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Intelligence Online understands that a delegation from the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) will visit Monaco next week. This will [...]

Collateral damage? Experts are stumped as to why some European companies were added to China's export control list on 24 [...]

With missile strikes resuming this week between Washington and Tehran, the assessment of the Iranian ballistic missile threat is drawing [...]

Trading with Pyongyang is proving problematic for Russian firms, including within their own country, documents reviewed by Intelligence Online have revealed.

What Washington can do to stop starvation.

A nimbler navy can deny China.

Supermarket shelves are emptying, sellers are rationing supplies and prices are rising.

Latest scorecard from the Twenty20 tri-series match between Namibia and South Africa in Windhoek.

C'est l'effroi chez les journalistes de droite quand, à partir des années 1930, de nombreuses femmes entrent dans la profession. Elles y demeurent très minoritaires, mais, hormis les éditoriaux, plus aucun registre ne leur est interdit. Loin d'être cantonnées aux rubriques mode, couture, (…) / Femmes, Presse, France, Histoire, Socialisme, Communisme, Guerre d'Espagne 1936-1939

The arrival of the seventh Prime Minister in Number 10 since the 2016 referendum is an opportunity to try once again to get to grips with British European policy.

In practice, this is not a problem of wrestling Lots of Things, but instead more about trying to work out whether the absence of visible activity is a function of a very tight ship, or of a lack of activity.

Undoubtedly, negotiations on the May 2025 reset agenda in the Common Understanding has progressed well, to the point that several dossiers are largely wrapped up: SPS and ETS are the two big ones. Internal Energy Market talks finally got underway in the early summer too, the last big element to get going.

At the same time, once it became clear that Keir Starmer was stepping down, the EU decided to pause everything, there being little point in making deals with a departing leadership. Moreover, the arrival of a new PM might also offer new opportunities for the EU to secure more concessions, especially if Andy Burnham was really that much more pro-cooperation and wanted to get a quick win.

The evidence of the first couple of months of Burnham suggests that this has not been the case. Indeed, as the tracker below (mildly sarcastically) suggests, Burnham’s time in power has been marked by talking about pretty much anything apart from EU policy.

PDF: https://bit.ly/UshGraphic148

The ‘regular’ EU-UK summit heralded by the Common Understanding, and already rather uncertain by the time of the May anniversary of the first one, has only been pushed back since, with Burnham’s recent talk of November feeling more aspirational that definite. This is not a government in a rush to press forward on things, despite Burnham’s repeated invocations of the damage of Brexit to the economy.

From what little he has said, the impression is very much one of continuity-Starmer: use the reset process to secure some wins, plus avoid the worst effects of the continual activity of the EU to protect and promote its interests. The language about ‘Made in Europe’ reflects another common thread to Starmer, once the UK had determined the potential impacts on high-profile sectors of the economy and the possible leverage of working together in Europe in the face of – how to put it? – debatable international relations.

However, all of this has been very much off-camera, without much grandstanding by either side, neither of whom really feel any value in kicking up a fuss. Even the failure of SAFE talks was managed away without too much hand-wringing and with efforts to find other ways of building defence procurement cooperation.

But there has been one exception.

Youth mobility has become the poster-child of the reset, and the one with the most conspicuous disagreements.

As a reminder, the two sides have always had different positions with regard to the fundamentals of any scheme, grounded in its purpose, scale and operationalisation.

PDF: https://bit.ly/UshGraphic127

Since the 2025 summit, those gaps (on caps on numbers, university fees and permitted activities) have not definitively closed down. Instead, there has been a steady drip-feed of briefings by both sides to try to signal intent and (less often) offer possible landing grounds.

The following is a list of all Financial Times stories that include such briefings, the paper being a convenient shared space for negotiators:

• 7 November 2025. ‘EU officials’ flag the need for the scheme to be drawn up as a binding legal instrument, rather than the memoranda of understanding the UK has with other third countries
• 5 December. A leaked EU ‘draft text’ has no cap on numbers, and gives EU students access to UK university fees
• 15 March 2026. ‘UK officials’ offer to give way of fees, in return for a cap and other concessions
• 5 June. ‘UK officials’ reiterate their offer on fees
• 3 July. The ‘Commission’ says the proposed cap is too low, EU nationals need to be exempt from the NHS surcharge and have access to UK fees
• 13 July. ‘EU diplomats’ say the cap offered by the UK is a ‘non-starter’ and repeat points on the surcharge and fees
• 18 August. ‘EU diplomats’ again say the cap offered is too low, but might consider something in the ‘low 100ks’, and say fees is ‘vital’
• 23 August. A leaked UK negotiating brief from ‘UK officials’ says Starmer was willing to concede on fees and up to 100k on the cap, in return for access to Made in Europe or steel tariffs

This procession suggests a number of points that speak to the wider relationship.

Firstly, the UK has moved further than the EU on these points. We might reasonably assume that the EU will get domestic fees, but without any evident quid pro quo on caps or other dossiers. Indeed, when such cross-linkage has been mentioned by the UK, the reply from the EU has been very dismissive. This reflects the underlying asymmetry in the relationship: the UK needs this more than the EU, and the EU knows this.

Secondly, this is as much evidence as we have that Burnham is not going to stray very far at all from Starmer’s positions: The PM was talking again about Made in Europe in his first PMQs this week. Whether that helps or hinders progress on negotiations remains to be seen, but the sense that Brussels was ultimately underwhelmed by Starmer’s translation of rhetoric to action does not look set to be challenged by Burnham any time soon.

Finally, it points to the perils of low-stakes negotiating. None of the items on the table will be of notable macro-economic significance for either side, but instead act as markers of good intent and willingness to try to keep the wheels spinning on the minimal architecture of the Trade & Cooperation Agreement’s free trade area. Part of this might be the anxiety over who will be in power in the UK following the next general election, but more of it is that neither side see their relationship as either particularly important or in need of urgent attention. With plenty of other things to be getting on with, this is something that lacks any strong sense of pressure to wrap things up.

Of course, it’s still early days, but if the last seven PMs have taught us anything, then it’s that their revealed preferences on EU policy are pretty clear, pretty quickly.

The post Not even a new ‘reset’: The minimalist Burnham agenda on the EU? appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

2026 ist kein gutes Jahr für das Putin-Regime. Die Front in der Ukraine bewegt sich kaum, ukrainische Drohnen und Raketen treffen Ziele weit im russischen Hinterland, die Wirtschaft schwächelt, und die Stimmung im Land verschlechtert sich. Unter diesen erschwerten Bedingungen muss die Kreml-Administration einen weiteren Sieg der Machtpartei Einiges Russland organisieren, denn im September steht die Wahl zur Staatsduma an. Dabei kann das russische Parlament seine Funktion als Legitimitätsressource in der personalistischen Putin-Diktatur kaum noch erfüllen. An der chronischen Schwäche der regimekonformen Parteien ist dies ebenso abzulesen wie an der Groteske um den Wahlausschluss der Jabloko-Partei.

Benjamin, 31, will Weltraumoffizier werden. Wie sieht seine Nachtschicht aus? Zu Besuch im Weltraumlagezentrum der Bundeswehr.

Letsile Tebogo says his late mother is always with him "in spirit" as he prepares to run in Budapest, the city where she watched him make history for Botswana and Africa.

Télé Sahel a indiqué le 2 septembre qu'un inventaire effectué à la Base 101 de Niamey avait permis de découvrir « un arsenal de guerre d'une quantité disproportionnée », comprenant notamment des centaines de fusils d'assaut, des lance-roquettes, des mitrailleuses, des explosifs et des munitions.

At least 69 people were shot dead in 1960 but no-one has been prosecuted and victims want restitution.

Carlos Queiroz is reappointed as head coach of Ghana's men's national team, two months after he appeared to step down following their exit from the World Cup.

Introduction

The disintegration of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s produced one of the most complex and violent conflict sequences in post–Cold War Europe.

Although the wars of the Yugoslav dissolution are often treated as a single regional crisis, they unfolded in distinct phases, each characterized by different actors, military strategies, and geopolitical implications. The first two phases—the Slovenian Ten-Day War and the Croatian War of Independence—set the structural, military, and political conditions for the subsequent escalation of violence in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The origins of these conflicts lie in the gradual erosion of Yugoslavia’s federal cohesion after the death of Josip Broz Tito in 1980. Economic decline, hyperinflation, rising unemployment, and regional disparities undermined the legitimacy of federal institutions. Simultaneously, nationalist political elites gained influence in several republics, promoting competing visions of sovereignty and territorial control. By 1990, multi-party elections across Yugoslavia produced governments with sharply divergent political agendas, making the continuation of the federation increasingly untenable.

The Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA), once regarded as a stabilizing force, became increasingly aligned with Serbian political interests. This shift weakened its legitimacy in other republics and contributed to the perception that the federal military apparatus was no longer neutral. As Slovenia and Croatia moved toward independence, the JNA attempted to preserve Yugoslavia’s territorial integrity, but its operational limitations and internal fragmentation quickly became evident.

The following sections examine the first two phases of the Yugoslav dissolution—the Slovenian and Croatian conflicts—through a security-political and military-scientific lens, highlighting their strategic dynamics, operational characteristics, and broader implications for regional stability.

2. Phase: The Slovenian and Croatian Conflicts (1991–1995)

2.1 The Ten-Day War in Slovenia (June–July 1991)

Slovenia’s declaration of independence on 25 June 1991 marked the beginning of armed confrontation between republican forces and the federal military. The JNA launched a limited operation aimed at securing border posts and reasserting federal authority. However, the Slovenian Territorial Defense Forces employed decentralized, flexible tactics, leveraging their familiarity with the terrain and strong local support.

The conflict lasted only ten days and resulted in relatively low casualties. The Brioni Agreement, brokered by the European Community, ended hostilities and paved the way for the JNA’s withdrawal. From a security-political perspective, the Slovenian conflict demonstrated the JNA’s inability to conduct rapid, decisive operations against motivated local forces. It also revealed the reluctance of the international community to intervene militarily at this early stage, relying instead on diplomatic pressure.

The Slovenian phase had two major strategic consequences. First, it exposed the JNA’s internal divisions, as many Slovenian and Croatian officers refused to participate in operations against their own republics. Second, it created a precedent for unilateral secession, encouraging Croatia and later Bosnia and Herzegovina to pursue independence despite the risk of armed conflict.

2.2 The Croatian War of Independence (1991–1995)

The conflict in Croatia was significantly more intense and prolonged. Croatia’s declaration of independence triggered armed resistance from the local Serb minority, supported by the JNA and Serbian paramilitary formations. The Serb-controlled regions, collectively known as the “Republic of Serbian Krajina,” sought to detach from Croatia and maintain ties with Belgrade.

Military Dynamics

The early phase of the war was marked by the JNA’s conventional superiority. Heavy artillery, armored units, and air support enabled Serbian forces to seize large territories. The siege of Vukovar in late 1991 became a symbol of the war’s brutality: the city was almost entirely destroyed after an 87-day siege, and mass atrocities were committed following its fall.

Croatia, initially lacking heavy weaponry and organizational cohesion, gradually built a more capable military structure. By 1993–1994, the Croatian Army had undergone significant modernization, improving command-and-control systems, logistics, and operational planning. International arms flows, covert training programs, and structural reforms contributed to Croatia’s growing military effectiveness.

Turning Points

The decisive moment came in 1995 with Operation Flash and Operation Storm, two large-scale Croatian offensives that recaptured most Serb-held territories. Operation Storm, conducted in August 1995, involved approximately 130,000 Croatian troops and resulted in the collapse of the Krajina entity. While militarily successful, the operation triggered the displacement of more than 200,000 Serbs, raising long-term humanitarian and political concerns.

Security-Political Assessment

The Croatian conflict highlighted several key features of the Yugoslav dissolution:

• the central role of ethnic territorial claims,
• the fragmentation of command structures within the JNA,
• the increasing involvement of paramilitary groups,
• and the limitations of UN peacekeeping missions (UNPROFOR), which lacked enforcement capabilities.

The war also demonstrated that the balance of power could shift rapidly when a previously disadvantaged actor successfully modernizes its military forces. Croatia’s transformation from a poorly equipped force in 1991 to a capable regional actor by 1995 reshaped the strategic landscape of Southeast Europe.

References (APA 7 Style)

Burg, S. L., & Shoup, P. S. (1999). The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic conflict and international intervention. M.E. Sharpe.

Cohen, L. J. (1993). Broken bonds: Yugoslavia’s disintegration and Balkan politics. Westview Press.

Gow, J. (2003). The Serbian project and its adversaries: A strategy of war and peace. Hurst & Company.

Holbrooke, R. (1998). To end a war. Random House.

Judah, T. (2000). The Serbs: History, myth and the destruction of Yugoslavia. Yale University Press.

Lampe, J. R. (2006). Balkans into Southeastern Europe: A century of war and transition. Palgrave Macmillan.

Mann, M. (2005). The dark side of democracy: Explaining ethnic cleansing. Cambridge University Press.

Ramet, S. P. (2006). The three Yugoslavias: State-building and legitimation, 1918–2005. Indiana University Press.

Silber, L., & Little, A. (1996). Yugoslavia: Death of a nation. Penguin Books.

Sudetic, C. (1998). Blood and vengeance: One family’s story of the war in Bosnia. Penguin Books.

United Nations. (1999). Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to General Assembly resolution 53/35: The fall of Srebrenica. United Nations.

Woodward, S. L. (1995). Balkan tragedy: Chaos and dissolution after the Cold War. Brookings Institution Press.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

A The First Two Phases of the Yugoslav Dissolution: A Security-Political Analysis of the Slovenian and Croatian Conflicts (1991–1995) bejegyzés először Biztonságpolitika-én jelent meg.

Le capitaine Roger Gabriel a affirmé que des proches de l’ancien président Mohamed Bazoum et des officiers tchadiens étaient liés à la tentative de coup d’État des 28 et 29 août au Niger. Selon lui, des forces spéciales tchadiennes et françaises devaient soutenir les mutins, avec l’appui présumé du Bénin et de la Côte d’Ivoire.

Dauer des Videos : 135'

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Quelle : © Europäische Union, 2026 - EP

Length of video : 135'

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Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP