European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Aleksandra Heflich and Jérôme Saulnier.

According to a recent European Parliamentary Research Service Cost of Non-Europe (CONE) report, ambitious and united European Union (EU) action in climate and energy policy could be very beneficial, bringing gains of up to 5.6 % of gross domestic product (GDP), equal to €1 trillion additional GDP per year in 2050, compared to a continuation of the status quo (see Figure 1). However, failure to arrive at a common approach, in particular by collectively addressing volatile energy prices and systemic risks emerging from EU dependency on external suppliers such as Russia, could result in the EU missing out on some, or the entirety, of these potential benefits.

In this briefing we confirm that the EU has a key role to play to attenuate and eliminate the related risks and in making the transformation possible and successful. We also confirm that fragmentation driven by low ambition and muddling through, or even worst case scenarios of fragmentation, would result in relatively high negative impacts.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Towards carbon neutrality through ambitious transformation of the EU energy system‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Cost of Non-Europe (CONE) in energy: Net zero in 2050 – ambitious and united EU action vs the baseline – detailed results and stress testing of alternative scenarios Potential adverse environmental impact of fragmentation (land use, land-use change, and forestry are not included)

Written by Andrés García with Tobias Hoffmann.

A workshop organised by the European Parliament’s Panel for the Future of Science and Technology (STOA) entitled ‘The use of animals for scientific research in Europe‘ was held on 28 June 2022. The event focused on the EU action plan to end the use of animals in scientific research and testing.

The workshop aimed to open a constructive exchange of views between leading experts in related fields to discuss whether this fast track for animal protection can also become a major obstacle to scientific progress in the EU; and, if so, how to find ways to avoid this effect while ensuring the welfare of animals used in science.

STOA Chair Christian Ehler (EPP, Germany) welcomed the speakers and set up the scene regarding EU legislation. President of the European Research Council (ERC) Maria Leptin, then delivered some introductory remarks emphasising that animal suffering must be minimized ‘in research, agriculture and everywhere’. In her view, animal suffering must be always balanced against human suffering stemming from disease.

In her opening speech Laura Gribaldo from the European Union Reference Laboratory for Alternatives to Animal Testing (EURL-ECVAM, JRC), insisted on the principle of the ‘three Rs’, i.e. Replacement, Reduction and Refinement of animal use in basic, applied and translational research. She noted that this principle is also valid for regulatory purposes and already firmly anchored in EU legislation, full replacement of animal testing being the ultimate goal.

An open discussion followed, starting with statements from a panel of experts in the different areas concerned. Meritxell Huch (Max Planck Institute of Molecular Cell Biology and Genetics, Dresden) commented on the need to implement alternative methods to animal testing whenever possible, although to gain holistic understanding of processes that occur at the level of the entire organism, animal studies are required and unavoidable. Peter Loskill (Institute for Biomedical Engineering, Eberhard Karls University, Tübingen), agreed on that idea, but also empathised that, especially for academic research, physiological models based on human tissue are also needed. In his view, this could be already achieved today and help to reduce animal testing. He pointed out that often knowledge about suitable alternatives was lacking within the research community, and called for programmes to better inform researchers. Bart Haagmans (Erasmus MC, Rotterdam) then took the floor to comment on recent developments around the Covid‑19 pandemic. Here, animal testing had been necessary for the quick development and testing of vaccines and suitable medication. He emphasised that, nevertheless and of course, the 3R principle should always be followed. Karin Forsberg Nilsson from the Department of Immunology, Genetics and Pathology at Uppsala University, highlighted the importance of animal testing in neuroscience, since no suitable alternatives are available for complex tissues such as the brain. She further pointed out that no scientist makes decisions lightly on performing animal testing and that the use of animals has been reduced to a great degree in recent decades. Ana Isabel Moura Santos from the Animal Welfare Body at the NOVA Medical School in Lisbon closed this panel, expressing her view that further development of alternative methods would be the best way to reduce animal testing, rather than regulations or legal decisions.

STOA Chair Christian Ehler (EPP, Germany) then invited the audience (both in the room and online) to put questions to the speakers. Following a broad discussion on whether the scientific community is indeed doing enough to reduce animal testing in research, Mr Ehler invited the panellists and attendees to suggest policy options involving action from the Parliament.

In her concluding remarks, ERC President Maria Leptin welcomed the discussion and the fact that politicians are willing to listen to scientists and facts. She highlighted the consensus on reducing animal testing in research and reminded the audience that products used in alternatives to animal testing often require the use of animal products.

The full recording of the event is available here.

Your opinion counts for us. To let us know what you think, get in touch via stoa@europarl.europa.eu

Written by ESMH team.

4 days, 6 thematic sessions, 1 festival, 26 renowned speakers, 50 science journalists

These are just some figures from the European Science-Media Hub (ESMH) summer school on ‘Journalism and climate change: how to tell complex stories?’, which took place on 8‑11 June 2022 in Brussels. The event focused on the increasing challenge of climate reporting, offering an open forum for journalists to look at possible solutions and to continue doing quality science-based story-telling.

The ESMH summer school 2022

At last, after a couple of years of Covid‑19 related restrictions, the ESMH was once more able to organise its big annual event – the summer school for young science journalists. This year, the summer school was held in a hybrid format, to adapt to the new working conditions imposed by the pandemic.

The first day of the event provided the participants with an overview of the actions that the European Union (EU) is taking on climate, ranging from the EU Green Deal to selected climate-related projects funded under Horizon 2020. Session 1 highlighted not only the environmental policies of the EU institutions, but also the efforts undertaken to engage with Europeans and to promote public awareness of the climate crisis. Session 2 gave an insight into some concrete EU climate projects involving science journalists and communicators, and society more widely.

The morning of the second day (Session 3) dealt with climate topics in newsrooms. The participants engaged in an interesting debate with five experienced environmental reporters on the complexity of climate story-telling. Takeaways included: science journalists need to adapt to the changing media landscape, evolve along with scientific knowledge, and keep the public engaged with their stories while handling data. The additional big challenge is not to overwhelm the audience.

In the afternoon, Session 4 focused on the challenge of the misinformation trap on climate change and ways to tackle it.

Session 5 on day three of the event was dedicated to collaborative EU journalistic projects on climate change. It stressed the added value of what the EU can do for science journalists in terms of networking, liaising with institutions and expanding the range of information sources available.

Session 6 focused on constructive journalism and on the importance of giving positive messages about climate change to the public, so that people feel they can play an active role in solving environmental issues.

The day closed with some final remarks from Panel for the Future of Science and Technology (STOA) Chair Christian Ehler (EPP, Germany), who underlined once again the European Parliament’s engagement on the climate challenge. He also emphasised the importance of EU institutions working with the media, especially on complex topics such as climate change and academic freedom.

During the afternoon and the following day, the summer school participants attended a short presentation of the New European Bauhaus project before joining the Festival of the New European Bauhaus, organised by the European Commission.

Past and future editions of the ESMH summer school

The ESMH summer school is an annual event – the first of this kind in the European Parliament – organised with the aim of offering a learning opportunity to young media makers from EU Member States.One of the main objectives of the ESMH is to organise seminars and events for media representatives on current scientific and technological developments.

The first edition of the ESMH summer school for young journalists – labelled ‘European Youth Science-Media Days (EYSMD)’ – took place from 4 to 7 June 2019 in Strasbourg. The three-day science event for young media makers was organised with the cooperation of the European Youth Press network (EYP) and provided an overview of existing interlinks between artificial intelligence (AI) and journalism.

Unfortunately, the pandemic prevented the ESMH from organising the second edition in May 2020. However, in October 2021, ESMH participated in the EYE2021 youth conference in Strasbourg and hostedthe ‘Telling stories on climate change: has the corona crisis changed the debate’ workshop(with in-person attendance) in cooperation with the European Parliament’s Directorate-General for Communication and in the context of the two-day European Generation Media Lab event. The ESMH team is already getting very positive feedback on this year’s event, both from speakers and participants. Good suggestions for new topics and further enhancements will be taken on board when organising the next edition of the summer school, possibly in 2023.

Written Maria Diaz Crego (1st edition).

Political advertising is central to influencing how people vote, and may affect citizens’ perceptions of the legitimacy of their own political system, particularly when published in the run-up to elections. Rules governing political advertising are therefore key to guaranteeing citizens’ fundamental rights and the integrity of democratic processes. So, it is not without reason that regulating political propaganda during electoral periods is one of the common focal points of electoral law. However, traditional rules on campaigning may either be ineffective or difficult to enforce in an online environment where new techniques are used to target potential voters with tailored political messages based on large amounts of personal data revealing their sensibilities and vulnerabilities.

To address the new challenges posed by online electoral campaigns, the European Commission presented a proposal that aims to build a harmonised set of rules on transparency and targeting of political advertising, and would apply to both online and offline political advertisements. The proposal is currently under discussion by the European Parliament and the Council through the ordinary legislative procedure. In the Parliament, the Committee on Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO) is responsible for the file. The rapporteur presented his draft report to the committee on 16 June 2022.

Versions

• July 2022: Towards new rules on transparency and targeting of political advertising (1st edition)

Proposal for a regulation of the European parliament and of the Council on the transparency and targeting of political advertising Committee responsible:Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO)COM(2021) 731l
25.11.2021Rapporteur:Sandro Gozi (Renew, France)2021/0381(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Pablo Arias Echeverría (EPP, Spain)
Maria-Manuel Leitão-Marques (S&D, Portugal)
Alexandra Geese (Greens, Germany)
Virginie Joron (ID, France)
Adam Bielan (ECR, Poland)
Stelios Kouloglou (The Left, Greece)Ordinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Committee vote on the draft report

Written by Kjeld van Wieringen with Marcos Fernández Álvarez.

Critical raw materials are essential to sustain Europe’s economic and environmental ambitions. As geoeconomic aggression and geopolitical tensions rise, the EU is re-thinking its reliance on certain imports. Can the EU secure its supply of critical materials?

For many Europeans, 2020 was a year of reckoning. When Covid-19 emerged in China, global supply chains were immediately affected in a negative way. When governments and businesses raced to buy medical equipment, they faced skyrocketing demand and market shortages. Many states imposed export restrictions, and shortages lasted for months. Now, in 2022, supply chain disruptions are still affecting the EU, and threatening to impede its economic recovery.

Against this backdrop, the EU is re-examining its strategic supply chains. The late 20th century was marked by the globalisation of trade. In a quest for ever greater efficiency, supply chains became highly complex and globally interdependent. Now Covid-19 and rising geopolitical tensions have cast doubt on this model. Efficiency is giving way to resilience.

Critical raw materials (CRMs) – such as lithium, cobalt, and rare earth elements (REEs) – are essential commodities for the EU economy. They are also key enablers of Europe’s digital, environmental, and defence ambitions. China currently produces 86 % of the world’s rare earth supply. The EU imports 93 % of its magnesium from China, 98 % of its borate from Turkey, and 85 % of its niobium from Brazil. Russia produces 40 % of the world’s palladium. The latter is a reminder of the strategic implications of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and the need for the EU to prepare for an increasingly uncertain world.

Potential impacts and developments

CRMs combine economic importance with high supply risk. Lithium is a case in point. It is used, for examples, in batteries, which are crucial to the EU’s digital and green transitions towards e‑mobility and clean energies. EU demand for lithium could grow up to 18 times by 2030, and 60 times by 2050, but the EU mines only a small fraction of the lithium it consumes, and relies on China to process it.

REEs head the list of critical materials: a group of 17 chemical elements widely used in high technology and low-carbon products. Neodymium and praseodymium are used in permanent magnets for power generation and electric motors. Lanthanum is needed in military equipment. The average smartphone uses up to 16 REEs. Although REEs are abundant in nature, they are so dispersed that their exploitation is only profitable in few places: China dominates the world’s supply with a 60 % global market share.

The EU is particularly vulnerable to REEs supply squeezes. This is partly due to market forces: demand for neodymium and dysprosium will largely exceed production by 2030. However, the main risk stems from China’s dominance of the market. In 2010, China imposed a two-month embargo on rare-earth exports to Japan, after Japan captured a Chinese fishing boat in waters claimed by both countries. As China becomes more assertive, such actions could become common. Also in 2010, China imposed export quotas reducing exports by 40 % with the declared objective of clamping down on illegal mining and environmentally damaging practices. The WTO later deemed these quotas illegal. In the short term, the quotas caused the cost of some REEs to skyrocket by 1 000 %. Shortly after, a combination of alternative supply, governance response, and illegal trading brought prices down again.

There are other concerns. Cobalt is crucial for batteries, wind generators, and digital technologies. The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) accounts for over 70 % of the global supply and China in turn owns 70 % of Congo’s mining industry. Political instability and poor governance in the DRC pose significant risks of supply disruptions. Worse still, the boom in demand is fuelling the growth of ‘artisanal mining‘: a dangerous, arduous practice that increasingly uses child labour, including by armed groups. Despite efforts by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and the EU to promote due diligence, this ‘resource curse‘ could leave the Congolese people even worse off.

Anticipatory policy-making

To support effective decision making, the EU must continue to monitor both the market and geopolitical developments. There is a long history of exaggerated fears about access to CRMs. However, supply shortages are highly damaging for economies, no Western country wants to repeat the 1973 oil crisis.

The EU could promote the recycling or substitution of CRMs. Recycling reduces waste and lessens the environmental impacts of mining. To boost recycling, the EU could tighten its regulations, promote ‘circular by design’ manufacturing, and fund research and development. CRMs can often only be substituted by other CRMs, but product for product substitution is sometimes an option. For example, hydrogen propulsion requires fewer CRMs than electric (lithium) batteries. Currently, the EU lacks an economy-wide substitution strategy. This could be articulated through the new European Raw Materials Alliance, the European Investment Bank (EIB), and the European Research Council.

For all that, the EU will still rely on mining to meet its needs. Certain CRMs can be mined in the EU, and some EU neighbours hold significant CRM deposits. The EU could support mining and processing sites in its territory through EIB investment and subsidies. This would mirror the US, which is supporting the reopening of its REEs mine at Mountain Pass (California). Yet the Mountain Pass case shows these exploitations are rarely competitive against foreign firms, and the EU could pay dearly for reducing its CRM dependency. Paradoxically, CRMs are needed for the green transition, but mining and processing them is notoriously polluting. However, effective restoration can greatly reduce damage to the local environment and tilt the balance in favour of reshoring mining. The EU has much tighter environmental regulations than other states, and importing large amounts of CRMs only externalises the environmental impact.

The EU must itself define the extent of its ‘open strategic autonomy‘ ambitions. Complete self-sufficiency, comparable to the post-war agricultural objectives may sound appealing in the light of Europe’s history of reliance on oil and gas imports. However, this would be highly expensive and not all CRMs are present on EU soil. Rather, the EU could combine partial CRM reshoring with diversification and risk management. Following the 2010 crisis, Japan pursued ambitious partnerships and investments in third countries, and is now much less reliant on China for REEs. The US is still at 80 % dependency, while the EU continues to import an unmatched 98 % of its rare earths from China. As many of the EU’s closest allies, including the UK, share its concerns regarding CRMs, the EU could follow Japan’s example and start diversifying its supply chains.

The EU may also opt to invest in environmentally sustainable and socially responsible rare earth mining projects in Africa and elsewhere, as part of its new Global Gateway strategy. At the same time, the EU could gain international leverage by reinforcing its strengths – rather than focusing on sectors where it is non-competitive. This could also help defuse geopolitical tension; in the words of Montesquieu: ‘The natural effect of trade is to bring about peace’. The Russian invasion of Ukraine has brought this paradigm into question. When the EU and its partners responded to Russian aggression with unprecedented sanctions, the rouble plunged, foreign-listed stocks of Russian companies plummeted, and the Russian economy was put on a path towards deep recession. In a world where direct military action could lead to nuclear confrontation, economic leverage and deterrence including in the field of CRMs, will still be a crucial instrument of foreign and security policy. Here, the EU’s new economic reciprocity toolbox, including the upcoming anti-coercion instrument, could soon come into play.

Read this at a glance on ‘Securing the EU’s supply of critical raw materials‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Kjeld van Wieringen with Julia Hüntemann.

In 2022, most global renewable power growth will consist of photovoltaic (PV) solar energy. In its 2021 industrial strategy, the European Commission acknowledged the need for a more strategic approach to renewable energies. As Member States seek to diversify away from Russian fossil fuels following the invasion of Ukraine, they should avoid exacerbating dependencies on solar panels manufactured in China.

Europe’s solar dependency on China

By 2008, China emerged as the dominant producer of solar PV panels. By 2012, it accounted for 64 % of worldwide production and, as of 2017, eight of the top 10 solar manufacturers were Chinese, supplying approximately three quarters of global solar PV panels. What enabled this unprecedented surge, at least to some extent, was a 75 % decline in production costs among China’s PV manufacturers. The swift price decrease, prompted by cost reductions in combination with alleged state subsidies, allowed Chinese PV manufacturers to outcompete their European and North American counterparts, driving them into bankruptcy. In addition, China has come to dominate the supply of polysilicon, mostly sourced in Xinjiang, which is a critical building block of silicon-based PV panels, with a global production share of 66 % in 2019.

However, China has not always dominated the solar PV supply chain, and Europe had been the frontrunner in the ‘solar revolution’. In 2007, 30 % of PV manufacturing was still located in Europe. In an attempt to protect the industry, the European Commission, in 2013, proposed a phased anti-dumping tariff on solar PV panels imported from China. In a nine-month investigation launched in September 2012, the Commission found that Chinese companies were selling solar panels to Europe at nearly half their normal market value and were receiving illegal subsidies. Proposing duties up to 64.9 %, the Commission’s anti-dumping and anti-subsidy investigation was valued at more than €20 billion and became the largest EU-China trade dispute so far. The measures were aborted following Chinese threats to retaliate with tariffs on French wine and German cars.

Currently, Europe holds less than 0.2 % of global PV panel production capacities. The upcoming anti-coercion instrument will seek to better shield EU policy mechanisms from such external pressure, and could help avoid the undermining of protection measures against unfair foreign industrial practices in the future.

Europe’s solar conundrum

In Europe and elsewhere, solar installation companies have over time come to rely on cheap equipment imported from China, and other Asian countries, including South-Korea Malaysia and Vietnam. Without such cheap equipment, solar PV installations – and therefore the implementation of green transition plans – could not advance at the pace they have. However, the Covid-19 crisis has shown that the EU is vulnerable to disruptions of international value chains. The war in Ukraine is another harsh reminder that energy and geopolitics are inseparable. A decade after the EU failed to protect its solar manufacturing industry from Chinese dumping and subsidies, global dependence on Chinese solar equipment has belatedly become a cause for concern.

A larger European PV manufacturing industry has the potential to provide lucrative employment and advance technological leadership. More importantly, in-house PV manufacturing would make the solar sector a source of energy security, allowing the EU to cut the unwanted dependencies that accompany imported oil and gas, particularly from Russia in the face of the ongoing aggression against Ukraine. With Europe importing 80 % of its solar panels from China, dependencies would merely shift from imported oil or gas to imported solar equipment, leaving much to be desired when it comes to the solar sector as a genuine source of energy security and strategic autonomy.

A letter signed by ministers from Austria, Estonia, Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Poland and Spain called on the European Commission to consider solar PV to be a strategic value chain and provide it with more support under Covid‑19 recovery packages. On the same basis, various stakeholders have urged the EU to reinforce European solar energy capacities. In May 2020, 90 organisations from the European solar sector also urged for solar PV manufacturing and research and development (R&D) to be at the core of the Green Deal. As part of the REPowerEU initiative, the Commission proposed a solar strategy that doubles solar PV capacity by 2025 and installs 600 gigawatts by 2030. Coupled with a proposed solar rooftop initiative – a legal obligation to install solar panels on all new public and commercial buildings after 2025 and residential buildings after 2029 – the demand for solar panels will inevitably shoot up.

With pleas to re-shore PV manufacturing capacities to Europe, the question remains how the Commission will go about providing its domestic manufacturers with a competitive business environment without igniting another round of solar trade disputes. This will require the navigation of domestic and international pressures and finding the right balance between the green transition and reinforcing Europe’s supply chain and energy security. Moreover, with energy prices rising steeply, the affordability of solar energy from European manufacturers is an additional challenge for the EU’s energy policy. The US’s pending decision on solar-energy tariffs that pits its goal of combating climate change against its ambition to wrestle high tech manufacturing supply chains from China vividly illustrates this dilemma. As in the US, how to promote EU- manufactured solar panels while keeping the green transition affordable is a real conundrum.

Increasing the EU’s capacity to act on solar energy

The Parliament and Commission could mitigate Europe’s solar dependence on China in the following ways:

1. Monitoring the supply chain: The new industrial strategy for Europe, adopted in March 2020, and updated again in 2021, announced the creation of an Industrial Forum, which supports the Commission in its analysis of industrial ecosystems and their capacity in supporting the twin digital and green transitions. Task Force 3 focuses on analysing strategic dependencies, and the Parliamentary committees responsible for industry (ITRE) and international trade (INTA) could invite them to present in-depth results. Their work could help in identifying energy partnerships with countries that share compatible production capabilities and quality standards; the US, Taiwan, Malaysia, India and Japan provide cases worth examining. Parliament legislators could support the announcement by the Commission of a legislative proposal (as part of REPowerEU) that intensifies work on the supply of raw materials critical to the production of solar panels.

2. Steer strategic discussions on the trade-off between strategic autonomy and the Green Deal: Regular exchanges of views could be held between the Parliament and relevant Commissioners to discuss the trade-off between ensuring a more autonomous supply of renewable energy technologies and the Green Deal‘s dependence on cheap solar equipment imported from China and silicon inputs from Xinjiang. The Commission would ideally take a clear stance in this trade-off, to avoid creating unclear signals for investors.

3. Encourage access to international investors and R&D institutes: At European level, PV manufacturing companies have already joined forces with Europe’s leading R&D institutes to develop state-of-the-art solar technologies. Now, the EU needs to ensure that European PV manufacturers also have access to international R&D institutes as well as investors. Here, the International Solar Alliance, spearheaded by India and France, could be extremely important in advancing technology transfer, and finding appropriate funding sources for R&D in addition to multiannual financial framework instruments such as Horizon Europe. It will be hard for PV manufacturing companies in the EU or elsewhere to catch up with China in this generation of solar PV technologies (i.e. crystalline silicon PV, accounting for 90 % of all installed solar panels globally). However, European, Japanese and US companies are still on a relatively equal footing with China for R&D in next generation solar technologies, including perovskite and organic PV. Oxford Photovoltaics, for instance, set a record conversion efficiency by combining perovskite with conventional silicon. Given that these solar technologies are largely still in the ‘lab’ stage, scope remains for European companies to enter the market. To make solar a source of EU energy security, Europe should swiftly commercialise them.

Read this at a glance on ‘The 2022 G7 Summit: Against the backdrop of Russia’s war on Ukraine‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clare Ferguson and Katarzyna Sochacka.

The war in Ukraine was again an important point on the agenda of the July 2022 plenary session, with Members debating the conclusions of the European Council meeting that took place on 23‑24 June 2022, as well as a long list of Council and Commission statements, including on facilitating exports of Ukrainian agricultural products, and on relations of the Russian government and diplomatic network with extremist, populist, anti-European and other European political parties. Parliament also debated statements on the Czech Presidency’s programme of activities for the next six months, and a ‘This is Europe’ debate was held with the Prime Minister of Greece, Kyriakos Mitsokakis. Members addressed European Union initiatives to address inflation, implementation of the European Pillar of Social Rights, and taxing energy companies’ windfall profits. Members rejected a motion to oppose the inclusion of nuclear and gas as environmentally sustainable economic activities in the EU taxonomy. A debate on the activities of the European Investment Bank took place in the presence of its President, Werner Hoyer. Members also considered the consequences of the recent heat waves and drought in the EU. Looking further afield, Members debated the United Kingdom’s unilateral introduction of the Northern Ireland Protocol Bill and respect of international law, and the United States Supreme Court decision to overturn abortion rights. Debates took place on the treatment of refugees at the Spanish-Moroccan border, and on the post-Cotonou Agreement. Finally, Members debated and voted on a number of legislative files.

Digital single market

Parliament approved two important legislative proposals – the digital markets act and the digital services act – following a political agreement reached between the co-legislators. The digital markets act is the EU’s answer to tackling the dominance of a few large platforms that act as gatekeepers, controlling access to digital markets, and distorting competition. Through its three main provisions, the legislation should provide a definition of a large platform, will oblige them to ensure their services are interoperable, and will ban them from giving preference to their own products in search results or re-using personal data. The European Commission will enforce the law, with the possibility to levy fines of up to 20 % of a firm’s worldwide turnover. The new digital services act should boost consumer protection through rules promoting a safer and more transparent online environment. Parliament has ensured that the new law makes the platforms hosting online search engines, social media and marketplace platforms responsible for protecting users against harmful and illegal content. Platforms will also be obliged to be more transparent and accountable, with larger platforms subject to stricter rules. The European Commission will share enforcement with national authorities, according to the size of the platform concerned.

ReFuelEU aviation initiative

Returning to the ‘Fit for 55’ package aimed at cutting EU emissions, Members adopted Parliament’s position on the RefuelEU aviation initiative. While the initiative seeks to increase availability of sustainable aviation fuels at EU airports, a Committee on Transport and Tourism (TRAN) report sought to widen the scope, proposing that more sustainable fuels are made available at more airports and for more aircraft. The decision supports a wider definition of renewable fuel, to include electricity, hydrogen and even used cooking oil, while excluding unsustainable food and feed crop-based fuel, such as palm oil, and encouraging further research into alternatives.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine: Crisis measures in the fisheries and aquaculture sector

In the context of Russia’s war against Ukraine, Members approved an agreement reached between the co‑legislators on additional crisis support for the EU fishery and aquaculture sectors. Given the urgency to act, Parliament’s Committee on Fisheries (PECH) had swiftly approved and tabled a report on the proposal to provide support for the seafood sector (which is hard-hit by rising fuel prices and trade disruption), by using amounts left over from the 2014‑2020 budget.

Croatia’s adoption of the euro on 1 January 2023

Members overwhelmingly adopted a Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) report on Croatia’s pathway to its adoption of the euro, which is expected to take place on 1 January 2023. Concurring with European Commission and European Central Bank assessments that price stability, fiscal sustainability, exchange rate fluctuations and long-term interest rates in the country prove that Croatia is ready to adopt the euro, Parliament’s opinion will now be forwarded to the Council, which is expected to give the final green light on Croatia adopting the euro later in July.

2021 Reports on Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Serbia

Members approved Foreign Affairs (AFET) Committee reports on the Commission’s 2021 assessment of accession prospects for Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Kosovo. The AFET report on Bosnia and Herzegovina underlined the pressing need for a broader strategic and security approach to the Western Balkans, calling for elections and electoral reform to go ahead in the country as planned. Parliament voted in favour of granting Kosovo’s citizens access to the EU visa-free travel scheme. However, the AFET report on Kosovo‘s intention to apply for EU membership in 2022 stressed that, as for other new applicants, there is no fast-track procedure. While judicial independence and reform is one issue to resolve before Kosovo can advance its European ambitions, another is the normalisation of relations with Serbia. While the committee reconfirmed unequivocal support for the EU-facilitated Belgrade-Pristina dialogue, Members noted that the AFET report on Serbia‘s progress towards accession in 2021 obviously underlines the country’s ambivalent attitude to EU policies and values and its reluctance to stand against Russia, and called for the country to align with the EU position.

Better regulation

As Parliament is committed to making EU laws and policies simpler and easier for people and businesses, Members voted a Legal Affairs Committee (JURI) report seeking to strengthen EU strategy on better law-making. Parliament insists on the need for transparency and openness, particularly as regards the Regulatory Scrutiny Board and the ‘one in, one out’ approach, whereby each new piece of legislation adopted must be accompanied by the removal of an older or outdated law. The JURI committee report also calls for children’s rights to be mainstreamed throughout EU legislation.

Question time: Increasing EU ambition on biodiversity ahead of COP15

Parliament strongly supports the current initiatives to protect and restore biodiversity in the EU, and advocates EU-wide mandatory pesticide reduction. During plenary ‘question time’, scheduled to allow closer scrutiny of the European Commission’s activities, Members questioned Commissioner Virginijus Sinkevičius on EU biodiversity protection, ahead of the 15th Conference of the Parties (COP15) to the UN Convention on Biodiversity, scheduled for December 2022.

Opening of trilogue negotiations

Members confirmed, without vote, three mandates for negotiations with the Council: one from the Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO) Committee on the proposal for a regulation on general product safety; and two from the Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) Committee, on the proposal for a regulation on the scope of eligible assets and investments, the portfolio composition and diversification requirements, rules on the borrowing of cash and other funding; and on a proposal for a regulation regarding 11 legal acts in the field of national accounts.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Plenary round-up – July II 2022‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Kjeld van Wieringen.

The proposed European chips act, presented by the European Commission in February 2022, aims to mobilise €43 billion in ‘policy-driven investment’ for the EU’s semiconductor sector by 2030. The Commission expects long-term private investment to exceed this. The plan serves to enable immediate EU coordination against supply disruptions, strengthen and scale up production and innovation throughout the EU semiconductor value chain, and further enhance the Union’s technological leadership, practical applications and digital sovereignty in this crucial field.

The global semiconductor value chain is characterised by chokepoints and critical dependencies, including on more advanced chips from Taiwan and South Korea, US intellectual property in chip design automation, Japanese wafers and Chinese chip assembly. Europe has strong capacities in research and equipment manufacturing, in addition to some production capacity of (less advanced) chips with larger transistors, often destined for the automotive sector, as well as (chemical) inputs.

The future effectiveness of the EU chips act could benefit from further emphasis on certain key challenges to strengthen and safeguard Europe’s position in the global chip value chain. Internally, reinforcing European chemical input and back-end manufacturing could be advanced by protecting European chemical suppliers against Chinese subsidies and by reshoring back-end facilities to Europe. Bilaterally, attracting and engaging in foreign semiconductor investment could see the use of relevant forums, partnerships and agreements, as well as relevant fast-track permits. Globally, enhancing foreign dependencies on the EU would require further reinforcement of existing European centres of excellence including in innovative research and equipment manufacturing.

The EU chips act, if provided with the right resources, could help to improve the EU’s position in the global semiconductor value chain significantly by 2030. Meanwhile, Intel’s €33 billion investment and Taiwanese interest in European chip manufacturing are also cause for optimism.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Strengthening EU chip capabilities‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marcin Grajewski.

Russia’s war on Ukraine has reduced supplies of gas and oil to the European Union and other regions, increasing energy prices and complicating efforts to cut emissions of greenhouse gases. Faced with oil and gas shortages, some countries have started to fire up polluting coal power plants which had previously been shut down, or have postponed their planned closure. Burning coal or lignite emits much more carbon dioxide than using oil and gas to produce electricity.

Scientists and analysts are urging swift, radical action on climate change, pointing to this and last year’s extreme weather – severe floods, fires, and more frequent hurricanes. Governments across the world are preparing for the next climate change conference, to be held in Sharm El-Sheikh at the end of 2022. The meeting is to provide more details of how countries plan to achieve the agreed goal of limiting global warming to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels, as set out in the 2015 Paris Agreement.

This note offers links to recent commentaries, studies and reports from international think tanks on climate issues. More papers on the topic can be found in a previous edition of ‘What Think Tanks are Thinking.

Sea level rise from climate change is threatening home septic systems and public health
Brookings Institution, June 2022

A global sustainability program: Lessons from the Marshall Plan for addressing climate change
Brookings Institution, June 2022

How can the European Union adapt to climate change?
Bruegel, June 2022

The EU and climate security: Toward ecological diplomacy
Carnegie Europe, Open Society, June 2022

Will green activism save Turkey’s democracy?
Carnegie Europe, June 2022

Does the EU need treaty change?
Carnegie Europe, June 2022

Think basins, not borders
Centre for European Policy Studies, June 2022

World climate and security report
Clingendael, June 2022

Green peace: How Europe’s climate policy can survive the war in Ukraine
European Council on Foreign Relations, June 2022

Solidarity, sustainability and well-being at the heart of the EU mission
European Policy Centre, June 2022

Reconciling EU energy security with climate policies: Rethinking European gas markets
Istituto Affari Internazionali, June 2022

Climate change and security in the Mediterranean: Exploring the nexus, unpacking international policy responses
Istituto Affari Internazionali, June 2022

Thirty years of UN climate talks: New challenges for cooperation
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, June 2022

CO2 extraction as an integral component of the European “Green Deal”
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, June 2022

Becoming global climate governors: How cities are moving from climate ambition to coordinated action and delivery
Barcelona Centre for International Affairs, May 2022

The Global quest for green growth: An economic policy perspective
Bruegel, May 2022

How to make EU fiscal rules compatible with net zero

Centre for European Reform, May 2022

Sustainable agriculture and food systems
Chatham House, May 2022

Climate change: The only option is action
Chatham House, May 2022

The CBAM effect: How the world is responding to the EU’s new climate stick
Clingendael, May 2022

EU plans to import hydrogen from North Africa
Corporate Europe Observatory, May 2022

Carbon dioxide removal: Climbing up the EU climate policy agenda
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, May 2022

6 things to know about direct air capture
World Resources Institute, May 2022

The European tank storage sector 2050 and beyond
The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, May 2022

The rising national security threats from climate change in the Mediterranean region
Atlantic Council, April 2022

The US should treat climate policy as economic policy
Brookings Institution, April 2022

Climate migration: What do we really know?
Bruegel, April 2022

Low-carbon technologies and Russian imports
Centre for European Policy Studies, April 2022

European green deal for militaries to strengthen Europe’s defence
Clingendael, April 2022

The EU emissions trading system after the energy price spike
Centre for European Reform, April 2022

Multilateral trade arrangements and climate provision
Centre for International and Strategic Studies, April 2022

Reflecting sunlight to reduce climate risk
Council on Foreign Relations, April 2022

EU regions in the transformation towards a climate-neutral future
Ecologic Institute, April 2022

The Green Agenda for the Western Balkans
European Policy Centre, April 2022

The future of energy poverty: Will the social climate fund be enough for a just transition?
Europeum, April 2022

Energy transitions and environmental geopolitics in the Southern Mediterranean
Istituto Affari Internazionali, April 2022

Environmental degradation: impacts on agricultural production
Institute for European Environmental Policy, April 2022

Ocean-based measures for climate action
Institute for Sustainable Development and International Relations, April 2022

5 ways to cut oil and gas use through clean transportation
World Resources Institute, April 2022

Russia’s Ukraine invasion and climate change go hand in hand
Carnegie Europe, March 2022

From carbon pricing to climate clubs
Centre for European Policy Studies, March 2022

From NGEU to a Green Capital Markets Union
Centre for European Policy Studies, March 2022

Carbon removals on the road to net zero
Centre for European Policy Studies, March 2022

The EU must triple down on green investment
Centre for European Reform, March 2022

How to make EU emissions trading system work for consumers
Centre for European Reform, March 2022

Could nuclear power cut Europe’s dependence on Russian energy?
Council on Foreign Relations, March 2022

Can a climate club accelerate industrial decarbonisation?
E3G, March 2022

Making EU climate governance fit for net zero
Ecologic Institute, March 2022

What if the Helsinki spirit was revived by climate change
Egmont, March 2022

Climate mitigation potential of large-scale nature restoration in Europe
Institute for European Environmental Policy, March 2022

No more free lunch: Ending free allowances in the EU ETS to the benefit of innovation  

Jacques Delors Institute, March 2022

Will the climate agenda unravel?
Peterson Institute for International Economics, March 2022

6 pressing questions about beef and climate change, answered
World Resources Institute, March 2022

Greening Europe’s post-COVID-19 recovery
Bruegel, February 2022

Three key areas of Europe’s climate diplomacy
European Council on Foreign Relations, February 2022

Read this briefing on ‘Climate change‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Hendrik Mildebrath.

As Pegasus revelations gain momentum and the first EU Member States become implicated, one of the most high-profile spying scandals of recent years is coming to light in Europe. The Canadian interdisciplinary laboratory Citizen Lab first discovered traces of Pegasus spyware in 2015, but it was only in 2021 that the scandal broke on a global level through a joint effort by Citizen Lab, Amnesty International, Forbidden Stories and 17 media organisations. Reports revealed that authoritarian and democratic governments around the world were using Pegasus to spy on journalists, lawyers, activists, politicians, and high-ranking state officials. Investigators link the spyware to human rights harms including intimidation, harassment, detention, and murder. Pegasus was developed by the NSO Group and is designed to breach mobile phones and extract vast amounts of data stored or processed by the target system, including text messages, call interceptions, passwords, locations, microphone and camera recordings, and information from apps.

In the European Union, the Hungarian and Polish governments were the first to be caught in the eye of the storm, after media organisations uncovered extensive use of Pegasus spyware by public authorities against opposition figures and government critics. Meanwhile, Spain finds itself in the throes of the Pegasus ‘cyclone’ after Citizen Lab revealed extensive Pegasus spyware operations against Catalans (‘CatalanGate’). Reportedly, Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands also have Pegasus at their disposal, while Cyprus and Bulgaria may have served as countries of export, raising questions about export destinations and authorisations. These revelations raise concerns on various levels of the European legal order with respect to data protection and privacy, freedom of expression, freedom of the press, freedom of association, redress mechanisms, and democratic processes and institutions. In response to abusive surveillance practices, individuals and authorities are sounding out redress and enforcement options, such as individual litigation, formal complaints, infringement procedures and sanctions mechanisms for qualified rule of law deficiencies. The European Parliament has set up a committee of inquiry to investigate the use of Pegasus and equivalent surveillance spyware.

As the Pegasus revelations shed light on the adverse effects of trade in and abuse of cyber-surveillance technologies, policymakers are seeking adequate responses. While the EU has made substantial progress in clarifying and strengthening its legislation in the area of cybersecurity, reinforcing civil liability and privacy rules may help prevent the abuse of spyware. To curb internal spyware abuse, the EU could promote public and private enforcement of data and privacy rights and further clarify the preconditions and parameters for cyber-surveillance and public-private surveillance cooperation. In a more determined approach, the EU may introduce human rights controls in procurement directives, ensure that unlawfully obtained evidence is inadmissible (misconduct defeats its purpose), and stimulate discussions on the legal limits of intelligence outsourcing as well as on enhanced accountability mechanisms. Additionally, the EU or its Member States could promote responsible behaviour of cyber-espionage professionals, if necessary, by reasonably regulating the spyware industry without driving it away or underground (path of legality). To curb external (third-country) abuse, the EU may consider further promoting the adequate and uniform application of export controls and pursuing coherent foreign policies that limit the proliferation and abuse of spyware. To achieve greater impact, the EU may simultaneously pursue a multilateral approach, partnering with like-minded countries to steer the global spyware market and ostracise malicious actors. In all domains, civil society and regulators call for adequate, coherent and uniform implementation of existing and future policies, as well as practical guidance. To ensure a future-proof iteration of the next policy cycle, it appears beneficial to broaden research to include the design, trade and use of cyber-weapons in general.

Read the complete study on ‘Europe’s PegasusGate: Countering spyware abuse‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Guillaume Ragonnaud (1st edition).

The current Machinery Directive (Directive 2006/42/EC) was designed to allow the free movement of machinery within the internal market, while ensuring a high level of protection of health and safety of users. To reduce the occurrence of accidents, it promotes inherently safe design and construction of machinery, and proper installation and maintenance.

On 21 April 2021, the Commission put forward a proposal for a regulation on machinery products, part of a wider ‘artificial intelligence package’. The need for an update stemmed in particular from recent developments in digital technologies, such as artificial intelligence, the internet of things, and robotics, which have raised new safety challenges. The proposed revision also intends to ensure more coherent interpretation of the scope and definitions, enhance safety for traditional technologies, reassess machines considered as ‘high risk’ and the conformity assessment procedures, reduce paper-based requirements for documentation, ensure coherence with other product safety legislation and avoid divergences in interpretation stemming from transposition.

On 3 May 2022, Parliament’s Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO) adopted its report, along with the decision to enter into interinstitutional negotiations, with the committee report as mandate. The plenary endorsed that decision on 20 May 2022, opening the way for the committee to start interinstitutional negotiations with the Council.

Versions

• July 2022: Ensuring the safety of machines in the digital age: Revision of the Machinery Directive (1st edition)

Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on machinery products Committee responsible:Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO)COM(2021)202
21.4.2021Rapporteur:Ivan Štefanec (EPP, Slovakia)2021/0105(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Adriana Maldonado López (S&D, Spain)
Svenja Hahn (Renew, Germany)
David Cormand (Greens/EFA, France)
Marco Campomenosi (ID, Italy)
Carlo Fidanza (ECR, Italy)
Kateřina Konečná (The Left, Czechia)Ordinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Trilogue negotiations

Written by Marcin Szczepański.

The 48th G7 Summit took place at Schloss Elmau, Germany, on 26-28 June 2022. Russia’s war on Ukraine has heavily affected the G7’s deliberations this year and created pressing new global challenges that were discussed both in the preparatory meetings and at the summit itself. The resulting communiqué focuses on supporting Ukraine, on reducing the impact of the war on the global economy, security of supply and prices of energy and food, climate challenges and the new G7 partnership for infrastructure and investment in developing countries.

Background

In January 2022, Germany identified ‘Progress towards an equitable world’ as an overarching theme of its G7 presidency. However, since the invasion of Ukraine has had profound and transformative global repercussions, it was a major item on the agenda both during the ministerial meetings and in the discussions between the leaders. After the first condemnatory statement on the day of the invasion (24 February), the leaders released four more in which they committed to various actions against Russia (see Figure 1). The Speakers and Presidents of Parliament of the G7 have also condemned the attack and supported strong countermeasures. Essentially, the war unleashed a chain of destabilising political, economic and social effects worldwide and exacerbated the economic impact of the pandemic. Problems such as the rising cost of living and inflationary pressures, threats to energy security, a looming global food crisis, a deteriorating Euro-Atlantic security environment and growing climate concerns made for a tense background to the summit.

Figure 1 – Main G7 commitments on Russia

The key summit agenda items were: (1) shaping the global economy; (2) promoting partnerships for infrastructure and investment; (3) cooperating on foreign and security policy; (4) the world in conflict: Ukraine (joined virtually by President Zelenskyy); (5) investing in climate, energy, and health; (6) addressing food security and advancing gender equality; and (7) strengthening international cooperation, the multilateral and digital order. A major goal of the summit was to show unity and resilience against Russia’s aggression. The EU was represented by Charles Michel, President of the European Council, and Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission. The EU’s priorities included: (1) actions to support Ukraine and put sanctions on Russia; (2) the status of Ukraine’s EU membership bid; (3) Russia’s responsibility for soaring food and energy prices, rising inflation, and supply chain disruptions; (4) the need to raise global climate ambition; (5) EU support for the Just Energy Transition Partnerships (JETPs); (5) perspectives for the G20, and; (6) the future pandemic prevention instrument.

Outcome

The G7 leaders adopted the main communiqué and four stand-alone statements. They pledged to ‘stand with Ukraine for as long as it takes, providing the needed financial, humanitarian, military, and diplomatic support’ and to help rebuild the war-damaged country through an international reconstruction conference and plan. The G7 will continue to seek ways to prevent Russia from profiting from the war and to cut its revenues from sales of gas and oil, including through possible coordinated price caps, which could also help to reduce energy price surges. In addition, the G7 will target Russia’s gold, its third largest export after oil and gas. The leaders also pledged to take action to secure energy supply, in coordination with the International Energy Agency, and to phase out energy from Russia. To help relieve the pressures created by the war, the leaders agreed that public investment in the gas sector can be an appropriate temporary response and mentioned the increased importance of LNG. To improve access to food, which is also deteriorating because of Russia’s invasion, the group will contribute an additional US$4.5 billion to the Global Alliance for Food Security, which makes a total of over US$14 billion in joint G7 commitments to increase global food security in 2022. The G7 leaders announced their commitment to minimise the global economic impact of the war, and reduce negative effects on their own countries, also by stability- and growth-oriented macroeconomic policies, tackling rising costs of living and boosting the resilience of supply chains. The Group also criticised the violations of human rights in China, while calling on Beijing to press Russia to withdraw its troops from Ukraine. 

Furthermore, the communiqué announced the establishment of a Climate Club, to support the implementation of the Paris Agreement. This is to be done by accelerating climate action and increasing its ambition, and addressing risks of carbon leakage for emission-intensive goods. To that end, they committed to stop new direct public support for the international unabated fossil fuel energy sector by the end of 2022, and achieve a highly decarbonised road sector by 2030, as well as a fully or mostly decarbonised power sector by 2035. The G7 will also step up its efforts to mobilise the collective US$100 billion in climate finance by 2025. In order to narrow the global investment gap, the G7 aims to mobilise US$600 billion over the next five years under the new Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII). It will support, with the involvement of private finance, ‘sustainable, inclusive, climate resilient and quality infrastructure based on intensified cooperation, democratic values, and high standards’. It will also finance the creation of additional JETPs. India, Indonesia, Senegal and Vietnam will follow the first JETP with South Africa, which was launched in 2021.

Views

Recent years have been rather turbulent for the G7. After the suspension of Russia from the Group (then the G8) – due to its 2014 annexation of Crimea – came the Trump years, marked by divisions over issues such as climate and trade. While during the financial crisis the majority of observers argued that it was the G20 which was critical to the global response, during the pandemic the roles reversed and the G7 reacted more swiftly. Some experts view the Group as incoherent over the dual threat of Russia and China: the US views both as serious threats, while the others tend to avoid confrontation with China.

Perhaps owing to the multitude of difficult issues at stake, G7 summits tend to produce mixed reactions, and the Schloss Elmau summit was no different. On food security, organisations fighting poverty and injustice considered that the G7 funding commitments fall way short of the necessary minimum of US$28.5 billion coming from UN appeals. There was no breakthrough on ending the blockages of grain shipments in the Black Sea. Environmental groups criticised the G7 for watering down pledges on climate action in the face of the energy crisis, failure to deliver on the climate finance front and the lack of a deadline for phasing out coal.

On the other hand, the University of Toronto G7 Research Group considered that the summit produced the strongest performance since the first G7 summit took place in 1975, based on the number of commitments, their level of ambition, and the money mobilised. Although not explicitly mentioned, it is widely held that the PGII is being set up to counter China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Analysts appreciated that there was a clearer commitment to finance hard infrastructure projects in the Partnership. They also considered the new approach to financing the projects, based on deploying limited public finance to mobilise larger volumes of private capital, to be promising. Anti-corruption activists welcomed the commitment to strengthen efforts to combat kleptocracies and corruption, while calling for more details and swift action.

From the EU perspective, particularly positive outcomes included the launch of the PGII and Climate Club, the declaration of the G7’s long-term help for Ukraine, and the start of work on future pandemic readiness.

Read this at a glance on ‘The 2022 G7 Summit: Against the backdrop of Russia’s war on Ukraine‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Eric Pichon.

Adopted in 2015 by the United Nations (UN), the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development – ‘the blueprint to achieve a better and more sustainable future for all’ – clearly links the 17 sustainable development goals (SDGs) that it introduced to a series of targets to be reached by 2030. The 2030 Agenda includes a detailed mechanism to monitor progress with regard to these targets. At the core of this mechanism are a number of quantified indicators for each target that are regularly revised by the UN and other international agencies. These agencies and the EU provide support to national statistical services across the world in collecting data for the SDG indicators in order to gather reliable and comparable datasets. These data feed the voluntary national reports that countries prepare to exchange good practices and advice on tackling the challenges they encounter in implementing their SDG strategies. High-level forums take stock of both progress and weaknesses in implementation, so as to ensure that everybody is on track in pursuing the SDGs.

The EU has long experience in collecting consistent data from its Member States. The European Union Statistical Office (Eurostat) has created a set of sustainable development indicators that provide a good overview of progress within the EU. EU development cooperation services have devised a framework of indicators to assess how EU support contributes to other countries’ implementation of the SDGs. However, the European Parliament and other stakeholders regret that the spill-over effect of EU policies on third countries remains a blind spot in the evaluation of the EU’s contribution to the SDGs.

Although technical in nature, SDG indicators and data also have a political dimension, as they clearly measure countries’ and other stakeholders’ achievements against their own commitments.

This is an update of a Briefing published in December 2019.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Reporting on SDG implementation: UN mechanisms and the EU approach‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Ionel Zamfir.

The 16th Sustainable Development Goal (SDG16) to ‘Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels’ represents a new milestone compared with the earlier millennium development goals. While several of its targets (such as peace, corruption-free institutions and freedom from violence) were once seen as prerequisites of sustainable development, the adoption of SDG16 marked the first time that they were globally recognised as development objectives in themselves. To achieve universal recognition, SDG16 leaves out explicit reference to internationally recognised political and civil rights norms, attracting some criticism. Its very general scope has also stirred controversy regarding the type of data required in order to assess progress rigorously.

The state of play with regard to the implementation of SDG16 indicates that substantial progress is still needed in order to achieve the SDG targets by 2030. Violent conflicts continue to affect many parts of the world, societal violence remains widespread in many countries and violence against children in particular remains a pervasive phenomenon, especially in developing countries. The pandemic has erased much previous progress on the SDGs, and led to restrictions on freedoms and more limited government accountability. The war in Ukraine, meanwhile, with its negative spill-overs on other SDGs demonstrates once more the crucial role of peace.

The EU has committed to contributing to the achievement of all the SDGs, and the specific targets of SDG16 have been given special recognition. From the Global Strategy to the ‘new consensus on development’, various policy documents acknowledge the crucial role of peace, democracy, human rights and the rule of law for sustainable development. The interconnection between the pursuit of these fundamental values and EU efforts to help developing countries achieve the SDGs is obvious in numerous measures undertaken in the framework of EU external action. The European Parliament is a strong champion for these values in the world.

This is an update of a Briefing published in February 2020.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Peace, justice and strong institutions: EU support for implementing SDG 16 worldwide‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Sector-specific distribution of EU and EU Member States’ development aid for governance and civil society (2016-2020, in € billion) Share of countries: by degree of achievement of SDG16 and by current degree of progress towards SDG16

Written by Agnieszka Widuto.

In 2020, about 36 million Europeans were unable to keep their homes adequately warm. Energy poverty is a multi-dimensional phenomenon, considered to be caused by a combination of low income, high energy expenses, and poor energy efficiency in buildings.

The EU has been addressing this issue in various legislative and non-legislative initiatives, most recently in the context of its climate policies and energy transition. The Gas and Electricity Directives call for the protection of vulnerable consumers, and the Energy Efficiency and Energy Efficiency of Buildings Directives require measures to alleviate energy poverty alongside efficiency efforts. The ‘renovation wave’ initiative under the European Green Deal aims to boost structural renovation in private and public buildings, while the Social Climate Fund includes households in energy poverty among its main beneficiaries.

The 2020 European Commission recommendation on the topic defines energy poverty as a situation in which households are unable to access essential energy services. It also provides a set of indicators relating for instance to the inability to keep a home adequately warm, arrears on utility bills, and a high share of income spent on energy bills. At the same time, no binding EU-level definition currently exists, and the proposed indicator set is not monitored systematically by Eurostat.

A number of possible policy options exist to address energy poverty under energy policy, social policy, or a mix of various regulatory solutions. Specific measures range from price regulation and tax breaks, to limits on disconnection, to social tariffs, energy efficiency improvements, and energy savings. Against the backdrop of security of energy supply concerns, the expected further rise in energy prices, and the ongoing EU transition to climate neutrality, the issue of energy poverty will be a crucial one in the months and years to come.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Energy poverty in the EU‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Michael Adam, Isabel Moran Vidal and Louise van de Pol.

The European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) organised an online roundtable on 28 June 2022 on one of the most-discussed technology concepts of today: the metaverse. Describing the metaverse as an immersive and constant virtual three-dimensional world, where people interact by means of an avatar to carry out a wide range of activities Anthony Teasdale, Director-General of EPRS introduced the event. He welcomed the panel of speakers and presented the briefing ‘Metaverse: Opportunities, risks and policy implications’, prepared by the Digital Policies Unit of the Members’ Research Service at EPRS. The roundtable discussion, moderated by Michael Adam, Head of the Digital Policies Unit, assessed the opportunities and risks deriving from the evolution of the metaverse and its potential impact on policy-making.

Axel Voss (EPP, Germany), Member of the EP Committee on Legal Affairs and previously Rapporteur on the report of the Special Committee on Artificial Intelligence in a Digital Age and on the own-initiative report on a civil liability regime for artificial intelligence, opened the event and set the scene. He recalled that the metaverse is the next big disruptive step in the digital world. It has the economic potential of turnover in trillions of euros. He stressed the legal uncertainties regarding data protection, intellectual property, cybercrime, e-identity and consumer and children protection. To prevent an evolution similar to the creation of social media, where regulations were drafted after tech companies had already fully developed social media platforms, it is necessary to start thinking now about regulation to secure European values in the metaverse.

During her keynote speech, European Parliament Vice-President with responsibility for STOA and Informatics and Telecommunication, Eva Kaili (S&D, Greece), applauded the EPRS initiative to discuss the metaverse at this early stage. She encouraged policy-makers to harness all the benefits of the metaverse and grasp the opportunity to deal with this technological change in the EU from the beginning. She pointed to a number of areas in which the European Parliament is already working on metaverse-related aspects. Technology always brings opportunities and challenges, but there is also always an option to decide how to use technology in the right way.

The ensuing panel discussion began with an introduction from Frank Steinicke, Professor for Human-Computer Interaction at Universität Hamburg. Professor Steinicke described the technological aspects of the metaverse. Noting that the building blocks needed to create the metaverse are: realistic avatars; mixed reality technologies; 5G; artificial intelligence machine learning; and blockchain. He added that the computer rendering would improve in such a way that real and virtual worlds will no longer be distinguishable. Professor Steinicke is in favour of building a ‘Euroverse’ – a European metaverse. Acknowledging that the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), and forthcoming digital markets and digital services acts are good frameworks for the metaverse, the challenge lies in the enforcement of those regulations. He stressed the need to build a partnership with non-EU metaverse companies, to make Europe attractive for IT experts, and to invest in computation education.

Rehana Schwinninger-Ladak, Head of Interactive Technologies, Digital for Culture and Education Unit, Directorate-General for Communications Networks, Content and Technology (CNECT) at the European Commission, then took the floor to present the European Commission position. The Commission is moving forward by investing in research and innovation activities in extended reality – a core technological building block of the metaverse – through the Horizon Europe programme, as well as by funding content creation through the Creative Europe programme (with a specific action on videogames and immersive storytelling). The aim is to build a consolidated European ecosystem by bringing together technology developers, producers, integrators, and user industries. To facilitate dialogue between all these actors and policy-makers and identify key challenges, the Commission has recently implemented the XR4ALL community and the VR/AR Industrial Coalition.

Yuval Rooz, Co-Founder and CEO of Digital Asset and creator of Daml provided a view from the private sector of the opportunities and challenges of the metaverse. In comparison to the internet, governing the metaverse is not a bigger challenge. He recommends regulators consider whether existing regulations are sufficient and create tools that would be able to efficiently enforce those regulations in the metaverse, potentially with the help of companies and innovators. Two key components of the metaverse are identity and financial interoperability. One way of protecting identity in the metaverse is the creation of a wallet of identities, where, for different activities, different levels of identity authentication would be required.  

In her presentation, Verity McIntosh, Senior Lecturer and expert in virtual reality at the University of West of England shared some of the results from the report she co-authored, ‘Safeguarding the metaverse’, with the audience. Existing harms associated with the proto-metaverse spaces include unsupervised use of virtual space, ineffective age limitation validation, exposure to age-inappropriate or illegal content and behaviours, failure to differentiate between virtual and real-world reality, harassment and abuse. Because the metaverse transcends geographical boundaries, the question of who will monitor the safety of its users is not straightforward. Other risks examined during research that need to be addressed were: who owns the behavioural data generated; neurological rights; digital poverty and inclusion; and impacts on the future of work. She recommended that policy-makers invest in inclusive infrastructure and skills, in immersive literacy, to provide appropriate legislation and designate competent institutions to empower consumers in connection with metaverse companies.

To watch this event online, please click here.

Written by Vitalba Crivello.

Much has been said and written about mis- and disinformation in science in recent years. The outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic in 2020 and the related health crisis inevitably triggered growing concern about the negative effects of false news and deceptive narratives on the public, notably on the level of trust which communities have in science, and on media reporting on scientific subjects. The European Science-Media Hub (ESMH) workshop ‘Promoting trust in science to combat misinformation’, hosted by the European Parliament Liaison Office (EPLO) in Spain (Madrid) in May 2022 offered an opportunity to share some insights.

Spanish community of science journalism reunited at the ESMH workshop

With evident enthusiasm, one of the 60 science journalists and communicators attending the event told us: ‘We have not sat together in the same room for a long time! What a great chance the ESMH has given to us to meet and talk once again about science!‘. The EPLO Office in Madrid’s Sala Europa was indeed packed for the panel’s debate, as the event was successfully held in-person, having been delayed by many months of Covid‑19 related restrictions.

The seminar began with Member of the European Parliament and Panel for the Future of Science and Technology (STOA) member Lina Gálvez Muñoz (S&D, Spain), speaking on the engagement of and the critical role played by the European Parliament to promote quality information, and a warm welcome from EPLO Press Officer Damián Castaño Martín. Vitalba Crivello, STOA Policy Analyst, then spoke about the specific role of the ESMH in providing evidence-based science communication and gave a short introduction on the activities of the Hub.

The floor was then left to the experts, with a roundtable on the importance of trust in science in tackling misinformation. The conversation was shaped by Michele Catanzaro, science journalist, who moderated the debate between Cary Funk, Director of science and society research at Pew Research Center, Sonia Contera, Professor of Biological Physics at the University of Oxford and Senior Fellow at the Oxford Martin School and Green Templeton College, Patricia Férnandez de Lis, Director of Materia, ElPáis, and Pampa García Molina, Editor-in-chief at Agencia SINC and Director of the Science Media Centre Spain. The workshop was held in Spanish, with some interpretation from English. You can watch the workshop and listen to the main messages here.

Engaging with the community of science journalism in Europe

What tools can science journalists and communicators use to combat misinformation?

What role can they play in the current complex information arena?

How can we engage the public in quality science information, based on trust?

These questions – among others – are recurrent in ESMH networking workshops for journalists and science communicators, Science-Media Days, which ESMH has been organising over the last two years.

These seminars are part of the ‘Engaging science journalists in the activities of the ESMH’ project, launched in 2019. Aiming at increasing its visibility among science journalists, the project intended to reach media-makers working for national or local media outlets and institutions in a decentralised country-by-country approach. Six countries were chosen to be part of a pilot project: Czechia, Germany, Finland, France, Spain and Sweden.

The project should deliver two main outputs:

1. a focus group study on media working standards, including a survey on science media representatives specific needs and expectations for better access to information at the European level;
2. country-specific workshops – ‘Science-Media Days’ – to promote networking and to match the ESMH seminars to their audiences’ expectations and needs.

Within that context, the pilot study investigated the media environment and setting for science journalism and science communication in the selected countries. It combined an overview of the European science-media landscape with the opinions of selected journalists, interviewed as part of a focus group. The objective was also to show media-makers that the ESMH can offer them some opportunities. The study also allowed first contacts to be established with local communities, in view of organising seminars in situ later on.

ESMH Science-Media Days

Due to the pandemic, in-person workshops obviously could not take place during the last two years, and had to be postponed. At the same time, however, the health crisis clearly demonstrated the need for evidence-based science information and the crucial role quality science journalism plays in our society. The crisis also showed how important good interaction between policy-makers, scientists and media is in promoting sound science. Adapting to the pandemic context, the ESMH organised the first two networking workshops online, in close cooperation with the EPLOs in the respective countries:

• ‘Science & misinformation: the first pandemic in the digital age‘, 22 March 2021, in cooperation with EPLO Lisbon, in Portuguese;
• ‘Coronavirus: is misinformation more contagious than the virus?’, September 2020, in cooperation with EPLO Berlin, in English.

The ESMH plans to organise further ‘Science-Media Days’ in other EU Member States in the near future, to continue promoting the role of the Hub in the European science-media landscape and seeking for further and closer cooperation with the various media communities. The final objective remains the same, consistent with the Hub’s mandate, i.e.promoting and implementing a quality and evidence-based science communication based on trust and capable of engaging the public in the conversation about science and technology topics.

Written by Marcin Grajewski.

Russia’s war on Ukraine has sent global food prices soaring. It has fuelled inflation in the European Union, the United States and many other countries, while threatening hunger in some poorer regions. Russia and Ukraine play a major role in food and fertiliser supply. They export about 30 per cent of the world’s wheat and 75 per cent of its sunflower oil. Some countries in Africa and the Middle East are nearly 100-per cent dependent on Russian or Ukrainian food. According to the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, food prices in May were up by nearly 30 per cent from a year earlier. Western countries are debating a plan to open up supply chains, for example by unblocking Ukrainian ports on the Black Sea, and to provide foodfinancing to developing countries.

This note gathers links to the recent publications and commentaries from international think tanks on the impact of the war on global and European food markets. Analyses on the Ukraine war and its implications for the energy market can be found in a previous edition of the ‘What Think Tanks are Thinking’ series.

The war in Ukraine triggered a global food shortage
Brookings Institution, June 2022

Food security: The role and limits of international rules on export restrictions
Bruegel, June 2022

Russia is intensifying the global food crisis
Centre for Eastern Studies, June 2022

Can the West afford to let the world go hungry? Overcoming challenges to establishing a humanitarian corridor in the Black Sea
Istituto Affari Internazionali, June 2022

Authoritarian leaders are turning to food export bans amid war in Ukraine
Peterson Institute for International Economics, June 2022

Production and export of food from Ukraine during the war with Russia
Centre for Eastern Studies, May 2022

Sustainable agriculture and food systems
Chatham House, May 2022

Why Ukraine’s ports are vital for global food prices
Heritage Foundation, May 2022

India’s wheat export ban: Bad economics, good politics, modest impact
Peterson Institute for International Economics, May 2022

The Ukraine war and food security in Africa: ‘Meeting the acute needs is not solving the general problem’
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, May 2022

The Ukraine war is deepening global food insecurity: What can be done?
United States institute of Peace, May 2022

The Ukraine war and threats to food and energy security
Chatham House, April 2022

Ukraine’s bread basket is emptying fast
Chatham House, April 2022

How Russia’s war in Ukraine could amplify food insecurity in the Mideast
Council on Foreign Relations, April 2022

Food crisis: Wheat imports from Russia and Ukraine
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, April 2022

Food price inflation continues to worsen: Here’s what should be done about it
Heritage Foundation, April 2022

Rising food prices: Global risks and vulnerabilities
Italian Institute for International Political Studies, April 2022

Russia’s war with Ukraine will force the acceleration of food production reforms in Africa
Polish Institute of International Affairs, April 2022

The Russian invasion of Ukraine endangers African food security in the long-term
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, April 2022

Obscured by the energy crisis, a food crisis unfolds
Atlantic Council, March 2022

East Africa’s growing food crisis: What to know
Brookings Institution, March 2022

The impact of the war in Ukraine on food security
Bruegel, March 2022

The economic policy consequences of the war
Bruegel, March 2022

Russia’s invasion leaves North Africa with a food crisis: What can Europe do?
European Centre for Development Policy Management, March 2022

Putin’s war: Driving Ukrainians into hunger, and the rest of the world as well
Friends of Europe, March 2022

Long-run impacts of the conflict in Ukraine on food security in Africa
Institut für Weltwirtschaft Kiel, March 2022

Guerre en Ukraine: Comment sauver la sécurité alimentaire sans sacrifier la transition agroécologique ?
Terra Nova, March 2022

Read this briefing on ‘Russia’s war on Ukraine and food security‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Frederik Scholaert.

The Russian war against Ukraine has led to high operating costs for the seafood sector. In late March 2022, the EU responded with temporary State aid and exceptional support for the current programming period under the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund (EMFAF). On 23 April 2022, the Commission adopted a new proposal amending the fund for the 2014-2020 programming period, so that its remaining budget can also be used to support the sector. During the July plenary session, Parliament is due to vote on its position on the file.

Background

The Russian war against Ukraine has significantly affected fishermen, aquaculture farmers and fish‑processing companies. In particular, increased energy prices threaten the profitability of the fishing industry. The monthly marine gasoil price increased from about €0.60 per litre in January 2022 to €1.00 in May 2022. While the EU sanctions do not include a ban on seafood trade, with the exception of some luxury seafood products, trade flows have been severely hampered, especially for EU fish-processing companies that rely on supplies of whitefish from Russia. In addition, Black Sea fisheries face a direct security threat.

First package of measures

In March 2022, the Commission adopted a package of measures to support the economy in the context of Russia’s invasion. Temporary State aid rules allow fishery and aquaculture companies to receive up to €35 000 in aid, and all companies affected by the crisis to get liquidity support and compensation for the high energy prices. In addition, the Commission triggered the EMFAF Regulation crisis mechanism, by declaring an event causing significant disruption to markets. This allows Member States to compensate operators for lost income or additional costs and producer organisations for the storage of fishery products.

Commission proposal

On 13 April 2022, the Commission adopted a new proposal to amend the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund (EMFF) – the predecessor of the EMFAF – which covered the 2014-2020 programming period. This would allow the taking of similar emergency measures to those activated under the EMFAF, namely financial compensation for additional costs, for income forgone and for the storage of products. Temporary cessation of fishing activities would be supported where they are currently unsafe. The proposal comes in the form of an amending regulation, as the EMFF does not contain a crisis mechanism to trigger emergency measures in the event of a crisis.

European Parliament position

Given the urgency of ensuring aid to the sector, Parliament’s Committee on Fisheries (PECH) acted quickly on the legislative proposal. On 20 June 2022, PECH unanimously adopted its report on the file, in which it proposed extending support for temporary cessation to all fishing activities where economic viability is impeded. As the PECH report is aligned with the position of the Council, no interinstitutional negotiations will be needed. The text is scheduled to be voted in plenary in July 2022.

First-reading report: 2022/0118(COD); Committee responsible: PECH; Rapporteur: Nuno Melo (EPP, Portugal). For further information, see the EPRS ‘At a glance’ note on the first package of measures.

Read this at a glance on ‘Russia’s war against Ukraine: Support for the seafood sector using leftover 2014-2020 budget‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Isabel Teixeira Nadkarni (Legislative Planning and Coordination Unit, Directorate-General for the Presidency).

INTRODUCTION

Czechia is a parliamentary republic with a head of government – the prime minister – and a head of state – the president. The current Prime Minister is Petr Fiala, from the Civic Democratic Party (ODS). He has been in office since November 2021 and was preceded by Andrej Babiš (2017-2021), the founder of the party ANO 2011. Czech President Miloš Zeman was first elected to the post in 2013 and had previously served as prime minister, from 1998 to 2002.

The supreme executive body is the government. It is led by the prime minister and appointed by the president of the republic. The president also appoints other government members based on the prime minister’s recommendations. Before it is installed, the government must win a vote of confidence in the Chamber of Deputies.

The Spolu alliance, formed for the 2021 legislative election, was composed of the Civic Democratic Party (ODS), KDU-ČSL (Christian and Democratic Union), and TOP 09 (Tradition, Responsibility, Prosperity). It currently governs the country in a coalition with the Pirates and Mayors’ alliance.

The Czech Parliament is bicameral. The upper house is the Senate (81 members elected for six years) and the lower house is the Chamber of Deputies (200 members elected for four years). There are currently seven parties in the Chamber of Deputies:

• ANO 2011 (ANO) – 72 members
• Civic Democratic Party (ODS) – 34 members
• Mayors and Independents (STAN) – 33 members
• Christian and Democratic Union – Czechoslovak People’s Party (KDU-ČSL) – 23 members
• Freedom and Direct Democracy (SPD) – 20 members
• TOP 09 – 14 members
• Czech Pirate Party (Pirati) – 4 members

All of these parties except the SPD also have seats in the Senate, where the Czech Social Democratic Party (ČSSD) and the Green Party (Z) also have seats. The Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM) holds no seats in the Chamber or the Senate but has one elected member of the European Parliament and representatives at regional level.

Czechia will hold the Presidency of the Council of the EU for the second time. The previous time was in the first half of 2009, coinciding with the last months of the sixth legislative term of the European Parliament and with the European elections, held between 4 and 7 June 2009.

The programme of the Trio formed together with France and Sweden has as its thematic priorities to protect citizens and freedoms; to promote a new growth and investment model for Europe; to build a climate-neutral, green, fair and social Europe; and to promote Europe’s interests and values in the world.

PART A: POLITICAL PRIORITIES OF THE CZECH PRESIDENCY

The Czech Presidency comes at a crucial time for the EU, faced with the challenges posed by the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine. Politically, the current security and geo-political situation will have an impact on the work of the Presidency and could well dominate the coming six months. Many issues will need to be addressed, particularly in the field of defence, refugees, displaced persons, financial aid and the accession perspective for Ukraine.

The ramifications of the war, including its impact on energy policy and the ‘Fit for 55’ package, on the EU’s economic recovery and its democratic resilience, as well as on the unity and internal dynamics of the Union, are likely to be high up on the agenda.

The motto of the Czech Presidency, ‘Europe as a task’, is inspired by a speech delivered by former Czech President Václav Havel in Aachen, at the Charlemagne Prize ceremony, in 1996. The triple challenge is to ‘rethink, rebuild, repower’ Europe.

The Czech priorities for the second half of 2022 will focus on the following topics:

• Managing the refugee crisis and Ukraine’s post-war recovery,
• Energy security,
• Strengthening Europe’s defence capabilities and cyberspace security,
• Strategic resilience of the European economy,
• Resilience of democratic institutions.

In light of the developments brought about by the Ukrainian refugee crisis, the Presidency aims to take work forward on the Pact on Migration and Asylum, presented by the Commission on 23 September 2020 (both Parliament and Council still have to adopt their respective positions on the proposals). The Czech Presidency will build on the principles of solidarity, efficiency and flexibility in this area.

The Fit for 55 climate package will also be high on the Czech Presidency’s agenda. Ensuring access to affordable, sustainable and reliable energy sources is one of the biggest challenges the EU is facing. In the next six months, the green and digital transitions will continue to be in the spotlight, but also security, in particular the implementation of the Strategic Compass, approved by the Council on 21 March 2022. The Czechs are due to take forward the Versailles agenda, based on the declaration adopted by EU leaders on 10-11 March 2022, which outlines how the EU can bolster defence capabilities, reduce energy dependency and build a more robust economic base.

The Czech Presidency will lead crucial legislative files in the Council, such as those in the Fit for 55 package, through interinstitutional negotiations and will be closely involved in the initiatives aimed at mitigating the impact of the energy crisis in Europe, including the RePowerEU plan. An important aspect is the diversification of sources including logistics, energy savings and acceleration of the transition to low-emission and renewable energy sources. The Presidency will work on the implementation of the regulation of gas reserves, i.e. filling storage facilities in the run-up to winter, and the promotion of voluntary joint purchases, so that the EU uses its combined weight in a similar way as with the purchase of Covid-19 vaccines.

Strengthening the single market, boosting innovation and competiveness, and reducing dependence on hostile or unstable regimes will be paramount for the resilience of the European economy. The European Chips Act, which aims to bolster Europe’s competitiveness and resilience in semiconductor technologies and applications, is a key proposal for the Czech Presidency, alongside the Artificial Intelligence Act and cybersecurity. It will also strive for the adoption of the European Digital Identity Wallet (a secure and trustworthy pan-European tool for proving a citizen’s identity) and the creation of an efficient and fair data market.

In 2022, the Single Market celebrates its 30th anniversary. Taking into account the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic in the single market and the challenging geopolitical context, the EU will need to identify further growth potential and address businesses and consumers’ concerns. Measures to ensure food security inside and outside the EU in light of the Russian invasion of Ukraine should also be considered during the coming months.

Furthermore, the Czech Presidency plans to focus on a number of trade agreements, with South American countries, Australia and New Zealand. Cooperation with Indo-Pacific partners is also due to be a priority issue, particularly in areas such as cybersecurity, supply chain security and space.

On social policy, the Czech Presidency will continue with the implementation of the European Pillar of Social Rights. The Trio committed itself to improving working conditions, including in the digital economy and for people working through platforms, to tackle gender inequalities in the labour market, including through measures to close the gender pay gap and through the promotion of equal opportunities for women and men to reconcile work, family and private life.

As regards democratic resilience, the Czechs aim to focus on media freedom (the Commission is due to present the European Media Freedom Act proposal in the third quarter of 2022), on transparency in financing political parties in the EU and on the rule of law, including in Hungary and Poland.

Still on the topic of democratic resilience, the Czech Presidency is expected to make progress on the proposal on Strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs) and on the proposal on transparency and targeting of political advertising.

In relation to the ongoing hearings under Article 7(1) TEU concerning Poland and Hungary, in a resolution approved on 5 May 2022 the European Parliament urged the upcoming presidencies to organise the hearings ‘regularly and at least once per presidency’. It called on the Council to ensure that hearings under Article 7(1) TEU also address new developments, including those related to violations of fundamental rights. The Council has so far organised five hearings on Poland and, by the end of May 2022, four hearings on Hungary within the framework of the General Affairs Council (GAC).

The Western Balkans region is also due to be among the regional priorities of the Czechs.

PART B: TOPICAL INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES Conference on the Future of Europe

The follow-up of the Conference on the Future of Europe’s final report – with 49 proposals to reform the EU, including Treaty change – delivered to the Presidents of the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission on 9 May 2022, will also need to be carried out by the Czech Presidency. In the 18-month programme of the Council, the French, Czech and Swedish Presidencies state that, based on the political conclusions of the Conference, ‘they will begin implementing them, as appropriate’.

The Czech Presidency aims to make use of these ideas and to create a space for the continuation of the debate. While implementing the European Year of Youth 2022, the Presidency will put emphasis on improving dialogue with young people and promoting their participation in political/policy processes.

EU budget for 2023

The draft general budget for 2023, presented by the Commission on 7 June 2022, will have to be negotiated between the Czech Presidency of the Council and the European Parliament by the end of this year. Uncertainty in the economic outlook persists, in the light of factors such as supply chain disruption, high energy prices, rising inflation and the continuing Covid-19 pandemic, as well as the consequences of the war in Ukraine.

The EU budget will continue to mobilise significant investments to boost Europe’s strategic autonomy, the ongoing economic recovery, safeguard sustainability and create jobs. It should prioritise green and digital investments while addressing pressing needs arising from recent and current crises. Additional proposals to finance the impact of the war in Ukraine both externally and internally are due to be tabled later in the year, on the basis of a more precise assessment of needs.

Furthermore, in its resolution on general guidelines for the preparation of the 2023 budget, approved in plenary on 5 April 2022, Parliament stresses that ‘a revision of the current MFF [Multiannual Financial Framework 2021-2027] is indispensable’, calling on the Commission to ‘assess when an MFF revision would be appropriate’.

Reform of the Electoral Act

Following Parliament’s legislative resolution on the reform of the EU’s electoral law, adopted on 3 May 2022, the Czech Presidency is due to steer negotiations in the Council, where unanimity will be needed on this matter. The formalisation of the lead candidate (Spitzenkandidat) process and the introduction of a Union-wide constituency, from which 28 members of the European Parliament would be elected (transnational list), are among Parliament’s proposals.

Programming of legislative priorities: Joint Declaration

It is also under the Czech Presidency that the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission should agree on the joint programming of legislative priorities in the form of a Joint Declaration, signed by the three Presidents, which is expected to cover 2023 as well as the first half of-2024, to coincide with the next European elections. The Czech Presidency will also carry on with the implementation of the Joint Declaration 2022, as negotiated at the end of the Slovenian Presidency.

The need to address the consequences of the war in Ukraine and the conclusions of the Conference on the Future of Europe are among the issues that should be reflected in the Commission work programme (CWP) for 2023. The current situation and the need to adopt emergency measures may require that the Commission postpones some of the initiatives planned for 2022 (the Commission has committed itself to duly inform Parliament of any delays).

Read this briefing on ‘Priority dossiers under the Czech EU Council Presidency‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.