European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

While Russia deploys cyber warfare and disinformation strategies in its war on Ukraine, social platforms, and telecommunication, media and internet operators are playing an important role in relaying information on the war and shaping public opinion. The EU has taken a number of immediate, practical, measures to support Ukraine, and is contemplating further action to build the resilience of its communications infrastructures, strengthen cybersecurity and counter disinformation.

State of play

Russia’s military aggression has largely destroyed and destabilised Ukraine’s communications infrastructure. This has been accompanied by hybrid threats, including massive disinformation campaigns and cybersecurity attacks. The work done by the EU’s East StratCom Task Force, set up to address Russia’s disinformation campaigns, shows that, since 2014, over 13 500 cases of disinformation (nearly 40 % of all cases identified) have targeted Ukraine. In recent weeks, the pro-Kremlin disinformation narrative on the situation in Ukraine has been gaining momentum; it includes a misrepresentation of the role of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and claims that the West is imposing censorship through state institutions and privately-owned social-media companies. Furthermore, Ukraine has suffered a string of cyber attacks in recent weeks, and concerns are also rising with regard to cyber strikes targeting the EU. The European Central Bank has gone so far as to warn European financial institutions of the risk of retaliatory Russian cyber attacks. Faced with these exceptional circumstances, the EU has acted to support Ukraine, and is exploring the need to adopt additional measures to foster the resilience of the communications infrastructure, strengthen cybersecurity and counter disinformation.

The global submarine cable network is the internet’s ‘backbone’. Over 95 % of international telecommunications are provided through undersea cables, transmitting vast amounts of data across oceans. The vulnerabilities of this infrastructure are long documented. Some experts warn that, in the context of Russia’s war on Ukraine, hostile action could be taken to damage or destroy physical internet infrastructure (such as undersea cables) that could disrupt global internet traffic and the flow of government and citizen communications, with serious economic consequences. EU response

• Boosting communications infrastructure resilience. Keeping Ukraine’s telecommunications services operational is critical to ensure normal functioning of the Ukrainian government, as well as to relieve the humanitarian crisis. Some European telecom companies have taken voluntary measures, such as offering free international calls to Ukraine, distributing SIM cards to refugees, and providing free Wi-Fi at refugee camps. In addition, the French Presidency of the Council of the EU will coordinate the efforts of private-sector companies in the Member States to provide Ukraine with IT equipment. The EU may also intensify its efforts to back the Ukrainian authorities by means of the €25 million EU project to support Ukraine’s digital transformation agreed in 2020, and the investment schemes under the Global Gateway strategy to finance digital infrastructure.
• Banning Russian propaganda on its war on Ukraine. Combating war propaganda and disinformation is a particularly pressing issue in Russia’s war. The Council decided on 2 March 2022 to suspend the broadcasting activities of Sputnik and Russia Today taking place in or directed at the EU until the aggression towards Ukraine ends and Russia and its associated outlets cease to conduct disinformation and information manipulation actions against the EU and its Member States. This extraordinary measure, which was immediately and directly applicable in all EU Member States, restricts the access of the main Russian state-controlled media outlets to the European media market. Furthermore, following the Commission’s call, European media regulators have agreed to strengthen their cooperation in establishing a taskforce that will focus on foreign disinformation in the context of the situation in Ukraine.
• Strengthening the EU anti-disinformation toolbox. The Ukraine crisis is fostering a debate on how to fend off foreign interference and disinformation more effectively. There are already proposals to increase East StratCom Task Force funding and extend the EU’s rapid alert system on disinformation to cover Ukraine and other interested parties. Moreover, on 8 March 2022, EU ministers called on tech firms (online platforms, internet service providers and social media companies) to take additional voluntary measures to combat online disinformation and information manipulation. The Ukrainian situation is also likely to steer EU lawmakers towards strengthening the EU’s online media framework in the pending digital services act and other initiatives under the democracy action plan, and in the European media freedom act due to be adopted in the third quarter of 2022.
• Supporting Ukraine’s fight against cyber threats. In the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and following on from the EU/Ukraine cyber dialogue launched in June 2021, the EU Foreign Affairs Council announced on 21 February 2022 that the EU would do more to help Ukraine defend itself against cyber attacks. A Cyber Rapid Response Team composed of EU experts has been deployed to that end.
• Bolstering EU cybersecurity capacities. The situation in Ukraine has also prompted the EU to reflect on how to complement its current framework to counter hybrid threats, and accelerate the pace of European cooperation to address cybersecurity challenges more effectively. On 24 January 2022, the Council of the EU called on the Commission to strengthen the EU’s resilience and ability to fight back against cyber attacks. Further initiatives to ensure resilience of electronic communications infrastructure and networks in Europe have been announced, including more cooperation at operational level, a future cyber resilience act, and the establishment of a cybersecurity emergency response fund.
• Limiting Russia’s access to dual-use technologies. The EU sanctions adopted on 25 February 2022 intend, not least, to limit Russia’s access to crucial advanced technology. Dual-use technologies – namely those that can be used for both peaceful and military objectives – such as semiconductors or cutting-edge technologies, radio communication technology and crypto-assets, must not be sold or otherwise supplied for use in Russia or to a Russian entity.

European Parliament position

The Parliament has long supported EU initiatives to regulate digital platforms and reinforce EU capacities to tackle disinformation and cyber threats. At its extraordinary session on 1 March 2022, it adopted a resolution, condemning the use of information warfare by Russian authorities, state media and proxies ‘to create division with denigrating content and false narratives’ about the EU. The resolution called on the Commission and the European External Action Service to enhance alternative online Russian-language information on the unfolding developments to counter disinformation. It welcomed the ban on Russia Today and Sputnik in the EU, and reiterated the calls on Google and YouTube to remove war propaganda accounts. Furthermore, it called for the EU and the Member States to terminate the software licences for military and civilian equipment in Russia and Belarus, more specifically those used for communication and satellite navigation. Finally, the resolution called for full use of the EU cyber sanctions regime against individuals, entities and bodies responsible or involved in the various cyber attacks targeting Ukraine, and for action to support Ukraine and Eastern partner countries in improving their resilience against possible Russian attacks. On 9 March 2022, the Parliament’s plenary adopted the final report of its Special Committee on Foreign Interference in all Democratic Processes in the EU, including Disinformation (INGE), urging the Commission to propose a more coordinated European strategy to counter operations by foreign governments using disinformation. The report recommends the setting up of a European centre to tackle interference threats, and stronger measures to address disinformation on online platforms. It also calls for new counter- and deterrence measures to ensure cybersecurity and resilience against cyber attacks, and to protect critical infrastructure and strategic sectors.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Russia’s war on Ukraine: The digital dimension‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Suzana Anghel.

At the informal European Council meeting held in Versailles, outside Paris, on 10-11 March 2022, EU leaders focused on Ukraine, security and defence, energy, and economic and financial affairs. They adopted the ‘Versailles Declaration’, condemning the ‘unprovoked and unjustified’ Russian military aggression against Ukraine, praising the Ukrainian people’s courage, demanding that Russia end its aggression, and stressing that the EU remained ‘ready to move quickly with further sanctions’. They also agreed to phase out EU dependency on Russian fossil fuels, though without setting a deadline, recognised Ukraine’s ‘European aspiration’, and committed to support reconstruction ‘once the Russian onslaught has ceased’. The leaders reiterated the Union’s commitment to ‘take more responsibility for its own security’, including by bolstering investment in defence capabilities and by strengthening the defence industry. They identified critical raw materials, semiconductors, health, digital and food as key sectors where the EU should reduce its strategic dependence, stating that it was time for the Union to ‘take further decisive steps towards building our European sovereignty’. Finally, EU leaders stated that national fiscal policies would need to take account of investment needs and reflect the new geopolitical situation.

1. Background

In his letter of invitation, the President of the European Council, Charles Michel, stressed that ‘it is more urgent than ever that we take decisive steps towards building our sovereignty, reducing our dependencies and designing a new growth and investment model’. He outlined the three main topics EU leaders would focus on in addition to Ukraine, which, in the light of events, was the main discussion point. These were: i) strengthening defence capabilities; ii) reducing energy dependency, in particular on Russian fossil fuels; and iii) building a more robust economic base. This was a substantially amended and expanded agenda compared with the original topics of discussion – investment and growth – announced in the indicative Leader’s Agenda in October 2021. Michel spoke of a ‘strategic summit’ to decide on an operational agenda, with a view to making the EU more sovereign and less dependent. Ahead of the meeting, he once again organised preparatory meetings by video-conference with various smaller groups of Heads of State or Government, with the aim of building consensus on the various agenda items in advance.

The meeting opened with an address by the President of the European Parliament, Roberta Metsola. EU leaders were joined for the debate on economic and financial affairs by the Presidents of the European Central Bank, Christine Lagarde, and the Eurogroup, Paschal Donohoe.  

2. Main results of the European Council meeting

EU leaders discussed Ukraine over dinner and adopted a statement on ‘Russian military aggression against Ukraine’, then incorporated within the final Versailles Declaration. The text outlines new strategic guidelines for security and defence, energy, and economic and financial affairs.

Ukraine

EU leaders stressed Russia’s responsibility for the war in Ukraine and for targeting civilians. They underlined that ‘those responsible will be held to account for their crimes’. They demanded that the ‘safety and security’ of nuclear facilities in Ukraine be ensured with the support of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and that Russia withdraw its forces from the ‘entire territory of Ukraine immediately and unconditionally’, and fully respect ‘Ukraine’s territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence within its internationally recognised borders’.

EU leaders praised the courage of the Ukrainians and stressed the EU was resolute in its coordinated ‘political, financial, material and humanitarian support’ for Ukraine as well as determined to step up pressure on Russia and Belarus, including through further sanctions. Michel indicated that the EU had ‘imposed on Russia the strictest sanctions ever adopted’, whilst European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen confirmed that a fourth package of sanctions was being examined. The Prime Minister of Latvia, Krišjānis Karinš, underlined that the EU should ‘go much faster, much further’ with the sanctions, generalise the SWIFT ban across all banks in Russia and Belarus, and stop energy imports, in order not only to isolate but also to rapidly cripple the Russian economy.

Two weeks after the Russian invasion, over 2.5 million Ukrainians have fled the war and 2 million are internally displaced. EU leaders emphasised that the Union was offering ‘temporary protection to all war refugees from Ukraine’, commended European countries, in particular those bordering Ukraine, for their solidarity, confirmed that the EU would continue to ‘offer humanitarian, medical and financial support to all refugees and the countries hosting them’ through REACT-EU, and called for the rapid adoption of the proposal on Cohesion’s Action for Refugees in Europe (CARE).

Main message of the President of the European Parliament: Roberta Metsola stressed that ‘sanctions must continue to bite hard’, warning that ‘Putin will not stop in Kyiv, just as he did not stop in Crimea’.

Enlargement

Although enlargement was not on the agenda in President Michel’s invitation letter, in light of the membership applications received from Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia, the topic had to be considered, not least to give a political signal. The debate centred on whether or not to ‘fast-track’ Ukraine’s accession. The Prime Minister of Slovakia, Eduard Heger, made a proposal to invite the President of Ukraine regularly as a guest to European Council meetings. EU leaders acknowledged Ukraine’s ‘European aspirations and the European choice’ expressed in the Association Agreement, and called for efforts to ‘further strengthen our bonds and deepen our partnership to support Ukraine in pursuing its European path’. The President of Lithuania, Gitanas Nausėda, tweeted that the ‘heroic Ukrainian nation deserves to know that they are welcome in the EU’.

EU leaders noted the Council’s swift action in inviting the European Commission to submit – ‘in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Treaties’ – its opinion not only on the Ukrainian bid, but also on the Moldovan and Georgian requests. This development does not preclude the European Council from stepping in later, on the basis of Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) to review ground rules and set specific conditionality for ‘fast-tracking’. Article 49 TEU, which the declaration does not refer to explicitly, lays down the eligibility criteria and procedure in only limited detail, and states that ‘the conditions of eligibility agreed upon by the European Council shall be taken into account’. This is understood as referring to the Copenhagen criteria set by the European Council back in 1993 and to subsequent changes to them, including stricter conditionality rules agreed in recent years.

Main message of the President of the European Parliament: Roberta Metsola stressed that ‘an open European perspective’ would give Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia hope of a European future.  

Energy policy

Given the situation, EU leaders agreed to phase out EU dependency on Russian gas, oil and coal as soon as possible – no date being specified. This should be done notably by reducing ‘overall reliance on fossil fuels, diversifying suppliers and routes by using LNG and developing biogas’ as well as by ‘developing a hydrogen market in Europe’ and accelerating development of renewables. Moreover, ‘the interconnection of European gas and electricity networks’ should be improved. The European Commission had already published REPowerEU, a communication in which it proposed to cut by two-thirds the EU’s dependency on Russian gas by the end of 2022. The Commission President confirmed after the meeting that, by May 2022, the Commission would present a plan allowing fossil fuel dependency on Russia to be phased out by 2027. She called the Versailles meeting a ‘finding moment’ triggering a rethink of energy policy from an energy security perspective, with a view to reducing dependency on Russian fossil fuels and investing in home-grown renewable energy.

The High Representative/Vice-President of the Commission (HR/VP) Josep Borrell recognised that the EU had increased its dependency on Russian gas since 2014. Figure 1 shows that, with the exception of crude oil, mineral fuels imports have increased. In 2020, Russia was the EU’s number one supplier of crude oil, hard coal and natural gas, with the exception of LNG. Overall, 47 % of the EU’s gas and 25 % of its petroleum came from Russia in the first half of 2021. The debate on reducing energy dependency is not new. In 2014, EU leaders adopted the 2014-2019 Strategic Agenda recognising that ‘Europe’s current energy dependency is a vulnerability’ and that ‘diversification of energy supply and routes’ was needed ‘to reduce energy dependency, notably on a single source or supplier’. The 2019-2024 Strategic Agenda reiterated that call.

Figure 1 – EU imports of mineral fuels from Russia (2020)

EU leaders also committed to ‘urgently address’ the current spike in energy prices ‘and consider concrete options’ to counter its impact. In close coordination with the European Commission, initial measures had been put in place at national level in the fall of 2021. In a letter addressed to Ursula von der Leyen, however, the Greek Prime Minister, Kyriakos Mitsotakis, called for measures to counter the ‘weaponisation’ of gas as a result of Russia’s war in Ukraine, including ‘targeted and temporary market intervention’ to avoid speculation. EU leaders will return to the topic at their forthcoming meeting on 24-25 March 2022, at which they are expected to take decisions allowing action to counter the impact of energy prices on the most vulnerable citizens.

Main message of the President of the European Parliament: RobertaMetsola stressed that the EU’s ‘immediate goal must be energy security’ based on diversity of sources, suppliers and routes. She underlined that the EU should move towards ‘zero gas from Russia’ and stated that ‘the bottom line is that we should not be forced to fund the bombs falling on Ukraine’.

Security and defence

EU leaders reaffirmed their commitment to strengthen European security and defence and increase the EU’s ‘capacity to act autonomously’. They stressed that close EU-NATO cooperation was key to European security and that an EU stronger on defence, complementary to NATO, would only make it a more reliable transatlantic partner. EU leaders acknowledged that for those Member States that are also members of NATO, the Alliance remained the foundation of their collective defence. They therefore committed to continue ‘to invest in our mutual assistance under Article 42(7) TEU’. In a joint letter, Finland and Sweden had recalled the mutual assistance clause (Article 42(7) TEU), which sets an obligation of ‘aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter’. There are still lessons to be learned from the first activation of the clause in 2015, which could help to clarify the procedure to be followed in the event of any new activation.

The Prime Minister of Sweden, Magdalena Andersson, stressed that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine had shifted the continent’s security equilibrium, confirming her country’s decision to increase defence spending to 2 % of GDP. Several other EU countries, including Germany and Romania, have also announced an increase in their defence spending. At Versailles, EU leaders committed to bolstering the development of joint capabilities, building synergies between civil and defence space research and strengthening the European defence industry. Ursula von der Leyen announced that the European Commission would prepare an ‘analysis of the defence investments gaps’ by May 2022, when EU leaders are expected to meet informally. In the interim, EU leaders are expected to endorse the Strategic Compass at the spring European Council meeting on 24-25 March 2022.

Main message of the President of the European Parliament: Roberta Metsola stressed that the EU ‘must go beyond the European Defence Fund and make the EU budget work for our security and defence policy whenever it adds value’. She underlined that PESCO should be reformed to facilitate flexible and resilient projects and that the EDA ‘should be brought under the EU’s budget umbrella’.

Reducing dependencies, boosting the economy and fostering investments

Given the ‘new geopolitical situation‘, EU leaders agreed to foster investment by mobilising EU and national public funding. Although the modalities have yet to be defined, national fiscal policies will reflect these needs. The leaders also committed to a robust trade policy and agreed that the EU should reduce its dependence on others, identifying five strategic areas: critical raw materials, health, digital, food security and semiconductors. For semiconductors, the leaders set a measurable objective: to develop EU production capacity to secure 20 % of the global market by 2030. A 2008 French Senate report stressed the strategic nature of the EU semiconductor industry, which was at risk because of global market shifts. The EU’s share of the global market has since reached a historic low.

Main message of the President of the European Parliament: Roberta Metsola underlined that the EU needed to focus on ‘restructuring and reinvesting in research and raw materials’.

Read this briefing on ‘Outcome of the informal European Council in Versailles on 10-11 March 2022‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Henrique Morgado Simões (1st edition).

On 15 December 2021, the Commission presented a proposal to regulate methane emissions reductions in the energy sector. The proposal is part of the second batch of proposals in the ‘fit for 55’ package, aiming to align EU climate and energy laws with the EU Climate Law’s 2030 target.

The proposal aims to address gaps in current legislation: those relating to methane emissions from upstream exploration and the production of oil and fossil gas, but also those from the gathering and processing of fossil gas, the transmission, distribution and underground storage of gas, and liquid gas terminals operating with fossil and/or renewable methane. The proposal furthermore introduces provisions on methane emissions from coal mines and those originating from outside the EU in relation to importer information requirements, the methane transparency database and the methane-emitters monitoring tool. Similarly, it sets out requirements for methane emissions reduction, monitoring and reporting, leak detection and repair, and limits to venting and flaring.

In Parliament, the proposal was referred to the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI), with the rapporteur still to be appointed.

Versions

• March 2022: Fit for 55 package: Reducing methane emissions in the energy sector (1st edition)

Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on methane emissions reduction in the energy sector and amending Regulation (EU) 2019/942 Committee responsible:Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI)COM(2021) 805
15.12.2021Rapporteur:To be appointed2021/0423(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Günther Sidl (S&D, Austria)
Martin Hojsík (Renew, Slovakia)Ordinary legislative procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council
on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Appointment of rapporteur Figure 1 – Key methane facts Figure 2 – Nature and timeline of requirements Figure 3 – Inactive wells: Member States’ and CAs’ responsibilities

Written by Alex Wilson (1st edition).

On 15 December 2021, the European Commission adopted a legislative proposal to recast the 2009 EU Gas Regulation, as part of the hydrogen and decarbonised gas markets package. This reflects the EU’s growing climate ambitions, outlined in the European Green Deal and its ‘Fit for 55’ package.

The Commission’s legislative proposal aims to support the decarbonisation of the energy sector by ramping up the production of renewable gases and hydrogen across the EU, and facilitating their integration in existing or new gas networks. It would create an EU legislative framework for hydrogen networks, comparable to those that already exist for natural gas and electricity. It would also oblige existing natural gas infrastructure to integrate a higher share of hydrogen and renewable gases, by means of high tariff discounts; provisions to facilitate blending of hydrogen with natural gas and renewable gases; and greater EU cooperation on gas quality and storage.

The Commission’s legislative proposal likewise includes a targeted revision of the 2017 Security of Gas Supply Regulation. This aims to foster greater regional cooperation on gas storage, facilitate the (voluntary) joint procurement of strategic stocks, and encourages Member States to take measures to address the growing risk of cyber-attacks on EU energy networks.

Versions

• March 2022: Recast EU Regulation on Gas and Hydrogen Networks (1st edition)

Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the internal markets for renewable and natural gases and for hydrogen (recast) Committee responsible:Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE)COM(2021) 804
15.12.2021Rapporteur:Jerzy Buzek (EPP, Poland)2021/0424(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Patrizia Toia (S&D, Italy)
Marie Toussaint (Greens/EFA, France)
Zdzisław Krasnodębski (ECR, Poland)Ordinary legislative procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council
on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Publication of draft report

Written by Marketa Pape.

In response to Russia’s unjustified invasion of Ukraine, the European Union has adopted unprecedented new sanctions. These included a ban of all Russian aircraft from its airspace, to which Russia reacted by banning all EU airlines from its skies. While the full weight of these decisions is only starting to be felt, the implications of the conflict for EU transport are much larger and include steep increases in fuel prices, interruptions to supply chains and the need to ensure the safe return of stranded drivers and seafarers, already problematic due to Covid-19.

State of play before the conflict

In reaction to Moscow’s 2014 annexation of Crimea, the EU adopted its first sanctions against Russia. These remain in place and target Russian individuals and organisations, but also the country’s strategic sectors of defence, energy and finance, without limiting transport connections.

In October 2021, the EU and Ukraine signed a common aviation area agreement, as a result of a process that started in 2005. It was to offer new opportunities for airlines and consumers (9.8 million passengers from the EU in 2019), based on common standards in aviation safety, security and air traffic management.

As one of the countries of the EU’s Eastern Partnership, Ukraine has been included in EU efforts to improve transport links with the Union and among these countries. The EU’s plans to extend its strategic transport infrastructure were prepared in 2018 by the European Commission and the World Bank and confirmed by the Eastern Partnership Summit in December 2021. The 39 projects in Ukraine amounting to about €4.5 billion covered all modes of transport and sought to support its trade with the EU, worth €43.3 billion in 2019.

Implications for EU transport Aviation

Reacting to Moscow’s new invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, EU countries have adopted new sanctions. In the first set of sanctions of 25 February 2022, the EU banned the sale of aircraft, parts and equipment to Russian companies, including insurance and maintenance services. Two days later, the EU banned all Russian aircraft, including private jets, from its airspace. Russia responded by banning from its skies all EU airlines and the airlines of 36 countries that have adopted similar sanctions. Further airspace closures were adopted by Belarus (partial) and Moldova (full). With Ukrainian airspace closed, movements by air of roughly 3.3 % of air passenger traffic in Europe have stopped, in addition to the passenger flights between Russia and Europe, which accounted for 5.7 % of global international traffic in 2021.  

Many flights have had to be cancelled or rerouted, with impacts mostly on Europe-Asia and Asia-North America connections. Bypassing Russian airspace lengthens flight times and increases fuel consumption. Following the invasion, the price of jet fuel increased to US$141 per barrel on 4 March, up 27 % in one month. Expert estimates of costs for an extra hour of passenger flight time vary between €3 600 and €15 000, depending on the size of the aeroplane and the price of fuel, which makes some routes uneconomic or impractical. Re-routing may also necessitate a refuelling stop, if the path extends beyond the range of the aircraft. Air operators are evaluating which flights to continue operating and whether to pass on the costs to consumers through fuel surcharges. Air cargo rates have also increased, to 120 % above their pre-crisis level by 7 March, and are continuing to rise. Sanctions and bans are expected to reduce flight capacity, especially between Europe and Asia, unless airlines in other parts of the world, such as the Middle East, fill the gap. Higher airfares could reduce demand for air travel.

According to analysts, Russian airlines have about 980 passenger jets in service, of which 777 are leased, mostly from companies based in Ireland. The sanctions have made it hard for Russian airlines to pay their lessors and also require that the existing lease contracts with Russian airlines be terminated by 28 March. However, leasing companies fear for their assets, as the state-owned airline Aeroflot and carriers that it owns are not responding to requests for the return of aircraft once lease agreements are terminated.

Rail

In addition to extra train services run by Ukrainian Railways, rail companies in neighbouring countries are organising humanitarian trains to evacuate refugees from Ukraine and send humanitarian aid back into the country. Other rail companies are banding together to offer additional carriages on trains and make travel free for Ukrainians to reach refuge or join family members across the continent.

While Russian railways are targeted by EU sanctions, freight trains can still run through Russia, but they cannot stop there. Many logistics companies operating rail freight connections between China and the EU are avoiding transit through Russia for security reasons. Instead of the ‘main route’, which previously served half of all EU-bound rail freight traffic, they opt for the ‘middle corridor’ through Azerbaijan and Georgia to Istanbul, where the cargo is reloaded onto vessels bound for Trieste. Transit through Ukraine accounted for only 2 % of the westbound container traffic volumes on the New Silk Route in 2021, but was on the rise, a fact recognised both by China and by Slovakia and Hungary, which were planning investments to develop the route through Ukraine.

Road

On 25 February, the International Road Transport Union (IRU) estimated that at least 12 000 truck drivers of many nationalities were stuck in Ukraine and the wider region, and urged the governments concerned to protect blocked truck drivers and prioritise their passage. By 4 March, with up to 5 000 drivers still stranded, the IRU called again on the Ukrainian authorities to ease the passage of drivers at border crossings.

Many transport organisations have offered their buses, coaches and trucks to help transport refugees and essential goods. To facilitate this support, seven EU countries along major transport routes towards Ukraine exempted humanitarian transport from tolls and rules on professional driving time and rest time.

In December 2021, road transport operators warned that driver shortages, pandemic restrictions, increased demand and rising fuel prices were causing supply chain disruptions. Uncertain fuel prices and supply are likely to further increase road freight rates, already at record high levels before the invasion.

Maritime

To address the impacts of the situation in the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov on shipping and seafarers, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) called an extraordinary session of its Council for 10-11 March.

Ukrainian and Russian seafarers make up 14.5 % of the global shipping workforce and EU fleets rely on them heavily. Fearing the impact on crew changes, already stretched due to Covid-19, European ship owners urged EU regulators to guarantee seafarers’ mobility and their rights as essential workers. They also warned that the severe crew shortages, delayed salary payments and closed Ukrainian ports could disrupt supply chains. With several commercial ships hit in the conflict, operators were forced to divert vessels. Most large shipping companies, citing unpredictable operational impacts, have suspended shipments to and from Russia, but some also to Ukraine. Bunker fuel prices rose sharply across the globe following the invasion.

Sanctions against Russia are complex and evolving. The companies targeted by EU sanctions include the Novorossiysk Commercial Sea Port and the United Shipbuilding Corporation. The UK, for its part, has banned Russian ships from its ports. It has been suggested, though, that as the UK ban is not accompanied by a blacklist, port operators are left with the complex task of identifying those ships, which requires the tracking of roughly 6 000 Russian-affiliated vessels, of which about 60 % do not sail under a Russian flag.

Renewed focus on military mobility

In the longer term, the conflict will likely lead to increased military spending. In the Versailles declaration, adopted by the European Council on 11 March 2022, EU leaders pledged to accelerate the ongoing efforts to enhance military mobility throughout the EU. While this refers to the ability to deploy, train and supply armed forces across European territory, for transport it means enhancing some strategic infrastructure segments of its transport network to support their dual use for military and civilian purposes. About €1.7 billion in co-funding is earmarked for such projects in the EU’s long-term budget for 2021-2027.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Russia’s war on Ukraine: Implications for EU transport‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marcin Szczepański.

It is widely held that geopolitical tensions in the world are on the rise. One of the clear indicators of this phenomenon is the increasing use of economic tools for the pursuit of strategic and geopolitical aims. This can take the form of coercion exerted by one country on another through trade or investment restrictions to interfere with their sovereign choices. In response to the EU and its Member States becoming the target of deliberate economic coercion in recent years, on 8 December 2021 the Commission published a proposal for the adoption of an anti-coercion instrument (ACI) that would allow the EU to better respond to such challenges on a global scale.

While the new framework is primarily designed to deter economic coercive action through dialogue and engagement, it also allows – as a last resort – to retaliate with countermeasures comprising a wide range of trade, investment and funding restrictions. While there is broad support for creating a legislative tool to address the growing problem of economic coercion, opinions are divided as regards the severity of countermeasures and the manner of establishing when they should kick in.

Within the European Parliament, the file has been assigned to the Committee on International Trade (INTA). A draft report is expected to be published in April.

Versions

• March 2022: Proposed anti-coercion instrument (1st edition)

Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of the Union and its Member States from economic coercion by third countries Committee responsible:International Trade (INTA)COM(2021) 775
8.12.2021Rapporteur:Bernd Lange (S&D, Germany)2021/0406(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Anna-Michelle Asimakopoulou (EPP, Greece); Marie-Pierre Vedrenne (Renew, France); Reinhard Bütikofer (Greens/EFA, Germany); Roman Haider (ID, Germany);
Michiel Hoogeveen (ERC, Belgium);
Helmut Scholz (The Left, Germany).Ordinary legislative procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Publication of draft report

Written by Rachele Rossi.

One of the main objectives of EU policy is to maintain vibrant rural areas. Rural economies however still face a number of socio‑economic pressures. The European Commission’s long-term vision for EU rural areas, to 2040, identifies action to take to ensure stronger, connected, resilient and prosperous rural areas and communities.

Recent figures reveal that rural areas cover more than 80 % of total EU territory and are home to 30 % of the EU population. These areas are both nature reservoirs and agricultural spaces. Moreover, life in rural areas can be a safer and healthier alternative to living in highly populated cities, and a hub for innovating ideas on more sustainable business models. However, many EU rural areas face the same challenges, such as demographic decline, low income and lack of economic opportunities, poor access to services and connectivity, low education and digital skill levels, and low employment rates, especially among women.

In 1997, the European Commission’s Agenda 2000 made the first move towards creating an EU rural development policy within the common agricultural policy (CAP). Co‑financed by EU and national funds, rural development measures helped rural areas tackle economic, environmental and social challenges. Over the years, rural development expenditure has continued to increase. Evaluations have highlighted the positive impact of certain measures, such as those related to village renewal and local development approach, as they are considered well-targeted and relevant to local needs. Although these measures only represent a small proportion of CAP funding, they play an important role in addressing the socio-economic needs of rural areas.

The recently adopted rules of the post-2022 CAP set the types of intervention for rural development that should be funded under the national CAP strategic plans. Each EU country will define where CAP funding will be used to achieve set objectives, including employment, growth, gender equality, social inclusion and local development in rural areas. The Commission’s recommendations on the national CAP strategic plans indicate that they are aiming to make fast broadband internet in rural areas accessible to 100 % of the population by 2025. This means that the share of rural households with next generation access (NGA) broadband will have to increase significantly from the 2019 EU average share of 56.4 %.

Following a public consultation launched in September 2020, the European Commission published ‘A long-term Vision for the EU’s Rural Areas – Towards stronger, connected, resilient and prosperous rural areas by 2040‘ on 30 June 2021. This represents a significant policy development. The specific issues and challenges faced by rural areas are now at the core of a wide‑ranging set of actions that look even beyond the CAP’s rural development measures. The long‑term vision includes proposals for a rural pact that engages EU, national, regional and local levels in supporting the vision and action plan with flagship projects and new tools to support stronger, connected, resilient and prosperous rural areas. A rural observatory will help improve data collection and analysis on the situation in rural areas. A ‘rural proofing’ mechanism will assess the anticipated impact of major EU legislative initiatives on rural areas.

The Commission’s communication sparked stakeholders’ interest and expectations for its potentially game‑changing role in the EU’s approach to the development of rural areas. For its part, the European Parliament has decided to draw up an own-initiative report on the long‑term vision for the EU’s rural areas.

More information can be found in the briefings on ‘Long-term vision for rural areas: European Commission communication‘ and ‘EU rural development policy: Impact, challenges and outlook‘ on the European Parliament Think Tank.

Written by Bruno Bilquin with Beatrix Immenkamp.

In an unprecedented and unanimous reaction to the Russian war on Ukraine that began on 24 February 2022, the EU swiftly decided to provide €500 million from the European Peace Facility to fund and coordinate EU military assistance and to deliver military (including lethal) equipment to Ukraine. The Council had already adopted an assistance measure of €31 million for non-lethal assistance to Ukraine on 2 December 2021. For the first time in its history, the EU is now using a dedicated, although off-budget, tool to finance – but not to deliver, with that responsibility falling on Member States alone – lethal military equipment for a third country.

The EU decisions to mobilise €500 million for military assistance to Ukraine

On 27 February 2022, the EU High-Representative for Foreign Affairs and Vice-President of the Commission (HR/VP), Josep Borrell, announced that he would propose that the Council respond favourably to a request for military assistance by Ukraine and use the European Peace Facility (EPF), an off-EU budget instrument operational since 1 July 2021, to fund emergency assistance measures. This would include a support package worth €450 million for military equipment and platforms designed to deliver lethal force, and a €50 million package to finance supplies such as fuel, protective equipment and emergency medical items. On 28 February, the Council took the corresponding decisions for two assistance measures under the EPF aimed at assisting the Ukrainian armed forces, Decision (CFSP) 2022/338 for the supply of military equipment and platforms designed to deliver lethal force and Decision (CFSP) 2022/339 for non-lethal support.

The EPF has a financial ceiling of €5.692 billion (in current prices) for 2021‑2027, with an annual ceiling that should increase gradually every year. For 2022, the planned ceiling is €540 million. The new €500 million assistance measures to Ukraine cover 2022 and 2023 (in accordance with Article 1(4) of Decisions 2022/338 and 2022/339). An increased EPF budget is reportedly on the agenda of the informal European Council meeting of 10 and 11 March 2022, in Versailles. Member States contribute to the EPF budget annually, according to their GNI. Denmark has opted out of the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and therefore does not contribute to the part of the EPF which replaces the Athena mechanism and finances common costs of the EU’s military operations under the CSDP. Following the invasion of Ukraine, on 6 March 2022, the main Danish parliamentary parties agreed that a referendum will be held on 1 June 2022 to decide on Denmark’s CSDP participation, signalling a possible ending of the Danish opt-out, although it is not yet clear whether this would impact Denmark’s position vis-à-vis the EPF. However, Denmark is planning to supply high-tech weapons to Ukraine, a decision reportedly backed by a broad majority in its parliament. Austria, Ireland and Malta, neutral Member States without CSDP opt-outs, are only contributing to non-lethal assistance measures.

On 2 December 2021, the Council adopted assistance measures for Georgia (€12.75 million) Moldova (€7 million) and Ukraine (€31 million), all for three years and aimed at strengthening the capacities of the beneficiary countries in military and defence matters, as well as promoting domestic resilience and peace. Providing military equipment to Ukraine: The clearing house

In response to the Russian attack on Ukraine, individual Member States began to supply military equipment to Ukraine earlier this year, subject to available stocks. This did not necessarily meet the needs of the Ukrainian army. In response, the European Union Military Staff (EUMS) has set up a clearing house within the EUMS to coordinate supply and demand (in accordance with Article 4(2) of Decision 2022/338). Ukraine sends official lists to this clearing house, specifying the equipment needed. Clearing-house staff hold meetings with all Member States and with partners – the United States, Canada, United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand, with the possibility to also involve South Korea and Norway in future – and provide information on: the equipment needed, offers, comparison, analysis of priorities and a military analysis of the evolution of the situation. Ukraine and the EU check and validate the list, after which the Member States then agree on what they will provide and each deliver the equipment and arms individually. The ongoing strategic compass process is expected to confirm the role of the EUMS in implementing the EPF-funded military assistance measures, and stress the importance of the EPF itself as a tool for EU action as a global security and peace provider.

The EU Advisory Mission (EUAM) Ukraine, a non-executive civilian mission under the CSDP, began operations in December 2014. Its mandate is to contribute to the creation of an accountable and efficient civilian security sector. Due to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, EUAM was forced to evacuate. The mission continues, however, to maintain contact with its Ukrainian counterparts. The fighter jets question

The Ukrainian Foreign Minister asked the EU to provide Soviet-era fighter jets, which could be operated by Ukrainian military pilots. The EU has considered providing such assistance; Bulgaria, Croatia, Poland, Romania and Slovakia fly or store such models. However, on 1 March 2022, Bulgaria, Poland and Slovakia reportedly ruled out supplying their planes. On 6 March 2022, Poland suggested handing over its 28 MiG‑29 fighter planes to the Ukrainian armed forces, through US intermediaries, a proposal that took several forms and was the subject of diplomatic exchanges, but has not come to fruition. Pentagon Press Secretary John Kirby issued a statement rejecting the plan on 8 March 2022, citing concerns it would raise a serious issue for NATO.

No plans for a no-fly zone over Ukraine, nor for NATO troops to fight in Ukraine

Ukraine has asked NATO to establish a no-fly zone over Ukraine. However, on 5 March 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin warned NATO against the move: ‘We will consider any move in this direction as participation in the armed conflict of the country from whose territory a threat to our servicemen is created. We will consider them participants in hostilities [from] that very second’. During a press conference on 4 March 2022, NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg confirmed that there would be no ‘no-fly zone’ over Ukraine and that NATO troops would not fight in Ukraine.

European Parliament position

The Parliament held an extraordinary plenary session, on 1 March 2022, with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and the Speaker of the Ukrainian Parliament (Verkhovna Rada) Ruslan Stefanchuk speaking from Kyiv. Following the session, Parliament adopted a resolution calling for: the EPF to be used to allocate significant additional funding to provide Ukraine with defensive military capacity; the full and immediate implementation of the assistance measures to Ukraine decided on 2 December 2021 and 28 February 2022; tougher sanctions against Russia; and new efforts to consider Ukraine’s request for EU candidate status. The resolution also calls for an urgent reassessment of the EUAM’s mandate and for it to be updated with a military training component. Based on earlier discussions, the latter would be linked to EPF funding. Parliament also supports the strengthening of the EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova (EUBAM) at the border between Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova/Transnistria. Further debate on the refugee situation and the EU’s role and Europe’s security situation took place in plenary on 8‑9 March 2022.

EU Member States providing equipment to Ukraine
Under the EPF, Member States can be reimbursed for both lethal and non-lethal military equipment they have sent to Ukraine since the beginning of this year. Equipment already sent or promised includes (non-exhaustive list): Belgium: 5 000 machine guns (2 000 initially, followed by 3 000), as well as body armour, helmets and fuel. Germany: 1 000 anti-tank weapons and 500 missiles. Austria: 10 000 helmets. Denmark: 2 700 weapons, shoulder-borne anti-tank weapons and protective equipment such as body armour. Spain: weapons, ammunitions, medical material and protective equipment. France: missiles, ammunitions, protective equipment and fuel. Italy: demining material and protective equipment. Netherlands: anti-tank weapons, 100 rifles, 400 missiles, ammunition, as well as radars and protective equipment. Sweden: 5 000 anti-tank rocket launchers and 5 000 bullet-proof vests. Czechia: arms, including 150 guns, 5 000 assault rifles, 2 085 other rifles, 3 200 machine guns, the corresponding ammunition, as well as medical material. Estonia: anti-tank missiles, protective equipment and medical material. Latvia: drones and ammunition. Finland: 2 500 assault rifles, ammunition, 1 500 anti-tank weapons, plus protective equipment, medical material and enhanced humanitarian support. Hungary: no lethal weapons, but a humanitarian aid package, including fuel and food.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Russia’s war on Ukraine: The EU’s financing of military assistance to Ukraine‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Ralf Drachenberg.

Summary

The European Council consists of the Heads of State or Government of the 27 EU Member States, as well as the President of the European Council and the President of the European Commission. It became a formal European Union (EU) institution, with a full-time President, under the Treaty of Lisbon. Although it does not exercise legislative functions, the European Council’s role – to ‘provide the Union with the necessary impetus for its development’ and to define its ‘general political directions and priorities’ – has developed rapidly over the past twelve years. The European Council President has a crucial role to play in this context.

The first term of Charles Michel, the incumbent President, comes to an end on 31 May 2022. Based on previous cycles, the decision on the (re-)election of the European Council President for the period from July 2022 to November 2024 is expected to be taken at the last formal European Council meeting before the end of the current mandate.

This briefing provides answers to some of the most frequently asked questions on the office of President of the European Council, in particular the position’s role and the election process. It also provides examples from the mandates of the three office holders to date.

1. When was the permanent office of President of the European Council created?

The office of full-time President was introduced in 2009 with the Lisbon Treaty – at the same time as the European Council became a fully fledged EU institution. It replaced the previous rotating presidency of the European Council, held by the Head of State or Government of the Member State holding the presidency of the Council of the European Union (Council of Ministers), which continues to chair most Council formations. The office was created, among other reasons, to bring more continuity and coherence to the European Council’s work.

This updates an October 2016 EPRS Briefing, ‘The choice of the President of the European Council: Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ)’.

2. What is the role of the European Council President?

The role of the President is set out in Article 15(6) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), which specifies that the President of the European Council:

• chairs the European Council and drives forward its work;
• ensures the preparation and continuity of the work of the European Council in cooperation with the President of the Commission, and on the basis of the work of the General Affairs Council;
• endeavours to facilitate cohesion and consensus within the European Council;
• presents a report to the European Parliament after each formal meeting of the European Council.

The President of the European Council also ensures the external representation of the EU on issues concerning its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), without prejudice to the powers of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.

Herman Van Rompuy, the first full-time President of the European Council, described his role as follows:

The European Council is generally considered to be the highest political authority in the Union but the job description and formal competences of its President are rather vague, even meagre. A lot therefore depends on what you do with it or make of it! I can put it differently: everything what was not foreseen formally, had to be created informally.

3. Is the President a member of the European Council?

The European Council’s President, just like the President of the European Commission, is a member of the European Council. Article 15 TEU states that ‘the European Council shall consist of the Heads of State or Government of the Member States, together with its President and the President of the Commission’. The difference between these two categories of members is that, as opposed to the Heads of State or Government, the two presidents do not have voting rights; thus, according to Article 235(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), ‘where the European Council decides by vote, its President and the President of the Commission shall not take part in the vote’.

4. How long is the President’s term of office?

Article 15(5) TEU states that the term of office of the President of the European Council is two and a half years. The same person can be re-elected once. Prior to 31 May 2022, the Heads of State or Government will need to decide whether or not to appoint Charles Michel for a second term as President, or choose someone else to succeed him. In both cases, the (re-)election process is the same. Based on previous practice, the decision is expected to be taken at the last formal European Council meeting before 31 May 2022, i.e. the spring meeting, on 24-25 March.

5. Who can replace the President if necessary?

There is no Vice-President of the European Council to provide support to the President or take over in the event that were necessary. In case of illness or death, or if the President’s term is ended due to impediment or serious misconduct in accordance with Article 15(5) TEU, the member of the European Council representing the Member State holding the rotating Council presidency replaces the President of the European Council until the election of his or her successor (Article 2(4) of the European Council Rules of Procedure).

6. Who proposes the candidate(s) for the office of President?

Neither the Treaties nor the European Council’s Rules of Procedure specify who is officially in charge of steering the nomination process and proposing the names of possible candidates. For the election and re-election of Herman Van Rompuy, it was the leader of the Member State holding the rotating Council presidency (the Swedish and Danish Prime Ministers, respectively) who collected proposals from the Heads of State or Government and sounded out the views of the other EU leaders. When considering his successor, the President himself was crucial in the selection process and proposed Donald Tusk as candidate, after seeking out the opinion of the Heads of State or Government.

When considering the re-election of Donald Tusk, it was the Head of State or Government of the Member State holding the rotating presidency at the time (i.e. the Prime Minister of Malta), who sounded out the views of the European Council members and chaired this agenda point. When looking for a successor in 2019, the process was coordinated by Donald Tusk.

7. How does the election process work?

The election of the President of the European Council is decided by qualified majority voting (Article 15(5) TEU). Using the same procedure, the European Council can also terminate his or her term of office in the case of an impediment or serious misconduct.

While decision-making by consensus is sought, this has not always been achieved. For Donald Tusk’s re-election on 9 March 2017, the Polish government voted against re-electing him, while all the others voted in favour. As a protest against Donald Tusk’s re-election, the then Polish Prime Minister, Beata Szydło, refused to agree on the conclusions, which can only be adopted by consensus; thus, for the first time, the European Council meeting ended with ‘conclusions by the President of the European Council’, as opposed to the standard European Council conclusions.

During the process of selecting his successor (and other high-level appointments at the start of the 2019 institutional cycle), Donald Tusk stressed that these decisions were to be taken by consensus, if possible, but that he ‘would not shy away from putting [them] to the vote’ if needed.

The election of the European Council’s President, as opposed to that of the Commission President and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (as a member of the College of Commissioners), does not need the European Parliament’s approval (see Table 1).

PositionTreaty articleEuropean Council roleEuropean Parliament rolePresident of the European Commission17(7) TEUPropose candidateElect candidatePresident of the European Council15(5) TEUElectNoneHigh Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy18(1) TEUAppoint (with agreement of the President of the Commission)Part of the approval of the College of CommissionersTable 1 – Treaty-based roles of the European Council and the European Parliament for high-level appointments 8. Who has held the office to date?

To date, three individuals have held the office of President of the European Council: Herman Van Rompuy, Donald Tusk and Charles Michel. Herman Van Rompuy was 62 years old at the start of him term of office as President (in 2009), while Donald Tusk was 57 (2014) and Charles Michel was 43 (2019).

Figure1 – Office holders, their European political party affiliation, Member State and date of (re-)election 9. What are the criteria for choosing the President?

Prior to the Lisbon Treaty, there was no choice for the members of the European Council as to who should hold the presidency, as it was automatically the Head of State or Government of the Member State holding the rotating presidency who carried out this role. The changes introduced with Lisbon gave them the possibility to choose the person who they believed would be most suitable to hold this office.

When choosing the future President of the European Council, EU leaders take into account other factors besides the candidates’ professional experience and performance to date. Attention may notably be paid to ensuring a certain balance between political forces in the EU, Member States and gender.

This balance is partially reflected and formalised in Declaration (No 6) on Article 15(5) and (6), Article 17(6) and (7) and Article 18 TEU, which states that ‘in choosing the persons called upon to hold the offices of President of the European Council, President of the Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, due account is to be taken of the need to respect the geographical and demographic diversity of the Union and its Member States’. During the nomination process for the EU’s new institutional leadership in 2019, Donald Tusk stressed that the nominations should reflect the EU’s demography and geographical balance, but also gender and political balances.

Unlike in previous cases, the election of Charles Michel as President of the European Council in 2019 was part of a package agreed at the special European Council meeting of 30 June-3 July 2019, which also included the positions of President of the European Commission, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and President of the European Central Bank (the latter not being a political appointment).

Figure 2 – Overview of high-level office-holders since the 2009 European Parliament elections 10. What factors determine whether a President is re-elected?

When the President seeks re-election, his or her prospects depend on various factors, including how successful or unsuccessful their first term in office has been; how many supporters or critics they may have in the European Council; the extent of political support in their home country; the existence of any strong or obvious alternative candidates; and the party political balance in the European Council at the time.

11. Can the President of the European Council hold other offices?

While the Treaty clearly states that the European Council President ‘shall not hold a national office’ (Article 15(6) TEU), it does not specify that it is forbidden to hold another European office. In fact, Herman Van Rompuy, Donald Tusk and Charles Michel each also served as President of the Euro Summit while President of the European Council.

The Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (TSCG) lays down that ‘the President of the Euro Summit shall be appointed by the Heads of State or Government of the Contracting Parties whose currency is the euro by simple majority at the same time as the European Council elects its President and for the same term of office’ (Article 12 TSCG). It does not specify that the President of the Euro Summit must come from a country that is part of the euro area. Donald Tusk (Poland) was President of the Euro Summit, but did not come from a country that was part of the euro area.

Merging the positions of President of the European Council and President of the European Commission

As argued by academics and mentioned in the European Parliament’s February 2017 resolution on improving the functioning of the EU, building on the potential of the Lisbon Treaty, the Treaties leave open the possibility for the offices of Presidents of the European Council and of the European Commission to be held concurrently by the same person.

In his 2017 State of the Union address, then Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker proposed to merge the offices of the Presidents of the European Commission and of the European Council into a ‘double-hatted President‘, as ‘Europe would be easier to understand if one captain was steering the ship’. He added that ‘having a single President would better reflect the true nature of our European Union as both a Union of States and a Union of citizens’.

Read this briefing on ‘Role and election of the President of the European Council: Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ)‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Katarzyna Sochacka and Clare Ferguson.

As the March I 2022 plenary session in Strasbourg took place just two weeks after Russia launched its war on Ukraine, security and economic issues were high on the agenda. Members held a debate with Kaja Kallas, Prime Minister of Estonia, on the EU’s role in a changing world and the security situation in Europe, and debated Council and Commission statements on the deterioration of the situation of refugees fleeing Ukraine. Celebrating International Women’s Day, Members heard an address by Ukrainian author, Oksana Zabuzhko. Members also debated a number of other Commission statements: on the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina; on transparency and standards in public access requests; on the need for EU action on sustainable textiles and on chronic kidney disease. Members approved the establishment of three temporary committees: a special committee on Covid‑19; an inquiry committee on the use of Pegasus and equivalent surveillance spyware; and the continuation for a second one-year term of the work of the Special Committee on Foreign Interference in all Democratic Processes in the EU, including Disinformation (INGE). Several debates and votes on legislative files took place, inter alia on the European Semester, batteries and battery waste and the general Union environment action programme to 2030.

Batteries and waste batteries

Members debated an Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI) Committee report on a European Commission proposal for a regulation on batteries and waste batteries. The ENVI committee’s report calls for even higher ambition, with a wider scope to include e-bike and other light transport batteries, and greater diligence throughout the battery lifecycle, from manufacture to recycling. Members adopted Parliament’s first-reading position, setting Parliament’s negotiating position and opening the way for interinstitutional negotiations to begin.

General Union environment programme to 2030

Members debated the EU’s climate ambitions and the eighth environment action programme – the framework for EU environmental policy to 2030. Parliament adopted the provisional agreement reached between the co-legislators, setting the priorities for EU objectives targeting a sustainable economy. The aim is to accelerate the transition to a climate-neutral economy, whilst ensuring that environmental measures do not perpetuate social and gender inequalities, and to phase out fossil fuel and other harmful subsidies.

Regional economic accounts for agriculture

Members considered, and adopted at first reading, the agreed text on the proposed overhaul of the regulation on economic accounts for agriculture, formalising regional agricultural data reporting. During the negotiations, Parliament’s Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development (AGRI) underlined the need to ensure cost-efficient agricultural data collection and avoid redundancy in data reporting.

Citizenship and residence by investment schemes

A considerable number of EU countries have offered citizenship and residence by investment schemes to those (estimated at over 132 000 people between 2011 and 2019) who are wealthy enough to pay. While investment received is estimated at €21.4 billion, the schemes bear obvious risks to sincere cooperation between EU Member States, and commodify EU rights, as well as posing security, corruption, money laundering, and tax avoidance risks. Parliament has expressed concern regarding these schemes since 2014, and Members returned to the issue to consider and adopt a legislative-initiative report from the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE). The committee report demands that the Commission come up with proposals to phase out citizenship by investment schemes completely, and propose new laws to harmonise and govern the rules on residence by investment schemes.

Foreign interference in democratic processes in the EU

Parliament has criticised countries who attempt to influence elections and other democratic processes in EU countries. Russia and China are among the best-known sources of foreign interference, but over 80 countries spread disinformation. Members heard the conclusions of the report on external attempts to influence elections and other democratic processes in EU countries from Parliament’s Special Committee on Foreign Interference (INGE). Parliament adopted a resolution based on the committee’s report, which summarises the EU’s main vulnerabilities to foreign interference, witnessed in several recent elections, and recommends a comprehensive EU strategy to develop resilience. Greater awareness of the problem should be encouraged through media literacy, by closing loopholes that allow foreign financing of political parties, and through stronger sanctions for foreign actors who interfere with our democracies. Parliament later voted to continue this work in a new special committee mandate for the coming year.

Shrinking space for civil society in Europe

A political, economic, social and cultural life in which freedom of expression and of association are respected is one guarantee of a resilient civil society. Parliament is concerned that the EU civic space has deteriorated, particularly since the pandemic, with some governments hindering civil society organisations’ participation in democratic life. Members debated and adopted a LIBE committee own-initiative report, advocating new measures, including a specific EU strategy, to protect and boost civil society organisations in the EU. The report underlines that the strategy should align with EU action in other fields, including on racism.

Role of culture, education, media and sport in the fight against racism

Members also considered and adopted a Culture and Education Committee own-initiative report on the role of culture, education, media and sport in the fight against racism. Considering the 2020 EU action plan on racism, the committee underlines the action still needed to combat stereotypes, develop inclusive education, raise awareness of the history of racism and ensure fair representation of ethnic minorities in the media. The committee insists that adequate resources be made available to ensure that the ambitions can be realised, and calls for the Commission to act on discrimination in sport. The committee also urges EU countries to take effective measures to prevent the media from spreading hate speech and false narratives about particular ethnic groups.

EU gender action plan III

Parliament debated elements driving gender parity in EU external policy. Members considered and adopted a report prepared by the Women’s Rights and Gender Equality (FEMM) and the Development (DEVE) Committees, on the third EU gender action plan, which seeks to mainstream gender equality in external policy. The report welcomes integration of the EU action plan on women, peace and security into GAP III, as well as the inclusion of climate change considerations, among other things. However, regretting the Council’s failure to endorse GAP III, it also criticises the omission of issues including women’s access to natural resources; sexual exploitation and violence; and the inclusion of women in mediation processes. Finally, it calls for more EU action to counter the effects of the pandemic on women, and greater focus on gender equality in trade and investment policy.

Opening of trilogue negotiations

Members confirmed, without vote, a mandate for negotiation from the Fisheries (PECH) Committee on the proposal for a regulation laying down conservation and management measures applicable in the Western and Central Pacific Convention Area.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Plenary round-up – March I 2022‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marcin Grajewski.

Many politicians and analysts have been arguing in recent years that, being highly vulnerable to external shocks, the European Union should boost its ‘strategic autonomy’ and/or develop a higher degree of ‘European sovereignty’. These concepts encompass a greater potential for independence, self-reliance and resilience in a wide range of fields – such as defence, security and trade, as well as in industrial, digital, economic, migration and health policies.

Russia’s military offensive in Ukraine gives this issue great urgency. In energy, the European Commission has now published plans to cut EU dependency on Russian gas by two-thirds this year and end its reliance on Russian supplies of the fuel well before 2030. And the debate is moving on to ideas and projects involving significantly more integration, solidarity and stronger joint security and defence. The EU’s strategic compass, a medium-term defence and security strategy, is being quickly updated to take into account the biggest armed conflict in Europe since World War II.

This note offers links to recent commentaries, studies and reports from international think tanks on the European issues related to European strategic autonomy and sovereignty.

The European Peace Facility: Supporting Ukraine and bolstering the EU’s strategic responsibility
Centre for European Policy Studies, March 2022

The EU and the Ukraine war: Making sense of the rise of a ‘geopolitical’ Union
Istituto Affari Internazionali, March 2022

What Russia’s war in Ukraine means for Europe
Carnegie Europe, March 2022

Russia’s war against Ukraine ends Europe’s self-deception
Carnegie Europe, March 2022

European strategic autonomy in light of Ukraine
Clingendael, February 2022

Why the Ukraine crisis should push the UK and EU into a tighter embrace on security policy
Centre for European Policy Studies, February 2022

Could EU-endorsed ‘coalitions of the willing’ strengthen EU security policy?
Centre for European Reform, February 2022

Global Gateway: Positioning Europe for a sustainable future
Clingendael, February 2022

The return of US leadership in Europe: Biden and the Russia crisis
Istituto Affari Internazionali, February 2022

Ukrainian crisis: Rethinking security in Europe
Notre Europe: Jacques Delors Institute, February 2022

The UK must not dismiss European ‘strategic autonomy’
Chatham House, February 2022

Elevating the EU’s added value as a security provider
Foundation for Progressive European Studies, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Fondation Jean-Jaurès, January 2022

EU strategic autonomy: A perennial pipe dream?
European Policy Centre, January 2022

The European Army project: The answer to the Union’s strategic shrinkage?
Europeum, January 2022

Strategic autonomy: Not without integration
Egmont, Foundation for Progressive European Studies, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Fondation Jean-Jaurès, January 2022

Strategic Compass: Towards EU space strategy for security and defence
Polish Institute for International Affairs, January 2022

In the shadow of war: Ukraine and the limits of a ‘geopolitical’ EU
Centre for European Policy Studies, January 2022

Construire l’autonomie stratégique de l’Europe face à la Chine
Institut Jacques Delors, December 2021

The future of European strategy in a changing geopolitical environment
The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, December 2021

Strategic Autonomy: Views from the North
Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies, December 2021

Strategic Compass: New bearings for EU security and defence?
European Union Institute for Strategic Studies, December 2021

Europe’s Strategic Compass: Merits and shortcomings
Istituto Affari Internazionali, December 2021

Multipolarity and EU Foreign and Security Policy: Divergent approaches to conflict and crisis response
Istituto Affari Internazionali, December 2021

The Global Gateway: A real step towards a stronger Europe in the world?
Bruegel, December 2021

The need for cooperative security In Europe
Brussels School of Governance, December 2021

European strategic autonomy in defence
Rand Corporation, November 2021

European reactions to AUKUS and implications for EU strategic autonomy
Istituto Affari Internazionali, November 2021

Instruments of a strategic foreign economic policy
Bruegel, Kiel Institute for the World Economy, DIW Berlin, November 2021

An architecture fit for strategic autonomy
Foundation for Progressive European Studies, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Fondation Jean-Jaurès, November 2021

Unpacking open strategic autonomy
Clingendael, November 2021

An architecture fit for strategic autonomy: Institutional and operational steps towards a more autonomous EU external action
Foundation for European Progressive Studies, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Fondation Jean Jaures, November 2021

European strategic autonomy and Spain’s interests
Real Instituto Elcano, November 2021

L’autonomie stratégique, cet obscur objet du désir
Institut de relations internationales et stratégiques, October 2021

Building European strategic autonomy vs. Turkish strategic depth: Macron’s diplomatic gamble
Institut français des relations internationales, October 2021

Seven steps to European defence, Transatlantic equilibrium, and Global Europe
Egmont, October 2021

The Strategic Compass: Entering the fray
Egmont, September 2021

Europe’s open strategic autonomy
European Trade Union Institute, September 2021

Read this briefing on ‘EU strategic autonomy in the context of Russia’s war on Ukraine‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marcin Cesluk-Grajewski and Nicola Censini.

On Tuesday 22 February 2022, the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) organised a conference on ‘Wellbeing and Covid‑19: Life in the pandemic’.

The event, moderated by Jutta Schulze‑Hollmén, Director of Human Resources at EPRS, followed the publication of an OECD report analysing the immediate implications of the pandemic for people’s lives and livelihoods in the industrialised world. Michal Šimečka (Renew, Slovakia), Vice-President of the European Parliament opened the conference and set the scene, recalling the severe economic and social toll Covid‑19 has inflicted. During his speech, he said that ”while a useful concept, GDP does not provide a sufficiently detailed picture of the living conditions that ordinary people experience”. It is necessary, instead, ”to dwell more on the human dimension of the disease”, notably issues such as work-life balance, health, family life, education and safety, as well as a rapidly growing number of cases of depression and the feeling of social exclusion.

In her presentation, Carrie Exton, OECD Senior Expert on Well-Being Data Insights and Policy Practice, accurately highlighted some significant social and economic inequalities that emerged during the pandemic and how these are shaping and orienting people’s daily lives. At European level, the overall picture is not so optimistic. In addition to providing interesting data on jobs, health, work-life balance, safety and more, she said people suffered from increased levels of fear, worry and depression. Such feelings are a direct result of health-related anxieties, such as the possibility of being hospitalised or dying, worries about the financial situation, the complications arising from domestic family arrangements during times of lockdown and restrictions on activities and social connectedness. While negative mental health consequences affect all ages, young people in particular have been found to be at high risk of developing poor mental health. Specific groups have been particularly hard hit, including health and care workers, people with pre-existing mental health problems, and women.

During her presentation, Carrie Exton also examined the role that wellbeing evidence can play in supporting governments” pandemic recovery efforts and in redesigning policy content from a more multidimensional perspective. Proper work-life balance, culture and civil engagement are indeed important for life satisfaction. It is therefore important that institutions start to deal with these problems as soon as possible. If mental and physical wellbeing is not addressed, there might also be both mid- and long-term consequences for our societies. That is’ why it is important to actively involve citizens and stimulate the debate on what policies and tools are needed to achieve these goals.

The conference then continued with an open discussion, with the participation of Céline Nieuwenhuys, who advises the Belgian government as Secretary General of the Federation of Social Services for Brussels and Wallonia, and Miquel Oliu Barton, Visiting Fellow at the Bruegel think tank and Adviser to the French and Spanish governments.

Céline Nieuwenhuys pointed out that crises such as pandemics often lead to divisions in a society, and governments should therefore act to bridge them, notably by taking care of the most vulnerable people’. In particular, she appealed to institutions and companies to remain open to citizens, with an individual welcome at a front desk, where time is taken to solve individual problems. In her opinion, the backlash against vaccinations might have resulted in many people losing trust in governments, or even democracy in general. She also said teleworking from home was welcomed by many, but was hated by a significant part of society, for example, single mothers who had to work while also caring for their children who had to stay at home, or those with cramped spaces. She added that tele-education was not a good solution for students.

Miquel Oliu Barton, noted that ‘the right policies should seek to overcome dichotomies such lockdowns and the erosion of trust in the government and science’. While presenting his research on Covid‑19 certificates, he pointed out that governments did not greatly improve security, but they did a lot to incentivise people to get vaccinated. The vaccination uptake grew massively since the adoption of this too. Anti-Covid policies should have been better coordinated among EU Member States, he said. The coordination worked in the economic response to the pandemic, but not in health and mobility’.

In conclusion, Petra Claes, Head of Medical Preparedness and Crisis Management at the European Parliament, described how the pandemic affected the Parliament and the concrete measures taken to prevent the spread of coronavirus in recent months.

To watch this event online, please click here.

You can find the next coming EPRS online events here.

Written by Matthew Parry and Ionel Zamfir.

International condemnation of Moscow’s war on Ukraine has reached far beyond Europe, as evidenced by overwhelming support for a United Nations (UN) resolution condemning the invasion. Several countries have gone further and joined the EU in adopting sanctions against Russia or sending military aid to Ukraine.

Broad international condemnation of Russia’s invasion at the UN

On 2 March 2022, the UN General Assembly (UNGA) convened in a special session and adopted, with a broad majority (141 votes in favour, to 5 against, with 35 abstentions and 12 absentees), resolution ES‑11/1 reaffirming Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and calling for the unconditional withdrawal of Russian forces from Ukraine. The text largely resembles the draft resolution vetoed earlier by Russia in the UN Security Council (UNSC). Unlike UNSC resolutions, UNGA resolutions cannot be vetoed, but are non-binding. Besides Russia and Belarus, the world’s least democratic regimes – Eritrea, North Korea and Syria – also voted against the UNGA resolution. Several countries that abstained (in particular China and Pakistan, but also South Africa) emphasised the need to address the security interests of both parties to the conflict. In Africa, 17 countries abstained, including those importing Russian arms, those where the Russian Wagner Group is active, and two of the continent’s most stable democracies, Senegal and South Africa. In Latin America, unsurprisingly, authoritarian regimes with traditional strong ties with Russia – Cuba and Nicaragua – abstained, along with Bolivia and El Salvador. In Asia, India and Vietnam, both importers of Russian arms, also abstained. Some countries have called for fair treatment of third countries’ nationals at Ukraine’s borders in light of reported incidents of discrimination.

Sanctions adopted against Russia

Both the EU and the United States (US) had promised before the war that Russia would pay a steep financial price for any attack on Ukraine, and have since coordinated their restrictive measures against Russia. In four rounds of sanctions, adopted on 23 February after Russia’s recognition of the two so-called ‘People’s Republics’ of Donetsk and Luhansk, and on 25 February, 28 February and 2 March after the start of the war, the EU imposed restrictions on individuals, including Vladimir Putin and senior Russian ministers; on financial transactions with all state-controlled banks; and on trade with the energy and aviation sectors, among others. Russian aeroplanes are banned from EU airspace and EU airports. US sanctions imposed from 21 February to 3 March include restrictions on Russian state banks; full blocking sanctions on numerous Russian financial institutions and businesses, including the parent company of Russia’s Nord Stream 2 natural gas pipeline project and senior Russian and Belarussian political and business figures; and export controls on US technology. Moreover, EU countries, the US and others agreed to cut out certain Russian banks from the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) financial transactions service. Discussions are ongoing in the US and the EU on a full ban on Russian oil imports.

Other countries joined the EU and the US in imposing sanctions. On 28 February, Switzerland announced a break with its long-standing policy of neutrality to mirror EU financial sanctions on Russia. On 1 and 2 March, the United Kingdom (UK) published regulations introducing new financial, trade and shipping sanctions against Russia. In addition, several allies or strategic partners of the US in the Asia-Pacific region imposed sanctions, namely Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan, with Japan’s sanctions, while less far-reaching than those imposed by the EU and the US, marking a departure from previous practice. Some of the countries that voted for the UNGA resolution, such as Brazil or Turkey, have however criticised the sanctions imposed on Russia, for different reasons.

Commitment of military aid to Ukraine

Both the EU (from the off-budget European Peace Facility) and the US paired sanctions with commitments of military aid to Ukraine in the form of money and weapons (but, so far, have neither sent combat troops nor made moves to impose a no-fly zone over Ukraine).

Most EU Member States have committed to provide defence aid, including Germany, which prior to the conflict refused to send lethal aid, as well as historically neutral Ireland, Austria, Finland and Sweden (albeit non-lethal aid in the case of the former two). These countries have been joined by non-EU countries such as Australia, Canada, North Macedonia and the UK.

Table 1: International reactions to Russia’s war on Ukraine

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Russia’s war on Ukraine: International reactions‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Martin Russell.

After a period of relative freedom in the 1990s allowed the emergence of civic activism in Russia, repression has now come full circle. Under Vladimir Putin’s power vertical, space for independent voices has narrowed. Like the political opposition and the media, civil society is now increasingly subordinate to the state.

Repressive legislation has gradually circumscribed the activities of non-governmental organisations (NGOs). As part of a more general drive to exclude external influences after a wave of post-election protests in 2011, in 2012 Russia adopted a Foreign Agent Law, whose scope since then has been progressively expanded to include media and individual activists as well as NGOs. A second Undesirable Organisations Law from 2015 excludes numerous international NGOs from the country.

While the Foreign Agent Law does not actually ban Russian NGOs from receiving foreign support, it makes it much harder for them to operate and has forced many to close down. The number of organisations concerned is relatively small, but it includes many of the country’s most prominent activists. Vaguely worded legislation puts large swathes of civil society at risk of falling foul of the law, a significant deterrent to activism.

Repressive legislation has created a divide between officially tolerated ‘social’ NGOs, whose activities and values are more closely aligned with the Kremlin’s agenda, and ‘political’ NGOs. Conditions for the latter have become increasingly hostile, leaving little room for political activism.

Read the complete briefing on ‘‘Foreign agents’ and ‘undesirables’: Russian civil society in danger of extinction?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Micaela del Monte.

The military invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation has pushed hundreds of thousands of people to flee the country and seek shelter in neighbouring countries. With each passing hour, the humanitarian situation is deteriorating both within and outside the country. Several Ukrainian cities have reportedly lost access to water, heating, electricity and basic supplies, while the civilian population is at risk of shelling and violence. While outside Ukraine’s borders, the international humanitarian community has quickly mobilised to provide support, the scale of the situation remains challenging.

Humanitarian situation

As of 8 March 2022, the United Nations Refugee Agency, UNHCR, estimated that more than 1.73 million people have fled from Ukraine to neighbouring countries – mainly to Poland, which alone welcomed around 1 million people, but also to Hungary, Moldova, Romania and Slovakia. Mostly women and children are seeking shelter and protection from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. As the days pass, the conflict is generating casualties, destruction and displacement within and outside Ukraine’s borders, causing one of the largest European humanitarian crises in recent times. The EU has stepped in to help civilians affected by the war in Ukraine, for instance with emergency aid programmes that will cover some basic needs, assistance at the EU borders, and activation of the Temporary Protection Directive (Directive 2001/55/EC). Civil society has shown great solidarity as well, to the point that some argue that this is the ‘biggest show of European mobilisation in recent years’. Nevertheless, the EU institutions recognise that humanitarian needs are expected to be enormous. Even if it is difficult to verify precisely the number of deaths and injured, overall the human costs of the ongoing invasion are already too high. Faced with this humanitarian situation, the Council of Europe has taken action as well. Both Ukraine and Russia have been Council of Europe members, since 1995 and 1996 respectively.

Council of Europe measures

On 21 February 2022, the Council of Europe’s Secretary-General, Marija Pejčinović Burić, strongly condemned the recognition by the Russian Federation, in violation of international law, of the ‘People’s Republics’ of Donetsk and Luhansk. Along the same lines, a few days later, the representatives of the 47 member states of Council of Europe held an extraordinary meeting, urging Russia ‘to immediately and unconditionally cease its military operations in Ukraine’; another extraordinary meeting was convened to examine the possibility of taking appropriate measures, ‘including under Article 8 of the Statute of the Council of Europe‘. The latter provides for the possibility to suspend a Council of Europe member from its right of representation in the event of serious violation of the principles set out in Article 3. The members of the Council of Europe must accept the principles of the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms, and ‘collaborate sincerely and effectively in the realisation of the aim of the Council’. While suspension is a temporary measure, Article 8 also provides the possibility for the Committee of Ministers to decide on the expulsion of a member in the case of non-compliance with this request.

On 25 February 2022, the Council of Europe decided to adopt Article 8 measures and suspended, with immediate effect, the Russian Federation from its rights of representation in the Committee of Ministers and the Parliamentary Assembly. However, as the Council of Europe clarified, Russia remains accountable under the European Convention on Human Rights, and the Russian judge, Mikhail Lobov, remains on the European Court of Human Rights, meaning the Court will still be able to receive complaints from Russian citizens.

This is not the first time the Council of Europe has taken action against Russia. Back in 2014, in the aftermath of the Russian annexation of Crimea, a Council of Europe resolution strongly condemned Russia’s military aggression, the ensuing annexation of Crimea and the violation of fundamental rights. Moreover, it called on Russia to withdraw its troops from Crimea immediately. Because this did not happen, a subsequent resolution suspended, inter alia, the Russian delegation’s voting rights and right to participate in election observation missions. In response, Russia suspended its contribution to the Council of Europe’s budget, causing organisational difficulties to the institution (Russia is one of the five major contributors to the Council of Europe’s budget). Eventually, in 2019, the Council of Europe voted to restore Russia’s voting rights, a decision criticised by some.

European Court of Human Rights

Ukraine and the Russian Federation are state parties to the European Convention on Human Rights, and the Strasbourg-based European Court of Human Rights is the international court competent to rule on individual or state applications alleging violations of the convention. On 28 February 2022, Ukraine introduced a request before the court – application number 11055/22, Ukraine v Russia (X) – asking for interim measures against the Russian Federation. The request referred to ‘massive human-rights violations being committed by the Russian troops in the course of the military aggression against the sovereign territory of Ukraine’. The following day, the court granted these measures according to Rule 39 of the court’s Rules. According to the court’s press release, the decision was taken because the Russian military action against Ukraine gives rise to a real and continuing risk of serious violations of the civilian population’s rights under the European Convention on Human Rights, in particular its Articles 2 (right to life), 3 (prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment) and 8 (right to respect for private and family life).

The European Court of Human Rights also asked Russia to abstain from attacking civilians, schools and hospitals, and to ensure the safety of the medical personnel and buildings within the territory under attack. Moreover, the court recalled that 2014 interim measures in relation to Russian alleged violations of the European Convention on Human Rights in Crimea, in the context of Ukraine and the Netherlands v Russia (case numbers 8019/16, 43800/14 and 28525/20), remain in force. Although it is too early to assess these interim measures’ effectiveness, it has been noted that interim measures have already been used in relation to situations of armed conflict in the past. The scholar argues that, to determine whether a state party has complied with the interim measures, one should assess whether that same party upholds the convention.

Interim measures

Although interim measures are envisaged in the court’s rules, and not in the European Convention on Human Rights, the state parties are obliged to comply with them: Rule 39 provides for the possibility to adopt such measures at the request of a party, any other person concerned, or of the court’s own motion. According to the court’s case law, interim measures are granted only where there is ‘an imminent risk of irreparable harm’, for instance in cases of expulsion and extradition. The court has also granted interim measures in the event of armed conflicts in the context of inter-state cases, when it considers that an armed conflict gives rise to a risk of serious violations of the European Convention on Human Rights.

European Parliament position

In its resolution of 1 March 2022, the European Parliament strongly condemned ‘the Russian Federation’s illegal, unprovoked and unjustified military aggression against and invasion of Ukraine’. The Parliament recalled that ‘attacks against civilians and civilian infrastructure as well as indiscriminate attacks are prohibited under international humanitarian law and therefore constitute war crimes’. It called on the European Commission, the Member States and United Nations humanitarian agencies to provide humanitarian assistance to the civilian population. The Parliament took note of the numerous reports about ‘violations of international humanitarian law committed by Russian troops, including indiscriminate shelling of living areas, hospitals and kindergartens’, and recalled that, since 2014, more than 14 000 people have lost their lives in a ‘conflict fomented by the Russian Federation in eastern Ukraine’.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Russia’s war on Ukraine: Council of Europe and European Court of Human Rights measures‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Karin Jacobs.

International Women’s Day on 8 March 2022 marks an occasion to reflect on the position of women as workers in the EU transport sector. Women only represent on average around 16 % (2020) of total employees in the different transport sectors and modes (land, water and air). In view of growing labour shortages in this important economic sector, worsened by the coronavirus pandemic, this share needs to increase, according to experts.

Context

One of the barriers to greater participation of women as workers in the transport sector is gender stereotyping, i.e. a generalisation about what is considered typically male or female work, for instance truck driving. The transport sector is known for its overall low quality of work and contracts. Working patterns are often unsuited to women’s needs as regards work-life balance and time flexibility. The sector is known for relatively low wages, poor career prospects, and limited training participation of women. Moreover, there is often a lack of appropriate workplace facilities in terms of safety and security, and of adequate tools and procedures to deal with sexual harassment. Women are under-represented in all parts of the transport sector (e.g. piloting, planning, designing, management, research and innovation). A 2021 study done for the European Parliament confirms that employment in the transport sector remains relatively unattractive for women, and recommends appropriate EU policy interventions, including funding, to tackle the problem. As the increasing labour shortages in the EU transport sector have been exacerbated by the pandemic, they call for particular attention. For instance, 2021 data from the International Road Transport Union (IRU) suggest that global driver shortages reached 17 % for bus and coach drivers and 10 % for truck drivers. Another 2021 research paper affirms that the EU lacks 400 000 truck drivers and is now reaching a critical point, whereby this could have an effect on the evolution of transport prices.

Figure 1 shows the differences in women’s employment in the land, water and air sectors of EU transport. While most of the women, in absolute terms, work in land transport (over 770 000), they only account for a 14.6 % share of the entire workforce in that subsector. In comparison, the share of female employment is much higher in air transport, where women represent 42.5 % of the workforce. In water transport, 20 % of workers are women, mainly on ferries and in cruises. In some of these sectors, changes in women’s employment are under way, and one can detect a small increase in the 2020 figures, compared with 2016. Nevertheless, further attention is needed, in particular in land and water transport.

EU action

While policies in the area of employment are the competence of EU Member States, the European Commission can support and complement national action. One of the first initiatives the Commission launched to strengthen women’s employment and equal opportunities in the transport sector was the 2017 ‘More women in transport – EU platform for change’. The platform serves as a forum to discuss and exchange relevant measures and best practice, and promotes women in transport professions by raising awareness on equality issues. In parallel, the Commission proposed new rules on work-life balance and flexible working arrangements to encourage a better division of caring responsibilities between women and men; now adopted, Directive 2019/1158/EU will apply from August 2022 to all workers who are parents or carers. In its 2020 gender equality strategy, the Commission affirmed that a gender equality perspective would have to be integrated into all EU policies as well as into EU funding programmes. Its sustainable and smart mobility strategy outlined the new opportunities linked to the transport sector’s digital transformation, including an improved working environment and better-quality jobs that could become more attractive for women. The Commission also promised to issue recommendations for the transition to automation and digitalisation, to mitigate their impact on the entire transport workforce, apply equality mainstreaming to its future transport-related policy initiatives, and continue to support stakeholder cooperation and exchange of good practice. Reacting to repeated calls from the European Parliament and the Council, in March 2021 the Commission proposed a directive on equal pay for equal work and on pay transparency (building on Directive 2006/54/EC), still to be negotiated by Parliament and Council.

European Parliament position

In a 2015 resolution, the Parliament called on the Commission to revise the recast Directive 2006/54/EC in line with its recommendations on equal pay and representation of female workers. This was followed in subsequent years by frequent parliamentary questions from various political groups. In its 2019 resolution on women’s rights and gender equality in the EU, the Parliament called inter alia for ‘real action’ to close the gender pay gap, and for targeted initiatives to address gender segregation and women’s access to labour markets. In another 2019 resolution, on the proposed directive on work-life balance for parents and carers, the Parliament insisted on requirements for equal treatment of men and women at work, which ensures guaranteed income and flexible working arrangements, and addressed the issue of stereotyping. More specific to the transport sector, during the negotiations leading up to the 2020 regulation on driving and resting periods, the Parliament insisted on the importance of having gender-friendly accommodation and better sanitary facilities at resting places. In 2020 and 2021, the Parliament also held the European Gender Equality Week, which contributed to the goal of women’s empowerment and gender equality. This has led to more visibility to and recognition of gender mainstreaming in all policy areas, including transport.

Earlier in 2022, the Parliament’s Committees on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality (FEMM) and on Transport and Tourism (TRAN) held a joint hearing on ‘Ensuring that European transportation works for women’, debating the outcomes of the study on women and transport mentioned above. Labour market participation of women is among the topics explored by the study, which points to the current lack of gender-disaggregated data within Member States. It recommends improving the share of women working in the transport sector by promoting higher social standards at EU level and measures targeting a better work-life balance, as well as dedicated education and training. Furthermore, it suggests that EU funding be regularly monitored for gender achievements – something that is already done, for instance in connection with the European Social Fund (ESF+). A further Parliament-requested study from 2021, on relaunching transport and tourism after the pandemic, mentions, specifically in relation to transport workers, the possibility to attract more female truck drivers by promoting higher social standards, safe and secure truck parking places, better resting places, and improved work-life balance measures.

Looking ahead

In recent years, there has been growing attention within the EU to the issue of gender equality, including as regards women in the transport sector. This trend has been reflected in EU strategies both of a sectoral and horizontal nature, and increasingly also in EU legislation. For its part, the European Parliament has contributed to keeping this topic high up on the EU political agenda.

The increased focus on gender issues in employment is starting to have an impact on the transport sector, which faces growing labour shortages and seeks ways to attract more younger workers as well as women to the workforce. Streamlining gender issues systematically – both in further EU action and funding – is expected to attract more women to work in this important economic sector.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Women in Transport‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Figure 1: Number and share of women employed in transport out of total employment, by transport modality, in the EU-27

Written by Rosamund Shreeves.

This year’s International Women’s Day takes place under the dual shadow of the Covid-19 pandemic and the unfolding crisis of Russia’s re-invasion of Ukraine. Both have spotlighted women’s grit and determination and their contributions to society, not least the true value of their care and emotional work. They also highlight the absolute necessity of adopting responses that are gender-sensitive and shaped with women’s participation.

A gender-sensitive humanitarian response to the Ukraine crisis

Two weeks ago, women in Ukraine were simply living their lives, studying, innovating, sitting in parliament, participating in local government, civil society, and the arts. They were already dealing with ‘ordinary’ barriers to gender equality, the impacts of eight years of conflict in the east of the country and the gendered social and economic consequences of the Covid-19 pandemic. Many were on the frontline of the health crisis. Today, many more are on the frontline of a war zone, giving birth in bomb shelters and basements, taking up arms, reporting at considerable risk to their lives, and fleeing their homes to bring their children and families to safety. Many have faced or will face multiple internal displacements inside Ukraine, while women and children make up the overwhelming majority of the refugees crossing into neighbouring countries.

Aside from the horrific consequences of attacks on civilian populations, the human rights of women and girls are at heightened risk during conflict. There is also evidence that including women in conflict resolution helps to ensure that their specific situations and needs are taken into account and to achieve more sustainable outcomes. In the current situation, the international community is highlighting the urgent need to safeguard access to medical care for pregnant women, provide safe and regular pathways to safety for all women and girls, irrespective of their nationality, ethnicity and religion, and ensure meaningful participation of women in negotiations, in line with UN resolution 1325 on women, peace and security. While welcoming the outpouring of support from private individuals, associations working on the ground are calling for coordinated action to register and accompany women and girls, and for sexual, reproductive and maternal health services and services to prevent and respond to gender-based violence to be set up in Ukraine and along the refugee routes. They also stress the need for statistics on the gender, age and disability status of refugees to inform responses. At the EU level, measures adopted so far to help those fleeing Russian aggression, include guidelines on simplifying border controls for vulnerable groups and immediate temporary protection in the EU, with rights to a residence permit, the possibility to work, housing, and access to social welfare, medical assistance and education.

A gender-sensitive recovery from the Covid-19 pandemic

If this were a ‘normal’ International Women’s Day, Irpin and the other municipalities and cities across Ukraine that are signatories to the European Charter for Equality of Women and Men in Local Life, would have been free to focus on rebuilding after the pandemic like their counterparts in the rest of Europe. Research by the EU agencies for gender equality (EIGE) and working and living conditions (Eurofound) shows that the Covid-19 crisis is having negative impacts on women’s employment, caring responsibilities, work-life balance and mental wellbeing. Unlike the financial crisis of 2008-2010, there have been high job losses in female-dominated service sectors responsible for much of the recent growth in women’s employment, as well as in the male-dominated sectors typically hit by recessions. Job losses and furloughing have been especially high among low-paid women workers. In addition, the Covid-19 crisis has had an unprecedented impact on unpaid work. Over the successive pandemic waves, closures of schools, nurseries, and day-care facilities for disabled and elderly people have shifted responsibility for care back to families. While men have taken on part of the additional unpaid work, women have shouldered the lion’s share, particular in the later stages of the pandemic. EIGE and the OECD find a connection between this increase, particularly for mothers, and the fact that women have been more likely than men to drop out of the labour market. This is echoed by the results of a special Eurobarometer survey on women and Covid-19 commissioned by the European Parliament to mark International Women’s Day. Of the 26 741 women across the EU who took part, a quarter (25 %) say that the increase in work at home meant that they were not able to do as much paid work as they wanted to, while 21 % say that they have decided to permanently reduce the amount of time they allocate to paid work. An even higher share say that the Covid-19 crisis has had an impact on their work-life balance (44 %) and that restrictions have significantly affected their mental health (41 %).

The extent of the negative impact of the Covid-19 crisis on the social and economic situation of women has triggered a debate on the urgent need to take a gender-sensitive approach in recovery policies. In this context, the establishment of the EU’s biggest financial instrument supporting recovery in the Member States – the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) – is an opportunity to channel the extraordinary resources to the measures that contribute to advancing gender equality. It is also a chance to put into practice the EU’s long-standing commitments regarding the need to mainstream gender across different policies and apply gender budgeting principles to EU spending, to ensure that women and men benefit equally from investment. Economists have demonstrated that switching recovery investment from the traditional focus on construction and manufacturing to the care sector would create more jobs for both women and men, and provide a better economic stimulus. A study for the European Parliament recommends that at least 30 % of the EU funding provided through the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) should go to investment in the care economy, to put it on an even footing with the allocations of 37 % and 30 % for the green and digital transitions. In line with the RRF Regulation, all the national recovery and resilience plans adopted to date declare gender equality to be a horizontal objective, to be given consideration in all measures. However, not all Member States have included dedicated reforms or investments explicitly addressing gender-related challenges, or indicating women as the main beneficiaries.

Position of the European Parliament

In its resolution of 1 March 2022 on the Russian aggression against Ukraine, the European Parliament called for special emphasis on the needs of women and children in humanitarian responses, including evacuations to safety. Its Committee for Women’s Rights and Gender Equality has modified the agenda of its event for International Women’s Day to address the situation in Ukraine, alongside the initial focus on exploring ambitious recovery policies. Parliament’s resolution on the gender perspective in the Covid‑19 crisis and post-crisis period addresses the harmful gendered and intersectional impacts of the pandemic and sets out recommendations for overcoming them. Parliament is clear that current and future challenges will require ‘a gender-sensitive approach, with gender mainstreaming and gender budgeting principles reflected in all aspects of the pandemic response’. It is also calling for gender-responsive use of recovery funding, including investment in the care sector.

Related EPRS publications for International Women’s Day

• Russia’s war on Ukraine: Assisting Ukrainians at the EU’s borders, EPRS At a glance briefing, 4 March 2022
• Women in foreign affairs and international security: Still far from gender equality, EPRS briefing, March 2021
• Beyond the pandemic: The potential of ambitious gender equality policy, EPRS At a glance briefing, March 2022 (available in 24 languages)
• Maternity and paternity leave in the EU, EPRS infographic, March 2022
• Equal pay for equal work between men and women: Pay transparency and enforcement mechanisms, EPRS legislative briefing, March 2022
• Topical digest: gender equality, February 2022 (links to EPRS publications on gender equality, including the gender dimensions of the Covid-19 crisis, the recovery and resilience facility and migration and asylum)

Related EPRS multimedia

• Video: Gender equality in the Recovery and Resilience Facility
• Video: Equal pay for equal work between men and women
• Video: Covid-19 increases women’s unpaid care work

Written by Claudia Vinci.

Up until Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the EU and Russia were important trade partners trading in a wide variety of goods, including agri-food products. Russia was the fifth largest importer of EU goods in 2020, despite the disruption of trade relations caused by the first Ukraine crisis in 2014. Furthermore, Russia is a major global exporter of several commodities, including sunflower oil, wheat and barley.

Background

The Russian Federation is one of the EU’s main trading partners, with the total volume of trade estimated at €173.7 billion in 2020 (Figure 1). Russia was the fifth importer of EU goods in 2020, while the EU is the first supplier to the Russian market, providing machinery and transport equipment, chemicals, manufactured goods, and agricultural products and raw materials, for a total value of €79 billion. Russia’s exports to the EU were led by fuel and mining products, agricultural products and raw materials, chemicals, and iron and steel, totalling almost €95 billion.

Figure 1 – EU trade in goods with the world and Russia (2020)

The 1997 bilateral partnership and cooperation agreement (PCA) is the general framework for EU-Russia trade relations. Negotiations for a new EU-Russia agreement, initiated in 2008, were suspended in 2014 owing to the first Ukraine crisis. In 2012, Russia joined the World Trade Organization (WTO), and EU-Russia trade relations have since been defined by the multilateral WTO rules. Since Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in March 2014, the EU has progressively imposed restrictive measures towards Russia; these led in the same year, as retaliation, to a Russian ban on selected agricultural products from the EU and some third countries, namely Australia, Canada, Norway and the United States. Although overall EU trade with Russia has continued, and even increased, from 2017 onwards, trade flows in agri-food products have decreased, as shown in Figure 2. On 24 February 2022, Russia launched an unprovoked attack on Ukraine, followed by a full-scale invasion. EU countries have since adopted unprecedentedly tough sanctions.

Figure 2 – EU trade with Russia: Agricultural products (2020) Agri-food trade figures

Trade with the Russian Federation represents 3.7 % of overall EU exports in agri-food products, and 1.4 % of overall agri-food imports. The main products imported from Russia, in terms of overall value, are residues and waste from the food industries, including oilcakes and feed components (32.3 %), oilseeds (19.1 %), animal or vegetable fats and oils (9.9 %), beverages (7.0 %), cereals (6.5 %), and other products (25.2 %). Concerning exports from the EU to Russia, the main categories are beverages (21.2 %), edible preparations (9.3 %), residues and waste from the food industries (8.0 %), oilseeds (7.4 %), live trees and other plants (7.3 %), cocoa (7.3 %), and other products (39.5 %).

Figure 3 – EU trade with Russia: Agricultural trade by product (2020)

In terms of categories of products for which a significant part of EU agri-food trade is linked to Russia (see Figure 3, share of dependency), figures show that almost 19 % of ‘other feed and feed ingredients’ imported to the EU come from Russia, as well as almost 8 % of sugar (other than beet and cane), and slightly more than 6 % of imported wheat. As for EU exports, more than half of total EU exports of soya beans are exported to Russia, as are more than 20 % of total EU exports of cocoa beans, oilseeds, eggs and honey, and cut flowers and plants. With regard to agri-food global exports, Russia is a major producer and exporter of sunflower oil (28.6 % of global exports), wheat (18 %), barley (15.4 %), and corn (2.3 %).

The impact of the Russia-Ukraine war in agri-food markets is still being evaluated; judging from both countries’ share in main agri-food commodities and fertilisers, it is expected to be considerable.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘EU-Russia trade in agri-food products‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Jakub Przetacznik with Linda Tothova.

Although Russia’s invasion of Ukraine began on 24 February 2022, it was preceded by long and repetitive military build-ups at the border, as well as by joint Russian-Belarusian military exercises on Belarusian territory. While Ukraine defends its territory with a much more motivated army, it is nevertheless smaller than and not as well equipped as the Russian forces. Military aid is being provided by EU Member States and other like-minded countries, including the United States, Canada and United Kingdom.

The attack

Russian forces entered Ukraine mainly around the country’s borders with Russia and Crimea, while Kyiv was attacked via Belarusian territory. The offensive has been much slower than Russia initially appeared to expect. As of 20:00 CET on 3 March 2022, Russia had taken control of land along the northern and south-eastern Ukrainian border with Russia, as well border regions north-west of Crimea. Russia has occupied only one regional capital to date (Kherson, 290 000 inhabitants). Russia also bombed cities including Kyiv, Kharkiv, Chernihiv and the Azov Sea city of Mariupol, which is reportedly ‘near to humanitarian catastrophe’.

The invasion is a flagrant violation of United Nations Charter Article 2 (4) prohibiting ‘use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state’. Ukraine, which is not a member of any military alliance, defends itself in accordance with UN Charter Article 51 establishing an inherent right to individual or collective self-defence in case of an armed attack against a UN member.

Balance of power Ukraine and Russia: Armed forces (2021)

With 900 000 troops, the Russian armed forces are over four times greater in number than the Ukrainian forces, which consisted of 196 000 troops in 2021. The Russian army can deploy 280 000 troops, with other armed forces, such as the navy, or the 180 000-strong command and support structures, being limited in scope for use in the war on Ukraine. It is estimated that there are currently 150 000 Russian soldiers present in Ukraine, while around 20 000 remain ready in reserve. Crucially, however, the Russian army is better equipped. Prior to the invasion, Russia disposed of 15 857 armoured combat vehicles, in comparison to Ukraine’s 3 309 – almost five times more, as well as over ten times the number of aircraft (1 391) compared with the Ukrainians (132). In January 2022, Ukraine reorganised its Territorial Defence Forces (TDF) with a new reserve force, which in mid-February 2022 were reportedly aiming at reaching 1.5‑2 million members. The actual number of TDF soldiers is unknown. In stark contrast to questions regarding the morale of the Russian army, the Ukrainian forces are highly motivated.

Cyber aspects
In the weeks preceding the war, Russia attacked Ukrainian websites in the context of its hybrid war on the country. In the past, cyber-attacks have cut off electricity networks in Kyiv. However, such attacks are not currently being seen, leading to speculation, with possible explanations ranging from Ukrainians protecting their information technology (IT) network, to possible use of Ukrainian IT infrastructure by Russian military forces. However, cyber-attack remains possible. At the same time, Ukraine has so far been able to communicate effectively with the world to provide information about the situation in the country. Ukraine is mobilising its compatriots to attack Russian websites related to the Kremlin-through the ‘Ukraine IT Army’, while other independent groups (including Anonymous and Cyber Partisans), have declared responsibility for attacks against Russia’s banks, state media and a Belarusian railway network used to move troops from Russia to Ukraine.

Russia’s military expenditure is traditionally high, equalling US$62.2 billion in 2021 – over 14 times greater than Ukraine’s US$4.3 billion. Following Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014, Russian military expenditure reached as much as 5.4 % of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2016, and has fallen below 4 % of GDP only twice. Ukraine, with its smaller economy, decided to invest its resources more peacefully, with military expenditure averaging 3.2 % of GDP in 2014‑2020, although still well above EU levels.

NATO response

A meeting of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Heads of State and Government issued a statement on Russia’s attack on Ukraine on 25 February 2022, expressing solidarity with the Ukrainian people and their democratically elected institutions, and condemning Russia’s full-scale invasion, described as a ‘terrible strategic mistake, for which Russia will pay a severe price, both economically and politically, for years to come’. As invasion has consequences for NATO’s deterrence and defence posture, consultations under Article 4 of the NATO Treaty have taken place, and defensive land and air forces in eastern NATO countries, as well as maritime assets across the NATO area, have been deployed. The commitment to collective defence under Article 5 of the NATO Treaty has been reconfirmed. The NATO Secretary General invited Finland, Sweden and the EU to join the meeting.

During a 24 February 2022 press briefing, US President Joe Biden stressed that there will not be a direct military confrontation between the USA and Russian forces. However, if the conflict extends to the Euro-Atlantic area, the USA ‘will defend every inch of NATO territory’ and meet its Article 5 commitments. The statement was followed by deployment of additional US troops to European NATO states.

EU response

The European Council immediately condemned ‘the Russian Federation’s unprovoked and unjustified military aggression against Ukraine’, calling for an immediate ceasefire and withdrawal of Russian forces. This was followed by a series of EU sanctions. Among the financial assistance to Ukraine, the Council approved two decisions providing Ukraine with €500 million for military aid and equipment. In a historic move, the EU will provide €450 million (CFSP 2022/338), to be financed by the European Peace Facility, for military equipment designed to deliver lethal force. A further €50 million (CFSP 2022/339) is for equipment and supplies not designed to deliver lethal force, such as personal protective equipment, first aid kits and fuel. A majority of EU Member States are delivering weapons or military aid in some form to Ukraine.

European Parliament position

In its resolution of 1 March 2022, the Parliament condemned Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine and demanded that Russia cease all military activities and withdraw from the country. The Parliament called on EU Member States to accelerate provision of defensive weapons for Ukraine. The Parliament also supported increased EU-Ukraine intelligence cooperation regarding the ongoing war and called for the EU institutions to work towards granting Ukraine EU candidate country status. However, mutual defence and solidarity clauses in the EU Treaties only apply to Member States.

Article 42(7) TEU (Mutual defence clause) obliges EU Member States to aid and assist ‘by all means in their power’ a Member State that has become a ‘victim of armed aggression on its territory’. Article 222 TFEU (Solidarity clause) stipulates that EU members ‘shall act jointly’ upon request by the relevant state authorities, if another Member State suffers a terrorist attack, natural or man-made disaster.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Russia’s war on Ukraine: Military balance of power‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Sidonia Mazur.

While Ukraine has received considerable support from the EU and European financial institutions since 2014, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, launched on 24 February 2022, has triggered a historic and twofold mobilisation of EU funds – for humanitarian action and military support. The European Commission has announced over €500 million in financing for humanitarian aid and the Council has decided to use the off-budget European Peace Facility (EPF) to assist Ukraine with €500 million in military aid. For the first time, the EU will direct its funds, €450 million, towards purchasing lethal weapons for a country at war, through the EPF. Should this funding prove insufficient, however, further mobilisation of the EU budget might be necessary. In its 1 March 2022 resolution, the European Parliament announced that it expects the EU and EU Member States ‘to activate any EU budget instruments available’.

State of play

Ukraine has developed a strong partnership with the European Union since 2014, including the signing and implementation of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement. The EU has assisted Ukraine financially, with EU and European financial institutions allocating over €17 billion in grants and loans to Ukraine to support the implementation of a broad reform agenda. This includes €5.6 billion via five macro financial assistance programmes. The EU has allocated more than €193 million in humanitarian aid to Ukraine since 2014, to assist victims of the armed conflict in the east of Ukraine. The EU has also provided grants worth €200 million to help Ukraine fight the Covid‑19 pandemic.

The Russian military invasion of Ukraine has aggravated the existing humanitarian crisis in the east of Ukraine and triggered a new catastrophe. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, over 1 million refugees have already fled Ukraine to neighbouring countries, mainly Poland, Hungary, Moldova, Slovakia, Romania and Russia. The European Commission estimates that up to 6.5 million people might be displaced, leading as many as 3.5 million to seek international protection, mainly in the EU. Many more millions will face extreme conditions while remaining in Ukraine.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has caused a paradigm shift in the EU’s approach to financing lethal military equipment. For the first time, the EU will purchase lethal weapons. The financial tool enabling this acquisition is the new European Peace Facility.

Since the beginning of 2022, the military threat to Ukraine has weighed heavily on investor confidence, causing a steady outflow of capital that has endangered Ukraine’s economic and financial stability.

EU response Humanitarian assistance

As the humanitarian situation in Ukraine deteriorates, the European Commission is providing emergency assistance. On 28 February 2022, the Commission announced €90 million for emergency aid programmes to help civilians in Ukraine and those displaced to Moldova. This EU humanitarian aid will provide food, water, health, shelter and help cover people’s basic needs.

The EU Civil Protection Mechanism has been activated, with offers from Member States including essential medical care items and civil protection support.

On 1 March 2022, the European Commission announced an additional €500 million from the EU budget for humanitarian aid in Ukraine and for refugees from Ukraine. It should be noted that the entire EU budget allocation for humanitarian aid worldwide for 2022 is slightly over €2 billion.

Military assistance

Under Article 41(2) TEU, the EU budget cannot be used to finance expenditure having military or defence implications, meaning common foreign and security policy (CFSP) operations outside the EU. However, Article 41(2) TEU also provides that such expenditure can be charged to the Member States. The novel European Peace Facility (EPF), created in 2021, is a financial tool outside the EU budget, financed by EU Member States based on a distribution key linked to gross national income. Using the EPF enables the EU to provide the armed forces of partner countries with infrastructure and equipment, including weapons. On 28 February 2022, the Council published its decision ((CFSP) 2022/338) on an assistance measure under the EPF for the supply of military equipment and platforms designed to deliver lethal force to the Ukrainian Armed Forces. The amount decided is €450 million for lethal arms and lethal assistance. It should be noted that the total budget for the EPF for 2022 is €540 million. This constitutes a paradigm shift, as the European Union is financing the acquisition of arms for the first time. Austria, Ireland and Malta are not participating in this measure.

At the same time the Council adopted a decision (CFSP) 2022/339 on an assistance measure under the EPF to provide the Ukrainian Armed Forces with €50 million in support. The measure shall finance the provision of equipment and supplies not designed to deliver lethal force, such as personal protective equipment, first aid kits and fuel. All EU Member States will participate.

European Parliament response

The European Parliament strongly condemns the Russian Federation’s aggression and invasion of Ukraine. In its resolution of 1 March 2022, the Parliament called ‘for the EU and its Member States to continue providing the strongest possible economic and financial support to Ukraine, as well as macro-financial and technical assistance wherever needed, including in defence- and security-related areas, to activate any EU budget instruments available and to develop a long-term strategy to support Ukraine’s efforts in strengthening the resilience of its democratic institutions and economy’. Moreover Parliament called for ‘the EU institutions to work towards granting EU candidate status to Ukraine, in line with Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union and on the basis of merit, and, in the meantime, to continue to work towards its integration into the EU single market along the lines of the Association Agreement’.

On 16 February, the European Parliament approved a €1.2 billion macro-financial loan to help Ukraine cover its external financing needs in 2022. Even before the 24 February Russian invasion, Ukraine faced significant economic challenges, which will worsen even further under the current circumstances. The loan is expected to be paid out to Ukraine during the next 12 months, in two tranches, the first being due in March 2022.

Possible further developments

The EU is equipped with a plethora of programmes aimed at supporting EU external action. These programmes are financed mainly by the EU budget. As the situation in Ukraine evolves, different elements of this system can be mobilised. The same applies to the financing of the needs relating to facilitating the welcome for refugees from Ukraine in the EU.

If the financing needs related to supporting Ukraine and those fleeing the invasion go beyond the multiannual financial framework 2020-2027 (MFF) agreement, there might be a need to use flexibility or even revise the MFF spending ceilings. This is a political and budgetary process that would need to involve both the Council and the European Parliament.

(The figures used in this briefing reflect the situation as of 3 March 2022 at 18:00 CET.)

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Russia’s war on Ukraine: EU budget response‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.