European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Maria Niestadt.

As a general-purpose technology, artificial intelligence (AI) has the potential to change our lives. It could bring many benefits, from increasing farming efficiency to helping to fight climate change and making transport safer, cleaner and more efficient. However, AI also generates a number of issues, such as opaque decision-making, discrimination, or intrusion into our private lives. To investigate these challenges and to analyse the impact of AI on the EU economy, the European Parliament decided in June 2020 to set up a special committee. The special committee on artificial intelligence in a digital age (AIDA) is expected to vote on its final report on 22 March 2022.

Special committee on artificial intelligence in a digital age

The European Parliament decided to set up a special committee on artificial intelligence in a digital age (AIDA) on 18 June 2020. Its 12-month mandate was to analyse the future impact of AI on the EU economy and its different sectors and its contribution to business value and economic growth, investigate the challenge of deploying AI, and analyse non-EU countries’ AI approach. The committee should submit an evaluation defining common EU medium and long-term objectives and the steps needed to reach them. The committee is chaired by Dragoş Tudorache (Renew Europe, Romania) and has 34 full Members.

The committee has exchanged views with the Commissioners responsible for internal market and digital affairs, and held hearings with experts, policy-makers, and business representatives. The hearings have explored (for example) AI’s potential in fighting climate change and cancer, as well as its use in agriculture and financial services. The AIDA committee has also held workshops on topics such as ‘AI and law enforcement’ and ‘AI and public administration’. The AIDA ‘working papers‘ summarise the key takeaways from these hearings, including the positions of political groups.

Report

The AIDA committee published a draft report (rapporteur: Axel Voss, EPP, Germany) on 2 November 2021, which outlined AI’s enormous potential to improve almost every area of our lives, from helping to combat pandemics and global hunger to improving healthcare. It could also significantly increase productivity, innovation, job creation and growth. According to the draft report, the EU should not regulate AI as a technology; but the type, intensity and timing of regulatory action should rather depend solely on the type of risk associated with a particular use of an AI system. The draft text warns that the EU is currently falling behind in the global tech race. If the EU wants to remain competitive, it needs to become an AI leader and set global standards. AI technologies also raise crucial ethical questions and fundamental rights concerns. Against this backdrop, the draft report addresses the opportunities and risks of AI in six specific areas: health, the EU Green Deal, external policy and security, competitiveness, democracy and the labour market.

During the 13 January 2022 debate on the 1 384 amendments tabled to the draft report, some Members stressed the risks of discrimination inherent in AI and emphasised the importance of also using private funding for AI development. Members from different political groups disagreed on the question whether the General Data Protection Regulation should be touched in the process of future regulation of AI. The AIDA committee is expected to vote on its final report on 22 March 2022, with Parliament then expected to consider the report in plenary in May 2022.

The AIDA report will complement other legislative and non-legislative initiatives in this area, such as the European Commission proposal for an EU regulatory framework on AI. As co-legislators, the European Parliament and the Council are currently discussing this proposal.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Investigation into the potential of artificial intelligence in the digital age‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clare Ferguson.

Meeting in plenary for the third time this month, Members are set to return to voting in person in the chamber for the first time since the onset of the coronavirus pandemic. A number of issues concerning new technologies are on the agenda, such as blockchain and roaming charges. Members are nevertheless most likely to focus on the subject of the Russian war on Ukraine, following a joint debate on the results of the recent European Council meeting in Versailles, and in preparation for the next meeting on 24‑25 March 2022. Members will also hear Council and European Commission statements on a possible EU action plan to ensure food security in light of the Russian invasion (agricultural products imported from Ukraine represent 4.6 % of all EU agri-food imports). The Council and Commission will also update Members on proposals to ensure a more affordable, secure and sustainable energy supply.

The Parliament has long stressed that corruption threatens democracy, fundamental rights and the rule of law, and undermines citizens’ trust in the EU and its institutions. The sanctions necessitated by Russia’s war on Ukraine have highlighted the presence of Russian oligarchs and oligarchic structures on EU territory. Denouncing the current situation, especially in certain countries where EU funding is sometimes diverted to such persons (and not just Russians), Parliament’s Budgetary Control (CONT) Committee has adopted a hard-hitting own-initiative report highlighting the need to protect EU funding against the risks of fraud and conflict of interest. On Wednesday, Members are expected to consider the committee’s motion for a resolution, which particularly condemns the use of EU agricultural funding for personal benefit, and warns against the threat to EU values of allowing oligarchs to gain control over the media and the judiciary.

Moldova has found itself on the frontline in Russia’s most recent aggression against its neighbours. The country has experienced Russian interference in its own democratic process in recent years, added to an economic downturn exacerbated by the pandemic. Moldova has nevertheless opened its borders to welcome large numbers of Ukrainian refugees. The country enjoys good political and economic relations with the EU, and signed association and free trade agreements with the bloc – Moldova’s largest trading partner – in 2014. The EU has provided €160 million in EU macro-financial assistance since 2017. Moldova has requested further assistance, and on Wednesday, Members are scheduled to consider a European Commission proposal (from before the outbreak of the war) starting to allocate €30 million in grants and up to €120 million in medium-term loans.

Parliament is always keen to encourage technological solutions that benefit citizens in their daily lives. On Wednesday, Members are expected to debate an agreement reached between the co-legislators on a pilot regime developing trading and transactions in crypto-assets – usually known as cryptocurrencies (such as bitcoin and ethereum). Parliament is in favour of encouraging crypto-assets, as long as they do not pose a risk to financial stability, transparency or market integrity, or permit legal loopholes. Parliament’s Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) therefore proposes to set stricter limits on trading with crypto-assets. The current proposal allows market capitalisation of less than €500 million in shares and issuance of up to €1 billion in bonds. Should Parliament decide to formally adopt the agreed text, it will go to Council for final approval.

Now that travel is getting back to normal, Members are scheduled to return to the issue of extending current EU legislation on roaming charges on Wednesday. In interinstitutional negotiations on the proposal to revise the rules to increase transparency and network quality, Parliament succeeded in capping the wholesale roaming charges at €2 per gigabyte from this year, with a progressive reduction to reach €1 in 2027. Once the Parliament and Council both formally adopt the provisional agreement reached between the co-legislators, citizens should be able to ‘roam like at home’ for a further 10 years.

• Pilot regime on distributed ledger technology market infrastructure
• Recast of the EU Roaming Regulation
• Macro-financial assistance to Moldova
• Protecting EU funds against oligarchic structures

Written by Suzana Anghel and Ralf Drachenberg.

On 24-25 March 2022, EU Heads of State or Government will meet for the third time in five weeks. In the presence of the United States President, Joe Biden, they will discuss developments in and support for Ukraine, in the context of the unprovoked Russian invasion of the country. Building on their Versailles Declaration of 10-11 March, EU leaders will take further steps aimed at strengthening European sovereignty in the field of security, defence and energy security. As regards security and defence, the European Council will endorse the EU Strategic Compass, call for its implementation, and give further guidelines for the deepening of European defence cooperation. With respect to energy, EU leaders will consider means to counter the current spike in energy prices, consider gas storage capacities and planning in view of the next winter and resume discussions on phasing out EU dependence on Russian fossil fuels. Furthermore, the European Council will take stock of coordination efforts in response to the Covid-19 pandemic, appraise the European Semester, and review initiatives designed to build a more robust economic base and reduce the EU’s strategic dependence in the most sensitive areas. Under external relations, items on the agenda will include the preparation of the forthcoming EU-China Summit and the political crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The European Council will be followed by a Euro Summit meeting on 25 March.

1. European Council agenda points

The indicative 2021-2022 Leaders’ Agenda, updated at the December 2021 European Council meeting, had outlined security and defence, economic recovery, the social agenda, the European Semester, and the single market and industrial policy as topics for the March European Council meeting. While security and defence, and the European Semester, were already on the provisional agenda, the war in the Ukraine and energy prices have been added as a result of current events.

The President of the European Council, Charles Michel, has prepared for this meeting by using his own ‘Michel method’, which involves video-conferences with small groups of four to six EU leaders ahead of the summit to prepare the ground. This approach provides Mr Michel with an opportunity to express his intentions as to the result he is seeking to obtain and to gain an insight into individual national leaders’ views on certain agenda points, thus reducing surprises at the meeting itself.

Charles Michel’s (first) term as European Council President comes to an end on 30 May 2022. Given that, since 2009, the (re-)election of the European Council President has taken place at the last formal European Council meeting before the end of the mandate, it can be expected that EU leaders will take a decision on the next European Council President. In line with tradition, for this agenda point, the Head of State or Government holding the rotating Presidency of the Council of the European Union, currently the President of France, Emmanuel Macron, will take the chair.

Having already attended two informal meetings of Heads of State or Government, this will be the first formal European Council meeting for Roberta Metsola, President of the European Parliament. Following Ms Metsola’s opening address, President Macron, again on behalf of the country holding the six-month rotating presidency, is expected to provide an overview of progress made in implementing previous European Council conclusions.

2. European Council meeting Russia’s invasion of Ukraine

EU leaders will again discuss Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine, this time in the presence of United States (US) President Joe Biden. They are expected to reaffirm transatlantic unity and stress solidarity with Ukraine. The discussions may also green light a fifth round of sanctions, including on oil and coal but probably not on gas. The European Council will most probably consider the deteriorating humanitarian situation in the country. This is a matter of grave concern for the international community, as over 3 million Ukrainians have fled the country in the three weeks since Russia’s invasion began. The leaders will also once more consider assistance for EU and non-EU frontline countries, which are facing an unrelenting influx of refugees. Furthermore, EU leaders will most probably reiterate their call to ensure the safety of Ukraine’s nuclear power plants, with support from the International Atomic Energy Agency. For the first time, EU leaders may consider Union support for reconstruction, which should go hand in hand with peace preparation efforts and could double the EU support offered to Ukraine under the European Peace Facility since the start of the war.

Three EU leaders, the Prime Ministers of Poland, Mateusz Morawiecki, Czechia, Petr Fiala, and Slovenia, Janez Janša, met with the President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelensky, in Kyiv on 15 March 2022. The visit, aimed at expressing EU support for Ukraine, its sovereignty and independence, was the first by Western leaders since Russia’s invasion began, and the other European Council members knew of it in advance. Petr Fiala emphasised that Ukraine was ‘also fighting for our lives’, while Mateusz Morawiecki stressed that a Europe that loses Ukraine ‘will no longer be Europe’ but ‘a defeated, humiliated and pathetic version of its former self’. At their meeting in Versailles, EU leaders recognised the ‘European aspirations and the European choice of Ukraine’, with public opinion polls showing clear European public condemnation of Russia’s invasion and support for Ukraine’s request for membership.

The Russian Federation was excluded from the Council of Europe – the pan-European organisation upholding human rights – by a decision of the organisation’s Committee of Ministers on 16 March. Russia had already initiated the procedure to leave in a pre-emptive attempt to avoid being excluded. Back in 2016, Russia withdrew from joining the International Criminal Court (ICC) at the time when the Court began investigating war crimes in South Ossetia following Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia. In March 2022, the ICC opened an investigation into ‘alleged crimes committed in the context of the situation in Ukraine since 21 November 2013’, which would allow it to investigate ‘war crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide committed on any part of the territory of Ukraine’.

In parallel, on 16 March 2022, in the Ukraine v.Russian Federation case, the International Court of Justice considered Ukraine’s request for an indication of provisional measures and ordered Russia ‘to suspend the military operations that it commenced on 24 February 2022 in the territory of Ukraine’. The Court reaffirmed the binding effect of its order, which creates ‘international legal obligations for any party to whom the provisional measures are addressed’.

Security and defence

Security and defence have been a rolling item on the agenda of the European Council for the past six months. EU leaders last discussed security and defence at their informal Versailles meeting, where they adopted a declaration and issued new strategic guidelines for the further development and deepening of European defence cooperation. At their spring meeting, the leaders are expected to endorse the Strategic Compass, which has recently been reviewed at their request, adding more robust language on the threat posed by Russia to European security in light of the war in Ukraine. The Strategic Compass, which was drafted with a view to providing a common perspective on the security threats and challenges facing the EU, is expected to lend further impetus to the EU’s bid to become a security and defence actor. The purpose is for the EU to be able to protect its citizens, to react quickly to crises and to deepen partnerships with like-minded partners, such as the United Nations and NATO.

The war in Ukraine raises more than ever the question of resources and how to allocate them efficiently. At Versailles, the European Parliament’s President, Roberta Metsola, stressed that the EU ‘must go beyond the European Defence Fund and make the EU budget work for our security and defence policy whenever it adds value’. A recent EPRS study pointed to ‘generally large average amounts of waste’ in current EU Member States’ spending; in the field of defence, this waste was cumulatively estimated at €32 billion for deployable troops, and €13 billion for procurement and research and development.

Energy security

Energy will feature on the agenda of the European Council for the fifth time since October 2021. EU leaders will again discuss energy prices and how best to reduce fossil fuel dependency, notably the phasing out of gas and oil imports from Russia. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen confirmed in Versailles that, by May 2022, the European Commission would present a plan to phase out fossil fuel dependency on Russia by 2027. Regarding the spike in energy prices, a first series of short-term measures had been taken in 2021. Given the worsening situation following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, EU leaders are expected to discuss further short- and medium-term measures to address energy prices and security of supply, such as the refilling of gas storage facilities across the continent. The European Commission is expected to publish a communication on this subject on 23 March, to provide input ahead of the European Council meeting.

A number of other initiatives will feed into the debate. Ahead of the Versailles summit, on 9 March, the Prime Minister of Greece, Kyriakos Mitsotakis, had addressed a letter to President von der Leyen, proposing a six-point plan to counter the ‘weaponisation’ of gas as a result of Russia’s war in Ukraine, including ‘targeted and temporary market intervention’ to avoid speculation. A ‘mini “Mediterranean summit”‘ held in Rome allowed Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain to articulate a common position on reforming the energy market. The mini-summit was part of a wider European tour the Prime Minister of Spain, Pedro Sanchez, undertook with the aim of building consensus ahead of the European Council meeting. 

A new phase in the Covid-19 pandemic

As the number of coronavirus-related deaths in the EU continues to fall, EU leaders may mention the importance of EU coordination on the removal of restrictions and on developing the vaccination campaign that has lessened the most severe effects of Covid-19. This may lead the European Council to reiterate the need to coordinate on future preparedness, namely on the ‘health union’ package.

The European Council will most likely welcome the decision authorising the opening of negotiations for an international agreement on pandemic prevention, preparedness and response. Charles Michel first proposed the idea in November 2020, and the European Council supported it at the time. EU leaders may reiterate their commitment to contributing to the global response to Covid‑19, both bilaterally and by ensuring access to vaccines through COVAX. This commitment has been repeated by the European Council in 10 of its meetings since the outbreak of the pandemic.

Economic issues

It has been a tradition that EU leaders use the March European Council meeting to discuss the European Semester – the framework for the coordination of economic policies across the EU – ever since its launch in 2011 in the context of the sovereign debt crisis. Implementation of the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RFF) – set up in 2020 in response to the economic consequences of the pandemic – is also now reviewed during the European Semester. EU Heads of State or Government are expected to endorse the annual sustainable growth survey (ASGS) and the draft Council recommendation on the economic policy of the euro area, also part of the 2022 European Semester exercise.

EU leaders will follow up on the objectives set out in the 2019-2024 Strategic Agenda, and firmly reiterated in the Versailles Declaration, aimed at building a more robust economic base and fostering investment. The focus will be on reducing the EU’s strategic dependence in the most sensitive areas: critical raw materials, semi-conductors, health, digital and food. The European Council is expected to call for the completion of the single market, in order for it to realise its full potential. The digital and services components should be top priority when it comes to removing the remaining unjustified barriers and administrative burdens, interconnecting ecosystems across Member States more effectively, and enforcing single market rules. EU leaders might also address the activities of the European Commission on the issue of food security.

External relations

EU leaders will most probably consider relations with China in preparation for the EU-China Summit on 1 April 2022. Two issues are likely to be central to the debate: China’s positioning over the war in Ukraine and the future of EU-China bilateral relations, including on trade and security. In 2021, the European Parliament froze its ratification of the EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) pending the lifting of sanctions imposed against ‘European individuals and entities, including five MEPs’.

EU leaders will also discuss the deterioration of the political situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Prior to the meeting, the High Representative/Vice-President of the European Commission (HR/VP), Josep Borrell, visited the country, stressing that its future and the future of the western Balkan region ‘lies in the European Union, as the best provider for peace and security’.

3. Euro Summit

On 25 March, EU leaders will convene for a Euro Summit meeting in inclusive format, in order to review progress on completing the banking union and the capital markets union, as indicated in the declaration issued at the last Euro Summit meeting, of 16 December 2021.

EU leaders are expected to consider the Commission’s communication of 2 March 2022 on ‘Fiscal policy guidance for 2023‘, as well as the statement of 14 March 2022 by the Eurogroup (i.e. the finance ministers of the Member States in the eurozone) on fiscal guidance for 2023. The Eurogroup President, Paschal Donohoe, expects a gradual evolution in fiscal policy, leading to a broadly neutral overall fiscal stance in 2023 for the euro area, but stressed that due to uncertainties and risks, the EU needed to remain agile and flexible in its policy response. Following the latest Eurogroup meeting, given the remaining availability of funds under Next Generation EU (NGEU) and the lack of agreement between Member States, it seems unlikely that EU leaders will return to the idea of creating new mutual bonds, along the lines of the NGEU pandemic recovery fund, to respond to the consequences of the war in Ukraine.

Read this briefing on ‘Outlook for the European Council meeting of 24-25 March 2022‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marketa Pape.

The EU aims at becoming a carbon neutral economy by 2050, an ambition outlined in the European Green Deal and enshrined in the EU Climate Law. To achieve climate neutrality, the EU transport sector has to cut its CO2 emissions by 90 %. This requirement contrasts with the fact that transport is the only sector in which greenhouse gas emissions have continued to grow in recent years, albeit with a short pause due to coronavirus-related restrictions on travel and movement.

In December 2020, the European Commission put forward a strategy outlining how it intends to transform the EU transport sector to align it with the European Green Deal, by making it green, digital and resilient. This sustainable and smart mobility strategy has become the blueprint for the Commission’s legislative and support activities. It contains 82 initiatives in 10 key areas, with specific milestones to be achieved by 2030 and 2050.

While the Commission is the key actor in preparing and proposing the legislation needed, the overall impact of this ‘green and digital fabric’ depends on when, and with what amendments, each legislative proposal gets passed into law by the European Parliament and the relevant ministers of EU Member States. And, crucially, how coherent the whole strategy remains.

Since the publication of the strategy just over a year ago, the Commission has progressed and put forward a number of legislative proposals. The EU co-legislators are discussing how the proposals should be amended and are getting ready to negotiate. The European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) tracks the progress of these legislative files with dedicated briefings, the most relevant of which are listed below.

In the July 2021 Fit for 55 package, several proposals target transport or modify some key related aspects, such as the energy needed. Here, the Commission proposes to ramp up the production of renewable energy, raising the target of energy from renewable sources from the current 32 % to 40 % by 2030, and to change the rules for energy taxation, replacing the volume-based approach to energy taxation with one based on energy content and environmental performance. For road transport, the Commission proposes to set stricter CO2 emission performance standards for new passenger cars and light commercial vehicles (vans) and allow only zero-emission vehicles from 2035. To support the roll-out of the necessary alternative fuels, a draft regulation on alternative fuels infrastructure proposes binding targets for electric vehicle charging points and hydrogen refuelling points, electric charging for stationary aircraft at airports and onshore power supply for ships at ports. Two specific sectoral proposals, on sustainable aviation fuels and on sustainable maritime fuels, focus on how to ensure sufficient quantities of cleaner fuels for airplanes and ships.

In terms of CO2 emissions, the Commission not only proposes to tighten the existing EU Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS), but also to extend it to maritime shipping and establish a separate, self-standing emissions trading system for fuel distribution for road transport and buildings. Both these sectors, however, remain included in the Effort Sharing Regulation, so that national policies would continue to support their decarbonisation. Reviewed rules for aviation are dealt with separately, with a proposal to end allowances from 2027 and integrate the global market-based Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation (CORSIA), applicable to international flights, into the revised ETS.

These ‘Fit for 55’ proposals are interlinked and also need to be understood against the background of the EU’s efforts to determine which investment counts as green. While the basic ‘taxonomy’ legal act is already in force, the process of establishing detailed criteria on how to classify activities as ‘green’ is ongoing. For transport, the key issue is whether natural gas and nuclear power will be regarded as sustainable or not.

The ‘Fit for 55’ package also includes a proposed new social climate fund (SCF), meant to help vulnerable households, micro-businesses and transport users meet the costs of the green energy transition in the buildings and road transport sector.

While negotiations on these files are expected to start in 2022, the Commission is already preparing further proposals. It will debate the way forward with transport experts at the 7th annual Future of transport conference on 23 March 2022, together with the most pressing issues facing the European transport sector, such as supply chain disruptions and digital transformation and road safety.

Written by Rosamund Shreeves.

Even – or especially – in complex, emergency situations, a gender perspective is vital in order to take into account the specific needs of women and men and the different risks to which they are exposed. Humanitarian actors are calling for a gender-sensitive response to the Ukraine crisis, to help tackle barriers to accessing vital services, address increased risks of gender-based violence and facilitate the reception and integration of refugees.

The scale of humanitarian need

After eight years of armed conflict in eastern Ukraine, humanitarian needs were already high. Before Russia launched its full-scale invasion on 24 February, the United Nations (UN) had already projected that 2.9 million Ukrainians – 54 % of whom were women and children – would need humanitarian assistance in 2022. The war has now caused an escalating humanitarian crisis. Shelling and air strikes on residential areas are resulting in increasing civilian deaths and severe damage to homes, hospitals, schools, and water and power supplies. The humanitarian situation is particularly desperate in areas besieged by Russian forces, with dwindling access to food and medicines and no or few safe avenues for aid to get in or people to get out. Two weeks into the conflict, an estimated 12.65 million people were stranded in affected areas, or unable or unwilling to leave due to military action. Around 1.85 million people were already internally displaced within Ukraine, a figure that could rise to 6.7 million. In the space of only three weeks, 3 million people have fled to neighbouring states (Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, Moldova, Belarus and Russia) and over 360 000 have moved on to other European countries. This complex and fast-moving situation requires a vast humanitarian response, spanning action to meet the immediate needs of those under fire and on the move, through to support for refugees settling in host communities. The UN also warns that a prolonged conflict could have a ripple effect way beyond Ukraine, including a risk of food insecurity in some countries that are heavily reliant on its wheat exports.

Why a gender-sensitive response matters

Since conflicts and humanitarian crises can affect women, men, girls and boys very differently, adopting a gender perspective from the outset ensures that their specific needs and the risks and vulnerabilities they are exposed to are taken into account, and that they are equally able to shape decisions about the support they need. Initial rapid gender analysis and monitoring can serve to identify some of the issues already emerging in relation to the conflict in Ukraine and urgent areas for action:

• Access to critical services and humanitarian support: Sex-disaggregated and intersectional data are vital to identify specific protection needs and ensure that humanitarian assistance is effective. Monitoring of humanitarian needs across Ukraine shows that there is a lack of shelter spaces for families and single sex spaces for women. It also identifies children, women, persons with disabilities and/or serious medical conditions, older people and minorities as the groups facing the greatest obstacles to accessing transport, food, medicine and emergency health care.
• Maintaining sexual and reproductive health services and maternity care: In times of war and forced displacement, interruptions to care can put women and girls at greater risk of unintended pregnancy, untreated infections and unsafe delivery. The UN Population Fund reports that at the start of the current crisis, there were around 265 000 pregnant women in Ukraine, some 80 000 of whom were expected to deliver over the next three months. Women are giving birth in risky conditions and at least one maternity hospital has been struck. Safeguarding access to these services is therefore a matter of urgency.
• Addressing sexual violence: Armed conflict increases the risk of sexual violence, including rape, sexual slavery and forced prostitution, while also reducing access to specialised support for survivors and potentially creating a climate of impunity. The conflict in eastern Ukraine highlights the particular risks faced by displaced women and girls and the unmet need for support and redress. In the current context, there are calls for the European Union to push for rape to be judged as a war crime and to establish mechanisms to monitor women’s fundamental rights during and after the conflict.
• Protection from sexual exploitation and trafficking: Women and children make up the overwhelming majority of those fleeing Ukraine. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) stresses that some children are unaccompanied and that many women have been separated from partners and support networks and are in a situation of financial insecurity. This puts both groups at risk of sexual exploitation and trafficking, and there are reports that this is already happening. Therefore, while welcoming the outpouring of support from private individuals offering transport and accommodation, associations working on the ground are calling for coordinated action to inform, register and accompany women and girls and vet potential hosts. Poorer men not wishing to be conscripted may also be vulnerable to migrant smugglers.

Since it is mainly women and girls who are seeking refuge, countries hosting refugees from Ukraine will need to pay particular attention to their specific reception and integration needs. Humanitarian actors and stakeholders are also stressing the need for safe and regular pathways to safety for all women and girls, irrespective of their nationality, ethnicity and religion, including for stateless persons and Roma with no documentation to prove their residence status. There are calls for women’s organisations to be involved in shaping the humanitarian response and for meaningful participation of women in peace negotiations, in line with UN Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security, to ensure that their specific situations and needs are taken into account and to achieve more sustainable outcomes.

EU commitments and action

The EU recognises that crises are not gender neutral, and that EU humanitarian assistance must be sensitive to gender and age if it is to be effective and reach those most in need. It has committed to including a gender dimension in all its humanitarian aid, by tracking how each action integrates gender and age and ensuring that humanitarian responses include strategies for protecting against sexual and gender-based violence, ensuring access to reproductive and sexual healthcare services and promoting women’s participation.

The EU is coordinating deliveries of material assistance to Ukraine and neighbouring countries. Other measures adopted so far to help those fleeing Russian aggression include guidelines on simplifying border controls for vulnerable groups and immediate temporary protection in the EU, giving rights to a residence permit, the possibility to work, housing, and access to social welfare, medical assistance and education. The availability of this legal option to enter and stay in EU countries removes some of the documented risks facing women and girls seeking asylum. However, the Commission has raised concerns about trafficking, particularly for arrivals with no relatives or contacts in the EU. The European Commission’s communication on solidarity with refugees and those fleeing war in Ukraine also recognises that, since women, unaccompanied minors and other children make up the majority of arrivals, the immediate priorities will include ensuring appropriate information and accommodation, preventing gender-based exploitation, supporting childcare, and ensuring swift access to education. Member States will be able to use EU cohesion funding to help refugees access childcare and education, find jobs and get psychological support.

European Parliament position

In a December 2021 resolution, Parliament stressed the need to focus on the situation of women and vulnerable groups at the Ukrainian border and in Russian-occupied territories of Ukraine. Another resolution, adopted the same month, called for more tangible elements of gender mainstreaming, such as gender analyses, to be implemented in EU humanitarian action. At its plenary session in March 2022, Parliament debated the deteriorating humanitarian situation in Ukraine, highlighting the need for proper assistance for women and children. It also adopted a resolution stressing the need to fight gender-based violence in war and calling for more women to be involved in peace and security.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Russia’s war on Ukraine: Ukrainian students in the EU‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marcin Grajewski.

Russia’s armed forces have increased their bombardment and shelling of Ukrainian cities, stepping up the war launched on 24 February. However, new talks between Moscow and Kiev about a future status for Ukraine outside NATO have raised hopes about a possible breakthrough in the biggest military conflict in Europe since World War II. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy has renewed calls on NATO to establish a ‘no-fly zone’ over Ukraine. Instead, the West has imposed tough sanctions against Russia, and many companies are withdrawing from the country, pushing it towards a default, emptying its shops and sending the rouble into freefall. Russian President Vladimir Putin said on 16 March that Russia was ready to discuss Ukraine’s neutrality, but added that Moscow would still achieve the goals of its military operation. Ukraine says it is willing to negotiate to end the war but will not surrender or accept Russian ultimatums.

This note gathers links to the recent publications and commentaries from many international think tanks on Russia’s war on Ukraine, its implications for the two countries, for the European Union and for the whole world. Earlier analyses of the implications of the war can be found in a previous edition of the ‘What Think Tanks are Thinking’ series.

The Western response to Putin’s war has been remarkable. But it’s not enough
Atlantic Council, March 2022

What are the risks and benefits of US/NATO military options in Ukraine? Our strategic risk calculator has answers
Atlantic Council, March 2022

What’s left to sanction in Russia? Wallets, stocks and foreign investments
Atlantic Council, March 2022

Four ways the war in Ukraine might end
Atlantic Council, March 2022

The economic policy consequences of the war
Bruegel, March 2022

Can China bail out Putin?
Bruegel, March 2022

War in Europe: The financial front
Bruegel, March 2022

How to wean Europe off Russian gas as swiftly as possible
Bruegel, March 2022

Mapping financial countermeasures against Russian aggression: Introducing the Brookings Sanctions Tracker
Brookings Institution, March 2022

Mind the escalation aversion: Managing risk without losing the initiative in the Russia-Ukraine war
Brookings Institution, March 2022

Russia vs. Ukraine: How does this end?
Brookings Institution, March 2022

Developing economies must act now to dampen the shocks from the Ukraine conflict
Brookings Institution, March 2022

Will Ukraine’s tragedy spur UN Security Council reform?
Brookings Institution, March 2022

What Russia’s war in Ukraine means for Europe
Carnegie Europe, March 2022

Darkness looms over Ukraine’s neighborhood
Carnegie Europe, March 2022

Russia’s war against Ukraine ends Europe’s self-deception
Carnegie Europe, March 2022

The war in Ukraine could change Poland
Carnegie Europe, March 2022

Can sanctions end Russia’s war in Ukraine?
Carnegie Europe, March 2022

The Kremlin’s crackdown on Western social networks
Centre for Eastern Studies, March 2022

How the war is affecting the Russian gas sector
Centre for Eastern Studies, March 2022

The US embargo on Russian energy resources: The consequences for Russia
Centre for Eastern Studies, March 2022

Sanctions against Russia: the government is becoming increasingly nervous
Centre for Eastern Studies, March 2022

When the taps are turned off: How to get Europe through the next winter without Russian gas
Centre for European Policy Studies, March 2022

The European security order after Putin’s aggression
Centre for European Policy Studies, March 2022

Considering Ukraine, why Georgia deserves EU membership
Centre for European Policy Studies, March 2022

The EU grants temporary protection for people fleeing war in Ukraine
Centre for European Policy Studies, March 2022

Russia-Ukraine: The West needs a sanctions strategy
Centre for European Reform, March 2022

Four questions on how the Russian assault on Ukraine will affect Europe
Centre for European Reform, March 2022

Why a no-fly zone risks escalating the Ukraine conflict
Chatham House, March 2022

Will American support for Ukraine last?
Chatham House, March 2022

Devising the strategy to deter Russia and weaken Putin
Chatham House, March 2022

Ukraine’s wider impact on Turkey’s international future
Chatham House, March 2022

Putin’s support from Russian society may decline fast
Chatham House, March 2022

Russia’s war against Ukraine: Preliminary observations
Clingendael, March 2022

Expert insights: Russia and Ukraine
Clingendael, March 2022

European defence and the war in Ukraine
Clingendael, March 2022

How bad is Ukraine’s humanitarian crisis?
Council on Foreign Relations, March 2022

Will international sanctions stop Russia in Ukraine?
Council on Foreign Relations, March 2022

Five questions: Russia’s war on Ukraine
Council on Foreign Relations, March 2022

Ukraine war should slow but not stop the U.S. pivot to Asia
Council on Foreign Relations, March 2022

From war of choice to war of perseverance
Council on Foreign Relations, March 2022

The Ukraine crisis could sideline the Iran Nuclear Deal
Council on Foreign Relations, March 2022

Tracking cyber operations and actors in the Russia-Ukraine war
Council on Foreign Relations, March 2022

How Asia is responding to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine
Council on Foreign Relations, March 2022

What’s next as Russia’s invasion continues?
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, March 2022

Russia import dependency problem
European Centre for International Political Economy, March 2022

The crisis of European security: What Europeans think about the war in Ukraine
European Council on Foreign Relations, March 2022

View from Kyiv: Putin’s failed blitzkrieg and the future of Europe
European Council on Foreign Relations, March 2022

Putin’s critical raw materials are a threat to EU economic security
Egmont, March 2022

The EU-Ukraine Association Agreement after Ukraine’s EU membership application: Still fit for purpose
Egmont, March 2022

Putin is creating the multipolar world he (thought he) wanted
Egmont, March 2022

For Russia, the Ukraine front stretches to the Mediterranean
Egmont, March 2022

The EU–Ukraine Association Agreement after Ukraine’s EU membership application: Still fit for purpose
European Policy Centre, March 2022

Putin’s war on Ukrainian women
European Policy Centre, March 2022

The EU has been sleepwalking into war, but it’s Germany and France who have a lot to answer for
European Policy Centre, March 2022

The war in Ukraine: China walking amid the shrapnel
European Policy Centre, March 2022

War in Ukraine: The European Union evolves as Putin attacks
Finnish Institute of International Affairs, March 2022

Guerre en Ukraine: L’armée russe est-elle sur le point d’atteindre le «point culminant» de son offensive?
Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, March 2022

Russia’s nuclear gamble
Foundation for European Progressive Studies, March 2022

Silence the guns in Ukraine: What international diplomacy can (and can’t) do
Foundation for European Progressive Studies, March 2022

We will need a ‘New Deal’ to engage with a post-Putin Russia
Friends of Europe, March 2022

Can Russia’s war on Ukraine drive Turkey and the West to reconcile?
German Marshall Fund, March 2022

L’UE fournit des armes létales à l’Ukraine: Trajectoire et portée d’une nouvelle compétence
Groupe de recherche et d’information sur la paix et la sécurité, March 2022

Russian energy exports and the conflict in Ukraine: What options for Italy and the EU?
Istituto Affari Internazionali, March 2022

The EU and the Ukraine war: Making sense of the rise of a ‘geopolitical’ Union
Istituto Affari Internazionali, March 2022

Japan responds to Russia’s war: Strong solidarity with Ukraine with an eye on China
Istituto Affari Internazionali, March 2022

Putin’s use and abuse of history: Back to the 19th century?
Istituto Affari Internazionali, March 2022

Comment l’Ukraine rebat les cartes du monde
Institut Montaigne, March 2022

L’Ukraine montre que les crypto-monnaies pourraient devenir une arme de (financement) de guerre
Institut Thomas More, March 2022

The Ukraine war: A global crisis?
International Crisis Group, March 2022

No-fly zone in Ukraine: War with Russia by another name
International Crisis Group, March 2022

The war against Ukraine: An expert assessment from on the ground
International Institute for Peace, March 2022

The danger of a single story: From Ukraine to Western Balkans
International Institute for Peace, March 2022

Time for NATO to find a way out of the escalation trap in Ukraine
International Institute for Strategic Studies, March 2022

Could the Ukraine crisis accelerate a longer-term policy shift away from fossil fuels?
International Institute for Strategic Studies, March 2022

The UN’s indictment of Russia and its long-term consequences
International Institute for Strategic Studies, March 2022

Ukraine’s EU application: A new paradigm for EU enlargement?
Irish Institute of International and European Affairs, March 2022

The Ukraine war and the risk of a new foreign fighters wave
Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, March 2022

Réfugiés ukrainiens: Le pas d’après
Institut Jacques Delors, March 2022

Putins heiliger Krieg
Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, March 2022

Russia vs Ukraine: Where does China (really) stand?
Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, March 2022

Europe’s economic response to the Russia: Ukraine war will redefine its priorities and future
Peterson Institute for International Economics, March 2022

Financial sanctions have devastated Russia’s economy: The EU and global financial system are absorbing the shock
Peterson Institute for International Economics, March 2022

Russia’s war on Ukraine: A sanctions timeline
Peterson Institute for International Economics, March 2022

No-fly zone over Ukraine?
Polish Institute of International Affairs, March 2022

Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and the threat to cultural heritage
Polish Institute of International Affairs, March 2022

Keeping Russians informed about Ukraine could help end this war
Rand Corporation, March 2022

Is Putin irrational? What nuclear strategic theory says about deterrence of potentially irrational opponents
Rand Corporation, March 2022

Latin America in the Ukraine crisis: A pawn in the game for Putin’sresurgent Russia
Real Instituto Elcano, March 2022

The Kremlin’s gas wars
Bruegel, February 2022

An attack on Ukraine; An attack on the Western worldview
International Institute for Peace, February 2022

Read this briefing on ‘Latest analyses of Russia’s war on Ukraine‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Ivana Katsarova.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 has caused vast displacement of people within the country as well as across the EU borders. While the annexation of Crimea had a negative impact on the country’s education system, recent events have added additional strain.

Outbound student mobility was already substantial in recent years, but it has accelerated even further since the Crimean conflict began . After doubling from some 25 000 to nearly 50 000 between 2007 and 2014, the number of Ukrainian students abroad has since skyrocketed by another 54 % to around 78 000 in 2019.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Russia’s war on Ukraine: Ukrainian students in the EU‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Angelos Delivorias (1st edition).

European long-term investment funds (ELTIFs) invest on a long-term basis in infrastructure projects, real estate and SMEs, among others. While the legislative framework – the ELTIF Regulation – for these funds was adopted six years ago, their market remains small. For this reason, the Commission has proposed amending the ELTIF Regulation to make it more appealing to investors. The key mulled changes involve differentiating between ELTIFs marketed to professional investors and those to which retail investors can have access; removing barriers to retail investor access to ELTIFs; and establishing an optional liquidity window mechanism for redemptions, for cases where investors need to exit early.

The file is currently under review by the co-legislators. Within the European Parliament, it has been assigned to the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs. The draft report is expected soon.

Versions

• March 2022: Amending the European Long-Term Investment Funds (ELTIFs) Regulation (1st edition)

Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2015/760 as regards the scope of eligible assets and investments, the portfolio composition and diversification requirements, the borrowing of cash and other fund rules and as regards requirements pertaining to the authorisation, investment policies and operating conditions of European long-term investment funds Committee responsible:Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON)COM(2021) 722
25.11.2021Rapporteur:Michiel Hoogeveen (ECR, the Netherlands)2021/0377(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Jessica Polfjärd (EPP, Sweden)
Elisabetta Gualmini (S&D, Italy)
Ondřej Kovařík (Renew, Czechia)
Claude Gruffat (Greens/EFA, France)
Gunnar Beck (ID, Germany)Ordinary legislative procedure
(COD) (Parliament and Council
on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Publication of draft report

Written by Claudia Vinci.

Up until the 2022 Russian invasion, Ukraine was exporting more than 40 % of its goods to the EU, making the EU the country’s leading trading partner. The principal goods imported by the EU were raw materials, chemical products and machinery. With regard to the agri-food sector, Ukraine supplied almost half of the cereals and vegetable oils and a quarter of the poultry meat consumed in Europe. While the full impact of the Russian invasion on Ukraine’s agri-food trade has still to be assessed, some possible scenarios have already emerged.

Background

The EU accounted for more than 40 % of Ukrainian trade in 2019, making it Ukraine’s main trading partner. Ukraine, on the other hand, represented only around 1.1 % of EU total trade, importing machinery and transport equipment, chemicals and manufactured goods. Ukraine exports mostly raw materials, chemical products and machinery to the EU. These exports rose by 48.5 % between 2016 and 2019, amounting to €24.2 billion in 2019, with total trade worth €43.3 billion in the same year.

Figure 1 – EU trade in goods with the world and Ukraine (2020)

Ukraine has been a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) since 2008. In 2014, the EU and Ukraine signed an association agreement, including a deep and comprehensive free trade area (DCFTA). The agreement formally entered into force in 2017, after a one-year provisional application period. The pandemic led to a significant drop in both exports and imports between the EU and Ukraine in 2020.

Agricultural sector

In 2019, the agricultural sector contributed almost 10 % to Ukraine’s gross domestic product (GDP), accounting for 18 % of the country’s jobs and 44 % of its export value.

The specific soil composition (chernozem) and landscape in Ukraine are optimal for agricultural production, in particular for crops. Around 80 % of the total utilised agricultural area in Ukraine is used for to grow cereals, oilseeds, vegetables and other annual crops. Ukraine’s agricultural producers benefit from a value added tax exemption or reduction on exported goods, used as leverage to encourage production and trade. In the period between 2000 and 2019, production of cereals rose from 23.8 million tonnes to 74.1 million tonnes, and oilseed production rose from 3.7 million tonnes to 22.2 million tonnes.

Figure 2 – EU trade with Ukraine: Agricultural products (2020) Agri-food trade figures

Of the 1.0 % of EU goods originating in Ukraine, 35.7 % are agricultural products. Agricultural products imported from Ukraine represent 4.6 % of all agri-food imports into the EU. When it comes to exports, the EU sells 1.2 % of its commodities to Ukraine, 12.4 % of which are agricultural products.

The main products imported from Ukraine are cereals, animal and vegetable fats and oils, oilseeds, food industry residues and waste, edible fruits and nuts, and meat and edible meat offal. The main exports from the EU to Ukraine are beverages, tobacco, dairy products, cocoa, edible preparations, food industry residues and waste, and oilseeds.

Figure 3 – EU trade with Ukraine: Agricultural trade by product (2020)

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Russia’s war on Ukraine: EU-Ukraine trade in agri-food products‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Eric Pichon.

In the face of the Covid-19 pandemic, ‘nobody is safe until everybody is safe’. On this basis, the EU, along with the World Health Organization (WHO) and other public and private partners, set up a global initiative to facilitate the development, production and global distribution of Covid-19 vaccines. COVAX was initially designed to pool funds and vaccine doses in order to ensure an equitable distribution between all participating economies until all of them – higher- and lower-income alike – reached a threshold of 20 % of their populations vaccinated.

The COVAX mechanism does not, however, prevent high-income economies from striking bilateral agreements with vaccine manufacturers or selected beneficiary countries. In this context, self-financing economies have secured several times more vaccine doses than their populations need, widening the vaccine supply gap for poorer economies.

The EU and participating Member States have contributed nearly a third of COVAX funding, however, as is the case for most donors, their vaccine donations have fallen short of the levels needed. The new rise in cases shows that ‘vaccine nationalism’ is not a viable policy.

The European Parliament has welcomed the EU’s participation in COVAX and expects the Commission to publish an assessment of this participation. To achieve the objective of immunising 70 % of the world population by mid-2022, the WHO has called on the EU, other donors and manufacturers to deliver on their pledges. In parallel, the plan is to develop vaccine manufacturing capacities in lower income economies, and devise a fair solution for sharing Covid-19-related knowledge and patents.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Understanding COVAX: The EU’s role in vaccinating the world against Covid-19‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Alex Wilson (1st edition).

On 15 December 2021, the European Commission adopted a legislative proposal to recast the 2009 EU Gas Directive, as part of the proposed hydrogen and decarbonised gas markets package. This reflects the EU’s growing climate ambitions, set out in the European Green Deal and its ‘Fit for 55’ package.

The Commission’s proposal aims to support the decarbonisation of the energy sector by ramping up the production of renewable gases and hydrogen, and facilitating their integration in EU energy networks. The recast directive would become a core component of a new EU legislative framework for hydrogen networks, comparable to those that already exist for natural gas and electricity.

The Commission’s proposal would refine the principles of the existing Gas Directive and fully extend their scope to cover hydrogen networks. This includes an important set of consumer rights, provisions relating to transmission and distribution system operators (including their unbundling), third-party access and integrated network planning, and independent regulatory authorities. 

In the Parliament, the file was attributed to the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE), which appointed Jens Geier (S&D, Germany) as rapporteur on 7 February 2022.

Versions

• March 2022: EU directive on gas and hydrogen networks (1st edition)

Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on common rules for the internal markets in renewable and natural gases and in hydrogen (recast) Committee responsible:Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE)COM(2021) 803 final
15.12.2021Rapporteur:Jens Geier (S&D, Germany)2021/0425(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Jerzy Buzek (EPP, Poland)
Claudia Gamon (Renew, Austria)Ordinary legislative
procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council
on equal footing –
formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Publication of draft report

Written by Marketa Pape (1st edition).

To support its economy, provide mobility for people and goods and ensure connectivity of all regions while also limiting negative impacts on climate and environment, the EU has been building a multimodal transport network across its territory: the trans-European transport network (TEN‑T). 

The TEN‑T policy is based on 2013 Union guidelines that defined the technical requirements for the planned transport infrastructure and the network layout. Network construction is also supported through EU funding, including the dedicated Connecting Europe Facility programme.   

Having evaluated the progress in TEN‑T implementation, the European Commission put forward revised TEN‑T guidelines in December 2021, to ensure sustainable connectivity through a reliable and high-quality infrastructure network, aligned with the objectives of the European Green Deal.

As co-legislators, the European Parliament and the Council will have to agree on the final form of the proposed regulation. In the Parliament, the Committee on Transport and Tourism will lead the file.

Versions

• March 2022: Revision of the trans-European transport network guidelines (1st edition)

Proposal for a regulation on Union guidelines for the development of the trans-European transport network, amending Regulation (EU) 2021/1153 and Regulation (EU) No 913/2010 and repealing Regulation (EU) 1315/2013 Committee responsible:Transport and Tourism (TRAN)COM(2021) 812
14.12.2021Rapporteur:To be confirmed2021/0420(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Isabel García Muñoz (S&D, Spain)
Jakop G. Dalunde (Greens/EFA, Sweden)
Roberts Zīle (ECR, Latvia)
Elena Kountoura (The Left, Greece)Ordinary legislative
procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council
on equal footing –
formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Initial discussions in committee

While Russia deploys cyber warfare and disinformation strategies in its war on Ukraine, social platforms, and telecommunication, media and internet operators are playing an important role in relaying information on the war and shaping public opinion. The EU has taken a number of immediate, practical, measures to support Ukraine, and is contemplating further action to build the resilience of its communications infrastructures, strengthen cybersecurity and counter disinformation.

State of play

Russia’s military aggression has largely destroyed and destabilised Ukraine’s communications infrastructure. This has been accompanied by hybrid threats, including massive disinformation campaigns and cybersecurity attacks. The work done by the EU’s East StratCom Task Force, set up to address Russia’s disinformation campaigns, shows that, since 2014, over 13 500 cases of disinformation (nearly 40 % of all cases identified) have targeted Ukraine. In recent weeks, the pro-Kremlin disinformation narrative on the situation in Ukraine has been gaining momentum; it includes a misrepresentation of the role of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and claims that the West is imposing censorship through state institutions and privately-owned social-media companies. Furthermore, Ukraine has suffered a string of cyber attacks in recent weeks, and concerns are also rising with regard to cyber strikes targeting the EU. The European Central Bank has gone so far as to warn European financial institutions of the risk of retaliatory Russian cyber attacks. Faced with these exceptional circumstances, the EU has acted to support Ukraine, and is exploring the need to adopt additional measures to foster the resilience of the communications infrastructure, strengthen cybersecurity and counter disinformation.

The global submarine cable network is the internet’s ‘backbone’. Over 95 % of international telecommunications are provided through undersea cables, transmitting vast amounts of data across oceans. The vulnerabilities of this infrastructure are long documented. Some experts warn that, in the context of Russia’s war on Ukraine, hostile action could be taken to damage or destroy physical internet infrastructure (such as undersea cables) that could disrupt global internet traffic and the flow of government and citizen communications, with serious economic consequences. EU response

• Boosting communications infrastructure resilience. Keeping Ukraine’s telecommunications services operational is critical to ensure normal functioning of the Ukrainian government, as well as to relieve the humanitarian crisis. Some European telecom companies have taken voluntary measures, such as offering free international calls to Ukraine, distributing SIM cards to refugees, and providing free Wi-Fi at refugee camps. In addition, the French Presidency of the Council of the EU will coordinate the efforts of private-sector companies in the Member States to provide Ukraine with IT equipment. The EU may also intensify its efforts to back the Ukrainian authorities by means of the €25 million EU project to support Ukraine’s digital transformation agreed in 2020, and the investment schemes under the Global Gateway strategy to finance digital infrastructure.
• Banning Russian propaganda on its war on Ukraine. Combating war propaganda and disinformation is a particularly pressing issue in Russia’s war. The Council decided on 2 March 2022 to suspend the broadcasting activities of Sputnik and Russia Today taking place in or directed at the EU until the aggression towards Ukraine ends and Russia and its associated outlets cease to conduct disinformation and information manipulation actions against the EU and its Member States. This extraordinary measure, which was immediately and directly applicable in all EU Member States, restricts the access of the main Russian state-controlled media outlets to the European media market. Furthermore, following the Commission’s call, European media regulators have agreed to strengthen their cooperation in establishing a taskforce that will focus on foreign disinformation in the context of the situation in Ukraine.
• Strengthening the EU anti-disinformation toolbox. The Ukraine crisis is fostering a debate on how to fend off foreign interference and disinformation more effectively. There are already proposals to increase East StratCom Task Force funding and extend the EU’s rapid alert system on disinformation to cover Ukraine and other interested parties. Moreover, on 8 March 2022, EU ministers called on tech firms (online platforms, internet service providers and social media companies) to take additional voluntary measures to combat online disinformation and information manipulation. The Ukrainian situation is also likely to steer EU lawmakers towards strengthening the EU’s online media framework in the pending digital services act and other initiatives under the democracy action plan, and in the European media freedom act due to be adopted in the third quarter of 2022.
• Supporting Ukraine’s fight against cyber threats. In the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and following on from the EU/Ukraine cyber dialogue launched in June 2021, the EU Foreign Affairs Council announced on 21 February 2022 that the EU would do more to help Ukraine defend itself against cyber attacks. A Cyber Rapid Response Team composed of EU experts has been deployed to that end.
• Bolstering EU cybersecurity capacities. The situation in Ukraine has also prompted the EU to reflect on how to complement its current framework to counter hybrid threats, and accelerate the pace of European cooperation to address cybersecurity challenges more effectively. On 24 January 2022, the Council of the EU called on the Commission to strengthen the EU’s resilience and ability to fight back against cyber attacks. Further initiatives to ensure resilience of electronic communications infrastructure and networks in Europe have been announced, including more cooperation at operational level, a future cyber resilience act, and the establishment of a cybersecurity emergency response fund.
• Limiting Russia’s access to dual-use technologies. The EU sanctions adopted on 25 February 2022 intend, not least, to limit Russia’s access to crucial advanced technology. Dual-use technologies – namely those that can be used for both peaceful and military objectives – such as semiconductors or cutting-edge technologies, radio communication technology and crypto-assets, must not be sold or otherwise supplied for use in Russia or to a Russian entity.

European Parliament position

The Parliament has long supported EU initiatives to regulate digital platforms and reinforce EU capacities to tackle disinformation and cyber threats. At its extraordinary session on 1 March 2022, it adopted a resolution, condemning the use of information warfare by Russian authorities, state media and proxies ‘to create division with denigrating content and false narratives’ about the EU. The resolution called on the Commission and the European External Action Service to enhance alternative online Russian-language information on the unfolding developments to counter disinformation. It welcomed the ban on Russia Today and Sputnik in the EU, and reiterated the calls on Google and YouTube to remove war propaganda accounts. Furthermore, it called for the EU and the Member States to terminate the software licences for military and civilian equipment in Russia and Belarus, more specifically those used for communication and satellite navigation. Finally, the resolution called for full use of the EU cyber sanctions regime against individuals, entities and bodies responsible or involved in the various cyber attacks targeting Ukraine, and for action to support Ukraine and Eastern partner countries in improving their resilience against possible Russian attacks. On 9 March 2022, the Parliament’s plenary adopted the final report of its Special Committee on Foreign Interference in all Democratic Processes in the EU, including Disinformation (INGE), urging the Commission to propose a more coordinated European strategy to counter operations by foreign governments using disinformation. The report recommends the setting up of a European centre to tackle interference threats, and stronger measures to address disinformation on online platforms. It also calls for new counter- and deterrence measures to ensure cybersecurity and resilience against cyber attacks, and to protect critical infrastructure and strategic sectors.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Russia’s war on Ukraine: The digital dimension‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Suzana Anghel.

At the informal European Council meeting held in Versailles, outside Paris, on 10-11 March 2022, EU leaders focused on Ukraine, security and defence, energy, and economic and financial affairs. They adopted the ‘Versailles Declaration’, condemning the ‘unprovoked and unjustified’ Russian military aggression against Ukraine, praising the Ukrainian people’s courage, demanding that Russia end its aggression, and stressing that the EU remained ‘ready to move quickly with further sanctions’. They also agreed to phase out EU dependency on Russian fossil fuels, though without setting a deadline, recognised Ukraine’s ‘European aspiration’, and committed to support reconstruction ‘once the Russian onslaught has ceased’. The leaders reiterated the Union’s commitment to ‘take more responsibility for its own security’, including by bolstering investment in defence capabilities and by strengthening the defence industry. They identified critical raw materials, semiconductors, health, digital and food as key sectors where the EU should reduce its strategic dependence, stating that it was time for the Union to ‘take further decisive steps towards building our European sovereignty’. Finally, EU leaders stated that national fiscal policies would need to take account of investment needs and reflect the new geopolitical situation.

1. Background

In his letter of invitation, the President of the European Council, Charles Michel, stressed that ‘it is more urgent than ever that we take decisive steps towards building our sovereignty, reducing our dependencies and designing a new growth and investment model’. He outlined the three main topics EU leaders would focus on in addition to Ukraine, which, in the light of events, was the main discussion point. These were: i) strengthening defence capabilities; ii) reducing energy dependency, in particular on Russian fossil fuels; and iii) building a more robust economic base. This was a substantially amended and expanded agenda compared with the original topics of discussion – investment and growth – announced in the indicative Leader’s Agenda in October 2021. Michel spoke of a ‘strategic summit’ to decide on an operational agenda, with a view to making the EU more sovereign and less dependent. Ahead of the meeting, he once again organised preparatory meetings by video-conference with various smaller groups of Heads of State or Government, with the aim of building consensus on the various agenda items in advance.

The meeting opened with an address by the President of the European Parliament, Roberta Metsola. EU leaders were joined for the debate on economic and financial affairs by the Presidents of the European Central Bank, Christine Lagarde, and the Eurogroup, Paschal Donohoe.  

2. Main results of the European Council meeting

EU leaders discussed Ukraine over dinner and adopted a statement on ‘Russian military aggression against Ukraine’, then incorporated within the final Versailles Declaration. The text outlines new strategic guidelines for security and defence, energy, and economic and financial affairs.

Ukraine

EU leaders stressed Russia’s responsibility for the war in Ukraine and for targeting civilians. They underlined that ‘those responsible will be held to account for their crimes’. They demanded that the ‘safety and security’ of nuclear facilities in Ukraine be ensured with the support of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and that Russia withdraw its forces from the ‘entire territory of Ukraine immediately and unconditionally’, and fully respect ‘Ukraine’s territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence within its internationally recognised borders’.

EU leaders praised the courage of the Ukrainians and stressed the EU was resolute in its coordinated ‘political, financial, material and humanitarian support’ for Ukraine as well as determined to step up pressure on Russia and Belarus, including through further sanctions. Michel indicated that the EU had ‘imposed on Russia the strictest sanctions ever adopted’, whilst European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen confirmed that a fourth package of sanctions was being examined. The Prime Minister of Latvia, Krišjānis Karinš, underlined that the EU should ‘go much faster, much further’ with the sanctions, generalise the SWIFT ban across all banks in Russia and Belarus, and stop energy imports, in order not only to isolate but also to rapidly cripple the Russian economy.

Two weeks after the Russian invasion, over 2.5 million Ukrainians have fled the war and 2 million are internally displaced. EU leaders emphasised that the Union was offering ‘temporary protection to all war refugees from Ukraine’, commended European countries, in particular those bordering Ukraine, for their solidarity, confirmed that the EU would continue to ‘offer humanitarian, medical and financial support to all refugees and the countries hosting them’ through REACT-EU, and called for the rapid adoption of the proposal on Cohesion’s Action for Refugees in Europe (CARE).

Main message of the President of the European Parliament: Roberta Metsola stressed that ‘sanctions must continue to bite hard’, warning that ‘Putin will not stop in Kyiv, just as he did not stop in Crimea’.

Enlargement

Although enlargement was not on the agenda in President Michel’s invitation letter, in light of the membership applications received from Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia, the topic had to be considered, not least to give a political signal. The debate centred on whether or not to ‘fast-track’ Ukraine’s accession. The Prime Minister of Slovakia, Eduard Heger, made a proposal to invite the President of Ukraine regularly as a guest to European Council meetings. EU leaders acknowledged Ukraine’s ‘European aspirations and the European choice’ expressed in the Association Agreement, and called for efforts to ‘further strengthen our bonds and deepen our partnership to support Ukraine in pursuing its European path’. The President of Lithuania, Gitanas Nausėda, tweeted that the ‘heroic Ukrainian nation deserves to know that they are welcome in the EU’.

EU leaders noted the Council’s swift action in inviting the European Commission to submit – ‘in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Treaties’ – its opinion not only on the Ukrainian bid, but also on the Moldovan and Georgian requests. This development does not preclude the European Council from stepping in later, on the basis of Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) to review ground rules and set specific conditionality for ‘fast-tracking’. Article 49 TEU, which the declaration does not refer to explicitly, lays down the eligibility criteria and procedure in only limited detail, and states that ‘the conditions of eligibility agreed upon by the European Council shall be taken into account’. This is understood as referring to the Copenhagen criteria set by the European Council back in 1993 and to subsequent changes to them, including stricter conditionality rules agreed in recent years.

Main message of the President of the European Parliament: Roberta Metsola stressed that ‘an open European perspective’ would give Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia hope of a European future.  

Energy policy

Given the situation, EU leaders agreed to phase out EU dependency on Russian gas, oil and coal as soon as possible – no date being specified. This should be done notably by reducing ‘overall reliance on fossil fuels, diversifying suppliers and routes by using LNG and developing biogas’ as well as by ‘developing a hydrogen market in Europe’ and accelerating development of renewables. Moreover, ‘the interconnection of European gas and electricity networks’ should be improved. The European Commission had already published REPowerEU, a communication in which it proposed to cut by two-thirds the EU’s dependency on Russian gas by the end of 2022. The Commission President confirmed after the meeting that, by May 2022, the Commission would present a plan allowing fossil fuel dependency on Russia to be phased out by 2027. She called the Versailles meeting a ‘finding moment’ triggering a rethink of energy policy from an energy security perspective, with a view to reducing dependency on Russian fossil fuels and investing in home-grown renewable energy.

The High Representative/Vice-President of the Commission (HR/VP) Josep Borrell recognised that the EU had increased its dependency on Russian gas since 2014. Figure 1 shows that, with the exception of crude oil, mineral fuels imports have increased. In 2020, Russia was the EU’s number one supplier of crude oil, hard coal and natural gas, with the exception of LNG. Overall, 47 % of the EU’s gas and 25 % of its petroleum came from Russia in the first half of 2021. The debate on reducing energy dependency is not new. In 2014, EU leaders adopted the 2014-2019 Strategic Agenda recognising that ‘Europe’s current energy dependency is a vulnerability’ and that ‘diversification of energy supply and routes’ was needed ‘to reduce energy dependency, notably on a single source or supplier’. The 2019-2024 Strategic Agenda reiterated that call.

Figure 1 – EU imports of mineral fuels from Russia (2020)

EU leaders also committed to ‘urgently address’ the current spike in energy prices ‘and consider concrete options’ to counter its impact. In close coordination with the European Commission, initial measures had been put in place at national level in the fall of 2021. In a letter addressed to Ursula von der Leyen, however, the Greek Prime Minister, Kyriakos Mitsotakis, called for measures to counter the ‘weaponisation’ of gas as a result of Russia’s war in Ukraine, including ‘targeted and temporary market intervention’ to avoid speculation. EU leaders will return to the topic at their forthcoming meeting on 24-25 March 2022, at which they are expected to take decisions allowing action to counter the impact of energy prices on the most vulnerable citizens.

Main message of the President of the European Parliament: RobertaMetsola stressed that the EU’s ‘immediate goal must be energy security’ based on diversity of sources, suppliers and routes. She underlined that the EU should move towards ‘zero gas from Russia’ and stated that ‘the bottom line is that we should not be forced to fund the bombs falling on Ukraine’.

Security and defence

EU leaders reaffirmed their commitment to strengthen European security and defence and increase the EU’s ‘capacity to act autonomously’. They stressed that close EU-NATO cooperation was key to European security and that an EU stronger on defence, complementary to NATO, would only make it a more reliable transatlantic partner. EU leaders acknowledged that for those Member States that are also members of NATO, the Alliance remained the foundation of their collective defence. They therefore committed to continue ‘to invest in our mutual assistance under Article 42(7) TEU’. In a joint letter, Finland and Sweden had recalled the mutual assistance clause (Article 42(7) TEU), which sets an obligation of ‘aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter’. There are still lessons to be learned from the first activation of the clause in 2015, which could help to clarify the procedure to be followed in the event of any new activation.

The Prime Minister of Sweden, Magdalena Andersson, stressed that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine had shifted the continent’s security equilibrium, confirming her country’s decision to increase defence spending to 2 % of GDP. Several other EU countries, including Germany and Romania, have also announced an increase in their defence spending. At Versailles, EU leaders committed to bolstering the development of joint capabilities, building synergies between civil and defence space research and strengthening the European defence industry. Ursula von der Leyen announced that the European Commission would prepare an ‘analysis of the defence investments gaps’ by May 2022, when EU leaders are expected to meet informally. In the interim, EU leaders are expected to endorse the Strategic Compass at the spring European Council meeting on 24-25 March 2022.

Main message of the President of the European Parliament: Roberta Metsola stressed that the EU ‘must go beyond the European Defence Fund and make the EU budget work for our security and defence policy whenever it adds value’. She underlined that PESCO should be reformed to facilitate flexible and resilient projects and that the EDA ‘should be brought under the EU’s budget umbrella’.

Reducing dependencies, boosting the economy and fostering investments

Given the ‘new geopolitical situation‘, EU leaders agreed to foster investment by mobilising EU and national public funding. Although the modalities have yet to be defined, national fiscal policies will reflect these needs. The leaders also committed to a robust trade policy and agreed that the EU should reduce its dependence on others, identifying five strategic areas: critical raw materials, health, digital, food security and semiconductors. For semiconductors, the leaders set a measurable objective: to develop EU production capacity to secure 20 % of the global market by 2030. A 2008 French Senate report stressed the strategic nature of the EU semiconductor industry, which was at risk because of global market shifts. The EU’s share of the global market has since reached a historic low.

Main message of the President of the European Parliament: Roberta Metsola underlined that the EU needed to focus on ‘restructuring and reinvesting in research and raw materials’.

Read this briefing on ‘Outcome of the informal European Council in Versailles on 10-11 March 2022‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Henrique Morgado Simões (1st edition).

On 15 December 2021, the Commission presented a proposal to regulate methane emissions reductions in the energy sector. The proposal is part of the second batch of proposals in the ‘fit for 55’ package, aiming to align EU climate and energy laws with the EU Climate Law’s 2030 target.

The proposal aims to address gaps in current legislation: those relating to methane emissions from upstream exploration and the production of oil and fossil gas, but also those from the gathering and processing of fossil gas, the transmission, distribution and underground storage of gas, and liquid gas terminals operating with fossil and/or renewable methane. The proposal furthermore introduces provisions on methane emissions from coal mines and those originating from outside the EU in relation to importer information requirements, the methane transparency database and the methane-emitters monitoring tool. Similarly, it sets out requirements for methane emissions reduction, monitoring and reporting, leak detection and repair, and limits to venting and flaring.

In Parliament, the proposal was referred to the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI), with the rapporteur still to be appointed.

Versions

• March 2022: Fit for 55 package: Reducing methane emissions in the energy sector (1st edition)

Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on methane emissions reduction in the energy sector and amending Regulation (EU) 2019/942 Committee responsible:Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI)COM(2021) 805
15.12.2021Rapporteur:To be appointed2021/0423(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Günther Sidl (S&D, Austria)
Martin Hojsík (Renew, Slovakia)Ordinary legislative procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council
on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Appointment of rapporteur Figure 1 – Key methane facts Figure 2 – Nature and timeline of requirements Figure 3 – Inactive wells: Member States’ and CAs’ responsibilities

Written by Alex Wilson (1st edition).

On 15 December 2021, the European Commission adopted a legislative proposal to recast the 2009 EU Gas Regulation, as part of the hydrogen and decarbonised gas markets package. This reflects the EU’s growing climate ambitions, outlined in the European Green Deal and its ‘Fit for 55’ package.

The Commission’s legislative proposal aims to support the decarbonisation of the energy sector by ramping up the production of renewable gases and hydrogen across the EU, and facilitating their integration in existing or new gas networks. It would create an EU legislative framework for hydrogen networks, comparable to those that already exist for natural gas and electricity. It would also oblige existing natural gas infrastructure to integrate a higher share of hydrogen and renewable gases, by means of high tariff discounts; provisions to facilitate blending of hydrogen with natural gas and renewable gases; and greater EU cooperation on gas quality and storage.

The Commission’s legislative proposal likewise includes a targeted revision of the 2017 Security of Gas Supply Regulation. This aims to foster greater regional cooperation on gas storage, facilitate the (voluntary) joint procurement of strategic stocks, and encourages Member States to take measures to address the growing risk of cyber-attacks on EU energy networks.

Versions

• March 2022: Recast EU Regulation on Gas and Hydrogen Networks (1st edition)

Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the internal markets for renewable and natural gases and for hydrogen (recast) Committee responsible:Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE)COM(2021) 804
15.12.2021Rapporteur:Jerzy Buzek (EPP, Poland)2021/0424(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Patrizia Toia (S&D, Italy)
Marie Toussaint (Greens/EFA, France)
Zdzisław Krasnodębski (ECR, Poland)Ordinary legislative procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council
on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Publication of draft report

Written by Marketa Pape.

In response to Russia’s unjustified invasion of Ukraine, the European Union has adopted unprecedented new sanctions. These included a ban of all Russian aircraft from its airspace, to which Russia reacted by banning all EU airlines from its skies. While the full weight of these decisions is only starting to be felt, the implications of the conflict for EU transport are much larger and include steep increases in fuel prices, interruptions to supply chains and the need to ensure the safe return of stranded drivers and seafarers, already problematic due to Covid-19.

State of play before the conflict

In reaction to Moscow’s 2014 annexation of Crimea, the EU adopted its first sanctions against Russia. These remain in place and target Russian individuals and organisations, but also the country’s strategic sectors of defence, energy and finance, without limiting transport connections.

In October 2021, the EU and Ukraine signed a common aviation area agreement, as a result of a process that started in 2005. It was to offer new opportunities for airlines and consumers (9.8 million passengers from the EU in 2019), based on common standards in aviation safety, security and air traffic management.

As one of the countries of the EU’s Eastern Partnership, Ukraine has been included in EU efforts to improve transport links with the Union and among these countries. The EU’s plans to extend its strategic transport infrastructure were prepared in 2018 by the European Commission and the World Bank and confirmed by the Eastern Partnership Summit in December 2021. The 39 projects in Ukraine amounting to about €4.5 billion covered all modes of transport and sought to support its trade with the EU, worth €43.3 billion in 2019.

Implications for EU transport Aviation

Reacting to Moscow’s new invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, EU countries have adopted new sanctions. In the first set of sanctions of 25 February 2022, the EU banned the sale of aircraft, parts and equipment to Russian companies, including insurance and maintenance services. Two days later, the EU banned all Russian aircraft, including private jets, from its airspace. Russia responded by banning from its skies all EU airlines and the airlines of 36 countries that have adopted similar sanctions. Further airspace closures were adopted by Belarus (partial) and Moldova (full). With Ukrainian airspace closed, movements by air of roughly 3.3 % of air passenger traffic in Europe have stopped, in addition to the passenger flights between Russia and Europe, which accounted for 5.7 % of global international traffic in 2021.  

Many flights have had to be cancelled or rerouted, with impacts mostly on Europe-Asia and Asia-North America connections. Bypassing Russian airspace lengthens flight times and increases fuel consumption. Following the invasion, the price of jet fuel increased to US$141 per barrel on 4 March, up 27 % in one month. Expert estimates of costs for an extra hour of passenger flight time vary between €3 600 and €15 000, depending on the size of the aeroplane and the price of fuel, which makes some routes uneconomic or impractical. Re-routing may also necessitate a refuelling stop, if the path extends beyond the range of the aircraft. Air operators are evaluating which flights to continue operating and whether to pass on the costs to consumers through fuel surcharges. Air cargo rates have also increased, to 120 % above their pre-crisis level by 7 March, and are continuing to rise. Sanctions and bans are expected to reduce flight capacity, especially between Europe and Asia, unless airlines in other parts of the world, such as the Middle East, fill the gap. Higher airfares could reduce demand for air travel.

According to analysts, Russian airlines have about 980 passenger jets in service, of which 777 are leased, mostly from companies based in Ireland. The sanctions have made it hard for Russian airlines to pay their lessors and also require that the existing lease contracts with Russian airlines be terminated by 28 March. However, leasing companies fear for their assets, as the state-owned airline Aeroflot and carriers that it owns are not responding to requests for the return of aircraft once lease agreements are terminated.

Rail

In addition to extra train services run by Ukrainian Railways, rail companies in neighbouring countries are organising humanitarian trains to evacuate refugees from Ukraine and send humanitarian aid back into the country. Other rail companies are banding together to offer additional carriages on trains and make travel free for Ukrainians to reach refuge or join family members across the continent.

While Russian railways are targeted by EU sanctions, freight trains can still run through Russia, but they cannot stop there. Many logistics companies operating rail freight connections between China and the EU are avoiding transit through Russia for security reasons. Instead of the ‘main route’, which previously served half of all EU-bound rail freight traffic, they opt for the ‘middle corridor’ through Azerbaijan and Georgia to Istanbul, where the cargo is reloaded onto vessels bound for Trieste. Transit through Ukraine accounted for only 2 % of the westbound container traffic volumes on the New Silk Route in 2021, but was on the rise, a fact recognised both by China and by Slovakia and Hungary, which were planning investments to develop the route through Ukraine.

Road

On 25 February, the International Road Transport Union (IRU) estimated that at least 12 000 truck drivers of many nationalities were stuck in Ukraine and the wider region, and urged the governments concerned to protect blocked truck drivers and prioritise their passage. By 4 March, with up to 5 000 drivers still stranded, the IRU called again on the Ukrainian authorities to ease the passage of drivers at border crossings.

Many transport organisations have offered their buses, coaches and trucks to help transport refugees and essential goods. To facilitate this support, seven EU countries along major transport routes towards Ukraine exempted humanitarian transport from tolls and rules on professional driving time and rest time.

In December 2021, road transport operators warned that driver shortages, pandemic restrictions, increased demand and rising fuel prices were causing supply chain disruptions. Uncertain fuel prices and supply are likely to further increase road freight rates, already at record high levels before the invasion.

Maritime

To address the impacts of the situation in the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov on shipping and seafarers, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) called an extraordinary session of its Council for 10-11 March.

Ukrainian and Russian seafarers make up 14.5 % of the global shipping workforce and EU fleets rely on them heavily. Fearing the impact on crew changes, already stretched due to Covid-19, European ship owners urged EU regulators to guarantee seafarers’ mobility and their rights as essential workers. They also warned that the severe crew shortages, delayed salary payments and closed Ukrainian ports could disrupt supply chains. With several commercial ships hit in the conflict, operators were forced to divert vessels. Most large shipping companies, citing unpredictable operational impacts, have suspended shipments to and from Russia, but some also to Ukraine. Bunker fuel prices rose sharply across the globe following the invasion.

Sanctions against Russia are complex and evolving. The companies targeted by EU sanctions include the Novorossiysk Commercial Sea Port and the United Shipbuilding Corporation. The UK, for its part, has banned Russian ships from its ports. It has been suggested, though, that as the UK ban is not accompanied by a blacklist, port operators are left with the complex task of identifying those ships, which requires the tracking of roughly 6 000 Russian-affiliated vessels, of which about 60 % do not sail under a Russian flag.

Renewed focus on military mobility

In the longer term, the conflict will likely lead to increased military spending. In the Versailles declaration, adopted by the European Council on 11 March 2022, EU leaders pledged to accelerate the ongoing efforts to enhance military mobility throughout the EU. While this refers to the ability to deploy, train and supply armed forces across European territory, for transport it means enhancing some strategic infrastructure segments of its transport network to support their dual use for military and civilian purposes. About €1.7 billion in co-funding is earmarked for such projects in the EU’s long-term budget for 2021-2027.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Russia’s war on Ukraine: Implications for EU transport‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marcin Szczepański.

It is widely held that geopolitical tensions in the world are on the rise. One of the clear indicators of this phenomenon is the increasing use of economic tools for the pursuit of strategic and geopolitical aims. This can take the form of coercion exerted by one country on another through trade or investment restrictions to interfere with their sovereign choices. In response to the EU and its Member States becoming the target of deliberate economic coercion in recent years, on 8 December 2021 the Commission published a proposal for the adoption of an anti-coercion instrument (ACI) that would allow the EU to better respond to such challenges on a global scale.

While the new framework is primarily designed to deter economic coercive action through dialogue and engagement, it also allows – as a last resort – to retaliate with countermeasures comprising a wide range of trade, investment and funding restrictions. While there is broad support for creating a legislative tool to address the growing problem of economic coercion, opinions are divided as regards the severity of countermeasures and the manner of establishing when they should kick in.

Within the European Parliament, the file has been assigned to the Committee on International Trade (INTA). A draft report is expected to be published in April.

Versions

• March 2022: Proposed anti-coercion instrument (1st edition)

Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of the Union and its Member States from economic coercion by third countries Committee responsible:International Trade (INTA)COM(2021) 775
8.12.2021Rapporteur:Bernd Lange (S&D, Germany)2021/0406(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Anna-Michelle Asimakopoulou (EPP, Greece); Marie-Pierre Vedrenne (Renew, France); Reinhard Bütikofer (Greens/EFA, Germany); Roman Haider (ID, Germany);
Michiel Hoogeveen (ERC, Belgium);
Helmut Scholz (The Left, Germany).Ordinary legislative procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Publication of draft report

Written by Rachele Rossi.

One of the main objectives of EU policy is to maintain vibrant rural areas. Rural economies however still face a number of socio‑economic pressures. The European Commission’s long-term vision for EU rural areas, to 2040, identifies action to take to ensure stronger, connected, resilient and prosperous rural areas and communities.

Recent figures reveal that rural areas cover more than 80 % of total EU territory and are home to 30 % of the EU population. These areas are both nature reservoirs and agricultural spaces. Moreover, life in rural areas can be a safer and healthier alternative to living in highly populated cities, and a hub for innovating ideas on more sustainable business models. However, many EU rural areas face the same challenges, such as demographic decline, low income and lack of economic opportunities, poor access to services and connectivity, low education and digital skill levels, and low employment rates, especially among women.

In 1997, the European Commission’s Agenda 2000 made the first move towards creating an EU rural development policy within the common agricultural policy (CAP). Co‑financed by EU and national funds, rural development measures helped rural areas tackle economic, environmental and social challenges. Over the years, rural development expenditure has continued to increase. Evaluations have highlighted the positive impact of certain measures, such as those related to village renewal and local development approach, as they are considered well-targeted and relevant to local needs. Although these measures only represent a small proportion of CAP funding, they play an important role in addressing the socio-economic needs of rural areas.

The recently adopted rules of the post-2022 CAP set the types of intervention for rural development that should be funded under the national CAP strategic plans. Each EU country will define where CAP funding will be used to achieve set objectives, including employment, growth, gender equality, social inclusion and local development in rural areas. The Commission’s recommendations on the national CAP strategic plans indicate that they are aiming to make fast broadband internet in rural areas accessible to 100 % of the population by 2025. This means that the share of rural households with next generation access (NGA) broadband will have to increase significantly from the 2019 EU average share of 56.4 %.

Following a public consultation launched in September 2020, the European Commission published ‘A long-term Vision for the EU’s Rural Areas – Towards stronger, connected, resilient and prosperous rural areas by 2040‘ on 30 June 2021. This represents a significant policy development. The specific issues and challenges faced by rural areas are now at the core of a wide‑ranging set of actions that look even beyond the CAP’s rural development measures. The long‑term vision includes proposals for a rural pact that engages EU, national, regional and local levels in supporting the vision and action plan with flagship projects and new tools to support stronger, connected, resilient and prosperous rural areas. A rural observatory will help improve data collection and analysis on the situation in rural areas. A ‘rural proofing’ mechanism will assess the anticipated impact of major EU legislative initiatives on rural areas.

The Commission’s communication sparked stakeholders’ interest and expectations for its potentially game‑changing role in the EU’s approach to the development of rural areas. For its part, the European Parliament has decided to draw up an own-initiative report on the long‑term vision for the EU’s rural areas.

More information can be found in the briefings on ‘Long-term vision for rural areas: European Commission communication‘ and ‘EU rural development policy: Impact, challenges and outlook‘ on the European Parliament Think Tank.

Written by Bruno Bilquin with Beatrix Immenkamp.

In an unprecedented and unanimous reaction to the Russian war on Ukraine that began on 24 February 2022, the EU swiftly decided to provide €500 million from the European Peace Facility to fund and coordinate EU military assistance and to deliver military (including lethal) equipment to Ukraine. The Council had already adopted an assistance measure of €31 million for non-lethal assistance to Ukraine on 2 December 2021. For the first time in its history, the EU is now using a dedicated, although off-budget, tool to finance – but not to deliver, with that responsibility falling on Member States alone – lethal military equipment for a third country.

The EU decisions to mobilise €500 million for military assistance to Ukraine

On 27 February 2022, the EU High-Representative for Foreign Affairs and Vice-President of the Commission (HR/VP), Josep Borrell, announced that he would propose that the Council respond favourably to a request for military assistance by Ukraine and use the European Peace Facility (EPF), an off-EU budget instrument operational since 1 July 2021, to fund emergency assistance measures. This would include a support package worth €450 million for military equipment and platforms designed to deliver lethal force, and a €50 million package to finance supplies such as fuel, protective equipment and emergency medical items. On 28 February, the Council took the corresponding decisions for two assistance measures under the EPF aimed at assisting the Ukrainian armed forces, Decision (CFSP) 2022/338 for the supply of military equipment and platforms designed to deliver lethal force and Decision (CFSP) 2022/339 for non-lethal support.

The EPF has a financial ceiling of €5.692 billion (in current prices) for 2021‑2027, with an annual ceiling that should increase gradually every year. For 2022, the planned ceiling is €540 million. The new €500 million assistance measures to Ukraine cover 2022 and 2023 (in accordance with Article 1(4) of Decisions 2022/338 and 2022/339). An increased EPF budget is reportedly on the agenda of the informal European Council meeting of 10 and 11 March 2022, in Versailles. Member States contribute to the EPF budget annually, according to their GNI. Denmark has opted out of the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and therefore does not contribute to the part of the EPF which replaces the Athena mechanism and finances common costs of the EU’s military operations under the CSDP. Following the invasion of Ukraine, on 6 March 2022, the main Danish parliamentary parties agreed that a referendum will be held on 1 June 2022 to decide on Denmark’s CSDP participation, signalling a possible ending of the Danish opt-out, although it is not yet clear whether this would impact Denmark’s position vis-à-vis the EPF. However, Denmark is planning to supply high-tech weapons to Ukraine, a decision reportedly backed by a broad majority in its parliament. Austria, Ireland and Malta, neutral Member States without CSDP opt-outs, are only contributing to non-lethal assistance measures.

On 2 December 2021, the Council adopted assistance measures for Georgia (€12.75 million) Moldova (€7 million) and Ukraine (€31 million), all for three years and aimed at strengthening the capacities of the beneficiary countries in military and defence matters, as well as promoting domestic resilience and peace. Providing military equipment to Ukraine: The clearing house

In response to the Russian attack on Ukraine, individual Member States began to supply military equipment to Ukraine earlier this year, subject to available stocks. This did not necessarily meet the needs of the Ukrainian army. In response, the European Union Military Staff (EUMS) has set up a clearing house within the EUMS to coordinate supply and demand (in accordance with Article 4(2) of Decision 2022/338). Ukraine sends official lists to this clearing house, specifying the equipment needed. Clearing-house staff hold meetings with all Member States and with partners – the United States, Canada, United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand, with the possibility to also involve South Korea and Norway in future – and provide information on: the equipment needed, offers, comparison, analysis of priorities and a military analysis of the evolution of the situation. Ukraine and the EU check and validate the list, after which the Member States then agree on what they will provide and each deliver the equipment and arms individually. The ongoing strategic compass process is expected to confirm the role of the EUMS in implementing the EPF-funded military assistance measures, and stress the importance of the EPF itself as a tool for EU action as a global security and peace provider.

The EU Advisory Mission (EUAM) Ukraine, a non-executive civilian mission under the CSDP, began operations in December 2014. Its mandate is to contribute to the creation of an accountable and efficient civilian security sector. Due to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, EUAM was forced to evacuate. The mission continues, however, to maintain contact with its Ukrainian counterparts. The fighter jets question

The Ukrainian Foreign Minister asked the EU to provide Soviet-era fighter jets, which could be operated by Ukrainian military pilots. The EU has considered providing such assistance; Bulgaria, Croatia, Poland, Romania and Slovakia fly or store such models. However, on 1 March 2022, Bulgaria, Poland and Slovakia reportedly ruled out supplying their planes. On 6 March 2022, Poland suggested handing over its 28 MiG‑29 fighter planes to the Ukrainian armed forces, through US intermediaries, a proposal that took several forms and was the subject of diplomatic exchanges, but has not come to fruition. Pentagon Press Secretary John Kirby issued a statement rejecting the plan on 8 March 2022, citing concerns it would raise a serious issue for NATO.

No plans for a no-fly zone over Ukraine, nor for NATO troops to fight in Ukraine

Ukraine has asked NATO to establish a no-fly zone over Ukraine. However, on 5 March 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin warned NATO against the move: ‘We will consider any move in this direction as participation in the armed conflict of the country from whose territory a threat to our servicemen is created. We will consider them participants in hostilities [from] that very second’. During a press conference on 4 March 2022, NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg confirmed that there would be no ‘no-fly zone’ over Ukraine and that NATO troops would not fight in Ukraine.

European Parliament position

The Parliament held an extraordinary plenary session, on 1 March 2022, with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and the Speaker of the Ukrainian Parliament (Verkhovna Rada) Ruslan Stefanchuk speaking from Kyiv. Following the session, Parliament adopted a resolution calling for: the EPF to be used to allocate significant additional funding to provide Ukraine with defensive military capacity; the full and immediate implementation of the assistance measures to Ukraine decided on 2 December 2021 and 28 February 2022; tougher sanctions against Russia; and new efforts to consider Ukraine’s request for EU candidate status. The resolution also calls for an urgent reassessment of the EUAM’s mandate and for it to be updated with a military training component. Based on earlier discussions, the latter would be linked to EPF funding. Parliament also supports the strengthening of the EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova (EUBAM) at the border between Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova/Transnistria. Further debate on the refugee situation and the EU’s role and Europe’s security situation took place in plenary on 8‑9 March 2022.

EU Member States providing equipment to Ukraine
Under the EPF, Member States can be reimbursed for both lethal and non-lethal military equipment they have sent to Ukraine since the beginning of this year. Equipment already sent or promised includes (non-exhaustive list): Belgium: 5 000 machine guns (2 000 initially, followed by 3 000), as well as body armour, helmets and fuel. Germany: 1 000 anti-tank weapons and 500 missiles. Austria: 10 000 helmets. Denmark: 2 700 weapons, shoulder-borne anti-tank weapons and protective equipment such as body armour. Spain: weapons, ammunitions, medical material and protective equipment. France: missiles, ammunitions, protective equipment and fuel. Italy: demining material and protective equipment. Netherlands: anti-tank weapons, 100 rifles, 400 missiles, ammunition, as well as radars and protective equipment. Sweden: 5 000 anti-tank rocket launchers and 5 000 bullet-proof vests. Czechia: arms, including 150 guns, 5 000 assault rifles, 2 085 other rifles, 3 200 machine guns, the corresponding ammunition, as well as medical material. Estonia: anti-tank missiles, protective equipment and medical material. Latvia: drones and ammunition. Finland: 2 500 assault rifles, ammunition, 1 500 anti-tank weapons, plus protective equipment, medical material and enhanced humanitarian support. Hungary: no lethal weapons, but a humanitarian aid package, including fuel and food.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Russia’s war on Ukraine: The EU’s financing of military assistance to Ukraine‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.