European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Etienne Deschamps.

In keeping with the wishes of Jean Monnet and his closest colleagues, who dreamt of seeing his family home transformed into a place in which young people could come together to discuss and share ideas, the European Parliament has made this public place of memory a venue of choice for people seeking to learn more about the way the European Union works and discover the environment in which one of the architects of today’s Europe lived and worked.

It was here that many plans which would have a decisive bearing on the future of France and Europe were drawn up. In this place which was close to Paris, but which at the same time offered a refuge from the clamour of the French capital, Jean Monnet developed his vision of peace and European unity. The European Parliament bought the house in 1982. Today, managed on a day-to-day basis by the House of European History, the Jean Monnet House offers, through a permanent multimedia exhibition, an insight into both the private world of Jean Monnet and his career and political ideals. Since 2013, the Jean Monnet House has been officially recognised by the French Government as a ‘Maison des illustres’ and is also part of the Network of Political Houses and Foundations of Leading Europeans, an initiative behind which the European Parliament is a driving force. Today, Parliament is breathing new life into the Jean Monnet House, in order to raise awareness of Monnet’s work and to pass on his values of peace and solidarity to a wider public by organising new activities and hosting numerous events in Houjarray.

Read this briefing on ‘The Jean Monnet House: A place of European memory‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Luisa Antunes.

Genome editing is a powerful new tool allowing precise alterations in the genome. The development of new approaches based on the CRISPR‑Cas9 system has made this process much more efficient, flexible and affordable, relative to previous strategies.

These technological advances originated in remarkable interest in possible applications, both in fundamental research and in the treatment or prevention of disease and disability. Possibilities range from restoring normal function in diseased organs by editing somatic cells to preventing genetic diseases in future children and their descendants by editing the human germline.

As with other medical breakthroughs, each such application comes with its own set of risks, benefits, ethical issues and societal implications, which may require the revision of existing regulatory frameworks. Important questions raised include how to balance potential benefits against unintended harms, how to govern the use of these technologies, how to incorporate societal values into relevant clinical and policy applications, and how to respect the inevitable cultural specificities that shape the future direction of the use of these technologies.

The goal of this study was therefore to provide an overview of the state-of-the-art of the science, as well as an analysis of current and projected regulatory, ethical, legal and social implications. Based on these findings, policy options were provided.

The internal market for health and ‘wellness’ services and products can and is already subject to considerable harmonisation in the European Union. Provided that there is sufficient consensus, there is ample room to either introduce genome editing-related provisions in existing directives and regulations (vertical approach), or to enact specific genome-editing legislation (horizontal approach). Besides legislative intervention, it is also possible to explore alternative or cumulative public and private governance mechanisms.

Harmonised definitions would be beneficial to the internal market for health and wellness services and products. These facilitate legal certainty in the internal market, improving the prospects for citizens (as patients and consumers), companies and healthcare providers (public or private) to navigate the different national rules and a fragmented legal landscape. Uniform definitions facilitate comparison and organic approximation of national legislation, policies, and governance structures.

Legal definitions should include appropriate resilience mechanisms to ensure sustained correspondence with scientific knowledge. From a regulatory perspective, the use of qualifiers such as ‘somatic versus germline‘, ‘hereditable‘ genome editing, or ‘modifying genetic identity‘, is considered scientifically outdated, vague and prone to differing legal interpretations. Somatic as well as germline applications may carry associated dangers. Once clinical safety is established, germline interventions could also have strong therapeutic potential. Possible horizontal harmonisation approaches could include, for example, maintaining a general prohibition, in which the clinical risk-benefit ratio is unacceptable and, additionally, clarifying concepts and, most importantly, creating exceptions for research and future treatments of serious diseases.

Regarding genetic eugenics prohibited by Article 3 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, this study proposes the option of regulation to expressly clarify or extend the prohibition to the actions of private actors and to somatic interventions where these cannot be considered to be the result of informed and free consent, and simultaneously clearly exempting preventive and precision medicine.

Regarding advanced therapeutic product regulation, genome-editing products are currently subject to a centralised approval procedure, but exceptions are decided locally. One option would be to further harmonise exceptions granting patients early access, e.g. compassionate use, named-patient use and hospital exceptions.

As for genome editing in assisted reproduction techniques, rules and proposals to allow editing are often linked with the treatment of serious diseases. There is an urgent need to define and, if possible harmonise science-based criteria used to determine the seriousness of a given disease, including both from a patient-centric perspective and using medical diagnosis elements.

Uncontrolled somatic editing can pose great social and ethical risks (e.g., inequality, public health problems, interventions in children and people unable to consent, discrimination, etc.). Regarding wellness and cosmetic somatic editing (including enhancement), strict regulatory framework for market approval only applies to products used for the treatment, prevention or diagnosis of a disease. The use of ‘human enhancement’ as a criterion for unacceptable interventions is not useful, as it is too vague, value-charged and difficult to enforce. An option would be to ensure public health prevention by determining types of editing that should be prohibited or restricted, practitioners’ professional qualifications, safety and technical requirements. Also here, a multi-level, risk-based approach would allow specific rules to be defined for prohibited and high-risk genome-editing interventions. Possible criteria could include the objectives of the intervention, expected outcomes and levels of risk for individuals and society.

Regarding medical/reproductive travel and beauty/wellness tourism, some countries have more permissive legislation or lack the ability to enforce rules. Restrictions should not hamper access to experimental or recently approved therapeutic options, including the participation in clinical trials. Possible options include the extraterritorial application of EU and Member State law to procedures performed abroad (provided that fundamental rights and freedoms are respected).

As for enforcement and forensic activities, the enforcement of prohibitions needs to account for fundamental rights and freedoms. An option would be to balance the needs for prevention and reintegration relating to the specific illicit conduct with the legal rights, interest and well-being of the victim. Secondly, subjects of illicit genome editing could be treated as victims and could be specifically allowed to refuse privacy or forensic activities invasive to their physical integrity. The long-term monitoring and inclusion in registries must also respect the rights to privacy, family life, personal integrity and autonomy.

Counterfeited or falsified services and products are a known intellectual property rights (IPR) and a public health issue. Genome editing could be included in the sphere of measures included when tackling this problem. Private governance through technology-licensing agreements already plays an important governance role. This study identifies an option to develop general guidance or model clauses for ethical licensing. The use of artificial intelligence (AI) systems for genome editing is a future area of concern and should be the object of consideration in AI-related regulation.

In conclusion, this study shows that while genome editing is the source of great expectations for the medical field, several ethical, social and legal questions remain to be addressed. Regulatory and governance mechanisms are greatly needed in the EU.

Read the complete study on ‘Genome editing in humans: A survey of law, regulation and governance principles‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Gregor Erbach and Liselotte Jensen.

The ‘fit for 55’ package, presented in July and December 2021, is designed to realise the European Climate Law objectives: climate neutrality by 2050 and a 55 % reduction of net greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 2030, compared with 1990 levels. It consists of 13 interlinked proposals to revise existing EU climate and energy laws, and six proposals for new legislation.

The proposals aim to accelerate emission reductions in the sectors covered by the EU emissions trading system (ETS) and the sectors covered by the Effort-sharing Regulation, and to increase carbon removals in the land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF) sector.

Under the new package, road transport and buildings would be included in the revised EU ETS, but would still be covered by the Effort-sharing Regulation. To reduce transport sector emissions, the new ETS for transport fuels would be complemented by stronger CO2 emission standards for new cars and vans, revised rules for alternative fuels infrastructure and new legislation on maritime and aviation fuels. Energy production and use across the economy are addressed by the revision of key EU energy legislation, a new regulation on energy-related methane emissions (within the effort-sharing sector), and a reform of the EU gas markets (Gas and Hydrogen Regulation and Directive). The proposals on ETS, effort-sharing, energy performance of buildings, renewable energy, energy efficiency and the social climate fund address energy use in buildings. Finally, the revision of the LULUCF Regulation is geared towards ensuring that the sector achieves 310 Mt CO2 removals by 2030. There would be certain flexibilities between the LULUCF sector and the effort-sharing sector. The revised Renewable Energy Directive contains sustainability criteria for biofuels, which affect the LULUCF sector. Transport: A challenging sector for climate action

GHG emissions from the transport sector have stagnated over the past decade, while other sectors such as electricity generation and industry achieved substantial emissions reductions, not least thanks to the EU ETS. To ensure that the transport sector contributes to the EU’s climate objectives, the maritime and road transport sectors are to be included in the EU ETS (while still covered by the Effort-sharing Regulation). Together with a review of the Energy Taxation Directive, this would raise the price of GHG emissions in the transport sector. The proposed revision of the Renewable Energy Directive sets requirements for renewable transport fuels, and introduces a credit mechanism to promote electromobility. Specific legislative proposals address emissions reductions and the supply of alternative fuels in the road transport, maritime transport and aviation sub-sectors.

Aviation: Free ETS allowances for airlines are to be phased out, and flights going outside the European Economic Area will become subject to the international CORSIA offsetting scheme. The RefuelEU Aviation proposal promotes sustainable aviation fuels.
Road transport: CO2 emission standards for new cars would become stricter, aiming for 100 % zero-emissions vehicles by 2035. The social climate fund, financed by the new ETS for road transport and buildings, would improve access to zero- and low-emission mobility and transport.
Maritime transport: The sector would be included in the EU ETS. The FuelEU Maritime proposal promotes sustainable maritime fuels. Energy: At the heart of the climate neutrality transition

Several proposals in the ‘fit for 55’ package address energy-related GHG emissions. The principal targets to contribute to the overall 55 % net emissions reduction are a 40 % share of renewable energy sources by 2030, and a substantial reduction of primary and final energy consumption. A higher carbon price through the revision of the EU ETS and the Energy Taxation Directive will drive the roll-out of renewables and energy efficiency improvements.

Links between the proposals: 1. The proposed revised Energy Taxation Directive refers to definitions in the proposed revised Renewable Energy Directive and the proposed revised Alternative Fuels Infrastructure Directive. 2. The proposed revised Gas and Hydrogen Regulation and Gas and Hydrogen Directive refer to the revised Renewable Energy Directive for the definition of renewable gas and low-carbon gas. 3. The proposed revised Renewable Energy Directive refers to the definition of ‘efficient district heating and cooling’ in the proposed revised Energy Efficiency Directive (EED), and the proposed revised Energy Performance of Buildings Directive refers to the definition of ‘energy performance contracting’ in the EED. 4. The proposed revised Energy Efficiency Directive and the proposal for a social climate fund refer to each other with respect to use of the fund. EU ETS: Cornerstone of EU climate action

The ‘fit for 55’ package contains four proposals to raise the ambition of the EU ETS, improve its functioning, broaden its scope to maritime transport, road transport and buildings, and provide for the participation of airlines in the international CORSIA offsetting scheme. These are complemented by proposals for a carbon border adjustment mechanism to safeguard international competitiveness by pricing the carbon emissions of imports, and for a social climate fund to address the social impacts of extending the EU ETS to road transport and buildings.

1. Financing of the social climate fund would come from revenues from the new ETS for transport and buildings. 2. The amount of carbon border adjustment depends on the phasing-out of free allowances in the EU ETS. 3. Allocation of free ETS allowances depends on operators’ compliance with the requirements of the EED. 4. The existing Regulation on monitoring, reporting and verification of maritime transport emissions (the Shipping MRV Regulation) is amended to align with the extension of the ETS to maritime transport. 5. Both proposals concern aviation in the EU ETS and implementation of the international CORSIA system. The second proposal ensures that Member States notify airlines of CORSIA obligations for 2021. EPRS publications

• Effort-sharing Regulation review: EU legislation in progress briefing; initial appraisal of Commission impact assessment
• LULUCF Regulation review: legislation in progress; initial appraisal
• EU ETS Directive review: legislation in progress; initial appraisal
• EU ETS market stability reserve review: legislation in progress
• EU ETS as regards aviation / Notification on CORSIA: legislation in progress; initial appraisal
• Carbon border adjustment mechanism: legislation in progress; initial appraisal
• Renewable Energy Directive review: legislation in progress; initial appraisal
• Energy Efficiency Directive review: legislation in progress; initial appraisal
• Social climate fund: legislation in progress; (no impact assessment prepared by the Commission)
• Energy Taxation Directive review: legislation in progress; (consultation procedure, no initial appraisal)
• Energy Performance of Buildings Directive review: legislation in progress; implementation in action
• Methane regulation: legislation in progress; initial appraisal (forthcoming)
• EU regulation on gas and hydrogen networks recast: legislation in progress; implementation appraisal
• EU directive on gas and hydrogen networks recast: legislation in progress
• CO2 emission standards for cars and vans: legislation in progress; initial appraisal
• Alternative fuels infrastructure regulation: legislation in progress; initial appraisal
• ReFuelEU Aviation: legislation in progress; initial appraisal
• FuelEU Maritime: legislation in progress; initial appraisal

Read this briefing on ‘Fit for 55 package‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Suzana Anghel and Rebecca Torpey.

Russia’s continuing war on Ukraine was central to the EU leaders’ debates at their special meeting on 30-31 May 2022. Closely linked to Ukraine, food security, security and defence, and energy were also high on the agenda. EU leaders approved €9 billion in special macro-financial assistance for Ukraine and agreed on a sixth package of sanctions against Russia, including a ban on seaborne oil (two-thirds of imports) with a temporary exemption for pipeline oil imports. On food security, the European Council strongly condemned the impact of Russia’s war on the global food supply chain and focused on ways to coordinate with international partners to ensure the global security of food supplies. In security and defence, the focus was on consolidation, rather than new strategic guidelines. EU leaders examined, but did not endorse, the ‘investment gaps’ analysis prepared, at their request, by the European Commission and the High Representative/Vice President of the Commission (HR/VP), Josep Borrell. They called on the Council to take forward work on specific items, not least developing a ‘joint EU defence strategic programming and procurement’ function. On energy, the EU leaders took stock of progress made since their Versailles meeting, on phasing out the EU’s dependence on Russian fossil fuels. After presentation of the REPowerEU plan, they agreed that work should continue on supply diversification, renewables, energy efficiency, interconnection, infrastructure and preparedness, including gas storage, price affordability and electricity market optimisation. The President of Cyprus, Nikos Anastasiades, briefed his colleagues on Turkey’s assertive behaviour in the area of Varosha.

1. Background

The European Council meeting began with the customary address by the President of the European Parliament, Roberta Metsola. She stressed that ‘Europe needs our leadership’, as the EU’s joint action ‘in the next months will define our common future’, and emphasised that the Parliament was ready to ‘constructively play its part’. The President of the European Council, Charles Michel, did not submit an updated Leaders’ Agenda, although the latest version expired in March 2022.

2. European Council meeting Ukraine

The European Council condemned Russia’s invasion of Ukraine once again, denouncing the suffering and destruction inflicted on Ukraine and its population, and calling on Russia to allow safe passage, humanitarian assistance and the return of Ukrainians forcibly deported. EU leaders recalled Ukraine’s right to self-defence, renewed their call for an immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Russian troops and equipment from the ‘entire territory of Ukraine within its internationally recognised borders’, and praised the ‘courage and determination’ of the Ukrainians to ‘fight to defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity and freedom of their country’. They confirmed the Union’s support and cooperation with partners, with a view to building ‘a peaceful, democratic and prosperous future’ for Ukraine. Along with sanctions, the most debated items were international justice, the EU’s support for Ukraine, and the war’s impact on neighbouring countries. Addressing the European Council, the President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, stressed the importance of European unity, pointed to the loss of lives, pleaded for the adoption of new sanctions and underlined that ‘there can be no compromises at the expense of (Ukraine’s) territorial integrity’.

Sanctions against Russia

EU leaders agreed on a sixth package of sanctions, expanding the list of Russian individuals and entities subject to sanctions (i.e. banks, military and religious officials, and ‘Russian state outlets‘ spreading disinformation). After a heated debate, they agreed to ban oil imports, with the exception of pipeline oil. In doing so, they stood by the principles outlined – no indirect funding of the war, phasing out of EU dependence on Russian fossil fuels, and economic isolation of Russia so that it ends the war. Charles Michel stressed that the agreement covered ‘more than two-thirds of oil imports from Russia, cutting a huge source of financing for its war machine’. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen indicated that the aim was to progressively target 90 % of Russian oil imports by the end of 2022. EU leaders committed to return to the temporary exception of pipeline oil, mainly benefiting Hungary, at a forthcoming meeting. They also agreed that, in the event of sudden interruptions of supply, ’emergency measures will be introduced to ensure security of supply’. They called on international partners to remain united in coordinating and implementing sanctions.

International law and justice

The European Council stressed that it ‘expects international humanitarian law, including the Geneva Convention relative to the treatment of prisoners of war, to be fully respected’. It has also expressed support for the gathering of evidence and investigation of war crimes carried out by the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court. EU leaders praised the ‘operational support’ provided by Europol and welcomed the creation of a Joint Investigation Team coordinated by Eurojust. They reiterated that those responsible for international law breaches would ‘be held to account for their actions’.

Humanitarian, financial, military, economic and political support for Ukraine

EU leaders reiterated the EU’s multi-dimensional support for Ukraine, confirming that the EU would continue to provide Ukraine with humanitarian aid and ‘commend[ing] the results of the High-level International Donors’ Conference co-hosted by Poland and Sweden’. They highlighted the financial support offered to frontline countries for the reception of Ukrainian refugees, and invited the European Commission to present new funding proposals within the multiannual financial framework (MFF). They also mentioned the EU’s commitment to support Ukraine financially, expressed readiness ‘to grant Ukraine new exceptional macro-financial assistance of up to €9 billion in 2022’, and called for speedy examination of the European Commission’s forthcoming proposal.

On the reconstruction of Ukraine, EU leaders expressed support for a dedicated reconstruction platform bringing together the EU, Member-State governments, the Ukrainian government, international partners and financial organisations, and suggested using frozen Russian assets to fund reconstruction efforts. They also praised Member States’ efforts to enshrine provisions allowing asset confiscation in their national laws and called on the Council to move ‘swiftly’ to examine the European Commission’s proposal to add violation of EU sanctions to the serious crimes with a cross-border dimension listed in Article 83 TFEU.

Ahead of its debate on enlargement, scheduled for 23-24 June 2022, the European Council introduced a first element of conditionality by linking EU support for Ukraine’s reconstruction to its ability to stay the course of reforms and follow its European pathway. It noted the European Commission’s work on opinions on the membership applications of Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia.

With respect to military support, the European Council confirmed the EU’s commitment ‘to continue bolstering Ukraine’s ability to defend its territorial integrity and sovereignty’. It welcomed the increase up to €2 billion of the support offered to Ukraine under the European Peace Facility.

Impact on neighbouring countries

Since the war began, the European Council has been monitoring its impact on neighbourhood countries closely, including on the Western Balkans and Moldova, which need support as they face strong economic, energy and migration pressure. Addressing the European Parliament in plenary, the President of Moldova, Maia Sandu, had outlined the efforts undertaken to cope with the large number of refugees, and underlined that Moldova supported Ukraine’s territorial integrity, stressing that ‘Crimea is Ukraine. Donbas is Ukraine. Kyiv is Ukraine. And they will always be’. The EU leaders also reaffirmed their support for the Belarusian people’s right to ‘new, free and fair elections’.

Main message of the President of the European Parliament: Roberta Metsola called for leadership and for the provision of ‘hope and perspective’ to Ukraine by granting candidate status. She recalled the objective of phasing out Russian fossil fuels and supported the sixth package of sanctions.

Food security and affordability

The war in Ukraine is straining the global food supply chain. Russia and Ukraine account for about 30 % of global exports of wheat, 20 % of corn and mineral fertilisers, and 80 % of the world’s sunflower oil trade. The disruption in fertiliser manufacturing also risks putting next year’s agricultural production under stress. Charles Michel held Russia accountable for the humanitarian crisis that may occur, after witnessing ‘silos full of grain, wheat and corn ready for export … stranded because of the Russian war and blockade of Black Sea ports’. EU leaders reiterated this sentiment by emphasising the impact of Russia’s war on global food security and affordability, calling on Russia to end its blockade of food exports. The European Council went further than it had at its meetings on 24-25 March and in Versailles, at which it focused on ways for the EU and the international community to respond to food supply issues. At this meeting, EU leaders directly denounced Russia’s illegal seizure and destruction of Ukrainian agricultural produce.

In the Middle East, Russia and Ukraine supply around 75 % of wheat imports, a figure reaching 90 % in east Africa. The blockade poses a broader security concern in the EU’s neighbourhood, potentially leading to further humanitarian crises. In this context, the Chair of the African Union, Macky Sall, addressed the European Council, outlining the risks facing Africa as well as possible solutions. The price of food in the EU increased by 8.64 % in April 2022 compared with April 2021, affecting the purchasing power of EU citizens, who are already facing rising energy costs. EU leaders considered ways to bolster food security and affordability, by facilitating food exports from Ukraine; coordinating the international response to a looming global food crisis; and reducing disruptions to fertiliser manufacturing. They signalled their support for specific initiatives at EU and international level, such as ‘solidarity lanes‘, the Food and Agriculture Resilience Mission, the adoption of common agricultural policy strategic plans, and the establishment of the Global Alliance on Food Security. They also called on the Commission to explore the use of European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) reserves and for international partners to promote more efficient use of fertilisers or alternatives.

Main message of the European Parliament President: Roberta Metsola decried Russia’s blackmail, which threatened to plunge vulnerable countries into famine, and signalled support for the Commission’s ‘solidarity lanes’ initiative, backed by the European Council on day two of the meeting.

Security and defence

The European Council considered the joint communication on the defence investment gaps analysis, but did not endorse the document as such. Instead – as flagged up before the meeting in the EPRS outlook – they invited ‘the Council to examine’ a select number of issues, including short-term defence procurement needs allowing stocks to be renewed, ‘the development of a joint EU defence strategic programming and procurement function’, measures to bolster the EU’s defence industry, and the possibility of enhancing the role of the European Investment Bank so as to mobilise up to €6 billion for dual-use projects under its strategic European security initiative. EU leaders stressed that they were looking forward to the Commission’s presentation of the European defence investment programme, which is scheduled for autumn 2022 and expected to include a value added tax exemption.

Commission President Ursula von der Leyen noted that several Member States had announced defence spending increases, amounting cumulatively to €200 billion. She referred to the challenges of fragmentation and duplication and called for better coordinated defence spending. Defence funding, including a possible increase of the European Defence Fund envelope – an aspect considered in the defence investment gaps analysis and supported by the European Parliament – was for now kept out of the debate. As EU leaders committed to keep defence on their agendas, funding might come up for discussion, possibly by mid-2023, if not sooner, when, in accordance with the Strategic Compass, ‘new financing solutions’ for joint procurement are expected.

EU leaders pointed to ongoing shifts in the EU’s close strategic environment as a result of Russia’s war, and stressed the importance of a ‘stronger and more capable’ joint response in security and defence. Whilst reaffirming NATO’s key role in ensuring collective defence for its members, they emphasised that ‘solidarity between (EU) Member States is reflected in Article 42(7) TEU – yet not calling for clarification on the procedure to be observed in the event of a new activation.

Main message of the President of the European Parliament: Roberta Metsola stressed that European security and defence was ‘fast becoming an existential question’, underlining the complementary nature of the EU and NATO. She again called for pooling of resources and better defence spending.

Energy

In light of its earlier commitment to reduce EU dependence on Russian fossil fuels, the European Council took stock of progress made thus far and exchanged views on the REPowerEU plan. It called in particular for accelerated development of renewables and for investment in infrastructure aimed at bolstering renewable energy production. Ursula von der Leyen stressed that ‘renewable energy has the big advantage that it is not only good for the climate but it is also good for our independence and good for our security of supply and it creates jobs at home’.

Energy affordability was a central topic for discussion, leading the European Council to call for joint efforts with like-minded partners to curb energy prices, including by setting temporary price caps. EU leaders encouraged the ‘prompt use’ of the newly established EU Energy Purchase Platform, open to eastern and Western Balkan partners, whilst stressing the need to accelerate winter preparations to avoid disruption, including by completely filling gas storage facilities. They stressed the importance of putting in place coordinated European contingency measures. The reform of the electricity market, supported by several Member States at past meetings, remains a pending issue. EU leaders have invited the European Commission to work on market optimisation and price affordability, on the basis of the report by the EU Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators.

Main message of the President of the European Parliament: Roberta Metsola underlined that consumers must be protected from ‘price fluctuations’ and stressed that investment in energy and in the green transition must be seen ‘as much as a security issue as it is an environmental one’.

Read this briefing on ‘Outcome of the special European Council meeting of 30-31 May 2022‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clare Ferguson.

Parliament meets again in Strasbourg for the first session of June, with Members scheduled to attend a ‘This is Europe’ debate with the Taoiseach of Ireland, Micheál Martin (who is also expected at the inauguration of a statue of former Member, and Nobel Peace Prize-winner, John Hume in the Parliament in Strasbourg). Parliament will also hear European Council and Commission statements on the conclusions of the special European Council meeting of 30‑31 May 2022, and consider a draft resolution on the rule of law and the potential approval of the Polish national recovery plan (RRF). However, the main topic on the agenda is the twin challenge of reducing harm to the environment and fossil fuel use, with a full day of joint debate on the ‘Fit for 55’ package scheduled for Tuesday. On Monday evening, the Parliament is due to hold a question time session with the Commission, in a practice revived earlier this year, this time on the topic of reducing the use of pesticides and strengthening consumer protection.

The first of the files scheduled for Tuesday’s ‘Fit for 55’ joint debate is the proposed review of the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS), aimed at aligning the ETS with the Climate Law target of a 55 % reduction in net EU greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 2030. In its report on the European Commission proposal, Parliament’s Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI) calls for accelerated emissions reduction and for a system to reward best performers and innovation. The committee also proposes to include municipal waste incineration in the ETS from 2026, and to raise ambition in the maritime transport sector. The ENVI committee demands an end to free allowances and that the carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM) is completed earlier – by 2030. The report proposes to increase and rename the Innovation Fund as the Climate Investment Fund and make access to the Modernisation Fund conditional on legally binding climate neutrality targets and respect for the rule of law. Tuesday morning’s joint debate will also discuss Parliament’s position in negotiations with the co-legislators on the proposed EU CBAM, where the ENVI committee has proposed significant amendments to the proposed measures to prevent carbon leakage by levelling the playing field between EU and third-country producers. The proposal entails setting a carbon price for imported products and ending free emissions allowances for European industry. The committee report amends the proposal’s scope: broadening the products and sectors covered and allocating CBAM revenue to the EU budget. However, to support least-developed countries, ENVI suggests earmarking an equivalent amount for their decarbonisation efforts. 

However, GHG emissions in sectors not included in the ETS account for around 60 % of EU emissions. The ‘Fit for 55’ debate therefore continues on Tuesday, with Members expected to discuss the revision of legislation governing measures to control GHG emissions in transport, buildings and agriculture. The Commission’s proposal aims at achieving climate neutrality by establishing binding national targets and setting annual emissions allocations (AEAs) for each EU country. Nevertheless, the ENVI committee calls for greater ambition, to align with the 2050 climate neutrality target. The ENVI committee also demands greater transparency in Member States’ actions under the regulation, including preparation of a Commission report on their AEA achievements. Parliament’s vote on the Effort-sharing Regulation will set its position for negotiations with the co-legislators.

Aviation emissions, projected to increase by 2050, are not included in the transport modes covered by the Effort-sharing Regulation. The ‘Fit for 55’ package aims to tackle these specifically, with Members expected to set Parliament’s position on the proposed revision of the EU ETS as regards aviation following Tuesday morning’s joint debate. The aviation proposal aims at amending the ETS Directive and implementing the current pilot carbon offsetting and reduction scheme for international aviation (CORSIA). Parliament already supports the elimination of the free allowances for emissions from flights to and from third countries, granted due to international pressure. An ENVI committee report on the proposals further calls for a 50 % reduction of these free allowances in 2024, before ending the exception in 2025. The ENVI report also supports the uptake of sustainable aviation fuels, and proposes to direct 75 % of aviation allowance auction revenue to reducing the sector’s total climate impacts internationally.

Other ‘Fit for 55’ package proposals also concern transport sector CO2 emissions, which have barely fallen since 2005. To set Parliament’s position ahead of negotiations with the co-legislators, Members are expected to debate stricter CO2 emissions standards for new cars and vans on Tuesday afternoon (part two of the joint debate). The ENVI committee report on the proposal seeks to increase the 2025 emissions reduction target to 20 % and abolish the incentive mechanism to accelerate market uptake of zero- and low-emission vehicles after 2025. However, the committee insists that assessment of the socio-economic impact of the measures should be more frequent, including whether funding is needed to ensure a just transition in the automotive sector. The ENVI report also calls for a common EU methodology to assess car and van lifecycle CO2 emissions, fuel and energy consumption by 2023. 

Members are also expected to debate Parliament’s position on proposals that aim to boost protection of crucial carbon sinks in the proposed revision of the regulation on land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF), also scheduled for part two of the ‘Fit for 55’ joint debate on Tuesday afternoon. The ENVI committee report on the proposal reiterates Parliament’s support for measures to halt deforestation and encourage sustainable farming, to protect the environment and the economic sectors that depend on it. The report disagrees with moves to merge LULUCF with agriculture measures however, and seeks to set national annual targets for 2026-2029, with penalties for non-compliance. It also underlines the need for coherence between EU policies that protect nature and biodiversity, and carbon storage measures. 

Nonetheless, it is recognised that none of these measures will be cheap. Members will therefore also debate the proposed creation of a social climate fund as part of the joint ‘fit for 55’ debate (on Tuesday morning). This initiative seeks to match funding from EU own resources and Member State contributions to compensate those hardest-hit by the cost of the transition to a more environmentally friendly society – vulnerable households, small businesses and transport users. Parliament’s ENVI and Employment and Social Affairs have produced a joint report outlining expectations for national social climate plans to prioritise ‘clean’ mobility and limit temporary direct income support measures. The joint report defines ‘mobility poverty’, makes disbursement of funds conditional on countries respecting the rule of law, and asks that national plans consider the socio-economic challenges for islands and outermost regions. The fund would be primarily financed through the extension of the EU ETS to cover the buildings and transport sectors. 

While the EU’s desire to become independent of Russian energy supplies has added impetus to the ‘Fit for 55’ initiatives, Parliament’s support for Ukraine in the face of Russia’s aggression means the country remains a major item on Parliament’s agenda. Ruslan Stefanchuk, Speaker of Ukraine’s Parliament, the Verkhovna Rada, is expected to make an address to a formal sitting of Parliament on Wednesday morning. As part of the now regular question time (scheduled for Tuesday evening) with HR/VP Josep Borrell, Members are scheduled to discuss EU external action to address the impact of the war in Ukraine on third countries. They are also due to debate a draft recommendation, prepared by the Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET), on EU foreign, security and defence policy in the light of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The report recommends the EU move swiftly to establish a defence union and to underpin its common defence by implementing the Strategic Compass. It calls for the EU to embrace the aim of strategic autonomy and to hold regular Council meetings of EU defence ministers. Calling to replace the unilateral declaration on political accountability with a bilateral agreement with the HR/VP, AFET underlines the imperative for Parliament to scrutinise the Strategic Compass and use of the European Peace Facility.

Members are expected to debate Parliament’s position on the Commission’s 2021 report on Turkey on Monday evening. Turkey’s EU accession negotiations are currently on hold, due to democratic backsliding. However, relations with the EU have improved slightly, with a recent AFET committee report welcoming Turkey’s mediation in Russia’s war against Ukraine, and underlining the importance of cooperation with a NATO ally in the currently unstable geopolitical situation. The AFET report on the Commission’s 2021 annual report on Turkey’s accession nevertheless notes that the human rights situation in Turkey continues to deteriorate. 

On Wednesday evening, Parliament is due to consider its position on an agreement reached between the co-legislators on the revised proposal for an international procurement instrument (IPI) to facilitate reciprocal access to procurement markets in non-EU (third) countries. The instrument would deter or disqualify tenderers from third countries that close their public procurement markets to EU bidders from bidding in the EU. Parliament successfully negotiated higher thresholds and fewer exceptions to the proposed rules, while minimising the administrative burden.

On Wednesday afternoon, Members are set to debate a crucial issue for Parliament – gaining the right of ‘direct’ legislative initiative. At present, the European Parliament, unlike national parliaments, only enjoys an ‘indirect right’ to propose legislation. This means it must submit a majority request to the Commission to prepare a proposal to implement the EU Treaties. To strengthen the EU’s democratic legitimacy, a report from the Committee on Constitutional Affairs (AFCO) calls for a general and direct right of initiative for Parliament (the only directly elected institution). This would require Parliament to trigger a Treaty change, an issue discussed at the recent Conference on the Future of Europe in respect of the possibility of more far-reaching EU reforms.

The winner of the LUX Audience Award is due to be announced at a ceremony scheduled for lunchtime on Wednesday. The prize celebrates quality cinema in Europe, with the three competing films obtaining help with distribution, including subtitling in the 24 official EU languages and screening at the LUX Film Days in more than 60 cities. The winning film will also be adapted for those with visual and hearing impairments. Previous laureates have gone on to be highly successful in the EU and beyond.

Finally, on Wednesday lunchtime, Members are scheduled to vote on a Fisheries Committee recommendation to grant consent to the conclusion of a new EU–Mauritania Fisheries Agreement and Protocol – the EU’s economically most significant fisheries agreement. In updating this cooperation framework, Parliament supports increased fisheries cooperation between EU partners in West Africa and strengthens calls for a regional fisheries management organisation to deal with shared stocks.

Written by Monika Kiss, Mar Negreiro, Maria Niestadt, Carolien Nijenhuis and Christiaan Van Lierop.

The latest available statistical data on demographic trends in the EU show that population features present in the EU-27 in previous years have persisted, but that the picture is slightly worse due to the Covid-19 pandemic.

The population of the EU represents a progressively shrinking proportion of the world population. While the latter is increasing steadily and is getting proportionally younger, the population of the EU is ageing rapidly, with a median age of 43.9 years in 2020, compared to 38.4 years two decades ago. This is due to increased longevity (a life expectancy of 81.3 years in 2019 compared to 69.86 in the 1960s), but also to a shrinking birth rate, amounting to 4.05 million live births in 2019, compared to 6.79 million in the 1960s. The pandemic led to an increase in ‘excess mortality’ in 2021, the two biggest peaks being in April and November, coinciding with two waves of Covid-19 infections.

Owing to vaccination campaigns and economic incentives, employment figures in 2021 were more positive than during the previous year. This positive development is also due to another phenomenon, the acceleration of the digital transition.

A digital revolution is transforming the world as we know it at unprecedented speed, and there is a growing awareness among EU citizens that digital technologies play an important role in their daily lives; on a societal level, digital technologies have the potential to improve living standards, life expectancy and quality of life. Looking at prospective demographic trends, this technological dependency is expected to continue. According to a 2021 Eurobarometer survey, more than 80 % of EU citizens think that the use of digital tools and the internet by 2030 will be important in their lives, and that they will bring at least as many advantages as disadvantages to them. However, there are differences according to demographic groups, among whom there remains a digital divide. For instance, younger users are more likely to be intensive internet users, and are also twice as likely to worry about the difficulty of disconnecting and finding a good online/offline life balance than those who are aged 55 and over. The use of digital technologies requires a sufficient level of digital skills, and in this respect the EU is still far away from its target (of 80 % of citizens with basic digital skills in 2030, compared to 58 % in 2021), but this is also strongly influenced by socio-demographic aspects.

Children and young people born after 1996 in the EU – sometimes called ‘Generation Z’, ‘Gen Z’ or ‘iGeneration’ – are the first digital natives: they are used to smartphones and tablets, and most have internet access at home. Demographically, though, their part in society is shrinking. Often young people are ahead of older family members in terms of technical competence (such as ICT skills) or time spent on the internet. The Covid-19 pandemic, which led to school closures and restrictions on physical contacts, also led, for the younger generation, to increased screen time and an abrupt transition to distance learning. The EU, its Member States and even private actors put in place initiatives to try and remedy these difficulties – for example, by providing access to hardware and software for pupils in need, partially opening schools, and providing non-digital home-learning resources.

Digitalisation is also changing the work life of young people, by reducing demand for routine and manual tasks while increasing demand for tasks requiring problem-solving and interpersonal skills. Young people often struggle to find a job, or jump from one precarious job to another. This in turn means that young people find it difficult to make the transition to independent life and depend financially, in large part, on their parents.

Apart from a small slice of ‘Generation Z’, it is ‘Generation Y’ or the ‘Millennials’ (those born between 1981 and 1996), as well as ‘Generation X’ (those born between 1964 and 1980) and some of the ‘Baby Boomers’ (the generation born between 1946 and 1964) who are present on the labour market and responsible for meeting the needs of the younger and older cohorts who depend on them. From the point of view of digital technologies, this heterogeneous group faces a lot of work-related challenges. These concern mainly automation, digitisation, the expansion of digital platforms and teleworking. While automated workflows and robots can make up for a lack of workers or perform physically demanding or hazardous tasks, they can also lead to job losses, relating mainly to routine tasks.

Digital technology enables people to work from any location at any time. Teleworking and digital platforms, which witnessed unprecedented growth during the pandemic, also have some drawbacks, mainly concerning work-life balance, digital privacy, and physical and mental health.

An ageing society brings challenges relating to growing demand for health and care services, loneliness, and social inclusion of older people. Digital technology could offer a solution to these problems. For example, it creates significant potential to improve support for older adults’ (often complex) healthcare needs and their need to stay connected with their social circle. However, the digital transformation also poses challenges. It has increased the exclusion of those who are digitally illiterate, who cannot access or afford digital tools or the internet, or who lack motivation and interest. Moreover, the onset of physical or cognitive impairments and inaccessible technology design renders digital engagement more challenging. The EU is aware of these issues and is backing initiatives and projects to overcome the digital gap and stimulate innovation for ageing well.

The EU’s digital transformation is taking place at an uneven pace, with clear differences visible across Europe in a number of different areas. In terms of digital literacy and skills, internet use is generally lower in southern and eastern EU regions than in the north and west, with a similar geographical division for e-commerce. The EU’s outermost regions have some of the lowest levels of digital literacy in the EU, particularly when it comes to social media participation, while residents of rural areas generally have lower levels of digital skills than people living in cities, often linked to low levels of digital connectivity in rural areas. Indeed, a significant urban-rural digital divide exists in all EU Member States, in large part due to the high costs and risks involved in the roll-out of digital infrastructure in less built-up areas. However, the recent expansion in the use of telework and ICT-based mobile work could represent one of the keys to the future development of rural areas.

Read the complete study on ‘Demographic outlook for the European Union 2022‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

EU-27 population pyramids for 2001 and 2019 (number of women and men by age group) Total fertility rate (live births per woman) Life expectancy at birth in the EU-27, between 2002 and 2019 Daily internet users in 2020 Total fertility rates in the EU-27, 2019

Written by Györgyi Mácsai (Members’ Research Service) and Igor Tkalec (GlobalStat, EUI).

This infographic examines some economic differences and similarities among countries of the Gulf region and the EU, like GDP growth, GDP per capita and female labour force participation rate. In terms of trade, the Gulf region stands already as an important source of oil and gas for the EU, these products contributing almost two-third of total imports of the latter from the Gulf region.

Read this ‘infographic’ on ‘The Gulf region: Economic indicators and trade with EU‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Monika Kiss.

In 2018, the United Nations declared 3 June World Bicycle Day. Cycling represents a growing share of mobility. It is a healthy, green and flexible means of transport that helps achieve savings and generate jobs. However, a lot remains to be done when it comes to safety and suitable cycling infrastructure across the EU. Although the regulatory framework on cycling is determined at Member State level, with concrete action shaped locally, the EU provides best practice advice and financial support for infrastructure development. For its part, the European Parliament has regularly highlighted the importance of cycling and supported it as a means of transport.

Cycling in the EU

Today, there are an estimated 1 billion bicycles in the world – about as many as passenger cars. Figures show that bicycles are becoming an ever more important mode of transportation. However, big differences exist between EU Member States. A 2020 Eurobarometer survey shows that, while the use of cars remains dominant, 8 % of EU citizens – mainly in big cities – use a privately owned bike or scooter as their main mode of daily transport, with an additional 1 % using shared bikes or scooters on a daily basis. Numbers are the highest in the Netherlands (41 %), followed by Sweden (21 %). Meanwhile, daily cycling figures remain low (1–5 % of journeys) in about a third of all EU countries.

Cycling has several environmental and health benefits. It is an affordable and flexible means of transport that benefits both society as a whole and its individual members in a number of ways. For example, according to the European Cyclists’ Federation (ECF), cycling generates global benefits of €150 billion per year, of which €90 billion concern the environment, public health and mobility. As a regular physical activity, cycling reduces the risks of heart disease, stroke, certain cancers and diabetes. Cycling can also help lessen greenhouse gas emissions, air pollution and noise. As a means of transport over short distances, it can help reduce traffic congestion, and thus also delays and lost working hours. Moreover, it can contribute to lowering the dependence on fossil fuels.

A more widespread take-up of cycling can also create new, often local jobs – in sectors such as bicycle manufacturing and retail trade, repairs, and infrastructure construction and maintenance, but also for instance in cycling tourism. Meanwhile, bicycle delivery and courier services have been booming since the start of the pandemic and the restrictions and public health measures put in place, which led to rapid development of e-commerce. Cargo bikes transporting goods or people are more and more part of our daily lives, as well.

However, the surge in cycling has come with its challenges. More needs to be done to ensure cyclists’ road safety and avoid accidents. Cyclists’ share of total road deaths in the EU stands at 8 %, and has been slowly rising. Mobility planning needs to be coordinated, and financing for cycling infrastructure secured. Boosting cycling as an attractive means of transport requires sustained investment in networks of safe and comfortable cycle routes in urban, peri-urban and rural areas across the EU. All levels of government, from local to the EU, need to contribute to this goal.

EU action and funding

Cycling policies are the Member States’ responsibility, with each EU country setting up its own regulatory framework. Practical measures (such as developing cycling networks or adapting the public transport network to facilitate combined trips) are taken primarily at local or regional levels, most often in cities.

EU-level intervention consists mainly of promoting cycling, providing financial support, and sharing best practice. The EU has recognised the importance of cycling and its integration in several areas of EU action, such as transport and tourism, energy and environment, regional and cohesion policy, and public health.

Multiple resources support implementation of cycling infrastructure and associated measures; they have been developed at national level or by other interested parties within the EU using EU co-funding. This is true, for instance, for EuroVelo, a European network of currently 17 long-distance cycling routes criss-crossing Europe, under full responsibility of the ECF. The network is in various stages of completion, and can be used by both cycling tourists and locals.

Two major EU funding sources can enhance cycling-related developments: the EU structural and investment funds, part of the regular EU budget, and the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), which aims to address the economic crisis caused by the pandemic. Through the structural funds – particularly the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and the Cohesion Fund – about €2 billion has been invested in cycling during the EU’s 2014–2020 multiannual financial framework (MFF). The current EU budget –the 2021–2027 MFF – is based on two principles: tackling the health and economic challenges caused by the pandemic, and bringing about sustainable transformation to meet the goals of the European Green Deal. The 2021–2017 ERDF and the Cohesion Fund will also support future cycling investments: at least 30 % of the former and 37 % of the latter must be dedicated to climate objectives.

Meanwhile, about half of the national recovery and resilience plans (NRRPs) drawing on the RRF intend to update, upgrade or extend existing national green mobility plans. Quite a few have assigned specific funds to enhance cycling, either as a daily means of transport, or as a sustainable form of tourism, or both. From the NRRPs submitted so far, Belgium is the frontrunner as regards cycling infrastructure, with investment worth €411 million (or 6.9 % of the country’s RRF funding) in 180 kilometres of new and 1 360 kilometres of upgraded cycling paths and secured bicycle parking, including at rail stations. Sizeable investments are also planned in Romania, Italy and France.

Furthermore, the EU supports platforms for the exchange of best practice, for instance the City Vitality Sustainability Initiative (CIVITAS), the European Platform on Mobility Management (EPOMM) and the Urban Mobility Observatory (ELTIS), which hosts cycling data.

Legislative work also focuses more and more on promoting cycling. To protect cyclists and other vulnerable road users more effectively, new features have been added to the EU rules on safety requirements for vehicles. For instance, the revised General Safety Regulation, adopted in November 2019, envisages, as of 2022, to improve direct vision for trucks and buses, reducing ‘blind spots’, and install systems at the vehicle’s front and side to detect and warn of vulnerable road users, especially when making turns. The proposal for a revised Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T) Regulation, published in December 2021 as part of the ‘efficient and green mobility’ package, can be considered a step forward for cycling in urban areas. It aims, among other things, to establish synergies with other policies, such as those to increase bicycle infrastructure, including the EuroVelo routes. The TEN-T proposal also highlights the importance of developing multimodal mobility and sustainable transport modes further. The European urban mobility framework, as part of the same package, discusses multimodality and the use of active travel, encouraging cities to draft sustainable urban mobility action plans, as well as promoting bike transport.

European Parliament’s role

Over the years, the European Parliament has repeatedly highlighted and supported cycling as a transport mode and cyclists’ interests. For instance, it called on the European Commission to develop an EU cycling strategy to get more people to cycle more often. In a September 2015 resolution on the implementation of the 2011 Commission white paper on transport, Parliament stressed the importance of supporting regional programmes for establishing and expanding cycling networks in large European regions to raise citizens’ awareness for environmental matters, give everyone the opportunity to cycle, and reduce air and noise pollution and congestion. The resolution also asked for better data on transport use behaviours, in particular as regards walking and cycling.

In its February 2019 report on the Commission proposal for a revision of the Motor Insurance Directive, the Parliament stressed that the directive should not cover electronic bicycles (such as segways and electric scooters), which – because of their smaller size – are less likely to cause significant damage to people and property. The final directive, adopted on 9 November 2021, took Parliament’s position on board.

In an October 2021 resolution on the 2021–2030 EU road safety policy framework, Parliament made recommendations to the Commission on how best to achieve its ambition of reducing road deaths to almost zero by 2050. The resolution also emphasised how important it is that the cycling and walking infrastructure the Member States deployed in response to the pandemic not only remains in place, but is expanded to further promote safe active travel.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘World Bicycle Day‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Luisa Antunes with Tobias Hoffman.

Since ancient times, from the Roman Empire around the Mediterranean Sea to floating islands used by the Uro people of Peru, civilisations have settled near water.

Today, rising sea levels place coastal cities under constant threat. An estimated 250 million people currently live on land below projected annual flood levels, often in coastal cities such as London, Lagos, Mumbai or Shanghai; and this number may rise to 630 million by the end of the century. An additional 318 million people have been displaced since 2018, due to climate disasters.

Many of these cities have already taken measures to adapt to rising sea levels. Shanghai is protected by a gigantic protection system, while New York City has created a system to shield its island-located economic borough of Manhattan. The government in Indonesia took one of the most drastic actions, deciding to move its entire capital inland, mainly because it was sinking and experienced regular flooding. The location of the new capital, Nusantara, has been criticised for leading to the displacement of indigenous populations and the destruction of vast areas of natural rain forest, essential to counteracting climate change.

Could it be that, instead of humankind fleeing from water, building on it could serve as a better long-term solution? What would the creation of entire water cities entail for societies, economies and the environment? What if populations could live on water instead of facing displacement and migration? The combined effects of climate change, land subsidence and accelerated urbanisation could force us to rethink the use of water surfaces on Earth as potential settlement areas, as an alternative to an Earth surface made uninhabitable by over-population and climate catastrophes.

Potential impacts and developments

Despite a popular image of modernity, the concept of living on water is not new. Overwater structures have been designed, built and used for centuries worldwide. Amsterdam is a present example of a city experimenting with totally floating houses. These are built as small modules, with individual buildings connected by plug-in systems, whose weight is balanced by concrete fundaments lying underwater. Energy, fresh water and internet connections are all provided via a land plug-in.

City planners believe that entire floating districts could both improve the housing crisis that afflicts many coastal cities, such as Amsterdam or Barcelona, and contribute to attenuating flooding crises. A floating system would allow constructions to adapt to waves, tides and even storms, including hurricanes. The flexible plug-in and out system of floating cities would also allow for new ways of city planning: sports stadiums, schools and parks could be easily moved to adapt to new demand. In addition, these flexible modern city models could serve as attractive tourist destinations.

The first overwater cities are expected to be located close to the coast. Such projects would be designed with climate adaptability in mind, while still offering contact with the mainland. Since plug-in systems have water and energy capacity limitations, self-sufficiency through solar power and water heat pumps would be essential.

As heat waves increase in frequency and severity, the surrounding water could be used to cool buildings. Sustainable public infrastructure and transportation strategies will also need to be reimagined. Several current coastal megacities are characterised by an uncontrolled, heterogeneous growth, which leads to high-cost constructions that produce huge amounts of waste. Ocean plastic is already a major issue for the marine ecosystem and tourism, so waste removal will need to be well organised. Cities on water will require a highly functional public sector. An additional risk is the cost itself: if living on water continues to be too expensive for the vast majority of the population, these cities might fall short on providing part of the solution to climate change-caused displacement and migration.

If cities continue to grow on water, additional protection from heavy storms will be necessary, resulting in disturbance of the surrounding marine structures, as this will affect currents and rivers, and inevitably change ecosystems. The ecological equilibrium will be disturbed, as underwater building foundations will create new habitats for micro- and macro-organisms, including pests. While underwater reef structures might pose opportunities for aquaculture and food production, constant maintenance will be required.

Keeping water out of liveable spaces is also not easy. A substantial concern linked to floating constructions is to constantly clean and renew surfaces with material free from leaking pollutants, anticipating how little we know about marine ecosystems. A completely floating city without direct land-based production will force us to find ways to autonomously produce fresh water and energy.

Although cities on water could serve as an answer to climate change, and the associated technology is potentially sustainable, their climate impact might still be immense. To stabilise underwater buildings, huge amounts of concrete are currently used, as concrete displaces water very effectively. However, concrete production contributes to 8 % of global CO2 emissions today, and concrete production has created an international competition for sand, the market for which is currently reaching record prices.

Economic considerations are just one aspect of the huge impact cities on water could have on international relations. Another might be their existence alone: cities on water would change international sea borders as they are currently legally defined. Countries might be tempted to use their floating cities to create additional territories. The growing value of marine territory could intensify, and we are already witnessing the effects of growing global tensions over disputed territorial areas. There is a risk that cities could also establish themselves as extraterritorial city-states outside national legislation and develop as tax havens.

Anticipatory policy-making

The European Union has a history of structuring urban planning, and existing regional urban development plans already address many aspects pertaining to cities on water, such as those on the circular economy, energy transition, housing and sustainable land use. Many outlined requirements, such as the efficient use of solar and waterpower systems, effective energy storage systems and zero pollution policies, are also part of the European Commission’s sustainability goals, namely in the European Green Deal. Furthermore, the European Bauhaus aims to foster sustainable living spaces whilst anticipating future living needs.

Many ‘smart cities’ are located at the coast and, therefore, potentially future cities on water. Anticipatory policy-making could start by integrating current ‘smart-city’-related policies in the projection of future-oriented living models, as well as assessing global needs and fostering international cooperation on worldwide issues. The Netherlands currently take a leading role, with decades-long experience in dealing with challenges posed by cities on and by water.

Legislation will also need to address fundamental housing issues, such as mortgage and financial classification laws. Clear legislation will be instrumental to ensuring future equal access to living spaces on water. The legal status of floating cities is a difficult challenge that requires revisiting long-established international agreements. Who owns cities on water might be one of the most relevant questions in the 21st century. Through its marine science expertise, strategically relevant industries and diplomatic relationships, the EU currently takes a leading international role. As it shares its marine environment, trade, security challenges and opportunities with global partners, the long-term success of the EU’s ocean governance will depend largely upon global action and collaboration.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘What if we built cities on water?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Listen to policy podcast ‘What if we built cities on water?’ on YouTube.

Written by Vasco Guedes Ferreira with Tobias Hoffmann.

A conference entitled ‘From a European to a global green’ held on 12 May 2022, organised jointly by the European Parliament’s Panel for the Future of Science and Technology (STOA) and the Japan-based Science and Technology in Society forum focused on the transition to green energy in the European Union and the wider world.

The conference aimed to open a constructive exchange of views between leading experts on cooperation opportunities in science and technology in the EU, Japan and the rest of the world, which supports the leveraging of the ‘European Green Deal’ to achieve a ‘Global Green Deal’.

In his opening speech, STOA Chair Christian Ehler (EPP, Germany) highlighted that such discussions at the global level are vital to progress on ‘green’ ambitions, noting that ‘We have to “light the torch & carry it forward” like at the Olympics’. Chairman of the STS forum, Professor Hiroshi Komiyama agreed, responding ‘So all of us take action to reach a bright future, move in the right direction and transform society’.

The first panel focused on ‘Green, secure and affordable energy for Europe’ and promoted a debate on the energy dimension of the European Green Deal. Views and statements from the European Commission and the research and business communities on the implementation challenges were debated. President of the European Research Council (ERC), Maria Leptin stressed the important role of curiosity-driven research. She explained that, in her view, research unconstrained by policy priorities needs to be part of any programme and noted that ERC-funded research projects contribute to achieving the EU Green Deal’s ambitions. Panellists discussed possibilities as to how the EU could accelerate the implementation of energy and climate policies, as well as debating the link with energy security and the reduction of energy imports. Panellists highlighted the role of science and technology in ensuring a fair and inclusive clean energy transition, including the investigation of hydrogen technologies. Panellist and President of the German Leibniz Association, Matthias Kleiner emphasised the need for more renewable energy, transnational collaboration and fundamental research to achieve these goals.

The second panel focused on ‘The path to a Global Green Deal’, with the aim of exploring how international cooperation on science and technology could use the European Green Deal to trigger a global green transformation. Questions and discussions focused on how like-minded partners from around the world could work together towards achieving a more sustainable world. The panel promoted the need for dialogue between industry, society and policy-makers from Japan and elsewhere, and developed a shared vision of the challenges, but also potential science and technology breakthroughs. Further discussions also focused on how different approaches from various regions of the world could be brought together to boost shared knowledge

Closing the event, European Parliament Vice-President Eva Kaili emphasised the EU’s commitment to accelerate its efforts in implementing the European Green Deal, which should contribute to ensuring Europe’s energy independence. She also highlighted that STOA is working on a complete analysis of the current situation, including the development of a preparedness plan for Europe, which addresses food, energy and technological security. She invited the STS forum to continue its cooperation with the EU aiming for a more sustainable world that could ultimately contribute to greater geopolitical stability.

The full recording of the event is available here. Your opinion counts for us. To let us know what you think, get in touch via stoa@europarl.europa.eu.

Written by Philip Boucher.

A recently published Panel for the Future of Science and Technology (STOA) study identifies and examines sources of divergence in the obligations facing public and private sector actors when applying artificial intelligence in the draft artificial intelligence act. It focuses in particular upon artificial intelligence (AI) that is designed to manipulate people, social scoring and biometric identification and develops a range of policy options.

Recent reports have examined the use of AI in a range of public-sector activities, in particular for improving the efficiency and quality of public services and citizen engagement. However, concerns have also been identified regarding the use of AI in some specific public-sector domains such as law enforcement. The spectre of ‘social scoring’ and ’emotion recognition’ applications has raised substantial discussion in Europe.

The proposed artificial intelligence act (AIA) places restrictions on how certain public-sector actors may use specific AI applications, most notably on the use of real-time biometric identification for law enforcement purposes, and the use of ‘social scoring’ applications by public authorities. For example, its Article 5 would prohibit:

‘the placing on the market, putting into service or use of AI systems by public authorities or on their behalf for the evaluation or classification of the trustworthiness of natural persons over a certain period of time based on their social behaviour or known or predicted personal or personality characteristics, with the social score leading to either or both of the following:

(i) detrimental or unfavourable treatment of certain natural persons or whole groups thereof in social contexts which are unrelated to the contexts in which the data was originally generated or collected;

(ii) detrimental or unfavourable treatment of certain natural persons or whole groups thereof that is unjustified or disproportionate to their social behaviour or its gravity’

As well as:

‘the use of “real-time” remote biometric identification systems in publicly accessible spaces for the purpose of law enforcement’

Other elements of the proposed AI act would also target public authorities. For example, the following AI applications are defined in Annex III as ‘high risk’ (in the context of migration, asylum and border-control management) and would therefore be subject to stricter market controls:

‘AI systems intended to be used by competent public authorities as polygraphs and similar tools or to detect the emotional state of a natural person’.

By placing obligations specifically upon certain state actors, these articles introduce divergences in the obligations facing public and private sector actors when applying AI. These may raise further questions about whether private sector actors should be able to make use of real-time biometric identification, social scoring and emotion recognition techniques.

The prohibition of ‘real-time’ remote biometric identification systems for law enforcement purposes has been subject to substantial debate in the European Parliament and beyond. Some have called for restrictions on these applications to apply to all actors, and others for the restrictions on state actors to be relaxed, a debate that continues in the negotiations on the draft AIA.

STOA has published a study that identifies and examines these sources of divergence in the obligations facing public and private sector actors when applying AI in the draft AIA. It focuses in particular upon manipulative AI, social scoring and biometric identification and develops a range of policy options in response to the challenges identified.

The study finds that both public and private sector applications of AI could present risks of direct or indirect harms, and that there is a degree of convergence in these risks. They observe that the divergences amount to treating similar AI applications differently depending on the actors that deploy them, while noting that the risk levels associated with these uses do not differ substantially, and exhibit similar degrees of power asymmetry with regards to individuals.

In the final stage of the study, the authors identified three broad policy options. To address incoherence in risk assessments and introduce explicit risk criteria, to consider strengthening information and disclosure obligations with withdrawal rights, and to consider non-linear modes of governing and co-regulation strategies. The full set of policy options are set out in greater detail in the accompanying STOA Options Brief.

Read the full report and STOA options brief to find out more. The study was presented by its authors to the STOA Panel at its meeting on 10 March 2022.

Your opinion counts for us. To let us know what you think, get in touch via stoa@europarl.europa.eu.

Written by Philip Boucher.

A recently published Panel for the Future of Science and Technology (STOA) study examines the use of artificial intelligence in workplace management systems. It explores the deployment and impacts of these technologies in the context of EU law before setting out a range of policy options for several legislative files.

As artificial intelligence (AI) spreads into workplaces, workers and employers are increasingly confronted with applications and software that affect labour relations. While AI systems could be introduced with the explicit aim of improving working conditions, this cannot be expected in general and evidence suggests that it may be the exception. In this context, a new STOA study has been published which examines the use of AI technologies in workplace management in the context of European Union (EU) law.

AI will become prominent in the workplace – Over time, many forms of software, both industry-specific and generalist, will acquire AI functionalities that will impact working conditions. AI is likely to become a prominent feature in many people’s jobs, although applications with particularly far-reaching effects will become prominent in some industries more quickly than others.

Introducing and operating AI at work poses challenges for businesses – Companies will have to reflect carefully on how they can incorporate AI into their business structure to obtain the best results. Many of the best tools will likely be expensive, require additional material and personnel, or demand adjustments to companies’ work organisation.

The functionality and utility of many forms of AI at work remain in doubt – Many of the AI tools currently deployed remain untested, and there are reasons to adopt a cautious and critical attitude towards several applications. Despite some promise for the world of work, AI is not a ‘silver bullet’ solution and requires effort to be implemented successfully without producing excessive adverse effects that could be highly detrimental to workers.

Businesses that lead in developing AI technologies will set the direction that other employers follow – Many employers still lack the hardware, data, staff, etc., required to advance on AI workplace management systems. However, some businesses at the forefront of this technology are already well ahead, setting out the direction that many other employers might follow.

AI has evident impact on working conditions – AI will, among other things, bolster the ‘datafication’ of work, making data protection and privacy rights all the more important. AI may also make work more precarious, increase businesses’ surveillance capabilities, and, in some instances, frustrate trade union activities. Despite some promising uses of AI in occupational safety and health (OSH) and non-discrimination, these technologies also present some threats in these areas. However, with some adjustment, much of the existing regulation can continue to function and steer the implementation of future AI at work in a desirable direction.

Regulatory adjustment will be required in several fields of law – By and large, across multiple areas of labour and employment legislation, AI can be governed if the rules are adequately adapted to the challenges it poses. However, without the necessary regulatory changes and investment in effective enforcement mechanisms in several areas, AI could spiral out of control.

The study, and its accompanying STOA options brief set out a range of policy options for the proposed artificial intelligence act (AIA) and EU directive on platform work, as well as the General Data Protection Regulation, anti-discrimination laws, OSH acquis, the Working Time, Fixed-Term Work, and Transparent and Predictable Working Conditions Directives, and instruments governing workers’ information and consultation.

Read the full report and STOA options brief to find out more. The study was presented by its authors to the STOA Panel at its meeting on 5 May 2022.

Your opinion counts for us. To let us know what you think, get in touch via stoa@europarl.europa.eu.

Citizens often send messages to the President of the European Parliament (or to the institution’s public portal) expressing their views on current issues and/or requesting action from the Parliament. The Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (AskEP) within the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) looks into these issues and replies to the messages, which may sometimes be identical as part of wider public campaigns.

The President of the European Parliament has recently received a large number of messages calling on the EU to recognise Georgia’s progress towards accession. Citizens first began to write to the President on this subject in May 2022. In February 2022, in a non-binding resolution, the European Parliament underlined that Georgia could start its accession process to the EU provided that it guarantees democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities.  The European Parliament also called for the EU and its Member States to recognise Georgia’s European perspective. 

Please find below the main points of the reply sent to citizens who took the time to write to the President of the European Parliament on this matter.

Main points made in the reply

When asked about Georgia obtaining candidate status to join the EU at a press point with NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg in the European Parliament on 28 April 2022, President Metsola stated: ‘This Parliament has always welcomed any country that looks to Europe as its home, that that should be the step that is taken. […] We are in constant contact with our Georgian partners and also representatives of the Georgian parliament in order to make sure that when that step happens, that you mentioned, we are ready to make our commitment and this parliament has never shied away from it.’ (Transcript)

On 17 February 2022, just before Russia’s most recent aggression against Ukraine began, the European Parliament adopted a non-binding resolution on the annual report on the implementation of the EU’s common foreign and security policy. In this resolution, the European Parliament underlines that Georgia (and Ukraine) could start their accession process to the EU provided that they guarantee democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities – known as the ‘Copenhagen criteria‘.

Furthermore, the European Parliament resolution calls for the EU and its Member States to recognise Georgia’s (and Ukraine’s) European perspective, which is considered vitally important for the countries’ security and stability, as well as a driver for their continued implementation of internal reforms. 

Previous debate and resolution

On 9 March 2021, the European Parliament held a plenary debate in Brussels on the current political situation in Georgia (part 1, (video) part 2 (video) and part 3 (video)).

The European Parliament had previously adopted a non-binding resolution, on 16 September 2020, on the implementation of the EU Association Agreement with Georgia. The Parliament welcomed the continued deepening of EU-Georgia relations and the firm support that Georgia’s chosen path of European and Euro-Atlantic integration enjoys across the political spectrum and in European society. Parliament also recalled that enhanced cooperation and EU assistance are based on the ‘more for more’ principle and are conditional on continued reform progress on, in particular, democracy and the rule of law, including checks and balances in the institutions, independence of the judiciary and electoral reform.

Accession to the EU

As to Georgia’s request for accession to the EU, the European Parliament’s formal decision-making role is limited. The European Parliament must give its consent (approve or reject but not amend) to any new accession to the EU. The decision to open membership negotiations has to be taken by the EU governments unanimously. More information on EU enlargement and the European Parliament’s role is available in this EP Factsheet. 

Finally, the European Parliament has a Delegation for relations with the South Caucasus (DSCA) where Members of the European Parliament regularly discuss Georgia-EU relations with Members of Parliament from Georgia.

Written by Jaan Soone.

On 14 July 2021, the European Commission presented the fit for 55 package – including a number of proposals to help cut emissions from transport. The package includes a proposal to increase production and use of sustainable aviation fuels (SAF), also known as the ReFuelEU Aviation initiative. In this proposal, the Commission puts forward obligations on fuel suppliers to distribute SAF when supplying fuel at EU airports, in order to enhance SAF uptake by airlines and so help reduce emissions from aviation. The Commission also wants to ensure that jet fuel uptake does not go beyond what is needed for safe operation of flights, to prevent additional emissions related to extra weight of aeroplanes carrying excessive amounts of fuel. This, in conjunction with the SAF supply obligation, is intended to ensure that all flights departing from larger EU airports carry a minimum amount of SAF. 

In the European Parliament, the Committee on Transport and Tourism (TRAN) is responsible for the file. In his draft report, the rapporteur Søren Gade (Renew Europe, Denmark) has proposed several changes to the Commission’s approach.

The TRAN committee draft report aims, inter alia, to provide aircraft operators and fuel suppliers with more flexibility to arrange SAF distribution, initially extending the transition period. Moreover, it suggests widening the rules’ scope to encompass more airports; wants to encourage investment in electric and hydrogen propulsion technology; and calls for the development of an environmental labelling scheme to further encourage SAF use.

The vote in the TRAN committee is tentatively scheduled for June 2022.

Read the complete briefing on ‘ReFuelEU Aviation initiative: Summary of the Commission proposal and the Parliament’s draft committee report‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Types of SAF and feedstocks as proposed by the European Commission Minimum share of SAF to be supplied according to the Commission proposal

Citizens often send messages to the President of the European Parliament (or to the institution’s public portal) expressing their views on current issues and/or requesting action from the Parliament. The Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (AskEP) within the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) looks into these issues and replies to the messages, which may sometimes be identical as part of wider public campaigns.

The President of the European Parliament has recently received a large number of messages calling on her to defend pro-life positions, in particular following a suggestion by French President Emmanuel Macron to include the right to abortion in the European Charter of Fundamental Rights. Citizens first began to write to the President on this subject in May 2022. In the past, the European Parliament has called on EU countries to safeguard individuals’ rights to make their own informed choices, while recognising that the EU has no direct powers to deal with sexual and reproductive health and rights in EU countries. President Metsola has indicated that she would defend Parliament’s position on this topic.

Please find below the main points of the reply sent to citizens who took the time to write to the President of the European Parliament on this matter (in English).

Main points made in the reply in English

During a press conference on 18 January 2022, President Metsola declared in relation to abortion ‘the positions of this House will be mine and I will promote them’.

On 24 June 2021, the European Parliament adopted a non-binding resolution on sexual and reproductive health and rights in the European Union. In this resolution, the European Parliament pointed out that the EU has no direct powers to deal with sexual and reproductive health and rights in EU countries.

However, it called on EU countries to safeguard individuals’ rights to make their own informed choices in this area, to guarantee the rights to bodily integrity and personal autonomy, equality and non-discrimination, and to give people the means to exercise those rights. Parliament also urged EU countries to remove all legal, political, financial or other barriers that deny persons full access to sexual and reproductive health and rights. Regarding your comments on French President Emmanuel Macron’s suggestion, we would like to highlight that modifying the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights requires the approval of all 27 EU countries.

Written by Suzana Elena Anghel.

On 30 and 31 May 2022, EU Heads of State or Government will meet for the fourth time since the outbreak of Russia’s war on Ukraine, to discuss developments in and support for the invaded country. Three other inter-connected topics – security and defence, energy and food security – will also be on the agenda. EU leaders are expected to take stock of the defence investment gaps analysis presented by the European Commission and the High Representative/Vice President of the Commission (HR/VP), Josep Borrell, and to give further guidelines. Their debate on energy could be a heated one as Member States agree on the main principle – cutting off the EU’s dependency on Russian fossil fuels – but disagree on the method and pace. With respect to food security, EU leaders are expected to consider the disruptive impact of Russia’s war on Ukraine on food supply chains and on prices in the EU and its neighbourhood.

Background

On 10-11 March 2022 in Versailles, the French President, Emmanuel Macron, announced that the EU leaders would meet in the course of May 2022 to follow up on their Versailles agenda. As is traditionally the case, the meeting will open with an address by the President of the European Parliament, Roberta Metsola. Subsequently, the President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelensky, will again join the meeting by video-link. In preparation for the special meeting of 30-31 May, for which conclusions are due to be issued, the President of the European Council, Charles Michel, met with several of his colleagues, including Emmanuel Macron and the Polish Prime Minister, Mateusz Morawiecki. Such bilateral meetings allow President Michel ‘to prepare the ground’ and work towards building consensus.  

European Council meeting Russia’s war on Ukraine

This meeting of EU Heads of State or Government will be the fourth since the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The leaders are expected to reaffirm their solidarity, support and assistance to Ukraine and its people, to support Ukraine’s territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders, and to call, once again, on Russia to comply with international law and cease hostilities. Enlargement will most probably not be discussed, as the topic is expected to come up for discussion at their meeting of 23-24 June 2022. The EU leaders have constantly expressed their support to Ukraine’s European aspirations and choice, a key political message, which is much anticipated today given rising sensitivities in Kyiv following President Macron’s proposal of a ‘European political community’. Sanctions will be another unity-testing issue for the European Council, as several leaders have called for more bold action, including an ambitious ban on fossil fuels.

President Michel pointed to the global consequences of Russia’s war on Ukraine, stressing that it has led ‘to one of the biggest refugee crises since World War Two, to rising food and energy prices’. Visiting Moldova, he praised the efforts of frontline countries to cope with the influx of refugees. Visiting Odesa on Europe Day, he praised the Ukrainian people’s courage, telling them: ‘You are not alone. We stand with you’.

Security and defence

EU leaders are expected to give further guidelines for the deepening of European defence cooperation, based on the joint communication on the defence investment gaps analysis prepared, at their request, by the European Commission and the HR/VP. The analysis stresses the negative effect of ‘years of defence underspending, which has led to an accumulation of gaps and shortfalls in the collective military inventories as well as reduced industrial production capacity’. It distinguishes between short-term actions, including replenishing, replacing and reinforcing capabilities, and medium- to long-term action, which requires the development of the next generation of air, land and maritime weaponry as well as of ‘space-based earth observation and critical enables’, which would make the EU fit to address, in cooperation with partners in NATO, growing multifaceted threats. It also praises the decisions of EU Member States to increase defence spending and calls for a coordinated approach to avoid repeating ‘past mistakes’, including duplication and waste. Several countries, including Germany, Lithuania and Poland have announced an increase in their defence spending, up to or beyond 2 % of GDP.

A new ‘short-term EU instrument to reinforce defence industrial capacities through joint procurement’, benefiting from EU financial support by up to €500 million from 2022 to 2024, could be introduced, and would require the speedy approval of the co-legislators. Furthermore, the European Defence Fund, currently allocated €8 billion under the 2021-2027 Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), could have its budget strengthened at the forthcoming mid-term review of the MFF. When addressing the informal meeting of EU leaders in Versailles, President Metsola stressed that the EU ‘must go beyond the European Defence Fund and make the EU budget work for our security and defence policy whenever it adds value’.

The Commission and the HR/VP have invited the European Council to endorse the recommendations put forward in the defence investment gaps analysis. It remains to be seen how the European Council will proceed. Faced with a similar request in 2019 regarding a joint communication on EU-China relations, EU leaders decided to choose which recommendations they wished to endorse.

Energy

EU leaders have committed to phasing out the Union’s dependence on Russian fossil fuels, and tasked the Commission with presenting an ambitious plan by May 2022. In its RePower EU plan the Commission has put forward several actions, including energy saving, supply diversification, and means to accelerate Europe’s clean energy transition, as well as ways to combine energy infrastructure investments and reforms. The plan gives a glimpse of the investments required to enable the EU to end its dependency on Russian fossil fuels, but fails to confirm a date by which the Union would completely phase out Russian fossil fuels. At the Versailles summit, the Commission President, Ursula von der Leyen, indicated 2027 as target date.

The energy debate is likely once again to be heated, as the degree of dependency on Russian fossil fuels differs greatly across Member States (see Figure 1). Lithuania, which has built the necessary infrastructure in recent years, announced it is now free of Russian gas imports. Other Member States, including Estonia, will stop Russian gas imports by the end of 2022. Certain EU countries, such as Hungary, continue to be highly dependent on Russian gas and oil imports, and have thus far opposed a ban on Russian oil imports.

Figure 1: EU imports of natural gas and crude oil from Russia (share of total imports, 2019) Food security

Russia’s war on Ukraine is disrupting global food markets, with the two countries being the main exporters of cereals, and Ukraine also dominating sunflower oil exports. EU leaders included food security in their Versailles agenda and considered the topic at their meeting of 24-25 March 2022, focusing on food affordability and security. The former is of direct interest to the EU, as global market prices will continue to rise affecting EU consumers’ purchasing ability. The latter poses a broader security concern in the EU’s neighbourhood, which could experience further unrest as a result of supply chain disruption.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Outlook for the special European Council meeting of 30-31 May 2022‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marketa Pape.

Despite a ‘bourgeois’ family background, which was a disqualification in communist-led Czechoslovakia, Václav Havel rapidly became an internationally acclaimed playwright. However, his unequivocally proclaimed ethical principles soon put him at odds with the communist regime, resulting in several prison sentences. Havel nevertheless held fast to his belief that moral integrity was a question of necessity, not choice, and attempted to live up to this ideal.

The 1989 collapse of the regime made Havel a hero and, shortly after, an unlikely President. During his years in office, he managed to drive his country through the challenges of moving to a free market democracy, while maintaining his personal moral convictions and tirelessly advocating for larger issues of human rights, peace and democracy, underpinned by an active civil society.

While Havel and his collaborators recast the foundations of today’s Czech and Slovak democracies, his achievements in foreign policy have perhaps been even more important. Reminding Western countries of the dangers of a Europe that continued to be divided even after the removal of the Iron Curtain, Havel was instrumental in anchoring the new Czech Republic in western Europe, through its membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU). He both recognised and emphasised the importance of closer European cooperation based on shared values, which for Havel constituted the core of relations among European countries. A firm advocate of the Euro-Atlantic alliance, he supported the United States of America, even on occasions when some other western European countries were reluctant to do so.

With his political writings reaching far beyond the circumstances in which they were written, Havel is considered one of the most important intellectuals of the 20th century. He has received numerous honours and awards. One of the European Parliament’s buildings in Strasbourg has borne Václav Havel’s name since 2017.

Read this briefing on ‘Václav Havel: Advocate of an undivided Europe‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clément Evroux (1st edition).

In the context of the twin digital and ecological transition, satellite communication is becoming a strategic asset for governments and civil society alike. Complementary to terrestrial networks, it can contribute to seamless digital communication, even when such networks are absent or disrupted. It builds on technological advances to ensure both low latency and global coverage, and the deployment of other emerging technologies such as quantum-based cybersecurity.

Today, the EU does not have the dedicated infrastructure (including space and ground segments) to offer satellite communication services to governments, the economy, and civil society. Several EU global partners and competitors are investing in parallel in such capabilities.

On 15 February 2022, the European Commission presented a proposal to improve the resilience of EU communications services by developing and operating multi-orbital connectivity infrastructure (with both space and ground segments) based on a public-partnership model. Governmental services would be operational from 2025, and private services at a later stage.

In the European Parliament, the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE) is responsible for the file; rapporteur is Christophe Grudler (Renew Europe, France). In the Council, work is ongoing in the working party on space.

Versions

• May 2022: EU secure connectivity programme: Building a multi-orbital satellite constellation (1st edition)

Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the Union Secure Connectivity Programme for the period 2023-2027 Committee responsible:Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE)COM(2022) 57
15.2.2022Rapporteur:Christophe Grudler (Renew, France)2022/0039(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Massimiliano Salini (EPP, Italy)
Ivo Hristov (S&D, Bulgaria)
Niklas Nienass (Greens/EFA, Germany)
Matteo Adinolfi (ID, Italy)
Evžen Tošenovský (ECR, Czechia)Ordinary legislative
procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council
on equal footing –
formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Publication of draft report

Written by Sebastian Clapp.

In a united response to Russia’s war on Ukraine, which started on 24 February 2022, EU Member States agreed to supply Ukraine with military equipment, including equipment designed to deliver lethal force. As of 16 May, Member States had agreed to make available €1.5 billion through the European Peace Facility (EPF) to fund assistance measures aimed at supporting the capabilities and resilience of the Ukrainian armed forces. A further €500 million in assistance was proposed on 13 May 2022 and is likely to be adopted very soon, bringing the amount up to €2 billion. Accordingly, the EPF will pay for some of the equipment Member States have provided or will provide to Ukraine. This is a first in the EU’s history, which has never jointly financed the provision of weapons to a third country.

Weapons and military aid pledged or delivered bilaterally by EU Member States: the issue of whether to supply Ukraine with heavy weapons (e.g. tanks) or light weapons (e.g. machine guns) or no weapons at all has sparked fierce debates in capitals across Europe. While countries such as Czechia, Poland and Slovenia have reportedly delivered heavy weaponry including T-72 tanks, others such as Austria and Ireland have decided to provide exclusively non-lethal equipment, in line with their policies of neutrality. So far, only Hungary, Malta and Cyprus have decided not to supply Ukraine with any military equipment at all. In addition to military equipment, many Member States have provided significant military aid. The graphic (Figure 1) and table (Annex I) below seek to provide an overview of the weapons and military aid (other than weapons deliveries) pledged or delivered bilaterally to Ukraine by Member States.

In order to coordinate supply and demand, the EU Military Staff within the European External Action Service have set up a clearing house mechanism, which coordinates supply and demand. Ukraine submits requests to this clearing house for the equipment needed. The requests are then checked, validated and matched with supply. Subsequently, each Member State delivers the available equipment and arms individually. These are predominantly taken from existing stocks, due to the urgent nature of the deliveries. Some of the military equipment that EU Member States have delivered to Ukraine may be eligible for reimbursement through the European Peace Facility – a new off-budget fund of €5.69 billion in current prices, operational since 1 July 2021. However, the process of validating Member States’ requests for reimbursement has not yet been finalised. Therefore, for the time being, it is not possible to establish the extent to which Member States will be reimbursed – through the EPF – for the military equipment/weapons they have delivered to Ukraine. Even if only some weapons will be reimbursed, the fact that they will be is groundbreaking, as it is the first time ever that the EU is financing the provision of weapons to a third country from a joint fund. According to EU High Representative Josep Borrell, this represents the breaking of a taboo.

On 1 March 2022, the European Parliament adopted a resolution calling for the EPF to be used to allocate significant additional funding to provide Ukraine with defensive military equipment and called for its immediate implementation. In a recent draft report, the Parliament noted that, on the follow-up of the adoption of the Strategic Compass, the EU must draw lessons from the use of the EPF in supporting Ukraine, increase its funding and build on the clearing house mechanism that was first implemented for Ukraine.

Disclaimer: The graphic (Figure I) and table (Annex I) below are non-exhaustive lists of weapons, non-lethal equipment and military aid delivered bilaterally to Ukraine by Member States, which have been compiled using exclusively open-source information. They do not in any way claim to represent a complete picture.

Figure 1: Weapons and military aid pledged and/or delivered bilaterally by EU Member States Member StateType of military equipment pledged or delivered to Ukraine Main source: Forum on the Arms Trade, if not specified otherwise AustriaNo weapons, but 10 000 helmets, fuel, protective equipmentBelgium200 anti-tank weapons, 5 000 automatic rifles/machine guns and fuelBulgariaNo weapons, but bullet proof vests, helmets and medical suppliesCroatiaRifles and machine guns, protective equipmentCzechiaT-72 tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, man-portable anti-aircraft weapons, 20 machine guns, 132 assault rifles, 70 submachine guns, 108 000 bullets, 4 000 mortars, 30 000 pistols, 7 000 assault rifles, 3 000 machine guns, sniper riflesCyprusNo weapons or military equipment, but medical suppliesDenmark2 700 anti-tank weapons, 300 Stinger missiles, protective vestsEstoniaJavelin anti-tank missiles, nine howitzers, €220 million military aidFinland2 500 assault rifles, 150 000 cartridges, 1 500 single-shot anti-tank weaponsFranceMILAN anti-tank guided missile systems, CAESAR artillery howitzers, plus unspecified defence equipmentGermany50 Gepard anti-aircraft tanks, 56 infantry fighting vehicles, 1 000 anti-tank weapons, 500 Stinger missiles, armoured howitzersGreecePortable rocket launchers, ammunition, Kalashnikov riflesHungaryNo weapons or military equipment, but medical suppliesIrelandNo weapons, but fuel, helmets, vests and medical suppliesItalyPending parliamentary approval – Stinger missiles, anti-tank weapons, heavy machine guns, light machine guns, counter-IED systemsLatviaStinger anti-aircraft missilesLithuaniaStinger anti-aircraft missiles and ammunitionLuxembourg100 Next Generation Light Anti-Tank Weapons, Jeep Wrangler 4×4 vehicles, non-lethal equipmentMaltaNo weapons or military equipment, but medical suppliesNetherlands200 Stinger missiles, 3 000 combat helmets, 2 000 fragmentation vests, 100 sniper rifles, ammunition, 400 rocket-propelled grenade launchersPoland200+ T-72 tanks, Piorun man-portable air defence weapons, pledges to supply ammunition, further air defence systems, light mortars, and reconnaissance dronesPortugalGrenades and ammunition, G3 automatic rifles, and other non-lethal equipmentRomaniaFuel, bulletproof vests, helmets, ammunition, military equipment and medical suppliesSlovakiaS-300 air defence systemSloveniaT-72 tanks (reported), undisclosed amount of Kalashnikov rifles, helmets and ammunitionSpain1 370 anti-tank grenade launchers, ammunition, light machine guns, medical supplies, helmets, flak jacketsSweden10 000 AT4 anti-tank weapons, helmets, and body shieldsANNEX I: Overview of type of military equipment pledged or delivered to Ukraine by Member States

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Russia’s war on Ukraine: Bilateral delivery of weapons and military aid to Ukraine‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marketa Pape (1st edition).

This initiative concerns proposed changes to the existing EU rules on the deployment of intelligent transport systems (ITS) in road transport.

The objective of the proposal is to expand the scope of the existing EU rules to cover new and emerging challenges and to make essential ITS services mandatory across the EU. The proposal seeks to resolve problems stemming from the lack of interoperability and continuity of the existing applications and services, but also from the low level of availability and sharing of the data supporting ITS services. Finally, it aims to ensure effective concertation and cooperation among stakeholders.

The European Commission put forward the proposal on 14 December 2021. Preparatory work in the Council is being handled by the Working Party on Transport – Intermodal Questions and Networks. At the European Parliament, the Committee on Transport and Tourism has taken the lead on the file.

Versions

• May 2022: Intelligent road transport systems (1st edition)

Proposal for a Directive amending Directive 2010/40/EU on the framework for the deployment of Intelligent Transport Systems in the field of road transport and for interfaces with other modes of transport Committee responsible:Committee on Transport and Tourism (TRAN)COM(2021) 813
14.12.2021Rapporteur:Rovana Plumb (S&D, Romania)2021/0419(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Jens Gieseke (EPP, Germany)
Izaskun Bilbao Barandica (Renew, Spain)
Alviina Alametsä (Greens/EFA, Finland)
Johan Van Overtveldt (ECR, Belgium)
Kateřina Konečná (The Left, Czechia)Ordinary legislative
procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council
on equal footing
– formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Publication of draft report