European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Guillaume Ragonnaud and Marcin Szczepanski.

Russia is a major global commodity producer and exporter. The country’s invasion of Ukraine has already pushed commodity prices to historically high levels, and could also lead to commodity shortages. This situation may cause considerable economic damage, with far-reaching consequences for EU industry.

Background

Richly endowed with natural resources, Russia plays a crucial role in global energy, raw materials and agricultural markets. In 2021, it was the second global producer and net exporter of crude oil, the second producer and first net exporter of natural gas, and the sixth producer and third net exporter of coal. Supply chains around the world, meanwhile, rely on Russia for its metal exports. The country is, for instance, the top producer of palladium (40 % of world production), a metal used in catalytic converters and for chemical production and petroleum refining. Palladium belongs to the platinum-group metals, which are on the EU’s critical raw materials list. Russia is also a top agricultural commodity producer. With a considerable part of its territory within the Eurasian wheat belt, Russia boasts around 25 % of global arable land. It overtook the EU in 2016 to become the world’s largest wheat exporter, and is expected to increase its lead by 2030. In 2021 Russia was the world’s top exporter of nitrogen fertilisers, and ranked second for phosphorous and potassium fertilisers. It is also a major source of materials used to produce fertilisers in Europe (e.g. natural gas for nitrogen fertilisers). Lastly, Russia is, by far, the world’s most forested country, hosting 20 % of the global forest area.

By 15 March 2022, the EU had adopted four packages of restrictive measures against Russia, affecting trade flows among other areas. The fourth package includes an EU import ban on some steel products and denies Russian products and services most-favoured-nation treatment on EU markets (meaning that Russia may be subject to higher tariffs and import bans). The US has also targeted Russia with similar, far-reaching sanctions. So far, Russia’s exports of commodities to the EU have been spared the sort of comprehensive trade bans imposed on other sectors, but this could change. From its side, on 10 March 2022, Russia imposed retaliatory export bans (on 48 countries, including the EU Member States and the US) on more than 200 products. These include some manufactured products, such as cars, railway carriages, telecoms, and electrical and agricultural equipment, as well as some commodities such as wood and timber, with repercussions for many sectors. For now, energy and raw materials – such as metals – are not covered by the ban. Extending the list to these could have grave consequences for EU industry and for its green and digital transformation. Russia is also considering withdrawing from the WTO, which would likely complicate trade still further.

Main commodities imported by the EU from Russia

The EU imported commodities worth €108.3 billion from Russia in 2021, a sum representing 65 % of all goods it imported from Russia that year. Energy commodities represented 91 % of commodity imports (€98.9 billion), raw materials 7 % (€7.3 billion) and food commodities 2 % (€2.1 billion). Imports of the top 20 commodities for which the EU depended on Russia most in 2021 (Figure 1) totalled €103.4 billion, representing 95 % of EU imports from Russia. The highest dependency rate was for nickel ores. Nickel is used for many products (mainly stainless steel, a range of alloys, electroplating and the fast-growing electric vehicle battery market). In 2021, Russia was the world’s third biggest nickel producer, mining 250 000 tonnes (9.2 % of global production). A number of energy commodities (natural gas, oil, coal) also feature prominently in this ranking. Coke and iron ore, two materials used in steelmaking are in the top 20. Iron ore is also mainly used in steelmaking, through the blast furnace route. Sulphur, used mainly to produce sulphuric acid, is of prime importance for many industrial sectors. Synthetic rubber is used to produce tyres and other consumer goods.

Top 20 EU commodity imports from Russia, 2021 Potential impact on EU industry

The future magnitude of the impact of Russia’s war on the EU economy is largely unknown, depending not least on the duration of the war and on the policy responses made. While commodity prices started from historically elevated levels owing to strong demand, they have recently reached or neared record highs. Agricultural commodity prices had been rising steadily since 2020, and the FAO food price index reached an all-time high in February 2022. The war is likely to keep commodity prices high, which is expected to exert even stronger inflationary pressures. Together with supply-chain disruptions, and high energy and oil prices squeezing incomes, this situation could cause a global stagflationary shock.

The OECD’s initial simulations after two weeks of conflict suggested that global growth could be reduced by over 1 percentage point, and global inflation could rise by close to 2.5 percentage points in the first full year from the start of Russia’s invasion. Energy-intensive industries (such as chemicals and steel manufacturing, fertilisers and transport) are expected to be impacted by higher prices and/or possible disruptions in the availability of energy products, possibly causing industry shutdowns. By 8 March 2022, high power prices resulting from surging gas prices had already taken 900 000 tonnes of aluminium and 700 000 tonnes of zinc smelting capacity offline in Europe. Furthermore, higher prices, metal shortages, and also logistics problems, could severely affect other industries (e.g. electric vehicle production).

Global supply chains, in which the EU is highly integrated, were already under pandemic-induced stress. The war may help to reconfigure supply chains permanently, particularly if it causes closer alignment of China and Russia. Experts also consider that the war may rupture the Belt and Road Initiative: the declining use of the Russian transport infrastructure that supports supply chain links between the EU and Asia is a case in point. This reconfiguration may come in the form of a tightening of supply chains or ‘friendshoring‘. If the oil shock of the 1970s can offer a guide to the future, accelerated innovation and the use of alternative energy sources are likely to become the new, transformational forces for EU industry. However, it has first to weather the deteriorating economic climate, the shock to supply chains, and surging oil and energy prices.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Russia’s war on Ukraine: Implications for EU commodity imports from Russia‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marcin Grajewski.

Inflation has reached the highest level in decades in the European Union, United States and many other countries, with the Ukraine conflict adding upward pressure on prices of energy and food. The Russian invasion has intensified the already near-record growth of consumer prices resulting from the coronavirus pandemic and broken supply-chains. The war has sharply curbed supply of energy, wheat and other products from Russia and Ukraine, their major producers. The countries’ exports look set to dwindle further if the war continues and the EU imposes a ban on its massive gas and oil imports from Russia, adding to the already strict sanctions on Moscow.

Some central banks have signalled that they will further increase interest rates, and ‘stagflation’, or high inflation coupled with economic stagnation, could follow. Before the invasion, many experts had expected rapid price growth to be temporary. Now, they believe inflation could become more entrenched, further squeezing households’ real income in coming months.

This note gathers links to the recent publications and commentaries from many international think tanks on resurgent inflation. Analyses on the war and its implications can be found in a previous edition of the ‘What Think Tanks are Thinking’ series.

The week inflation became entrenched
Bruegel, March 2022

The impact of the war in Ukraine on food security
Bruegel, March 2022

Can Europe manage if Russian oil and coal are cut off?
Bruegel, March 2022

Inflation in America: Experts react to the latest CPI release
Brookings Institution, March 2022

Stagflation: Real threat or imagined?
Council on Foreign Relations, March 2022

Russia’s war on Ukraine: There is worse to come (for the West as well)
Centre for European Reform, March 2022

Ukraine crisis could trigger cascading risks globally
Chatham House, March 2022

How agriculture bureaucrats are manipulating food prices and our diets
Mises Institute, March 2022

Inflation: Who or what is the culprit?
Mises Institute, March 2022

The European Economic Advisory Group’s report on the European economy 2022 –-Economic policy for the next decade: A changed role of governments?
IfO, March 2022

Economic consequences of the Russian invasion of Ukraine
IfO, March 2022

Preiskontrollen eignen sich nicht, um die Inflation zu bekämpfen
DIW Berlin, March 2022

World economy in spring 2022: Slower growth amid higher inflation
Euro Area Economy Spring 2022: War in Ukraine impairs post-pandemic recovery
Kiel Institute of the World Economy, March 2022

Does rational economic policy require a Stability and Growth Pact?
Österreichische Gesellschaft für Europapolitik, March 2022

Why I worry about inflation, interest rates, and unemployment
Peterson Institute for International Economics, March 2022

Fed gets a grip on 2022, still optimistic on 2023
Peterson Institute for International Economics, March 2022

Why US inflation surged in 2021 and what the Fed should do to control it
Peterson Institute for International Economics, March 2022

What is needed to tame US inflation?
Peterson Institute for International Economics, March 2022

Will anchored inflation expectations actually anchor inflation?
Peterson Institute for International Economics, March 2022

Higher oil prices stemming from Russia-Ukraine war may be temporary
Peterson Institute for International Economics, March 2022

Beyond oil, natural gas, and wheat: The commodity shock of Russia-Ukraine crisis
Atlantic Council, March 2022

What about inflation and the Russia-Ukraine crisis?
Atlantic Council, March 2022

Why inflation is President Biden’s biggest political problem
Brookings Institution, February 2022

The weakness of average inflation targeting
Bruegel, February 2022

Who is suffering most from rising inflation?
Bruegel, February 2022

East-west divergence in central bank action will not last much longer
Bruegel, February 2022

Russia’s energy role in Europe: What’s at stake with the Ukraine crisis
Council on Foreign Relations, February 2022

What do the data tell us about inflation expectations?
IfO, February 2022

Inflation rises could again poison euro zone politics
Chatham House, February 2022

Inflation politics is clearer than inflation economics
Brookings Institution, January 2022

Taking stock of the new Fed and ECB monetary policy frameworks
Brookings Institution, January 2022

Inflation expectations
Centre for European Policy Studies, January 2022

Inflation: Policymakers should stop driving it and start fighting it
Heritage Foundation, January 2022

European inflation is not American inflation
Peterson Institute for International Economics, January 2022

Inflation: Learning the proper lessons from history
Council on Foreign Relations, January 2022

Read this briefing on ‘Inflation in the wake of coronavirus and war‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Kjeld van Wieringen with Julia Hüntemann.

Within the scope of the European Union’s new industrial strategy, the European Commission acknowledges the need for a more strategic approach to renewable energies. Following up on the presentation of the strategy, the European Parliamentary Research Service organised a webinar, in cooperation with Parliament’s Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union, to assess developments in the global solar photovoltaic (PV) industry. The event identified opportunities as well as challenges – not only for the EU – but also for India, to reduce their dependence on solar PV technologies manufactured in China.

China emerged as the dominant producer of PV modules by 2008. By 2012, it accounted for 64 % of worldwide production, and as of 2017, 8 of the top-10 solar manufacturers were Chinese, supplying ca. three quarters of the world’s solar panels. China’s unprecedented surge as a global provider of solar panels was also enabled by a 75 % decline in production costs. While China’s success in this industry has been deemed a result of Beijing’s commitment to establish market leadership, the country has not always dominated the supply chain. In 2007, 30 % of PV manufacturing was in Europe, making the region the initial front-runner in the solar revolution. However, the swift price decreases achieved by cost reductions among Chinese PV manufacturers in combination with significant state subsidies allowed them to outcompete their European counterparts, driving them into bankruptcy. In 2012, a proposal by the Commission to implement anti-dumping duties of up to 67.9 percent was aborted, following Chinese threats to retaliate with tariffs on French wine and German cars, and thus failed to save the European solar panel industry. Currently, Europe holds less than 0.2 % of PV cell production capacities. While PV manufacturers in the EU can no longer match the cheap prices offered by Chinese competitors, Indian PV manufacturers were never able to do so, as the country joined the ‘solar race’ at a time when the China had already established market leadership.

Solar installation companies have been incentivised to rely on the cheap equipment exported from China, both in Europe and in India. Without them, solar installations – and therefore green transition plans – could not have advanced at the pace they did. Nevertheless, an unpleasant aftertaste lingers, as the dependency on Chinese solar equipment is increasingly deemed a cause for concern both in the EU and in India. 

Both Europe and India consider a domestic PV manufacturing industry important because it would provide lucrative employment opportunities, and a source of technological leadership and international prestige. More importantly however, in-house PV manufacturing would make the solar sector a source of energy security, allowing the EU and India to cut the unwanted dependencies that accompany imported oil and gas. With Europe importing 80 % of its solar panels from China, and India up to 90 % of its required solar equipment, dependencies are simply shifting from imported oil or gas to imported solar equipment, leaving much to be desired when it comes to the solar sector as a genuine source of energy security. 

In May 2020, India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi deemed this dependence on foreign suppliers untenable and proclaimed a new policy focus on domestic (solar) manufacturing, through the ‘Atmanirbhar Bharat Abhiyan’ (Self-Sufficient India) and ‘Make in India’ initiatives. Around the same time, a letter signed by Ministers from Austria, Estonia, Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Poland and Spain called on the Commission to consider solar PV to be a strategic value chain, to receive more support under Covid‑19 recovery packages. Similarly, in the summer of 2020, 90 organisations from the European solar sector urged for solar PV manufacturing and research and development (R&D) to be at the core of the Green Deal.

With pleas to re-shore PV manufacturing capacities to Europe gaining renewed momentum, the question remains how Europe will go about providing its domestic manufacturers with a business environment in which they can compete with their Chinese counterparts, without igniting another round of solar trade disputes, as experienced in 2012‑2013. The Commission’s anti-dumping and anti-subsidy investigation, valued at more than €20 billion but cut short following Chinese threats to increase tariffs on European wines and luxury cars, became one of the largest EU-China trade disputes. The European Union could consider diversifying its supply of solar equipment, a process which will require the navigation of domestic and international pressures, and thus demands – first and foremost – a careful study of mid- to long-term trends in the global solar industry. In an attempt to help the EU anticipate these pressures, the webinar concluded with an assessment of scenarios for cooperation and competition between the EU and its Indian and Chinese counterparts respectively. These scenarios were presented within a foresight ‘Best Case’, ‘Anticipated Case’ and ‘Worst Case’ framework. 

Best CaseAnticipated CaseWorst CaseEU-IndiaIndia and the EU find effective ways of cooperating more closely within the framework of the already existing EU-India Clean Energy and Climate Partnership. The EU has been collaborating closely with India in deployment of climate friendly energy sources, collaboration that could be extended to include the manufacturing, as well as the research and development arm of the supply chain. Energy cooperation could also be embedded deeper in the recently ratified EU-India Connectivity Partnership to find investment opportunities for automated production lines. This could be particularly valuable in trying to bring next generation solar technologies onto the market (see below).Narendra Modi has pledged to achieve self-sufficiency, cutting dependencies on PV imports irrespective of their country of origin. Under current circumstances, this goal seems unfeasible given that:
1)      PV manufacturing companies in India have poor access to debt capital, meaning they have difficulties in securing loans (unlike their Chinese competitors);
2)      PV manufacturing companies in India face high electricity prices, which make operations expensive in the first place;
3)      PV manufacturing companies in India face severe difficulties in establishing economies of scale, owing to strict labour laws enshrined in the Industrial Disputes Act of 1947.
If self-sufficiency is an unfeasible goal, we can expect India to diversify its supply of solar equipment away from China, favouring producers in Europe, Japan and the USA. Given the scale of India’s Nationally Determined Contributions, the ambition of its National Solar Mission and the according demand for solar equipment, European PV manufacturers should consider India a promising market.A number of scenarios could be envisaged.
1)      India decides to pursue closer energy cooperation with Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) partners, particularly Japan, rather than the EU.
2)      In an attempt to offer its PV manufacturers a more competitive environment, India decides to launch a safeguard duty on solar equipment imports, irrespective of their country of origin, including those imported from Europe. (NB: India already imposed such a duty in 2018. This was gradually phased out in 2020.)
India’s solar energy ambitions are seriously slowed due to a government that creates an insecure investment climate while trying to negotiate between the incompatible interest of two stakeholder groups. On the one hand, the Government of India is committed to fast and cheap solar installations, an objective which requires cheap inputs from China. On the other hand, the Government of India has pledged verbal support to domestic PV manufacturers that compete with precisely those supplying cheap equipment to India. This policy flip-flop has resulted in the imposition of trade defence instruments, e.g. the safeguard duty in 2018‑2020, which was too low to support PV manufacturers in becoming globally competitive, but high enough to create bureaucratic hurdles and confusion, discouraging investors in solar installation.EU-ChinaImports of subsidised Chinese solar panels are regulated by country-neutral instruments such as anti-subsidy rules or safeguard duties.
This creates opportunities to diversify solar panel imports through partnerships with India, Japan, South Korea and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries.
Other European green energy industries (wind, hydrogen etc.) are not out-competed.Increased regulation of solar panel imports from China cause tensions but not a trade war.
The possible introduction of the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism raises tariffs on Chinese solar panels using energy from coal. Possible measures following human rights concerns about the solar panel value chain in Xinjiang and worsening EU-China relations could also raise further barriers.
Increased price of solar panels due to tariffs and increased reliance on domestic manufacturing slow solar installations in Europe to a small extent.Chinese counter measures cause another massive dispute or trade war.
Tariffs cause internal divisions and civil society protest in the EU, in light of economic and climate interests.
Higher solar panel prices (domestically or foreign manufactured, but hit by tariffs), slowing solar installations significantly. 
Alternatively, a lack of (carbon emission) tariffs on solar panel imports and other protective measures to protect European solar panel industries against unfair competition result in next generation European solar technologies and production being out-competed and supplanted. The same could be true for other green energy industries such as hydrogen and wind energy. Conclusions:

The webinar discussion led to the participants suggesting a number of options for further EU action.

1. Monitoring the supply chain: The European Parliament could monitor the solar PV supply chain, an exercise that could help the European Commission identify energy partnerships with countries sharing compatible production capabilities, manufacturing processes and quality systems. Similar scenarios of cooperation and competition could be conducted with regard to the USA, Taiwan, Malaysia and Japan.
2. Steer strategic discussions on the trade-off between strategic autonomy and Green Deal: Regular exchanges of views could be held between Parliament and the relevant Commissioners, to discuss the trade-off between strategic autonomy versus an uninterrupted implementation of the Green Deal that necessitates access to cheap solar equipment imported from China. The EU could take a clear stance in this trade-off, to avoid creating confusing signals for investors.
3. Encourage access to international investors and R&D institutes: At the European level, PV manufacturing companies have already joined forces with Europe’s leading R&D institutes to develop state-of-the-art solar technologies. Now, the EU needs to ensure that European PV manufacturers also have access to international R&D institutes as well as investors. Here, the International Solar Alliance, spearheaded by India and France, could be extremely important in advancing technology transfer and finding appropriate funding sources for R&D. Parliament could look into how multiannual financial framework (MFF) instruments, such as Horizon Europe, could help achieve investment partnerships beyond the EU.
4.  It is unclear whether PV manufacturing companies in the EU, or those anywhere else, could catch up with China in this generation of solar PV technologies (i.e. crystalline silicon PV which currently still accounts for 90 % of all installed solar panels globally.). However, Japanese, US and EU companies are still on a relatively equal footing with China when it comes to R&D in ‘next generation’ solar technologies, including perovskite and organic PV. Given that these solar technologies are largely still in the ‘lab’ stage and have not yet been commercialised, scope remains for European companies to enter the market. Oxford Photovoltaics, for instance, recently set a world record, with a 29.52 % conversion efficiency using a solar cell combining perovskite and silicon. Its investments of over €150 million and the expansion of its manufacturing by 2022 indicate that future next generation technology solar panel production in Europe is still within reach.

Written by Zsolt G. Pataki.

The fifth-generation mobile network (5G) is not just a performance booster for current mobile communication networks, but is also a technology enabling the convergence of communication networks with another fundamental block of the digital era – computing. 5G technology is defined by a complex ecosystem, composed of heterogeneous stakeholders, technologies, methodologies and best practices.

On the one hand, this ecosystem offers new opportunities for digitalisation, a key reason for which 5G technology is envisaged as providing a cornerstone of European resilience and as one of the seven flagship areas of the European Recovery and Resilience Facility. On the other hand, the complexity of this ecosystem poses unexplored security and privacy concerns, risks and challenges that might threaten the feasibility of the future development of 5G. These issues, along with a possible lack of awareness about them, are factors that might lead to serious vulnerabilities regarding personal data and sensitive information. Protecting information is essential for EU citizens’ security and privacy. Information leaks can severely damage the European Union: 5G network security has become an intense battlefield between Western countries and China, where some of the main providers of 5G network equipment are established.

In this context, and in addition to two earlier studies on the impact of 5G (on human health and on the environment respectively), the European Parliament’s Panel for the Future of Science and Technology (STOA)commissioned another important study. This study aims at identifying the risks that the deployment of 5G technology could pose to EU citizens’ privacy, security, and businesses, and exploring their potential implications.

The unrivalled capability and flexibility of 5G have been made possible by a decades-long process of convergence between computing and telecommunications. Their merger brings to light a new ecosystem, where telecommunications and computing collaborate to enable new scenarios, and where stakeholders can extend their business offering and compete with each other. Throughout this epochal shift, a wide debate around privacy and security has unfolded. The complexity of the 5G ecosystem requires a deep insight into its main components, and especially into how the components affecting privacy and security interact with each other. To this end, the authors of the study performed an impact assessment based on a research conceptual map divided into four categories (privacy, security, technologies, ethics/politics), focused on the identification and analysis of the new potential risks, challenges and opportunities that 5G technology entails with respect to privacy and security.

On this basis, they formulated a set of policy options for potential enhancements of the next releases of technical specifications and regulations, organised into three dimensions (privacy, security and ethics):

• The policy options for mitigating privacy risks and challenges include, inter alia, that any organisation involved in the EU 5G ecosystem should establish a controller or a processor and should encourage its own legal departments to perform a transfer impact assessment (TIA). A potential alternative path would be to adopt a hybrid approach where personal or sensitive data is stored locally, close to and within an individual’s national boundaries (edge cloud) and less-sensitive data is stored in the cloud. Adopting a personal data wallet – a digital area where individuals can access data, provide consent and receive notifications – could be considered as a fundamental tool for exercising the rights to privacy and data protection. New European legislation will also have to monitor the evolution of the privacy issue in the next specifications and deployments of 5G technology, and ensure data sovereignty, as the 5G ecosystem requires the cooperation of several stakeholders located worldwide.
• Options to reduce security risks and challenges include network softwareisation and flexibility, with standard rules and procedures to be considered for reducing ambiguities between network components, monitoring the evolution of multiconnectivity, and accelerating cybersecurity standards – as existing cybersecurity guidelines are implemented by service and component providers in line with their internal procedures, 5G should adopt common standards for cybersecurity.
• Ethics risks and challenges may be related to a lack of citizen awareness of the impacts of 5G on ethical issues. More democratic access to adequate information on 5G ethics impacts should be provided. Awareness and critical thinking should be nurtured in the context of digital and data literacy within lifelong education projects, as well as in schools. A tailored regulatory framework for applied ethics in 5G (in the same way as there are other kinds of applied ethics, such as AI ethics, roboethics, etc.), may be needed at the EU level. The accountability, trustworthiness and reliability of 5G and related technologies (e.g. AI, IoT, robotics, etc.) has to be considered in the regulatory framework governing the implementation of 5G verticals (e.g. eHealth, smart cities, energy, etc.).

The STOA Options Brief linked to the study contains an overview of several policy options. Read the full report to find out more, and let us know what you think via stoa@europarl.europa.eu.

Written by Clare Ferguson and Katarzyna Sochacka.

With the war in Ukraine high on Parliament’s agenda, the highlight of the March II 2022 plenary session in Brussels was a formal address by Justin Trudeau, Prime Minister of Canada. Members held a debate with the Council and the European Commission on the need for an urgent EU action plan to ensure food security inside and outside the EU, in the light of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. They also debated the power of the proposed joint European action to secure more affordable, reliable and sustainable energy. Turning to the ‘Suisse Secrets’ scandal, Members debated how to encourage anti-money-laundering standards in third countries. Members also discussed the outcome of the European Council meeting in Paris on 10 March 2022, and the preparations for the 24‑25 March 2022 meeting. Several legislative files were adopted, inter alia on roaming charges; the cohesion action for the presence of refugees in Europe and use of funds under the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF) Regulation, both in light of the war in Ukraine; and on the Status Agreement between the EU and Moldova on Frontex operations.

Roaming Regulation

Members debated extending and adapting current EU legislation on roaming charges. In interinstitutional negotiations on the proposal to revise the rules to increase transparency and network quality, Parliament succeeded in capping the wholesale roaming charges at €2 per gigabyte from this year, with a progressive reduction to reach €1 in 2027. Now that the Parliament has adopted the provisional agreement, it goes to the Council for confirmation, before citizens are able to ‘roam like at home‘ for a further 10 years.

Pilot regime for market infrastructure based on distributed ledger technology

Parliament is always keen to encourage technological solutions that benefit citizens in their daily lives. Members debated and adopted, by a large majority, the agreement reached between the co-legislators on a pilot regime developing trading and transactions in crypto-assets – usually known as cryptocurrencies (such as bitcoin and ethereum). Parliament is in favour of encouraging crypto-assets, as long as they do not pose a risk to financial stability, transparency or market integrity, or permit legal loopholes. Parliament’s Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) therefore proposed stricter limits on trading. Market capitalisation will be allowed up to €500 million in shares and issuance of bonds up to €1 billion.

Macro-financial assistance to the Republic of Moldova

Moldova has found itself on the frontline in Russia’s most recent aggression against its neighbours. The country has experienced Russian interference in its own democratic process in recent years, added to an economic downturn exacerbated by the pandemic. Moldova has nevertheless opened its borders to welcome large numbers of Ukrainian refugees. The country enjoys good political and economic relations with the EU, and signed association and free trade agreements with the bloc – Moldova’s largest trading partner – in 2014. The EU has provided €160 million in EU macro-financial assistance since 2017. In response to a Moldovan request for further assistance, the Commission proposed (before the outbreak of the war), to start allocating €30 million in grants and up to €120 million in medium-term loans. Members adopted this proposal by an overwhelming majority.

The fight against oligarch structures, protection of EU funds from fraud and conflict of interest

The Parliament has long stressed that corruption threatens democracy, fundamental rights and the rule of law, and undermines citizens’ trust in the EU and its institutions. The sanctions necessitated by Russia’s war on Ukraine have highlighted the presence of Russian oligarchs and oligarchic structures on EU territory. Denouncing the current situation, especially in certain countries where EU funding is sometimes diverted to such persons (and not just Russians), Parliament’s Budgetary Control (CONT) Committee tabled a hard-hitting own-initiative report highlighting the need to protect EU funding against the risks of fraud and conflict of interest. Members debated and adopted a resolution which particularly condemns the use of EU agricultural funding for personal benefit, and warns against the threat to EU values of allowing oligarchs to gain control over the media and the judiciary.

Opening of trilogue negotiations

A number of committee decisions to enter into interinstitutional negotiations were announced: from the Legal Affairs (JURI) Committee on the proposal for a directive on corporate sustainability reporting, from the Employment and Social Affairs (EMPL) and Women’s Rights and Gender Equality (FEMM) Committees on the proposal for a directive to strengthen the application of the principle of equal pay for equal work or work of equal value between men and women through pay transparency and enforcement mechanisms, and from the ECON committee on the proposal for a regulation on markets in crypto-assets.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Plenary round-up – March II 2022‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Micaela Del Monte and Maria Margarita Mentzelopoulou.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has forced hundreds of thousands of people, mostly women and children, to flee the country and seek shelter in neighbouring countries. Ukraine’s civilian population is being subjected to shelling and violence, while outside Ukraine’s borders, the international humanitarian community has quickly mobilised to provide support. As the humanitarian situation deteriorates, children are particularly vulnerable.

Humanitarian situation: Ukraine’s children in danger

As of 16 March 2022, the United Nations (UN) Refugee Agency, UNHCR, estimated that more than 3.4 million people, mostly women and children, had fled Ukraine to neighbouring countries – mainly to Poland but also to Hungary, Moldova, Romania and Slovakia. As the days go by, the conflict is generating increasing numbers of casualties, destruction and displacement within and outside Ukraine’s borders, causing one of the greatest European humanitarian crises of recent times. The crisis has triggered the ‘biggest show of European mobilisation in recent years’, but the situation is disastrous, and the human cost already too high.

According to the UN Children’s Fund (Unicef), the war is posing an immediate and growing threat to Ukraine’s 7.5 million children. Since 24 February, 1.5 million children have fled the country, but there are still up to 6 million children trapped in Ukraine. With growing numbers of attacks on schools, hospitals and other civilian infrastructure, where many people have been sheltering, these children are in grave danger and are vulnerable to injury or death, as well as being deprived of food, clean water, education and health care. According to the United Nations (UN), as of 18 March at least 59 children had been killed as a result of the war, while media reports suggest that the number may have reached at least 100.

Children, together with women, are at extreme risk of violence and abuse, including human trafficking, smuggling and illegal adoption. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) has warned of the high risk of human trafficking and sexual exploitation of the population in distress, but also of the financial insecurity suffered by certain unaccompanied children and many women who have been separated from partners and support networks. Many children are without parental care, either because, amid the chaos, they were separated from their families or because they were living in residential care or boarding schools when the Russian invasion started. Among the latter category, of 100 000 children, it is estimated that half have disabilities and need special attention and care. Save the Children reports that Ukraine probably has among the highest rates of institutional care for children in Europe, ‘with about 1.3 % of all children living in some form of residential care facility’. Ukraine is also an international surrogacy hub, and infants born to surrogate mothers are currently stranded in shelters, as their parents cannot travel to collect them.

International and EU response

UNHCR is working with partners and local organisations on the ground to reinforce vulnerability screening and referrals for people with specific needs, while improving monitoring of unaccompanied and separated children, and referral to specialised services. Unicef has meanwhile published advice for the relevant authorities, aid workers and volunteers on protecting displaced and refugee children in and outside Ukraine. The guidance states that children could be at risk of human trafficking, child labour, sexual exploitation, illegal adoption and aggravated smuggling, and that displaced girls are at particular risk of gender-based violence. The Council of Europe’s Group of Experts on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings (GRETA) has also warned of the danger faced by people fleeing the armed conflict in Ukraine of falling victim to human trafficking and exploitation. There are already reports of traffickers targeting unaccompanied children fleeing Ukraine; many such children are currently unaccounted for, following the hasty evacuation of orphanages and foster homes. In some countries, specialised anti-trafficking non-governmental organisations are disseminating leaflets to refugees, warning them of the risks of accepting transport and accommodation from strangers, and informing them of how to seek help and report suspicious cases to the existing national helplines for trafficking victims.

The EU has stepped in to help civilians affected by the war in Ukraine, for instance with emergency aid programmes that will cover some basic needs, assistance at the EU borders, and activation of the Temporary Protection Directive (Directive 2001/55/EC). On 21 March, the Commission issued operational guidelines, establishing the existence of a mass influx of displaced persons from Ukraine, in line with the 2017 communication on the protection of children in migration. The guidelines stress that the ‘protection of migrant children arriving from Ukraine is a top priority for the EU’, and that provision must be made for children’s specific needs and rights, including physical and mental healthcare, and education. They further clarify that unaccompanied, separated and orphan children (covered by Article 16 of the Temporary Protection Directive) deserve particular attention, and that decisions must always consider the best interests of the child. On 10 March, the Commission published a statement calling for the protection of children in Ukraine following the bombardment of the children’s and maternity hospital in Mariupol, and called for the establishment of genuine humanitarian corridors to evacuate the most vulnerable. This was echoed in a declaration by the European ministers in charge of children.

Together with international organisations, the Commission has called repeatedly for an end to the war, stressing the need to stop attacks in civilian areas and on civilian infrastructure. One such attack on 16 March 2022 destroyed a theatre and a swimming pool in the city of Mariupol, where some 1 000 civilians, including children, were reportedly sheltering. According to the European Union Agency for Asylum, EU and neighbouring countries have focused their efforts on ensuring that children can access education, by simplifying the relevant procedures, waiving childcare fees, and providing for smooth integration into the school curriculum and language learning.

Finally, on 23 March, the Commission published a communication outlining action taken in response to the humanitarian crisis. The measures address the protection of children and their rights and include guidance for the registration of children upon arrival. Under the European Child Guarantee, national coordinators have a key role to play here and there is a specific focus on children from institutions and children at risk of trafficking and abduction. The Commission is also preparing dedicated standard operating procedures for transfers of unaccompanied minors. It will bring together Member States to pool experience and identify the educational needs of displaced children, while establishing a ‘school education gateway’ – a one-stop shop to link to educational material from Ukraine.

European Parliament’s position

Parliament has come up with a series of proposals in recent years, stressing the need for special protection for vulnerable groups – such as unaccompanied children and women and girls. Prioritising unaccompanied and separated children, Parliament has stressed that child protection must be the leading principle when dealing with children. In its resolution of 1 March, the European Parliament strongly condemned ‘the Russian Federation’s illegal, unprovoked and unjustified military aggression against and invasion of Ukraine’ and recalled that ‘attacks against civilians and civilian infrastructure as well as indiscriminate attacks are prohibited under international humanitarian law and therefore constitute war crimes’. It also called on the Commission, the Member States and UN agencies to offer the civilian population humanitarian assistance. Parliament referred to the numerous reports of ‘violations of international humanitarian law committed by Russian troops, including indiscriminate shelling of living areas, hospitals and kindergartens’, and pointed out that, since 2014, more than 14 000 people have died in a ‘conflict fomented by the Russian Federation in eastern Ukraine’. In addition, Parliament stressed the need to pay attention to vulnerable groups, ‘in particular children in institutional care, unaccompanied children, and children with disabilities and other serious illnesses, including childhood cancers’.

In a letter to European Commission President, Ursula von der Leyen, and European Council President, Charles Michel, the Socialists & Democrats Group in the European Parliament have called for an EU initiative to protect and assist children coming from Ukraine as well as those still there. The letter calls for an urgent agreement on an EU-Ukraine child protection package, to be set up jointly with the Ukrainian government, to protect and assist children in and from Ukraine. The group intends to raise this issue for debate during Parliament’s April plenary session.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Russia’s war on Ukraine: The situation of Ukraine’s children‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Ralf Drachenberg.

Charles Michel’s (first) term as European Council President comes to an end on 30 May 2022. In advance of his potential re-election by EU Heads of State or Government to that function, this paper looks at his activities during the course of his 30-month mandate to date, with a special focus on the institutional and inter-institutional dimension of his role.

In practice, the coronavirus pandemic has dictated the agenda of the European Council from almost the beginning of Mr Michel’s time in office. The resulting need to concentrate on ‘crisis management’ provided him, as it had his predecessors, with the opportunity to show leadership, applying a careful balance between the role of facilitator and that of agenda-setter. Despite the challenging circumstances he has faced, Mr Michel has managed to make his mark on the European Council’s agenda, notably on external relations, championing the concept of ‘strategic autonomy’. He demonstrated strong activism both prior to and after the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, playing an important role in European Union mobilisation to support the country. He has also adjusted the European Council’s working methods, in particular with the use of video-conferences of small groups of EU leaders to better prepare full European Council meetings. Cooperation between the European Council President and the European Parliament has increased in comparison to previous years, particularly regarding activities not required of the President by the Treaties. Mr Michel has also innovated in communications, notably through a newsletter aimed at EU citizens.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Charles Michel as President of the European Council‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Vivienne Halleux (1st edition).

On 17 November 2021, the European Commission tabled a proposal to revise EU rules governing shipments of waste. The proposed regulation aims at easing shipments of waste for reuse and recycling in the EU, to support the transition to a circular economy; ensuring that waste exported from the EU is managed in an environmentally sound manner in the destination countries; and stepping up enforcement to counteract illegal shipments of waste. While supporting the proposed streamlining and digitalisation of procedures, stakeholders have stressed the need for significant improvements to ensure that the new regulation fulfils its objectives, in particular as regards exports of waste.

The proposal is now in the hands of the co-legislators. In the European Parliament, the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI), responsible for the file, plans to consider its rapporteur’s draft report in May 2022.

Versions

• March 2022: Revision of the EU’s Waste Shipment Regulation (1st edition)

Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on shipments of waste and amending Regulations (EU) No 1257/2013 and (EU) No 2020/1056 Committee responsible:Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI)COM(2021) 709
17.11.2021Rapporteur:Pernille Weiss (EPP, Denmark)2021/0367(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Cyrus Engerer (S&D, Malta)
Linea Søgaard-Linell (Renew, Denmark)
Sara Matthieu (Greens/EFA, Belgium)
Pietro Fiocchi (ECR, Italy)
João Pimenta Lopes (The Left, Portugal)Ordinary legislative
procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council on
equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Publication of draft report

Written by Maria Niestadt.

As a general-purpose technology, artificial intelligence (AI) has the potential to change our lives. It could bring many benefits, from increasing farming efficiency to helping to fight climate change and making transport safer, cleaner and more efficient. However, AI also generates a number of issues, such as opaque decision-making, discrimination, or intrusion into our private lives. To investigate these challenges and to analyse the impact of AI on the EU economy, the European Parliament decided in June 2020 to set up a special committee. The special committee on artificial intelligence in a digital age (AIDA) is expected to vote on its final report on 22 March 2022.

Special committee on artificial intelligence in a digital age

The European Parliament decided to set up a special committee on artificial intelligence in a digital age (AIDA) on 18 June 2020. Its 12-month mandate was to analyse the future impact of AI on the EU economy and its different sectors and its contribution to business value and economic growth, investigate the challenge of deploying AI, and analyse non-EU countries’ AI approach. The committee should submit an evaluation defining common EU medium and long-term objectives and the steps needed to reach them. The committee is chaired by Dragoş Tudorache (Renew Europe, Romania) and has 34 full Members.

The committee has exchanged views with the Commissioners responsible for internal market and digital affairs, and held hearings with experts, policy-makers, and business representatives. The hearings have explored (for example) AI’s potential in fighting climate change and cancer, as well as its use in agriculture and financial services. The AIDA committee has also held workshops on topics such as ‘AI and law enforcement’ and ‘AI and public administration’. The AIDA ‘working papers‘ summarise the key takeaways from these hearings, including the positions of political groups.

Report

The AIDA committee published a draft report (rapporteur: Axel Voss, EPP, Germany) on 2 November 2021, which outlined AI’s enormous potential to improve almost every area of our lives, from helping to combat pandemics and global hunger to improving healthcare. It could also significantly increase productivity, innovation, job creation and growth. According to the draft report, the EU should not regulate AI as a technology; but the type, intensity and timing of regulatory action should rather depend solely on the type of risk associated with a particular use of an AI system. The draft text warns that the EU is currently falling behind in the global tech race. If the EU wants to remain competitive, it needs to become an AI leader and set global standards. AI technologies also raise crucial ethical questions and fundamental rights concerns. Against this backdrop, the draft report addresses the opportunities and risks of AI in six specific areas: health, the EU Green Deal, external policy and security, competitiveness, democracy and the labour market.

During the 13 January 2022 debate on the 1 384 amendments tabled to the draft report, some Members stressed the risks of discrimination inherent in AI and emphasised the importance of also using private funding for AI development. Members from different political groups disagreed on the question whether the General Data Protection Regulation should be touched in the process of future regulation of AI. The AIDA committee is expected to vote on its final report on 22 March 2022, with Parliament then expected to consider the report in plenary in May 2022.

The AIDA report will complement other legislative and non-legislative initiatives in this area, such as the European Commission proposal for an EU regulatory framework on AI. As co-legislators, the European Parliament and the Council are currently discussing this proposal.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Investigation into the potential of artificial intelligence in the digital age‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clare Ferguson.

Meeting in plenary for the third time this month, Members are set to return to voting in person in the chamber for the first time since the onset of the coronavirus pandemic. A number of issues concerning new technologies are on the agenda, such as blockchain and roaming charges. Members are nevertheless most likely to focus on the subject of the Russian war on Ukraine, following a joint debate on the results of the recent European Council meeting in Versailles, and in preparation for the next meeting on 24‑25 March 2022. Members will also hear Council and European Commission statements on a possible EU action plan to ensure food security in light of the Russian invasion (agricultural products imported from Ukraine represent 4.6 % of all EU agri-food imports). The Council and Commission will also update Members on proposals to ensure a more affordable, secure and sustainable energy supply.

The Parliament has long stressed that corruption threatens democracy, fundamental rights and the rule of law, and undermines citizens’ trust in the EU and its institutions. The sanctions necessitated by Russia’s war on Ukraine have highlighted the presence of Russian oligarchs and oligarchic structures on EU territory. Denouncing the current situation, especially in certain countries where EU funding is sometimes diverted to such persons (and not just Russians), Parliament’s Budgetary Control (CONT) Committee has adopted a hard-hitting own-initiative report highlighting the need to protect EU funding against the risks of fraud and conflict of interest. On Wednesday, Members are expected to consider the committee’s motion for a resolution, which particularly condemns the use of EU agricultural funding for personal benefit, and warns against the threat to EU values of allowing oligarchs to gain control over the media and the judiciary.

Moldova has found itself on the frontline in Russia’s most recent aggression against its neighbours. The country has experienced Russian interference in its own democratic process in recent years, added to an economic downturn exacerbated by the pandemic. Moldova has nevertheless opened its borders to welcome large numbers of Ukrainian refugees. The country enjoys good political and economic relations with the EU, and signed association and free trade agreements with the bloc – Moldova’s largest trading partner – in 2014. The EU has provided €160 million in EU macro-financial assistance since 2017. Moldova has requested further assistance, and on Wednesday, Members are scheduled to consider a European Commission proposal (from before the outbreak of the war) starting to allocate €30 million in grants and up to €120 million in medium-term loans.

Parliament is always keen to encourage technological solutions that benefit citizens in their daily lives. On Wednesday, Members are expected to debate an agreement reached between the co-legislators on a pilot regime developing trading and transactions in crypto-assets – usually known as cryptocurrencies (such as bitcoin and ethereum). Parliament is in favour of encouraging crypto-assets, as long as they do not pose a risk to financial stability, transparency or market integrity, or permit legal loopholes. Parliament’s Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) therefore proposes to set stricter limits on trading with crypto-assets. The current proposal allows market capitalisation of less than €500 million in shares and issuance of up to €1 billion in bonds. Should Parliament decide to formally adopt the agreed text, it will go to Council for final approval.

Now that travel is getting back to normal, Members are scheduled to return to the issue of extending current EU legislation on roaming charges on Wednesday. In interinstitutional negotiations on the proposal to revise the rules to increase transparency and network quality, Parliament succeeded in capping the wholesale roaming charges at €2 per gigabyte from this year, with a progressive reduction to reach €1 in 2027. Once the Parliament and Council both formally adopt the provisional agreement reached between the co-legislators, citizens should be able to ‘roam like at home’ for a further 10 years.

• Pilot regime on distributed ledger technology market infrastructure
• Recast of the EU Roaming Regulation
• Macro-financial assistance to Moldova
• Protecting EU funds against oligarchic structures

Written by Suzana Anghel and Ralf Drachenberg.

On 24-25 March 2022, EU Heads of State or Government will meet for the third time in five weeks. In the presence of the United States President, Joe Biden, they will discuss developments in and support for Ukraine, in the context of the unprovoked Russian invasion of the country. Building on their Versailles Declaration of 10-11 March, EU leaders will take further steps aimed at strengthening European sovereignty in the field of security, defence and energy security. As regards security and defence, the European Council will endorse the EU Strategic Compass, call for its implementation, and give further guidelines for the deepening of European defence cooperation. With respect to energy, EU leaders will consider means to counter the current spike in energy prices, consider gas storage capacities and planning in view of the next winter and resume discussions on phasing out EU dependence on Russian fossil fuels. Furthermore, the European Council will take stock of coordination efforts in response to the Covid-19 pandemic, appraise the European Semester, and review initiatives designed to build a more robust economic base and reduce the EU’s strategic dependence in the most sensitive areas. Under external relations, items on the agenda will include the preparation of the forthcoming EU-China Summit and the political crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The European Council will be followed by a Euro Summit meeting on 25 March.

1. European Council agenda points

The indicative 2021-2022 Leaders’ Agenda, updated at the December 2021 European Council meeting, had outlined security and defence, economic recovery, the social agenda, the European Semester, and the single market and industrial policy as topics for the March European Council meeting. While security and defence, and the European Semester, were already on the provisional agenda, the war in the Ukraine and energy prices have been added as a result of current events.

The President of the European Council, Charles Michel, has prepared for this meeting by using his own ‘Michel method’, which involves video-conferences with small groups of four to six EU leaders ahead of the summit to prepare the ground. This approach provides Mr Michel with an opportunity to express his intentions as to the result he is seeking to obtain and to gain an insight into individual national leaders’ views on certain agenda points, thus reducing surprises at the meeting itself.

Charles Michel’s (first) term as European Council President comes to an end on 30 May 2022. Given that, since 2009, the (re-)election of the European Council President has taken place at the last formal European Council meeting before the end of the mandate, it can be expected that EU leaders will take a decision on the next European Council President. In line with tradition, for this agenda point, the Head of State or Government holding the rotating Presidency of the Council of the European Union, currently the President of France, Emmanuel Macron, will take the chair.

Having already attended two informal meetings of Heads of State or Government, this will be the first formal European Council meeting for Roberta Metsola, President of the European Parliament. Following Ms Metsola’s opening address, President Macron, again on behalf of the country holding the six-month rotating presidency, is expected to provide an overview of progress made in implementing previous European Council conclusions.

2. European Council meeting Russia’s invasion of Ukraine

EU leaders will again discuss Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine, this time in the presence of United States (US) President Joe Biden. They are expected to reaffirm transatlantic unity and stress solidarity with Ukraine. The discussions may also green light a fifth round of sanctions, including on oil and coal but probably not on gas. The European Council will most probably consider the deteriorating humanitarian situation in the country. This is a matter of grave concern for the international community, as over 3 million Ukrainians have fled the country in the three weeks since Russia’s invasion began. The leaders will also once more consider assistance for EU and non-EU frontline countries, which are facing an unrelenting influx of refugees. Furthermore, EU leaders will most probably reiterate their call to ensure the safety of Ukraine’s nuclear power plants, with support from the International Atomic Energy Agency. For the first time, EU leaders may consider Union support for reconstruction, which should go hand in hand with peace preparation efforts and could double the EU support offered to Ukraine under the European Peace Facility since the start of the war.

Three EU leaders, the Prime Ministers of Poland, Mateusz Morawiecki, Czechia, Petr Fiala, and Slovenia, Janez Janša, met with the President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelensky, in Kyiv on 15 March 2022. The visit, aimed at expressing EU support for Ukraine, its sovereignty and independence, was the first by Western leaders since Russia’s invasion began, and the other European Council members knew of it in advance. Petr Fiala emphasised that Ukraine was ‘also fighting for our lives’, while Mateusz Morawiecki stressed that a Europe that loses Ukraine ‘will no longer be Europe’ but ‘a defeated, humiliated and pathetic version of its former self’. At their meeting in Versailles, EU leaders recognised the ‘European aspirations and the European choice of Ukraine’, with public opinion polls showing clear European public condemnation of Russia’s invasion and support for Ukraine’s request for membership.

The Russian Federation was excluded from the Council of Europe – the pan-European organisation upholding human rights – by a decision of the organisation’s Committee of Ministers on 16 March. Russia had already initiated the procedure to leave in a pre-emptive attempt to avoid being excluded. Back in 2016, Russia withdrew from joining the International Criminal Court (ICC) at the time when the Court began investigating war crimes in South Ossetia following Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia. In March 2022, the ICC opened an investigation into ‘alleged crimes committed in the context of the situation in Ukraine since 21 November 2013’, which would allow it to investigate ‘war crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide committed on any part of the territory of Ukraine’.

In parallel, on 16 March 2022, in the Ukraine v.Russian Federation case, the International Court of Justice considered Ukraine’s request for an indication of provisional measures and ordered Russia ‘to suspend the military operations that it commenced on 24 February 2022 in the territory of Ukraine’. The Court reaffirmed the binding effect of its order, which creates ‘international legal obligations for any party to whom the provisional measures are addressed’.

Security and defence

Security and defence have been a rolling item on the agenda of the European Council for the past six months. EU leaders last discussed security and defence at their informal Versailles meeting, where they adopted a declaration and issued new strategic guidelines for the further development and deepening of European defence cooperation. At their spring meeting, the leaders are expected to endorse the Strategic Compass, which has recently been reviewed at their request, adding more robust language on the threat posed by Russia to European security in light of the war in Ukraine. The Strategic Compass, which was drafted with a view to providing a common perspective on the security threats and challenges facing the EU, is expected to lend further impetus to the EU’s bid to become a security and defence actor. The purpose is for the EU to be able to protect its citizens, to react quickly to crises and to deepen partnerships with like-minded partners, such as the United Nations and NATO.

The war in Ukraine raises more than ever the question of resources and how to allocate them efficiently. At Versailles, the European Parliament’s President, Roberta Metsola, stressed that the EU ‘must go beyond the European Defence Fund and make the EU budget work for our security and defence policy whenever it adds value’. A recent EPRS study pointed to ‘generally large average amounts of waste’ in current EU Member States’ spending; in the field of defence, this waste was cumulatively estimated at €32 billion for deployable troops, and €13 billion for procurement and research and development.

Energy security

Energy will feature on the agenda of the European Council for the fifth time since October 2021. EU leaders will again discuss energy prices and how best to reduce fossil fuel dependency, notably the phasing out of gas and oil imports from Russia. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen confirmed in Versailles that, by May 2022, the European Commission would present a plan to phase out fossil fuel dependency on Russia by 2027. Regarding the spike in energy prices, a first series of short-term measures had been taken in 2021. Given the worsening situation following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, EU leaders are expected to discuss further short- and medium-term measures to address energy prices and security of supply, such as the refilling of gas storage facilities across the continent. The European Commission is expected to publish a communication on this subject on 23 March, to provide input ahead of the European Council meeting.

A number of other initiatives will feed into the debate. Ahead of the Versailles summit, on 9 March, the Prime Minister of Greece, Kyriakos Mitsotakis, had addressed a letter to President von der Leyen, proposing a six-point plan to counter the ‘weaponisation’ of gas as a result of Russia’s war in Ukraine, including ‘targeted and temporary market intervention’ to avoid speculation. A ‘mini “Mediterranean summit”‘ held in Rome allowed Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain to articulate a common position on reforming the energy market. The mini-summit was part of a wider European tour the Prime Minister of Spain, Pedro Sanchez, undertook with the aim of building consensus ahead of the European Council meeting. 

A new phase in the Covid-19 pandemic

As the number of coronavirus-related deaths in the EU continues to fall, EU leaders may mention the importance of EU coordination on the removal of restrictions and on developing the vaccination campaign that has lessened the most severe effects of Covid-19. This may lead the European Council to reiterate the need to coordinate on future preparedness, namely on the ‘health union’ package.

The European Council will most likely welcome the decision authorising the opening of negotiations for an international agreement on pandemic prevention, preparedness and response. Charles Michel first proposed the idea in November 2020, and the European Council supported it at the time. EU leaders may reiterate their commitment to contributing to the global response to Covid‑19, both bilaterally and by ensuring access to vaccines through COVAX. This commitment has been repeated by the European Council in 10 of its meetings since the outbreak of the pandemic.

Economic issues

It has been a tradition that EU leaders use the March European Council meeting to discuss the European Semester – the framework for the coordination of economic policies across the EU – ever since its launch in 2011 in the context of the sovereign debt crisis. Implementation of the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RFF) – set up in 2020 in response to the economic consequences of the pandemic – is also now reviewed during the European Semester. EU Heads of State or Government are expected to endorse the annual sustainable growth survey (ASGS) and the draft Council recommendation on the economic policy of the euro area, also part of the 2022 European Semester exercise.

EU leaders will follow up on the objectives set out in the 2019-2024 Strategic Agenda, and firmly reiterated in the Versailles Declaration, aimed at building a more robust economic base and fostering investment. The focus will be on reducing the EU’s strategic dependence in the most sensitive areas: critical raw materials, semi-conductors, health, digital and food. The European Council is expected to call for the completion of the single market, in order for it to realise its full potential. The digital and services components should be top priority when it comes to removing the remaining unjustified barriers and administrative burdens, interconnecting ecosystems across Member States more effectively, and enforcing single market rules. EU leaders might also address the activities of the European Commission on the issue of food security.

External relations

EU leaders will most probably consider relations with China in preparation for the EU-China Summit on 1 April 2022. Two issues are likely to be central to the debate: China’s positioning over the war in Ukraine and the future of EU-China bilateral relations, including on trade and security. In 2021, the European Parliament froze its ratification of the EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) pending the lifting of sanctions imposed against ‘European individuals and entities, including five MEPs’.

EU leaders will also discuss the deterioration of the political situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Prior to the meeting, the High Representative/Vice-President of the European Commission (HR/VP), Josep Borrell, visited the country, stressing that its future and the future of the western Balkan region ‘lies in the European Union, as the best provider for peace and security’.

3. Euro Summit

On 25 March, EU leaders will convene for a Euro Summit meeting in inclusive format, in order to review progress on completing the banking union and the capital markets union, as indicated in the declaration issued at the last Euro Summit meeting, of 16 December 2021.

EU leaders are expected to consider the Commission’s communication of 2 March 2022 on ‘Fiscal policy guidance for 2023‘, as well as the statement of 14 March 2022 by the Eurogroup (i.e. the finance ministers of the Member States in the eurozone) on fiscal guidance for 2023. The Eurogroup President, Paschal Donohoe, expects a gradual evolution in fiscal policy, leading to a broadly neutral overall fiscal stance in 2023 for the euro area, but stressed that due to uncertainties and risks, the EU needed to remain agile and flexible in its policy response. Following the latest Eurogroup meeting, given the remaining availability of funds under Next Generation EU (NGEU) and the lack of agreement between Member States, it seems unlikely that EU leaders will return to the idea of creating new mutual bonds, along the lines of the NGEU pandemic recovery fund, to respond to the consequences of the war in Ukraine.

Read this briefing on ‘Outlook for the European Council meeting of 24-25 March 2022‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marketa Pape.

The EU aims at becoming a carbon neutral economy by 2050, an ambition outlined in the European Green Deal and enshrined in the EU Climate Law. To achieve climate neutrality, the EU transport sector has to cut its CO2 emissions by 90 %. This requirement contrasts with the fact that transport is the only sector in which greenhouse gas emissions have continued to grow in recent years, albeit with a short pause due to coronavirus-related restrictions on travel and movement.

In December 2020, the European Commission put forward a strategy outlining how it intends to transform the EU transport sector to align it with the European Green Deal, by making it green, digital and resilient. This sustainable and smart mobility strategy has become the blueprint for the Commission’s legislative and support activities. It contains 82 initiatives in 10 key areas, with specific milestones to be achieved by 2030 and 2050.

While the Commission is the key actor in preparing and proposing the legislation needed, the overall impact of this ‘green and digital fabric’ depends on when, and with what amendments, each legislative proposal gets passed into law by the European Parliament and the relevant ministers of EU Member States. And, crucially, how coherent the whole strategy remains.

Since the publication of the strategy just over a year ago, the Commission has progressed and put forward a number of legislative proposals. The EU co-legislators are discussing how the proposals should be amended and are getting ready to negotiate. The European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) tracks the progress of these legislative files with dedicated briefings, the most relevant of which are listed below.

In the July 2021 Fit for 55 package, several proposals target transport or modify some key related aspects, such as the energy needed. Here, the Commission proposes to ramp up the production of renewable energy, raising the target of energy from renewable sources from the current 32 % to 40 % by 2030, and to change the rules for energy taxation, replacing the volume-based approach to energy taxation with one based on energy content and environmental performance. For road transport, the Commission proposes to set stricter CO2 emission performance standards for new passenger cars and light commercial vehicles (vans) and allow only zero-emission vehicles from 2035. To support the roll-out of the necessary alternative fuels, a draft regulation on alternative fuels infrastructure proposes binding targets for electric vehicle charging points and hydrogen refuelling points, electric charging for stationary aircraft at airports and onshore power supply for ships at ports. Two specific sectoral proposals, on sustainable aviation fuels and on sustainable maritime fuels, focus on how to ensure sufficient quantities of cleaner fuels for airplanes and ships.

In terms of CO2 emissions, the Commission not only proposes to tighten the existing EU Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS), but also to extend it to maritime shipping and establish a separate, self-standing emissions trading system for fuel distribution for road transport and buildings. Both these sectors, however, remain included in the Effort Sharing Regulation, so that national policies would continue to support their decarbonisation. Reviewed rules for aviation are dealt with separately, with a proposal to end allowances from 2027 and integrate the global market-based Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation (CORSIA), applicable to international flights, into the revised ETS.

These ‘Fit for 55’ proposals are interlinked and also need to be understood against the background of the EU’s efforts to determine which investment counts as green. While the basic ‘taxonomy’ legal act is already in force, the process of establishing detailed criteria on how to classify activities as ‘green’ is ongoing. For transport, the key issue is whether natural gas and nuclear power will be regarded as sustainable or not.

The ‘Fit for 55’ package also includes a proposed new social climate fund (SCF), meant to help vulnerable households, micro-businesses and transport users meet the costs of the green energy transition in the buildings and road transport sector.

While negotiations on these files are expected to start in 2022, the Commission is already preparing further proposals. It will debate the way forward with transport experts at the 7th annual Future of transport conference on 23 March 2022, together with the most pressing issues facing the European transport sector, such as supply chain disruptions and digital transformation and road safety.

Written by Rosamund Shreeves.

Even – or especially – in complex, emergency situations, a gender perspective is vital in order to take into account the specific needs of women and men and the different risks to which they are exposed. Humanitarian actors are calling for a gender-sensitive response to the Ukraine crisis, to help tackle barriers to accessing vital services, address increased risks of gender-based violence and facilitate the reception and integration of refugees.

The scale of humanitarian need

After eight years of armed conflict in eastern Ukraine, humanitarian needs were already high. Before Russia launched its full-scale invasion on 24 February, the United Nations (UN) had already projected that 2.9 million Ukrainians – 54 % of whom were women and children – would need humanitarian assistance in 2022. The war has now caused an escalating humanitarian crisis. Shelling and air strikes on residential areas are resulting in increasing civilian deaths and severe damage to homes, hospitals, schools, and water and power supplies. The humanitarian situation is particularly desperate in areas besieged by Russian forces, with dwindling access to food and medicines and no or few safe avenues for aid to get in or people to get out. Two weeks into the conflict, an estimated 12.65 million people were stranded in affected areas, or unable or unwilling to leave due to military action. Around 1.85 million people were already internally displaced within Ukraine, a figure that could rise to 6.7 million. In the space of only three weeks, 3 million people have fled to neighbouring states (Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, Moldova, Belarus and Russia) and over 360 000 have moved on to other European countries. This complex and fast-moving situation requires a vast humanitarian response, spanning action to meet the immediate needs of those under fire and on the move, through to support for refugees settling in host communities. The UN also warns that a prolonged conflict could have a ripple effect way beyond Ukraine, including a risk of food insecurity in some countries that are heavily reliant on its wheat exports.

Why a gender-sensitive response matters

Since conflicts and humanitarian crises can affect women, men, girls and boys very differently, adopting a gender perspective from the outset ensures that their specific needs and the risks and vulnerabilities they are exposed to are taken into account, and that they are equally able to shape decisions about the support they need. Initial rapid gender analysis and monitoring can serve to identify some of the issues already emerging in relation to the conflict in Ukraine and urgent areas for action:

• Access to critical services and humanitarian support: Sex-disaggregated and intersectional data are vital to identify specific protection needs and ensure that humanitarian assistance is effective. Monitoring of humanitarian needs across Ukraine shows that there is a lack of shelter spaces for families and single sex spaces for women. It also identifies children, women, persons with disabilities and/or serious medical conditions, older people and minorities as the groups facing the greatest obstacles to accessing transport, food, medicine and emergency health care.
• Maintaining sexual and reproductive health services and maternity care: In times of war and forced displacement, interruptions to care can put women and girls at greater risk of unintended pregnancy, untreated infections and unsafe delivery. The UN Population Fund reports that at the start of the current crisis, there were around 265 000 pregnant women in Ukraine, some 80 000 of whom were expected to deliver over the next three months. Women are giving birth in risky conditions and at least one maternity hospital has been struck. Safeguarding access to these services is therefore a matter of urgency.
• Addressing sexual violence: Armed conflict increases the risk of sexual violence, including rape, sexual slavery and forced prostitution, while also reducing access to specialised support for survivors and potentially creating a climate of impunity. The conflict in eastern Ukraine highlights the particular risks faced by displaced women and girls and the unmet need for support and redress. In the current context, there are calls for the European Union to push for rape to be judged as a war crime and to establish mechanisms to monitor women’s fundamental rights during and after the conflict.
• Protection from sexual exploitation and trafficking: Women and children make up the overwhelming majority of those fleeing Ukraine. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) stresses that some children are unaccompanied and that many women have been separated from partners and support networks and are in a situation of financial insecurity. This puts both groups at risk of sexual exploitation and trafficking, and there are reports that this is already happening. Therefore, while welcoming the outpouring of support from private individuals offering transport and accommodation, associations working on the ground are calling for coordinated action to inform, register and accompany women and girls and vet potential hosts. Poorer men not wishing to be conscripted may also be vulnerable to migrant smugglers.

Since it is mainly women and girls who are seeking refuge, countries hosting refugees from Ukraine will need to pay particular attention to their specific reception and integration needs. Humanitarian actors and stakeholders are also stressing the need for safe and regular pathways to safety for all women and girls, irrespective of their nationality, ethnicity and religion, including for stateless persons and Roma with no documentation to prove their residence status. There are calls for women’s organisations to be involved in shaping the humanitarian response and for meaningful participation of women in peace negotiations, in line with UN Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security, to ensure that their specific situations and needs are taken into account and to achieve more sustainable outcomes.

EU commitments and action

The EU recognises that crises are not gender neutral, and that EU humanitarian assistance must be sensitive to gender and age if it is to be effective and reach those most in need. It has committed to including a gender dimension in all its humanitarian aid, by tracking how each action integrates gender and age and ensuring that humanitarian responses include strategies for protecting against sexual and gender-based violence, ensuring access to reproductive and sexual healthcare services and promoting women’s participation.

The EU is coordinating deliveries of material assistance to Ukraine and neighbouring countries. Other measures adopted so far to help those fleeing Russian aggression include guidelines on simplifying border controls for vulnerable groups and immediate temporary protection in the EU, giving rights to a residence permit, the possibility to work, housing, and access to social welfare, medical assistance and education. The availability of this legal option to enter and stay in EU countries removes some of the documented risks facing women and girls seeking asylum. However, the Commission has raised concerns about trafficking, particularly for arrivals with no relatives or contacts in the EU. The European Commission’s communication on solidarity with refugees and those fleeing war in Ukraine also recognises that, since women, unaccompanied minors and other children make up the majority of arrivals, the immediate priorities will include ensuring appropriate information and accommodation, preventing gender-based exploitation, supporting childcare, and ensuring swift access to education. Member States will be able to use EU cohesion funding to help refugees access childcare and education, find jobs and get psychological support.

European Parliament position

In a December 2021 resolution, Parliament stressed the need to focus on the situation of women and vulnerable groups at the Ukrainian border and in Russian-occupied territories of Ukraine. Another resolution, adopted the same month, called for more tangible elements of gender mainstreaming, such as gender analyses, to be implemented in EU humanitarian action. At its plenary session in March 2022, Parliament debated the deteriorating humanitarian situation in Ukraine, highlighting the need for proper assistance for women and children. It also adopted a resolution stressing the need to fight gender-based violence in war and calling for more women to be involved in peace and security.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Russia’s war on Ukraine: Ukrainian students in the EU‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marcin Grajewski.

Russia’s armed forces have increased their bombardment and shelling of Ukrainian cities, stepping up the war launched on 24 February. However, new talks between Moscow and Kiev about a future status for Ukraine outside NATO have raised hopes about a possible breakthrough in the biggest military conflict in Europe since World War II. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy has renewed calls on NATO to establish a ‘no-fly zone’ over Ukraine. Instead, the West has imposed tough sanctions against Russia, and many companies are withdrawing from the country, pushing it towards a default, emptying its shops and sending the rouble into freefall. Russian President Vladimir Putin said on 16 March that Russia was ready to discuss Ukraine’s neutrality, but added that Moscow would still achieve the goals of its military operation. Ukraine says it is willing to negotiate to end the war but will not surrender or accept Russian ultimatums.

This note gathers links to the recent publications and commentaries from many international think tanks on Russia’s war on Ukraine, its implications for the two countries, for the European Union and for the whole world. Earlier analyses of the implications of the war can be found in a previous edition of the ‘What Think Tanks are Thinking’ series.

The Western response to Putin’s war has been remarkable. But it’s not enough
Atlantic Council, March 2022

What are the risks and benefits of US/NATO military options in Ukraine? Our strategic risk calculator has answers
Atlantic Council, March 2022

What’s left to sanction in Russia? Wallets, stocks and foreign investments
Atlantic Council, March 2022

Four ways the war in Ukraine might end
Atlantic Council, March 2022

The economic policy consequences of the war
Bruegel, March 2022

Can China bail out Putin?
Bruegel, March 2022

War in Europe: The financial front
Bruegel, March 2022

How to wean Europe off Russian gas as swiftly as possible
Bruegel, March 2022

Mapping financial countermeasures against Russian aggression: Introducing the Brookings Sanctions Tracker
Brookings Institution, March 2022

Mind the escalation aversion: Managing risk without losing the initiative in the Russia-Ukraine war
Brookings Institution, March 2022

Russia vs. Ukraine: How does this end?
Brookings Institution, March 2022

Developing economies must act now to dampen the shocks from the Ukraine conflict
Brookings Institution, March 2022

Will Ukraine’s tragedy spur UN Security Council reform?
Brookings Institution, March 2022

What Russia’s war in Ukraine means for Europe
Carnegie Europe, March 2022

Darkness looms over Ukraine’s neighborhood
Carnegie Europe, March 2022

Russia’s war against Ukraine ends Europe’s self-deception
Carnegie Europe, March 2022

The war in Ukraine could change Poland
Carnegie Europe, March 2022

Can sanctions end Russia’s war in Ukraine?
Carnegie Europe, March 2022

The Kremlin’s crackdown on Western social networks
Centre for Eastern Studies, March 2022

How the war is affecting the Russian gas sector
Centre for Eastern Studies, March 2022

The US embargo on Russian energy resources: The consequences for Russia
Centre for Eastern Studies, March 2022

Sanctions against Russia: the government is becoming increasingly nervous
Centre for Eastern Studies, March 2022

When the taps are turned off: How to get Europe through the next winter without Russian gas
Centre for European Policy Studies, March 2022

The European security order after Putin’s aggression
Centre for European Policy Studies, March 2022

Considering Ukraine, why Georgia deserves EU membership
Centre for European Policy Studies, March 2022

The EU grants temporary protection for people fleeing war in Ukraine
Centre for European Policy Studies, March 2022

Russia-Ukraine: The West needs a sanctions strategy
Centre for European Reform, March 2022

Four questions on how the Russian assault on Ukraine will affect Europe
Centre for European Reform, March 2022

Why a no-fly zone risks escalating the Ukraine conflict
Chatham House, March 2022

Will American support for Ukraine last?
Chatham House, March 2022

Devising the strategy to deter Russia and weaken Putin
Chatham House, March 2022

Ukraine’s wider impact on Turkey’s international future
Chatham House, March 2022

Putin’s support from Russian society may decline fast
Chatham House, March 2022

Russia’s war against Ukraine: Preliminary observations
Clingendael, March 2022

Expert insights: Russia and Ukraine
Clingendael, March 2022

European defence and the war in Ukraine
Clingendael, March 2022

How bad is Ukraine’s humanitarian crisis?
Council on Foreign Relations, March 2022

Will international sanctions stop Russia in Ukraine?
Council on Foreign Relations, March 2022

Five questions: Russia’s war on Ukraine
Council on Foreign Relations, March 2022

Ukraine war should slow but not stop the U.S. pivot to Asia
Council on Foreign Relations, March 2022

From war of choice to war of perseverance
Council on Foreign Relations, March 2022

The Ukraine crisis could sideline the Iran Nuclear Deal
Council on Foreign Relations, March 2022

Tracking cyber operations and actors in the Russia-Ukraine war
Council on Foreign Relations, March 2022

How Asia is responding to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine
Council on Foreign Relations, March 2022

What’s next as Russia’s invasion continues?
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, March 2022

Russia import dependency problem
European Centre for International Political Economy, March 2022

The crisis of European security: What Europeans think about the war in Ukraine
European Council on Foreign Relations, March 2022

View from Kyiv: Putin’s failed blitzkrieg and the future of Europe
European Council on Foreign Relations, March 2022

Putin’s critical raw materials are a threat to EU economic security
Egmont, March 2022

The EU-Ukraine Association Agreement after Ukraine’s EU membership application: Still fit for purpose
Egmont, March 2022

Putin is creating the multipolar world he (thought he) wanted
Egmont, March 2022

For Russia, the Ukraine front stretches to the Mediterranean
Egmont, March 2022

The EU–Ukraine Association Agreement after Ukraine’s EU membership application: Still fit for purpose
European Policy Centre, March 2022

Putin’s war on Ukrainian women
European Policy Centre, March 2022

The EU has been sleepwalking into war, but it’s Germany and France who have a lot to answer for
European Policy Centre, March 2022

The war in Ukraine: China walking amid the shrapnel
European Policy Centre, March 2022

War in Ukraine: The European Union evolves as Putin attacks
Finnish Institute of International Affairs, March 2022

Guerre en Ukraine: L’armée russe est-elle sur le point d’atteindre le «point culminant» de son offensive?
Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, March 2022

Russia’s nuclear gamble
Foundation for European Progressive Studies, March 2022

Silence the guns in Ukraine: What international diplomacy can (and can’t) do
Foundation for European Progressive Studies, March 2022

We will need a ‘New Deal’ to engage with a post-Putin Russia
Friends of Europe, March 2022

Can Russia’s war on Ukraine drive Turkey and the West to reconcile?
German Marshall Fund, March 2022

L’UE fournit des armes létales à l’Ukraine: Trajectoire et portée d’une nouvelle compétence
Groupe de recherche et d’information sur la paix et la sécurité, March 2022

Russian energy exports and the conflict in Ukraine: What options for Italy and the EU?
Istituto Affari Internazionali, March 2022

The EU and the Ukraine war: Making sense of the rise of a ‘geopolitical’ Union
Istituto Affari Internazionali, March 2022

Japan responds to Russia’s war: Strong solidarity with Ukraine with an eye on China
Istituto Affari Internazionali, March 2022

Putin’s use and abuse of history: Back to the 19th century?
Istituto Affari Internazionali, March 2022

Comment l’Ukraine rebat les cartes du monde
Institut Montaigne, March 2022

L’Ukraine montre que les crypto-monnaies pourraient devenir une arme de (financement) de guerre
Institut Thomas More, March 2022

The Ukraine war: A global crisis?
International Crisis Group, March 2022

No-fly zone in Ukraine: War with Russia by another name
International Crisis Group, March 2022

The war against Ukraine: An expert assessment from on the ground
International Institute for Peace, March 2022

The danger of a single story: From Ukraine to Western Balkans
International Institute for Peace, March 2022

Time for NATO to find a way out of the escalation trap in Ukraine
International Institute for Strategic Studies, March 2022

Could the Ukraine crisis accelerate a longer-term policy shift away from fossil fuels?
International Institute for Strategic Studies, March 2022

The UN’s indictment of Russia and its long-term consequences
International Institute for Strategic Studies, March 2022

Ukraine’s EU application: A new paradigm for EU enlargement?
Irish Institute of International and European Affairs, March 2022

The Ukraine war and the risk of a new foreign fighters wave
Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, March 2022

Réfugiés ukrainiens: Le pas d’après
Institut Jacques Delors, March 2022

Putins heiliger Krieg
Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, March 2022

Russia vs Ukraine: Where does China (really) stand?
Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, March 2022

Europe’s economic response to the Russia: Ukraine war will redefine its priorities and future
Peterson Institute for International Economics, March 2022

Financial sanctions have devastated Russia’s economy: The EU and global financial system are absorbing the shock
Peterson Institute for International Economics, March 2022

Russia’s war on Ukraine: A sanctions timeline
Peterson Institute for International Economics, March 2022

No-fly zone over Ukraine?
Polish Institute of International Affairs, March 2022

Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and the threat to cultural heritage
Polish Institute of International Affairs, March 2022

Keeping Russians informed about Ukraine could help end this war
Rand Corporation, March 2022

Is Putin irrational? What nuclear strategic theory says about deterrence of potentially irrational opponents
Rand Corporation, March 2022

Latin America in the Ukraine crisis: A pawn in the game for Putin’sresurgent Russia
Real Instituto Elcano, March 2022

The Kremlin’s gas wars
Bruegel, February 2022

An attack on Ukraine; An attack on the Western worldview
International Institute for Peace, February 2022

Read this briefing on ‘Latest analyses of Russia’s war on Ukraine‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Ivana Katsarova.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 has caused vast displacement of people within the country as well as across the EU borders. While the annexation of Crimea had a negative impact on the country’s education system, recent events have added additional strain.

Outbound student mobility was already substantial in recent years, but it has accelerated even further since the Crimean conflict began . After doubling from some 25 000 to nearly 50 000 between 2007 and 2014, the number of Ukrainian students abroad has since skyrocketed by another 54 % to around 78 000 in 2019.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Russia’s war on Ukraine: Ukrainian students in the EU‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Angelos Delivorias (1st edition).

European long-term investment funds (ELTIFs) invest on a long-term basis in infrastructure projects, real estate and SMEs, among others. While the legislative framework – the ELTIF Regulation – for these funds was adopted six years ago, their market remains small. For this reason, the Commission has proposed amending the ELTIF Regulation to make it more appealing to investors. The key mulled changes involve differentiating between ELTIFs marketed to professional investors and those to which retail investors can have access; removing barriers to retail investor access to ELTIFs; and establishing an optional liquidity window mechanism for redemptions, for cases where investors need to exit early.

The file is currently under review by the co-legislators. Within the European Parliament, it has been assigned to the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs. The draft report is expected soon.

Versions

• March 2022: Amending the European Long-Term Investment Funds (ELTIFs) Regulation (1st edition)

Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2015/760 as regards the scope of eligible assets and investments, the portfolio composition and diversification requirements, the borrowing of cash and other fund rules and as regards requirements pertaining to the authorisation, investment policies and operating conditions of European long-term investment funds Committee responsible:Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON)COM(2021) 722
25.11.2021Rapporteur:Michiel Hoogeveen (ECR, the Netherlands)2021/0377(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Jessica Polfjärd (EPP, Sweden)
Elisabetta Gualmini (S&D, Italy)
Ondřej Kovařík (Renew, Czechia)
Claude Gruffat (Greens/EFA, France)
Gunnar Beck (ID, Germany)Ordinary legislative procedure
(COD) (Parliament and Council
on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Publication of draft report

Written by Claudia Vinci.

Up until the 2022 Russian invasion, Ukraine was exporting more than 40 % of its goods to the EU, making the EU the country’s leading trading partner. The principal goods imported by the EU were raw materials, chemical products and machinery. With regard to the agri-food sector, Ukraine supplied almost half of the cereals and vegetable oils and a quarter of the poultry meat consumed in Europe. While the full impact of the Russian invasion on Ukraine’s agri-food trade has still to be assessed, some possible scenarios have already emerged.

Background

The EU accounted for more than 40 % of Ukrainian trade in 2019, making it Ukraine’s main trading partner. Ukraine, on the other hand, represented only around 1.1 % of EU total trade, importing machinery and transport equipment, chemicals and manufactured goods. Ukraine exports mostly raw materials, chemical products and machinery to the EU. These exports rose by 48.5 % between 2016 and 2019, amounting to €24.2 billion in 2019, with total trade worth €43.3 billion in the same year.

Figure 1 – EU trade in goods with the world and Ukraine (2020)

Ukraine has been a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) since 2008. In 2014, the EU and Ukraine signed an association agreement, including a deep and comprehensive free trade area (DCFTA). The agreement formally entered into force in 2017, after a one-year provisional application period. The pandemic led to a significant drop in both exports and imports between the EU and Ukraine in 2020.

Agricultural sector

In 2019, the agricultural sector contributed almost 10 % to Ukraine’s gross domestic product (GDP), accounting for 18 % of the country’s jobs and 44 % of its export value.

The specific soil composition (chernozem) and landscape in Ukraine are optimal for agricultural production, in particular for crops. Around 80 % of the total utilised agricultural area in Ukraine is used for to grow cereals, oilseeds, vegetables and other annual crops. Ukraine’s agricultural producers benefit from a value added tax exemption or reduction on exported goods, used as leverage to encourage production and trade. In the period between 2000 and 2019, production of cereals rose from 23.8 million tonnes to 74.1 million tonnes, and oilseed production rose from 3.7 million tonnes to 22.2 million tonnes.

Figure 2 – EU trade with Ukraine: Agricultural products (2020) Agri-food trade figures

Of the 1.0 % of EU goods originating in Ukraine, 35.7 % are agricultural products. Agricultural products imported from Ukraine represent 4.6 % of all agri-food imports into the EU. When it comes to exports, the EU sells 1.2 % of its commodities to Ukraine, 12.4 % of which are agricultural products.

The main products imported from Ukraine are cereals, animal and vegetable fats and oils, oilseeds, food industry residues and waste, edible fruits and nuts, and meat and edible meat offal. The main exports from the EU to Ukraine are beverages, tobacco, dairy products, cocoa, edible preparations, food industry residues and waste, and oilseeds.

Figure 3 – EU trade with Ukraine: Agricultural trade by product (2020)

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Russia’s war on Ukraine: EU-Ukraine trade in agri-food products‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Eric Pichon.

In the face of the Covid-19 pandemic, ‘nobody is safe until everybody is safe’. On this basis, the EU, along with the World Health Organization (WHO) and other public and private partners, set up a global initiative to facilitate the development, production and global distribution of Covid-19 vaccines. COVAX was initially designed to pool funds and vaccine doses in order to ensure an equitable distribution between all participating economies until all of them – higher- and lower-income alike – reached a threshold of 20 % of their populations vaccinated.

The COVAX mechanism does not, however, prevent high-income economies from striking bilateral agreements with vaccine manufacturers or selected beneficiary countries. In this context, self-financing economies have secured several times more vaccine doses than their populations need, widening the vaccine supply gap for poorer economies.

The EU and participating Member States have contributed nearly a third of COVAX funding, however, as is the case for most donors, their vaccine donations have fallen short of the levels needed. The new rise in cases shows that ‘vaccine nationalism’ is not a viable policy.

The European Parliament has welcomed the EU’s participation in COVAX and expects the Commission to publish an assessment of this participation. To achieve the objective of immunising 70 % of the world population by mid-2022, the WHO has called on the EU, other donors and manufacturers to deliver on their pledges. In parallel, the plan is to develop vaccine manufacturing capacities in lower income economies, and devise a fair solution for sharing Covid-19-related knowledge and patents.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Understanding COVAX: The EU’s role in vaccinating the world against Covid-19‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Alex Wilson (1st edition).

On 15 December 2021, the European Commission adopted a legislative proposal to recast the 2009 EU Gas Directive, as part of the proposed hydrogen and decarbonised gas markets package. This reflects the EU’s growing climate ambitions, set out in the European Green Deal and its ‘Fit for 55’ package.

The Commission’s proposal aims to support the decarbonisation of the energy sector by ramping up the production of renewable gases and hydrogen, and facilitating their integration in EU energy networks. The recast directive would become a core component of a new EU legislative framework for hydrogen networks, comparable to those that already exist for natural gas and electricity.

The Commission’s proposal would refine the principles of the existing Gas Directive and fully extend their scope to cover hydrogen networks. This includes an important set of consumer rights, provisions relating to transmission and distribution system operators (including their unbundling), third-party access and integrated network planning, and independent regulatory authorities. 

In the Parliament, the file was attributed to the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE), which appointed Jens Geier (S&D, Germany) as rapporteur on 7 February 2022.

Versions

• March 2022: EU directive on gas and hydrogen networks (1st edition)

Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on common rules for the internal markets in renewable and natural gases and in hydrogen (recast) Committee responsible:Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE)COM(2021) 803 final
15.12.2021Rapporteur:Jens Geier (S&D, Germany)2021/0425(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Jerzy Buzek (EPP, Poland)
Claudia Gamon (Renew, Austria)Ordinary legislative
procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council
on equal footing –
formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Publication of draft report

Written by Marketa Pape (1st edition).

To support its economy, provide mobility for people and goods and ensure connectivity of all regions while also limiting negative impacts on climate and environment, the EU has been building a multimodal transport network across its territory: the trans-European transport network (TEN‑T). 

The TEN‑T policy is based on 2013 Union guidelines that defined the technical requirements for the planned transport infrastructure and the network layout. Network construction is also supported through EU funding, including the dedicated Connecting Europe Facility programme.   

Having evaluated the progress in TEN‑T implementation, the European Commission put forward revised TEN‑T guidelines in December 2021, to ensure sustainable connectivity through a reliable and high-quality infrastructure network, aligned with the objectives of the European Green Deal.

As co-legislators, the European Parliament and the Council will have to agree on the final form of the proposed regulation. In the Parliament, the Committee on Transport and Tourism will lead the file.

Versions

• March 2022: Revision of the trans-European transport network guidelines (1st edition)

Proposal for a regulation on Union guidelines for the development of the trans-European transport network, amending Regulation (EU) 2021/1153 and Regulation (EU) No 913/2010 and repealing Regulation (EU) 1315/2013 Committee responsible:Transport and Tourism (TRAN)COM(2021) 812
14.12.2021Rapporteur:To be confirmed2021/0420(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Isabel García Muñoz (S&D, Spain)
Jakop G. Dalunde (Greens/EFA, Sweden)
Roberts Zīle (ECR, Latvia)
Elena Kountoura (The Left, Greece)Ordinary legislative
procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council
on equal footing –
formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Initial discussions in committee