European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Katarzyna Sochaka and Clare Ferguson.

The highlight of the September 2022 plenary session was the annual address by the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, on the State of the European Union (SOTEU). Ukraine’s First Lady, Olena Zelenska, was present for SOTEU and the debate that followed, where Russian aggression in Ukraine was again an important point. A ‘This is Europe’ debate was held with the Prime Minister of Finland, Sanna Marin. Members also debated Council and Commission statements on the EU response to the increase in energy prices in Europe, the urgent need for action at EU level to ensure humane treatment of migrants in Europe, the consequences of extreme weather phenomena and increasing EU efforts to fight climate change, and on the ecological disaster in the Oder River. Debates also took place on the state of the SME Union, surveillance and predator spyware systems in Greece, and the situation in the Strait of Taiwan.

Energy efficiency and renewable energy

Reducing consumption and boosting use of renewables will be key to helping Europe weather the energy crisis. Members debated and adopted positions based on two Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE) reports on proposals from the ‘fit for 55’ package (the EU’s plans to achieve climate neutrality by 2050). Parliament adopted its position on the proposal to revise the Energy Efficiency Directive, by a large majority. To fight climate change and rising energy prices, the Parliament therefore seeks a more ambitious reduction in both primary and final consumption. The ITRE report proposes binding national contributions based on Member States’ consumption levels, setting milestones in 2025 and 2027, and targets energy consumption in public buildings. Members also voted overwhelmingly in favour of a second ITRE report, on revising the Renewable Energy Directive. The committee supports the new 45 % renewable energy sources target, and seeks further innovative renewable energy and storage technology targets, to improve flexibility to cope with peaks in demand. The report also proposes tightening sustainability criteria for biomass and accelerating grants for renewables permits. It sets more ambitious targets for the transport sector and greater promotion of renewable fuels in the maritime sector. The results of the votes set Parliament’s position on the files for interinstitutional negotiations with the Council.

Adequate minimum wages

While EU governments set their own minimum wage levels, Members debated and adopted a provisional agreement on new EU legislation to ensure minimum wage protection is available to workers throughout the EU and thus will lead to a decent standard of living. Parliament has succeeded in enhancing workers’ access to a minimum wage in the proposal, setting an 80 % threshold for collective bargaining. Under the new rules, statutory minimum wages should be updated every two (or four, if indexed) years. Member States have two years to transpose the directive into national law.

Deforestation regulation

Despite their crucial role in mitigating climate change, the loss of forests to agricultural expansion is becoming acute, driven by production of agricultural commodities, many of which are exported to the EU. Demanding that companies ensure the products they sell in the EU are not the result of deforestation, Members adopted a report from the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI) by a large majority. In its report on the European Commission’s response to Parliament’s demands to tackle the issue by introducing new rules on export due diligence, the committee calls for the proposed deforestation regulation to cover a significantly higher level of minimum controls on a wider range of commodities, set stronger penalties and mandatory compensation, and protect human rights. The result of the vote sets Parliament’s position for negotiations with the Council on the proposal.

Interim report on the 2021 proposal for a revision of the MFF

Members adopted a Committee on Budgets (BUDG) report on the 2021 proposal for a revision of the multiannual financial framework (MFF), setting out the Parliament’s position before the Council formally asks for its consent to the revision. The revision is needed to raise the MFF ceilings to incorporate the social climate fund and to introduce an automatic annual adjustment of the MFF ceilings based on new own resources, to allow for the repayment of Next Generation EU borrowing. The BUDG committee report also calls for additional funding to help vulnerable household and transport users in the transition to climate neutrality. The report supports the use of all available Union budget instruments to provide economic and financial support, both to Ukraine and to help EU citizens face the consequences of Russia’s aggression.

Draft amending budget No 2/2022

Noting that implementation of the EU’s 2021 budget left a high surplus (over €3.2 billion), mostly from higher than expected customs revenues, competition fines and some under-spending, Members also adopted a BUDG report on an amending budget. Draft amending budget No 2/2022 (DAB 2/2022) will therefore enter this sum as revenue in the 2022 budget, reducing Member State contributions accordingly.

Statute and funding of European political parties and foundations

Parliament adopted a Committee on Constitutional Affairs (AFCO) report on the proposal to revise the rules applicable to European political parties and foundations. The AFCO report proposes that parties from Council of Europe members that are not EU Member States should be eligible to become European parties, and proposes changes to their financing. To ensure parties comply with EU values, the committee proposes to streamline the deregistration procedures, particularly in cases where parties have not met standards on transparency, gender balance or the use of political advertising.

Fisheries measures

In a joint debate on fisheries measures, Members adopted two Fisheries Committee (PECH) reports. The first highlights the importance of transposing the new 2022 conservation measures for north-west Atlantic fisheries management. The EU is a party to the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO), and is therefore obliged to transpose new NAFO measures, so that they apply to EU vessels. The EU is also party to the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC), and Members also adopted a PECH report on a provisional agreement to transpose the WCPFC management measures for tuna fisheries.

Renewed partnership with the Southern Neighbourhood

Members adopted a Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) report on a renewed partnership with the Southern Neighbourhood, which comes as the effects of Russia’s war on Ukraine are being felt in the region, not least on food security. The AFET report urges action to seize the momentum to boost long-term growth and development through economic cooperation. It also encourages promotion of regional integration in the southern Mediterranean, with a view to establishing a Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area.

Question time: The state of play of the war in Ukraine

During Question Time, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the Commission, Josep Borrell, debated the state of play of the war in Ukraine with Members, noting that EU sanctions are helping Ukraine to continue to defend itself against Russian aggression.

Opening of trilogue negotiations

Members confirmed, without votes, mandates for negotiation: two from the Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO) Committee, on the proposal for a regulation on standardisation organisations concerning European standards and European standardisation deliverables, and on the proposal for a directive on consumer credits; from the BUDG and Budgetary Control (CONT) committees on a proposal for a regulation on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union; as well as a mandate from the PECH committee on a proposal for a regulation on restrictions to the access to Union waters.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Plenary round-up – September 2022‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clément Evroux (1st edition).

The COVID-19 pandemic has shone a light on the growing importance of digital health technologies, both to enable remote medical care and to facilitate the health response by international, national and local authorities. At the same time, personal health data have been key for containment measures such as the EU digital COVID-19 certificate.

The European Commission’s proposal for a regulation on a European health data space aims to improve individuals’ access to and control of their electronic personal data (primary use), while facilitating data re-use for societal good across the EU (secondary use). Grounded in the EU data strategy, which mentions health as one of the nine European common data spaces, it cuts across several other EU policy priorities, such as the health union and the digital single market.

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The proposal establishes a set of rules, infrastructure and governance mechanisms to promote both primary and secondary uses of electronic health data, while ensuring data protection and strengthening cybersecurity.

The Commission expects the initiative to have a broad socio-economic impact, ranging from improving people’s health, to facilitating the uptake of evidence-based policy-making. Its success is thought to depend not only on the capacity to implement the legal basis effectively, but also on broader conditions such as EU-wide connectivity, social trust and digital skills.

The legislative procedure is in its early stages. A European Parliament rapporteur has not yet been appointed.

Versions

• European health data space (1st edition)

Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the Union Health Data Space Committee responsible:Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE)COM(2022) 0197
3.5.2022Rapporteur:2022/0140(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Ordinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Publication of draft report

Written by Carla Stamegna (1st edition).

In July 2021, the European Commission tabled a proposal to establish a new EU authority to counter money laundering and the financing of terrorism (AMLA), in the context of a package of legislative proposals aimed at implementing the 2020 action plan for a comprehensive Union policy on preventing money laundering and the financing of terrorism. The AMLA would be the centre of an integrated system composed of the Authority itself and the national authorities with an AML/CFT supervisory mandate. It would also support EU financial intelligence units (FIUs) and establish a cooperation mechanism among them.

The Council achieved a partial political agreement on the proposal on 29 June 2022. In Parliament, the file was referred to the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs ECON) and the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE). The co-rapporteurs issued their joint report in May 2022.

Versions

• Anti-money-laundering authority (AMLA): Countering money laundering and the financing of terrorism (1st edition)

Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the Authority for Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism and amending Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010, (EU) 1094/2010, (EU) 1095/2010 Committees responsible:Economic and Monetary Affairs ECON) and Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE)COM(2021) 421
20.7.2021Co-rapporteurs:Luis Garicano (Renew, Spain); Emil Radev (EPP, Bulgaria)2021/0240(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Isabel Benjumea Benjumea (EPP, Spain); Caterina Chinnici (S&D, Italy); Pedro Marques (S&D, Portugal); Ramona Strugariu (Renew, Romania); Gwendoline Delbos-Corfield (Greens/EFA, France); Ernest Urtasun (Greens/EFA, Spain); Gunnar Beck (ID, Germany); Annalisa Tardino (ID, Italy); Joachim Stanisław Brudziński (ECR, Poland); Andżelika Anna Możdżanowska (ECR, Poland); Clare Daly (The Left, Ireland); Martin Schirdewan (The Left, Germany)Ordinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Adoption of report in committee

Written by Costica Dumbrava.

The EU has imposed progressively harsher sanctions on Russia, first in response to Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014, and then in response to its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Successive packages of EU sanctions, adopted in the framework of the EU’s common foreign and security policy, include entry restrictions for specific individuals linked to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine.

After partially suspending the EU-Russia visa facilitation agreement in February 2022, the Council decided to fully suspend the agreement in September 2022. This made the visa application process for all Russian nationals more expensive, lengthier and subject to increased scrutiny.

The EU Visa Code, which lays down common procedures and conditions for issuing short-stay (Schengen) visas, requires the competent authorities of the Schengen states to examine and decide on each individual visa application. An individual assessment is also required by the Schengen Borders Code when carrying out checks at the EU’s external borders.

In both contexts, the competent authorities of the Schengen state concerned need to assess whether individuals pose a threat to public policy, internal security, public health or international relations. Moreover, an individual who has previously obtained a Schengen visa may still be denied entry into the territory of a Schengen state based on the (separate) risk assessment carried out during the border check. Neither the Visa Code nor the Schengen Borders Code contain provisions on imposing generalised visa or entry bans, however.

Read the complete briefing on ‘EU entry restrictions in relation to Russia’s war on Ukraine‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Number of Schengen visas issued at consulates in 2020-2021 Number of Schengen visas issued at consulates in Russia in 2021

Written by Marcin Grajewski.

The European Union is debating how to respond to the energy crisis resulting from Russia’s war on Ukraine. Energy prices are surging in the EU and elsewhere, as Russia curtails fossil fuel exports with the aim of pressing the Union to reduce its support for Ukraine. Gas prices are now some ten times their average over the last decade. Individual EU governments are offering their citizens and businesses financial relief, but they face the dilemma of balancing this aid with allowing energy prices to grow in order to discourage consumption. Some countries are reopening polluting coal-fired power plants and delaying closures of nuclear energy generators.

The European Commission proposed, in September, EU-wide measures against Russia’s energy market manipulation. They would force firms and individuals to use less energy in certain circumstances, and envisage windfall charges on some power generators, which would be returned to consumers. It offers liquidity aid for energy firms and proposes a cap on the price of Russian gas. EU energy ministers discussed the ideas on 9 September, but reached no firm conclusions.

This note gathers links to the recent publications and commentaries from many international think tanks on the energy market. Earlier analyses of high energy prices can be found in a previous edition of the ‘What Think Tanks are Thinking’ series.

A grand bargain to steer through the European Union’s energy crisis
Bruegel, September 2022

Gazprom: Dip in production and exports, profits up
Centre for Eastern Studies, September 2022

Why gas price caps and consumer subsidies are both extremely costly and ultimately futile
Centre for European Policy Studies, September 2022

The energy market in time of war
Centre on Regulation in Europe, September 2022

To preserve Western interests in the Gulf, we need to expand the scope of our engagement
Friends of Europe, September 2022

Winds of change in the Eastern Mediterranean: Between hydrocarbons and renewable energy geopolitics
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, September 2022

Energy unity or breakup? The EU at a crossroads
Istituto Affari Internazionali, September 2022

Russia’s climate action and geopolitics of energy transition: The uncertain and unsettling outlook following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine
Istituto Affari Internazionali, September 2022

How carbon tariffs and climate clubs can slow global warming
Peterson Institute for International Economics, September 2022

Closing nuclear generation amounts to running in place on climate
Atlantic Council, August 2022

The climate bill’s oil and gas provisions are a worthwhile trade-off
Brookings Institution, August 2022

China’s role in supplying critical minerals for the global energy transition: What could the future hold?
Brookings Institution, August 2022

The grand energy bargain Europe needs to defeat Putin
Bruegel, August 2022

European natural gas imports
Bruegel, August 2022

Russia in a gas war with Europe
Centre for Eastern Studies, August 2022

It would be a strategic mistake for the EU to ditch the Energy Charter Treaty
Centre for European Policy Studies, August 2022

Climate extremes: The energy required for adaptation calls for stronger mitigation efforts
Centro Euro-Mediterraneo sui Cambiamenti Climatici, August 2022

Attacks on Ukraine nuclear plant: What’s at stake?
Chatham House, August 2022

How the U.S. oil and gas industry works
Council on Foreign Relations, August 2022

The role of energy production through the waste-to-energy cycle
Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, August 2022

Power of need: Energy security in the Western Balkans
European Council on Foreign Relations, August 2022

A reform strategy to transform energy: From piecemeal to system-wide change
Peterson Institute for International Economics, August 2022

Green energy depends on critical minerals. Who controls the supply chains?
Peterson Institute for International Economics, August 2022

Who controls critical mineral supply chains for green energy?
Peterson Institute for International Economics, August 2022

EU seeks to import more gas from the Caspian basin
Polish Institute of International Affairs, August, 2022

As North African energy links are redrawn, Italy becomes Europe’s southern gas hub
Barcelona Centre for International Affairs, July 2022

A German gas crisis will cause jitters across Europe
Brookings Institution, July 2022

The future of mining in Latin America: Critical minerals and the global energy transition
Brookings Institution, July 2022

Europe needs energy solidarity, not a North-South rift
Bruegel, July 2022

A Transatlantic Energy and Climate Pact is now more necessary than ever
Bruegel, July 2022

European Union demand reduction needs to cope with Russian gas cuts
Bruegel, July 2022

With a looming winter gas crisis, the EU doesn’t need an empty symbol of solidarity
Centre for European Policy Studies, July 2022

The impact of the Ukraine war on global energy markets
Centre for European Reform, July 2022

Retail energy markets under stress
Centre on Regulation in Europe, July 2022

Timing is the key to the Gulf replacing Russian oil
Chatham House, July 2022

The cold man of Europe: Germany’s energy emergency
European Council on Foreign Relations, August 2022

Europe’s carbon border adjustment moves to trilogue: Potential impact on trade and WTO compatibility still unclear
European Centre for International Political Economy, July 2022

Managing the energy and food crises: Exceptional times call for exceptional measures
European Policy Centre, July 2022

La crise énergétique montre l’importance de la solidarité européenne devant les chocs asymétriques
Fondation Robert Schuman, July 2022

The green transition is a strategic transition
Friends of Europe, July 2022

Polish energy policy in search of equilibrium
German Marshall Fund, July 2022

Europe’s long winter: Escaping the energy crisis
Institute of International and European Affairs, July 2022

The de-globalisation of oil: Risks and implications from the politicisation of energy markets
Istituto Affari Internazionali, July 2022

Sense and nonsense behind energy price caps
Istituto Affari Internazionali, July 2022

Technological innovation and the energy value chains in the transition to a low-carbon economy
Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, July 2022

Winter is coming: Gas demand regulation in the EU in preparation for a crisis
Polish Institute of International Affairs, July 2022

Revitalising EU-Ukraine cross-border infrastructure for a secure, clean energy future
Regulatory Assistance Project, July 2022

The hydrogen ambitions of the Gulf States
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, July 2022

Read this briefing on ‘Russia’s war on Ukraine fuels energy crisis‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Rafał Mańko.

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s third State of the Union address, scheduled for 14 September 2022, will be delivered at a time when the European Union and its Member States are facing unprecedented geopolitical and economic challenges. Rising energy prices and accelerating climate change are testing the EU’s resilience. On a more positive note, the recovery and resilience plans of most Member States have been approved, and the Next Generation EU spending programme will provide financing for the EU’s green transformation. Nevertheless, the enforcement of EU values (Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union), and in particular the rule of law, remains a challenge; the application of the Conditionality Regulation could provide the tools to address some of the related issues. Other points worth noting are that months after the Conference on the Future of Europe ended, the European Commission’s follow-up to its outcome is still underway, and that the coronavirus pandemic, although no longer the main topic of concern, is continuing to have a profound effect on lives and societies.

The EU State of the Union address, delivered to the European Parliament by the president of the European Commission, dates back to 2010. The address takes stock of the achievements of the past year and presents priorities for the year ahead. It is an important tool when it comes to the Commission’s ex-ante accountability vis-à-vis Parliament and is also aimed at rendering the definition of priorities at EU level more transparent and at communicating them to the public. The event chimes with similar practices in national democracies. The United States, for instance, has a long-standing tradition of presidential State of the Union addresses. In contrast to the US constitution, the EU Treaties do not prescribe a State of the Union address; the EU version was established by the 2010 Framework Agreement on relations between Parliament and the Commission.

This briefing further updates an earlier one from September 2016, originally written by Eva-Maria Poptcheva.

Read the complete briefing on ‘State of the Union address, European Parliament, 2022‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Elena Lazarou and Branislav Stanicek.

With war having returned to the European continent, measuring the level of threats to peace, security and democracy around the world – as the ‘Normandy Index’ does – is more important than ever. The annual Index was presented for the first time on the occasion of the Normandy Peace Forum in June 2019, as a result of a partnership between the European Parliament and the Region of Normandy. The Index has been designed and prepared by the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS), in conjunction with and on the basis of data provided by the Institute for Economics and Peace. This paper sets out the findings of the 2022 exercise, which draws on data compiled in 2021, and explains how the Index can be used to compare peace – defined on the basis of a given country’s performance against a range of predetermined threats – across countries and regions. It is complemented by 60 individual country case studies, derived from the Index.

The paper forms part of the EPRS contribution to the 2022 Normandy World Peace Forum. It is accompanied by two papers, one on the EU’s contribution to peace and security in 2022, and the other on EU peace-building efforts in the Eastern Neighbourhood.

Read the complete study on ‘Mapping threats to peace and democracy worldwide: Normandy Index 2022‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Highest and lowest scoring countries in 2022

Written by Clare Ferguson.

Members return to meet in plenary in Strasbourg to an agenda that reflects the increasingly worrying convergence of Russia’s war on Ukraine, climate and energy crises. Members can expect to hear the Commission’s plans for addressing the continued crisis situation during the President of the European Commission’s statement on the State of the Union, scheduled for Wednesday morning. In terms of the Commission’s ongoing priorities, EPRS analysis shows that the von der Leyen Commission has already submitted almost two thirds of its over 500 targeted initiatives, with almost half of those already adopted. Members will also take a wider view of the future of the EU in a return to the ‘This is Europe’ series of debates with EU Heads of State or Government. The Prime Minister of Finland, Sanna Marin, is expected to take part in the debate on Tuesday morning.

A summer of drought after a year of floods has kept the need to fight climate change at the top of the agenda. Correcting the EU’s dependence on Russian gas has also become urgent. Reducing energy consumption and boosting use of renewables will be key to helping Europe weather the coming storm. Members are expected to consider two Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE) reports on parts of the ‘fit for 55’ package (the EU’s plans to achieve climate neutrality by 2050), during this session. On Monday evening, Parliament is due to consider proposals to revise the Energy Efficiency Directive, where the committee seeks a more ambitious reduction in both primary and final consumption. It proposes binding national contributions based on Member States’ consumption levels, setting milestones in 2025 and 2027. The ITRE report also targets energy consumption in public buildings, and provides more detailed proposals to implement the ‘energy efficiency first’ principle. On Tuesday afternoon, Members are scheduled to debate another ITRE report, on the proposal to revise the Renewable Energy Directive. The committee supports the new 45 % renewable energy sources target, and seeks further innovative renewable energy and storage technology targets, to improve flexibility to cope with peaks in demand. The report also proposes tightening sustainability criteria for biomass and accelerating grants for renewables permits. It also sets more ambitious targets for the transport sector and greater promotion of renewable fuels in the maritime sector. The votes on the reports will set Parliament’s position for trilogue negotiations with the Council.

In advance of the Council and European Commission statements expected on Tuesday afternoon on the EU response to the increase in energy prices in Europe, Members are due to consider a report from Parliament’s Committee on Budgets (BUDG) on Monday evening. The interim report on the 2021 proposal for a revision of the multiannual financial framework (MFF) aims to set out the Parliament’s position before the Council formally asks for its consent to the revision. The revision is needed to raise the MFF ceilings to incorporate the social climate fund and to introduce an automatic annual adjustment of the MFF ceilings based on new own resources, to allow for the repayment of Next Generation EU borrowing. The BUDG committee report supports incorporating the social climate fund in the Union budget and the MFF, and calls for additional funding to help vulnerable household and transport users in the transition to climate neutrality. The report supports the use of all available Union budget instruments to provide economic and financial support both to Ukraine and to help EU citizens face the consequences of Russia’s aggression. The BUDG committee has also adopted a report on an amending budget, which notes that implementation of the EU’s 2021 budget left a high surplus (over €3.2 billion), mostly from higher than expected customs revenues, competition fines and some under-spending. To enter this sum as revenue in the 2022 budget, and reduce Member State contributions accordingly, the European Commission has proposed draft amending budget No 2/2022 (DAB 2/2022).

Despite their crucial role in mitigating climate change, the loss of forests to agricultural expansion is becoming acute, with 90 % of forest loss driven by production of agricultural commodities, many of which are exported to the EU. On Monday evening, Members are expected to consider a report from the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI) on the European Commission’s response to Parliament’s demands to tackle the issue by introducing new rules on export due diligence. The committee calls for the proposed deforestation regulation to cover a significantly higher level of minimum controls on a wider range of commodities (livestock, maize and rubber, and possibly sugar cane, ethanol and mining products). Penalties should be stronger and compensation mandatory when the rules are breached. The new legislation should also ensure that imports to the EU are produced in conformity with human rights. The result of the vote will set Parliament’s position in advance of negotiations with the co-legislators.

While EU governments set their own minimum wage levels, on Tuesday afternoon, Members are expected to consider a provisional agreement on legislation to ensure minimum wage protection is available to workers throughout the EU and lead to a decent standard of living. Parliament has succeeded in enhancing workers’ access to a minimum wage in the proposal, setting an 80 % threshold for collective bargaining. Under the new rules, statutory minimum wages would be updated every two (or four, if indexed) years. Once the final agreement is adopted, Member States have two years to transpose the directive into national law.

Turning to foreign affairs, during Question Time scheduled for Tuesday afternoon, Josep Borrell, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the Commission (HR/VP) is expected to update Members on the state of play of the war in Ukraine, before giving a statement on the situation in the Strait of Taiwan. Members are also expected to consider a Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) report on a proposal for a renewed partnership with the Southern Neighbourhood on Tuesday afternoon, which comes as the effects of Russia’s war on Ukraine are being felt in the region, not least on food security. The AFET report urges action to seize the momentum to boost long-term growth and development through economic cooperation. It also encourages promotion of regional integration in the southern Mediterranean, with a view to establishing a Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area.

Council and Commission representatives are expected to attend the plenary on Monday evening to brief Members on the situation regarding spyware systems in Greece, the latest EU country after Hungary, Poland and Spain to be accused of spying on journalists and opposition politicians.

In a joint debate on fisheries scheduled for Monday evening, Members are due to consider two Fisheries Committee (PECH) reports. The first concerns transposing the new 2022 measures for north-west Atlantic fisheries management. The EU is a party to the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO), and is therefore obliged to transpose new NAFO measures, so that they apply to EU vessels. The PECH report highlights the importance of complying with these conservation measures, which affect around 40 EU vessels with a 2021 catch of about 45 500 tonnes. The EU is also party to the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC) and Members are expected to debate a second PECH report on a provisional agreement to transpose the WCPFC management measures for tuna fisheries. While only a few EU vessels have recently fished in the area, they land large quantities (14 000 tonnes in 2020).

Finally, on Thursday morning, Parliament is scheduled to consider a Committee on Constitutional Affairs (AFCO) report on the proposal to revise the rules applicable to European political parties and foundations, which help form European political awareness and communicate EU citizens’ wishes. The AFCO report proposes that parties from Council of Europe members that are not EU Member States should be eligible to become European parties, and proposes changes to their financing. To ensure parties comply with EU values, the committee proposes to streamline the deregistration procedures, particularly in cases where parties have not met standards on transparency, gender balance or the use of political advertising.

Written by Etienne Bassot.

A year ago, we were assessing the European Commission’s delivery on the eve of the 2021 State of the Union address against the backdrop of a progressive return to freedom of movement following Covid‑19 lockdowns and an economic crisis, chaos in Kabul, and megafires and deadly floods in Europe. This year, we prepare our assessment against the backdrop of growing inflation and an energy crisis, a war on our continent and even more extreme weather phenomena, once again not only severely disrupting everyday life but even causing deaths. The phase of profound changes described last year has not faded: on the contrary, it continues to unfold in Europe and the rest of the world – as analysed in our study on ‘Future Shocks 2022’ (see References section) – and the situation is becoming increasingly acute for European policymakers, businesses and citizens alike.

The heart of the European project – peace, democracy, and prosperity – is being challenged, and even attacked: peace, with a war leading to major international consequences – from millions of people fleeing their bombed homes and seeking refuge abroad to new alliance outlines – at the European Union’s border; democracy, with the unjustified invasion of Ukraine and, at home, interference in our elections and our public debate; and prosperity, through the domino effects of spiralling prices, with European citizens increasingly anxious about heating their homes this winter, having endured a climate catastrophe of record high temperatures, megafires, disappearing glaciers and drought during summer 2022.

These profound changes do not render the European project obsolete – quite the opposite, they make it even more relevant. Peace is the root of the European project – peace among European nations from the ashes of the Second World War, as well as world peace, as encapsulated in the very first words of the Schuman Declaration: ‘World peace cannot be safeguarded without the making of creative efforts proportionate to the dangers which threaten it’. Democracy has been at the forefront of the European agenda these past months with the Conference on the Future of Europe coming to its conclusions in May 2022, with its final report submitted to the presidents of the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission. The President of the European Parliament, Roberta Metsola, celebrated ‘this unique exercise in active citizenship, in Europe building and in future proofing our foundations’, and recalled that Europe means: ‘freedom, democracy, the rule of law, justice, solidarity, equality of opportunity’. During the same closing ceremony, President von der Leyen declared that the Commission would ‘announce the first new proposals responding to (the) report in (her) state of the Union address’, expected just after this publication comes out. Finally, prosperity, which is preconditioned by peace and democracy, is of the essence, with inflation reaching levels unseen since the creation of the euro and a growing awareness of resource scarcity, from energy to water. In this context, ever more Europeans cherish the relevance of the European project, as the latest Parlemeter shows: six in ten people make the defence of European values, such as freedom and democracy, a priority, and the fight against poverty the priority they expect the European Parliament to address. Overall, two thirds of Europeans see EU membership as a good thing.

Advancing the general interest of the Union falls to the Commission, which takes the appropriate initiatives to this end. When she took office in 2019, President von der Leyen set six policy priorities. The Commission’s first priority since then has been climate change, an area where President von der Leyen wants Europe to lead globally. On taking office, she also stated that Europe ‘needs a geopolitical Commission’, which becomes even more necessary with the ‘tectonic’ magnitude of this year’s changes. At home, the ambitions are to help the EU recover from the coronavirus crisis, to turn the EU into a digital continent, followed by aims of promoting the European way of life and a new push for European democracy, notably with the Conference on the Future of Europe.

Our analysis monitors all six of these priorities. It combines a two-page presentation of each priority and a single-page infographic (page 3) illustrating the degree of progress – both overall and under each of the six priorities.

Our assessment is that, of the over 500 initiatives foreshadowed (521), almost two thirds (62 %, 330) have already been submitted and, in the case of legislative proposals, the co-legislators have started work. It is worth noting that almost one in five of the Commission’s initiatives are non-legislative in character, such as strategies, action plans and other communications. Among the 330 initiatives, almost half (48 %) have already been adopted (160) – by the legislator in the case of legislative proposals, or simply by the Commission in the case of non-legislative initiatives – while the great majority of the remainder are either proceeding normally through the legislative process (120, or 71 %) or close to adoption (16, or 9 %). Conversely, a certain number are proceeding very slowly or are currently blocked (34, or 20 %).

These numbers reflect the state of play as the Commission will soon enter the fourth year of its five-year mandate, the last full year before the 2024 European elections, a year when the executive typically continues to come forward with new proposals, whilst the twin branches of the legislature (the European Parliament and the Council of the EU) are simultaneously fully engaged in considering and (very often) amending them. The ranking and proportionate progress have remained stable compared with the previous assessment, which is remarkable given the two major crises (the pandemic and the war in Ukraine and their multifaceted consequences) that the European Union has faced since 2020.

With a focus on each of the six policy priorities, our assessment shows how the European Commission is performing at the different stages of announcing and tabling proposals, followed by the three institutions’ progress in negotiating and finally adopting legislation. The European Green Deal ranks highest in the number of initiatives planned (125), but the executive has tabled only just over half of them (or 55 %), leading to less than a quarter being adopted by the co-legislators so far (23 %). The third priority, ‘An economy that works for people’, comes next (99), but this time with more initiatives tabled (77 %) and a third of them adopted (34 %). The digital priority totals 78 initiatives planned, 60 % of which are already submitted (47), and 18 already adopted (23 %). For ‘A stronger Europe in the world’, an area with relatively few legislative initiatives by definition, and in contrast with the majority of the Commission’s priorities, over four in five (85 %) initiatives have already been tabled (see Section 4) and three out of five adopted. A fair amount of work remains to be done for the other priorities: 40 % of the proposals remain to be submitted for ‘A Europe fit for the digital age’, 28 % for ‘Promoting our European way of life’ and 45 % for ‘A new push for democracy’ (see Sections 2, 5 and 6). This latter priority comes lowest in terms of number of initiatives announced (51).

Following the State of the Union address, the Commission will adopt its work programme, in accordance with the 2010 Interinstitutional Agreement between the European Parliament and the European Commission. It has announced its 2023 work programme will be published on 18 October 2022.

Commission delivery in 2023 will be all the more important as we approach the 2024 European elections, when citizens will watch carefully how the EU has responded to today’s challenges. Europeans will vote with these profound changes in mind, but also – in a positive note worth noting in the latest Parlemeter – with hope, a dominant feeling in more countries. For more information on how the von der Leyen Commission’s agenda is proceeding, a proposal-by-proposal assessment is available on the European Parliament’s ‘Legislative Train Schedule’ website, developed by EPRS, at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative-train/

Read the complete in-depth analysis on ‘The von der Leyen Commission’s six priorities: State of play in Autumn 2022‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

The von der Leyen Commission’s six priorities: Legislative and non-legislative delivery to 31 August 2022

Written by Luisa Antunes.

Demographic, socio-political and economic pressures have made eating meat an unsustainable practice for the long term. However, meat substitutes have proved unpopular, owing to social norms and a lack of trust; some alternatives also contribute heavily to climate change. Could microbial protein be a sustainable alternative to meat that not only solves these multidimensional pressures but also contributes actively to reversing climate change?

The massive economic development and urbanisation seen in the past 50 years, coupled with a growing worldwide population and the emergence of protein-rich diets, such as the Atkins and Keto diets, have led to an exponential rise in meat consumption. The amount of meat consumed per capita levels has nearly doubled since 1990 and meat production has more than quadrupled since the 1960s. Globally, we consume 350 million tonnes of meat per year, most of which in Europe, Australia and North America.

However, with inflation, the costs of meat and of the cereals used to feed animals is rising, raising the spectre of food insecurity in the EU on account of the increased import price of cereal. Climate change and conflicts worldwide are leading to food insecurity, malnutrition, and protein and micronutrient deficiency. In addition, concerns are growing over animal welfare. Meat production also negatively impacts the environment, with cattle ranching and crop plantation contributing to deforestation, and increasing methane, carbon dioxide (CO2), nitrous oxide and water vapour emissions.

Several alternatives to meat have emerged in recent decades, and some are readily available in Europe’s supermarkets. The most common are soybean products. These have been met with consumer reticence, owing to their cost and an arguably unappetising taste. They have a heavy impact on the environment, contributing to roughly 20 % of tropical deforestation.

Another proposed solution is powder-form insect-based products. Such products are slowly entering the EU market and the European Commission recently approved an additional, third, insect species. However, once more, consumer perception has been cautious, possibly on account of cultural differences compared to parts of the world where such products are part of the traditional diet. In addition, the products found in supermarkets today tend to be highly processed.

Microbial protein, that is, protein biomass derived from bacteria, yeast, filamentous fungi and microscopic algae, could be a viable solution. It involves the fermentation of sugar-fed microbes in large, heated industrial bioreactors, which could alleviate dependency on agricultural land use. A recent study conducted by German researchers has estimated that replacing a fifth of meat from cattle with fungi ‘meat’ by 2050 could halve annual deforestation and related CO2 emissions.

The concept of eating microbial protein is not new. Humans have been consuming products made from fungi (beer and bread) and bacteria (yoghurt, cheese) products since the development of the first Neolithic communities. The first industrial attempt at microbial protein production was made in the 1970s with Pruteen, a protein-rich product made from methanol-oxidising bacteria and used to feed pigs. Pruteen was discontinued in 1979 because of its price and unfounded reports of allergic reactions. Quorn® is a mycoprotein-based product produced from fungi, invented in 1985 and still sold today. An Irish-led Horizon 2020 project, currently under way, is seeking to produce microbial protein from fungi fed with pasta, bread and beer residues. A few products already on the market include milk, eggs, dairy, mycelium ‘meat’ and even seafood analogues.

It seems that microbial ‘meat’ could offer a way to reverse climate change, protect animal welfare and respond to the needs of a growing world population. But do we have the technology in place? What would be the energy requirements for producing large amounts of microbial protein? Are we ready to change our consumption habits and do we trust the safety of artificially-produced meat? Is EU legislation up to date and able to adapt to animal meat substitutes?

Potential impacts and developments

By using fewer land resources for crop and animal farming, cutting deforestation and biodiversity loss, and reducing greenhouse gas emissions, microbial ‘meat’ could help to reverse climate change. It would also offer a faster and more cost-effective way to ensure food security for a growing world population. In addition, it could be used as animal feed. However, mass production would require large, power-hungry generators. Therefore, it would need to be coupled with ‘green’ energy in order to be environmentally sound. Furthermore, the use of autotrophic or lithotrophic bacteria would reduce the need for sugar feed as a growth source. Bacteria can fix CO2 and methane from the atmosphere and remediate agricultural and water waste, further helping to counter climate change.

What is more, microbial ‘meat’ would be a healthier alternative to red meat. First, it would help regulate our intestinal pH, increasing the proportion of ‘good’ bacteria, which help prevent diet-related non-communicable diseases, such as tumours, cardiovascular diseases, obesity and diabetes. Second, it would be less sensitive to contamination by common foodborne bacteria such as Campylobacter, Escherichia coli, Listeria and Salmonella. Consequently, it would also require less antibiotic treatment, thus helping reduce the burden of antibiotic resistance in the animal industry, also making it a potentially better alternative than cultured meat. Microbial ‘meat’ does not require pesticides and has a higher protein content than animal meat. In addition, it could be genetically-engineered for a fortified vitamin and mineral content, as well as to approximate its taste and texture to that of red meat.

On the other hand, the possibility of using genetically modified bacteria and fungi (GMM) to produce microbial protein has recently attracted political attention because of potential health risks. However, it is debateable whether these products would fall within the remits of the GMO Regulation, since consumers would eat the derived protein, rather than the organism that produced it.

Anticipatory policy-making

Microbial protein is comfortably anchored in EU legislation. It is recognised under the Regulation on Novel Foods, according to the safety principles defined in the General Food Law. Since 2007, EFSA has been compiling a qualified presumption of safety (QPS) list of microorganisms that are safe and can be used in food and feed.

The European Union has a strategy for tackling food security, health and sustainability by 2030 through its new Food 2030 research and innovation policy framework. Microbial proteins are included under the framework’s umbrella of alternative sources of protein that could contribute to a climate-friendly dietary shift by 2030. The EU also supports research into alternative sources of protein. Under Horizon 2020, the European Commission invested €70 million in 15 different projects investigating the potential of plant-, insect-, microalgae– and microbial- based protein sources. Horizon Europe is now offering funding opportunities through its flagship innovation programme, the European Innovation Council. In addition, EFSA launched a funding call in October 2021 for research into microbiomes in food production systems.

The microbial protein market cannot be developed without economic measures to foster sustainable and healthy food production. The EU has introduced a number of policies aimed at facilitating access to finance, improving access to markets, and fostering competitiveness and innovation for small and medium-sized enterprises.

Last but not least, behavioural change will not be possible without understanding consumer habits and barriers to dietary transition, investing in education and raising awareness about healthier and more sustainable choices.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘What if microbial protein could help revert climate change?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Listen to policy podcast ‘What if microbial protein could help revert climate change?’ on YouTube.

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Citizens often turn to the European Parliament to ask what the European Union (EU) is doing to address climate change.

The atmosphere is warming, the climate is changing and ecosystems are more at risk with each passing year. The 2015 Paris Agreement aims to keep the global temperature rise well below 2°C compared with pre-industrial levels, and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C. Today, the global temperature is estimated at 1.07°C above pre-industrial levels. Without gradual substantial cuts in global greenhouse gas emissions, aligned with fixed targets for 2030 and 2050, we will exceed the 2°C limit before 2050.

The EU is taking a whole series of measures to place its economy and society on a sustainable path that protects citizens and the environment on a long-term basis.

These climate ambitions are reflected in the EU budget. In the long-term budget for 2021‑2027, €356 billion is set aside for protecting natural resources and the climate. Additionally, the EU has pledged 30 % of the cohesion and regional development funds, two of the largest EU subsidy packages, to climate objectives.

European Climate Law

In June 2021, the EU adopted the European Climate law, which sets the European Green Deal goals into law – that the EU will become climate neutral by 2050, and reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 55 % by 2030, compared to emissions in 1990. It also establishes a framework for achieving these objectives.  

Realising the European Climate Law objectives: Fit for 55

In July 2021, the European Commission presented the Fit for 55 package, a set of legislative proposals aimed at reducing emissions by 55 % by 2030. Council and Parliament adopted their respective positions on the proposals in summer 2022, and will now negotiate an agreement on the final texts. You will find updated information on the Legislative Trains website.

Among the many proposed changes, the following can be highlighted:

As regards transport, specific legislative proposals address emission reductions and alternative fuels for aviation, road transport and maritime transport. For instance, CO2 emission standards for new cars would become stricter. From 2035, all new cars and vans sold in the EU would need to be ‘zero-emission’, meaning they would not have an internal combustion engine.

To make the energy sector more sustainable, at least 40 % of energy would be required to come from renewable sources by 2030, an increase on the current target of 32 %.

The scope of the EU’s Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) would be expanded to include maritime and aviation transport emissions, in addition to the sectors currently covered (electricity and heat generation, energy-intensive industries and aviation within Europe). Overall emissions from sectors covered by the system would have to be reduced by 61 % by 2030, compared to 2005 levels.

As regards buildings, new rules would aim to tackle the issues of energy poverty, as well as poor building insulation, which represents 40 % of the energy consumed.

The EU supports and involves citizens

With the Social Climate Fund, the EU plans to offer financial help for households, micro-enterprises and transport users that are particularly affected by the impact of the proposed changes.

The European Commission has also launched the European Climate Pact, an EU-wide initiative inviting people, communities and organisations to participate in climate action. It aims to involve the public in the transition to a greener Europe by inviting citizens to connect and share knowledge, learn about climate change and develop and implement solutions.

European Parliament position

Since its 2018 resolution on the UN Climate Change Conference in Katowice (COP24), Parliament has consistently highlighted the importance of implementing an ambitious climate policy.

Ahead of the United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP26), the European Parliament called for an end to subsidies for fossil fuels by 2025, and for the G20 to commit to climate neutrality by 2050. Parliament also called for international measures to protect ecosystems that store large amounts of carbon, such as peatland. It also called upon developed nations to honour their promise to provide US$100 billion in climate finance to developing countries to assist in their green transition.

In June 2022, Parliament adopted its position on eight EU proposals that are part of the Fit for 55 package. Parliament encourages industries to further reduce their emissions and invest in low-carbon technologies. It has also called for measures helping those who are most affected by the proposed changes, such as people with high transport costs, to be expanded.

Further information

• European Green Deal, European Parliamentary Research Service, At a Glance, 2019
• European climate law, European Parliamentary Research Service, Briefing, August 2021
• Social climate fund: Fit for 55 package, Briefing, European Parliamentary Research Service, June 2022
• Fit for 55 package, Briefing, European Parliamentary Research Service, June 2022

Keep sending your questions to the Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (Ask EP)! We reply in the EU language that you use to write to us.

Written by Meenakshi Fernandes and Cecilia Navarra.

Care work provided in homes and institutions is a public good that is under-valued by society. Care workers are more likely to have low earnings and precarious working conditions. About 9 in 10 care workers are women.

Most unpaid care work within households is carried out by women. The ‘unpaid care penalty’ for women in the EU, which is equivalent to the earnings they lost because of this unbalanced distribution of care responsibilities, is estimated to reach €242 billion per year.

EU action in the care sector has the potential for high returns for society. Fostering the ‘equal earner – equal carer model’ could generate benefits of between €24 billion and €48 billion a year. EU action to promote affordable, high-quality care could produce an additional €90 billion to €160 billion in benefits each year.

This updates a June 2022 EPRS briefing with new data and clarifications on the estimation methods used.

Read the complete briefing on ‘What if care work were recognised as a driver of sustainable growth?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Read also: European care strategy: Pre-legislative synthesis of national, regional and local positions on the European Commission’s initiative

Potential benefits of EU action in the care sector Vicious cycle of low investment in care and gender inequalities Drivers of the unpaid care penalty: Labour market indicators of women as compared with men Who are the 12 million paid care workers in the EU?

Written by Marcin Grajewski.

European Union foreign ministers have agreed to make it more difficult for Russians to obtain visas to travel to the bloc, but stopped short of imposing an EU-wide visa ban, as called for by Ukraine. More than six months after Russia invaded Ukraine, the country is holding out against the aggressor, helped by military and financial help from the United States, EU countries and others. Ukrainian forces have recently launched counter-attacks against the Russian military occupying areas in the south and east of the country. United Nations experts arrived at Ukraine’s large nuclear plant at Zaporizhzhia to assess the risk of radiation from the facility, which is currently controlled by Russian forces but operated by Ukrainian staff. Russia is scaling down natural gas supplies to the EU in retaliation for sanctions against Moscow, fuelling inflation and additional fears of recession.

This note gathers links to the recent publications and commentaries from many international think tanks on Russia’s war on Ukraine. Earlier analyses of the implications of the war can be found in a previous edition of the ‘What Think Tanks are Thinking’ series.

Politics

Guerre en Ukraine: Un changement de monde?
Institut français des relations internationales, September 2022

Six months, twenty three lessons: What the world has learned from Russia’s war in Ukraine
Atlantic Council, August 2022

A strong Ukraine is the best solution to Europe’s Russia problem
Atlantic Council, August 2022

Russia, Ukraine, and the decision to negotiate
Brookings Institution, August 2022

Understanding the Erdoğan-Putin duet
Carnegie Europe, August 2022

Russia’s longstanding problem with Ukraine’s borders
Chatham House, August 2022

La Turquie et la guerre en Ukraine, ou le retour à une politique du grand écart
Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, August 2022

Ukrainian politicians fight for the future
Carnegie Europe, August 2022

Vogue diplomacy: First Lady Olena Zelenska is Ukraine’s secret weapon
Atlantic Council, July 2022

Everyone’s talking about the endgame in Ukraine: Here’s how it might look
Brookings Institution, July 2022

Ukraine and Taiwan on the Biden-Xi chessboard
Bruegel, July 2022

It’s bifurcation, not bipolarity: Understanding world order after the Ukraine invasion
Brussels School of Governance, July 2022

Europe’s continued commitment to Ukraine hinges on Germany
Carnegie Europe, July 2022

Autocracy versus democracy after the Ukraine invasion: Mapping a middle way
Carnegie Europe, July 2022

Ukraine could tear Europe apart
Cato Institute, July 2022

The EU and India agree to disagree on Ukraine… and that’s ok

Centre for European Policy Studies, July 2022

Expert insights: Russia and Ukraine
Clingendael, July 2022

The impact of the war on the economic development of Ukraine
DIW, July 2022

Russian spring 2022 recruitment circle: Putin’s camouflaged referendum
Egmont, July 2022

Russia’s war on Ukraine viewed from China
European Council on Foreign Relations, July 2022

La mer Noire, le spectre d’un nouveau rideau de fer?
Fondation Robert Schumann, July 2022

La guerre russo-ukrainienne, catharsis de deux conflits convergents
Institut de relations internationales et stratégiques, July 2022

Taïwan-Ukraine: Quel parallèle entre les stratégies maritimes de la Chine et de la Russie?
Institut Thomas More, July 2022

Opinions européennes face à la guerre en Ukraine
Institut Jacques Delors, July 2022

Opinions européennes face à la guerre en Ukraine
Institut Jacques Delors, July 2022

The lessons the United States learned, and that Russia did not
Rand Corporation, July 2022

War of the worlds: How cognitive dissonance and repression shape Russian perceptions of the conflict in Ukraine
Rand Corporation, July 2022

Wirtschaftssanktionen gegen Russland: Internationale Perspektiven und globale Auswirkungen
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, July 2022

Russia’s war against Ukraine and its consequences
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, July 2022

Krieg und Hunger : Versorgungsrisiken, Lösungsansätze, Konfliktkonstellationen
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, July 2022

Pourquoi la guerre en Ukraine risque d’affaiblir l’Europe dans le monde
Terra Nova, July 2022

Russia’s war on Ukraine: How to get to negotiations
United States Institute of Peace, June 2022

Why fear of provoking Putin is the most provocative policy of all
Atlantic Council, June 2022

Ukraine and what it means for European Union enlargement
Bruegel, June 2022

A creeping annexation. Russia’s plans to partition Ukraine
Centre for Eastern Studies, June 2022

Will Putin’s war in Ukraine make the EU stronger?
Centre for European Policy Studies, June 2022

Will Putin’s war lead to the collapse of fortress Russia
Clingendael, June 2022

Why the West should support Ukraine but not appropriate the war
Clingendael, June 2022

Ukraine could become an EU Member. What would that mean?
Council on Foreign Relations, June 2022

How the war in Ukraine shapes the multipolar world
Egmont, June 2022

Peace versus justice: The coming European split over the war in Ukraine
European Council on Foreign Relations, June 2022

The U.S. must support Ukraine in a fiscally responsible manner
Heritage Foundation, June 2022

Asia and the war in Ukraine
International Institute for Strategic Studies, June 2022

Military

Russia’s attack on Ukraine: Day 186
Centre for Eastern Studies, August 2022

The EU, NATO and European security in a time of war
Centre for European Reform, August 2022

Russia recruiting volunteers to fight in Ukraine
Polish Institute of International Affairs, August 2022

Lessons for the West: Russia’s military failures in Ukraine
European Council on Foreign Relations, August 2022

Four (updated) ways the war in Ukraine might end
Atlantic Council, July 2022

First help Ukraine win the war, then help it win the peace
Centre for European Reform, July 2022

The next war: How Russian hybrid aggression could threaten Moldova
European Council on Foreign Relations, July 2022

Strike traction: How the West can support a Ukrainian counter-offensive
European Council on Foreign Relations, July 2022

Shadow of the bomb: Russia’s nuclear threats
European Council on Foreign Relations, July 2022

Immediate impact: How Western heavy weapons are already helping Ukraine halt Russia
European Council on Foreign Relations, July 2022

Guerre en Ukraine: Le sens du signalement nucléaire russe
Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, July 2022

Les armes nucléaires et la guerre en Ukraine : bilan provisoire et conséquences possibles
Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, July 2022

Don’t humiliate Russia! Or how to repeat past mistakes at the cost of European security
Friends of Europe, July 2022

Making it the distance to victory: Ukraine’s war and post-war needs
Globsec, July 2022

The defense impact of the Ukraine war on the Visegrád Four
German Marshall Fund, July 2022

Ukraine: Le cadre européen des exportations d’armes en péril?
Groupe de recherche et d’information sur la paix et la sécurité, July 2022

Ukrainians resist in the occupied south
Polish Institute of Foreign Relations, July 2022

Ukrainian society in the face of war
Polish Institute of Foreign Relations, July 2022

Might Russia turn to terror bombing civilians in Ukraine?
Rand Corporation, July 2022

Problems and capability gaps in military aid for Ukraine
Polish Institute of Foreign Relations, June 2022

Possible Russian nuclear deployments to Belarus could shift Europe’s nuclear balance
United States Institute of Peace, June 2022

War crimes and genocidal intent in the heart of Europe
European Policy Centre, June 2022

Energy

Russia in a gas war with Europe
Centre for Eastern Studies, August 2022

Attacks on Ukraine nuclear plant: What’s at stake?
Chatham House, August 2022

A German gas crisis will cause jitters across Europe
Brookings Institution, July 2022

European Union demand reduction needs to cope with Russian gas cuts
Bruegel, July 2022

Revitalising EU-Ukraine cross-border infrastructure for a secure, clean energy future
Regulatory Assistance Project, July 2022

Sanctions

UK trade and the war in Ukraine
Chatham House, September 2022

The Ukraine war has made Iran and Russia allies in economic isolation: Here’s how
Atlantic Council, August 2022

Using sanctioned Russian assets to rebuild Ukraine will not be easy
Centre for European Reform, August 2022

Unmoved: Why a ban on Russians’ visas won’t help
European Council on Foreign Relations, August 2022

Russia’s war on Ukraine: A sanctions timeline
Peterson Institute for International Economics, August 2022

Food

Agriculture supply shocks due to Russia’s war cause hardships for numerous states
Bertelsmann Stiftung, July 2022

Global food insecurity due to the war in Ukraine
Clingendael, July 2022

Read this briefing on ‘Russia’s war on Ukraine six months on‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Rachele Rossi.

Most of the world’s farmers are engaged in small‑scale agriculture. The majority of them are in developing countries but there are many in developed countries as well. Small farms make up the vast majority of the EU’s 10 million farms. What constitutes a small farm depends on the context. However, improving the conditions of small-scale food producers is a global objective.

Recent studies have lowered past estimates of how much of the global food supply is produced by small farms. Notwithstanding the complex nature of such estimates and the possible under-estimation of small operators’ production because of self‑consumption, it is clear that small farms allocate larger shares of their production to food and have a more diversified produce portfolio than larger farms. Moreover, small farms’ role in food production and availability also depends on their involvement in local food systems: when they are well connected in the supply chain, small‑scale producers tend to leave less space for self‑provisioning and their businesses are more viable.

In addition to producing food, small farms play a key role in the EU’s rural world. They are typically associated with protecting landscape features and biodiversity and the notion of providing public goods. They help to maintain lively rural and remote areas, help preserve the identity of regional production, and offer employment in regions with fewer job opportunities. Yet, the pace of disappearance of small farms has been quite rapid in recent decades. Unfavourable demographic change in rural areas is part of the explanation. In addition, it is small farms that suffer most from the challenges facing the agricultural sector, such as market pressures and weather extremes, and they have to invest greater effort to engage in innovation and new technology.

The EU’s farm policy includes specific measures to address small farms’ needs, although most of the EU’s agricultural funds go to farms with larger farmland areas. However, the new policy framework that will start operating as of 2023 provides a valuable opportunity for EU Member States to use the flexibility offered in the development of their strategic plans to tailor measures to small farms and local conditions and help preserve the economic, social, and environmental assets that small farms bring to the EU food system.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Small farms’ role in the EU food system‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

EU farms and farmland by land size class Percentage distribution of farms by farmland area in hectares (ha) The decreasing share of the EU’s small farms World farms and farmland by land size class

Written by Maria Margarita Mentzelopoulou with Massimo Spinelli.

From the beginning of the Covid-19 pandemic in early 2020, and up to mid-April 2020, EU Member States were facing an extraordinary situation that led to the declaration of a health emergency. EU governments gradually took urgent measures to contain the spread of the virus, such as re‑introduction of border controls in the Schengen area, implementation of temporary travel restrictions, and introduction of sanitary measures. These had vast impact on both mobility and migration.

Multiple measures also aimed to mitigate the effects of the pandemic on foreign nationals residing on the territory of EU Member States. National responses to contain Covid-19 diverged both in nature and scope. Overall, restrictive measures affected asylum-seekers’ right to look for protection on EU territory; their – and migrants’ – right to access relevant procedures; their residence status and permits; and their enjoyment of other rights, such as access to health services.

Member States had to adapt their asylum procedures swiftly to the pandemic. The measures focused on the extension of residence permits, regularisation of undocumented migrants, the release of migrants and asylum-seekers from detention centres, and suspension of forced returns.

At the same time, new obstacles arose in ensuring an effective and fair asylum procedure for first-instance applications and appeals, relating for example to the quality of remote interviews, applicants’ access to electronic tools and the skills needed to use them, and the quality of processes and data protection. After mid-April 2020, EU Member States gradually lifted restrictions, starting to adapt to the new reality after the pandemic. The European Parliament has addressed the impact of Covid-19 on vulnerable groups, including asylum-seekers and refugees. At the same time, Parliament stressed that internal border controls and travel restrictions at the external borders should not affect the right to seek asylum.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Impact of Covid-19 on asylum procedures in EU Member States‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Mar Negreiro.

The digital transformation is making the EU institutions and administration more vulnerable to cyber-threats and incidents, the number of which has surged dramatically in recent years. There were as many during the first half of 2021 as in the whole of 2020, for instance.

Yet an analysis of 20 Union institutions, bodies and agencies showed that their governance, preparedness, cybersecurity capability and maturity vary substantially, weakening the system.

This proposal for a regulation would establish a common framework to ensure that similar cybersecurity rules and measures are applied within all Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, to improve their resilience and incident-response capacities and rapidly improve the existing situation.

In the European Parliament, the file has been allocated to the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE), where the rapporteur is working on her draft report.

Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down measures for a high common level of cybersecurity at the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union Committee responsible:Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE)COM(2022) 0122
22.3.2022Rapporteur:Henna Virkkunen (EPP, Finland)2022/0085(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Eva Kaili (S&D, Greece)
Izaskun Bilbao Barrandica (Renew, Spain)
Mikuláš Peksa (Greens/EFA, Czechia)
Markus Buchheit (ID, Germany)
Evžen Tošenovský (ECR, Czechia)
Marc Botenga (The Left, Belgium)Ordinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Publication of draft report

Written by Gregor Erbach and Martin Höflmayr, with Nela Foukalová.

The aim of the European Green Deal is to make Europe the first climate-neutral continent, by 2050, while maintaining economic growth and prosperity. It is Europe’s growth strategy. The transition to a climate-neutral economy with net zero greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) over the course of just 28 years represents an industrial revolution at unprecedented speed, with significant impacts on gross domestic product (GDP), investment, employment, competitiveness, distribution, public finances and monetary stability.

Outlining the expected impact of transition to a climate-neutral economy on economic indicators on the basis of analysis by academics and think-tanks and the Commission’s impact assessment (IA) of the climate target plan, this briefing focuses in particular on economic output (GDP), public debt, competitiveness, labour markets, energy prices, inflation and distributional effects.

Climate mitigation policies affect economic output. According to the IA, transition towards net zero
is expected to have only limited impacts on aggregate output (GDP), but its composition will shift
from consumption towards investment . Moreover, the impacts on sectoral output, investment and
the labour market are likely to be significant, creating a need for policy measures to ensure a just
transition. There is a risk of negative short -term impacts if consumption and production decrease,
e.g. as a result of carbon pricing. However, increased investment, for example in low-carbon technologies, would potentially boost productivity and economic growth in the long term.

Transition to climate neutrality demands solid economic governance to manage the risk to macroeconomic and financial stability. The Commission’s sustainable growth strategy in the European Semester framework is built around four aspects of competitive sustainability. Parliament has called for the addition of a climate indicator and coordinated efforts to implement the digital and environmental transitions, alongside the current approach to fiscal and budgetary policies.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Economic impacts of the green transition‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

GDP, energy consumption and GHG emissions (World and EU)

Written by Agnieszka Widuto.

The EU solar energy strategy proposed under the REPowerEU plan aims to make solar energy a cornerstone of the EU energy system. Boosting renewable energy is also an important part of the European Green Deal in the context of the green transition towards climate neutrality. Solar energy is affordable, clean and has been the fastest-growing energy source in the last decade. It can be used for electricity and heating, while also helping reduce EU dependency on energy imports by replacing them with domestic production.

EU measures to boost solar energy include making the installation of solar panels on the rooftops of new buildings obligatory within a specific timeframe, streamlining permitting procedures for renewable energy projects, improving the skills base in the solar sector and boosting the EU’s capacity to manufacture photovoltaic panels.

Several challenges still need addressing, however. These include competition for land use with other sectors, technological issues, skills shortages and the need to prevent a new energy dependency on non-EU solar panel producers.

The ambitious plan includes doubling the current level of solar photovoltaic capacity by 2025 and producing almost 600 GW by 2030. Achieving these goals will depend on continued commitment to renewable energy deployment, success in addressing a number of challenges, and the ability to unlock the full potential of solar energy in the EU, for instance, by boosting domestic solar production and the use of new technologies.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Solar energy in the EU‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Karin Jacobs.

In the framework of the Commission’s Regulatory Fitness and Performance Programme (REFIT) and Better Regulation agenda, and as announced in the 2011 White Paper on Transport, the Commission has presented a legislative proposal to amend existing rules on damage stability requirements for roll on roll off (ro-ro) passenger ships, known as ferries. This is to improve the maritime safety of both vessels and their passengers.

The proposed revision of the existing directive originates from maritime accidents, as with the MS Estonia in 1994 and the MS Express Samina in 2000. It would ensure consistency with the applicable international standards, recently updated by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) under its 2020 SOLAS Convention. It also aims to strengthen the fleet entry requirements within the EU for large vessels that have not yet been certified here.

The proposal will amend the existing Directive (2003/25/EC) in this area. The main purpose is to align current technical rules with IMO stability requirements, and to simplify these rules.

Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2003/25/EC as regards the inclusion of improved stability requirements and its alignment with stability requirements defined by the International Maritime Organization Committee responsible:Transport and Tourism (TRAN)COM(2022) 0053
18.2.2022Rapporteur:Roberts Zile, ECR, Latvia)2022/0036(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Magdalena Adamowicz, EPP, Poland
Vera Tax, S&D, The Netherlands
Caroline Nagtegaal, Renew, The Netherlands
Jutta Paulus, Greens/EFA, Germany
Elena Kountoura, The Left, GreeceOrdinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Vote in committee on draft report

Written by Silvia Kotanidis.

With the Conference on the Future of Europe now at an end, a new phase has started: that of following up on the more than 320 recommendations it produced.

This process is however a complicated one. Legally, ways to implement the Conference’s recommendations may require changes to the European Union (EU) Treaties, which is a complex and challenging process. Politically, debating how to implement reforms and deciding to what extent to modify the EU legal system may require intense negotiations.

The current EU Treaties, which are the fruit of successive reforms occurring over the last 35 years, may be modified only according to a complex set of procedures. The ordinary revision procedure may be used to amend any part of the Treaties, including the modifications of the institutional set up and of the Union’s competences. The simplified revision procedure may only be used to modify limited areas of EU policies – namely Title III of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union – or the Council’s decision-making rules.

The recommendations issued by the Conference on the Future of Europe and the recent international crises and political developments might provide an impulse for a deeper reform of the EU, as the European Parliament has suggested in several resolutions. Whether a deeper reform will be attempted depends however on the political will of the national governments, which hold the power to decide on whether to engage in a revision of the Treaties and, ultimately, on the content of the reforms.

Read the complete briefing on ‘How the EU Treaties are modified‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.