European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Angelos Delivorias (1st edition).

Two European Union (EU) directives regulate the EU collective investment funds industry, the Directive relating to undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) and the Alternative Investment Funds Manager Directive (AIFMD). The UCITS, which covers mutual funds, lays down uniform rules, allowing their cross-border offer, while the AIFMD, which covers hedge funds and private equity, lays down the rules for authorising, supervising and overseeing the managers of such funds. While reviewing the application of the scope of the AIFMD (as mandated), the European Commission considered that a number of issues highlighted in the AIFMD review were equally relevant for the activities of UCITS. As a result, it proposed to amend both directives, to better align their requirements.

The file is currently under review by the co-legislators. Within the European Parliament, it has been assigned to the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, which is now considering the draft report.

Version

• June 2022: Amendments to AIFMD and UCITSD (1st edition)

Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directives 2011/61/EU and 2009/65/EC as regards delegation arrangements, liquidity risk management, supervisory reporting, provision of depositary and custody services and loan origination by alternative investment funds Committee responsible:Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON)COM(2021) 721
25.11.2021Rapporteur:Isabel Benjumea (EPP, Spain)2021/0376(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Paul Tang (S&D, the Netherlands)
Billy Kelleher (Renew, Ireland)
Mikuláš Peksa (Greens/EFA, Czechia)
Gunnar Beck (ID, Germany)
Eugen Jurzyca (ECR, Slovakia)Ordinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Vote in committee on the draft report © ipopba / Adobe Stock

Written by Nikolina Šajn (1st edtion).

On 30 March 2022, the Commission published a proposal for a directive empowering consumers for the green transition, through better protection against unfair practices and better information. The proposal is designed to enhancing consumer rights in making informed choices in order to play an active role in the transition to a climate-neutral society. It proposes new rules to provide consumers with information on products’ sustainability, in particular their durability and reparability, at the point of purchase. It also aims to promote commercial guarantees exceeding the two-year legal guarantee, as well as to ban false and misleading green claims (‘greenwashing’) and certain types of premature obsolescence of products.

In the European Parliament, the file has been referred to the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection. In the Council, discussions have started in the working party on consumer protection and information.

Version

• June 2022: Empowering consumers for the green transition (1st edtion)

Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directives 2005/29/EC and 2011/83/EU as regards empowering consumers for the green transition through better protection against unfair practices and better information Committee responsible:Internal Market and Consumer ProtectionCOM(2022) 143
30.3.2022Rapporteur:Biljana Borzan (S&D, Croatia)2022/0092(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Arba Kokalari (EPP, Sweden)
David Cormand (Greens/EFA, France)Ordinary legislative
procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council
on equal footing –
formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Publication of draft report

Written by Marcin Grajewski.

EU Heads of State or Government will discuss war-torn Ukraine’s bid to join the EU when they meet at a regular European Council meeting in Brussels next week. The leaders are expected to discuss Ukraine’s request to gain the status of official EU candidate along with French President Emmanuel Macron’s plan to create a ‘European Political Community’, with Ukraine as a member, as news media have reported, quoting draft Council conclusions. The meeting on 23-24 June is unlikely to make any firm decisions on either of the two proposals, the quoted draft conclusions suggest. EU enlargement, which had been on the backburner for some years, returned to the spotlight after Russia attacked Ukraine on 24 February. Having failed to conquer Ukraine quickly, Russia is now concentrating its war effort in the south-eastern provinces of the country.

This note gathers links to recent publications and commentaries from many international think tanks on Russia’s war on Ukraine. Earlier analyses of the implications of the war can be found in a previous edition of the ‘What Think Tanks are Thinking’ series.

Ukraine’s female soldiers reflect country’s strong feminist tradition
Atlantic Council, June 2022

Russia’s war on global food security
Atlantic Council, June 2022

Food security: The role and limits of international rules on export restrictions
Bruegel, June 2022

What Russia’s war in Ukraine means for Europe
Carnegie Europe, June 2022

Russia’s lesser-known intentions in Ukraine
Carnegie Europe, June 2022

Supporting democracy after the invasion of Ukraine
Carnegie Europe, June 2022

European Union imposes partial ban on Russian oil
Center for International and Strategic Studies, June 2022

Will Putin’s war in Ukraine make the EU stronger?
Centre for European Policy Studies, June 2022

The militarization of Russian polar politics
Chatham House, June 2022

Expert insights: Russia and Ukraine
Clingendael, June 2022

How the war in Ukraine shapes the multipolar world
Egmont, June 2022

One hundred days of the war in Ukraine: Who’s winning and who’s losing?
Friends of Europe, June 2022

Preventing the West from losing the war in Ukraine: Keeping an eye on the geopolitical ball
Friends of Europe, June 2022

Missing in action in Ukraine: German leadership
German Marshall Fund, June 2022

Why it is so hard to repeat the Marshall Plan
German Marshall Fund, June 2022

Victory for Ukraine will also be defined by EU enlargement
German Marshall Fund, June 2022

Should the EU offer Ukraine candidate status?
German Marshall Fund, June 2022

Why Ukraine (and Moldova) must become EU candidates
Istituto Affari Internazionali, June 2022

Not yet time for diplomacy: Lessons from Italy’s iIl-conceived peace plan for Ukraine
Istituto Affari Internazionali, June 2022

Russia’s war on Ukraine: A sanctions timeline
Peterson Institute for International Economics, June 2022

Russian disinformation efforts on social media
Rand Corporation, June 2022

Ukraine’s best chance for peace
Rand Corporation, June 2022

Three possible futures for a frozen conflict in Ukraine
Atlantic Council, May 2022

The Russia-Ukraine war at three months
Brookings Institution, May 2022

Fiscal support and monetary vigilance: Economic policy implications of the Russia-Ukraine war for the European Union
Bruegel, May 2022

Ukraine needs external financial assistance now
Bruegel, May 2022

The EU needs transparent oil data and enhanced coordination
Bruegel, May 2022

Now is not the time to confiscate Russia’s central bank reserves
Bruegel, May 2022

NATO, the EU and the return of collective defence
Brussels School of Governance, May 2022

German ambiguity is deciding Ukraine’s future
Carnegie Europe, May 2022

Does the EU need a new enlargement policy?
Carnegie Europe, May 2022

State of the Union: Three months into Putin’s war
Centre for European Reform, May 2022

The coming storm: Insights from Ukraine about escalation in modern war
Center for International and Strategic Studies, May 2022

L’Europe dans la tempête parfaite
Fondation Robert Schuman

The Kremlin’s aims and assumptions: Russia’s war in Ukraine
International Centre for Defence and Security, May 2022

Ukraine should wait on cease-fire talks with Russia: Here’s why
Council on Foreign Relations, May 2022

The unprofessional Russian soldier
Egmont, May 2022

A question of balance: India and Europe after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine
European Council on Foreign Relations, May 2022

Turkey, NATO, and the Ukraine war: Why Erdogan’s grievances are about more than Sweden and Finland
European Council on Foreign Relations, May 2022

World hunger crisis: Is an apocalypse awaiting us?
Friends of Europe, May 2022

Beyond the “End of History”: Nationalism, liberalism and the war in Ukraine
Istituto Affari Internazionali, May 2022

The sporting sanctions against Russia: Debunking the myth of sport’s neutrality
Istituto Affari Internazionali, May 2022

Premiers enseignements nucléaires de la guerre en Ukraine
Institut français des relations internationales, May 2022

The war in Ukraine: More Western aid and fear of escalation
Institute for National Security Studies, May 2022

What Putin’s war in Ukraine means for the future of China-Russia relations
The London School of International Economics and Political Science, May 2022

Eine Chronologie der nuklearen Anspielungen Moskaus im Krieg gegen die Ukraine
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, May 2022

Will the Russia-Ukraine war speed European fiscal integration?
Peterson Institute on International Economics, May 2022

Rethinking the EU’s role in European collective defence
Rand Corporation, May 2022

Read the complete briefing on ‘Ukraine’s application to join the EU‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Mar Negreiro (1st edition).

In its digital decade strategy, the European Commission has put forward its vision for new strategic digital objectives for 2030. These should prepare Europe for the roll-out of the next generation of broadband infrastructure with gigabit speeds, including 5G, for the digital transformation of the public and private sectors, and to improve the digital divide. To measure progress towards the digital decade, the Commission proposes a ‘digital compass’ with indicators based on four dimensions: improved digital skills, secure and sustainable digital infrastructures, digital transformation of businesses, and digitalisation of the public sector.

The decision will establish the ‘Path to the digital decade’ policy programme, which aims to set up a governance framework and funding to help achieve the 2030 digital decade targets, including multi-country projects and cooperation mechanisms between the Commission and Member States.

At the European Parliament, the file has been allocated to the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy, which adopted its report on 17 May 2022 and also agreed to enter into negotiations with the Council. The mandate was endorsed by Parliament during the June plenary session.

Version

• June 2022: Path to the digital decade programme (1st edition)

Proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the 2030 Policy Programme ‘Path to the Digital Decade’ Committee responsible:Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE)COM(2021) 574
15.9.2021Rapporteur:Martina Dlabajová (Renew, Czechia)2021/0293(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Ivan Štefanec (EPP, Slovakia)
Josianne Cutajar (S&D, Malta)
Jordi Solé (Greens/EFA, Spain)
Elena Lizzi (ID, Italy)
Jessica Stegrud (ECR, Sweden)
Marisa Matias (The Left, Portugal)Ordinary legislative
procedure (COD)
(Parliament and
Council on equal
footing – formerly
‘co-decision’) Next phase: Trilogue negotiations

Written by Giulio Sabbati and Alex Wilson.

This infographic aims to provide an overview of some of the most important energy indicators. It is purely for information purposes and subject to change. Figures on page one are based on market data (gas and oil prices) or data supplied by market actors (LNG capacity and gas storage rates). Figures on page 2 are based on the latest publicly available Eurostat data. These data are only available retrospectively, usually on an annualised basis, and therefore do not reflect the latest state-of-play following the outbreak of the war.

Electricity prices for household and non-household consumers, € per kWh, second half of 2021. EU energy import dependency from Russia, Share of total import Final energy consumption by sector, Million tonnes of oil equivalent (MTOE) Gas price in the EU, Title Transfer Facility (€ per megawatt-hour) Gas storage, Available storage capacity (Twh) and filling rate LNG capacity per Member State, Billion m3, April 2022 Brent Crude oil (US$ per barrel) Share of energy from renewable sources%, 2020

Read this infographic on ‘Monitoring the energy situation in the EU: June 2022‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Monika Kiss.

The unjustified Russian invasion of Ukraine has damaged transport infrastructure, caused major transport disruptions and led to a massive flow of refugees into the EU and neighbouring countries.

In response, the EU has adopted several sets of sanctions, leading to the closure of EU airspace to Russian aircraft, the closure of EU ports to Russian vessels, a ban on Russian transport operators and a ban on exports of goods and technology in the aviation, maritime and space sectors.

Designed to undermine Russia’s economic and financial ability to sustain its war effort, the sanctions have also impacted on transport in the EU, leading to traffic shortages, supply chain bottlenecks and the need to bypass traditional routes, thereby lengthening journey times and increasing costs.

In order to monitor and deal with these negative impacts and humanitarian crises, the EU has introduced measures to support traffic flows and supply chains, securing the swift and safe transfer of people trapped in war zones and the transfer of essential goods and commodities.

The European Commission has devised a dedicated contingency plan for transport to strengthen coordination in the event of emergencies. It introduces guiding principles for implementing crisis response measures, and contains a number of initiatives intended to remedy the difficulties encountered following the war.

The European Parliament is meanwhile playing an active role by closely monitoring and evaluating the situation, including the EU action taken so far, while also proposing the adoption of additional EU measures to support passenger and freight traffic flows.

This briefing updates an ‘at a glance’ note on the same topic, published in March 2022.

Read this at a glance note on ‘Russia’s war on Ukraine: Implications for transport‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marketa Pape (1st edition).

Wage policy in the EU is a patchwork of different national traditions and legal frameworks. As a result, minimum wage levels diverge considerably, and leave many workers unprotected. While setting minimum wages is the competence of EU Member States, the EU has a supporting and complementary role.

In October 2020, the European Commission proposed a directive seeking to improve the adequacy and increase the coverage of minimum wages, while also strengthening collective bargaining as the main instrument to ensure fair wages and working conditions. It is the first time that the Commission has initiated legislative action on minimum wage protection, leaving Member States to define the specific minimum wagelevels. The ensuing debate focused on how far-reaching and binding the concrete EU requirements for national minimum wages should be.

The European Parliament adopted its position in November 2021, and the Council in December 2021. Interinstitutional negotiations concluded on 6 June 2022 with a provisional agreement that must now be confirmed by the Parliament and Council.

Version

• June 2022: Directive on adequate minimum wages (1st edition)

Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on adequate minimum wages in the European Union Committee responsible:Employment and Social Affairs (EMPL)COM(2020) 682
28.10.2020Rapporteurs:Dennis Radtke (EPP, Germany)2020/0310(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Agnes Jongerius (S&D, Netherlands)
Monica Semedo (Renew, Luxembourg)
Mounir Satouri (Greens/EFA, France)
Dominique Bilde (ID, France)
Anna Zalewska (ECR, Poland)
Özlem Demirel (The Left, Germany)Ordinary legislative
procedure (COD) (Parliament
and Council on equal
footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: First-reading vote in plenary

Written by Ionel Zamfir.

Ending impunity for serious crimes against human rights and humanitarian norms is an important EU and United Nations objective. It is essential in overcoming the legacy of past conflict and building the basis of stable, peaceful societies, as shown by the experience of societies that have taken this path in recent decades. The EU has developed a comprehensive approach to help non-EU countries implement transitional justice.

Historical background

The field of transitional justice emerged in the late 1980s and early 1990s, in response to the political transitions that took place during that time in Latin America and Eastern Europe. The implementation of transitional justice measures depended on the national context, varying greatly, e.g. among former communist regimes. Today, the focus of transitional justice mechanisms has moved to countries afflicted by conflict in Africa and Asia. The International Criminal Court (ICC), established in 2002, aims to complement national systems where these are unable to bring to justice for serious crimes those in the highest positions of responsibility. Transitional justice aims both at holding those responsible for serious crimes to account and providing redress to victims, as well as at building fairer and resilient justice systems able to secure reconciliation and the transition to democracy. It includes several measures:

Prosecution of leaders and high officials of former regimes: communist leaders in some eastern European countries and leaders of military juntas in Latin America (Argentina 1985 verdict, Guatemala 2013 verdict, finally invalidated), faced justice in their countries, while others – former presidents of Serbia (died before conviction), Côte d’Ivoire (acquitted) and Kosovo (ongoing), stood trial in international tribunals.

Prosecution: independently of rank, of perpetrators of grave crimes, particularly genocide: Rwanda. (1994).

Lustration policies: including vetting procedure before holding public office: these were central to the efforts of former communist countries in Europe (such as Germany, Czechia and Estonia), in overcoming their past and building stable democracies, but they were not free of judicial controversy regarding the concordance of lustration laws with human rights.

Truth initiatives: ranging from the opening of secret services archives (as in former communist countries) to the Truth Commission in South Africa, (1995), while in Cambodia in 1995, a non-governmental organisation (NGO) assumed the task of preserving the memory of genocide.

Rehabilitation and redress: for those convicted on political grounds or for persecuted groups.

Amnesty: the most controversial approach to transitional justice, as it precludes justice for victims, can be instrumental in ending bloody conflict. However, amnesty cannot apply in serious crimes against humanity and other similar crimes, as made clear in the landmark decisions of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. In Latin America, amnesty was granted broadly to allow transition, but amnesty laws were later struck down for grave crimes in Argentina (2003), Guatemala (1996) or Peru (2019), although not in Brazil.

United Nations framework

For the United Nations, according to the numerous documents adopted by its various fora, transitional justice ‘comprises the full range of processes and mechanisms associated with a society’s attempts to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation. These may include both judicial and non-judicial mechanisms’. This definition is broadly used, including by the EU. The UN has developed a comprehensive approach to transitional justice based on four pillars: truth, justice, reparation, and guarantees of non-recurrence. According to a 2022 report from the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), transitional justice should be ‘context-specific, comprehensive, victim-centred, gender-sensitive, participatory and nationally owned’. Moreover, transitional justice is expected to contribute to peace and reconciliation, an aspect underlined in the most recent resolution on the topic by the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC). The UNHRC considers that transitional justice processes, including the promotion of truth, justice, reparation and guarantees of non-recurrence, can prevent a repeat of past atrocities or similar violations and contribute to sustainable peace.

European Union action

Closing the accountability gap, fighting impunity and supporting transitional justice is among the priorities of the EU action plan on human rights and democracy for 2020-2024. According to the specific actions outlined under this objective, the EU commits to support national-level initiatives and transitional justice processes for fighting impunity for human rights violations. The EU further commits to engage with international justice mechanisms, such as hybrid UN tribunals.

The EU High Representative/Vice-President and European Commission developed an EU policy framework on support to transitional justice, which was endorsed by the Council in its conclusions of November 2015. The framework provides guidance for both EU institutions and Member States, based on main UN elements:

• criminal justice: the EU supports the reform of national criminal legislation, as well as initiatives to develop prosecutorial and judicial capabilities, adequate legal defence, and long-term protection and assistance for witnesses and victims; the EU further supports alternative ways (mediation or traditional courts) to provide justice; it supports the ICC;
• truth: the EU promotes truth-seeking initiatives based on international law and best practice;
• reparations: the EU encourages a participatory, victim-focused approach to reparations;
• guarantees of non-recurrence/institutional reform: the EU provides support to security and justice sector reforms, with the objective to establish civilian control, governance and security force accountability. The EU encourages the adoption of vetting procedures and codes of conduct, in accordance with international human rights standards.

The framework also emphasises that transitional justice processes must be nationally and locally owned and inclusive; adapted to the needs and specificities of the local communities and countries concerned; they must comply with international norms and standards; and must be gender and child sensitive. The EU opposes amnesties for war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide or gross violations of human rights, in line with the UN position. According to the framework, the EU should integrate its support for transitional justice in its crisis response and peacebuilding; and in development and enlargement policies.

The EU is an important player in the field of transitional justice. The EU supports the ICC; it helps countries in situations of fragility; it implements a comprehensive approach to external conflicts and crises; it integrates the pursuit of transitional justice in its common security and defence policy (CSDP) missions, and provides financial support for transitional justice initiatives and related issues. Transitional justice is among the priorities of multiannual indicative programmes jointly agreed with partner countries including Burundi, Central African Republic, Colombia, Rwanda, South Sudan and The Gambia, as well as among the priorities for the implementation of the EU thematic programme on human rights and democracy, both funded by the Global Europe Instrument. Transitional justice is also integrated into EU enlargement policy, where the Commission’s annual reports assess progress in this respect. The EU annual report on human rights and democracy provides specific examples (see 2021).

European Parliament position
The European Parliament has repeatedly underlined the need to put an end to impunity for grave crimes under international law. Parliament’s February 2022 resolution on human rights and democracy in the world – EU annual report 2020 calls for the promotion of transitional justice processes that empower civil society, victims, marginalised and vulnerable populations; and urges the EU to strengthen its response to conflicts, autonomously and in collaboration with partner countries and regional organisations, including a strong focus on transitional justice. In its January 2021 resolution on human rights and democracy in the world and the EU’s policy on the matter – annual report 2019, Parliament proposes to promote EU commitment to the fight against impunity by establishing an EU Special Representative on International Humanitarian Law and International Justice and underlines the need to ensure justice for all victims of violations of international human rights and humanitarian law. It also stresses that the international community has a responsibility to end impunity; and calls for the EU to ensure the integration of a gender perspective, increasing the role of women and young people in transitional justice. In a March 2019 resolution on building EU capacity on conflict prevention and mediation, Parliament declares that a pool of experts covering reconciliation and transitional justice is needed at EU level.

Read this at a glance note on ‘Transitional justice: Central to fighting impunity‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Anita Orav.

In December 2000, in a resolution to mark the 50th anniversary of the 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, the UN General Assembly designated 20 June as World Refugee Day. According to the UN, at the end of 2020 there were 82.4 million forcibly displaced people in the world; nearly 26.4 million of them were refugees and around half of those were under 18 years old. In 2022, following Russia’s war on Ukraine, Europe is facing a large new wave of refugees in search of peace and security.

Refugee flows to Europe

In the EU, after the massive influx of migrants in 2015-2016 had subsided and the coronavirus pandemic had limited migratory flows, migrant numbers started rising again in 2021. The number of first-time asylum applicants registered in 2021 was 535 000 – a 28.3 % increase year-on-year – approaching the level prior to the 2015-2016 crisis. Syrians, Afghans and Iraqis accounted for 40 % of all applications lodged, and Germany, France and Spain were the main destination countries. In early 2022, there was a dramatic increase in displaced persons following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Estimates from the UNHCR show that by June 2022, 6.8 million people had left Ukraine, most of them initially fleeing to neighbouring countries such as Poland, Romania, Hungary, Slovakia, Czechia and Moldova. The EU Agency for Asylum (EUAA) reports that asylum applications lodged by Ukrainians in March 2022 reached a record number of 14 000, and that there was a parallel increase in asylum applications by people from former-Soviet Union countries such as Russia, Belarus, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. However, weekly inflows have declined, as many Ukrainians have returned to their country. By the end of May, 2.1 million Ukrainians had crossed back into Ukraine, although this trend is likely to reflect back-and-forth movements.

EU solidarity with Ukrainian refugees

Since the first day of the conflict, the EU and its Member States have strongly condemned Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, and adopted several packages of restrictive sanctions against Russia (in addition to those already imposed since Russia’s 2014 invasion of Crimea). Moreover, the EU and its Member States are mobilising support to help people fleeing the war, including through direct humanitarian aid, €1.2 billion in macro-financial assistance, emergency civil protection assistance and support at the border.

On 4 March 2022, the EU decided to activate – for the first time – the Temporary Protection Directive (2001/55/EC), as it enables Member States to respond rapidly and to offer rights to people in need of immediate protection without overwhelming national asylum systems. This directive grants people fleeing Ukraine a number of rights: to stay in the EU for at least one year, to obtain a residence permit, and to access education and the labour market. By the end of May 2022, nearly 3 million Ukrainians had registered for temporary protection in the EU+ (EU Member States plus Norway and Switzerland), while around 21 400 had applied for international protection.

Member States, cities, regions and individuals are themselves offering humanitarian and military assistance to Ukraine; some EU citizens are hosting refugees in their homes. As Ukrainians are one of the largest groups of third-country nationals living in the EU, many refugees seek to join Ukrainians already living in EU countries as a support network. The largest Ukrainian diasporas currently are found in the five Member States that host 80 % of Ukrainians in the EU: Poland, Italy, Czechia, Germany and Spain.

The European Parliament has continually expressed support for Ukraine and emphasised that solidarity and unity within the EU are key to helping Ukraine and ending the war. MEPs have also called for support for EU countries facing the brunt of the effects of the war and hosting a large number of Ukrainian refugees.

Read this at a glance note on ‘World Refugee Day: EU solidarity with Ukraine‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Ann Neville.

Since the start of Russia’s war on Ukraine there has been mounting evidence of what may constitute violations of international criminal law in the conduct of the war. Active investigations into alleged core international crimes (which are classified as war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide) have begun, with the involvement of the Ukrainian authorities, the International Criminal Court, and other international organisations.

The EU is playing an active role in this process, with Eurojust assisting a Joint Investigation Team established by Ukraine, Poland and Lithuania, and with the participation of a number of other Member States. The Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court is also participating, the first time it has joined a Joint Investigation Team. However, investigations of the crime of aggression, relating to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, are hampered by the fact that neither Russia nor Ukraine are signatories of the Statute of Rome, which established the International Criminal Court and brought this crime within its jurisdiction.

This briefing discusses investigations into core international crimes in Ukraine. It looks at the identification, gathering and assessment of information to ensure that it is admissible as evidence in trials of those accused of these crimes. It also analyses the specific challenges involved in the assessment of digital information and how to ensure that it is properly evaluated in an era of deepfakes and digital manipulation.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Russia’s war on Ukraine: Investigating and prosecuting international crimes‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clare Ferguson and Katarzyna Sochacka.

The war in Ukraine stayed on the agenda for the June I 2022 plenary session in Strasbourg, with Ruslan Stefanchuk, Speaker of Verkhovna Rada making an address to a formal sitting of Parliament. Members also debated the conclusions of the special European Council meeting of 30‑31 May 2022. Parliament debated the rule of law and the potential approval of the Polish National Recovery Plan, and approved the call for a convention on revision of the EU Treaties. Members debated global threats to abortion rights, particularly in the USA, and the massacre of Christians in Nigeria. A ‘This is Europe’ debate was held with the Taoiseach of Ireland, Micheál Martin. Finally, a ceremony celebrated the 60th anniversary of the common agricultural policy.

Fit for 55 package

Members considered a series of ‘fit for 55’ proposals, and rejected the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI) report on the Commission proposal to align the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) with the Climate Law target of a 55 % reduction in net EU greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 2030. The proposal included carbon pricing on housing and transport. The report, which called for an end to free allowances and earlier completion of the CBAM, was therefore referred back to the ENVI committee for further discussion of Parliament’s position. In consequence, the Parliament voted to refer the report on the proposed EU carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM) – proposing to phase out free ETS allowances as the carbon border charge is introduced gradually from 2026 to 2032 – back to the ENVI committee too. While the plenary voted on amendments to the proposed social climate fund, reducing its size, these depend on whether private households are covered by the ETS. The final vote on the social climate fund is therefore on hold until agreement is reached on the ETS reform.

For the other elements of the ‘fit for 55’ package, Members adopted Parliament’s positions and referred the files back to the ENVI committee for trilogue negotiations. Legislation governing measures to control GHG emissions in transport, buildings and agriculture covers sectors not included in the ETS, and which account for around 60 % of EU emissions. The proposal on the Effort-sharing Regulation would establish binding national targets and annual emissions allocations (AEAs) for each EU country, while the ENVI committee called for greater transparency and ambition, to align with the 2050 climate neutrality target.

The proposed revision of the Regulation on Land Use, Land-use Change and Forestry (LULUCF) passed with a large majority. Members support proposals for a more ambitious target for carbon sinks and an increased GHG reduction target of 57 %, raising net greenhouse gas removals in LULUCF to at least 310 million tonnes of CO2 equivalent. Protecting fragile natural carbon sinks is also beneficial in improving biodiversity and reforestation, and should not therefore be considered part of agricultural emissions.

Turning to transport emissions, and the proposed revision of the EU ETS as regards aviation, Parliament agrees to reduce aviation emissions further, to achieve EU and global climate goals. The proposals aim at amending the ETS Directive and implementing the current pilot carbon offsetting and reduction scheme for international aviation (CORSIA). Parliament already supports the elimination of free allowances for emissions from flights to and from third countries, granted due to international pressure. The ENVI committee report on the proposals called for a 50 % reduction of these free allowances in 2024, before ending the exception in 2025. The report also supported the uptake of sustainable aviation fuels.

On stricter CO2 emissions standards for new cars and vans, Members agreed to phase out internal-combustion engine cars and vans in pursuit of a zero-emission objective for 2035. The ENVI committee report on the proposal sought to increase the 2025 emissions reduction target to 20 % and abolish the incentive mechanism to accelerate market uptake of zero- and low-emission vehicles after 2025. However, the committee also insists that assessment of the socio-economic impact of the measures should be more frequent, including whether funding is needed to ensure a just transition in the automotive sector.

EU foreign, security and defence policy after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine

Members debated and adopted a recommendation prepared by the Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET), on EU foreign, security and defence policy, in the light of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The report recommends the EU move swiftly to establish a defence union and to underpin its common defence by implementing the Strategic Compass. It calls on the EU to embrace the aim of strategic autonomy and to hold regular Council meetings of EU defence ministers. The AFET committee underlined the imperative for Parliament to scrutinise the Strategic Compass and use of the European Peace Facility.

2021 Report on Turkey

Members debated a report on the Commission’s latest report on Turkey. While Turkey’s EU accession negotiations are currently on hold, due to democratic backsliding, relations with the EU have improved slightly. The AFET committee report welcomed Turkey’s mediation in Russia’s war against Ukraine, and underlined the importance of cooperation with a NATO ally in the currently unstable geopolitical situation. The AFET report on the Commission’s 2021 annual report on Turkey’s accession nevertheless notes that the human rights situation in Turkey continues to deteriorate.

International procurement instrument

Parliament debated and adopted an agreement reached between the co-legislators on the revised proposal for an international procurement instrument (IPI) to facilitate reciprocal access to procurement markets in non-EU (third) countries. The instrument should deter or disqualify tenderers from third countries that close their public procurement markets to EU bidders from bidding in the EU. Parliament successfully negotiated higher thresholds and fewer exceptions to the proposed rules, while minimising the administrative burden.

Question time: Reducing pesticides and strengthening consumer protection

To strengthen its oversight of the EU executive, Parliament has revived the practice of holding ‘question time’ with the European Commission. During the June I session, the Commission answered questions on pesticide use and consumer protection. Members have expressed regret that most EU countries have neither promoted alternative techniques nor reduced the use of pesticides.

Right of legislative initiative for Parliament

Members debated a right of ‘direct’ legislative initiative for the European Parliament. At present, unlike national parliaments, it only enjoys an ‘indirect right’ to propose legislation. Aimed at strengthening the EU’s democratic legitimacy, Members adopted a Committee on Constitutional Affairs (AFCO) report calling for a general and direct right of initiative for Parliament – the only directly elected institution.

LUX Audience Award

The winner of the LUX Audience Award this year is Quo vadis, Aida?, directed by Jamila Žbanić. The prize celebrates quality cinema in Europe, with the three competing films obtaining help with distribution, including subtitling in the 24 official EU languages and screening at the LUX Film Days in more than 60 cities. Quo vadis, Aida? will now be adapted for those with visual and hearing impairments.

EU-Mauritania Fisheries Agreement and protocol

Members approved the new EU–Mauritania Fisheries Agreement and Protocol, as recommended by the Fisheries (PECH) Committee. The agreement is the EU’s economically most significant and supports increased fisheries cooperation between EU partners in West Africa.

Opening of trilogue negotiations

Members confirmed, without vote, mandates for negotiation from the Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE) Committee on a proposal for a decision establishing the 2030 policy programme ‘Path to the Digital Decade’, and from the Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) Committee on a proposal for a regulation on European green bonds.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Plenary round-up – June I 2022‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Philip Boucher

Three members of the Panel for the Future of Science and Technology (STOA) – Patrizia TOIA (S&D, Italy), Maria-Manuel LEITÃO-MARQUES (S&D, Portugal) and Pietro FIOCCHI (ECR, Italy) – participated in a STOA delegation to the European Laboratory for Learning and Intelligent Systems (ELLIS) Unit in Milan on 23 and 24 May 2022. They met with researchers working on various fields of artificial intelligence (AI) including technical development, assessment techniques, industry collaboration, ethics and policy.

The European Laboratory for Learning and Intelligent Systems (ELLIS) is a pan-European AI network of excellence that focuses on fundamental science, technical innovation and societal impact. It has recently established a Unit in Milan, which aims to develop into a key European hub for AI by promoting scientific excellence and fostering top-quality industrial research. It coordinates and focuses the AI research of four local universities: University of Milan, Bocconi University, Politecnico di Milano, and University of Milan-Bicocca. These Universities take turns to chair the Milan ELLIS Unit. This year, the University of Milan, our hosts for the delegation, has the chair. The Unit’s work is particularly relevant in the context of several legislative proposals, including the AI act, data governance act, digital services act and the regulation on machinery products.

The delegation opened with a visit to the Rectorate of the University of Milan. Members were welcomed by the Rector, Professor Elio Franzini, Deputy Rector Professor Maria Pia Abbracchio and Professor Nicolò Cesa‑Bianchi. They provided an introduction to ELLIS and the Milan Unit and participated in a discussion about the modalities of industrial collaboration, including sponsorship, capacity building, and the management of intellectual property rights.

The second day of the delegation was dedicated to in-depth meetings with researchers from the ELLIS Unit. Members visited the Department of Computer Science at the University of Milan and were welcomed by its Director, Professor Silvana Castano, who highlighted several collaborative research and study activities. The day continued with two sessions of meetings with ELLIS Unit researchers from across the four universities.

Opening the first session, Professor Vincenzo Piuri introduced several projects applying AI to monitor and control industrial processes, renewable energy production, transportation systems and security. Professor Andrea Celli then explained his work on mechanisms to ensure the fairness of ‘matching platforms’ that connect users and services, for example in the distribution of online advertising. The session continued with Professor Federico Cabitza, who highlighted the diminishing role of accuracy metrics in assessing the quality of machine learning applications in the medical domain, and set out alternatives that focus upon robustness, reliability and utility. Professor Viola Schiaffonati concluded the session with a discussion of how AI presents challenges to traditional conceptualisations of risk and uncertainty, calling for a paradigm shift to make discussions of AI ethics more effective, and highlighting the concepts of active responsibility and value sensitive design.

The second session opened with Professor Francesco Trovò, who highlighted the uneven application and potential of AI across industrial sectors, and explained several initiatives to promote uptake and technology transfer, including their key enabling and constraining features. Professor Simone Melzi then presented the state of the art in image recognition including cutting-edge developments with 3D data, highlighting the challenges presented by image manipulation and adversarial attacks. The delegation then heard from Professor Carlo Baldassi, who explained the potential benefits of recent advances in the field of computational neuroscience, including systems that interact directly with human brains, and their associated practical, theoretical, and ethics challenges. Finally, Dr Massimo Rivolta showcased ELLIS work on AI decision support systems for medical diagnosis and treatment, highlighting key elements related to data availability, trust, privacy and personalisation.

The delegation concluded with a visit to Fondazione UNIMI, the university’s start-up incubator. Members were welcomed by the incubator’s President, Professor Luca Solari, and its Director, Dr Roberto Tiezzi. They explained the Fondazione’s model for bringing academic research to the market applications, and engaged in discussion of the associated opportunities and challenges. They were then joined by Professor Caterina La Porta, who presented several innovative projects in the field of pathology, including inspiring applications for cancer diagnosis and treatment. The discussion focused upon the need for good-quality, interoperable health data, a key factor in the European Health Data Space.

STOA is grateful to the universities and staff for their warm welcome, the detailed explanations of their work, and the stimulating discussions. We look forward to further opportunities to engage with universities and researchers in the future.

Written by Nikolina Šajn (1st edition).

On 30 March 2022, the European Commission put forward a proposal for a regulation establishing a general framework for setting ecodesign requirements for sustainable products, repealing rules currently in force which concentrate on energy-related products only. The regulation would lay down rules that would apply to all products on the internal market, with the aim of making them more durable, reusable, reparable, upgradable, recyclable and generally less harmful to the environment. The regulation would include rules on a digital product passport, green public procurement and banning the destruction of unsold goods.

Within the European Parliament, the file has been referred to the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety. The proposal is in line with previous requests by Parliament to broaden the scope of the ecodesign legislation to cover all main product groups, and to introduce a digital product passport and green public procurement criteria.

Reactions of stakeholders to the proposal varied, from calling it a ‘game-changer’ and appealing for swift action on product-specific rules, to worries about possible overlapping requirements and warnings about significant investments that would be required from businesses.

Versions

• June 2022: Ecodesign for sustainable products (1st edition)

Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a framework for setting ecodesign requirements for sustainable products and repealing Directive 2009/125/EC Committee responsible:Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI)COM(2022) 142
30.3.2022Rapporteur:Simona Bonafè (S&D, Italy)2022/0095 (COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Jessica Polfjärd (EPP, Sweden)
Karin Karlsbro (Renew, Sweden)
Malte Gallée (Greens/EFA, Germany)
Sylvia Limmer (ID, Germany)
Alexandr Vondra (ECR, Czechia)
Silvia Modig (The Left, Finland)Ordinary legislative
procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council
on equal footing –
formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Publication of draft report

Written by Branislav Stanicek with Martin Russell.

The countries in the Western Balkans are traditionally a focus of Russian interests. The Russian Federation has strong historical ties with the Western Balkans and holds a relative soft-power attraction for them, yet its influence and economic impact in the region are declining, as investment and aid by the EU-27 and other players, such as China, have been dwarfing Russian investment.

Geopolitical confrontation

The Western Balkans, together with the European Neighbourhood, have emerged as a front in Russia’s geopolitical confrontation with the West. Some argue that this confrontation is deeply rooted in shared geography (Robert Kaplan), others, that it is an expression of different political systems, values and ideologies (Zbigniew Brzezinski). Brzezinski believes that America’s failure to engage with Russia after the end of the Cold War has backfired, giving Russia the energy to focus on securing its authoritarian rule within its own territory and on restoring its influence in the former Soviet Union states and beyond.

The Balkan 2021 Barometer shows constant support for EU membership across the Western Balkans, with 62 % of countries endorsing EU accession in 2020 (59 % in 2019 and 56 % in 2018). However, disillusionment with slow progress towards EU accession and economic stagnation are creating an opening for other geopolitical players. All six Western Balkan countries are still on track for joining the EU, but progress has faltered recently, with only two countries – Montenegro and Serbia – actually in accession negotiations. Furthermore, the Russian war on Ukraine seems to have tipped EU-27 public opinion in favour of swiftly granting EU accession to Ukraine, but not the Western Balkans. Despite successful EU-Western Balkans summits (most recently in Zagreb, 2020, and in Brdo, 2021), some countries, such as Albania and North Macedonia, have not even opened accession negotiations. Simmering ethnic tensions, high unemployment, exodus of youth, and shaky constitutional arrangements in countries such as Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), are creating an opportunity for Russia to leverage its already substantial influence in the region.

Russia’s soft power and economic influence

Cultural and historical ties give Russia considerable soft power, particularly among Serbs. Historical ties go as far back as the pan-Slavic movement of the 19th century and Russia’s support for Serbian independence from the Ottoman Empire. Russia entered World War I on Serbia’s side; in the Kosovo* conflict, it condemned the NATO bombing of Serbia and firmly opposed Kosovar independence. Russia uses its status as a permanent UN Security Council member in Serbia’s favour. In 1994 and 2015, Moscow vetoed two UN Security Council resolutions condemning violence by Bosnian Serbs, the latter resolution qualifying the 1995 Srebrenica massacre as genocide. During the pandemic, this soft power also manifested as ‘vaccine diplomacy’.

Although Russian investment in the region has increased in absolute terms, Russia’s economic footprint as a share of the total economy in the Western Balkans has shrunk or stagnated in the wake of international sanctions over Russia’s annexation of Crimea. Even though Russian economic influence is heavily concentrated in the energy sector, its share as a percentage of GDP is declining across the region. Russia’s energy influence is biggest in Serbia, North Macedonia and BiH, where it supplies close to 100 % of gas needs and owns several assets, such as the Lukoil gas stations network. Russian Gazprom’s South Stream pipeline would have consolidated Moscow’s dominance of gas markets, but it was abandoned in December 2014 after the European Commission ruled that it contravened EU legislation.

On the other hand, Kosovo, Montenegro and Albania currently consume little or no Russian gas, and future supplies are likely to come from Azerbaijan rather than Russian fields, via the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP). Montenegro will probably have to wait several years before the connecting Ionian-Adriatic Pipeline (IAP) is put in place. The IAP is planned to carry natural gas from Albania’s Fier via Montenegro and BiH to Split in Croatia. The 520 km-long pipeline would be bi-directional and have an annual capacity of 5 billion cubic metres. The Western Balkans Investment Framework estimates that constructing the 94 km-long IAP in Montenegrin territory will cost €207 million. In Fier, the IAP would connect to the TAP, built to transport natural gas from the Shah Deniz II field in Azerbaijan to Europe. The first deliveries of Azeri gas to Italy via the TAP were made in 2021. In North Macedonia, Azeri gas is expected to start competing with Russian supplies from 2023. Outside the energy sector, where Russia’s presence is gradually declining, Russia’s economic presence through trade is dwarfed by that of the EU-27 (see Figure 1). However, experts caution that Russia’s major presence in strategic sectors is making the region’s governments vulnerable to its pressure and is accentuating state capture risk.

Figure 1 – Western Balkan countries’ trade with main partners, 2021 (%) Progressive alignment with EU foreign policy: case of sanctions against Russia

Western Balkan countries are also facing the ‘asymmetric assault’ on democracy, launched by Russian media outlets, such as the Sputnik news agency, which set up a base in Belgrade in 2014. Despite Soviet-era disinformation campaigns and diplomatic efforts, the majority of the Western Balkan population supports EU accession and pro-Western policies. In the past, Serbian public opinion was supportive of closer ties with Russia: a poll carried out in mid-2016 by NSPM magazine showed that 72 % were in favour of an alliance with Russia, compared to just 8 % for NATO. However, a February 2022 poll concluded that half of Serbs want to stay neutral when faced with a choice between the EU and Russia. This foreign policy alignment became highly visible in February 2022, when Albania, Kosovo and North Macedonia joined the EU’s sanctions against Russia, while Montenegro announced it would adopt them in April. The Serbian government adopted conclusions in which it voiced support for the territorial integrity of Ukraine but refrained from applying the EU sanctions. Russia remains Serbia’s biggest arms supplier, yet is in increasing competition with China. On 29 May 2022, the Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić announced that his country had signed an agreement on a new three-year gas contract with Russia.

European Parliament position

The Parliament supports the EU prospects of all Western Balkan countries. On 26 April 2022, the Parliament’s President, Roberta Metsola, observed that the EU must ‘think of ways to accelerate the enlargement process in the Western Balkans’, because ‘stability in the immediate neighbourhood is vital for the EU’s own stability’. The Parliament has voiced concern about Russia’s influence in the region and its attempts to destabilise both the region as a whole and individual countries within it (for instance, BiH). The Parliament is concerned that Russian investment in the region poses high risks for corruption and state capture. It has also called on Serbia to align its foreign policy more closely with the EU. The Parliament also expects that the European External Action Service and the European Commission would improve coordination and address disinformation and hybrid threats that seek to undermine the region’s EU prospects.

(*) This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244/1999 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Russia’s influence in the Western Balkans‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Ivana Katsarova.

From 9 to 12 June the New European Bauhaus Festival takes place in Brussels and all over Europe.

The New European Bauhaus initiative is an innovative cooperation project combining sustainability and wellbeing goals. Inspired by the eponymous arts school founded in Germany by Walter Gropius in 1919, the European Commission initiative aims at addressing contemporary and future ecological, economic and societal concerns. Launched by the Commission to help deliver the European Green Deal – geared towards achieving a sustainable economy and eliminating net greenhouse gas emissions by 2025 – the project envisages the participation of a wide range of actors in a vast effort of cooperation between science, technology, the arts and culture.

This first edition of the Festival will thus gather citizens, politicians and professionals to debate and shape ideas for the future landscape of the European Union. On the agenda: exhibitions, artistic performances, conferences, seminars and other gatherings combining a ‘live’ onsite event and a ‘virtual’ online component.

The European Parliament will also dedicate an exhibition, the Sustainability Space (9‑11 June, Gare Maritime Brussels), showcasing a selection of efforts to improve sustainability. Visitors will have an opportunity to hear about environmental activities taking place within the European Parliament and see the ‘Interactive Environmental Dashboard’ used to monitor and assess Parliament’s environmental performance in its own premises. There will also be messages from Members of Parliament and a photo exhibition of ‘Solar Portraits‘ by Rubén Salgado Escudero, depicting the lives of people who accessed electricity for the first time through the power of solar energy.

A new exploratory study on the possibilities offered by the New European Bauhaus, commissioned by STOA – Parliament’s Panel for the Future of Science and Technology – will be officially presented during a workshop, taking place on 13 June at 11:00 am on Parliament’s premises. The aim of the study, entitled ‘The Green Deal ambition: Technology, creativity and the arts for environmental sustainability‘ (by Emanuele Bompan and Elisabetta Tola), is to help inform the debate on the New European Bauhaus within the European Parliament and beyond. It brings together insights from a number of scientific research papers and reports on current experiences of cross-pollination between the cultural and creative and the tech sector. The authors have also gathered the ideas, contributions and perspectives of a selected number of European players with key expertise in design, arts, architecture, new materials, and science and technology. Taken together, this collection of contributions offers a more nuanced view on how the New European Bauhaus could contribute to achieving the goals of the European Green Deal.

Importantly, the authors argue that a prominent role must be given to young people, so that European spaces are defined by those who will live there in the future. Consequently, the vision of the New European Bauhaus must not be just another path set up by ‘those who have an already established position’, but instead become a ‘place of intergenerational confrontation’.

To summarise, these are some of the ideas on offer for what already looks like a very busy weekend …

Reading list:

• EU Prize for Contemporary Architecture / Mies van der Rohe Award: A tribute to Bauhaus, At a glance, Magdalena Pasikowska-Schnass, 2021.
• The Bauhaus movement: Where are the women?, Briefing, Ivana Katsarova, 2021.
• Education and the New European Bauhaus, At a glance, Denise Chircop, 2021.
• Cohesion policy contribution to New European Bauhaus, At a glance, Agnieszka Widuto, 2021.
• What if technology and culture combined to boost a green recovery?, At a glance, Vadim Kononeko, 2020.

Written by Piotr Bąkowski.

In recent times, the European Union (EU) has witnessed a sharp rise in hate speech and hate crime, yet EU law criminalises such conduct only if related to a limited set of protected characteristics, such as race and ethnicity. The Commission, with the support of the Parliament, seeks to address this limitation by extending the list of ‘EU crimes’ included in Article 83 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), to cover hate speech and hate crime. This can only be done by a Council decision adopted by unanimity, with the Parliament’s consent.

Background

According to a 2020 study conducted for the European Parliament and a 2021 study supporting the European Commission’s initiative to counter hate speech and hate crime, the incidence of these phenomena has steadily increased across the EU in recent years. Hate speech in particular thrives on social media, whose users, including political figures, tend to express their thoughts without reserve. Citing several other studies and surveys, the Commission study provides examples of hate speech and hate crime experienced by various targeted groups, and offers some statistics. For instance, 63 % of girls surveyed reported some form of online harassment on social media platforms; 38 % of people with disabilities experienced hate speech in the 12 months preceding the survey; and 17 % of such persons fell victim to physical violence, compared to 8 % of persons without disabilities. These developments have been linked to a perception of increased migration, but also to economic and social crises, the proliferation of conspiracy theories and disinformation, as well as the growing use of the internet, including social media. The coronavirus pandemic – and the insecurity and economic hardship it brought along – seems to have contributed greatly to a surge in hate speech and hate crime.

At the EU level, Council Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA criminalises hate speech and hate crime based on a range of grounds. It prohibits ‘publicly inciting to violence or hatred against a group of persons or a member of such a group defined by reference to race, colour, religion, descent or national or ethnic origin’. It also requires that Member States take measures to ensure that racist and xenophobic motivation is considered an aggravating circumstance by their criminal laws, or alternatively, may be taken into consideration by the courts when setting penalties. The bias motivation is thus the defining element of hate speech and hate crime.

Whereas all EU Member States have criminalised hate speech based on the grounds covered by the 2008 framework decision, national laws differ with regard to other protected characteristics. As for hate crime, it has been broadly criminalised across the EU either as a ‘self-standing’ offence (defined by the bias motivation) or as an aggravating circumstance for any offence or a range of specific offences.

At present, the EU has no competence to criminalise hate speech and hate crime based on grounds not covered by the 2008 framework decision. Article 83 TFEU could serve as a legal basis for such action should these offences become part of an exhaustive list of ‘areas of particularly serious crime with a cross-border dimension resulting from the nature or impact of such offences or from a special need to combat them on a common basis’ (‘EU crimes’). Under this provision, the Parliament and the Council may establish minimum rules regarding the definition of such offences and related sanctions. Moreover, based on ‘developments in crime’, the Council may adopt a decision (subject to the consent of the Parliament) identifying other areas of crime meeting the criteria specified in Article 83 TFEU. The Commission may trigger such a decision by submitting a communication to the Parliament and the Council.

European Commission initiative

On 9 December 2021, the Commission published a communication (COM(2021) 777) inviting the Council to adopt a decision identifying hate speech and hate crime as an area of crime under Article 83(1) TFEU. A proposal for such a Council decision is in the form of an annex to the communication. If adopted, the Commission would follow up with a proposal for a directive on minimum rules concerning the definition of criminal offences and sanctions in this area of crime, which the Parliament and Council would negotiate under the ordinary legislative procedure.

In its communication, the Commission argues that hate speech and hate crime meet the criteria for inclusion in the list as defined by Article 83 TFEU. The Commission considers these offences ‘particularly serious’ due to the harm they cause to individual victims, wider communities, and society as a whole. Their ‘cross-border dimension’ is, in the Commission’s view, related to spillover effect across borders (in particular, but not only, with respect to online hate speech). Moreover, the Commission sees a special need for a common approach to combating these phenomena, as divergent national approaches across the EU have resulted in fragmentation that weakens efforts in this regard.

The Commission’s initiative is part of a broader set of EU policy actions addressing discrimination and violent extremism, including several strategies, among them the one on the rights of persons with disabilities 2021-2030. Moreover, it complements a legislative proposal for a directive to prevent and combat violence against women and domestic violence: while it is true that hate speech and hate crime can target victims because of gender-related bias, the proposal for a directive establishes minimum rules on the definition of criminal offences and penalties in the areas of sexual exploitation and computer crime, thus covering a distinct set of criminal acts.

European Parliament position

The Parliament has addressed hate speech and hate crime in numerous resolutions. In its October 2018 resolution on the rise of neo-fascist violence in Europe (2018/2869(RSP)), it noted a link between the dissemination of hate speech and violence, stressing the negative role that politicians and political parties may play in this respect. It therefore called on the Member States to ‘strongly condemn and sanction hate crime, hate speech and scapegoating by politicians and public officials at all levels and on all types of media, as they directly normalise and reinforce hatred and violence in society’.

In a November 2020 resolution (2020/2009(INI)), the Parliament observed that hate speech and disinformation were increasingly exploited for political purposes as a means of intensifying social polarisation. It recognised a relationship between the business model of social media platforms – which is based on micro-targeted advertising – and the spreading and amplifying of hate speech by these platforms, which may result in radicalisation leading to violent extremism. The Parliament reiterated its calls on the Member States to implement and enforce measures to prevent, condemn and counter hate speech and hate crime. It also pointed to the need of reinforcing the legal framework for tackling hate speech and discrimination, stressing that negotiations on the horizontal anti-discrimination directive, which have been stalled in the Council, should be unblocked to this end.

A March 2021 resolution (2021/2557(RSP)) dealt specifically with hate speech against LGBTIQ people. The Parliament condemned the creation of ‘LGBTI-free zones’ as part of a broader context of increased discrimination and attacks against the LGBTIQ community, which includes a rise in hate speech by public authorities and public media. The problem of hate speech targeting LGBTIQ people was further addressed in a Parliamentary resolution of December 2021 (2020/2035(INL)), which noted that while this form of abuse is ‘pervasively common’ in particular in the online sphere, some Member States have no laws to address it.

In September 2021, the Parliament adopted a legislative resolution (2021/2035(INL)) calling on the Commission to submit a related proposal to identify gender-based violence as a new area of crime under Article 83(1) TFEU. It welcomed the initiative to extend the list of the areas of crime to encompass hate crime and hate speech, recommending that the Commission include sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression and sex characteristics as discrimination grounds specifically covered by this Treaty provision.

The most recent, May 2022, resolution (2021/2055(INI)) pointed to religious-based hate crimes that remain under-reported and unprosecuted, and called for establishing comprehensive data collection systems on hate crimes and other discriminatory acts against belief- or religious communities.

For more information, please see the file on the Parliament’s Legislative Train Schedule.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Combating hate speech and hate crime in the EU‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Citizens often turn to the European Parliament to ask what the European Union (EU) is doing to promote gender equality.

Policies central to promoting gender equality, such as employment and social policy are mainly the responsibility of the EU countries. Nevertheless, the European Union is determined to protect gender equality, which is a fundamental right under EU law. The EU therefore strives to foster gender equality in all its actions. Examples include promoting gender equality and equal pay at the workplace, combating discrimination and gender-based violence, and challenging stereotypes.

Gender equality strategy

In March 2020, the European Commission published its 2020-2025 gender equality strategy, which builds upon the previous 2016-2019 strategy. The key goals include:

• ending gender-based violence;
• ensuring gender equality in the workforce, including equal pay and equal pensions;
• challenging gender stereotypes;
• promoting equality in household chores, including childcare;
• achieving gender balance in decision making and politics.

Equal pay

Equal pay for equal work is a key principle enshrined in the EU treaties. The current legislation on equal pay was originally adopted in 2006. It prohibits both direct and indirect gender discrimination at all stages of employment.

Despite the fact that wage discrimination is illegal, it can be hard to detect when such discrimination occurs. This makes it difficult for victims to bring a legal claim. To tackle this issue through the gender equality strategy, the Commission put forward a legislative proposal on pay transparency in March 2021. This new law would include a number of measures aimed at improving pay transparency, such as:

• Job seekers would enjoy the right to information about the pay range for jobs they are applying for, including information about the pay for men and women in similar positions. Employers would be forbidden from asking applicants their previous salary level.
• Employers with at least 250 employees would be required to report on their gender pay gap, and conduct an assessment if the gap is greater than 5 %.
• Victims of pay discrimination would be better compensated, as it should become easier to bring a successful claim, since the new rules place the burden of proof to show there is no pay discrimination on the employer.
• Workers’ representatives would be more involved, including in leading collective claims for pay discrimination.

Parliament welcomed this strategy in a December 2021 resolution, but called for clearer targets and indicators to close the pay gap. In its position on the legislative proposal adopted in March 2022, Parliament supports stricter measures than those proposed by the Commission. See this press release for details.

Similarly, ministers of EU countries have also called for additional measures to close the pay gap and to prevent discrimination, most recently in June 2019.

Women on Boards

Today, only 30.6% of board members in the EU’s largest publicly listed companies are women, with significant differences among member states (from 45.3% in France to 8.5% in Cyprus).

On 7 June 2022, the European Parliament and EU countries agreed on a bill to increase the presence of women on corporate boards. The provisional agreement aims to ensure gender parity on boards of publicly listed companies in the EU. Parliament succeeded in including an assessment on the scope of the directive at a later stage on whether non-listed companies should be included in the scope of directive. The European Commission first presented its proposal in 2012 and the European Parliament adopted its negotiation position back in 2013. The file was blocked in the Council for almost a decade, until Employment and Social Affairs ministers agreed on a position in March 2022. Parliament and Council will now have to formally approve the agreement and EU countries would then need to implement the directive two years after it has been adopted.

Parental leave

Women are more likely to take a career break during pregnancy and after childbirth. Recognising this exacerbates the gender gap, the EU has set minimum safety standards for pregnant workers. Additionally, the EU also guarantees a minimum of 14 weeks of maternal leave, and 4 months of parental leave for either parent. An employee cannot be fired, or punished in any way, for taking this leave.

Gender-based violence

The proposed 2020-2025 gender equality strategy also aims at combating gender-based violence. First, the EU is pushing for ratification of the Istanbul Convention on violence against women in all EU countries, most of which have already done so.

In a September 2021 resolution, the European Parliament called on the EU to build upon the Istanbul Convention, and to implement even broader legislation. It proposed prevention measures, such as improving education about sexuality and non-violence at an early age, and addressing underlying causes of violence, such as harmful stereotypes. Parliament also called for better support services, improved protection for victims, and minimum standards for law enforcement.

Parliament reiterated some of these demands in the context of online gender-based violence in a December 2021 resolution. Parliament also highlighted that the Covid‑19 pandemic and resulting lockdowns led to an increase in domestic abuse, and called on the Commission to conduct a thorough analysis of this problem.

EU institutions and bodies

The EU is also committed to promoting gender equality in its institutions. 

Parliament has a Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality (FEMM), which makes sure that all EU legislation takes account of gender equality. The committee organises an annual gender equality week to highlight research and promote discussion on this topic.

The proportion of female Members of the European Parliament has steadily increased over the years, and currently stands a little over 40 %. The number of women in key Parliament positions, such as vice-presidents, has also risen. Additionally, for the first time, there are now as many male as female members of the European Commission. Economic decision-making continues to be the  area where the EU scores the lowest in terms of gender equality and women’s representation. Nevertheless, the European Central Bank has set its own targets to promote gender balance.

The EU also established the European Institute for Gender Equality, which collects information about gender equality and advises EU policy makers. It also promotes the practice of gender mainstreaming, which encourages EU policy makers to consider how every new law affects gender equality.

EU fighting for a gender-equal world

In 2020, the Commission put forward a third gender action plan, to promote gender equality and women’s empowerment through all EU external action. This new action plan on gender equality and women’s empowerment in 2021-2025 external action aims at accelerating progress on empowering women and girls, and safeguarding gender equality gains.

In a March 2022 resolution, Parliament welcomed the third gender action plan. It called on the EU to work for stronger and systematic collaboration to promote gender equality in key areas of action:

• eliminating all forms of gender-based violence;
• ensuring access to healthcare for women and sexual and reproductive rights;
• promoting economic and social rights and equality, and ensuring the autonomy of women and girls;
• encouraging participation and leadership by women, girls and young women;
• involving women in peacebuilding and security initiatives;
• ensuring gender-responsive humanitarian actions;
• building a green and digital society;
• creating a true ‘generation equality’.

Further information

• Annual reports on gender equality in the EU, European Commission, 2021
• European Gender Equality Index, European Institute for Gender Equality, 2021
• Gender mainstreaming in the European Parliament: state of play, European Parliamentary Research Service, Study, 2021
• Gender equality in the Recovery and Resilience Facility, European Parliamentary Research Service, Briefing, 2021

Keep sending your questions to the Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (Ask EP)! We reply in the EU language that you use to write to us.

Written by Lasse Boehm, Elena Lazarou and Giulio Sabbati.

The war Russia unleashed on Ukraine has global repercussions, beyond the death toll and the human tragedy in Ukraine itself, and the resulting refugee flows and wider destabilising effects on Europe’s east. This infographic depicts some of the economic consequences of the war, for Europe, but also the rest of the world.

Amongst the effects most directly felt by Europeans are rising energy prices. For years, Russia has been Europe’s largest supplier of coal, oil and gas. The war sent prices rising as Russia stopped supplying some Member States with gas, leading Europe to search for supplies elsewhere and forcing Europeans to pay more for their petrol and household heating. Higher energy prices are also a challenge for industry, which consumes large quantities of Russian gas.

Food prices have also risen since the outbreak of the war due to both Russia and Ukraine being amongst the largest producers of wheat and other commodities. The impact is felt directly by European consumers. Russia’s position as an important commodity exporter also impacts on supply chains for raw materials used by European industry, some of which are listed in these infographics. Rising prices for energy, food and commodities fuel inflation in Europe, and are a daily reminder of the impact of this war of aggression far beyond the borders of Ukraine and the conflict itself.

The consequences of the war are not limited to the European continent. Many countries in North Africa and the Middle East depend on wheat exports from Russia or Ukraine. Ukrainian exports are particularly affected, with Russia occupying parts of south-eastern Ukraine’s coastline, as well as attacking and blockading the remaining Ukrainian ports. Russia, in turn, has deliberately restricted some of its food exports in retaliation against the sanctions that have been imposed. The combined effect of reduced Russian and Ukrainian agricultural products means that the countries dependent on them – especially on wheat exports – will suffer directly as a consequence of the war unleashed by Russia. The combination of declining food exports and higher food prices poses a major risk for food security in some of the most vulnerable societies and countries in the world, further aggravating a situation which had already deteriorated due to pandemic- related food supply issues The World Food Programme estimates that acute hunger could rise to affect an additional 47 million people in the 81 countries it monitors, as a result of Russia’s war on Ukraine.

What these infographics demonstrate is that this is not a localised conflict which can be ignored by the global community. Russia’s war of aggression was not only an assault on the world order. It also directly impacts on millions of people all over the world – on their food supply, the price they pay for their energy, and the industries in which they are employed. These ‘domino effects’ of the war will have far-reaching implications, not only for the EU’s internal policies and its own resilience, but also for its external action and development policy.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Domino effects of the war‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

EU import dependency on cereal Air passenger traffic in Europe EU dependency on Russia in gross available energy Change in cost of food basket EU import dependency on Russia Exports of wheat by Russia and Ukraine Top 5 products exported by Russia worldwide Harmonised index of consumer prices, (HICP) in percentage points Annual capacity in billion m3 per year

Written by Aidan Christie.

Throughout his life, John Hume (1937-2020) sought to improve the circumstances of the people of Northern Ireland, beginning in his home city of Derry (Londonderry to its unionist residents). Born just a decade and a half after partition, and in a city whose hinterland had been divided by the border, he naturally wished for the unification of Ireland. But he saw that that could not be achieved without realistic plans, nor without a partnership between the two major communities in Northern Ireland, unionist and nationalist.

While working as a school-teacher, in the belief that they could themselves better their lot, he drove forward a wide range of actions to improve the economic circumstances of his community – which was far from the priority of the unionist government in Belfast. A nationalist community that was increasingly vocal in calling for fairer treatment brought him a leading role in the civil rights movement in Northern Ireland, before he made the switch to elected office in the Northern Ireland Parliament. The Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) that he co-founded was part of a short-lived power-sharing government in 1974, but it was to be a false dawn, followed by direct rule from London for more than two decades.

With killings a part of everyday life in Northern Ireland during the Troubles, John Hume argued incessantly that violence was not the means to bring about the unification of Ireland, but rather that understanding and respecting each other’s differences was the key to finding peace. He worked continuously to bring together the different parties and governments, all of which needed to be involved to resolve the conflict, as shown by the 1998 Good Friday Agreement. In that, he was inspired by the model of post-war European integration. His own experience as a Member of the European Parliament for 25 years (1979-2004) confirmed that a more collaborative approach to addressing differences could pay off. The design of the structures in the Good Friday Agreement owes much to his European experience, but it is thanks to his perseverance – in the face of considerable risks to both him and his family – in persuading those wedded to violence that there was a peaceful solution, that those institutions became reality.

Read the complete briefing on ‘John Hume: Northern Ireland’s peace-maker and committed European‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Luisa Antunes.

Genome-editing techniques have advanced tremendously in recent decades, especially since the development of CRISPR‑Cas9 by Nobel laureates Jennifer Doudna and Emmanuelle Charpentier. Such technological advances allow precise and targeted alterations to human DNA in a manner that is more efficient, more flexible and relatively less expensive than previous strategies. Coupled with artificial intelligence, this revolutionary technology could open a new field of precision medicine that includes a wide diversity of applications, ranging from uncovering therapeutic options for several allergies to potentially eliminating cancer, curing immunological diseases, antimicrobial resistant infections, cystic fibrosis, sickle cell anaemia and more.

Yet, proposing to alter the human genome conjures images of science fiction and past echoes of eugenics. Associated concerns allude not only to ethics, but also to safety, economic and political implications. What is the limit between a genetic modification aimed at treating a disease and a cosmetic alteration designed to modify a physical aspect of the consumer? Will genome editing replace the lucrative market of plastic surgery? What is the potential sociopolitical impact of unequal economic access to precision therapeutic medicine? Could international technological and regulatory differences carry geopolitical repercussions in the global arena?

To map the scientific and legal framework of genome editing in humans and support policy-makers in their understanding of its technical development and potential impact, the European Parliament Science and Technology Options Assessment (STOA) Panel commissioned a study entitled ‘Genome-editing in humans: A survey of law, regulation and governance principles’. The report was written by Professor Ana Nordberg, of the Faculty of Law, Lund University (Sweden) together with Doctor Luisa Antunes, policy analyst at STOA.

The study provides an overview of genome-editing technologies, the associated potential and risks, followed by a comparative analysis of regulatory frameworks in the European Union and worldwide, and options for political action.

In sum, genome-editing legislation can be introduced either in existing EU regulations (vertical approach), or through specific legislation (horizontal approach), and alternative governance mechanisms can also be explored. In any case, legal harmonisation facilitates the navigation of all stakeholders involved in a currently fragmented EU legal landscape. Moving forward, a few policy options can be envisaged:

1. Resilience mechanisms could be included in legislation to ensure continued correspondence between legislation and ongoing scientific advancements. Terms such as somatic v germline, hereditable genome editing, modifying genetic identity, andhuman enhancement are vague, scientifically outdated and could be updated.
2. Somatic as well as germline applications can pose social and ethical risks. A multi-level, risk-based approach could be used to determine what interventions to ban. The prohibition of genetic eugenics could extend to somatic applications.
3. Assisted reproduction techniques are often linked with the treatment of serious diseases. Scientific criteria used to determine disease seriousness could be harmonised.
4. Legislation on reproductive travel and wellness tourism varies by country. Corresponding EU law could apply extraterritorially.
5. Genome-editing needs to account for fundamental rights and freedoms. Subjects of illicit practices should be treated as victims and be allowed to refuse body-invasive activities, whilst also respecting their privacy, life, integrity and autonomy.
6. Counterfeited services are an intellectual property rights and public health issue. Genome editing could be introduced in existing legislation, including artificial intelligence (AI) legislation, and ethical licensing could be considered.

While genome editing provides great expectations for medicine, several ethical, social and legal questions remain to be addressed and regulatory and governance mechanisms are greatly needed in the EU.

The study was presented at a STOA panel meeting on 7 April 2022, and fostered fruitful discussions between the panel members present, who also raised questions with Professor Ana Nordberg:

Christian Ehler (STOA Chair, EPP, Germany): What is the most urgent legislative measure to be taken?

Professor Nordberg: It is urgent to adapt legal rules so that research on assisted reproduction is not delayed. Secondly, it is important to increase regulation on non-therapeutic uses (somatic interventions). The market for cosmetic products is huge and consumers are not very particular about which products they use, so this is a problematic legal area, which could be subject to further regulation. When patents expire, there will be a strong opportunity to explore the cosmetic products market, so regulation should already be in place. This issue links to questions of medical wellness and reproductive tourism to countries outside the EU.

Pernille Weiss (EPP, Denmark): How can we measure the seriousness of disease in respect to genome editing in assisted reproduction?

Professor Nordberg: There is an ongoing debate on the meaning of disability, which medical criteria are usually used to define. However, such criteria might differ from the patient’s own understanding of their condition. The patient’s view should also be taken into account.

What are the links between genome editing and the proposed artificial intelligence act?

Professor Nordberg: Artificial intelligence can be very helpful in disease diagnosis. Associated with genome editing, it can help correct certain diseases. However, genome editing could also be used to modify traits with no therapeutic objective. It could therefore be considered in the proposed artificial intelligence act.

Maria-Manuel Leitão-Marques (S&D, Portugal): How can we create flexible legislation that can be adapted to such a fast-evolving scientific area? Do you see a parallel with the proposed artificial intelligence legislation? If so, do you think a risk-based approach, as used in the artificial intelligence act proposal, could be adapted and applied to this area?

Professor Nordberg: The field is evolving very fast. Legislation will therefore need to be flexible, adaptive and resilient.

There is a clear parallel with the proposed legislation of artificial intelligence. The study favours a risk-based approach, which already exists in the legislation of pharmaceutical product evaluation and marketing authorisation. Legislation could take the perspective of ethical and social risks and implications, as well as being patient-based. It is also important to add the possibility of flexible legislative definitions, such as annexes, which can be revised easily if the technology moves forward, so that any legislation will not be outdated in just a few years. This can also be seen in the proposed artificial intelligence act.

Ivars Ijabs (Renew, Latvia): What is the threshold between genetic eugenics, which are prohibited, and self-enhancement?

Professor Nordberg: The distinction between eugenics and self-enhancement is very complex. It is therefore difficult to consider concepts such as ‘human enhancement’ in legislation. Human dignity, human autonomy, human agency, are concepts that might be better choices to use in legislation.

It is important to establish boundaries on the definition of eugenics. For instance, private actors can be considered to use a form of eugenics, regardless of the outcome, if they operate outside of the normal informed consent given by an individual subject to an intervention. It is therefore extremely important to prohibit and maintain a ban. Prohibition, in my view, should be clearly extended to private actors.

What is the role of public opinion in EU policies on this issue? As with genetically modified organisms, the EU’s commitment on genome editing in humans seems to be rather conservative. How do we make this democratic participation compatible with the further development of techniques that would improve human life?

Professor Nordberg: There is no single public opinion on elective interventions, but rather a question of public ‘opinions’, since there are many and these depend quite significantly on context. Non-therapeutic (elective) somatic interventions could be regulated. For example, at times, the same people who are very concerned about the safety of a vaccine are then very happy to be subjected to cosmetic modifications, for instance in a beauty salon, without knowing if there are any safety precautions. Legislation in this field is lacking.

The full set of policy options are set out in greater detail in the accompanying STOA options brief. Read the full report and accompanying STOA options brief to find out more.

Your opinion counts for us. To let us know what you think, get in touch via stoa@europarl.europa.eu.