European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Luisa Antunes.

The rapid growth of genetic databases worldwide, coupled with fast-decreasing costs and the rapid pace of technological change, has increased the possibility of every human genome on Earth being sequenced this century. This raises ethical and legal questions on data privacy and ownership. While a global genetic database would revolutionise preventive medicine and research, new forms of surveillance, discrimination and power imbalances could emerge. The global interplay between the individual, the state and private individuals could shift, requiring modern and flexible legislation to protect the rights of the individual.

When genome-sequencing technology – the ability to read each ‘letter’ of our DNA code – was first developed in the 1970s, it involved a laborious process of sequentially identifying each base pair (between A, T, G or C). This revolutionary technology became the ‘gold standard’ used until the 2000s, including in the first successful cloning of a mammal, Dolly the sheep, born in 1996. The 1990s also saw a race for the first human genome sequence, achieved in 2001. Newer, next-generation sequencing techniques have since evolved, allowing for faster and cheaper results. Where sequencing a human genome (more than 3 billion base pairs) cost US$95 million in 2001, it is now feasible for under €500 and within 24 hours. Yet, the first fully complete human genome sequence was only published in early 2022, with the sequencing of the missing 8 %.

Alongside these technological advances, the last 30 years have seen the emergence of DNA databases hosted by governments and companies for forensic or health purposes. The first was created in the United Kingdom in 1995. It hosts DNA from 6.6 million individuals linked to crime scenes, but has been accused of racial bias, since 40 % of the DNA samples came from males of ethnic minority origin, in contrast to 9 % from white men. The United States database (with 9 million profiles) has come up against the same criticism. Questions of data privacy and human rights loom over China’s profiling of more than 40 million individuals, including ethnic minorities. In Kuwait, DNA testing was made mandatory for the entire population in 2015 as an anti-terrorism measure, a requirement abandoned only two years later, because of privacy concerns. Closer to home, France hosts the EU’s biggest forensic database, with 1.9 million DNA profiles, while Interpol has access to 54 national DNA databases.

Health genetic testing started in the mid-1980s, to detect cystic fibrosis and other rare genetic conditions. Estonia and Iceland were pioneers, with 15 % and 8 % of their respective populations now sequenced, which has allowed research on national ancestry and the epidemiology of rare genes. The UK, the Faroe Islands and three northern provinces in the Netherlands also have large databases. The USA has sequenced 1 million genomes. In Dubai, a large-scale project was launched in 2018, to prevent genetic disease. In Russia, the processing of personal data, including beliefs and sexual identity, is permitted for research purposes without personal consent. Privately owned databases entered the market in the late 1990s. They offer direct-to-consumer (DTC) genetic testing for genealogy and health purposes. The largest are AncestryDNA, with 14 million records, followed by 23andMe (9 million), MyHeritageDNA (3 million), and Family Tree DNA (2 million).

We carry 10 times more microbial cells in our bodies than human cells. The bacteria and other microorganisms that live in our skin, intestines, mouth and sexual organs contribute to the normal functioning of the immune system and help combat the development of several diseases, including Covid‑19. It can therefore be argued that a world human genome database would not be complete without including microbiome data. The Human Microbiome Project, which ran from 2007 to 2016, collected 32 terabytes of metagenomic data on the link between our microbiota and common diseases.

Potential impacts and developments

The rapid development of public and private databases, along with fast-declining costs and ever-evolving technology, is opening the door to a future where all human genomes could be sequenced. However, the first impact may well be the production of copious amounts of data, requiring improved data processing and storage.

The medical field is likely to be revolutionised, with advances in the research and treatment of both common and rare diseases. Medical research may become more equitable, if the genetic diversity of existing databases, currently heavily biased towards those of European descent, is widened. BRCA1/2 gene screening made news headlines in 2015, when actor and United Nations (UN) Special Envoy Angelina Jolie went public with her decision to undergo a double mastectomy to reduce her chances of developing breast cancer. Preventive medicine could become standard in the detection of cancers and Alzheimer’s disease. However, genetic predisposition is not always deterministic, as environment, personal health and life choices also play a significant role in disease development. Genetic screening has also been shown to temporarily increase psychological stress for individuals. Should genome editing lead to increased population longevity, it is to be expected that there will be implications for demography, the economy, education, employment, the environment, healthcare, housing and pensions .

In evolutionary anthropology, a recent study revealed links between genetics and migratory historical events during the Spanish Reconquista. The large hereditary investigation market opened by DTC testing could have serious consequences, if information on all human genomes becomes freely accessible, with implications for family relations, as well as data ownership and privacy rights, in the particular cases of sperm donation and adoption.

Genetic surveillance will also be affected. In a world where everyone has their genome sequenced, a clear legal framework will be crucial in defining who has access to and who owns the data (the state, private companies and/or individuals). One option would be for every human to have their own DNA privately stored and to be able to decide when to share it with trusted entities – doctors for example.

Questions of data privacy also link to ethical and equity issues. Widely accessible genetic information could open the door to new forms of discrimination in the workplace (recruitment based on genetic disease risk), in education (selection based on genetic traits), in healthcare and by insurance companies (more expensive rates for those with unfavourable traits).

Anticipatory policy-making

In a future where all human genomes are sequenced, legislators will need to address ethical and privacy concerns. This calls for interdisciplinary ethical bodies with experts in legal, societal and medical fields. The UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) considers genetic data to be a human rights issue. The 1997 Oviedo Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine (not yet signed by all EU Member States) is the only international legally binding instrument on the protection of human rights in biomedicine, including genetic data. Genomic sequencing has since expanded, and framework gaps and the need for privacy safeguards have become increasingly clear. As genetic data has become a source of profit for insurance and DTC companies, future legislation will need to differentiate between commercial and public health interests. While restrictive legislation on accessing genetic data might offer protection against discrimination, the same restrictions could prevent researchers from investigating novel medical approaches. Two legislative acts are relevant in this field. The European Commission’s European health data space (EHDS) proposal is aimed at ensuring a clear legal framework, while empowering individuals’ control over their health data. The proposed AI act will play a key role in genetic data governance, as digital rights extend to personal genetic data. On the privacy of genetic data, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) offers a starting point for effective policy-making. Legislation will need to address companies offering DTC testing, where a regulated market could help set up quality assurance for genetic testing services. The Council of Europe has adopted a recommendation stating that insurance companies should not request genetic testing. Finally, EU legislation should address the potential international impacts of sequencing all human beings. International agreements on genetic data usage are desirable; otherwise, countries with fewer regulations could offer loopholes for more heavily regulated business sectors in the EU.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘What if we sequenced all human genomes?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Listen to policy podcast ‘What if we sequenced all human genomes?’ on YouTube.

Written by Agnieszka Widuto.

The Sustainable Development Goals were established in 2015 as part of the United Nations (UN) 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. The signatories adopted a policy framework with 17 goals, addressing issues such as poverty, hunger, health and wellbeing, education, gender equality, environment and climate, strong institutions, peace and justice. Sustainable development aims at balancing social, economic and environmental aspects, seeing them as interconnected.

The European Union (EU) has contributed to both setting and implementing the SDGs. It has committed to deliver on the 2030 Agenda through its internal and external policies, as outlined in the Towards a Sustainable Europe by 2030 reflection paper, the European Green Deal and the European Commission’s political priorities and work programme. To measure their progress towards achieving the goals, EU Member States prepare voluntary national reviews, in line with UN guidelines. EU-level progress is measured through a set of indicators adapted to the EU context, and Eurostat publishes annual monitoring reports on the results. The objectives of the SDGs were integrated into the European Semester in 2019.

The SDGs also have a regional dimension, sometimes called ‘localisation’. Achieving around 65 % of the targets is estimated to depend on input from local and regional authorities. Numerous regions and cities, including in the EU, have expressed support for the SDGs and many have integrated them in their policy frameworks. Efforts to localise the SDGs are ongoing and regional achievements are featured in the national reviews presented at international conferences. Monitoring SDGs at the regional level can thus help support the overall implementation of the SDGs, reinforce national efforts, support regional development strategies, and provide a broader picture of within-country trends. The European Parliament has expressed its support for an EU sustainable development strategy and enhanced involvement of regional, local and civil society stakeholders in SDG implementation.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in EU regions‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Listen to policy podcast ‘Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in EU regions‘ on YouTube.

Written by Clare Ferguson.

The last plenary session before the summer recess takes place in Strasbourg on 4-7 July 2022, with Members set to consider a packed agenda of policy decisions, many of which address the new geopolitical and economic realities resulting from Russia’s war against Ukraine. Unsurprisingly therefore, Czechia’s priorities for its second six-month Presidency of the Council of the EU include protecting EU citizens and freedoms, and its interests and values on the world stage; providing momentum for growth and investment; and supporting the ongoing EU climate and social policies. Members will consider the planned programme of activities, which began on 1 July 2022, in a key debate on Wednesday morning. A debate on the conclusions of the 23-24 June 2022 European Council meeting will follow. This session’s ‘This is Europe‘ debate is scheduled to take place on Tuesday morning, with the Prime Minister of Greece, Kyriakos Mitsotakis.

Parliament is set to approve two important pieces of proposed legislation following a debate on Monday evening, – the digital markets act and the digital services act – following a political agreement reached between the co-legislators. The digital markets act is the EU’s answer to tackling the dominance of a few large platforms that act as gatekeepers, controlling access to digital markets, and distorting competition. Through its three main provisions, the legislation should provide a definition of a large platform (those with €7.5 billion in annual turnover and €75 billion in market capitalisation), will oblige them to ensure their services are interoperable, and will ban them from giving preference to their own products in search results or re-using personal data. The European Commission will enforce the law, with the possibility to levy fines of up to 20 % of a company’s worldwide turnover. The new digital services act should boost consumer protection through rules promoting a safer and more transparent online environment. Parliament has ensured that the new law makes the platforms hosting online search engines, social media and marketplace platforms, responsible for protecting users against harmful and illegal content. Online platforms will also be obliged to be more transparent and accountable, with larger platforms subject to stricter rules. The European Commission will share enforcement with national authorities, according to the size of the platform concerned.

On Monday evening, and in advance of an important step set for 1 January 2023, Members are expected to consider a Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) report on Croatia’s pathway to its adoption of the euro. The report concurs with European Commission and European Central Bank assessments that price stability, fiscal sustainability, exchange rate fluctuations and long-term interest rates in the country prove that Croatia is ready to adopt the euro. The legal act is expected to be adopted by the Council in July.

Against the background of Russia’s continued aggression against Ukraine, and following EU leaders’ 23 June decision to grant EU candidate status to Ukraine and Moldova and to confirm Georgia’s European perspective, Members turn once again to prospects for EU enlargement, this time in the Western Balkans. Members are set to debate Foreign Affairs (AFET) Committee reports on the Commission’s 2021 assessment of accession prospects for Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Kosovo[1] on Tuesday afternoon. The AFET report on Bosnia and Herzegovina underlines the pressing need for a broader strategic and security approach to the Western Balkans, and calls for elections and electoral reform to go ahead in the country as planned. The AFET committee notes Kosovo‘s intention to apply for EU membership in 2022, but stresses that, as for other new applicants, there is no fast-track procedure. While judicial independence and reform is one issue to resolve before Kosovo can advance its European ambitions, another is the normalisation of relations with Serbia. While the committee reconfirms unequivocal support for the EU-facilitated Belgrade–Pristina dialogue, the AFET report on Serbia‘s progress towards accession in 2021 obviously underlines the country’s ambivalent attitude to EU policies and values and its reluctance to stand against Russia.

In the context of Russia’s war against Ukraine, Members are set to vote on additional crisis measures to support the EU fishery and aquaculture sectors on Wednesday lunchtime. Given the urgency to act, Parliament’s Committee on Fisheries (PECH) swiftly approved the proposal to provide support for the seafood sector, hard-hit by rising fuel prices and trade disruption, by using amounts leftover from the 2014‑2020 budget.

Returning to the ‘Fit for 55’ package aimed at cutting EU emissions, Members will consider a Committee on Transport and Tourism (TRAN) report on the proposed RefuelEU aviation initiative on Thursday morning. While the initiative seeks to increase availability of sustainable aviation fuels at EU airports, the TRAN committee seeks a wider scope, proposing that more sustainable fuels are made available at more airports and for more aircraft. While the report seeks a wider definition of renewable fuel to include electricity, it supports the exclusion of food and feed based fuel, as well as further research into alternatives.

Ahead of the 15th Conference of the Parties (COP15), Parliament will use the revived ‘question time’ scheduled for Tuesday afternoon to scrutinise the Commission on EU biodiversity protection. Parliament strongly supports the current initiatives to protect and restore biodiversity in the EU, and advocates EU-wide mandatory pesticide reduction.

Finally, Parliament is committed to making EU laws and policies simpler and easier for people and businesses. On Thursday morning, Members consider a Legal Affairs Committee (JURI) report that seeks to strengthen the EU strategy on better regulation, outlined in the Commission’s 2021 communication. The JURI committee insists on the need for transparency and openness, particularly as regards the Regulatory Scrutiny Board and the ‘one in, one out’ approach, whereby each new piece of legislation adopted leads to the removal of an older or outdated law. The committee also wishes to see children’s rights mainstreamed throughout EU legislation.

[1] This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244/1999 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.

Written by Anna Caprile and Eric Pichon.

At least one of the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) set by the United Nations (UN) will be missed in 2030 – SDG 2 – ‘zero hunger’ – also endangering the accomplishment of the rest of the SDG goals under Agenda 2030. Hunger and malnutrition are rising dramatically across the world, a trend aggravated by the pandemic. In 2020, 811 million people in the world were facing hunger, the highest level since 2014, and 3 billion people were without access to a healthy diet. The fight against hunger and malnutrition has been the focus of two global summits, namely the UN Food Systems Summit (September 2021), which committed to a deep reform of global food systems, and the Nutrition for Growth Summit (December 2021), which saw the biggest pledge since 2013. In the EU itself, considered one of the most food-secure regions in the world, nearly 7 million people were already experiencing severe food insecurity before the pandemic, and malnutrition is on the rise, as demonstrated by obesity and pre-obesity prevalence rates.

SDG 2 aims not only at achieving food security but also at improving nutrition and promoting sustainable agriculture. These objectives have been mainstreamed in the recently reformed common agricultural policy and the ‘farm to fork’ and biodiversity strategies. In developing countries, the EU is strongly committed to achieving SDG 2. The EU institutions and Member States, which collectively provide more than half of official development assistance worldwide, have reaffirmed this commitment in the new European ‘consensus on development’. Alongside development aid, the EU has several levers at its disposal to act on food insecurity causes, such as security and defence missions and comprehensive strategies in conflict areas, as well as substantial research capacities. >The fact that its internal policies, in particular agricultural, climate and trade policies, have a spill-over effect on other food systems in the world, in particular in poorer countries, also make the EU a significant player.

Read the complete briefing on ‘SDG 2 – zero hunger, and EU action against hunger and malnutrition‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Listen to policy podcast ‘SDG 2 – zero hunger, and EU action against hunger and malnutrition‘ on YouTube.

Written by Frederik Scholaert and Karin Jacobs.

The United Nations 2030 Agenda and the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), adopted in 2015, set the global roadmap for achieving sustainable development. It includes SDG 14 on ‘life below water’, which focuses on the sustainability of the oceans, thereby recognising their essential role in life on our planet. Oceans contain 80 % of all life forms, produce more than 50 % of the Earth’s oxygen and play a central role in regulating the climate. In addition, the ‘blue economy’ provides 4.5 million direct jobs in the EU. It covers traditional sectors, such as fisheries, maritime transport and coastal tourism, as well as innovative sectors, such as renewable ocean energy and the blue bioeconomy, which show great potential for sustainable blue growth. However, human activities threaten the health of our oceans. The effects of climate change are devastating, resulting in rising water temperatures, acidification, increased flooding and loss of marine biodiversity. The combination with other man-made stressors, such as pollution, including from land-based resources, and overexploitation of marine resources exacerbates the problem, reduces the resilience of oceans and poses a serious threat to the planet as a whole.

To manage maritime activities sustainably and cope with different environmental pressures, the EU has implemented a wide range of policies. This includes established policies, such as the common fisheries policy, the marine strategy framework directive and the maritime spatial planning directive, as well as specific legislation related to marine litter. Other new initiatives under the European Green Deal also play an important role in relation to ocean governance and sustainable blue growth, such as the 2030 biodiversity strategy, the offshore renewable energy strategy, the ‘Fit for 55’ package and the new guidelines on aquaculture. The external dimension of EU policies, its international ocean governance agenda and its global commitments make the EU a global player in shaping ocean governance and contribute to its commitment to deliver fully on SDG 14. On the occasion of World Oceans Day on 8 June 2022, this publication provides an overview of the main EU policies and initiatives in the field of ocean governance.

Read the complete briefing on ‘EU action on ocean governance and achieving SDG 14‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Listen to policy podcast ‘EU action on ocean governance and achieving SDG 14‘ on YouTube.

Written by Vivienne Halleux (1st edition).

The European Green Deal envisages a review of measures addressing pollution from large industrial installations, with a view to aligning existing legislation with the EU’s zero pollution ambition, as well as its energy, climate and circular economy policy goals. On 5 April 2022, the European Commission tabled a proposal to revise the Industrial Emissions Directive, the main European Union instrument regulating pollutant emissions from industry, together with a proposal to revise the Regulation establishing the European Pollutant Release and Transfer Register, related to environmental information. The proposal aims at upgrading the existing register to a more comprehensive and integrated industrial emissions portal, enabling more accurate monitoring of the environmental performance of large industrial activities. The main changes proposed include better alignment with the Industrial Emissions Directive, both in terms of activities covered and reporting level; inclusion of reporting on the use of resources; and integration in the database of additional relevant environmental data reported under other related EU legislation.

In Parliament, the file has been referred to the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety. The same rapporteur and shadow rapporteurs will handle the revision of the European Pollutant Release and Transfer Register Regulation and that of the Industrial Emissions Directive.

Version

• June 2022: Establishing an industrial emissions portal (1st edition)

Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on reporting of environmental data from industrial installations and establishing an industrial emissions portal Committee responsible:Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI)COM(2022) 157
05.04.2022Rapporteur:Radan Kanev (EPP, Bulgaria)2022/0105 (COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Mohammed Chahim (S&D, the Netherlands)
Michal Wiezik (Renew, Slovakia)
Eleonora Evi (Greens/EFA, Italy)
Anna Zalewska (ECR, Poland)
Marisa Matias (The Left, Portugal)Ordinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Publication of draft report

Written by Vivienne Halleux.

Covering some 52 000 large agro-industrial installations EU-wide, the Industrial Emissions Directive is the main EU instrument regulating pollutant emissions from industry. The proposal for a revision tabled by the European Commission on 5 April 2022 aims to bring it into line with the EU’s zero pollution ambition, energy, climate and circular economy policy goals under the European Green Deal. The main changes include expanding the scope (in terms of sectors covered and thresholds), strengthening permit requirements to authorise installations to operate, and measures to promote innovation.

Stakeholders’ reactions to the text were mixed. Industry and farming representatives expressed strong concerns about the added complexity, timeliness and practical implementation of the proposal. While welcoming many improvements, non-governmental organisations criticised the missed opportunity to make the directive fit for climate protection, and the proposed new regime for intensive livestock rearing. In Parliament, the file has been referred to the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI), which appointed Radan Kanev as rapporteur.

Version

• June 2022: Revision of the Industrial Emissions Directive (1st edition)

Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2010/75/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 on industrial emissions (integrated pollution prevention and control) and Council Directive 1999/31/EC of 26 April 1999 on the landfill of waste Committee responsible:Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI)COM(2022) 156
05.04.2022Rapporteur:Radan Kanev (EPP, Bulgaria)2022/0104 (COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Mohammed Chahim (S&D, the Netherlands)
Michal Wiezik (Renew, Slovakia)
Eleonora Evi (Greens/EFA, Italy)
Anna Zalewska (ECR, Poland)
Marisa Matias (The Left, Portugal)Ordinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Publication of draft report Sectoral shares of IED installations in 2018

Written by Ralf Drachenberg.

The June 2022 European Council meeting marked a potentially historic moment: EU leaders granted Ukraine and Moldova candidate status and also confirmed Georgia’s European perspective. Although highly anticipated, this major step was neither obvious nor uncontroversial, as for the first time it concerned a country still at war, generating intense discussions both within the European Council and with partner countries. On Ukraine, EU leaders took stock of the situation in the country, confirmed their commitment to increased military support and financial assistance, and called on like-minded partners to align with EU sanctions. Regarding relations with non-EU partners in Europe, the European Council had its first strategic discussion on the ‘European political community’ concept (EPC), with a possible first EPC summit to take place under the upcoming Czech Presidency. Turkey’s assertiveness in the eastern Mediterranean and the Belarus people’s right to ‘free and fair elections’ were also discussed.

On other topics, however, not least on the Conference on the Future of Europe, the results were underwhelming, as EU leaders took no concrete follow-up decision, simply leaving it to each EU institution to do so within its own sphere of competence. Moreover, no breakthrough was possible regarding the Western Balkans – neither at the leaders’ meeting nor at the European Council itself.

The last component of the two days of meetings saw a Euro Summit in inclusive format. EU leaders discussed two major issues, the current economic situation, notably the rise in prices of energy, food and commodities, and the EU’s financial architecture, reiterating their commitment to the completion of the banking and capital markets unions.

1. General aspects

The European Council meeting began with the customary address by the President of the European Parliament, Roberta Metsola, who had also attended the Western Balkans Leaders’ Meeting the same morning. She stressed that ‘this is a moment where we must remain together. It is a moment we did not choose, but one that we have no choice but to meet’. Her intervention was followed by a discussion in which at least 10 EU Heads of State or Government took part, indicating that the interest in and quality of the exchanges with the President of the Parliament continue to increase.

The President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, addressed the European Council once again (remotely), reaffirming that Ukraine was capable of becoming a fully fledged member of the European Union.

The President of the European Council, Charles Michel, did not use the opportunity of this meeting to update the indicative Leaders’ Agenda. It was last updated in December 2021, and covered the period up to March 2022.

On the suggestion of the Prime Minister of Italy, Mario Draghi, the organisation of another special European Council meeting, either before or just after the summer break, and dedicated to economic issues, was debated within the European Council, with varying opinions expressed on the idea.

2. European Council meeting Wider Europe

EU leaders held a first exchange of views on French President Emmanuel Macron’s proposal to launch a ‘European political community’ (EPC), and will revert to the subject at one of their forthcoming meetings. The aim of the EPC would be to ‘strengthen the stability and security of the European continent’ and ‘offer a platform for political coordination’ with ‘all European countries with whom we have close relations’, with meetings taking place at leaders’ level. While stressing that the Western Balkan countries had reacted ‘rather in a positive and favourable way’ to the EPC concept, Charles Michel – and the European Council conclusions – strongly underlined that the EPC was not seen as an alternative to enlargement, so reassuring those countries that had expressed concerns prior to the meeting.

Ukraine

EU leaders discussed Russia’s war on Ukraine once again, reaffirming the latter’s legitimate right to defend itself, its territorial integrity and its sovereignty. They deplored the attacks targeting the civilian population and infrastructure, and called on Russia to ‘immediately and unconditionally withdraw all its troops and military equipment from the entire territory of Ukraine within its internationally recognised borders’. The European Council reconfirmed the EU’s staunch support for Ukraine, and discussed humanitarian, financial, economic, social and military aid. As regards financial assistance, European leaders took note of the fact that the European Commission would be presenting a proposal for macro-financial assistance of up to €9 billion, which they had green-lighted at their meeting on 30-31 May 2022. On military support, they confirmed the EU’s commitment, and called on the Council to ‘swiftly work on a further increase of military support’. Since the start of the war, the EU has committed €2 billion under the European Peace Facility.

EU leaders stressed that international humanitarian law ‘must be respected’, reiterated their demand that Russia allow the immediate return of Ukrainians, in particular children abducted to Russia, and stressed that war crimes will be prosecuted and punished. No further sanctions were agreed, the focus being put on implementation and avoidance of circumvention. The EU leaders agreed that the sanctions had mounted pressure on Russia, calling on like-minded partners to align with the EU sanctions, and on the Council to finalise the ‘decision adding the violation of Union restrictive measures to the list of EU crimes’. The European Council also strongly emphasised that, by weaponising food in its war against Ukraine, Russia was solely responsible for the current food crisis, and reiterated its call on Russia to cease these detrimental activities. In recent speeches, Charles Michel had clearly underlined that food security issues were not caused by EU sanctions, but rather by Russia ‘stealing grain, blockading ports’ and targeting agricultural resources. A central point in the discussion concerned how to get millions of tonnes of Ukrainian grain out of the country. To this end, EU leaders signalled their support for solidarity lanes and for the UN’s attempts to unblock exports through an agreement on secure corridors between Russia, Turkey and Ukraine. In order to respond effectively to global food security concerns, the European Council also called on the Commission and the Member States to increase their support for developing countries with supply chain issues, help them develop their manufacturing capacities, and hasten the delivery of relevant initiatives from the EU-African Union Summit.

Main message of the President of the European Parliament: Roberta Metsola warned against ‘war fatigue’ fuelled by inflation and disinformation. She stressed that the EU needed ‘to break free from Russian energy’, start preparing the next sanctions package, push back against false food security narratives, and avoid new ‘iron curtains and spheres of influence’. She expressed her support for an expansion of solidarity lanes, and stressed that Russia was responsible for any impending food crisis.

EU membership applications of Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia

The European Council took the important decision to grant candidate country status to Ukraine and Moldova, and to offer a European perspective to Georgia. The three countries’ progress towards membership would be subject to conditionality. However, only Georgia still needs to first fulfil certain conditions set by the European Commission in its opinion issued in response to the membership applications. Prior to the summit, Roberta Metsola and Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas had issued a joint opinion piece, in which they stressed that a clear message to Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia would give ‘hope’ and show ‘a strong signal of belief in shared European values’. Just before the summit started, the European Parliament adopted a resolution supporting candidate country status for Ukraine and Moldova and Georgia, by a majority of 529 votes.

EU leaders noted that enlargement was a merit-based process and that each country’s progress would be assessed individually against the Copenhagen criteria, albeit also with respect to the ‘EU’s capacity to absorb new members’ – a criterion that clouds clarity on the final outcome

Main message of the President of the European Parliament: Roberta Metsola stressed that it ‘would have been a historically wrong decision not to grant candidate status to Ukraine and Moldova today, or give a clear perspective to Georgia’.

Western Balkans

Prior to the European Council meeting, EU and Western Balkan leaders met for a leaders’ meeting, which some Balkan leaders had even threatened to boycott. Given the disappointment expressed by Western Balkan countries on the lack of progress on their membership applications, no declaration was adopted. Their criticism even prompted Charles Michel to adjust the order of the agenda points at the European Council, initiating a roundtable discussion on the Western Balkans ahead of that on the membership application of Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia.

The High Representative/Vice President of the European Commission Josep Borrell stated that ‘we are not where we should be with the Western Balkans’. In that context, he stressed the importance of rethinking the decision-making process and pointed to the failure of the unanimity rule.

The European Council conclusions expressed ‘full and unequivocal commitment to the EU membership perspective of the Western Balkans’, recalled the ‘reversible and merit-based’ principle of the revised enlargement methodology, stressed the importance of reforms and of an independent judiciary, and called for the fight against corruption to continue. However, EU leaders also felt the need to clarify the ‘status’ of three applicant countries: North Macedonia, Serbia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, giving an encouraging tone to the conclusions. The EU leaders called ‘for a swift resolution’ of the dispute between Bulgaria and North Macedonia, ‘so that accession negotiations could be opened without delay’. The French Presidency presented a proposal, which received the backing ‘in extremis’ of the Bulgarian parliament on 24 June 2022; it now requires the approval of North Macedonia to enable a breakthrough. EU leaders also called urgently for ‘tangible progress’ to be made on resolving outstanding disputes, particularly in the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue on normalisation of relations between Serbia and Kosovo, which is a prerequisite for progress on Serbia’s accession process. The European Council had a long discussion on Bosnia and Herzegovina. Welcoming the political agreement of 12 June 2022, EU leaders indicated that they would be ready to grant candidate country status as soon as the 14 priorities identified in the Commission’s opinion had been implemented, notably the long overdue constitutional and electoral reform.

Main message of the President of the European Parliament: Roberta Metsola called for the launch of accession negotiations with Albania and North Macedonia and for Kosovo to be granted visa liberalisation. She stressed that the Western Balkan countries ‘need to see hope lead to results’.

Conference on the Future of Europe (CoFoE)

Discussions on the follow-up to the Conference on the Future of Europe were rather short and the results were underwhelming. The European Council only ‘took note’ of the CoFoE proposals. While calling for ‘an effective follow-up ‘, they did not provide concrete guidelines in this respect, just stating that each EU institution should do this ‘within their own sphere of competences’, rather than doing it jointly among the EU institutions. EU Heads of State or Government also noted the importance of ensuring that citizens are informed of the follow-up to the proposals made in the report. The president of France, Emmanuel Macron, indicated that the European Council would continue with its debate on this issue.

Main message of the President of the European Parliament: Roberta Metsola told the EU Heads of State or Government to be ambitious and to enhance the Union’s capacity to act in vital areas such as health, energy, defence and fundamental values. She stressed that the Parliament’s views, as expressed in its two resolutions, should not be ignored. She reiterated the Parliament’s desire to hold a convention, which would ‘keep the conversation on our EU project going’. Ms Metsola also confirmed Parliament’s readiness to face the challenges jointly with the other EU institutions and Member States. 

Economic issues

As anticipated in the EPRS outlook for the meeting, EU leaders generally endorsed the integrated country-specific recommendations. They welcomed the fulfilment by Croatia of all the convergence criteria to join the euro area, endorsed the Commission’s proposal that Croatia should adopt the euro on 1 January 2023, and invited the Council to adopt the relevant Commission proposals swiftly.

Given the reluctance of certain EU Member States towards market intervention at EU level, EU leaders reiterated their call on the Commission to explore with international partners ways of curbing rising energy prices, including the feasibility of introducing temporary price caps where appropriate. Faced with Russia’s weaponisation of gas, the European Council invited the Commission to pursue its efforts to secure energy supply at affordable prices.

3. Euro Summit

EU leaders also held a Euro Summit meeting in inclusive format, with all 27 Member States participating, as well as the President of the European Central Bank, Christine Lagarde, and the President of the Eurogroup, Pascal Donohoe. They discussed the current economic situation in the EU, notably rising inflation, which as Charles Michel stated, is ‘a major concern for all of us’. He underlined that ‘Russia’s war of aggression is pushing up the price of energy, food and commodities, and that all of this has a direct impact on our citizens and businesses’. EU leaders agreed to coordinate their economic responses to the rising cost of living closely. In their statement, EU leaders reiterated their commitment to completing banking union, with future steps to follow, and called for efforts to deepen the capitals market union to be stepped up.

Read this briefing on ‘Outcome of the meetings of EU leaders on 23-24 June 2022‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Angelos delivorias (1st edition).

The second Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID II) and the Markets in Financial Instruments Regulation (MiFIR) are the principal texts regulating investment services and activities in the EU. Following an extensive consultation and in light of the recent developments in the context of the coronavirus pandemic, the European Commission proposed the establishment of an EU-wide consolidated tape for shares, bonds, exchange-traded funds (ETFs) and derivatives, as well as making targeted changes to market structure, so as to increase transparency and strengthen the competitiveness of EU financial markets. Consolidated tape is a high-speed electronic system that reports the latest price and volume data on sales of exchange-listed stock.

The files are currently under review by the co-legislators. Within the European Parliament, they have both been assigned to the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs. The draft reports are expected soon.

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• June 2022: Amendments to MiFID II and MiFIR: The EU’s markets in financial instruments (1st edition)

Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2014/65/EU on markets in financial instruments
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 as regards enhancing market data transparency, removing obstacles to the emergence of a consolidated tape, optimising the trading obligations and prohibiting receiving payments for forwarding client orders Committee responsible:Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON)COM(2021) 726 and
COM(2021) 727, 25.11.2021Rapporteur:Danuta Maria Hübner (EPP, Poland)2021/0384(COD) and 2021/0385(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Eero Heinäluoma (S&D, Finland)
Nicola Beer (Renew Europe, Germany)
Karima Delli (Greens/EFA, France)
Gunnar Beck (ID, Germany)
Johan Van Overtveldt (ECR, Belgium)Ordinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Publication of draft report © ekapolsira / Adobe Stock

Written by Marcin Grajewski.

Inflation has risen to levels not seen in 40 years in the euro area or in many other countries, forcing some central banks to raise interest rates in a context that bodes ill for economic growth. Initially driven by post-pandemic supply shortages and then by soaring energy prices, following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, inflation is now becoming increasingly broadly based, affecting everything from food and services to household goods. Dissatisfaction with the rising cost of living is leading to social protests, increasing political risks for many countries. In the euro area, price growth was 8.1 % in May year-on-year, more than four times the European Central Bank’s target.

This note gathers links to the recent publications and commentaries from many international think tanks on resurgent inflation. Many earlier publications on inflation can be found in a previous edition of the ‘What Think Tanks are Thinking’ series.

The Fed has regained the initiative, but at a cost
Atlantic Council, June 2022

Fragmentation risk in the euro area: No easy way out for the European Central Bank
Bruegel, June 2022

5 key takeaways on inflation from the May CPI report
Brookings Institution, June 2022

Can child care and pre-K help reduce inflation?
Brookings Institution, June 2022

What if the Federal Reserve books losses because of its quantitative easing?
Brookings Institution, June 2022

Demand- and supply-side factors behind the higher inflation
Centre for Social and Economic Research, June 2022

The ECB’s normalisation path
Centre for European Policy Studies, June 2022

IfO Economic Forecast Summer 2022: Inflation, supply bottlenecks and war slow down economic recovery in Germany
IfO, June 2022

Weltwirtschaft im Sommer 2022: Inflationsschub bremst die Expansion
Kiel Institute, June 2022

Stagflation and fragmentation: The euro area at crossroads
LUISS School for European Political Economy, June 2022

How money printing destroyed Argentina and can destroy others
Mises Institute, June 2022

The Fed tries to get ahead of inflation
Peterson Institute for International Economics, June 2022

How free trade can fight inflation: More competition means lower prices
Peterson Institute for International Economics, Foreign Affairs, June 2022

To fight inflation, cutting tariffs on China is only the start
Peterson Institute for International Economics, June 2022

Measures to combat inflation and its effects
Austrian Institute of Economic Research, May 2022

Three headaches for the European Central Bank
Bruegel, May 2022

Inflation-related updates to ‘Recession Remedies’
Brookings Institution, May 2022

Wages, pensions and household income have risen in real terms over the past 25 years
DIW, May 2022

The Ukraine war and inflation
IfO, May 2022

We must not override the signal function of the price!
IfO, May 2022

Our economy needs a good dose of customer-driven deflation
Mises Institute, May 2022

Brexit is driving inflation higher in the UK than its European peers after identical supply shocks
Peterson Institute for International Economics May 2022

Impact of the war in Ukraine on the debate on the future of agriculture in the EU
Polish Institute of International Affairs, May 2022

Is a recession coming? A key indicator is also the king of mixed messages
Rand Corporation, May 2022

Le nouveau manuel politique de la zone euro
Terra Nova, May 2022

Rising cost of living and poverty
Austrian Institute of Economic Research, April 2022

Fiscal support and monetary vigilance: Economic policy implications of the Russia-Ukraine war for the European Union
Bruegel, April 2022

From low to high inflation: Implications for emerging market and developing economies
Centre for Economic Policy Research, April 2022

Rental inflation and stabilisation policies: international evidence and the Irish experience
Economic and Social Research Institute, April 2022

German economy slowed down by war, inflation and Chinese lockdowns
DIW, April 2022

Political shocks and inflation expectations: Evidence from the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine
IfO, April 2022

Comment se protéger au mieux de l’inflation ?
Institut Thomas More, April 2022

Economic prospects call for high inflation and slowing global growth
Peterson Institute for International Economics, April 2022

Die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung im Ausland: Krieg in der Ukraine belastet die Weltwirtschaft und bringt weiteren Inflationsschub
RWI, April 2022

Read this briefing on ‘The return of inflation‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Tambiama Madiega, Polona Car and Maria Niestadt with Louise Van de Pol.

One of the most talked about concepts in modern technology, the metaverse can be described as an immersive and constant virtual 3D world where people interact by means of an avatar to carry out a wide range of activities. Such activities can range from leisure and gaming to professional and commercial interactions, financial transactions or even health interventions such as surgery. While the exact scope and impact of the metaverse on society and on the economy is still unknown, it can already be seen that the metaverse will open up a range of opportunities but also a number of risks in a variety of policy areas.

Major tech companies are scaling up their metaverse activities, including through mergers and acquisitions. This has given impetus to a debate on how merger regulations and antitrust law should apply. Business in the metaverse is expected to be underpinned largely by cryptocurrencies and non-fungible tokens, raising issues of ownership, misuse, interoperability and portability. Furthermore, the huge volume of data used in the metaverse raises a number of data protection and cybersecurity issues (e.g. how to collect user consent or protect avatars against identity theft).

There is considerable scope for a wide range of illegal and harmful behaviours and practices in the metaverse environment. This makes it essential to consider how to attribute responsibility, inter alia, for fighting illegal and harmful practices and misleading advertising practices, and for protecting intellectual property rights. Moreover, digital immersion in the metaverse can have severe negative impacts on health, especially for vulnerable groups, such as minors, who may require special protection. Finally, the accessibility and inclusiveness of the metaverse remain areas where progress has still to be made in order to create an environment of equal opportunities.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Metaverse: Opportunities, risks and policy implications‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clare Ferguson and Katarzyna Sochacka.

The highlight of the June II 2022 plenary session was the vote to overwhelmingly endorse the granting of candidate status to Ukraine and Moldova, and – once it meets the conditions set out by the Commission – Georgia. On the evening of 23 June, EU leaders did indeed follow suit. Members debated preparations for that European Council meeting taking place on 23-24 June 2022, including the meeting with Western Balkan leaders on 23 June. The Parliament also debated with the Commission and Council the use of national vetoes undermining the global tax deal, and held debates, inter alia, on implementation and delivery of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals, and the future of EU international investment policy. Parliament adopted its position, following the urgent procedure, on exceptional temporary support under the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development in response to the impact of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. A ‘This is Europe’ debate was held with the Prime Minister of Croatia, Andrej Plenković. Finally, in a formal sitting, Members heard an address by Hakainde Hichilema, President of the Republic of Zambia.

Gas storage

Members debated an urgent proposal to boost gas storage in Europe, to reduce dependency on Russian gas. As Members endorsed the provisional agreement reached between the Parliament and Council, the measures should already take effect this summer. EU countries should fill 85 % of their storage sites by November 2022, with fair burden-sharing ensured according to national consumption levels, and joint purchases encouraged. While broadly in agreement with the Commission’s proposal to prepare for severing trade with Russian suppliers, Parliament’s negotiators were successful in adding provisions to take account of national variations, such as derogations for isolated gas markets in Ireland, Malta and Cyprus.

Fit for 55

The EU has committed to a 55 % cut in greenhouse gas emissions by 2030, and climate neutrality by 2050, with the proposals under the ‘fit for 55’ package aimed at turning this ambition into reality. Following Parliament’s rejection of the Committee on Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI) report on the Commission’s proposal to align the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) with this target during the June I plenary session, Members adopted a set of amendments re-tabled by ENVI that include the amendments that were carried by the June I plenary, as well as other compromise amendments related to the linear reduction factor, the timing for phasing out free ETS allowances, and the corresponding phase-in of the carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM). Members also adopted their position on the revision of the CBAM to place a carbon price on certain imported products and phase out free emissions allowances for European industry. Because CBAM is tightly linked to the ETS file, it too was referred back to committee without a vote during the June I session. Members adopted the significant amendments to the original proposal included in the ENVI report. Members also completed the adoption of the Parliament’s position on the Social Climate Fund, intended to help those most affected by the green transition, following the vote on amendments in the June I session. The Parliament is thus ready to negotiate with the Council on all three files, along with the other fit for 55 package proposals adopted earlier in the month.

Recovery and Resilience Facility

Parliament’s role in scrutiny and oversight is key to ensuring that measures intended to support the post-pandemic recovery benefit EU citizens. Members debated and adopted a joint report of the Committees on Budgets and on Economic and Monetary Affairs on implementation of the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF). This report aims at providing Parliament’s input to the July review of RRF implementation. It highlights the RRF’s key role in the EU’s economic recovery, and in making the EU more resilient, competitive and strategically autonomous. The report notes that successful implementation is key to ensuring long-term impact and economic growth in the EU, pointing to the RRF’s stabilising effects to date. Urging Member States to provide the Commission with sufficient information to ensure effective reporting, the committees also stressed the importance of regular scrutiny and monitoring of RRF expenditure and compliance with the rule of law, where the report warns that reimbursement should be possible in case of non-compliance. Taking stock of EU countries’ use of the funding available to date, the report also highlights the RRF’s potential to boost EU prosperity and urges Member States to take advantage of the loans available.

Amending budget No 3 – Financing reception costs of people fleeing Ukraine

Members debated and adopted an amending budget to provide EU funding to finance the continued cost of welcoming refugees from Ukraine. It strengthens the financing of the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF) and the Border Management and Visa Instrument (BMVI). The additional €99.8 million in commitment appropriations and €76 million in payment appropriations for AMIF and €100 million in payment appropriations for BMVI will help to ensure that people fleeing Ukraine benefit from adequate initial reception conditions in Member States.

2021 Report on Montenegro

Continuing the annual assessment of progress by candidate countries, Members debated the Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) report on the Commission’s 2021 report on Montenegro’s EU accession negotiations. Despite recent political upheaval in the country, Parliament is keen to promote stability in its neighbourhood through the accession process. However, while the AFET report welcomes the new government, it also points out that Montenegro must continue to ensure a functioning parliamentary democracy and the necessary EU-related reforms. Any new candidates for EU membership will have to reach the same democratic and economic standards

Future of EU-Africa trade relations

Parliament adopted a resolution based on a Committee on International Trade (INTA) report that considers how to foster ethical and sustainable trade relations with African countries, in the light of the fast-changing global trade situation. The report calls for EU assistance to integrate the continent into the global economy through robust EU-Africa trade relations, as well as to help African countries to counter the effects of Covid‑19 and the war on Ukraine.

Accession to the Hague Convention

Members followed the Legal Affairs Committee recommendation and gave consent to the EU’s accession to the Hague Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters. By requiring its signatories to recognise and enforce judgments given in civil or commercial matters in other signatory countries, the convention is intended to reduce the difficulties experienced in making legal claims by businesses who trade across borders, and particularly for EU citizens and companies doing business in the USA.

Opening of trilogue negotiations

The Fisheries (PECH) Committee’s decision to enter into interinstitutional negotiations on the proposal for a regulation as regards specific measures to alleviate the consequences of the military aggression of Russia against Ukraine on fishing activities and to mitigate the effects of the market disruption was endorsed without a vote.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Plenary round-up – June II 2022‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Tarja Laaninen.

‘The war on Ukraine is also a war on information’, says Reporters Without Borders (RSF). On 16 June 2022, the Committee on Culture and Education (CULT), together with the Civil Liberties (LIBE) and Foreign Interference (INGE) committees, held an exchange of views on ‘Media freedom, protection of journalists and the fight against disinformation in the context of the war in Ukraine’. Speakers from journalists’ organisations, media professionals in exile and Commission representatives outlined their views on recent events in the light of their impacts on journalism and media freedom.

Four months since the brutal invasion of Ukraine began, Russian armed forces are deliberately targeting and killing journalists and bombing broadcasting equipment. ‘In 2022, 13 journalists in Europe alone lost their lives when on duty, 12 of them while reporting the war’, Renate Schröder from European Federation of Journalists (EFJ) told the audience. In parallel, Kremlin crackdowns mean that Russians have been left with no access to domestic sources of independent information covering the events in Ukraine. A recently-adopted law threatens anyone spreading ‘false information’ – which includes using the word ‘war’ – with up to 15 years in prison.

‘In the beginning of the war, we did not have equipment, we didn’t even find helmets; nobody was prepared for the war’, the panellists told the event. A good protective kit costs at least €1 000. With the help of UNESCO and various journalist organisations, safety equipment such as helmets and bulletproof vests, satellite phones, solar batteries and first aid kits were gathered and sent in. The most important thing, according to the experts, is to support continued journalism in Ukraine: to help local journalists so that they can keep on reporting on what is happening on the ground. ‘For this, money is needed’, said Oliver Money-Kirely from the International Press Institute (IPI): ‘The priority is to keep [the] Ukrainian media running, pay salaries, help displaced journalists’. The structure for solidarity is already in place on both the European and Ukrainian sides, he said, with bi-monthly meetings taking place. RSF has set up two Press Freedom Centres in Ukraine – in Lviv and Kyiv – to support journalists by distributing equipment, giving physical and online safety training and offering psychological support.

In the new emergency support programme for Ukraine, €15 million has been earmarked for measures to strengthen the media in Ukraine. Ukrainian journalists based in Ukraine or in the candidate countries to the EU can also benefit from support from the EU-funded Media Freedom Rapid Response project, which provides for grants of up to €5 000, and can cover needs such as medical assistance, subsistence, relocation costs and psychological support. The Journalists-in-Residence programme is already offering temporary shelter to a number of journalists in Leipzig and Milan.

In Russia, it is essential to help the few remaining independent journalists. For the journalists who have left the country, it is important to enable them to work from abroad: they need help with equipment, with setting up digital newsrooms, and with digital security and other ways of ensuring that information can still get into Russia. The hundreds of journalists in exile from Russia are in a precarious situation, many with very short residence permits – often only for six months, depending on the country – and their credit cards blocked. Nevertheless, many of them are determined to keep working to inform the Russian public. There are plans to create a community of journalists in exile from Russia who are in need of financial and technical help, and to set up offices for international cooperation in Paris, Riga and Amsterdam.

RSF has used ‘mirror site’ technology to unblock access to Meduza, the most popular Russian independent news website. With technical assistance from hackers, ICT specialists and engineers in several European countries, RSF is able to quickly create an exact copy or ‘mirror of a censored site and place it on content delivery networks that also host many other services and therefore cannot be easily blocked.

Soon after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the EU adopted sanctions against state-owned outlets Russia Today and Sputnik. Their broadcasting in or directed at the EU is now suspended. With the recently adopted sixth package of sanctions, which comes into force on 25 June, the ban will extend to three more Russian media outlets. These are exceptional measures and target the core of the Kremlin disinformation and war propaganda machine in the EU. Some EU countries have also taken measures against additional Russian channels, which is possible under the Audiovisual Media Services Directive.

On disinformation, the Commission is in close dialogue with the signatories of the new Code of Practice on Disinformation, signed on 16 June, in order to receive weekly updates on how they are monitoring and limiting disinformation linked to the Russian invasion, for instance closing accounts and stepping up cooperation with fact-checkers. The European External Action Service’s EUvsDisinfo websites are continuing to expose disinformation – originating in pro-Kremlin media – that is spread across the EU and Eastern Partnership countries. On 21 June, the Council approved conclusions on the protection and safety of journalists and media professionals, pointing to a Council of Europe report that the number of alerts about serious threats to the safety of journalists and media freedom in Europe has almost doubled since 2016.

However, complex interactions between the media and audiences also pose challenges in the EU: a sobering report from the Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism, published in June 2022, shows that a significant portion of the European population does not trust the media. There are big differences between countries: whereas in Finland, overall trust in traditional news is 69 %; in Germany, the figure is 50 %, in Poland 42 %, in Spain 32 % and in France only 29 %. Worryingly, a growing proportion of Europeans are avoiding the news altogether, for various reasons. In Denmark, 20 % of the people asked said they actively avoided the news, while in Sweden this was the case for 32 % of respondents, and in Romania 40 %. According to the report, selective news avoidance has also increased – most likely as a result of the difficult and depressing nature of the coverage.

Written by Carmen-Cristina Cîrlig with Romy Louisa Boden (1st edition).

The European Commission proposed a revision of Directive 2008/99/EC on the protection of the environment through criminal law in December 2021. The proposal intends to clarify some of the terms contained in the directive and includes an updated list of environmental crime offences, harmonised sanction types and levels, measures to strengthen international investigation and prosecution, improvements to the collection of statistical data and measures to improve national enforcement chains. Ultimately, the revision aims to increase the effectiveness of investigation and prosecution of environmental criminal offences across the European Union. Parliament’s Legal Affairs (JURI) Committee is the committee responsible for drawing up the draft report on the proposal.

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• June 2022: Revision of Directive 2008/99/EC: Protection of the environment through criminal law (1st edition)

Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of the environment through criminal law and replacing Directive 2008/99/EC Committee responsible:Legal Affairs (JURI)COM(2021) 851
15.12.2021Rapporteur:Antonius Manders (EPP, Netherlands)2021/0422(COD)Ordinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Publication of draft report

Written by Ralf Drachenberg.

A series of sensitive topics feature on the agenda of the last regular European Council meeting before the summer break, taking place on 23-24 June. Considering the magnitude of the issues at stake, this European Council meeting – if successful – could become a milestone summit. Notably, EU leaders are expected to consider granting candidate country status to Ukraine and Moldova, most probably with certain specific conditions, to reaffirm the Western Balkans’ European perspective, and to consider the proposal put forward by the President of France, Emmanuel Macron, to create a European Political Community. They will also discuss developments in and support for Ukraine following Russia’s military aggression, as well as the broader consequences of the war, including food security. As at past meetings since the outbreak of the war, the President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, may once again address the European Council. EU leaders could also consider the situation in the eastern Mediterranean, a topic they last discussed at the request of the President of Cyprus, Nikos Anastasiades, at the special European Council meeting of 30-31 May 2022. To what extent EU leaders will discuss the follow-up to the Conference on the Future of Europe remains uncertain.

1. European Council agenda points

Charles Michel is expected to use the opportunity of the 23-24 June European Council to update the indicative Leaders’ Agenda, setting a timetable for key issues to be discussed by the EU Heads of State or Government at upcoming meetings. The latest version expired in March 2022.

Following the opening address by the President of the Parliament, Roberta Metsola, the President of France, Emmanuel Macron, as leader of the country holding the six-month rotating presidency of the Council of Ministers, is expected to provide an overview of progress made in implementing previous European Council conclusions. An outstanding task for the European Council is the adoption of the new ‘strategic guidelines for legislative and operational planning’ within the area of freedom, security and justice, which were expected to be updated in the spring of 2020. More than two years later, and despite more than 20 European Council meetings in the meantime, EU leaders have yet to comply with this Treaty obligation (Article 68 TEU).

2. European Council meeting Wider Europe

As confirmed in the invitation letter from the President of the European Council, Charles Michel, EU leaders will ‘hold a strategic discussion on the European Union’s relations with its partners in Europe’ and consider the recent initiative by President Macron aimed at creating a European Political Community (EPC). In a non-paper circulated ahead of the meeting, France has outlined its vision of the EPC, which would be a body for political cooperation with democratic, non-EU European partners, including countries in the Western Balkans and the Eastern Partnership, as well as other like-minded partners. It would not substitute for the enlargement process, but instead could contribute to the ‘security, stability and prosperity of our continent’. President Michel has supported the initiative, underlining that the EPC’s aim is ‘not to replace the EU accession process’, but to grant ‘immediate political integration’ and facilitate regular political dialogue. The initiative initially drew criticism from Ukraine, which perceived it as an attempt to sidestep its EU membership application. During a visit to Kyiv on 16 June, the leaders of France, Emmanuel Macron, of Germany, Olaf Scholz, of Italy, Mario Draghi, and of Romania, Klaus Iohannis, expressed their support for granting ‘immediate’ candidate status to Ukraine. With this visit, they addressed Ukraine’s concerns, while paving the way to a more consensual debate on the EPC at the forthcoming European Council meeting.

Ukraine

EU leaders will discuss, for the fifth time since the start of the war, Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine. They will most probably call again on Russia to withdraw from Ukraine, reaffirm Ukraine’s legitimate right to defend itself, and condemn Russia’s war crimes as well as its breaching of international law and international humanitarian law. They might also reiterate their earlier call for the return of Ukrainians deported to Russia. In a recent resolution, the Lithuanian Parliament pointed to the 200 000 children ‘exiled’ to Russia, stressing the breach of international law and calling on ‘the UN and the EU to use the principle of universal jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute those involved in supervising the deportation of Ukrainians’.

Sanctions have been a recurrent topic on the European Council’s agenda since the outbreak of the war, with EU leaders green-lighting six packages so far. At the previous special European Council meeting on 30-31 May 2022, several EU leaders, including the Prime Minister of Estonia, Kaja Kallas, called on EU leaders to go beyond the current set of sanctions. A seventh package of sanctions was brought up for discussion by Poland during the Foreign Affairs Council on 20 June. EU leaders could also discuss sanctions at their meeting, and recall the importance of implementing them in close cooperation with like-minded partners.

EU leaders could discuss humanitarian aid, as well as further civilian and military assistance. The amount of military assistance agreed since the beginning of the war under the European Peace Facility (EPF) amounts to €2 billion, representing over a third of the envelope agreed for the EPF for the 2021-2027 period.  

Food security has become a recurrent item on the European Council agenda since the Versailles summit of 10-11 March 2022, being considered either as a stand-alone point or as part of the debate on the situation in Ukraine. Russia has been attacking silos, blocking Ukraine’s ability to export grain by sea, and even resorting to grain theft. To avoid shortages and a global food crisis, sustained efforts are being made to export Ukrainian grain, mainly through Romania and Poland, despite ‘bottlenecks’. Addressing the UN Security Council, President Michel stressed that ‘Russia is solely responsible for this food crisis’ and for ‘preventing Ukraine from planting and harvesting’. Turkey has shown readiness ‘to host a four-way meeting with the United Nations, Russia and Ukraine to organise the export of grain through the Black Sea’. At the Foreign Affairs Council on 20 June, the High Representative/Vice-President of the European Commission, Josep Borrell, spoke of the growing risk of famine in Africa as a direct consequence of Russia’s war on Ukraine. He underlined the EU’s support for ‘UN efforts to de-block the exports from Ukraine’, stressing once again that the food crisis is not the result of EU sanctions.

EU Membership applications of Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia

The European Council is expected to consider whether to grant candidate status to Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. In its opinion presented on 17 June 2022, the European Commission recommended candidate status for Ukraine and Moldova, while stressing that Georgia ‘must first meet certain conditions before receiving candidate status’. For Ukraine and Moldova, the European Commission stressed that candidate status is granted on the assumption that the two countries stay the course on reforms, accelerate judicial reform efforts, continue and deliver on ‘the commitment to fight corruption’, and strengthen efforts to eliminate the oligarchs’ ‘influence of vested interests in economic, political, and public life’. Prior to being granted candidate status, Georgia would have, inter alia, to ‘adopt and implement a transparent and effective judicial reform strategy’ and work towards free and independent media.

It remains to be seen to what extent the European Council will follow the European Commission’s opinion, what specific conditions would be put in place, and for which countries, if not for all. The debate might be less heated than initially expected, following the positive outcome of the four leaders’ visit to Kyiv as well as the readiness of several Member States, including the Netherlands and Denmark, to support granting Ukraine candidate country status. If granted candidate country status, the three countries could access funds under the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance

Western Balkans

Following the EU–Western Balkans leaders’ meeting, which precedes the European Council on the morning of 23 June, EU leaders are likely to discuss the outcome of the meeting and reaffirm the region’s ‘unequivocal EU membership’ perspective. In this context, EU leaders might recall the principles and methodology governing the enlargement process, and call on countries from the region to work towards solving their outstanding disputes. The Western Balkans are a key priority for the EU, which is aware of the fragile regional situation and of Russia’s disinformation there. Visiting the region, President Michel stressed that the Western Balkans are a ‘strategic priority’ for the EU, that the EU–Western Balkans leaders’ meetings will help to strengthen ‘political cooperation and coordination’, and that ‘launching accession negotiations with both North Macedonia and Albania as soon as possible is a top priority’ for the Union.

Conference on the Future of Europe

EU leaders are supposed to discuss the follow-up to the Conference on the Future of Europe (CoFoE), and examine whether their views align with the CoFoE proposals. EPRS research (see ‘The Conference on the Future of Europe and the European Council‘) has shown that there is significant convergence between the results of the CoFoE and the priorities of the European Council as expressed in its strategic agenda for 2019-2024 and in its conclusions over the last three years.

Although the French Minister for European Affairs, Clément Beaune, representing the rotating Council Presidency, expressed his hope of prioritising the follow-up of the CoFoE at this European Council meeting, it is currently not certain whether an extensive discussion will take place on this topic.

The European Parliament has clearly signalled its preferences as to how to follow up on the results of the CoFoE. On 9 June, it adopted a resolution in which it argued that the Treaties need to be amended to make the EU better prepared for future crises, and called for a Convention to be convened for that purpose.

While Parliament’s position is clear, a joint Council position still needs to be established, with initial discussions at the General Affairs Council meeting of 21 June not progressing to that stage. Currently, Member States hold different positions. While 13 Member States have expressed their opposition to Treaty change, six other Member States have indicated that they ‘remain in principle open to necessary Treaty changes that are jointly defined’, emphasising the need for ‘an inter-institutional process to coordinate consensus-building in the Council, European Parliament and the Commission’.

EU leaders, such as French President Emmanuel Macron, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, Italian Prime Minister Mario Draghi and Irish Taoiseach (Prime Minister) Micheál Martin – the latter two in their speeches as part of Parliament’s ‘This is Europe’ series of debates – have already expressed their support for Treaty change, if necessary. Consequently, it is still open whether EU Heads of States or Government will solely reiterate that ‘an effective follow-up to this report is to be ensured by the institutions, each within their own sphere of competences and in accordance with the Treaties’, or if they will go further.

On 17 June, Vice-Presidents of the European Commission Dubravka Šuica, Věra Jourova and Maroš Šefcovic presented the Commission’s communication on the Conference on the Future of Europe. The Commission’s position is that the follow-up is a shared responsibility of the EU institutions, according to their institutional remit and in respect of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality.

To follow up on the proposals of the CoFoE, the Commission sets out four categories of responses: i) existing initiatives that address the proposals; ii) those which the European Parliament and the Council are called upon to adopt; iii) planned actions which will deliver on the ideas, building in new reflections from the Conference; and iv) new initiatives or areas of work inspired by the proposals, falling within the remit of the Commission. To keep citizens informed and to keep up the momentum, a Conference feedback event will be organised in autumn 2022.

Considering the proposal to hold a Convention, the Commission stressed that it ‘stands ready to fully play its institutional role in the procedure set out in Article 48 of the Treaty on European Union, and in particular to give its opinion in response to a consultation by the European Council’.

Economic issues

EU Heads of State or Government are expected to endorse the 2022 country-specific recommendations (CSR), which set the goals for Member States’ fiscal and economic policies, outlining necessary structural reforms, thus concluding the policy-guidance phase of the European Semester.

EU leaders will welcome the fulfilment by Croatia of all the convergence criteria as set out in the Treaty and endorse the European Commission’s positive recommendation on Croatia joining the euro area on 1 January 2023. The Eurogroup has already endorsed the Commission’s recommendation, on 17 June 2022, and the European Council will most likely call on the Council to adopt swiftly the relevant Commission proposals.

3. Euro Summit

On 24 June, EU leaders will convene for a Euro Summit meeting in inclusive format, in order to review progress on completing banking union and the capital markets union. As the March 2022 Euro Summit meeting was cancelled due to lack of time, EU Heads of State or Government will discuss these issues together for the first time since December 2021.

EU leaders will consider the results of the meeting of the Eurogroup on 16 June, which saw progress on banking union but failed to agree on the Commission’s 2015 proposal for a European deposit insurance scheme (EDIS). EU leaders will most likely reiterate the need for further progress to be made in these areas.

Read this briefing on ‘Outlook for the meetings of EU leaders on 23-24 June 2022‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Suzana Anghel.

On 23 June 2022, for the first time since the start of Russia’s war on Ukraine, the Heads of State or Government of the EU and of the six Western Balkan countries will meet for a leaders’ meeting in Brussels. The discussion will focus on enlargement, energy, security and defence, and youth. Discussion of Emmanuel Macron’s ‘European Political Community’ proposal is not on the agenda, but it could come up during the debate.

Background

On 18 May 2022, the President of the European Council, Charles Michel, announced the holding of a meeting of EU and Western Balkan leaders, with the aim of promoting ‘enhanced EU–Western Balkans engagement’. The meeting, to be organised in cooperation with the current French Presidency of the Council of the European Union, will focus on enlargement, energy, security and defence, and youth. It will take place in Brussels, on the morning preceding the European Council meeting of 23-24 June 2022. Back in December 2021, when presenting the priorities of the French Presidency of the Council, French President Emmanuel Macron indicated that a conference on the Western Balkans would be organised in June 2022. He also stressed that the Western Balkans were at the ‘heart of Europe’. He pointed to the then already tense regional situation, underlined the Union’s responsibility – urging it to re-engage with and invest in the Western Balkans – and called for support in countering disinformation. The President of the European Parliament, Roberta Metsola, may also attend the leaders’ meeting.

International and regional context

Russia’s war on Ukraine has reshaped Europe’s security architecture. Analysts warn of possible ‘aftershocks in the Balkans’, stressing that more must be done to counter disinformation originating in Russia, and to boost ‘energy diversification and infrastructure’, so as to reduce the region’s dependence on Russia and China. The five Western Balkan countries that are members of the United Nations – Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia – voted in favour of the United Nations General Assembly resolution condemning Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. Unity in condemning the aggression did not, however, translate into unity in setting up and implementing sanctions on Russia. Only Albania, Kosovo*, Montenegro and North Macedonia have so far joined the EU in imposing sanctions on Russia. The three countries in the region that are members of NATO – Albania, North Macedonia and Montenegro – have provided Ukraine with military equipment and assistance. In contrast, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia have refused to impose sanctions on Russia, with Serbia even prolonging its gas contract, although they have maintained EU accession as a priority for their countries.

The meeting format and venue

The EU leaders and the leaders of the six Western Balkan countries will meet in Brussels for a leaders’ meeting as opposed to a regular EU–Western Balkans summit. The main difference between the two types of meeting lies in the role played by the rotating Presidency of the Council of the EU. At past EU–Western Balkans summits, the rotating Bulgarian, Croat and Slovenian Presidencies played central roles in preparing the meetings, considering it the pinnacle of their respective presidencies. The forthcoming EU–Western Balkans leaders’ meeting takes place during the French Presidency of the Council, but does not represent its core event, which was the Versailles Summit of 10-11 March 2022. The choice of venue – Brussels – is yet another confirmation of the less prominent role of the rotating presidency in the meeting; thus, Charles Michel and his team will have the upper hand in managing the proceedings.

The main agenda points

The topics on the agenda – energy, security and defence, and youth – are not new. They belong to the key priorities discussed at past EU–Western Balkans summits and/or outlined in the declarations adopted by the EU leaders, ‘in consultation with Western Balkans leaders’, in Sofia (2018), Zagreb (2020) and Brdo (2021).

Energy is by far the most challenging topic in the context of Russia’s war on Ukraine, and high dependency on Russian fossil fuels. At Versailles, EU leaders decided to phase out the Union’s dependence on Russian fossil fuels. They reached out to the Western Balkan countries, with a call ‘to enhance connectivity with our immediate neighbourhood’ and, at subsequent meetings, agreed on a voluntary joint procurement mechanism for gas, liquefied natural gas and hydrogen, open to the region. On security and defence, cooperation is multifaceted, covering areas ranging from Western Balkan countries contributions to EU missions and operations, to security sector reform and intelligence cooperation. With respect to youth, leaders may take stock of progress made in the implementation of the ‘innovation agenda for the Western Balkans’ launched in Brdo. Youth policies are key to stabilising the region and reversing existing trends that make the Western Balkans a ‘net emigration’ region.

State of play on enlargement

Progress is lacking on enlargement, despite the revised methodology from 2020, which allows countries to ‘phase in’ to EU programmes. Montenegro and Serbia are the frontrunners, although the pace remains rather slow. Furthermore, Serbia’s proximity to Russia and reluctance to advance in resolving its dispute with Kosovo could result in an even slower pace. Solving neighbourly disputes remains one of the main criteria for EU accession. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz has underlined that, ‘when a brutal war is being waged in our immediate neighbourhood, it is of central importance that both countries (Serbia and Kosovo) gradually resolve their conflict’. Two other countries – Albania and North Macedonia – are waiting for accession negotiations to begin. Despite several calls, including from Germany, to solve the outstanding  dispute, Bulgaria is still blocking the opening of accession negotiations with North Macedonia; with an indirect impact on Albania. The remaining two countries – Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo – are lagging behind owing to the absence of reforms and, in the case of the former, political instability, which a newly brokered political agreement could, if implemented in full, help overcome.

Past declarations were rather similar in content and messages – focusing inter alia on counter-terrorism cooperation, illegal migration and the European perspective of the Western Balkans – and were frequently addressed by the European Council in connection with the region. The word ‘enlargement’ appears only in the Brdo Declaration, where EU leaders underlined that ‘fair and rigorous conditionality and the principle of own merits’ should apply, inviting countries from the region to stay on course with their reforms. In a direct attempt to counter mounting disinformation, the Brdo Declaration stated that the EU is ‘the region’s closest partner, main investor and principal donor’.

European political community initiative

On 9 May 2022, President Macron invited the EU and like-minded non-EU countries in Europe to consider forming a ‘European political community‘ (EPC), to ‘complement’ but not substitute for the enlargement process. The proposal is expected to be debated during the forthcoming European Council meeting under the agenda point ‘wider Europe’. The EPC proposal has raised criticism from Ukraine, which initially saw it as an attempt to sideline its application for EU membership. The proposal has received mixed reactions in countries in the Western Balkans, with some, including North Macedonia, viewing it as ‘an excellent opportunity to unite countries that failed or did not want to join the bloc at a given moment, given the new geopolitical situation’. Touring the region ahead of the EU–Western Balkans leaders’ meeting, Charles Michel stressed that the aim was ‘not to replace the EU accession process’ but to grant ‘immediate political integration’ and allow regular political dialogue among leaders’, and hence stimulate progress on EU integration and accession.

European Parliament position

In an exceptional development, Parliament’s political group leaders adopted a joint statement ahead of the 23-24 June European Council meeting, expressing support for the Western Balkans on their EU integration path, and calling on the EU leaders to ‘maintain’ the Union’s ‘long-standing commitment’ to the region.

Read this at a glance note on ‘EU – Western Balkans leaders’ meeting of 23 June 2022‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Jakub Przetacznik with Simona Tarpova.

Russia launched its war on Ukraine on 24 February 2022, but Russian cyber-attacks against Ukraine have persisted ever since Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014, intensifying just before the 2022 invasion. Over this period, Ukraine’s public, energy, media, financial, business and non-profit sectors have suffered the most. Since 24 February, limited Russian cyber-attacks have undermined the distribution of medicines, food and relief supplies. Their impact has ranged from preventing access to basic services to data theft and disinformation, including through deep fake technology. Other malicious cyber-activity involves sending of phishing emails, distributed denial-of-service attacks, and use of data-wiper malware, backdoors, surveillance software and information stealers.

Organisations and governments around the world have not been indifferent to the hybrid risks thus posed. EU-, US- and NATO-led initiatives have been carried out with the aim of neutralising cyber-threats and protecting essential infrastructure. As part of these initiatives, the EU has activated its Cyber Rapid Response Teams (a project under Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) in the area of security and defence policy), to support Ukraine’s cyber-defence. Non-government and private players have supported Ukraine through various cyber-resilience activities. Since the beginning of the invasion, a significant number of counter-attacks have been launched by independent hackers, affecting the Russian state, security, banking and media systems.

The European Parliament has called for stepping up cybersecurity assistance to Ukraine and for making full use of the EU’s cyber-sanctions regimes against individuals, entities and bodies responsible for or involved in the various cyber-attacks targeting Ukraine.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Russia’s war on Ukraine: Timeline of cyber-attacks‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Timeline of cyber-attacks on Ukraine

Written by Tambiama Madiega with Anne Louise Van De Pol.

The artificial intelligence act envisages setting up coordinated AI ‘regulatory sandboxes’ to foster innovation in artificial intelligence (AI) across the EU. A regulatory sandbox is a tool allowing businesses to explore and experiment with new and innovative products, services or businesses under a regulator’s supervision. It provides innovators with incentives to test their innovations in a controlled environment, allows regulators to better understand the technology, and fosters consumer choice in the long run. However, regulatory sandboxes also come with a risk of being misused or abused, and need the appropriate legal framework to succeed.

In April 2021, the European Commission presented a proposal for a regulation laying down harmonised rules on AI (the ‘artificial intelligence act’ or ‘AI act’). Academics and stakeholders have commented on the proposal, touching, in particular, on issues regarding the lack of liability protection for sandbox participants, the need for a more harmonised approach to AI regulatory sandboxes, and the interplay between AI sandbox and EU data protection rules.

The European Parliament has called for introducing regulatory sandbox instruments in several resolutions. Its April 2022 committee draft report on the AI act argued for more transparency on the implementation and use of AI sandboxes.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Artificial intelligence act and regulatory sandboxes‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clare Ferguson.

There is something of a global dimension to the agenda for this second session of the month, with Hakainde Hichilema, President of Zambia, due to address a formal sitting on Thursday. Members will, the previous day, debate the preparation of the 23‑24 June 2022 European Council meeting, which will be preceded by the 23 June meeting between EU and Western Balkans leaders. They will also debate Council and Commission statements on EU candidate status for Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. This follows the Commission’s recommendation last Friday to grant candidate status to the first two, and – following a number of priorities being addressed – subsequently to Georgia too. The question of candidate status will also be on the agenda of the European Council this week. As regards existing candidate countries, on Wednesday evening, Members are set to debate the  Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) report on the Commission’s 2021 report on Montenegro’s EU accession negotiations. Despite recent political upheaval in the country, Parliament is keen to promote stability in its neighbourhood through the accession process. However, while the AFET report welcomes the new government, it also points out that Montenegro must continue to ensure a functioning parliamentary democracy and the necessary EU-related reforms. Any new candidates for EU membership will have to reach the same democratic and economic standards. A debate is also scheduled on Wednesday evening on a Budget Committee report on an amending budget to provide EU funding to finance the continued cost of welcoming refugees from Ukraine. The latest ‘This is Europe’ debate will take place on Wednesday afternoon, with a familiar face to Parliament – the Prime Minister of Croatia, Andrej Plenković.

Looking further afield on Wednesday, Parliament is expected to consider a Committee on International Trade (INTA) report that considers how to foster ethical and sustainable trade relations with African countries, in the light of the fast-changing global trade situation. The report calls for EU assistance to integrate the continent into the global economy through robust EU-Africa trade relations, as well as to help African countries to counter the effects of Covid‑19 and the war on Ukraine. The report considers that a full commitment to the EU-AU ‘Joint Vision for 2030’ is key to achieving the UN Sustainable Development Goals – the implementation and delivery of which are also a topic slated for debate on Wednesday evening.

Several files linked to the Russian war on Ukraine and the post-pandemic recovery also feature on the agenda. On Thursday morning, Members will turn to an urgent proposal to boost gas storage in Europe, to reduce dependency on Russian gas. Should Members endorse the provisional agreement reached between Parliament and Council, the measures should already take effect this summer. This means that EU countries should fill 85 % of their storage sites by November 2022, with fair burden-sharing ensured according to national consumption levels, and joint purchases encouraged. While broadly in agreement with the Commission’s proposal to prepare for severing trade with Russian suppliers, Parliament’s negotiators were successful in adding provisions to take account of national variations, such as derogations for isolated gas markets in Ireland, Malta and Cyprus.

The EU has committed to a 55 % cut in greenhouse gas emissions by 2030, and climate neutrality by 2050, with the proposals under the ‘fit for 55’ package aimed at turning this ambition into reality. Following Parliament’s rejection of the Committee on Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI) report on the Commission’s proposal to align the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) with this target during the June I plenary session, the file returns swiftly to the agenda for a vote on Wednesday afternoon. Members will consider a set of amendments re-tabled by ENVI that include the amendments that were carried by the June I plenary, as well as other compromise amendments related to the linear reduction factor, the timing for phasing out free ETS allowances, and the corresponding phase-in of the carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM). Because the ENVI report on the revision of the CBAM to place a carbon price on certain imported products and phase out free emissions allowances for European industry is tightly linked to the ETS file, it too was referred back to committee without a vote during the June I session. The report, which proposes significant amendments to the original proposal, will therefore also return to the agenda on Wednesday afternoon. The final vote, following the vote on amendments in June I, on the Social Climate Fund, intended to help those most affected by the green transition, is also due to take place.

Parliament’s role in scrutiny and oversight is key to ensuring that measures intended to support the post-pandemic recovery benefit EU citizens. On Wednesday afternoon, a debate is planned on a Committee on Budgets and Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee joint report on implementation of the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF). This report aims at providing Parliament’s input to the July review of RRF implementation. It highlights the RRF’s key role in the EU’s economic recovery, and in making the EU more resilient, competitive and strategically autonomous. The report notes that successful implementation is key to ensuring long-term impact and economic growth in the EU, pointing to the RRF’s stabilising effects to date. Urging Member States to provide the Commission with sufficient information to ensure effective reporting, the committees also stress the importance of regular scrutiny and monitoring of RRF expenditure and compliance with the rule of law, where the report warns that reimbursement should be possible in case of non-compliance. Taking stock of EU countries’ use of the funding available to date, the report also highlights the RRF’s potential to boost EU prosperity and urges Member States to take advantage of the loans available.

Finally, a Legal Affairs Committee report which recommends that the Parliament give consent to the EU’s accession to the Hague Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters will be voted on Thursday. By requiring its signatories to recognise and enforce judgments given in civil or commercial matters in other signatory countries, the convention is intended to reduce the difficulties experienced in making legal claims by businesses who trade across borders, and particularly for EU citizens and companies doing business in the USA.

Written by Katrien Luyten with Alessia Rossi.

In 1987, the United Nations General Assembly decided that every year 26 June should mark International Day against Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking. The idea was to demonstrate its commitment to the fight against drug abuse, illicit production and trafficking, and their nefarious effects on individuals and on society as whole. The illicit drug market generates huge profits for organised crime, and is estimated to be the source of approximately one fifth of global crime proceeds.

Background

The illicit drug market has long been the largest criminal market in the EU, reaching an estimated minimum retail value of €30 billion a year. Illicit drugs are also the preferred market for organised crime groups, eager to accumulate wealth by whatever means necessary. Their use of violence has intensified in recent years as they seek to intimidate other drug suppliers identified as rivals.

Europe is globally considered an important market for drugs, both in terms of domestic production and as a transit point or trafficking destination from other countries around the world. South America, west Asia, and North Africa are major drug-trafficking corridors into Europe. Cannabis and synthetic pharmaceuticals are also produced increasingly within Europe. According to the 2022 European Drug Report issued by the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA), cannabis is the illicit drug most used in the EU (used by 78.6 million adults) – followed by cocaine (14.4 million), MDMA (10.6 million) and amphetamines (8.9 million). The same report estimates that around 83.4 million or 29 % of adults (aged 15 to 64) have used illicit drugs at least once. According to estimates provided in the report, at least 5 800 people died of an overdose involving illicit drugs in the EU in 2020, up 12 % from 2019. Although overdose deaths increased in nearly all age categories, the highest increase (82 %) was among the 50-plus age group. Opioids, mainly heroin or its metabolites, often in combination with other substances, were found in 74 % of all fatal overdoses; furthermore, of all those entering drug treatment in Europe in 2020, 28 % did so with opioids as their primary drug.

Criminal groups not only adapt their supply to society’s demand but are also flexible in adapting and capitalising on changes in the environment in which they operate, creating additional challenges for law enforcement. In this regard, innovation in drug production, trafficking methods, and the related use of anonymised services for secure communications are a fertile breeding ground for the establishment of new trafficking routes and the growth of online markets, on both the surface web and the darknet. Drug sales using social media and instant messaging apps are attractive to potential customers and may be on the increase, as these technologies are perceived as a safer, more convenient and more accessible source of supply. These new methods were refined during the Covid-19 crisis, against which this market has been extremely resilient.

According to the EMCDDA report, levels of drug availability and use increased across the EU in 2021 compared with 2020, with some variations depending on the substance and the Member State. This points to a return to the pre-pandemic drug situation. In addition, the drug market can be influenced by significant international developments. Geopolitical tensions, determining the attractiveness of a specific border region or sector for criminals, are considered an opportunity for organised crime groups. In this regard, the humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan and the war in Ukraine may also have an impact in the medium and long terms on the kinds of drug problems facing the European Union.

EU action against drug abuse and illicit trafficking

The drug market not only inflicts substantial harm on millions of people, it also infiltrates and undermines public institutions, health and safety, the environment and labour productivity. For all these reasons and many others, the EU has been active in pursuing strategic and operational measures since the 1985 Schengen Agreement and 1990 Schengen Convention. Member States have been increasingly reliant on cross-border and EU cooperation to support their law enforcement authorities on the ground and to counter transnational drug operations. The constant goal is to reduce drug supply and demand by working closely with all partners at national and international level, EU institutions, bodies and agencies, as well as civil society organisations. Justice and home affairs EU agencies, such as the EMCDDA, Europol and Eurojust, play a central role in the drugs field, in the EU and internationally.

It is worth mentioning that the Council of the EU recently adopted a general approach on the new mandate of the European Drugs Agency, which aims to transform the current EMCDDA into a fully fledged agency and to respond more effectively to the new health and safety challenges posed by illicit drugs. Once adopted by the co-legislators, the Commission proposal put forward in January 2022, will enable the Agency, amongst other things, to issue alerts for particularly dangerous substances put on the market; to set up a network of forensic and toxicological laboratories; to carry out awareness and prevention campaigns at EU level; develop research in a more systematic way on drug markets and drug supply, and also support the EU policy against drug trafficking and drug consumption at international level.

Through the EU drugs strategy, the EU coordinates evidence-based, balanced and integrated measures with EU countries, and speaks with one voice internationally. In 2020, the Council of the EU approved the EU’s 2021-2025 drugs strategy, which builds on input from the Commission communication on an EU agenda and action plan on drugs for 2021 to 2025 – adopted in July 2020 as part of the new 2020-2025 security union strategy. The strategy aims to ensure a high level of health protection, social stability and security, while also contributing to awareness-raising. Moreover, it places EU responses to organised crime and drugs problems at the centre of the EU policy agenda – also dovetailing with the applicable goals of the UN’s 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda.

Law enforcement action against drug trafficking is coordinated through EMPACT (the European Multidisciplinary Platform Against Criminal Threats). This is a security initiative, driven by EU Member States, to identify, prioritise and address threats posed by organised and serious international crime and has become a permanent instrument, as set out in the Council conclusions on the permanent continuation of the EU policy cycle for organised and serious international crime: EMPACT 2022+.

Relatively few EU legislative acts have been adopted in this area. Along with the Council implementing decisions to ban new psychoactive substances, these include:

• Directive (EU) 2017/2103 on adding new psychoactive substances to the definition of ‘drug’, amending Council Framework Decision 2004/757/JHA and repealing Council Decision 2005/387/JHA;
• Regulation (EU) 2017/2101 amending Regulation (EC) No 1920/2006 on information exchange on, and an early warning system and risk assessment procedure for, new psychoactive substances; and
• Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/1737 amending Regulation (EC) No 273/2004 and Regulation (EC) No 111/2005 as regards the inclusion of certain drug precursors in the list of scheduled substances.

European Parliament

Parliament has been very active in addressing the problem of illicit drug control across the entire EU for many years. Already back in 1986, Parliament adopted a resolution calling on the Council to address the drug problem at ‘all levels from production and supply to demand and consumption’. In its 2020 resolution on the EU security union strategy, Parliament called for increased focus on rehabilitation and prevention in the EU action plan, not least through awareness-raising campaigns dedicated especially to children and young people. Parliament once again stressed that attention should be paid to both drug production and consumption and called for the extension of the EMCDDA’s mandate to cover multiple addictions.

Read this at a glance note on ‘International Day against Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.