandate. While Parliament’s Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) Committee supported the proposal, it sought stronger safeguards, democratic oversight and accountability. The approved text will reinforce cooperation with private parties and third countries, encourage research and innovation at Europol, and improve the rules on how the law enforcement agency deals with both data analysis and protection.

Persistent organic pollutants

Parliament debated and adopted by large majority a report on a proposal which would strengthen limits on the use of certain harmful chemicals. The Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety proposes stricter limits than in the Commission’s proposal for persistent organic pollutants (carbon-based chemicals that get into our bodies through the food chain) in waste. The committee proposes stronger restrictions on chemicals found in incinerated waste, pesticides, water and fireproofing, aiming for a toxic-free environment. The adopted report sets Parliament’s position for negotiations with the Council on the proposal.

Artificial intelligence in a digital age

Parliament set up its Special Committee on Artificial Intelligence in a Digital Age (AIDA) in 2020, to investigate the challenges of deploying AI technologies and to analyse their impact on the EU economy. The committee has now completed its work, and Members debated and then adopted a resolution on its final report on the potential opportunities and risks, as well as measures to ensure the EU becomes a global leader in AI. The report concludes with an urgent call for action to promote a human-centric, trustworthy and inclusive approach to AI, based on fundamental rights, that manages risks while taking full advantage of the benefits.

Election of the Members of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage

Members debated and voted by a small majority a Committee on Constitutional Affairs report proposing to further harmonise the national rules on European elections. The rules on eligibility and accessibility are not the same in every EU country at present, and as well as further harmonising them, the Parliament proposes to create a Union-wide constituency. This would give citizens two votes (one national, one Union-wide), with the second used to elect 28 Members to the European Parliament through transnational electoral lists – with strict requirements to ensure reasonable balance among Member States – and a uniform electoral system. Now that the Parliament has adopted its formal proposal, it is transmitted to the Council, which has to adopt the new rules, following the Parliament’s consent on the final text. Once adopted, the new regulation would also need to be ratified by each Member State before it can come into force.

Opening of trilogue negotiations

Members confirmed, without a vote, mandates for negotiation from the Fisheries Committee (PECH) on the proposal for a regulation on conservation and management measures for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna, and on the proposal for a regulation on certain provisions for fishing in the GFCM (General Fisheries Commission for the Mediterranean) Agreement area, as well as from the Internal Market and Consumer Protection Committee (IMCO) on the proposal for a directive on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to the making available on the market of radio equipment (common chargers for mobile phones).

Members also approved by a vote mandates for negotiations from the Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs Committee (LIBE) on the proposals for regulations extending the framework for the issuance, verification and acceptance of interoperable Covid-19 vaccination, test and recovery certificates (EU Digital Covid Certificate) to facilitate free movement of EU citizens during the pandemic and for third-country nationals legally staying or residing in the territories of Member States.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Plenary round-up – May I 2022‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Nikolina Šajn.

The amount of clothes bought per person in the European Union (EU) has increased by 40 % in just a few decades, driven by a fall in prices and the increased speed with which fashion is delivered to consumers. Clothing has the fourth highest impact on the environment of all categories of EU consumption. This impact is often felt in non-EU countries, where most production takes place. The production of raw materials, spinning them into fibres, weaving fabrics and dyeing require enormous amounts of water and chemicals, including pesticides for growing raw materials such as cotton. Consumer use also has a large environmental footprint, owing to the water, energy and chemicals used in washing, tumble-drying and ironing, and microplastics shed into the environment. Less than half of used clothes are collected for reuse or recycling when they are no longer needed, and only 1 % are recycled into new clothes, since technologies that would enable clothes to be recycled into virgin fibres are only now starting to emerge.

Various ways to address these issues have been proposed, including developing new business models for clothing rental, designing products in a way that would make re-use and recycling easier (circular fashion), convincing consumers to buy fewer clothes of better quality (slow fashion), and generally steering consumer behaviour towards choosing more sustainable options.

The European Commission laid out its vision for the textiles sector for 2030 in the March 2022 EU strategy for sustainable and circular textiles. The Commission has proposed a regulation on ecodesign requirements for sustainable products and a directive on empowering consumers for the green transition. The package will aim to make all products on the internal market more sustainable, while providing consumers with information on sustainability. The application of these rules to textiles will be specified in delegated acts, largely planned for 2024.

This briefing expands on and updates a 2019 EPRS briefing Environmental impact of the textile and clothing industry: What consumers need to know.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Textiles and the environment‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Gyorgyi Macsai (Members’ Research Service) with Igor Tkalec (GlobalStat, EUI).

Trade relations between the EU and Chile are imbalanced not only in terms of trends in export and import of goods, but also in the diversity of trade products and in their ranking in the list of main trade partners. The EU was Chile’s third biggest trade partner in 2021, with a 10,4 % share in Chile’s trade with the world. Germany, Spain and the Netherlands are leading the list of Chile’s top EU trade partners.

Read this infographic on ‘Chile: Economic indicators and trade with EU‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Vivienne Halleux.

In the European Union (EU), one in eight deaths is linked to environmental pollution. Pollution is also one of the five main causes of biodiversity loss, representing a significant cost for society. The EU has set the goal of achieving zero pollution for a non-toxic environment by 2050. This would mean reducing air, water and soil pollution to ‘levels no longer considered harmful to health and natural ecosystems and respecting the boundaries the planet can cope with’.

Achieving this long-term ambition will mean updating the comprehensive legal framework currently in place at EU level to address pollution in order to keep up with the latest scientific evidence. In 2022, the EU is expected to review its air quality standards to align more closely with the recently updated World Health Organization recommendations, and to look into pollutants affecting surface and groundwater. Additional areas that should be revised in parallel include key laws designed to tackle pollution at source, setting requirements for pollutant emissions from industry and vehicles, for urban wastewater treatment and sustainable use of pesticides. The key challenges in achieving the zero pollution goal remain to ensure policy coherence, compliance and enforcement. Other issues to monitor include liability for pollution and related costs, with recent assessments pointing to the need to be consistent and rigorous in implementing the ‘polluter pays’ principle.

Parliament has pushed for ambitious action to protect people’s health and the environment from pollution. It has argued that air quality legislation should also cover non-regulated pollutants with demonstrated adverse impacts, such as ultrafine particles, black carbon, mercury and ammonia. It has also called for decisive action on pollutants of emerging concern in water, such as per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances, microplastics, endocrine-disrupting chemicals and pharmaceuticals. Finally, it has urged the Commission to design a dedicated legal framework for soil protection, equivalent to that existing for water and air.

Recently, steps have been taken at global level to curb plastic pollution through legally binding means and to form a science-policy interface body on chemicals and waste.

Read the complete briefing on ‘The EU’s zero pollution ambition: Moving towards a non-toxic environment‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Maria Diaz Crego (1st edition).

During the May I plenary session, Parliament is expected to vote on a legislative-initiative report proposing to repeal the 1976 European Electoral Act and replace it with a new Council Regulation on the election of the Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) by direct universal suffrage. Since the first European elections in 1979, the rules applying to the election of MEPs combine the common principles established in the European Electoral Act, as modified in 2002, and the different national rules implementing them. As a result, important elements of the electoral procedure remain in the hands of the national legislatures and there is no harmonisation across the Member States.

Following the proposals in Parliament’s (26 November 2020) resolution on stocktaking of European elections, the report proposes to further harmonise the rules applicable to European elections in areas such as the age for voting or standing as a candidate; postal voting; the electoral calendar for European elections; the principles applicable to the selection of candidates, including from a gender perspective; and the electoral threshold. In addition, the report proposes to establish a common electoral system and procedure for the election of 28 MEPs in a Union-wide constituency comprising the territory of all the Member States. Once finalised by Parliament, the proposal is transmitted to the Council for its adoption, with the EP required to consent to the final text.

Versions

• April 2022: Towards new rules for European elections? (1st edition)

Proposal for a Council Regulation on the election of the members of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage, repealing Council Decision (76/787/ECSC, EEC, Euratom) and the Act concerning the election of the members of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage annexed to that decision Committee responsible:Constitutional Affairs (AFCO)A9-0083/2022
4.4.2022Rapporteur:Domènec Ruiz Devesa (S&D, Spain)2020/2220(INL)Shadow rapporteurs:Sven Simon (EPP, Germany
Guy Verhofstadt (Renew, Belgium)
Damian Boeselager (Greens/EFA, Germany)
Gerolf Annemans (ID, Belgium)
Angel Dzhambazki (ECR, Bulgaria)
Leila Chaibi (The Left, France)Special legislative procedure
(Legislative initiative from
Parliament; unanimity in
Council; Parliament’s consent;
approval by all Member States) Next steps expected: Vote on the legislative initiative in plenary

Written by Philip Boucher.

The word ‘innovation’ is often used as shorthand for improved technical, economic and social processes. However, any specific innovation involves the redistribution of costs and benefits, creating winners and losers. For some, regulation of technology should be avoided in case it hinders innovation, while others see regulation as essential, to mitigate risks on the path to innovation. However, regulation and innovation are not a zero-sum game. Debates about regulatory (in)action and its impact on innovation would benefit from greater specificity about which innovation paths are considered desirable, for whom, and how policy choices would help to achieve them. This paper explores the relationship between regulation and innovation in the context of artificial intelligence (AI).

AI is a collection of technologies that have the capacity to analyse their environment and respond ‘intelligently’ with some degree of autonomy. Notoriously difficult to define, AI straddles the boundary between current and future technology. Today’s AI plays a substantial and increasing role in our personal and professional lives. In some cases, algorithms are almost visible, as they personalise news feeds, recommend products and give directions. More often, they inform (and sometimes implement) ‘upstream’ decisions in industrial, commercial and public-sector processes. Those affected can rarely understand or even examine these algorithms, although they do have profound impacts, both positive and negative. Tomorrow’s AI is often projected in wild scenarios ranging from the obsolescence of employment with health and wealth for all, to mass surveillance, disempowerment and unseen depths of inequality. More likely, we will see moderate elements of both extremes, with impacts distributed unevenly across populations, although this depends to some extent upon decisions about regulatory (in)action and the resulting innovation pathways.

Like AI, innovation is difficult to define and evaluate. While instinctively considered a good thing, any specific innovation involves the redistribution of costs and benefits in ways that are not always welcomed by everyone and may only be revealed years later. Innovation in AI is no exception. We often hear that AI regulation should be avoided in case it hinders innovation, although proponents of this approach rarely specify how this would promote an innovation path while at the same time ensuring optimal distribution of the costs and benefits involved. Following the lead of the better regulation guidelines, it is good practice to first set out desirable criteria for innovation paths and outcomes – including the distribution of costs and benefits – before examining how a range of possible regulatory approaches, including a baseline approach of no regulatory action, could help to achieve them.

In many ways, regulation has earned its bad reputation when it comes to innovation. Some heavily regulated sectors have been slow to respond to appetites and opportunities for innovation, perhaps because of inexperience or protectionism. Some regulations encouraging the adoption of ‘best available techniques’ and ‘end-of-pipe solutions’ have promoted short-term innovation at the expense of more ambitious transformative innovation. However, regulation provides the necessary preconditions to enable market access for innovations, provides firms considering major investment with certainty, and can be used to articulate ambitious visions for development. Regulation is also important in establishing the conditions and context of innovation, including as regards labour, capital, certainty and competition. There are also cases where innovation leads to disruptive social, economic or security impacts that demand regulatory responses.

In some cases, the inherited wisdom of ‘regulation hinders innovation’ may hold true. However, it is likely that a combination of carefully designed and implemented measures for at least some aspects of technology development would provide the optimal conditions for a desirable innovation path.

Anticipatory policy-making

In the context of AI, four broad approaches to the regulation-innovation relationship can be identified. Some are characterised by the ‘carrot’ of incentivising specific AI applications to reap their benefits and seize the opportunities they offer, others by the ‘stick’ of restraining specific AI applications in order to mitigate their risks. These approaches are not mutually exclusive; they can go hand in hand, alongside moments of regulatory inaction, to optimise the conditions for the preferred innovation path.

The first broad approach is to directly regulate AI innovation in order to shape how algorithms are developed and applied. ‘Carrot’ policies could include mission-oriented innovation programmes to promote ‘moonshots’ that deliver benefits far beyond what can be achieved incrementally, for example, to bypass automation of private vehicles in favour of an ambitious shared-ownership model. ‘Stick’ policies can promote innovation by responding to concerns that might inhibit potential adoption, for example, with moratoria on controversial applications such as biometric identification and lethal autonomous weapons.

The second broad approach is to shape the context in which AI is developed and adopted in order to influence the pace and direction of innovation. ‘Carrot’ measures could include boosting capital, skills, data and SME support, as well as completing the digital single market to reduce friction in terms of legal compliance, administrative burden and consumer choice. ‘Stick’ measures could include digital taxes and penalties for uncompetitive practices. Again, these stick policies can promote innovation by enhancing competition, which has a demonstrably positive link to innovation.

The third broad approach is to respond indirectly to specific outcomes and impacts as they emerge. While such measures may have a weaker influence on the pace and direction of innovation itself, they play an important role in ensuring that the innovation path remains desirable. Examples include providing a safety net for workers at risk of displacement and ensuring the continued effectiveness of measures to defend fundamental rights with regard to democratic processes, non-discrimination and consumer protection. Equitable distribution of costs and benefits, alongside protection measures for citizens and consumers, could be key conditions for the acceptability of innovation paths.

The fourth broad approach involves innovation in regulation itself, changing how policies are designed and implemented to better fit the specificities of AI. Novel approaches, such as ‘regulatory markets‘, would see firms compete to meet demands set by regulators. Temporary spaces or ‘sandboxes’ can liberate regulators and innovators to perform controlled experiments with policies and technologies and observe the results before deciding whether to scale them up. Anticipatory innovation governance also recommends early-stage experiments to establish constant feedback loops between innovation and regulation. Well-crafted regulation is not only compatible with AI innovation, but is its essential precondition. Poorly designed policy choices – including both regulation and inaction – can damage both AI development and public confidence. There are no simple solutions to complex socio-technical challenges, but there certainly are some emerging lessons for policy-makers: promote synergies, leaving behind the ‘zero-sum game’ assumption that regulation is in direct competition with innovation; take a long-term view, as restricting some developments in the short term can deliver innovation payoffs in the long term by ensuring competition, inspiring public trust or leapfrogging incremental steps; level the playing field, as a more even distribution of costs, benefits and opportunities is conducive to innovation; focus on objectives and outcomes, as AI develops more quickly than policy, so detailed prescriptions could be quickly outdated; regulate innovatively, first making use of novel approaches such as sandboxes, experiments and co-regulation, and then harmonising, to benefit from best practices, economies of scale and interoperability; recognise diversity, taking account of local and regional conditions to ensure a fairer distribution of costs, benefits and opportunities; deployinnovative procedures for public administration and procurement to improve performance, accumulate in-house expertise and promote a culture of innovation in the public sector; and promote confidence thatcitizens’ and consumers’ rights will be respected, and that firms’ regulatory environment will remain stable and supportive. Indeed, policy-makers are increasingly embracing a range of regulatory options as a means – and not a barrier – to achieve the right kind of AI innovation.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘What if AI regulation promoted innovation?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Listen to policy podcast ‘What if AI regulation promoted innovation?’ on YouTube.

Written by Alex Wilson and Lasse Boehm.

Russia remains Europe’s largest supplier of coal, oil, and gas. This poses a particular difficulty for the EU and its Member States, which are urgently seeking to reduce their energy dependence. This is not only necessary to pressure Russia economically to end its invasion of Ukraine, but also to prevent Russia from weaponising its energy supplies and threatening Europe’s energy security in future.   

Replacing Russian natural gas will be much more difficult than replacing oil and coal, due to differences in supply infrastructure, transportation and storage. While part of the long-term solution lies in the promotion of renewable energy sources and energy efficiency savings, the EU will nevertheless require large volumes of natural gas imports in the short and medium term.

Since most of Europe’s pipeline infrastructure is organised to import Russian gas, alternative supplies will mostly have to come by sea in the form of liquefied natural gas (LNG). To guarantee security of supply, the EU will also need to ensure gas storage levels remain high so Member States can cope with a sudden interruption of gas supplies. However, both LNG terminals and gas storage capacity are unevenly spread across Europe, with important policy implications.

There is a clear need to frontload investment to diversify supplies and fill storage, but uncertainty as to who can or should finance these changes. There is also the question of how to coordinate policy action at EU level, how to buffer against negative social and economic consequences, and how to ensure coherence of security of supply with the ‘fit for 55’ package and the European Green Deal.

Read the complete briefing on ‘EU gas storage and LNG capacity as responses to the war in Ukraine‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

LNG capacity per Member State (operational and planned) EU storage capacity (TWh)

Written by Matthew Parry and Marcin Szczepański.

The United States imposed a battery of sanctions and multilateral measures on Russia following its invasion of Ukraine, while also providing Ukraine and its EU neighbours with military, economic and humanitarian aid.

US sanctions

The US first imposed sanctions on Russia when it annexed Crimea in 2014. Further sanctions followed when Russia recognised the independence of Donetsk and Luhansk, and invaded Ukraine in February 2022:

• individual sanctions on Vladimir Putin, Sergey Lavrov, National Security Council members, oligarchs, other entities and persons evading sanctions; and visa restrictions;
• financial sanctions on businesses linked to major industries, e.g. defence, energy, diamond mining, telecommunications and transport, as well as on banks and financial institutions (asset freezes and account closures), ban of transactions with the Russian Direct Investment Fund;
• prohibition on all investment in Russia;
• prohibition on Russian aircraft and airlines entering US airspace (private and commercial);
• ban on oil, liquefied natural gas (LNG) and coal imports to US;
• export controls on technologies such as semiconductors, computers, telecommunications, lasers, and sensors and equipment for oil and gas industries, for both US exports and exports from third countries that use US inputs, such as software and equipment;
• asset blockagesfor persons, connected to media and news agencies spreading disinformation;
• similar sanctions on Belarus, covering export controls, banks, individuals and entities with links to Russia, the military sector, and its inputs and products, and trade tariffs.

Joint sanctions and comparison

Some US sanctions have been coordinated with the EU and other G7 members. A major step was to block the Russian Central Bank’s reserves and cut off many banks from the SWIFT international payment system. This was followed by limits on ‘golden passports‘ and the launch of the Russian Elites, Proxies, and Oligarchs (REPO) task force (G7 plus Australia), which seeks to find, freeze and/or confiscate the assets of sanctioned individuals. The sanctions have come in waves, but in some fields the US has gone further than the EU, which is more exposed to Russia in terms of energy supply and investment. The US has banned all new investment in Russia (the EU just in the energy sector). The US has also prohibited all coal, LNG, and oil imports (the EU only coal and other solid fossil fuels). US export controls cover both the oil and gas sectors, (the EU targets the former, plus technology and goods used for liquefaction of natural gas).

Main US and EU sanctions as of 22 April 2022 Military aid as of 25 April 2022

The US has given Ukraine over US$4 billion in military aid since 2014, with as much as US$3.7 billion of that since the war began. It has facilitated the supply of spare parts to make 20 warplanes operational, and provided Ukraine with training and lethal aid, including heavy weaponry, such as helicopters, tanks, heavy artillery, armoured personnel carriers, drones, howitzers, anti-aircraft and anti-armour systems, and also standard weapons and munitions. The US has promised to help Ukraine transition to more advanced weapons and air defence systems that are essentially NATO capable. It has shared invaluable intelligence (satellite imagery and analysis) on the Russian invasion, but stopped short of introducing a no-fly zone over Ukraine. Some EU Member States have also provided Soviet-era weapons, and received US compensation.

Humanitarian response and support for democracy and human rights

Between 2014 and 2021, the US donated more than US$351 million in humanitarian aid to Ukraine, in part to feed and house vulnerable Ukrainians, including those affected by the pandemic. Between 24 February and 24 March 2022, the US spent US$123 million to support the EU and neighbouring countries’ efforts to receive and host Ukrainian refugees, including US$48 million in Poland, US$10 million in Romania, US$9 million in Hungary, and US$4 million in Slovakia. On 24 March 2022, the Biden administration announced that it was preparing to provide refuge for ‘up to’ 100 000 Ukrainians, and was ‘prepared to provide’ more than US$1 billion in new humanitarian aid to support Ukrainians inside and outside Ukraine. However, reportedly, at the time of writing, the US has yet to establish a mechanism for resettling Ukrainians directly, with some trying to enter the US via Mexico. The Biden administration has also announced a further US$320 million in democracy and human rights funding for Ukraine and neighbouring democracies.

Contribution to European energy security

On 25 March 2022, President Biden and Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced the creation of a joint US-EU task force to diversify EU LNG supplies in alignment with shared transatlantic climate objectives, and reduce EU demand for Russian natural gas imports. As part of the first objective, the US says it will strive to increase EU imports in 2022 from the US and other international partners by at least 15 billion cubic metres (bcm), and the Commission has promised to work with Member States to lift demand for US LNG by some 50 bcm per year ‘until at least’ 2030; (in 2021, the EU imported 22 bcm of LNG from the US, and 155 bcm of all forms of natural gas from Russia). Some question the US’s ability to increase LNG exports rapidly, and the EU’s capacity to raise LNG imports, or transport them between Member States.

Prior to these announcements, members of Congress and energy industry trade groups had called on the administration to increase gas and oil exports to partners in Europe, but reportedly faced reluctance as a result of concerns about rising energy prices in the US, and trade-offs between the administration’s European energy security objectives and its ambitions to reduce US greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. On 31 March 2022, the White House announced a ‘historic release’ from the US strategic petroleum reserve of 1 million barrels per day over the following six months, amounting to some 180 million barrels in total. The EU should benefit from the resulting downward pressure on the world oil price.

Efforts in multilateral institutions

The US has also acted in multilateral institutions including the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and General Assembly (UNGA) and the International Court of Justice (ICJ); as well as the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the Group of Twenty (G20); often in tandem with the EU and other partners. On 25 February, one day after Russia’s invasion began, the US co-submitted a UNSC resolution demanding that Russia cease and withdraw. Russia, a permanent UNSC member, vetoed it. A similar text was put to the UNGA on 2 March, with the US voting with 140 other countries in support. On 23 March, the US and 12 other UNSC members abstained on, and so caused to fail, a Russia-proposed resolution on humanitarian access to Ukraine, objecting to language defending Russia’s invasion. On 7 April, the US joined 92 other countries in voting in the UNGA to suspend Russia from the UN’s Human Rights Council. The US welcomed a 16 March ICJ provisional order for Russia to halt its invasion, and on 23 March accused Russia of war crimes (neither the US nor Russia are parties to the ICJ statute). At the WTO, the US joined the EU and 12 other members in declaring on 14 March that they would cease to grant Russia WTO-derived trading privileges and discontinue work towards Belarus’s WTO accession. On 6 April, US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen expressed the view that Russia should be expelled from the G20, and said that the US would boycott G20 meetings involving Russian officials. The White House has also coordinated a collective response from NATO to the invasion, not least by deploying additional forces to Europe, while making it clear that the alliance is not a co-belligerent.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Russia’s war on Ukraine: US response‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clare Ferguson.

While Russia’s invasion of Ukraine continues to dominate the international headlines, Members of the European Parliament return to Strasbourg for the first plenary session in May. Members are expected to debate the implications of the war for cybersecurity and on transport in Europe, as well as on reinforcing the EU’s capacity to act to mitigate the social and economic consequences. Nevertheless, the need for an urgent European Union response to the war has not delayed (and indeed has sometimes accelerated) action on a number of other files on the agenda. A key debate is scheduled with Mario Draghi, Prime Minister of Italy, in the first of a series with Heads of State or Government. The European Commission is expected to make a statement on the ongoing hearings regarding threats to common European values in Poland and Hungary. The President of the European Council, Charles Michel, has been invited to participate in this session’s revived ‘question time’.

As every year, Members are set to carry out their democratic oversight of spending under the EU budget in a joint debate on Wednesday, when they consider 53 reports examining whether EU institutions, agencies and other bodies complied with the rules and the principles of sound financial management in their 2020 expenditure. Firstly, the Committee on Budgetary Control (CONT) recommends that Parliament grant discharge to the European Commission and to all six executive agencies, which are responsible for the bulk of EU budget spending. It also recommends granting separate discharge for the European development funds. The committee insists that the Commission act to end violations of the rule of law and to use the tools it has to make payment of EU funding conditional on respect for EU values. It also highlights the risk of a continuing gap between the high level of commitments and the amount of payments made. It makes recommendations concerning monitoring of expenditure and detection of fraud. On discharge for the other EU institutions, the CONT committee recommends postponing the decision on granting discharge for the European Council and Council, the Court of Auditors and the Economic and Social Committee, and indicates it would table new reports within six months. The committee decries the European Council and Council’s refusal to disclose how it has spent EU taxpayers’ money, a situation that persists since 2009. It also criticises the European Council’s interference in the legislative process, when it has no legislative role. The committee demands clarification of payment of allowances at the Court of Auditors, following media reports of misuse. It also criticises the re-appointment of a member investigated for harassment to the Economic and Social Committee. The committee further proposes that Parliament grant discharge to 9 joint undertakings and 31 of the 32 EU decentralised agencies, where action has largely been taken to remedy previous shortcomings. It wishes to postpone the decision on the European Border and Coast Guard Agency until the agency has addressed the findings of an EU Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) investigation regarding harassment, misconduct and migrant pushbacks, and has shared the outcome with Parliament.

On Monday evening, Parliament is scheduled to consider a proposal which would strengthen limits on the use of certain harmful chemicals. The Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety proposes stricter limits than in the Commission’s proposal for persistent organic pollutants (carbon-based chemicals that get into our bodies through the food chain) in waste. The committee proposes stronger restrictions on chemicals found in incinerated waste, pesticides, water and fireproofing, aiming for a toxic-free environment. The vote in plenary would set Parliament’s position for negotiations with the Council on the proposal.

Balancing the need to protect citizens and to encourage innovation in the digital era is tricky. Looking to the future, Parliament set up its Special Committee on Artificial Intelligence in a Digital Age (AIDA) in 2020, to investigate the challenges of deploying AI technologies and to analyse their impact on the EU economy. The committee has now completed its work and, on Tuesday morning, Members are expected to consider its final report on the potential opportunities and risks as well as measures to ensure the EU becomes a global leader in AI. The report concludes with an urgent call for action to promote a human-centric, trustworthy and inclusive approach to AI, based on fundamental rights, that manages risks while taking full advantage of the benefits.

New technologies are also altering the security domain, providing both an opportunity to enhance EU action to counter serious crime and terrorism and a challenge to protecting personal data. On Tuesday afternoon, Parliament is set to vote on the provisional agreement resulting from interinstitutional negotiations on the proposal to strengthen Europol‘s mandate. While Parliament’s Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) committee supports the proposal, it calls for stronger safeguards, democratic oversight and accountability. If agreed, the proposal will reinforce cooperation with private parties and third countries, encourage research and innovation at Europol, and improve the rules on how the law enforcement agency deals with both data analysis and protection.

Finally, on Monday evening, Members are expected to debate a Committee on Constitutional Affairs report proposing to further harmonise the national rules on European elections. While the rules on eligibility and accessibility are not the same in every EU country at present, revising them would also offer an opportunity to create a Union-wide constituency. This would give citizens two votes (one national, one Union-wide), electing 28 Members to the European Parliament – under strict requirements – through transnational electoral lists and a uniform electoral system. Once the Parliament has adopted its formal proposal, that is transmitted to the Council, which would adopt the new rules, following the Parliament’s consent on the final text. Once adopted, the new regulation would also need to be ratified by each Member State before it can come into force.

Written by Karin Jacobs.

With its Climate Law, the EU has set itself the target of reducing its greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by at least 55 % by 2030, and aims for climate neutrality by 2050. Of the maritime sector’s CO2 emissions, between and 6 and 7 % are generated at berth in ports in the European Economic Area. This calls for a strong focus on the greening of shipping, making port services sustainable and infrastructure for alternative fuels available. In parallel, key maritime and inland ports on the trans-European transport network (TEN-T) need to adapt to the role of strategic multimodal nodes and clean energy hubs.

Fit for 55 proposals: Implications for ports

In July 2021, to align the EU economy with the European Green Deal and the sustainable and smart mobility strategy, the European Commission put forward a first set of legislative proposals, the fit for 55 package. The proposals are interlinked and several have implications for ports. These concern maritime fuels, fuels infrastructure, emissions trading, and energy taxation. In November 2021, the Council reacted by demanding further guidance on the proposals’ overall ambition, and an assessment of their joint impact.

The proposed FuelEU Maritime regulation aims to boost the production and uptake of sustainable, low-carbon fuels in maritime transport, and obliges ships to use on-shore power supply (OPS); ports are expected to facilitate both. The rules apply to ships of more than 5 000 gross tonnes (GT), regardless of their flag. From 2025, limits would be introduced on the carbon intensity of the energy used by vessels, covering around 90 % of the emissions generated. From January 2030, ships staying for more than two hours in a port would have to connect to OPS, unless they used another zero-emission technology. Responsibility would lie with the shipping companies. Non-compliance would lead to penalties, which would feed into an innovation fund to finance the production of renewable maritime fuels and other greening actions in the sector. The investment in the port infrastructure needed will be port-specific and depend on the size and type of traffic. The Commission estimates the total cost of investment in alternative fuels infrastructure over the 2025-2050 period at €9.9 billion: €2.5 billion for hydrogen infrastructure and €7.4 billion for OPS.

Until recently, there was little reliable data to quantify the emissions savings achievable with OPS. However, a 2021 study on CO2 emissions data collected through the EU monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) system shows significant potential savings if the replacement electricity were clean. Italy would have the highest savings in absolute terms (487 kilotonnes (kt)), Sweden the highest reduction in relativesavedshare (99 %). For oil-reliant countries (e.g. Greece, Cyprus) or coal-dominated ones (e.g. Poland, Estonia), the reduced share is low or negative (Figure 1).

Amount of CO2 emissions saved (absolute and relative) in coastal Member States, by using OPS

The proposed regulation on the deployment of alternative fuels infrastructure seeks to ensure the availability of a dense alternative fuels network, including liquefied natural gas (LNG) at EU ports. It requires that, by the beginning of 2030, at least 90 % of demand for OPS be met in TEN-T maritime ports, and sets requirements for OPS for inland waterway vessels at berth. With containerships, cruise ships and passenger ferries using OPS, both greenhouse gas emissions and air pollution in and near ports should decrease. Furthermore, EU Member States would have to install LNG refuelling points in maritime TEN-T ports, and jointly ensure LNG coverage for seagoing ships to circulate throughout the TEN-T network by 2025.

The EU emissions trading system (ETS) is the cornerstone of the EU’s policy to combat climate change and reduce GHG emissions cost-effectively. The proposed ETS review seeks to align the ETS with the EU Climate Law. While requirements for the current ETS sectors will be strengthened, the Commission is proposing to further reduce emission allowances and extend the ETS to the maritime sector by including ships of 5 000 GT and more. The system would cover all energy used in European ports and consumed during voyages between them, and 50 % of the energy used during journeys between EU ports and those in a third country. Penalties from the ETS would feed into an innovation fund targeting climate action. Half of ETS revenues would need to be spent on climate action by Member States, and could also go into the innovation fund. Once the International Maritime Organisation develops a global pricing mechanism, the ETS would be aligned.

With the revision of the Energy Taxation Directive, the Commission has proposed to tax fuels according to their energy content and environmental performance instead of their volume. Fossil fuels, such as those used as bunker fuels in vessels, will no longer be exempt from taxation in EU ports, but will remain untaxed in ports outside of the EU. From 2023, taxes would be introduced over a 10-year period, requiring sufficient market uptake of alternative fuels. Taxation laws, such as this proposal, require unanimity of EU Member States. Other recent Commission legislative proposals affecting EU ports concern the taxonomy rules, defining economic activities that contribute to climate action, and the revised TEN-T guidelines. These legislative proposals need to be negotiated between the European Parliament and Council.

European Parliament views

In its October 2018 resolution on deployment of infrastructure for alternative fuels in the EU, the Parliament called on the Commission to support the decarbonisation of the maritime sector, with a clear focus on innovation, digitisation and adaptation of ports and ships. It also supported the deployment of OPS at both inland and maritime ports. A January 2020 resolution on the Green Deal welcomed the proposal to review the Alternative Fuels Directive, calling on Member States to commit to proper funding and step up the pace for the deployment of innovative strategies, charging infrastructure and alternative fuels at national level.

Ports’ priorities

To implement the changes spelled out in the proposals, ports will need sufficient funding. European Sea Ports (ESPO) asked for better alignment of the FuelEU Maritime and alternative fuels infrastructure regulation (AFIR) proposals, and to ensure a return on OPS investments, conditioned by its mandatory use, possibly accompanied by an EU-wide permanent tax exemption for OPS. The scope of OPS should take into account prioritisation of busy terminals. ESPO also proposed to extend the taxation on bunkering outside of the EU, to safeguard an international level playing field for EU ports. In their view, the ETS should be extended to prevent evasive calls in the neighbouring non-EU ports, and ETS revenues should be re-invested solely in the greening of the sector. Inland navigation stakeholders’ concerns focus on providing OPS under AFIR. For ESPO, the existing grids at inland ports will not be able to address the demands for electricity, making the 2030 target unfeasible. Inland ports insist that OPS should be taxation-free, and seek further EU financial support, including additional funding for port reforms.

Outlook

While the delivery of the European Green Deal remains high on the EU’s political agenda, the war in Ukraine could slow down legislative negotiations, and the expected developments and investments. Energy security imperatives could redefine the requirements, linked to energy supply, including the acceptance of (bio) LNG as a globally available transition fuel. The closure of ports in Ukraine has already disrupted European supply chains, and could further exacerbate pandemic-related congestion at terminals, also putting maritime safety and security at risk. Furthermore, EU ports may have to face the need to apply EU sanctions against Russian-linked vessels, as proposed in the latest sanction package This could be reflected in the forthcoming review of maritime safety rules, for instance in terms of port state control.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘European ports becoming ‘fit for 55’‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Alex Wilson (1st edition).

The Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has triggered serious concerns about EU energy security. The problem is particularly acute in the gas sector, where Russia is the leading third-country supplier, on which several Member States are heavily dependent. To ensure the EU is prepared for the risk of an interruption of gas supplies next winter, the Commission has proposed an urgent regulation on gas storage, requiring Member States to: fill in at least 80 % of their storage capacity by 1 November 2022 (rising to 90 % in subsequent years); carry out the certification of all gas storage system operators; and provide a 100 % tariff discount on entry and exit points into gas storage.

The Commission has suggested that this regulation be agreed under an expedited procedure by the Parliament and the Council, so that it can start taking full effect from summer 2022. The ITRE committee decided to call for use of the urgent procedure (Rule 163) without a committee report, and appointed a negotiating team of MEPs to enter immediately into interinstitutional negotiations with the Council and the Commission. This decision was endorsed during the April plenary session of the European Parliament.

EU storage capacity (TWh) Versions

• April 2022: New EU regulation on gas storage (1st edition)

Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL amending Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 concerning measures to safeguard the security of gas supply and Regulation (EC) No 2009/715 on conditions for access to natural gas transmission networks Committee responsible:Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE)COM(2022) 135
23.3.2022Negotiating team:Jerzy Buzek (EPP, Poland), coordinator
Patrizia Toia (S&D, Italy)
Klemen Grošelj (Renew, Slovenia)
Marie Toussaint (Greens/EFA, France)
Paolo Borchia (ID, Italy)
Zdzislaw Krasnodębski (ECR, Poland)
Sandra Pereira (The Left, Portugal)2022/0090(COD)

Ordinary legislative procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council on
equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Next steps expected: