European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Vivienne Halleux.

In the European Union (EU), one in eight deaths is linked to environmental pollution. Pollution is also one of the five main causes of biodiversity loss, representing a significant cost for society. The EU has set the goal of achieving zero pollution for a non-toxic environment by 2050. This would mean reducing air, water and soil pollution to ‘levels no longer considered harmful to health and natural ecosystems and respecting the boundaries the planet can cope with’.

Achieving this long-term ambition will mean updating the comprehensive legal framework currently in place at EU level to address pollution in order to keep up with the latest scientific evidence. In 2022, the EU is expected to review its air quality standards to align more closely with the recently updated World Health Organization recommendations, and to look into pollutants affecting surface and groundwater. Additional areas that should be revised in parallel include key laws designed to tackle pollution at source, setting requirements for pollutant emissions from industry and vehicles, for urban wastewater treatment and sustainable use of pesticides. The key challenges in achieving the zero pollution goal remain to ensure policy coherence, compliance and enforcement. Other issues to monitor include liability for pollution and related costs, with recent assessments pointing to the need to be consistent and rigorous in implementing the ‘polluter pays’ principle.

Parliament has pushed for ambitious action to protect people’s health and the environment from pollution. It has argued that air quality legislation should also cover non-regulated pollutants with demonstrated adverse impacts, such as ultrafine particles, black carbon, mercury and ammonia. It has also called for decisive action on pollutants of emerging concern in water, such as per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances, microplastics, endocrine-disrupting chemicals and pharmaceuticals. Finally, it has urged the Commission to design a dedicated legal framework for soil protection, equivalent to that existing for water and air.

Recently, steps have been taken at global level to curb plastic pollution through legally binding means and to form a science-policy interface body on chemicals and waste.

Read the complete briefing on ‘The EU’s zero pollution ambition: Moving towards a non-toxic environment‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Maria Diaz Crego (1st edition).

During the May I plenary session, Parliament is expected to vote on a legislative-initiative report proposing to repeal the 1976 European Electoral Act and replace it with a new Council Regulation on the election of the Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) by direct universal suffrage. Since the first European elections in 1979, the rules applying to the election of MEPs combine the common principles established in the European Electoral Act, as modified in 2002, and the different national rules implementing them. As a result, important elements of the electoral procedure remain in the hands of the national legislatures and there is no harmonisation across the Member States.

Following the proposals in Parliament’s (26 November 2020) resolution on stocktaking of European elections, the report proposes to further harmonise the rules applicable to European elections in areas such as the age for voting or standing as a candidate; postal voting; the electoral calendar for European elections; the principles applicable to the selection of candidates, including from a gender perspective; and the electoral threshold. In addition, the report proposes to establish a common electoral system and procedure for the election of 28 MEPs in a Union-wide constituency comprising the territory of all the Member States. Once finalised by Parliament, the proposal is transmitted to the Council for its adoption, with the EP required to consent to the final text.

Versions

• April 2022: Towards new rules for European elections? (1st edition)

Proposal for a Council Regulation on the election of the members of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage, repealing Council Decision (76/787/ECSC, EEC, Euratom) and the Act concerning the election of the members of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage annexed to that decision Committee responsible:Constitutional Affairs (AFCO)A9-0083/2022
4.4.2022Rapporteur:Domènec Ruiz Devesa (S&D, Spain)2020/2220(INL)Shadow rapporteurs:Sven Simon (EPP, Germany
Guy Verhofstadt (Renew, Belgium)
Damian Boeselager (Greens/EFA, Germany)
Gerolf Annemans (ID, Belgium)
Angel Dzhambazki (ECR, Bulgaria)
Leila Chaibi (The Left, France)Special legislative procedure
(Legislative initiative from
Parliament; unanimity in
Council; Parliament’s consent;
approval by all Member States) Next steps expected: Vote on the legislative initiative in plenary

Written by Philip Boucher.

The word ‘innovation’ is often used as shorthand for improved technical, economic and social processes. However, any specific innovation involves the redistribution of costs and benefits, creating winners and losers. For some, regulation of technology should be avoided in case it hinders innovation, while others see regulation as essential, to mitigate risks on the path to innovation. However, regulation and innovation are not a zero-sum game. Debates about regulatory (in)action and its impact on innovation would benefit from greater specificity about which innovation paths are considered desirable, for whom, and how policy choices would help to achieve them. This paper explores the relationship between regulation and innovation in the context of artificial intelligence (AI).

AI is a collection of technologies that have the capacity to analyse their environment and respond ‘intelligently’ with some degree of autonomy. Notoriously difficult to define, AI straddles the boundary between current and future technology. Today’s AI plays a substantial and increasing role in our personal and professional lives. In some cases, algorithms are almost visible, as they personalise news feeds, recommend products and give directions. More often, they inform (and sometimes implement) ‘upstream’ decisions in industrial, commercial and public-sector processes. Those affected can rarely understand or even examine these algorithms, although they do have profound impacts, both positive and negative. Tomorrow’s AI is often projected in wild scenarios ranging from the obsolescence of employment with health and wealth for all, to mass surveillance, disempowerment and unseen depths of inequality. More likely, we will see moderate elements of both extremes, with impacts distributed unevenly across populations, although this depends to some extent upon decisions about regulatory (in)action and the resulting innovation pathways.

Like AI, innovation is difficult to define and evaluate. While instinctively considered a good thing, any specific innovation involves the redistribution of costs and benefits in ways that are not always welcomed by everyone and may only be revealed years later. Innovation in AI is no exception. We often hear that AI regulation should be avoided in case it hinders innovation, although proponents of this approach rarely specify how this would promote an innovation path while at the same time ensuring optimal distribution of the costs and benefits involved. Following the lead of the better regulation guidelines, it is good practice to first set out desirable criteria for innovation paths and outcomes – including the distribution of costs and benefits – before examining how a range of possible regulatory approaches, including a baseline approach of no regulatory action, could help to achieve them.

In many ways, regulation has earned its bad reputation when it comes to innovation. Some heavily regulated sectors have been slow to respond to appetites and opportunities for innovation, perhaps because of inexperience or protectionism. Some regulations encouraging the adoption of ‘best available techniques’ and ‘end-of-pipe solutions’ have promoted short-term innovation at the expense of more ambitious transformative innovation. However, regulation provides the necessary preconditions to enable market access for innovations, provides firms considering major investment with certainty, and can be used to articulate ambitious visions for development. Regulation is also important in establishing the conditions and context of innovation, including as regards labour, capital, certainty and competition. There are also cases where innovation leads to disruptive social, economic or security impacts that demand regulatory responses.

In some cases, the inherited wisdom of ‘regulation hinders innovation’ may hold true. However, it is likely that a combination of carefully designed and implemented measures for at least some aspects of technology development would provide the optimal conditions for a desirable innovation path.

Anticipatory policy-making

In the context of AI, four broad approaches to the regulation-innovation relationship can be identified. Some are characterised by the ‘carrot’ of incentivising specific AI applications to reap their benefits and seize the opportunities they offer, others by the ‘stick’ of restraining specific AI applications in order to mitigate their risks. These approaches are not mutually exclusive; they can go hand in hand, alongside moments of regulatory inaction, to optimise the conditions for the preferred innovation path.

The first broad approach is to directly regulate AI innovation in order to shape how algorithms are developed and applied. ‘Carrot’ policies could include mission-oriented innovation programmes to promote ‘moonshots’ that deliver benefits far beyond what can be achieved incrementally, for example, to bypass automation of private vehicles in favour of an ambitious shared-ownership model. ‘Stick’ policies can promote innovation by responding to concerns that might inhibit potential adoption, for example, with moratoria on controversial applications such as biometric identification and lethal autonomous weapons.

The second broad approach is to shape the context in which AI is developed and adopted in order to influence the pace and direction of innovation. ‘Carrot’ measures could include boosting capital, skills, data and SME support, as well as completing the digital single market to reduce friction in terms of legal compliance, administrative burden and consumer choice. ‘Stick’ measures could include digital taxes and penalties for uncompetitive practices. Again, these stick policies can promote innovation by enhancing competition, which has a demonstrably positive link to innovation.

The third broad approach is to respond indirectly to specific outcomes and impacts as they emerge. While such measures may have a weaker influence on the pace and direction of innovation itself, they play an important role in ensuring that the innovation path remains desirable. Examples include providing a safety net for workers at risk of displacement and ensuring the continued effectiveness of measures to defend fundamental rights with regard to democratic processes, non-discrimination and consumer protection. Equitable distribution of costs and benefits, alongside protection measures for citizens and consumers, could be key conditions for the acceptability of innovation paths.

The fourth broad approach involves innovation in regulation itself, changing how policies are designed and implemented to better fit the specificities of AI. Novel approaches, such as ‘regulatory markets‘, would see firms compete to meet demands set by regulators. Temporary spaces or ‘sandboxes’ can liberate regulators and innovators to perform controlled experiments with policies and technologies and observe the results before deciding whether to scale them up. Anticipatory innovation governance also recommends early-stage experiments to establish constant feedback loops between innovation and regulation. Well-crafted regulation is not only compatible with AI innovation, but is its essential precondition. Poorly designed policy choices – including both regulation and inaction – can damage both AI development and public confidence. There are no simple solutions to complex socio-technical challenges, but there certainly are some emerging lessons for policy-makers: promote synergies, leaving behind the ‘zero-sum game’ assumption that regulation is in direct competition with innovation; take a long-term view, as restricting some developments in the short term can deliver innovation payoffs in the long term by ensuring competition, inspiring public trust or leapfrogging incremental steps; level the playing field, as a more even distribution of costs, benefits and opportunities is conducive to innovation; focus on objectives and outcomes, as AI develops more quickly than policy, so detailed prescriptions could be quickly outdated; regulate innovatively, first making use of novel approaches such as sandboxes, experiments and co-regulation, and then harmonising, to benefit from best practices, economies of scale and interoperability; recognise diversity, taking account of local and regional conditions to ensure a fairer distribution of costs, benefits and opportunities; deployinnovative procedures for public administration and procurement to improve performance, accumulate in-house expertise and promote a culture of innovation in the public sector; and promote confidence thatcitizens’ and consumers’ rights will be respected, and that firms’ regulatory environment will remain stable and supportive. Indeed, policy-makers are increasingly embracing a range of regulatory options as a means – and not a barrier – to achieve the right kind of AI innovation.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘What if AI regulation promoted innovation?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Listen to policy podcast ‘What if AI regulation promoted innovation?’ on YouTube.

Written by Alex Wilson and Lasse Boehm.

Russia remains Europe’s largest supplier of coal, oil, and gas. This poses a particular difficulty for the EU and its Member States, which are urgently seeking to reduce their energy dependence. This is not only necessary to pressure Russia economically to end its invasion of Ukraine, but also to prevent Russia from weaponising its energy supplies and threatening Europe’s energy security in future.   

Replacing Russian natural gas will be much more difficult than replacing oil and coal, due to differences in supply infrastructure, transportation and storage. While part of the long-term solution lies in the promotion of renewable energy sources and energy efficiency savings, the EU will nevertheless require large volumes of natural gas imports in the short and medium term.

Since most of Europe’s pipeline infrastructure is organised to import Russian gas, alternative supplies will mostly have to come by sea in the form of liquefied natural gas (LNG). To guarantee security of supply, the EU will also need to ensure gas storage levels remain high so Member States can cope with a sudden interruption of gas supplies. However, both LNG terminals and gas storage capacity are unevenly spread across Europe, with important policy implications.

There is a clear need to frontload investment to diversify supplies and fill storage, but uncertainty as to who can or should finance these changes. There is also the question of how to coordinate policy action at EU level, how to buffer against negative social and economic consequences, and how to ensure coherence of security of supply with the ‘fit for 55’ package and the European Green Deal.

Read the complete briefing on ‘EU gas storage and LNG capacity as responses to the war in Ukraine‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

LNG capacity per Member State (operational and planned) EU storage capacity (TWh)

Written by Matthew Parry and Marcin Szczepański.

The United States imposed a battery of sanctions and multilateral measures on Russia following its invasion of Ukraine, while also providing Ukraine and its EU neighbours with military, economic and humanitarian aid.

US sanctions

The US first imposed sanctions on Russia when it annexed Crimea in 2014. Further sanctions followed when Russia recognised the independence of Donetsk and Luhansk, and invaded Ukraine in February 2022:

• individual sanctions on Vladimir Putin, Sergey Lavrov, National Security Council members, oligarchs, other entities and persons evading sanctions; and visa restrictions;
• financial sanctions on businesses linked to major industries, e.g. defence, energy, diamond mining, telecommunications and transport, as well as on banks and financial institutions (asset freezes and account closures), ban of transactions with the Russian Direct Investment Fund;
• prohibition on all investment in Russia;
• prohibition on Russian aircraft and airlines entering US airspace (private and commercial);
• ban on oil, liquefied natural gas (LNG) and coal imports to US;
• export controls on technologies such as semiconductors, computers, telecommunications, lasers, and sensors and equipment for oil and gas industries, for both US exports and exports from third countries that use US inputs, such as software and equipment;
• asset blockagesfor persons, connected to media and news agencies spreading disinformation;
• similar sanctions on Belarus, covering export controls, banks, individuals and entities with links to Russia, the military sector, and its inputs and products, and trade tariffs.

Joint sanctions and comparison

Some US sanctions have been coordinated with the EU and other G7 members. A major step was to block the Russian Central Bank’s reserves and cut off many banks from the SWIFT international payment system. This was followed by limits on ‘golden passports‘ and the launch of the Russian Elites, Proxies, and Oligarchs (REPO) task force (G7 plus Australia), which seeks to find, freeze and/or confiscate the assets of sanctioned individuals. The sanctions have come in waves, but in some fields the US has gone further than the EU, which is more exposed to Russia in terms of energy supply and investment. The US has banned all new investment in Russia (the EU just in the energy sector). The US has also prohibited all coal, LNG, and oil imports (the EU only coal and other solid fossil fuels). US export controls cover both the oil and gas sectors, (the EU targets the former, plus technology and goods used for liquefaction of natural gas).

Main US and EU sanctions as of 22 April 2022 Military aid as of 25 April 2022

The US has given Ukraine over US$4 billion in military aid since 2014, with as much as US$3.7 billion of that since the war began. It has facilitated the supply of spare parts to make 20 warplanes operational, and provided Ukraine with training and lethal aid, including heavy weaponry, such as helicopters, tanks, heavy artillery, armoured personnel carriers, drones, howitzers, anti-aircraft and anti-armour systems, and also standard weapons and munitions. The US has promised to help Ukraine transition to more advanced weapons and air defence systems that are essentially NATO capable. It has shared invaluable intelligence (satellite imagery and analysis) on the Russian invasion, but stopped short of introducing a no-fly zone over Ukraine. Some EU Member States have also provided Soviet-era weapons, and received US compensation.

Humanitarian response and support for democracy and human rights

Between 2014 and 2021, the US donated more than US$351 million in humanitarian aid to Ukraine, in part to feed and house vulnerable Ukrainians, including those affected by the pandemic. Between 24 February and 24 March 2022, the US spent US$123 million to support the EU and neighbouring countries’ efforts to receive and host Ukrainian refugees, including US$48 million in Poland, US$10 million in Romania, US$9 million in Hungary, and US$4 million in Slovakia. On 24 March 2022, the Biden administration announced that it was preparing to provide refuge for ‘up to’ 100 000 Ukrainians, and was ‘prepared to provide’ more than US$1 billion in new humanitarian aid to support Ukrainians inside and outside Ukraine. However, reportedly, at the time of writing, the US has yet to establish a mechanism for resettling Ukrainians directly, with some trying to enter the US via Mexico. The Biden administration has also announced a further US$320 million in democracy and human rights funding for Ukraine and neighbouring democracies.

Contribution to European energy security

On 25 March 2022, President Biden and Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced the creation of a joint US-EU task force to diversify EU LNG supplies in alignment with shared transatlantic climate objectives, and reduce EU demand for Russian natural gas imports. As part of the first objective, the US says it will strive to increase EU imports in 2022 from the US and other international partners by at least 15 billion cubic metres (bcm), and the Commission has promised to work with Member States to lift demand for US LNG by some 50 bcm per year ‘until at least’ 2030; (in 2021, the EU imported 22 bcm of LNG from the US, and 155 bcm of all forms of natural gas from Russia). Some question the US’s ability to increase LNG exports rapidly, and the EU’s capacity to raise LNG imports, or transport them between Member States.

Prior to these announcements, members of Congress and energy industry trade groups had called on the administration to increase gas and oil exports to partners in Europe, but reportedly faced reluctance as a result of concerns about rising energy prices in the US, and trade-offs between the administration’s European energy security objectives and its ambitions to reduce US greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. On 31 March 2022, the White House announced a ‘historic release’ from the US strategic petroleum reserve of 1 million barrels per day over the following six months, amounting to some 180 million barrels in total. The EU should benefit from the resulting downward pressure on the world oil price.

Efforts in multilateral institutions

The US has also acted in multilateral institutions including the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and General Assembly (UNGA) and the International Court of Justice (ICJ); as well as the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the Group of Twenty (G20); often in tandem with the EU and other partners. On 25 February, one day after Russia’s invasion began, the US co-submitted a UNSC resolution demanding that Russia cease and withdraw. Russia, a permanent UNSC member, vetoed it. A similar text was put to the UNGA on 2 March, with the US voting with 140 other countries in support. On 23 March, the US and 12 other UNSC members abstained on, and so caused to fail, a Russia-proposed resolution on humanitarian access to Ukraine, objecting to language defending Russia’s invasion. On 7 April, the US joined 92 other countries in voting in the UNGA to suspend Russia from the UN’s Human Rights Council. The US welcomed a 16 March ICJ provisional order for Russia to halt its invasion, and on 23 March accused Russia of war crimes (neither the US nor Russia are parties to the ICJ statute). At the WTO, the US joined the EU and 12 other members in declaring on 14 March that they would cease to grant Russia WTO-derived trading privileges and discontinue work towards Belarus’s WTO accession. On 6 April, US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen expressed the view that Russia should be expelled from the G20, and said that the US would boycott G20 meetings involving Russian officials. The White House has also coordinated a collective response from NATO to the invasion, not least by deploying additional forces to Europe, while making it clear that the alliance is not a co-belligerent.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Russia’s war on Ukraine: US response‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clare Ferguson.

While Russia’s invasion of Ukraine continues to dominate the international headlines, Members of the European Parliament return to Strasbourg for the first plenary session in May. Members are expected to debate the implications of the war for cybersecurity and on transport in Europe, as well as on reinforcing the EU’s capacity to act to mitigate the social and economic consequences. Nevertheless, the need for an urgent European Union response to the war has not delayed (and indeed has sometimes accelerated) action on a number of other files on the agenda. A key debate is scheduled with Mario Draghi, Prime Minister of Italy, in the first of a series with Heads of State or Government. The European Commission is expected to make a statement on the ongoing hearings regarding threats to common European values in Poland and Hungary. The President of the European Council, Charles Michel, has been invited to participate in this session’s revived ‘question time’.

As every year, Members are set to carry out their democratic oversight of spending under the EU budget in a joint debate on Wednesday, when they consider 53 reports examining whether EU institutions, agencies and other bodies complied with the rules and the principles of sound financial management in their 2020 expenditure. Firstly, the Committee on Budgetary Control (CONT) recommends that Parliament grant discharge to the European Commission and to all six executive agencies, which are responsible for the bulk of EU budget spending. It also recommends granting separate discharge for the European development funds. The committee insists that the Commission act to end violations of the rule of law and to use the tools it has to make payment of EU funding conditional on respect for EU values. It also highlights the risk of a continuing gap between the high level of commitments and the amount of payments made. It makes recommendations concerning monitoring of expenditure and detection of fraud. On discharge for the other EU institutions, the CONT committee recommends postponing the decision on granting discharge for the European Council and Council, the Court of Auditors and the Economic and Social Committee, and indicates it would table new reports within six months. The committee decries the European Council and Council’s refusal to disclose how it has spent EU taxpayers’ money, a situation that persists since 2009. It also criticises the European Council’s interference in the legislative process, when it has no legislative role. The committee demands clarification of payment of allowances at the Court of Auditors, following media reports of misuse. It also criticises the re-appointment of a member investigated for harassment to the Economic and Social Committee. The committee further proposes that Parliament grant discharge to 9 joint undertakings and 31 of the 32 EU decentralised agencies, where action has largely been taken to remedy previous shortcomings. It wishes to postpone the decision on the European Border and Coast Guard Agency until the agency has addressed the findings of an EU Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) investigation regarding harassment, misconduct and migrant pushbacks, and has shared the outcome with Parliament.

On Monday evening, Parliament is scheduled to consider a proposal which would strengthen limits on the use of certain harmful chemicals. The Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety proposes stricter limits than in the Commission’s proposal for persistent organic pollutants (carbon-based chemicals that get into our bodies through the food chain) in waste. The committee proposes stronger restrictions on chemicals found in incinerated waste, pesticides, water and fireproofing, aiming for a toxic-free environment. The vote in plenary would set Parliament’s position for negotiations with the Council on the proposal.

Balancing the need to protect citizens and to encourage innovation in the digital era is tricky. Looking to the future, Parliament set up its Special Committee on Artificial Intelligence in a Digital Age (AIDA) in 2020, to investigate the challenges of deploying AI technologies and to analyse their impact on the EU economy. The committee has now completed its work and, on Tuesday morning, Members are expected to consider its final report on the potential opportunities and risks as well as measures to ensure the EU becomes a global leader in AI. The report concludes with an urgent call for action to promote a human-centric, trustworthy and inclusive approach to AI, based on fundamental rights, that manages risks while taking full advantage of the benefits.

New technologies are also altering the security domain, providing both an opportunity to enhance EU action to counter serious crime and terrorism and a challenge to protecting personal data. On Tuesday afternoon, Parliament is set to vote on the provisional agreement resulting from interinstitutional negotiations on the proposal to strengthen Europol‘s mandate. While Parliament’s Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) committee supports the proposal, it calls for stronger safeguards, democratic oversight and accountability. If agreed, the proposal will reinforce cooperation with private parties and third countries, encourage research and innovation at Europol, and improve the rules on how the law enforcement agency deals with both data analysis and protection.

Finally, on Monday evening, Members are expected to debate a Committee on Constitutional Affairs report proposing to further harmonise the national rules on European elections. While the rules on eligibility and accessibility are not the same in every EU country at present, revising them would also offer an opportunity to create a Union-wide constituency. This would give citizens two votes (one national, one Union-wide), electing 28 Members to the European Parliament – under strict requirements – through transnational electoral lists and a uniform electoral system. Once the Parliament has adopted its formal proposal, that is transmitted to the Council, which would adopt the new rules, following the Parliament’s consent on the final text. Once adopted, the new regulation would also need to be ratified by each Member State before it can come into force.

Written by Karin Jacobs.

With its Climate Law, the EU has set itself the target of reducing its greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by at least 55 % by 2030, and aims for climate neutrality by 2050. Of the maritime sector’s CO2 emissions, between and 6 and 7 % are generated at berth in ports in the European Economic Area. This calls for a strong focus on the greening of shipping, making port services sustainable and infrastructure for alternative fuels available. In parallel, key maritime and inland ports on the trans-European transport network (TEN-T) need to adapt to the role of strategic multimodal nodes and clean energy hubs.

Fit for 55 proposals: Implications for ports

In July 2021, to align the EU economy with the European Green Deal and the sustainable and smart mobility strategy, the European Commission put forward a first set of legislative proposals, the fit for 55 package. The proposals are interlinked and several have implications for ports. These concern maritime fuels, fuels infrastructure, emissions trading, and energy taxation. In November 2021, the Council reacted by demanding further guidance on the proposals’ overall ambition, and an assessment of their joint impact.

The proposed FuelEU Maritime regulation aims to boost the production and uptake of sustainable, low-carbon fuels in maritime transport, and obliges ships to use on-shore power supply (OPS); ports are expected to facilitate both. The rules apply to ships of more than 5 000 gross tonnes (GT), regardless of their flag. From 2025, limits would be introduced on the carbon intensity of the energy used by vessels, covering around 90 % of the emissions generated. From January 2030, ships staying for more than two hours in a port would have to connect to OPS, unless they used another zero-emission technology. Responsibility would lie with the shipping companies. Non-compliance would lead to penalties, which would feed into an innovation fund to finance the production of renewable maritime fuels and other greening actions in the sector. The investment in the port infrastructure needed will be port-specific and depend on the size and type of traffic. The Commission estimates the total cost of investment in alternative fuels infrastructure over the 2025-2050 period at €9.9 billion: €2.5 billion for hydrogen infrastructure and €7.4 billion for OPS.

Until recently, there was little reliable data to quantify the emissions savings achievable with OPS. However, a 2021 study on CO2 emissions data collected through the EU monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) system shows significant potential savings if the replacement electricity were clean. Italy would have the highest savings in absolute terms (487 kilotonnes (kt)), Sweden the highest reduction in relativesavedshare (99 %). For oil-reliant countries (e.g. Greece, Cyprus) or coal-dominated ones (e.g. Poland, Estonia), the reduced share is low or negative (Figure 1).

Amount of CO2 emissions saved (absolute and relative) in coastal Member States, by using OPS

The proposed regulation on the deployment of alternative fuels infrastructure seeks to ensure the availability of a dense alternative fuels network, including liquefied natural gas (LNG) at EU ports. It requires that, by the beginning of 2030, at least 90 % of demand for OPS be met in TEN-T maritime ports, and sets requirements for OPS for inland waterway vessels at berth. With containerships, cruise ships and passenger ferries using OPS, both greenhouse gas emissions and air pollution in and near ports should decrease. Furthermore, EU Member States would have to install LNG refuelling points in maritime TEN-T ports, and jointly ensure LNG coverage for seagoing ships to circulate throughout the TEN-T network by 2025.

The EU emissions trading system (ETS) is the cornerstone of the EU’s policy to combat climate change and reduce GHG emissions cost-effectively. The proposed ETS review seeks to align the ETS with the EU Climate Law. While requirements for the current ETS sectors will be strengthened, the Commission is proposing to further reduce emission allowances and extend the ETS to the maritime sector by including ships of 5 000 GT and more. The system would cover all energy used in European ports and consumed during voyages between them, and 50 % of the energy used during journeys between EU ports and those in a third country. Penalties from the ETS would feed into an innovation fund targeting climate action. Half of ETS revenues would need to be spent on climate action by Member States, and could also go into the innovation fund. Once the International Maritime Organisation develops a global pricing mechanism, the ETS would be aligned.

With the revision of the Energy Taxation Directive, the Commission has proposed to tax fuels according to their energy content and environmental performance instead of their volume. Fossil fuels, such as those used as bunker fuels in vessels, will no longer be exempt from taxation in EU ports, but will remain untaxed in ports outside of the EU. From 2023, taxes would be introduced over a 10-year period, requiring sufficient market uptake of alternative fuels. Taxation laws, such as this proposal, require unanimity of EU Member States. Other recent Commission legislative proposals affecting EU ports concern the taxonomy rules, defining economic activities that contribute to climate action, and the revised TEN-T guidelines. These legislative proposals need to be negotiated between the European Parliament and Council.

European Parliament views

In its October 2018 resolution on deployment of infrastructure for alternative fuels in the EU, the Parliament called on the Commission to support the decarbonisation of the maritime sector, with a clear focus on innovation, digitisation and adaptation of ports and ships. It also supported the deployment of OPS at both inland and maritime ports. A January 2020 resolution on the Green Deal welcomed the proposal to review the Alternative Fuels Directive, calling on Member States to commit to proper funding and step up the pace for the deployment of innovative strategies, charging infrastructure and alternative fuels at national level.

Ports’ priorities

To implement the changes spelled out in the proposals, ports will need sufficient funding. European Sea Ports (ESPO) asked for better alignment of the FuelEU Maritime and alternative fuels infrastructure regulation (AFIR) proposals, and to ensure a return on OPS investments, conditioned by its mandatory use, possibly accompanied by an EU-wide permanent tax exemption for OPS. The scope of OPS should take into account prioritisation of busy terminals. ESPO also proposed to extend the taxation on bunkering outside of the EU, to safeguard an international level playing field for EU ports. In their view, the ETS should be extended to prevent evasive calls in the neighbouring non-EU ports, and ETS revenues should be re-invested solely in the greening of the sector. Inland navigation stakeholders’ concerns focus on providing OPS under AFIR. For ESPO, the existing grids at inland ports will not be able to address the demands for electricity, making the 2030 target unfeasible. Inland ports insist that OPS should be taxation-free, and seek further EU financial support, including additional funding for port reforms.

Outlook

While the delivery of the European Green Deal remains high on the EU’s political agenda, the war in Ukraine could slow down legislative negotiations, and the expected developments and investments. Energy security imperatives could redefine the requirements, linked to energy supply, including the acceptance of (bio) LNG as a globally available transition fuel. The closure of ports in Ukraine has already disrupted European supply chains, and could further exacerbate pandemic-related congestion at terminals, also putting maritime safety and security at risk. Furthermore, EU ports may have to face the need to apply EU sanctions against Russian-linked vessels, as proposed in the latest sanction package This could be reflected in the forthcoming review of maritime safety rules, for instance in terms of port state control.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘European ports becoming ‘fit for 55’‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Alex Wilson (1st edition).

The Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has triggered serious concerns about EU energy security. The problem is particularly acute in the gas sector, where Russia is the leading third-country supplier, on which several Member States are heavily dependent. To ensure the EU is prepared for the risk of an interruption of gas supplies next winter, the Commission has proposed an urgent regulation on gas storage, requiring Member States to: fill in at least 80 % of their storage capacity by 1 November 2022 (rising to 90 % in subsequent years); carry out the certification of all gas storage system operators; and provide a 100 % tariff discount on entry and exit points into gas storage.

The Commission has suggested that this regulation be agreed under an expedited procedure by the Parliament and the Council, so that it can start taking full effect from summer 2022. The ITRE committee decided to call for use of the urgent procedure (Rule 163) without a committee report, and appointed a negotiating team of MEPs to enter immediately into interinstitutional negotiations with the Council and the Commission. This decision was endorsed during the April plenary session of the European Parliament.

EU storage capacity (TWh) Versions

• April 2022: New EU regulation on gas storage (1st edition)

Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL amending Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 concerning measures to safeguard the security of gas supply and Regulation (EC) No 2009/715 on conditions for access to natural gas transmission networks Committee responsible:Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE)COM(2022) 135
23.3.2022Negotiating team:Jerzy Buzek (EPP, Poland), coordinator
Patrizia Toia (S&D, Italy)
Klemen Grošelj (Renew, Slovenia)
Marie Toussaint (Greens/EFA, France)
Paolo Borchia (ID, Italy)
Zdzislaw Krasnodębski (ECR, Poland)
Sandra Pereira (The Left, Portugal)2022/0090(COD)

Ordinary legislative procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council on
equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Next steps expected:

Written by Katrien Luyten.

Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, over 3.4 million people have already been forced to seek refuge, mostly in neighbouring countries. The European Commission estimates that Russia aggression may have displaced up to 6.5 million people. In response, the European Union swiftly decided to grant EU-wide temporary protection to people arriving from Ukraine.

The EU Temporary Protection Directive (Directive 2001/55/EC) enables EU Member States to move rapidly to offer protection and rights to people in need of immediate protection and to avoid overwhelming national asylum systems in cases of mass arrivals of displaced persons. Although invoked several times in the past, the directive has never been activated before. Russia’s military aggression prompted a unanimous decision in the Council to grant temporary protection (for an initial period of one year) to people fleeing the war in Ukraine. This temporary protection may be extended automatically by two six-monthly periods, for a maximum of another year.

The EU’s decision to grant temporary protection has been widely welcomed and the directive is considered the most appropriate instrument under the current exceptional circumstances. There are, however, still many open questions as to its practical implementation in the EU Member States. The scale of the arrivals entails many immediate as well as longer-term challenges. On the other hand, and in spite of accusations of double standards in favour of ‘white’ or ethnic European refugees, the demonstrations of EU-wide solidarity with the Ukrainian people raise hopes for concrete progress on overall reform of the EU’s migration and asylum rules. At the time of writing, the conflict has already caused civilian casualties and the destruction of hospitals, schools and other civilian infrastructure, creating a humanitarian catastrophe both within Ukraine and beyond its borders.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Temporary protection directive‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Listen to policy podcast ‘Temporary protection directive‘ on YouTube.

Written by Tarja Laaninen.

The European Commission is planning to establish ‘nutrient profiles’, that is, maximum amounts for nutrients such as fat, sugar and/or salt in foods, above which the use of nutrition or health claims would be restricted or forbidden. For example, breakfast cereals exceeding a sugar limit could no longer advertise their fibre or vitamin content.

The Commission was already tasked with setting nutrient profiles to restrict the promotion of food high in fat, sugar and/or salt under the Nutrition and Health Claims Regulation (‘Claims Regulation’) adopted in 2006. Now, in accordance with the action plan accompanying the EU’s ‘farm to fork’ strategy, the Commission will submit a proposal on nutrient profiles by the end of 2022. The proposal will form part of a wider package revising EU legislation on food information supplied to consumers, together with proposals on front-of-pack nutrition labelling, origin labelling, date marking, and labelling of alcoholic beverages.

In the same package, the Commission also intends to solve a problem that has long been puzzling manufacturers and consumers in the herbal and plant products market, namely, that the same product can be classified both as a herbal medicine and as a food, depending on the Member State in which it is sold.

While most consumer organisations and health advocates strongly support the idea of introducing nutrient profiles, opponents caution against overly simplistic labels that punish certain food groups and lead health-conscious individuals to avoid them. The European Parliament has stressed that food information is a potent tool for empowering consumers.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Nutrient profiles: A ‘farm to fork’ strategy initiative takes shape‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Costica Dumbrava (1st edition).

In December 2021, the European Commission presented a proposal to amend the Schengen Borders Code, which lays down the rules governing controls at the EU internal and external borders. While debates on the reform of Schengen have been going on for a while, recent challenges related to the coronavirus pandemic on the one hand, and attempts to instrumentalise migrants as a way to put pressure on the EU’s external borders, on the other, have created new momentum for reform.

The Commission’s proposal aims to improve the Schengen system’s resilience to serious threats, and to adapt it to new challenges. It introduces a new coordination mechanism to deal with health threats at the external borders and a new Schengen safeguard mechanism to provide a common response at the internal borders in situations of threats affecting Member States, including the possibility to directly transfer irregular migrants apprehended at the internal borders back to the competent authorities in the EU country from which it is assumed they just came, without undergoing an individual assessment.

The proposal, which falls under the ordinary legislative procedure, is at the initial stage of the legislative process. In the European Parliament, the proposal has been assigned to the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE). Preliminary discussions have also taken place in the Council.

Versions

• April 2022: Revision of the Schengen Borders Code (1st edition)

Proposal for a Regulation amending Regulation (EU) 2016/399 on a Union Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders Committee responsible:Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE)COM(2021) 891
14.12.2021Rapporteur:Sylvie Guillaume (S&D, France)2021/0428(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Sara Skyttedal (EPP, Sweden)
Malik Azmani (Renew, Netherlands)
Erik Marquardt (Greens/EFA, Germany)
Patryk Jaki (ECR, Poland)
Pernando Barrena Arza (The Left, Spain)Ordinary legislative procedure
(COD) (Parliament and Council
on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Publication of draft report

Written by David de Groot.

Since 2014, the European Parliament and European Commission have been calling on Member States not to grant citizenship in return for investment in the country concerned. Following the invasion of Ukraine by Russian military forces, these calls have intensified, with Member States now being urged to withdraw such citizenship when it has been granted to Russian or Belarusian nationals who are on the sanctions list or support the invasion.

Russian nationals and citizenship or residence by investment schemes

Three Member States (Bulgaria, Cyprus and Malta) currently offer schemes granting nationality on the basis of a financial investment (citizenship by investment (CBI) schemes – or ‘golden passports’). Twelve Member States (Cyprus, Estonia, Greece, Spain, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands and Portugal) offer schemes granting residence permits on the basis of investments (residence by investment (RBI) schemes – or ‘golden visas’).

An October 2021 EPRS study estimated that, between 2011 and 2019, over 132 000 people secured residence or citizenship in EU Member States by means of CBI or RBI schemes. However, for many schemes it is unclear who the beneficiaries are. While Russian nationals are not the biggest group on the global citizenship market, this is different in Cyprus and Malta, where they account for over 50 and 40 %, respectively, of naturalisations granted on the basis of CBI schemes.

In contrast to the above, in the EU – as far as information is available – there has generally been little take-up of RBI schemes by Russian nationals. The exception is Latvia, where the vast majority of approvals originate from Russia. This particular programme has, however, seen a steep decline in admissions since 2014. Most RBI scheme approvals nowadays occur in Greece, Portugal and Spain, where the percentages of Russian applications are lower.

Rethinking policy on golden passports and visas

In a joint statement of 26 February 2022, the European Commission, France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, Canada and the United States, committed, not least, to take ‘measures to limit the sale of citizenship – so called golden passports – that let wealthy Russians connected to the Russian government become citizens of our countries and gain access to our financial systems’.

On 2 March 2022, Malta announced that it had suspended, until further notice, the processing of applications from nationals of the Russian Federation and Belarus. Similarly on 24 March 2022, the Bulgarian Parliament adopted amendments to the Bulgarian Citizenship Act, abolishing the citizenship by investment scheme and requiring a review of previous naturalisations granted.

In a resolution of 9 March 2022, calling on the Commission to make specific legislative proposals on citizenship and residence by investment schemes (2021/2026(INL)), the European Parliament welcomed the commitment announced by the Member States to take measures to limit the sale of citizenship to Russian nationals connected to the Russian government. Nevertheless, Parliament called upon all Member States to stop operating their CBI and RBI schemes for all Russian applicants with immediate effect. It also urged Member States to: reassess all applications from Russian nationals approved over the past few years; exploit all possibilities under national and EU law to ensure that no Russian individual with financial, business or other links to the Putin regime retains their citizenship and residency rights; and temporarily block such individuals from exercising those rights. Parliament also called on the Commission to verify any such reassessments carried out by Member States and to present, as a matter of urgency, a legislative proposal to ban CBI schemes completely and to ban RBI schemes for Russian nationals who are subject to targeted measures.

On 28 March 2022, the European Commission issued a recommendation urging Member States to immediately repeal any existing investor citizenship schemes and to ensure strong checks are in place to address the risks posed by investor residence schemes.

The Commission also recommended that where a person concerned:

• is or becomes subject to EU restrictive measures, or
• where it is otherwise determined that the person concerned significantly supports, by any means, the war in Ukraine or other related activities of the Russian government or the Lukashenko regime that breach international law,

the Member State concerned should immediately assess, in accordance with the principles resulting from the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (C-135/08 Rottmann, C-221/17 Tjebbes), including the principle of proportionality and the protection of fundamental rights, whether naturalisation should be withdrawn from these individuals.

Equally, where such a person had acquired a residence permit on the basis of an RBI scheme, the Commission recommended that such a residence permit should be withdrawn or not renewed.

Member States were also asked to report on the implementation of the recommendation by the end of May, and to keep the Commission informed on a regular basis from May onwards.

On 6 April 2022, the European Commission sent a reasoned opinion to Malta (INFR(2020)2301) regarding its investor citizenship scheme. This is the final stage before the infringement procedure would be referred to the Court of Justice. The Commission considered that the granting of EU citizenship in return for pre-determined payments or investments, without any ‘genuine link’ to the Member State concerned, was in breach of EU law.

On 7 April 2022, after Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy had addressed the Cypriot Parliament calling for an end to the sale of citizenship to Russian nationals, the Cypriot President, Nicos Anastasiades, told reporters that instructions had been given for the revocation of four passports of Russians on the EU’s sanctions list.

Rules applicable to the withdrawal of nationality

According to the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union, when a Member State withdraws its nationality from a person, and as a result EU citizenship, it must make an individual assessment as to the consequences of this loss and the proportionality of the measure. Furthermore, such a withdrawal must – in principle – not lead to statelessness. This rule is laid down in international conventions, for instance under Article 7 of the European Convention on Nationality.

The same Article 7 also sets out the cases in which nationality may be withdrawn, by operation of law or at the initiative of a state party. These include:

‘b) acquisition of the nationality of the State Party by means of fraudulent conduct, false information or concealment of any relevant fact attributable to the applicant;

c) voluntary service in a foreign military force;

d) conduct seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of the State Party;’

These same grounds have been invoked in recent years for the withdrawal of nationality from terrorists, where the requirement of preventing statelessness resulted in the provisions targeting dual nationals, making the citizenship of dual citizens less secure than that of single-nationality citizens and raising questions about citizenship equality. Similarly, distinguishing between naturalised citizens and native citizens for the purpose of citizenship deprivation leads to the creation of different classes of citizens.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Russia’s war on Ukraine: Reassessing ‘citizenship by investment’ schemes‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Sebastian Clapp.

NATO has condemned Russia’s war on Ukraine in the strongest possible terms, and calls it ‘the biggest security threat in a generation’. The Alliance calls on Russia to cease hostilities immediately, withdraw all its forces from Ukraine and work towards a peaceful diplomatic solution. To avoid direct confrontation with Russia, NATO has made clear that it will not deploy forces to Ukraine, which is not a NATO member, nor will it enforce a no-fly zone over Ukraine. The delivery of weapons and equipment to Ukraine (by individual NATO Allies) and the imposition of unprecedented sanctions are being organised predominantly outside the NATO framework. In order to deter further Russian aggression and reassure its Allies, NATO has substantially enhanced its own deterrence posture, with large deployments of troops and equipment to the eastern flank of the Alliance’s territory.

NATO response to Russia’s war on Ukraine

Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, NATO held three extraordinary meetings within a few weeks: meetings of defence ministers, and foreign ministers – both with the participation of partners – and an extraordinary NATO summit. NATO leaders called the Russian war on Ukraine the ’gravest threat to Euro-Atlantic security in decades’ and condemned the invasion in the strongest possible terms. They stressed that Russia must immediately stop the invasion and withdraw its forces from Ukraine. Allies reiterated their resolve in countering Russia’s attempts to destroy the foundations of international security and stability, and to defend its 30 Allies and ‘every inch of Allied territory’. NATO reiterated that it is united and resolute in opposing Russian aggression, and underlined its iron-clad commitment to Article 5, the Alliance’s collective defence clause. The Alliance also condemned Russia’s decision to recognise the separatist regions of eastern Ukraine, and emphasised that it stands with the people of Ukraine and its legitimate, democratically elected president, parliament and government. Allies called on Russia to engage constructively in credible negotiations. NATO also reaffirmed its commitment to NATO’s open door policy. In December 2021, Moscow had issued demands in the form of draft security pacts to the United States and NATO, demanding NATO pull back troops from eastern Europe and cease its open door policy for future members, including Ukraine, which the US and NATO rejected.

NATO support measures for Ukraine following the Russian war on Ukraine

The delivery of weapons and military equipment, as well as the imposition of sanctions, is taking place outside the NATO framework. NATO has repeatedly emphasised its role as a defensive alliance, and that it is not seeking a war with Russia. It has ruled out enforcing a no-fly zone over Ukraine, which would risk the crisis escalating and spilling over into a wider European conflict involving NATO Allies, or even potentially leading to World War III, although experts believe that the latter is unlikely. NATO has also reiterated that it will not deploy forces to Ukraine. At the same time, NATO has warned Russia that it must stop its ‘nuclear sabre-rattling’ and that any use of chemical weapons will have far-reaching consequences. NATO’s strategy has thus been ‘a careful balancing of its defensive mission, its credibility and the need to avoid escalation’. NATO says that it is assisting in the coordination of requests for assistance and supporting Allies in the delivery of humanitarian and non-lethal aid, however details on this are unclear. NATO has also repeatedly expressed support for the delivery of weapons and military equipment to Ukraine by individual NATO Allies. Allies such as the United Kingdom, United States, Canada and EU Member States have provided Ukraine with weapons and equipment. Following a tasking from NATO leaders, at the meeting of foreign ministers on 6-7 April, NATO agreed to further strengthen and sustain support to Ukraine. Allies agreed to do more when it comes to weapons and military support. NATO committed to enhancing practical support to regional partners, including Georgia (e.g. on cyber and situational awareness) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (new defence capacity-building package), but also to increase practical and political cooperation with Asia-Pacific partners (Australia, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand) on issues such as countering disinformation and cyber-threats. Ministers agreed that NATO’s next Strategic Concept (adoption of which is planned at the Madrid Summit in June 2022) must set guidelines for NATO’s future relationship with Russia and provide a roadmap for the Alliance’s adaptation to a more volatile and competitive world.

NATO relations with Ukraine
Ukraine is not a NATO member. While NATO had assured Ukraine in 2008 that it would one day join NATO, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy recently acknowledged that Ukraine will not seek NATO membership, a fact that has been ‘implicitly true’ for a long time, due to opposition from several NATO Allies stemming from a fear of escalating tensions with Russia. In fact, Ukraine was never offered a Membership Action Plan, a key step in the NATO accession process. Despite this, NATO maintains its open-door policy, as any reversal on the matter would breach its founding treaty (Article 10), violate the principles of the European security order and assign blame to NATO enlargement for escalating tensions. Relations with Ukraine date back to 1991, when it joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council. In 1994, Ukraine joined Partnership for Peace, a practical bilateral cooperation programme with NATO. In 1997, the NATO-Ukraine Commission (NUC) was established, to oversee Ukraine’s ‘Euro-Atlantic integration process’. Under its direction, areas of cooperation include, inter alia, building capabilities, including cyber, interoperability measures, training, security and defence reform and exercise participation, with the aim of enhancing Ukraine’s ability to defend itself. Ukraine actively contributes to NATO-led operations and missions: most recently Ukrainian special forces were commended for their role in evacuating 96 Ukrainians and Afghans at high risk from Kabul. In recognition of its strong commitment to NATO, Ukraine became one of six Enhanced Opportunities Partners (alongside Australia, Finland, Georgia, Jordan and Sweden) in 2020, granting it enhanced access to interoperability programmes, exercises and information-sharing. NATO deterrence measures within the Alliance

NATO has significantly enhanced its defence and deterrence measures in response to Russia’s war on Ukraine, through the deployment of elements of the NATO Response Force, a multinational rapid-response force. As a result of substantial reinforcement by NATO Allies, there are currently 40 000 troops under direct NATO command stationed on the eastern flank of the Alliance. Additionally, 130 allied fighter jets and 140 allied ships are in the region, as well as national deployments of troops and weapons by Allies, including the UK, the US, Canada and European allies. Most significantly, US deployments of troops and equipment, such as Patriot missiles, to Europe have been stepped up, with 15 000 more US soldiers since February 2022, bringing the number of US troops stationed in Europe (including western Europe) to a total of 100 000. At the extraordinary NATO Summit on 24 March, leaders agreed to form four further multinational battlegroups, in Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia, bringing the total to eight. This deployment constitutes the ‘biggest reinforcement of Alliance collective defence in a generation’. NATO’s rapid reinforcement strategy ensures that these can be strengthened quickly. NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg recently announced that NATO is working to transform the Alliance’s presence in the east to a large, permanent military presence. NATO had already decided in 2014 to enhance its deterrence posture in the east, following Russia’s annexation of Crimea. And at the 2016 Warsaw Summit, it decided to increase NATO’s forward presence on its eastern flank, an important component of NATO’s deterrence and defence posture and reassurance measure. In 2017 the first four multinational battlegroups were deployed to Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia.

European Parliament position

In an extraordinary plenary session, on 1 March, addressed by President Zelenskyy, Parliament adopted a resolution in which it noted that NATO remains the foundation of the collective defence of the Member States who are NATO allies, and welcomed the unity of the EU and NATO in facing Russian aggression. Parliament encouraged the strengthening of NATO’s enhanced forward presence on the eastern borders, and underlined the need to increase NATO’s collective deterrence posture, preparedness and resilience. Parliament welcomed the activation of NATO’s defence plan as well as the activation of the NATO response forces and their partial deployment in addition to troop deployments from NATO Allies. Parliament encouraged Member States to increase defence budgets, develop more effective capabilities and fully utilise joint EU efforts to strengthen NATO’s European pillar, which increases both NATO and EU security. In 2021, Parliament had adopted a resolution on EU-NATO cooperation, in which it welcomed the intensified cooperation with NATO since the 2016 Warsaw Joint Declaration and 2018 Brussels Joint Declaration, and emphasised that a strong EU-NATO partnership is vital to address the security challenges faced by both organisations. The EP also called on the EU to keep deepening its important partnership with NATO, and noted that, for Member States that are NATO Allies, NATO remains the cornerstone of collective defence.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Russia’s war on Ukraine: NATO response‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Magdalena Psikowska-Schnass.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine aims to deny the sovereign country its right to a distinct identity. Indiscriminate shelling is seriously damaging Ukraine’s cultural heritage. International law sets rules to limit civilian deaths and destruction of cultural heritage, both are war crimes that the international community will need to address.

War in Ukraine: Saving innocent lives, and cultural heritage as an identity factor

When Russia invaded sovereign Ukraine on 24 February 2022, it claimed spiritual and cultural justification. However, Russia had already invaded eastern parts of the country in 2014, resulting in the illegal annexation of Crimea. Since then, Ukraine has been striving to protect its United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) world cultural heritage site in occupied Crimea, the ancient city of Tauric Chersonese and its 5th century BC Chora. Ukraine’s cultural heritage already suffered huge losses during World War II, when the Nazis carried out looting and destruction.

Cultural heritage in illegally annexed Crimea
The peninsula is rich in cultural heritage and has been subject to politically motivated interventions and russification of its history. There has been unlawful transfer of artefacts to Russia and illegal archaeological excavations, the findings of which have been exported to Russia or sold on the black market. The unique cultural heritage of Crimean Tatars has been destroyed and biased conservation works have obscured its origins. Threat to UNESCO world cultural heritage sites and cultural institutions in Ukraine

For weeks, Russian troops targeted Kyiv, home to UNESCO cultural heritage site Pechersk Lavra and Saint Sophia Cathedral. Besides sites in Kyiv and Crimea, the UNESCO list includes Lviv’s old town and three other sites (see map). Seventeen further sites are candidates for inclusion, featuring on UNESCO’s tentative list. Among them, the historic centre of Chernihiv, Kharkiv’s skyscraper, Derzhprom, the archaeological ‘Stone Tomb’ site, have all been affected by heavy fighting. As the frontline moves, other sites, such as the historic centre of Odesa and the Mykolayiv astronomical observatory, face serious danger of destruction.

Map: UNESCO cultural heritage sites, and cultural losses in Ukraine

However, the destruction of cultural sites across the country provoked by the Russian war has so far spared the western regions. The international press reports UNESCO’s preliminary list of cultural losses by the end of March 2022 included 29 religious sites, 16 historic buildings, 4 museums and 4 monuments. The Holocaust Memorial Centre in Drobitsky near Kharkiv, where the Nazis killed thousands of Jews, is among them. The Ivankiv Historical-Cultural Museum, north of Kyiv, was destroyed on 28 February 2022. The fate of its collection of 25 paintings by Ukrainian folk artist Maria Prymachenko, praised by Picasso and Chagall, is unknown.

International concerns and conventions

Crimes against human life and crimes against culture ‘are simply two different stages in the same violent process of ethnic cleansing and genocide’. The 1954 Hague Convention set rules for the protection of cultural property from destruction and looting during armed conflicts. Russia and Ukraine are both parties to the Convention. The text established a blue shield as an easily identifiable sign of immunity attributed to cultural property. The notion of intentional destruction of cultural property as a war crime is further developed in the 2017 UN Security Council Resolution 2347. This text was a reaction to cultural destruction carried out by Islamic State.

War crimes against cultural property
Armed groups intentionally destroyed the mausoleums at Timbuktu, a UNESCO cultural heritage site, and burned their manuscripts in 2012, during the occupation of northern Mali. Since then, the peacekeeping forces’ mandate also includes the protection of cultural heritage. In 2016, the International Criminal Court (ICC) convicted the perpetrator, who recognised his responsibility, and sentenced him to nine years of imprisonment and €2.7 million in reparations. The EU contributed to the reconstruction of the mausoleums.

UNESCO’s Director-General has stated that Ukraine’s cultural heritage must be safeguarded, ‘as a testimony of the past but also as a catalyst for peace and cohesion for the future, which the international community has a duty to protect and preserve’. Its Committee for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict held an extraordinary meeting on 18 March 2022 to discuss the situation. The Committee granted preliminary financial assistance of US$50 000 for emergency measures, such as in situ protection and the evacuation of cultural property. The committee also envisaged the potential inclusion of some of Ukraine’s cultural heritage property on the International List of Cultural Property under Enhanced Protection, established by the 1999 Second Protocol.

Efforts to duly display a blue shield emblem, identify needs for material and skills support to shield buildings and statues from shelling, protect artefacts from damage and move them to museum cellars or safe havens have intensified. International bodies and specialists in cultural heritage preservation hold regular online meetings to discuss technicalities. As a result, on 9 March 2022, an appeal from the newly established Centre to Rescue Ukraine’s Cultural Heritage in Lviv enumerated material and financial needs.

Many countries and cultural institutions have answered the call for assistance. Nemo, the Network of European Museum Organisations, provides information about available support from across Europe for Ukrainian museums and their professionals. The Committee for Aid to Museums of Ukraine was established by 26 Polish museums, to help secure their collections and provide support. The Nordic Museum in Stockholm has started a fund to provide finance for the National Museum of Ukrainian History in Kyiv. France, the Netherlands and Italy sent tonnes of much needed materials.

The digitisation of collections is a way to preserve cultural works for the future. The Europeana platform issued a statement of support for Ukraine and displays digitised collections of Ukrainian cultural heritage. Saving Ukrainian Cultural Heritage Online (SUCHO), a group of more than 1 300 librarians, archivists, researchers and programmers, are working together to identify and archive at-risk sites, digital content, and data in Ukrainian cultural heritage institutions.

Under the French Presidency of the Council of the European Union, culture ministers, deeply concerned about preservation of cultural heritage, unanimously adopted a declaration on the situation in Ukraine on 7 March 2022. In June 2021, the Council recognised the role of cultural heritage for peace and called for its protection during armed conflicts and its integration into the EU toolbox for conflicts and crises.
The European Parliament’s Culture and Education Committee hosted a debate on 15 March 2022 on how Russia’s biased interpretation of history denies Ukrainian identity.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Russia’s war on Ukraine’s cultural heritage‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Eric Pichon and Martin russell.

While the UN Human Development Index, which assesses progress in the standard of living, health and education, ranks Russia among the ‘very high human development’ countries, other data suggest a more nuanced reality.

Russia has gone from Soviet-era egalitarianism to extremes of wealth and poverty. Economic growth during the first decade under Vladimir Putin’s leadership slightly reduced the gap between rich and poor, but inequality is still higher than in most developed countries. Factors such as corruption and low taxes for the rich exacerbate the income gap. Free public healthcare and a relatively inclusive education system apparently mitigate inequality. However, many hospitals are ill-equipped, and universities struggle to compare with foreign counterparts.

Since 2014 and the invasion of Crimea, Russians’ living conditions have deteriorated. Russia’s war of aggression on Ukraine and the imposition of Western sanctions is already placing a burden on the poorest members of Russian society, as prices increase and staple goods begin to run out. The social contract between Russians and Putin, often considered as one in which citizens ceded certain freedoms and civil liberties in exchange for stability and prosperity, is now under strain.

This briefing is partly based on and updates previous EPRS publications on socioeconomic inequality and on the education system.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Human development in Putin’s Russia: What the data tell us‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Russia’s 15-year-olds’ ability to use their knowledge and skills Public spending in Russia, Ukraine and the EU on health, education and the armed forces Official and perceived poverty in Russia: A huge gap Income and wealth inequalities in Russia and Europe in 2021 Income and wealth inequalities in Russia over time Total unemployment: Russia, EU and Ukraine (% of total labour force) Human Development Index scores for EU, Russia, Ukraine and the world GDP per capita and its annual growth in EU, Russia and Ukraine

Written by Magdalena Pasikowska-Schnass.

The EU institutions engage in regular structured dialogue with representatives of churches, and religious, non-confessional and philosophical organisations, on the basis of Article 17 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).

This dialogue, which takes the form of high-level meetings or working-level discussions, is focused on policy issues on the European agenda. It traces its origins to earlier initiatives, such as that launched in 1994 by Jacques Delors – ‘A soul for Europe’ – which aimed to find ways to build an ethical, moral and spiritual dimension into European integration and policy-shaping. The draft Constitutional Treaty of 2004 included provisions on regular, open and transparent dialogue between EU institutions, and representatives of churches and religious communities, and of non-confessional or philosophical communities. Although the Constitutional Treaty was rejected in referendums in France and the Netherlands, its successor, the Lisbon Treaty, adopted in 2007 and in force since December 2009, preserved the same provisions in its Article 17 TFEU.

The European Parliament has stressed the importance of constant dialogue among, and with, religious and non-confessional and philosophical communities. Following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, it sought to give substance to the provisions of Article 17 TFEU, primarily through organising dialogue on subjects of interest for the EU and its citizens. The European Commission and the Council also hold regular Article 17 TFEU dialogue sessions and high-level meetings.

This is a further updated version of a briefing last issued in November 2020.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Article 17 TFEU: Dialogue with churches, and religious and philosophical organisations‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Citizens often turn to the European Parliament to ask what the European Union (EU) is doing to fight disinformation and the ‘infodemic’.

A growing number of governments, as well as foreign and domestic non-state actors such as extremist movements, are using increasingly sophisticated techniques, including algorithms, automation and artificial intelligence to spread disinformation (meaning deliberately deceptive information) in Europe. With the war in Ukraine, foreign and particularly Russian actors are increasingly interfering in the media and on social networks. One of their main aims is to create confusion and polarise society, thus undermining democracy. The EU has stepped up its efforts to protect its democratic processes from manipulation.

Action taken by the European Parliament

The European Parliament has consistently pushed for a joint European response to disinformation and called for more resources to fight disinformation in EU countries and its neighbourhood. It has done so via its budgetary powers, as well as through hearings and resolutions (further details are available here).

In a resolution of March 2022, based on the work of a Special Committee on Foreign Interference in all Democratic Processes in the European Union, including Disinformation (INGE), Parliament acknowledges that the EU’s lack of awareness and counter-measures makes it attractive to interference by malicious foreign actors, endangering democracy. It therefore calls for:

• a common strategy and a series of specific measures, such as, banning Russian propaganda channels and requiring platforms to do their part to reduce information manipulation and interference,
• more public funding for independent, pluralistic, and widely-distributed media and fact-checking institutions,
• preventing foreign actors from hiring former high-level politicians.

In March 2022, Parliament set up a new special Committee on Foreign Interference (INGE2). The committee will identify gaps in EU legislation that could be exploited for malicious purposes. It will have a year to present its recommendations.

The European Parliament’s anti-disinformation team monitors and analyses disinformation, cooperates with other institutions and civil society, and organises training and awareness raising activities. The unit can be contacted at europarl-spox@ep.europa.eu. The Parliament also has a webpage on ‘How to fight disinformation‘ and shares in-house research as well as information on media literacy and reliable sources through its social media channels.

Action taken by the EU as a whole

The EU’s 2018 action plan against disinformation and the 2020 European democracy action plan have resulted:

• more support, including funding and training, for quality journalism and media literacy,
• a code of practice on disinformation (see related Q&A) between leading social networks, online platforms and advertisers. The signatories commit to employing best practices against disinformation, taking down fake accounts and reporting on their actions. In May 2021, the Commission published guidance to strengthen this code – more information in this press release),
• a digital services act, proposed by the European Commission in December 2020. This aims to create a safer digital space in which the fundamental rights of all users of digital services are protected (more information here).
• the InVID project (which stands for ‘In video veritas‘ – or ‘In video, there is truth’), partly funded by the EU. The project aims to tackle the problem of fake videos on social media, which spread conspiracy theories and other falsehoods. The platform allows users to carry out a reverse image search of videos to detect whether the images have been used in a different context and/or manipulated.
• an EU-supported Social Observatory for Disinformation and Social Media Analysis (SOMA), bringing European fact-checking organisations and researchers together to fight against disinformation.

Action taken by the European Council

Faced with the threat of Kremlin disinformation campaigns, the EU set up an ‘East Strat Com Task force‘ in March 2015. The Task Force exposes false claims from actors close to Russia that seek to undermine the EU and manages a debunking site called ‘EUvsDisinfo‘.

EU countries and institutions now have a Rapid Alert System (RAS), which helps them to share knowledge about disinformation. The system was used ahead of the European elections in May 2019, and to combat false information about coronavirus during the pandemic.

Coronavirus and the ‘infodemic’

The coronavirus public health emergency triggered an ‘infodemic’ – a confusing flood of information, not all of which is accurate. To help people to find science-based answers to their questions, the European Parliament’s European Science-Media Hub (ESMH) set up a dedicated website that includes a list of useful fact-checking initiatives.

Further reading

• How to spot when news is fake, animated graphic available in all EU languages, European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS), February 2019
• Trump’s disinformation ‘magaphone’: Consequences, first lessons and outlook, Briefing, European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS), February 2021
• Foreign interference in democracies, Topical Digest, Special Committee on Foreign Interference in all Democratic Processes in the European Union, including Disinformation (INGE), September 2020
• The sharp power of knowledge: Foreign authoritarian meddling in academia, Study, European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS), December 2019
• Regulating disinformation with artificial intelligence, Study, European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS), March 2019

Keep sending your questions to the Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (Ask EP)! We reply in the EU language that you use to write to us.

Written by Ralf Drachenberg.

The role of the European political parties, often under-estimated in the past, has increased significantly over the years. Today, they are important coordinators within the EU political system, carrying out a variety of activities that can be classified conceptually as ‘vertical’, ‘horizontal’ and ‘diagonal’ coordination.

This EPRS study explores the growing ‘politicisation’ of the European Council and the increased coordination role which European political parties appear to play in the context of the European Council.

The parties’ main coordination activities are clearly their respective ‘pre-summits’, held just ahead of European Council meetings. These pre-summits serve multiple purposes for the parties – including coordinating positions for the imminent European Council discussions, long-term strategising, communication, socialising and networking – with the importance of each varying between the different parties.

A case study looking at the nomination of the EU’s new institutional leadership in 2019 illustrates the importance of the European political parties’ role in coordinating between EU leaders in the European Council.

Read this study on ‘European political parties and the European Council: A pattern of ever closer coordination?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Ivana Katsarova.

Under Vladimir Putin’s watch, Russia hosted the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi and the 2018 FIFA World Cup. Other authoritarian regimes, such as China’s and Qatar’s, have engaged in similar ‘sports-washing’ activities to gain international credibility and divert attention from their troublesome human rights records. However, Putin’s decision to invade Ukraine put an end to sport’s neutrality. In the past few weeks, multiple sports governing bodies and international federations have moved to exclude Russia from major sporting events, thus depriving its regime of a precious soft power.

The end of sport’s neutrality

Russia invaded Georgia in 2008, a year after the International Olympic Committee (IOC) had awarded the 2014 Winter Olympic Games to Sochi. Six years later, on the day of the games’ closing ceremony, Russia invaded and subsequently annexed Crimea. Notwithstanding Russia’s continuing occupation of the region, FIFA – the international football governing body – decided to hold the men’s World Cup in Russia in 2018.

Liaisons dangereuses
Sponsorship is a handy tool for regimes seeking to cleanse their reputation, and Russia has used it to this end while also promoting its business interests. The way Russian state-owned gas producer Gazprom has invested in some European national leagues often speaks of these business interests.
Gazprom was the main sponsor of Schalke 04 – a football club based in one of Germany’s coal-producing districts – since 2007, when Germany was shifting away from coal to natural gas and when the Nord Stream 1 pipeline – owned and operated by Gazprom – was entering its final design stage. On 28 February, Schalke 04 announced that it had terminated its partnership with Gazprom.
Similarly, in 2010, Gazprom became the main sponsor of FC Red Star Belgrade, just when the Serbian government was considering signing agreements for the construction of the South Stream pipeline. The club has resisted pressure to distance itself from Gazprom, with UEFA arguing ‘it is a matter for individual clubs’.

Fast forward to 24 February 2022: Russia’s military assault on Ukraine provoked a somewhat different response, which put an end to sport’s neutrality. Indeed, the IOC condemned Russia’s breach of the Olympic Truce adopted by the UN General Assembly and, after initial hesitation, on 28 February it called on individual federations to ban Russian athletes from participating in any international events until further notice. The International Paralympic Committee followed suit on 3 March: in a reversal, citing threats by several federations to boycott the 2022 Winter Paralympics, it banned Russian (and Belarussian) athletes from competing in the games.

Similarly, in a joint statement of 28 February, FIFA and UEFA (the Union of European Football Associations) announced their decision to suspend ‘all Russian teams, whether national representative teams or club teams … from participation in both FIFA and UEFA competitions until further notice’. In recent history, only South Africa faced similar sanctions during the apartheid era. The Russian Football Union unsuccessfully appealed the ban to the Court of Arbitration for Sport, which upheld the sanctions.

FIFA and UEFA’s decision came after they came under intense pressure from individual countries to go further in their sanctions, with FIFA initially having stated that Russia could compete as the ‘Football Union of Russia’ and play matches outside the country. Indeed, Poland, Sweden and Czechia refused to play World Cup play-off games against Russia. England, Scotland and Wales quickly followed suit. UEFA also decided to strip Putin’s hometown, St Petersburg, of the Champions League final, the most important club football event of the year. Similarly, UEFA terminated a deal worth €40 million a season with energy company Gazprom (see box), a major sponsor of the Champions League since 2012.

Experts argue that the IOC’s, FIFA’s and UEFA’s latest reactions have been opportunistic: seemingly, the bodies remained neutral for a long time to preserve their commercial ambitions and only reacted when they felt the need to move in line with global opinion.

In parallel, almost 40 sports and culture ministers from around the world – including from Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan and the UK, which together with the US make up the G7 club of most developed economies – published a statement calling on international sports federations to cut ties with Russia and ‘show solidarity with the people of Ukraine’.

Spurred on by the overwhelming global public outrage against the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the spirit of solidarity with the Ukrainian people, dozens of international sports federations severed their ties with Russia and banned its national teams from participation in international competitions.

The Association of Tennis Professionals (ATP) relocated the 2022 St Petersburg Open to Kazakhstan. The International Tennis Federation (ITF) cancelled all events in Russia, excluded its team from international events and suspended the Russian Tennis Federation’s membership. However, the ATP and the World Tennis Association (WTA) refused to yield to international pressure and allowed individual players to continue taking part in competitions, but not under the Russian national flag. The ATP, the WTA, the ITF and the four Grand Slam tournaments donated US$700 000 in support of the Tennis Plays for Peace campaign, which aims to provide humanitarian relief to Ukraine, and to the Ukraine Tennis Federation.

Three of Russia’s most popular winter sports – ice hockey, biathlon and figure skating – were also impacted. The International Ice Hockey Federation, the International Biathlon Union and the International Skating Union banned all athletes from Russia from events until further notice.

The International Volleyball Federation suspended all Russian national teams, clubs and officials; stripped Russia of the right to host the 2022 Volleyball Men’s World Championship in August 2022; and will relocate games that were to take place in Russia in June and July. The European Volleyball Confederation announced a similar ban. The International Basketball Federation and the International Gymnastics Federation followed suit.

EU and sports movement’s response

On 4 April, under the French Presidency of the Council, the EU ministers for sport backed initiatives to help Ukrainian athletes continue their activities. The French Minister for Sport, Roxana Maracineanu, praised in particular sports clubs from EU countries for receiving Ukrainian sportsmen and women, providing them with the necessary infrastructure and equipment, and integrating Ukrainian athletes into clubs and teams.

Initiatives undertaken by the sports movement
The Hungarian Swimming Association has helped host Ukraine’s junior national swimming team to enable athletes to continue their training. The Italian Swimming Federation has offered a training camp to 12 elite swimmers and four coaches from Ukraine. Italy has also hosted Ukraine’s national artistic swimming team and 30 young Ukrainian volleyball players. Similarly, a semi-professional female soccer team that fled the war in Ukraine has found shelter and a new training ground at the German Bundesliga club 1.FC Cologne. National canoe federations across Europe have also offered joint support to Ukrainian athletes affected by the ongoing conflict. The International Canoe Federation is coordinating assistance provided to over 120 people, including 51 senior athletes, 51 juniors and 25 paracanoe athletes. Senior athletes have been offered accommodation in Romania and Bulgaria, while junior ones have been welcomed at various sites in Poland, Hungary, France, Germany and Estonia.

EU ministers also watched a video testimony from their Ukrainian counterpart, Vadym Huttsait, who called for more sanctions against Russian and Belarussian athletes.

Spyros Capralos, president of the European Olympic Committees, recalled the collaboration with national Olympic committees from Poland, Finland, Estonia, Romania, Austria and Italy in offering accommodation and sports equipment to Ukrainian athletes.

Assistance from the Olympic Movement
The wider Olympic Movement has also provided humanitarian assistance to the Ukrainian sports community. Olympic champion and IOC Member Sergii Bubka, in his capacity as president of the National Olympic Committee of Ukraine, has been tasked by the IOC with coordinating the various projects. The IOC has already released an initial US$200 000 to address the most pressing issues and is prepared to help coordinate all humanitarian action in the long term through the Olympic Refuge Foundation.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Russia’s war on Ukraine: Impact on athletes and sports competitions‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Frederik Scholaert.

The Russian war against Ukraine has a significant impact on the EU seafood sector. Increased prices for energy and raw materials have led to high operating costs for fishermen, aquaculture farmers and fish-processing companies. The European Commission has responded with emergency measures, adapting State aid rules and activating exceptional support from the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund (EMFAF).

Impact

The EU fisheries and aquaculture sector was affected by rising energy prices in the course of 2021, and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has led to a further escalation in energy costs. Marine gasoil prices are reaching peaks that are more than double compared to early 2021 (see Figure 1). Prices are exceeding €1 per litre in many EU countries, while, according to the sector, EU vessel operations are only profitable up to €0.60 per litre. Many EU fishermen are mooring their boats and warning of a shortage of fresh fish. Black Sea fisheries face direct impacts from the war, in particular for Romanian vessels that used to fish close to Ukrainian waters and are now advised to stay away from the conflict zone. Aquaculture and fish processing companies are also affected by increased energy costs, as well as by high logistic costs and trade disruption. Although import bans do not cover seafood from Russia (apart from caviar and shellfish products added in the fifth round of sanctions), trade flows are severely hampered, particularly affecting EU fish-processing companies that rely heavily on supplies of whitefish from Russia.

Average monthly marine gas oil prices for the three main EU fishing countries (Jan 2016-Mar 2022). Emergency measures

An exchange of views took place in Parliament’s Committee on Fisheries on 16 March 2022, with Members calling for support for operating costs, to prevent a complete closure of the sector. A joint statement by 13 Member States, submitted ahead of the Agriculture and Fisheries Council on 21 March 2022, urged the European Commission to come up with specific proposals. Parliament’s resolution on food security, adopted on 24 March 2022, called for broad emergency measures for the seafood sector, including compensation for income lost, support for temporary cessation of activities and storage aid.

On 23 March 2022, the Commission adopted a temporary State aid framework to support the economy in the context of Russia’s invasion. It allows Member States to grant fishery and aquaculture companies up to €35 000, to provide liquidity support in the form of state guarantees and subsidised loans, and to provide aid to compensate for high energy prices. Measures under the framework can be combined with aid under permanent State aid rules and are valid retroactively from 1 February until the end of 2022.

On 25 March 2022, the Commission triggered the EMFAF Regulation crisis mechanism (Article 26(2)), by declaring the occurrence of an exceptional event causing significant disruption to markets. This allows Member States to compensate operators for lost income or additional costs, as well as producer organisations that store fishery products. Member States can define specific measures in their operational programmes and the support will be available from 24 February 2022 until the end of the year. In addition, a possible upcoming amendment to the fund for the previous programming period, the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund (EMFF), could free up remaining unused budget from that fund to help the sector.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Support for the fishing, aquaculture and fish-processing sectors‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.