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Les dernières nominations et le décret portant Aof du ministère de l’Economie et des Finances ne sont pas du goût des travailleurs. Réunis en fin de semaine dernière en assemblée générale sous l’égide du Syntracef, ces derniers ont décidé d’organiser un sit-in de protestation demain, mercredi.

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Dans un message publié sur Facebook, le ministre de l'Économie a décidé de "rétablir la vérité", après les révélations de Mediapart et du "Canard enchaîné".

In the eyes of Greeks the meaning of Social Europe has changed over time, spanning the range from funds to promote social cohesion to externally enforced welfare state reforms in an austerity context. To the extent Greeks became familiar with Social Europe, they never took it to heart but would admit that they have periodically benefited from Social Europe’s tangible outlays, such as the European Structural Funds. Nowadays the Greek experience of a protracted economic crisis and a sudden refugee crisis can contribute towards rethinking Social Europe.

Welcome and unwelcome aspects of Social Europe

In pre-crisis Greece, Social Europe used to mean a welcome invitation to make Greece’s living standards converge with those of the rest of the EU. It also meant a less welcome push to introduce into Greece labour market and pension reforms, which would alter a patronage-based divide between insiders and outsiders.

European social policies, including active labor market policies and flexicurity, were alien in Greek society. Social Europe was not received well in a society in which many thought that they were entitled to a stable job and welfare benefits, dispensed by the state, by virtue of belonging to a group treated differently from other groups.

Examples of insider groups included civil servants, bank employees, journalists and the liberal professions. The majority of the rest were outsiders. An insider-outsider division has been the result of a particular historical legacy of state-society relations.

Social equity Greek style

Greeks hold complicated views on social equity. On the one hand they entertain egalitarian ideas as, in contrast to other European societies, there has never been an influential landed aristocracy in the Greece, while heavy industrialization was mostly absent from the country’s path to development.

On the other hand, Greeks often show more social solidarity with the narrow occupational group to which they belong rather than with the weaker social strata in general. While most Greeks reject any kind of social privilege, they simultaneously adhere to tailor-made, occupation-based privileges, such as rights to early retirement available to selected groups or preferential access to public sector jobs through political party patronage.

Social Europe after the crisis: from entitlement to austerity

After the crisis struck, the EU-imposed fiscal consolidation of the Greek economy led to the expansion of poverty, soaring unemployment and a deeper insider-outsider division between Greeks who have been relatively untouched by the crisis and their co-patriots who have been economically destroyed by it.

The economic crisis was very quickly transformed into a social crisis. Social Europe was flushed out of Greece along with the bathwater of relatively generous pensions, incommensurate to past insurance contributions, and wages standing higher than productivity levels.

Meanwhile, successive Greek governments fought to support their political clienteles by preventing substantive reforms in the aforementioned highly discriminatory welfare system, which pits insiders against outsiders. This is a fight that continues to this day. Thus, in crisis-ridden Greece, Social Europe has been associated, not so much with the rationalization of the welfare state, as with deep social spending cuts.

Rethinking Social Europe

However, as soon as the refugee crisis broke out in 2015 and hundreds of thousands of desperate people landed on Greek islands, Greeks rushed to offer help. Noticing the glaring absence of central state authorities, Greeks started pouring clothes, shoes, food and medicines on to incoming waves of refugees. Suddenly for Greeks, who during the crisis had taken Social Europe to mean indiscriminate austerity measures, being a European now meant sharing one’s own reduced resources with non-Europeans emerging from the sea.

Seeing a real humanitarian crisis from close by, Greeks have started putting Greek and European politics in perspective. In 2015 populist promises that other Europeans would rally around an anti-austerity Greek and South European vision to reshape Social Europe have evaporated. Pre-electoral claims that all that was necessary for Greeks to enjoy pre-crisis living conditions was to banish the EU-imposed austerity packages have contributed to the government turnover of 2015, but have soon proven futile. Almost every Greek has realized that a patronage-based system of welfare is normatively indefensible and financially unsustainable.

Distrust and dissatisfaction with the EU

But the fact that unfettered and one-size-fits-all austerity can rapidly lead an once relatively prosperous EU Member-State, such as Greece, to acute social crisis, has indicated how fragile Social Europe has become as well.

On this issue, the governing coalition of Syriza party with the right-wing Independent Greeks party, which has been in power since January 2015, believes that in the past Social Europe spelled the undermining, rather than the protection, of workers’ rights, for example, through introducing unacceptable flexibility in labour relations.

Finally, the coalition of Syriza would like to see more flexibility in the Stability and Growth Pact’s rules and the abandonment of Fiscal Compact, so as to allow national governments in Member States to follow expansionist economic policies. Simultaneously the radical left/right coalition distrusts the strengthening of decision-making powers of EU’core, including a stronger EU budget. Yet Syriza does call for an EU-wide increase in public investment.

Source: Clingendael

Author: Dimitri A. Sotiropoulos

Avec onze (11) points, les Ecureuils du Bénin se classent à la 2ème place derrière le Mali qui totalise treize (13) points après la 5ème journée des éliminatoires de la Coupe d’Afrique des Nations (Can Gabon 2017).

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Sudan is in urgent need of a fresh democratic transition, and for an inclusive peace to avert negative scenarios.

By Ahmed H Adam and Ashley D Robinson

The Arab Spring that swept across the Middle East and succeeded in overthrowing three dictatorships in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya in 2011 was a pivotal point in the history of nations.

Despite the subsequent descent into the "Arab Winter", the peaceful protests of young people were heroic. The movement demonstrated the power of the people against the status quo and the grip of repressive regimes.

After the initial but short-lived success of the Arab Spring, many observers asked: "Why hasn't there been a Sudanese Spring?" Sudan's crisis had been no less severe, nor protracted than those of the Arab Spring countries.

In addition, two of the Arab Spring countries - Egypt and Libya - border Sudan. Omar al-Bashir, the Sudanese president, was quick to answer the question claiming that his coup 27 years ago was Sudan's version of the Arab Spring. "Those who are waiting for the Arab Spring to come will be waiting for a while," he said.

He explained that the Arab Spring in Sudan had already occurred through a bloodless revolution that he led against the democratically elected government of Prime Minister al-Sadiq al-Mahdi on June 30, 1989. Bashir's claim had astonished many in Sudan and across the globe.

Pioneers of uprisings

While the Sudanese people admire the Arab Spring, they do not appreciate the question of why the Sudanese have not followed suit.

They proudly believe that they are the pioneers of the art of popular uprisings in the region.

The Sudanese succeeded in overthrowing two military dictatorships through popular uprisings: They threw out the regime of General Ibrahim Abboud in October 1964 and the regime of General Jaafar Nimeiri in April 1985.

As in the April 1985 uprising, students today are leading the way in building momentum. Last April's surge in student protests should be seen as a continuation of a successful revolt, not as random pockets of unrest, says Mastour Mohamed, the secretary-general of the Sudanese Congress Party (SCP).

Indeed, the people of Sudan have made many efforts to break through the ceiling of a repressive regime.

In January 2011, anti-government protesters, inspired by the "Arab Spring" movements in Tunisia and Egypt demanded the departure of the regime.

Peaceful protesters were met with the regime's usual excessive use of force. Perhaps South Sudan's secession overshadowed the protesters' demands.

Demonstrations surged again in December of 2011, when students at the University of Khartoum staged a successful sit-in. Increasing economic and political fragility of what's left of Sudan, led the government to impose austerity measures.

Public announcements of these austerity measures brought protesters back on to the streets in the summer of 2012.

Rising fuel prices throughout 2013 also increased public outrage. The September popular uprising of 2013 was one of the milestones in the Sudanese quest for freedom and dignity. The uprising started in Nyla City in Darfur, and then swept across the country.

Again, protesters were met with a heavy and bloody crackdown. The notorious National Intelligence Security Services (NISS) killed more than 200 peaceful demonstrators.

Puncturing the wall of fear

Sudan cannot heal the wounds of its evil past as long as those who have inflicted such injustice are permitted to do so with impunity - and with the broken or hollow promises of peace from the international community.

As the regime's same old tactics rot it from the inside, those outside the regime feel the deterioration.

Those who previously benefited from the inequitable policies of Bashir's regime are feeling the consequences of their dwindling prospects. They are gaining greater perspective and empathy for their former ethnic rivals.

A student from Khartoum University, and a leading activist against the so-calledcorruption dams, stated that "the student activists are now fully aware of the regime's tactics and cannot be divided on racial or any other grounds."

Mohamed of the SCP argued that students have scaled the "wall of fear". "Risking their lives, students picked up tear gas canisters before they exploded and threw them back at the armed forces. Thus they fight back and do not quit," he said.

When asked why students have punctured the "wall of fear", Adam Musa, one of the leaders of the Darfuri Student Leagues Coalition, said: "We do not have another option. People are so bitter. The continuous excessive violence by the regime and our long accumulated trauma, has emboldened us to fight back."

Sudan shall not be failed

Sudan is geopolitically important for the region in the fight against terrorism, and in its efforts of humanitarian intervention for those migrating through Sudan's porous borders.

A united Sudan is vital for the stability and security of the region. However, current policies and leadership in the country continue to dissatisfy the people of Sudan.

The Arab mainstream media have not given the same coverage to the aspirations and efforts of the Sudanese people as they have to the neighbouring Arab Spring countries.

Sudan is in urgent need of a fresh democratic transition, and for an inclusive peace to avert the negative scenarios of Libya and Syria.

Perhaps such media attention would provide powerful insights into how to avoid another Bashir-like dictatorship for the countries which have fallen into the chaos of "Arab Winter".

The League of Arab States has failed to offer the Sudanese opposition forces and independent civil society any fair hearing, as they have been doing in Syria.

The league and its members should listen to Sudanese forces of change. The people of Sudan will eventually succeed in bringing about change in their country, as they did in 1964 and 1985.

The question is, what role will the Arab states play in the rebirth of this vital nation?

Ahmed H Adam is a visiting fellow at Cornell University's Institute for African Development, and a research fellow at the Department of Public Policy and Administration at the American University in Cairo.

Ashley D Robinson is a public policy and human rights expert. She obtained her master's degree from Columbia University, School of International and Public Affairs.

June 13, 2016 (KHARTOUM) - Sudanese government Monday, announced the official dissolution of Darfur Regional Authority (DRA) and Darfur Peace Office, indicating that the implementation of peace agreement in Darfur region.

Former DRA chairman Tijani al-Sissi speaks to the press after the dissolution of the regional body on June 13, 2016 (ST Photo)

The DRA was established in line with the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD), which was signed in July 2011, by the Government of Sudan and former rebel Liberation and Justice Movement, and the Justice and Equality Movement-Dabajo in April 2013.

The regional body had a four-year mandate to implement the framework peace document. However, the DRA term was extended up to July 2016, by a presidential decree in 2015.

The dissolution was announced following a meeting of the High Committee for Peace in Darfur attended by First Vice President, Bakri Hassan Saleh, DRA Chairman, Tijani al-Sissi, DRA member, Bahr Abu Gaurda , the head of Darfur Peace Office, Amin Hassan Omer, and some DRA ministers.

However, the meeting agreed to maintain the High Committee for Peace in Darfur headed by President Omer al Bashir and the International Committee for DDPD Implementation Follow-Up headed by Qatar.

JEM Dabajo political advisor, Nahar Osman Nahar told Sudan Tribune that the meeting decided to dissolve the DRA officially. Nevertheless he added that DRA commissions and funds that didn't yet finish the implementation of their projects will be continue their activities under a new body to attached to the presidency.

“So, the DRA commissions will be directly supervised by the Presidency of the Republic. As for, the (former) DRA Chairman Tijani al-Sissi, the government will find a solution for his situation later,” said Nahar.

One the fate of DRA staff members, Nahar said they will be financially compensated based on years of service. Also some of them will be incorporated in the civil service in Darfur states and the central government while others will be absorbed in the newly established regional institutions.

“This marks the official end of the DRA, and some of its commissions will continue working most probably for one year,” added Nahar.

For his part, the Chairman of Darfur Peace Office, Amin Hassan Omer, told the media that the meeting concluded to establish a body at the presidency to oversee the DRA five commissions, stressing that the composition of the council of Development and Reconstruction Fund will be reviewed.

The head of DRA was accused in the past of controlling this vital fund and appointing the majority his supporters to its board.

Amin said the meeting discussed the procedures for dissolving DRA in July and attaching DRA Commission to the Presidency of the Republic. He added that the Darfur Peace Office is fully dissolved because it was a coordination body between the DRA and the federal government.

He pointed that the nomad and pastoralists commission will be dissolved and integrated into the Development and Reconstruction Fund.

The state minister at the presidency further said the meeting decided to maintain Darfur Special Criminal Court and resolved to ask the African Union and United Nations to send observers to the court.

The Chairman of DRA, Tijani al-Sissi, on his part reiterated that DRA commissions will continue implementing their projects, pointing that DRA has implemented 85% of DDPD items.

Last April, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared the end of DRA after the conduct of Darfur Administrative Referendum.

Darfur Administrative Referendum results indicated that 97.73 % of the voters have called for keeping the current five states, while 2.28% of the voters called for one region in Darfur.

Al-Sissi who is also a Fur tribal dignitary was the only political leader to call for the establishment of a single administration in the western Sudan region.

(ST)

June 13, 2016 (JUBA) - South Sudanese presidency comprising President Salva Kiir, First Vice President, Riek Machar, and Vice President, James Wani have not yet directed state governments and army command to establish cantonment sites for forces of the Sudan People's Liberation Army in Opposition (SPLA-IO) in the country.

A state governor in Bahr el Ghazal region revealed that the presidency has not yet acted upon their last week's consensus to establish cantonment areas for the opposition forces.

General Elias Waya, governor of the newly created Wau state, said he has not received any official directive from the presidency about the establishment of the cantonment sites for forces of SPLA-IO.

“I have no information about the establishment of the cantonment sites for SPLA-IO forces in the state. There is no official communication. No directives have been given from the presidency,” Governor Waya explained.

“Yes, we heard from the media the decision of the cabinet but this has to be operationalized. It has to be made official in writing,” he said when reached on Monday to comment on the establishment of cantonment sites.

Waya also described security situation in the area as calm and under control.

His comments echoed the explanation from a SPLA-IO's senior commander, General James Koang Chuol, who also said the Joint Military Ceasefire Committee (JMCC), of which he is a member, has not yet received official directive from the presidency to establish the cantonment sites.

Observers say the delay in the establishment of the cantonment sites for forces of the SPLA-IO in the country, specifically in the two regions of Bahr el Ghazal and Equatoria, continues to be a cause of current tensions and clashes between the two rival forces when coming into contacts during reconnaissance.

Others attribute the delay to lack of funds to facilitate movements of the officials who would be involved in identification of the locations and discussion with local communities.

(ST)

L'examen du Bepc a bien démarré lundi 13 juin au Bénin. Des dizaines de milliers de candidats ont composé pour le compte de la première journée. L'essentiel à retenir des épreuves.

Par René Adéniyi

Deux sujets au choix en français en ce qui concerne l'épreuve de communication écrite. Le premier porte sur un article de journal à faire ou à rédiger à propos du bon déroulement des élections au Bénin. Tout récemment au Bénin, il était question des présidentielles et donc ce premier sujet a porté sur l'actualité. Le bon candidat averti et bien formé par son professeur de français se devait de faire tout ceci à l'aide de ce qu'il a appris concernant les différentes parties d'un article de journal. A lui après de l'illustrer à travers ce qu'on lui a demandé. Quant au sujet 2, il était tout simplement d'une lettre dite familière à rédiger concernant les préparatifs pour l'examen du Bepc.
Après la communication écrite, l'épreuve de lecture est basé sur un texte tiré de l'oeuvre Petit Jo, enfant des rues de l'écrivain camerounais Evelyne Poundi Ngollé. Dans l'ensemble, les questions étaient abordables également.
Dans l'après-midi, les candidats ont planché en Histoire-Géographie sur un sujet d'histoire qui met en exergue la résistance du roi Gbêhanzin aux Français et un autre sur l'agriculture au Bénin . Un vrai cadeau en principe pour nos chers candidats.

L'apologie de la méchanceté du Béninois, qui a valu l'invention du mot « béninoiserie », est cette tendance pour le Béninois à considérer son voisin comme le malveillant qui passe le plus clair de son temps à échafauder les meilleures stratégies pour commettre des « homicides occultes » dans le seul dessein de le tirer vers le bas. Cette idée est entretenue et exacerbée principalement par les charlatans, certaines nouvelles églises et malheureusement par de nombreux musiciens.

La méfiance à l'égard des autres, un des freins au développement du Bénin

Un regard sur les données de la Banque mondiale nous révèle que le Bénin a le quatrième taux de mortalité adulte le plus faible en l'Afrique de l'ouest (après le Cap-Vert, le Sénégal et le Niger). En d'autres termes, 497 Béninois sur 1000 ayant atteint l'âge de 15 ans peuvent espérer vivre jusqu'à 60 ans. Ceci témoigne de ce que le Béninois adulte ne meure pas plus vite que le Togolais (555/1000), le Burkinabé (536/1000), le Nigérian (730/1000), l'Africain (623/1000) ou même le citoyen d'un pays en voie de développement (531/1000). Pourtant, l'idée du Béninois « envoûteur » et « tueur » de son prochain est soigneusement entretenue dans le subconscient du citoyen lambda.

Pourtant, l'idée du Béninois « envoûteur » et « tueur » de son prochain est soigneusement entretenue dans le subconscient du citoyen lambda.

L'enfant est formaté pour se méfier de l'autre. Le jeune ne veut pas travailler en équipe et l'adulte préfère entreprendre seul. Une enquête de la Banque mondiale identifie d'ailleurs le Bénin comme l'un des pays au plus fort taux de création d'entreprises unipersonnelles au monde. La mort d'un entrepreneur béninois rime souvent avec la disparition de sa société, conflit de succession oblige. Que dire de toutes ces vieilles maisons abandonnées dans les villes béninoises pour des raisons de disputes fraternelles, ou de pratiques charlatanesques supposées ! Des politiques publiques audacieuses devraient permettre de lever quelques freins culturels qui s'activent systématiquement dans le véhicule du développement du Bénin.

Bannir les messages qui font l'apologie de la méchanceté

Malgré leur nécessité, les politiques publiques audacieuses sont difficilement formulées au Bénin en raison du manque d'engagement des acteurs politiques ou de l'instrumentalisation des institutions chargées de leur formulation. À titre illustratif, les décisions les plus audacieuses de ces dix dernières années furent certainement l'implémentation par la police nationale des mesures de port du casque et l'obligation pour les motocyclistes de rouler dans l'espace du trafic local qui leur est réservé. En leur temps, ces mesures n'avaient pas échappé à la critique populaire. Pourtant aujourd'hui, il est aisé de reconnaitre leur utilité. Bien que les chiffres ne soient pas disponibles, ces mesures semblent avoir significativement réduit le nombre des accidents mortels sur les routes.

Des efforts devront aussi être consentis dans la démystification du phénomène à travers une communication intensive en langues locales sur l'étendue du territoire national.

Il y a des réformes tout aussi importantes qui méritent d'être formulées et appliquées avec le même degré d'audace. La Haute autorité de l'audiovisuel et de la communication (HAAC), institution chargée de la régulation des médias au Bénin, devrait avoir le courage de bannir systématiquement des chaines de télévision, de radio ou toute production artistique et religieuse qui ferait l'apologie de la méchanceté supposée de l'homme béninois et son désir irréfragable d'envoûter son prochain. L'interdiction d'antenne pour les porteurs de ce type de messages est une nécessité. Des efforts devront aussi être consentis dans la démystification du phénomène à travers une communication intensive en langues locales sur l'étendue du territoire national.

Des dispositions institutionnelles pour mieux appréhender le phénomène

Des dispositions devraient être prises pour évaluer l'efficacité des guérisseurs traditionnels et charlatans parce que bon nombre d'entre eux diffusent inlassablement la doctrine du Béninois malveillant. Il est évident que tout Béninois doit être conscient de certains traits de notre culture dont nous devons être profondément fiers. Ces traits culturels distinctifs incluent la réfutation de la domination, la réprobation de la violence physique. Ils incluent également la reconnaissance des vertus enseignées par certains préceptes traditionnels tels que le vaudou ou le Fâ ( un langage codé entre Dieu et les hommes que seuls les initiés peuvent décrypter), qui sont en réalité exempts de toute apologie du mal.

Des dispositions devraient être prises pour évaluer l'efficacité des guérisseurs traditionnels et charlatans parce que bon nombre d'entre eux diffusent inlassablement la doctrine du Béninois malveillant.

Les normes culturelles ne devraient pas empêcher d'améliorer les mécanismes qui permettent de garantir le bien-être des citoyens béninois, aussi bien sur le plan de la santé que sur le plan spirituel. Les faiseurs de miracle (pasteurs, charlatans, guérisseurs traditionnels) devraient être recensés et suivis de près par des cellules en charge au sein de l'Etat de la collecte et de l'analyse d'informations de façon à dénicher les réels talents et à en faire des références nationales voire des attractions touristiques.

En outre, le gouvernement devrait dédier un fonds de recherche à l'étude des phénomènes inexpliqués qui servent de terreau aux « diffuseurs de mauvaises nouvelles ». Ainsi, les chercheurs béninois pourront déterminer de façon empirique les facteurs qui contribuent à l'ancrage de l'idée du Béninois malveillant afin de combattre ce phénomène de façon programmatique. Il semble que cette perception nuise profondément à l'unité nationale et au développement de l'entreprenariat.

*Les points de vue exprimés ne reflètent pas nécessairement ceux d'IMANI Center for Policy and Education

Alan R. Akakpo
Analyste de politique publique et responsable projet IMANI Francophone-Benin.

http://www.wathi.org/laboratoire/tribune/finir-freins-culturels-progres-collectif-benin/

By Tesfa-Alem Tekle

June 13, 2016 (ADDIS ABABA) – Ethiopian and Eritrean forces on Sunday engaged in fresh fighting along their heavily militarised common border, officials in Asmara said.

Eritrea, which borders Sudan and Ethiopia, has been dubbed the North Korea of Africa (HRW)

According to multiple reports, the two rival forces fought in Tserona front, an area situated about 75 kilometers south of the Eritrean capital, Asmara.

An Eritrean opposition website said the clashes took place shortly after midnight on Sunday morning and each side appears to be calling up reinforcement.

Asmara released a short statement accusing neighbouring Ethiopia of launching the attack.

However, the Ethiopian information and communications minister, Getachew Reda couldn't confirm the border clashes, saying he had no knowledge about the report.

Ethiopian forces “has today, Sunday 12 June 2016, unleashed an attack against Eritrea on the Tsorona Central Front” the Eritrean ministry of information said in a statement.

The statement added that the purpose and ramifications of this attack are not clear.

“The Government of Eritrea will issue further statements on the unfolding situation” the short statement concluded.

The latest fighting comes, as Ethiopia in recent months warned Eritrea that it would take a proportional action unless the red Sea nation refrains from continued provocations.

In February, a group of Eritrean armed men cross borders in to Ethiopia and carried out mass kidnappings from a Tigray region in North Ethiopia bordering Eritrea.

However Eritrea freed the abductees after Ethiopia warned it would take military action to recue its citizens.

Last moth, Ethiopia said it has foiled what it described was a plot by Eritrean mercenaries to carryout a terror attack in the country.

Ethiopia has previously carried out military actions against targets inside Eritrea to what Addis Ababa says is a proportional measures to Eritrea's continued aggression.

In 1998, the two neighbors fought a two-year long war over their disputed border which has claimed the lives of at least 70,000.

The row over their border remains unresolved and forces of both sides regularly engage in lower-scale skirmishes.

It is not yet clear on to what has triggered Sunday's clashes but Ethiopia has routinely accused Eritrea of orchestrating a number of cross-border attacks using Ethiopian rebels it harbors, an accusation Asmara denies.

Abraham Belay, a political analyst based in Addis Ababa told Sudan Tribune that the quick statement issued by Eritrea is “nothing more than the usual systematic ways” of the country to divert the people's attention.

“It is meant to deflect the public's attention from the recent UN human rights commission report,” he said.

The United Nations Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in Eritrea on Wednesday disclosed that the commission found crimes that were committed against humanity.

Mike Smith, the chairman of the commission said crimes of enslavement, imprisonment, enforced disappearance, torture, persecutions, sexual and gender based violence, discrimination on the basis of religion and ethnicity and other inhuman crimes were documented.

The latest report said it has found no improvement in the rule of law further citing to the absence of a constitution, an independent judiciary or democratic institutions in Eritrea.

The commission said it has recommended to the UN Security Council to refer the situation in Eritrea to the prosecutor of the Hague-based International Criminal Court.

(ST)

June 13, 2016 (KAMPALA) – Fighting erupted on Sunday evening in Uganda's Gulu district near the border with South Sudan, Ugandan media outlets have reported.

Ugandan leader Yoweri Museveni and his son Muhoozi Kainerugaba (Monitor)

The first clashes in the Gulu district area, predominantly inhabited by the Acholi tribe in Uganda, occurred after media reports that a number of army officers have been allegedly arrested in Kampala over an alleged plan to stage military coup against President Yoweri Museveni.

“It is true, Gulu Police barracks was attacked today [Sunday],” Uganda media quoted police spokesperson, Fred Enanga.

“The attackers were repulsed in a fight that lasted about 39 minutes – from around 9:00 pm to 9:30 pm,” he added.

Enanga could not however name the fighters who stormed the police state for security reasons, saying this would be “jeopardizing investigations.”

Shops were closed as the fierce gun battle rocked the town, forcing many to scamper for safety. The police station was reported raided before army reinforcement came in to flash out the gunmen.

The incident also comes against the backdrop of reports that a new rebel movement has begun to operate in the area against President Museveni's government.

Last year, unidentified group of armed men attacked Mubende Police Station to loot the armoury but were repulsed after the army came in and joined the battle.

(ST)

June 13, 2016 (JUBA) – A senior army general in the opposition faction of the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA-IO) under the leadership of the First Vice President, Riek Machar, said they have not been officially informed to open the river Nile route.

Lt. Gen. Simon Gatwech Dual, the chief of staff of the SPLA-IO, talks to the press at a rebel military site in Juba on April 25, 2016 (Photo AFP/Charles Lomodong)

The presidency of South Sudan and the council of ministers have resolved on a number of security issues, but which have not yet been communicated officially to the implementers on the ground.

In the last week's Friday council of ministers meeting, information minister, Michael Makuei Lueth, said the SPLM-IO leadership would direct their Sector One commander in Upper Nile state, General Johnson Olony, to allow the river route to open between Renk and Malakal which the opposition controls.

However, the top commander of the SPLA-IO in the Joint Military Ceasefire Committee (JMCC), General James Koang Chuol, said their organization has not been informed to communicate the matter.

JMCC is a body established under the August 2015 peace agreement to monitor the implementation of the security arrangements in the country.

“We have not been informed officially that there is food that is going to be brought from Renk to Juba. If we were informed the joint military committee would do that. But no one had informed the military committee officially,” General Chuol told the media.

He said they have not been informed about the items which the government wanted to ferry along the River Nile.

The river route connecting Renk and Malakal has been blocked since last year by the opposition forces of the SPLA-IO.

General Chuol also earlier said they have not been informed officially in writing to identify the cantonment areas for opposition forces in Greater Equatoria and Greater Bahr el Ghazal regions, despite agreement in the presidency to establish the cantonment areas.

No cantonment areas have yet been established in the country.

(ST)

Much has been reported about how Afghan men, mostly young Shias, are being incentivised or coerced by Iran into fighting on the side of the Assad regime in Syria. There has been little study, however, of how exactly they end up in Syria. Said Reza Kazemi (*) has been tracking a 22 year-old Shia Afghan called Musa and discovered a story of going to fight in Syria that is far more complex. Musa’s case highlights how young men, failing to be integrated into their local communities, are becoming more connected to the outside world. It also shows how such dislocated youths can believe that by fighting in Syria they can become men.

This dispatch follows previous fieldwork and AAN publications by Said Reza Kazemi on the problematic behaviour of young people in Herat. The names of people and places in this dispatch have been changed or withheld at the request of interviewees.

It was a pleasant spring afternoon in a shahrak, or informal settlement, on the tree-clad outskirts of Herat city on 3 April 2016 when 21-year-old Jawid received a message from his close friend Musa on his Chinese-made smartphone while chatting to this author. After the ritual of greetings and catching up, Musa and Jawideengaged in what turned out to be a serious conversation:

Musa [online from Tehran, Iran]: Forgive me [halal konen] but I’m no longer going to be around.

Jawid [online from Herat, Afghanistan]: What do you mean? Where will you be?

M: Don’t tell anyone: I’ll be in Syria.

J: Why?

M: Just going there.

J: I don’t know what to say. As you wish… But I beg you: don’t go.

M: Isn’t it good if I become a shahid [a martyr]?

J: You could have continued your schooling and taken your kankur [university entrance test] here. At least you could have tried to get into university here. You could have gone there [to Syria] if you hadn’t succeed with kankur. Or you could have eventually found some work here. So many people go on living here. Of course, it’s good to become a shahid. Not everyone can become a shahid. Of course, I can’t tell you what to do and I can’t stop you going either.

M: That [continuing school] was certainly possible, Jawid. My problem comes from another place, and I can’t talk about it.

J: What problem?

M: The problem lies in my heart.

J: Because of your dad?

M: No.

J: What problem do you have with your heart?

M: Leave it. Bye for now.

J: Well, you must do whatever feels right for you.

M: You know, Jawid, we all die. It has nothing to do with going to Syria. We die wherever we are, once our ’ajal [final hour] comes.

J: Are you serious about your decision?

M: Yes.

J: Are your mum and dad aware of it?

M: No.

J: Nobody’s aware of it! Why don’t you talk to your mum and dad about it? Tell them, or it’ll be very sad for them.

M: I’m going tomorrow. To Yazd [the centre of Iran’s Yazd province, around 270 km southeast of Isfahan], for training. One month of training in Iran and two months of fighting in Syria. Just pray that all will be fine for me at the end.

This conversation between the two young Afghans both reveals and conceals a number of issues. To understand it, it needs to be placed in its context. It highlights, for example, the growing awareness of the outside world among segments of Afghanistan’s younger population, their increased connectivity to worlds both virtual and real and their increasing mobility, both locally and abroad. Following Musa intermittently over the last three years (see previous research here), the author has been amazed at how fascinated Musa has always been with the connectivity provided to him by information and communication technologies, primarily via mobile phone and the Internet.

The socioeconomic circumstances of both Musa’s family and the 8,000 or so inhabitants of his shahrak (a Dari diminutive of shahr, city) are generally low. Most of the residents – where Musa has spent most of his life and which is inhabited mostly by Shia Hazaras and Sayyeds – are daily-wage labourers employed in piecemeal construction work. Musa’s father is a local shopkeeper. Youths like Musa have, nevertheless, managed to purchase Chinese-made smartphones and stay connected via the Internet (see previous AAN research on the growth of new media in Afghanistan here). Many of these young people put pressure on their parents to buy them smartphones.

Like many of his peers, Musa spends much of his time on his phone, either messaging his friends in Afghanistan and abroad, or checking Facebook and other social networking websites. He watches video clips, listens to music and generally surfs the net. It is this connectivity that has made young people like Musa aware of regional and global developments, such as the war in Syria and, more importantly, how to take part in it. However, their use of information and communication technologies continues to be largely uncritical, partly because of the generally low standards of education and upbringing in society (home, school and the broader community). However, even in countries with much higher standards of education and upbringing, young people have been radicalised through the media and joined the Syrian conflict. (1)  Therefore, there is more to youth radicalisation than the use of information and communication technologies. In Musa’s case, he was not radicalised, but his use of such technologies made him increasingly aware about developments outside Afghanistan, including how other young men were fighting in Syria.

The failure of local Afghan communities to integrate their youths

Musa’s connectivity to the outside world eventually led to his desire to travel abroad. His sense of dislocation did not happen overnight, however; it took a while for Musa to gradually become alienated from his local community in the shahrak, particularly from his school and his family.

It began with a life-changing incident at school. The shahrak where Musa has lived most of his life has one public school, and two private schools which compete with each other to attract fee-paying students. Musa used to attend one of these private schools, but was expelled. He came to blows with one of his teachers, following a reprimand for failing to do his homework, which had suffered increasingly due to time spent with his friends late into the night, and on his smartphone.

Despite his father’s pleas, the school stood by their decision and Musa lost a year of studies. In the following academic year, 2014-15, Musa attended a public school outside the shahrak in downtown Herat. He dropped out, however, while in his last year.

Musa’s father, who has four children (two girls aged 24 and 20 and two boys aged 22 and 5), then tried to get Musa involved in life in their local community, but these efforts were also in vain. He tried to engage Musa in the small grocery shop he had been running in the locality for over a decade. Musa was, however, not interested in helping his father there or in a subsequent shop his father wanted to set up for him to run. Musa’s father, relatives and some of his school friends, including Jawid, then tried to draw Musa into one of the few local educational centres that have been providing, among other things, English language and computer literacy courses. Musa attended an English language course for a short while, but soon dropped out. His father’s last move was to draw Musa into local life through marriage, but this effort backfired.

He had gone to a neighbour’s home, asking their daughter – a girl Musa had come to appreciate – for his son. As the author later found out through female relatives, the girl had previously turned Musa down. One reason was that the girl, who studies medicine at Herat University, rejected Musa because he did not have higher education. Furthermore, marriage is an expensive and complicated process of traditions and rituals, making it difficult for parents to settle their restless sons. In fact, many young Afghan men whose parents are not financially secure see migration abroad (such as Iran, Europe or Australia) as a way to find the money for getting settled in life. (2) In Musa’s case, his father had saved and put aside the necessary money, but his son had already been turned down by the girl he loved – one of the reasons for him wanting to pursue a different life path. Musa’s father eventually learned all this from his wife.

The failure of Afghan communities to integrate their young people needs to be placed in a larger historical and cultural context. Figures of authority in a community – parents, educational leaders, religious figures, etc – face a new generation of young men (and women) who often do not share their historical, social or cultural experiences. Most parents in the shahrak have lived most of their lives in Afghanistan’s central highlands region, as well as in intermittent migration in neighbouring countries, such as Iran and Pakistan, with far less connectivity or mobility than their children today have or can appreciate. Youths such as Musa wish to have ‘modern sociability’. This lies in stark contrast to traditional ways of life in Afghanistan in which people, particularly their parents and older generations, prefer to be content with whatever they have in life and living where their ancestors have lived or where they are currently settled, that is on the outskirts of Herat city. Additionally, young people like Musa have lived most of their lives in Herat – an ancient, politically and economically important urban centre with historical and rapidly broadening ties both inside and outside of Afghanistan, particularly with neighbouring Iran and Turkmenistan,  far from their ancestral central highlands, a region that many of them, including Musa, have never even been to. (3)

Handling these generational clashes is difficult for local figures of authority and parents such as Musa’s. In his father’s words:

I tried everything I could to keep him here. I didn’t make him work, besides his studies, as many parents in the shahrak do. I encouraged him to attend an English language course, in addition to his school. But he used to say, even if he studied, he wouldn’t be able to find a job that suited his education because of corruption and nepotism in the country. I told him I would open a shop for him, bring him a wife and help him build a family and a house of his own on a plot of land that I own in the shahrak. But he used to say he didn’t see a future for himself and his family in Afghanistan even if he got married. He was of a different mind. I could never understand him or know what he was constantly doing with his mobile phone. I neither know English nor am I knowledgeable about the internet and things like that. Musa wanted to go, and he did go. The night he was smuggled out of Herat for Tehran about ten months ago, we had our last conversation, but I ultimately failed to convince him, to give him hope of a future in order to make him stay here. He went without my or his mother’s consent.

Getting out of Afghanistan: failed attempt to get to Germany via Iran

In chats with the author before he left, it was clear Musa had not initially intended to go to Syria. He ended up in the war there or, as he told his friend Jawid, he happened to “just be going there.” Musa was connected, through Facebook and other social networking websites, with friends from the shahrak who had managed to get as far away as Austria and Germany, particularly from 2013 onwards. He was also regularly in touch with one of his paternal uncles who had previously got himself and his family smuggled to Augsburg in southern Germany in 2010. The atmosphere of ‘raftan, raftan’ (going, going), as ordinary people say on the streets of Herat, had clearly impacted youths such as Musa, who aspire to achieve a modern lifestyle (see also AAN research on ongoing but recently reduced ‘exodus’ from Afghanistan here, here  and here).

Initially, Musa had to get himself smuggled to Iran via Pakistan and then on to Turkey. From Turkey, he planned, like most other asylum-seekers, to try the Aegean Sea route to Greece and then all the way to Augsburg to his uncle.

It was in the middle of the night in July 2015 when Musa left the shahrak with one of his other paternal uncles and his paternal aunt’s husband for Iran via Pakistan. His companions were going to Iran to find construction work there. Following his return from Iran after about six months, during which he had missed his wife and children, Musa’s other paternal uncle told the author about the hardship and numerous risks they went through along the smugglers’ route to Iran. Remarkably, he said, they were lucky not to have been captured and killed by what he described as “Sunni Daesh [ISIS] supporters” along the Pakistani route via Taftan in Pakistan’s Baluchistan province. “The Daeshis suspect that Shia Afghans who go to Iran go on to fight for Assad in Syria. They send their own men to fight for the opposition in Syria; so, they kill any Shia Afghans they catch along the Pakistani route to Iran,” he said (for mobilisation of Sunnis in Pakistan to fight for the opposition in Syria, see here). AAN’s earlier research on Afghan fighters in Syria has also shown how the Syrian conflict has turned into an “odd meeting place” for Afghans fighting on the side of the Assad regime and those fighting for the opposition (see here). Even if Musa only saw Daesh in video clips on his Facebook account on his smartphone before he left, he felt how his journey to Iran could involve threats from Daesh mobilisers and supporters.

Musa and his two companions arrived safely in Tehran after almost a week. They had agreed to pay the smuggler after their arrival (around 30,000 Afghanis each, equivalent to 460 US dollars) through working and earning money in Iran. Many smugglers travel to Iran after obtaining visas from Iran’s consulate in Herat and then take their money from the people they have smuggled to that country, as one Herati in the smuggling business confided to the author in mid-2015. Musa found work as an apprentice in a carpentry shop on the outskirts of Tehran. He wanted to leave Iran for Europe as soon as he could, but could not for lack of money. (4) Musa’s work at the carpentry shop only just enabled him to get by in Tehran. His father would call him and Musa complained to him and his mother about his difficult living conditions in the carpentry shop, which also included household chores such as preparing and cooking food, washing and cleaning – things his mother and sisters had done for him at home and that he had taken for granted until then.

Musa put pressure on his parents to help him get out of Iran as soon as possible, particularly because European states were tightening their laws and considering closing their borders to asylum-seekers, especially those from Afghanistan (see a previous AAN dispatch here). He was keeping abreast of developments regarding asylum-seekers in Europe through his friends as well as by following the media. In particular, he asked his father to provide him with the money by selling his plot of land in the shahrak. However, because his father had not given Musa the permission to leave, he insisted that Musa had to work himself to raise the money if he wanted to go to Europe. (5) His Augsburg-based paternal uncle also refused to support Musa’s trip financially, for the same reason – because his brother (Musa’s father) had not given his blessing to Musa’s departure. The result was that Musa was stuck in Tehran.

Ending up in the Syrian war

Musa ended up in the war in Syria when he felt all other doors – to Europe, Iran and Afghanistan – were closed to him. He could not go to Europe as he was unable to make enough money to do so. Even if he had had the money, by early 2016, a move to Europe would most likely have been futile, as European states had closed their borders to asylum-seekers, especially those from Afghanistan. At best, he would have ended up in Turkey.

Secondly, he had lost face and felt he could no longer return to Afghanistan. That would have demonstrated his leaving had been a mistake and, worse, that he had failed himself. Recent research on Afghan migration has brought up the role of stigma in causing people who have failed in their migration efforts and been deported to try to migrate again. (6) Thirdly, Musa found life in Iran unbearable, as he briefly wrote in another message to his friend Jawid in mid-March 2016:

J: So, you enjoy living in a modern and developed city like Tehran?

M: It’s not like mum and dad’s home. I work hard in the carpentry shop. I feel I’m getting respiratory problems because of the wood dust in the shop. What’s more, my hair has started falling out and I’m beginning to go bald.

There have been increasing numbers of think-thank and media reports about Iran incentivising or coercing thousands of Afghan men to fight for the Assad regime in Syria. (7) Although the role of the Iranian state certainly contributes to young Afghans joining the conflict in Syria (see AAN research here, here and this media report here), it does not tell the whole story about how Afghan youths such as Musa end up there. When young people feel that other doors have been closed to them, they can see participation in the Syrian conflict as their last chance to demonstrate their masculinity or build some form of identity or social status for themselves as fighters. Even if they die, they will be shahids (martyrs). In this way at least they will be celebrated and remembered (see their glorification as fighters and, after their deaths, as martyrs on one of the Facebook pages of the Fatemiyun Brigade here). Musa alluded to this in his conversation with his friend Jawid. Youths such as Musa who end up in Syria should not be seen as passive, powerless or ‘mercenary’, to be dispatched, manipulated and exploited by the Iranian and Assad regimes. Rather they are active agents shaping the circumstances of their lives and their destinies. In-depth, informal conversations with Musa’s family and friends made it clear it was almost entirely Musa’s own decision to go to fight in Syria. He wanted to shape his own life and go his own way.

This does not mean that these young men are immune to incentives offered by Iran to fight for the Assad regime. They receive monthly salaries ranging between 2.5 and 3.5 million Toman (around 50,000-70,000 Afghanis, or 769 – 1,076 US dollars) and residence permits for themselves and their families. The Iranian parliament is also discussing granting Iranian citizenship to the families of Afghans who are dispatched by the Iranian government and ‘martyred’ fighting in Syria (see here). Religion also has an impact on young people such as Musa. According to the author’s conversation with a well-placed member of Sadeqia, the major Shia mosque and religious centre in Herat, Grand Ayatollah Sayyed Ali al-Sistani, whom the majority of Shias in Herat and the wider western region of Afghanistan follow, has declared going to Syria to defend Shia shrines as wajeb-e kefa’i (mandatory within one’s capacity). In fact, Afghans fighting for the Assad regime in Syria are described by Iran as well as by themselves as “the defenders of the shrine and the domain of the guardianship of the Islamic jurist” (modafe’an-e haram wa harim-e welayat). The ‘shrine’ refers to that of Sayyeda Zainab’s shrine, the Prophet Muhammad’s granddaughter, which is located in southern Damascus; the ‘jurist’ is Iran’s highest authority, namely supreme leader Grand Ayatollah Sayyed Ali Khamenei; here, it is implied, his authority extends outside Iran’s borders. All in all, joining the war in Syria is a highly complicated decision-making process, in which young men themselves play a significant role, in addition to various structural factors.

Musa’s story also shows the extent of the involvement of Afghans in the Syrian war. Several of Musa’s friends have taken part in (some have died there) or are seriously considering going to fight there. Importantly, his friends have, to a large extent, influenced his decision to go. Two, Rauf and Mohsen (featured in the author’s previous research here), who have also got themselves smuggled to Iran, are contemplating going, but so have far been dissuaded by their families, particularly by their mothers and sisters.

The author has identified three of Musa’s friends and twelve of his near and distant kin and acquaintances who have fought or died in Syria:

– Haidar, Musa’s friend, killed in action in Syria: a large funeral was organised to commemorate his death in Iran. He was buried in the martyrs’ area of a graveyard in Iran thanks to the Iranian residence permit his father Asghar was able to obtain for himself and his family. They subsequently moved from the shahrak, where they are now celebrated, to Iran. This has greatly contributed to the socioeconomic enhancement of his family.

– Asghar, Haidar’s father, was dispatched several times to fight in Syria though he was prevented by his wife from going back to fight in Syria on his last attempt, as the family has already lost its son. He has developed symptoms that could be characterised as post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). He is currently living with his family in Iran.

– Gholam, Musa’s friend, is currently fighting in Syria and influenced Musa in his decision to go. He has started making a contribution to the economic wellbeing of his family.

– Zaman, Musa’s friend, was killed in action in Syria. A large funeral was organised for him in Iran and he was buried in the martyrs’ area of a graveyard in Iran. His family moved from the shahrak to Iran as they were granted residency permits by the Iranian government. They are now celebrated by his family as well as by the wider community in the shahrak and in Iran.

– Two maternal uncles, reportedly prominent members and commanders in the Fatemiyun Brigade that is composed of Afghan Shias (for more on the Fatemiyun, see here). One of the uncles had deserted the Afghan National Army a few years ago and went back to Iran. They were already members of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. They have previous experience of fighting for Iran in the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988).

– Three more relatives on Musa’s mother’s side (who are married to sisters of Musa’s mother) are currently fighting in Syria.

– Two brothers of Musa’s eldest sister’s husband, who are religiously oriented, are following the fatwa of Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani and are fighting to defend Shia shrines in Syria. They are said, by their Herat-based brother, to believe in either killing or dying fighting the Daeshis. Musa’s eldest sister’s husband is also considering joining the Syrian war.

– The brother of another distant relative of Musa’s, who is also religiously oriented, believes in fighting to defend Shia shrines in Syria.

– Another distant relative of Musa’s is currently fighting in Syria and has reportedly saved the life of a major Iranian commander. He was reportedly honoured by Iran’s political and religious leadership, including Iran’s supreme leader Ali Khamenei (see here  on Khamenei’s meeting with families of Afghans killed in Syria). He is a member of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and had previously fought on Iran’s side in the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988).

– Another distant relative of Musa’s, killed in action in Syria, was as old as Musa and also a poor student at school. He had a big funeral and was buried in the martyrs’ area of a graveyard in Iran. His family is now celebrated and this has made an important contribution to the socioeconomic enhancement of his family.

– A close relative who previously fought in Syria is currently in Herat and is planning to go back.

Syria stories

The participation of a growing number of young men in the Syrian conflict has given rise to difficult questions and controversies in the shahrak, and probably elsewhere in Afghanistan, about fundamental concepts such as jihad (holy war), namus (honour), watan (homeland) and shahid/shahadat (martyr/martyrdom). Tensions can be particularly high when families, friends and acquaintances get together and recount what can be called ‘Syria stories’ – stories they have heard either from people they know who are presently fighting in Syria or from those who have returned home from Iran or Syria.

The father of Musa’s friend, Rauf, who is seriously thinking of joining the battlefield in Syria, told the author on 5 May 2016:

Rauf didn’t inform us when he left the shahrak to be smuggled to Iran. We didn’t know where he was for several days until we received his call from Tehran. Then his mother and I became calmer, especially because he went to stay with his brother who is in Iran with his family. After a while, Rauf said he was going to fight in Syria for jihad to defend our religion and our namus. Even if he dies, he says he’ll die as a shahid. I strongly disagreed and shouted at him down the mobile phone. I told him jihad takes place in a person’s watan. I told him you become a shahid fighting for your namus in your own watan. Afghanistan is itself at war. I oppose whatever the Iranians and some of our own Afghan clerics are telling young people such as my son. His mother said she wouldn’t ‘forgive her milk’ if he goes to fight in Syria. She said she would do biabi [shame, disgrace] to the family by leaving the house, running through the streets and alleys of the shahrak, barefooted and without a veil, if her son has goes to fight in Syria (8). So far, we’ve managed to keep him out of there.

Many of the stories from and about Syria are filled with terrifying descriptions of the war in that country. There are tales about young Afghan fighters who have been captured and decapitated by Daesh. Narrating what his brother told him about his experiences in Syria, one of Musa’s relatives, during a family get-together, said that, in one instance, his brother and comrades were besieged, a hellish fight took place and those who could not escape the area faced a horrible end: Daesh members reportedly used their shoe laces to behead them. His brother had, however, managed to flee the area. Several weeks ago, the beheaded body of one of the young local Afghans who had gone to Syria was returned for burial in Mashhad, the centre of Iran’s Razavi Khorasan province which neighbouring Herat. Several relatives of young Afghan fighters say many bodies (most of them decapitated) are never returned; rather they are left to rot in no man’s land in Syria.

There are also stories of how repentant some young Afghan fighters have become after seeing the Syrian war for themselves. In some cases, they have intentionally injured or disabled themselves so they no longer have to take part in armed hostilities and are dispatched back to Iran. They then leave Iran for elsewhere (back to Afghanistan or on to Europe). Additionally, there are numerous stories about how young Afghan fighters killed in the Syrian war are celebrated at funerals attended by crowds of Afghans and Iranians in various cities across Iran. Undoubtedly, part of this is political propaganda by the Iranian government to sustain fighter mobilisation to boost the manpower of the Assad regime. They are then buried in martyrs’ areas in graveyards throughout the country (see, for example, here about the burial in Mashhad and Yazd of nine Afghans who had been killed in Khan Tuman, a strategic village in the northern Syrian city of Aleppo).

There are also many positive tales about these young men. Although they were, in many ways, failures in their own society (or saw themselves as such) and seriously confused about what they were doing in life, they have come to be seen as the defenders of Shia shrines and heroes of the religion within a short time span. They are celebrated as fighters and as martyrs after their deaths. Many have become the main breadwinners and providers for their families. Some have managed to obtain Iranian residence permits for their families. More generally, they gain experience of life and are able to command some level of social respect among their families and communities. This is exactly the point missing in previous think-tank research and media coverage of young Afghan men participating in the Syrian conflict. To these, one should also add many tales of camaraderie among these young Afghan fighters as well as between them and their Iranian and Syrian comrades. Finally, there are also stories of at least a few Afghan fighters who have fallen in love with Syrian women or the women with them and who stay on, possibly to form families if they continue to survive and if the Syrian war is brought to some conclusion – pointing to the down-to-earth fact that normal life can go on even in the midst of a catastrophic war.

Musa in Syria, his family in the shahrak and what his case tells us

The night he left Yazd for Syria on 4 May 2016, Musa finally called to let his parents know that he was going to fight in Syria. In anger over his parents not helping him financially to leave Iran for Germany, he had cut off all contact with his family and friends, both via phone and the Internet, with the exception of close friends such as Jawid. That night he talked to all his family members, namely his parents, two sisters, his eldest sister’s husband and his younger brother. He asked his parents for halaliyat (forgiving him for whatever wrong he might have committed in the past), in case he never returned from the Syrian battlefield. Finally, his parents saw no other way but to give in. His mother said that, after he called, she was not able to sleep for nights and his father had been increasingly pensive. During his last conversation with his family, Musa reportedly told them that his maternal uncles, who are prominent members and commanders of the Fatemiyun Brigade, would intervene so that he would not be dispatched to the frontline, but instead to place him in a non-combat role such as providing first aid and other medical services in a hospital in Damascus. Whether or not his maternal uncles were able to do this is unknown, for there has been no more news from or about Musa since 4 May.

Musa’s story tells us how Afghan communities and government authorities have to deal with a new generation of Afghan youth who are increasingly connected to the outside world and, increasingly, have the possibility of travelling abroad. In Musa’s case, his own community failed to integrate him into local life – although not for lack of trying – and no one was able to prevent him following his own path. In particular, Musa’s father and mother certainly did all they could and acted as responsible and caring parents but they faced a changing situation that was extremely difficult to manage.

Communities should listen to their young people’s needs more and invest in their interests. Even small things can bring about changes. One of Musa and his friends’ interests was playing football. Developing this and other extra-curricular activities (that need not be expensive) can make a difference by making youths such as Musa more interested in their communities. Even organising small, local tournaments can have a big impact (see the author’s previous dispatch on grassroots football leagues and great hopes in Afghanistan here). An adult from the shahrak said he was spending more time playing and encouraging youngsters to play football, because they enjoyed it and because it tired them out so they would not have the energy to spend a lot of time on their mobile phones or the Internet.

Musa and other young people in his situation are desperately looking for ways to make their mark in life and build their own identity and social status. They want hope and a future. Unless they find this in their own neighbourhood and in their society, the temptation to go to places like Syria will remain, even under the worst circumstances imaginable, in order that they might prove themselves.

* Said Reza Kazemi is a PhD student (2013-2016) at Heidelberg University in Germany where he is writing a dissertation on an ethnographic story about the past and present of an Afghan transnational family. He has previously worked as a researcher for the Afghanistan Analysts Network (AAN).

 

(1) Jytte Klausen, “Tweeting the jihad: social media networks of western foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 38 (1), 2015: 1-22.

(2) To many young Afghans, migration is a rite of passage to adulthood, marriage and settling in life. See Alessandro Monsutti, “Migration as rite of passage: young Afghans building masculinity and adulthood in Iran,” Iranian Studies 40 (2), 2007: 167-185.

(3) Ute Franke, “Ancient Herat revisited: new data from recent archaeological fieldwork,” in Rocco Rante (ed) Greater Khorasan: history, geography, archaeology and material culture, Berlin/Munich/Boston: Hubert & Co., Göttingen, 2015, 63-88; C.P.W. Gammell, The pearl of Khorasan: a history of Herat, London: Hurst, 2016; Jolyon Leslie, “Political and economic dynamics of Herat,” Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace (USIP), 2015.

(4) According to a local money changer in Khorasan Market in downtown Herat in late 2015, one needs around USD 10,000 to make it to a European country like Germany. This was generally the amount he was transferring to individuals who had left Herat for Europe through being smuggled.

(5) Research on migration has shown that migrants who have obtained permission to leave their families and homeland are more successful than those who do not. See, for example, Loretta Baldassar, “Transnational families and aged care: the mobility of care and the migrancy of ageing,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 33 (2), 2007: 275-97.

(6) Lisa Schuster and Nassim Majidi, “Deportation stigma and re-migration,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 41 (4), 2015: 635-52.

(7) Ari Heistein and James West, “Syria’s other foreign fighters: Iran’s Afghan and Pakistani mercenaries,” 20 November 2015, The National Interest; Ali Alfoneh, “Shiite combat casualties show the depth of Iran’s involvement in Syria,” 3 August 2015, The Washington Institute; Human Rights Watch, “Iran Sending Thousands of Afghans to Fight in Syria,” 29 January 2016; Saeed Kamali Dehghan, “Afghan refugees in Iran being sent to fight and die for Assad in Syria,” 5 November 2015, The Guardian; Hashmatallah Moslih, “Iran ‘foreign legion’ leans on Afghan Shia in Syria war,” Aljazeera. See also Seth G. Jones, “Syria’s growing jihad,” Survival: Global Politics and Strategy 55 (4), 2013: 53-72; and W. Andrew Terrill, “Iran’s strategy for saving Assad,” The Middle East Journal 69 (2), 2015: 222-36.

(8) This is a typical pattern of behaviour distressed women display and/or are expected to display in Afghanistan’s sociocultural context. See Benedicte Grima, The performance of emotion among Paxtun women, Austin: University of Texas Press, 1992.

 

(B2) En bon amateur de rock, le secrétaire général de l'OTAN, Jens Stoltenberg, devrait entonner, ce mardi (14 juin), à la manière des Pet Shop boys, un "Go East" convainquant. Les ministres de la Défense de l'OTAN vont, en effet, endosser la décision de déployer de façon quasi-permanente plusieurs milliers d'hommes sur les frontières orientales de […]

Après les incidents impliquant supporters anglais et russes à Marseille, les autorités britanniques ainsi que la fédération anglaise ont tenté de jouer l'apaisement dans la crainte de voir leur équipe exclue de la compétition.

La représentation nationale a opté la semaine dernière pour le report de l'examen de la loi portant statut du barreau en République du Bénin. Une loi transmise au Parlement le 23 mars 2006 par le gouvernement et affectée à la commission des lois pour étude en commission. Dix ans après, le rapport de ladite loi est soumis aux députés en plénière pour adoption. Une opportunité saisie par les parlementaires pour exprimer leurs préoccupations de nature à voter une norme législative en harmonie avec les nouvelles réalités au sein de l'UEMOA.
Après l'adoption du rapport de la commission suite au débat général, les élus du peuple ont abordé l'étude article par article. C'est au niveau de l'article 55 que députés et ministre ont éprouvé de sérieuse difficulté au sujet des conditions d'accès. Les parlementaires dans la logique d'une profession ouverte mais le représentant du gouvernement, Joseph Djogbénou oppose les règlements de l'union. Des règlements à en croire ses dires, limitent les marges de manœuvre des élus par rapport aux amendements. Les débats ont pris une allure inquiétante. Raison de la proposition d'organisation d'un séminaire d'appropriation du contenu de la loi en particulier les débats techniques.

Nicaise AZOMAHOU

La suite de l'essentiel des propos des députés qui militent pour le report

Rosine Soglo : « Moi personnellement qu'il ne sert à rien de perdre le temps. Monsieur le président, demander aux députés ce qu'ils veulent vraiment. Mais à les entendre, soit on a besoin d'avocats ou on n'en a pas besoin. Il ne faut pas qu'on perde le temps »

Paulin Gbenou : on est en face d'une loi qu'on veut voter. Votre lecture de la situation nous parait indiquée. Avec l'article 55, si on passait cela au vote, on allait rejeter le texte et on ne peut plus continuer. Il vaut mieux suspendre et on va mieux nous approprier de la loi. Je souscris à la suspension »

Mathurin Nago : « vous avez trouvé la solution avec le débat, il apparait qu'il y a un autre obstacle qu'il faut nouer. Au niveau des professionnels, les choses semblent simples. Mais à notre niveau, il faut mieux comprendre avant de légiférer en tenant compte de nos réalités. La proposition de suspension de l'examen de ce projet de loi est pertinente et il vaut mieux aller à un séminaire. On ne veut pas voter un texte qui soit contre la jeunesse. Le gouvernement et les avocats doivent se retrouver »

Abdoulaye Gounou : « il y a une sorte de durcissement de conditions d'accès à la profession dans ce texte. Ce texte est fondamental. Je salue votre suggestion. Il ne s'agit pas de paraphraser la France, mais nous avons nos réalités. »

André Okounlola : « je voudrais vous féliciter car votre proposition est sage. Quand on suit ce qui se passe ici, il vaut mieux arrêter. Nous devons nous approprier des textes avant de poser cet acte solennel. S'il y a des faits obscurs, les initiateurs doivent lever nos zones d'ombre. On n'est pas encore convaincu. »

Ake Natonde : « la loi que nous étudions est une loi portant statut du barreau de la république du Benin. Nous sommes entrain de revoir l'ancienne loi qui date de 1955. La loi peut avoir une durée de vie de 50 ans et on n'a pas le droit de faire des erreurs. Il ne faudrait pas que nous acceptions la caporalisation des corporations dans notre pays. Vous êtes un homme d'expériences, monsieur de l'Assemblée nationale. »

Octave Houdegbe : je nous voyais dans une conformité parce qu'on nous a dit que ce texte est conforme à l'Uemoa. Nous étions en conformité avec tout ce qui est de l'Uemoa. Mais je viens de comprendre que nous parlons du barreau béninois. Nous avons besoin de bien comprendre. Un séminaire sera la bienvenue »

Djenontin : « je vous remercie d'avoir su lire l'ambiance de l'hémicycle. C'est une décision sage pour que les nerfs puissent se calmer. Tous les députés sont animés de l'esprit de faire aboutir ce texte qui a d'ailleurs trop duré. Mais il faut nous permettre de bien approprier ce texte. Je comprends la peine du garde des sceaux mais nous allons doucement. Sinon on risque de bâcler. »

Propos transcrits par N.A

Griffon

In 2009 France was planning to start delivering by 2015 new multirole armored vehicles to replace a variety of aging infantry vehicles starting, within a large modernization program called Scorpion. But the 2010-14 multiyear budget relied on a number of rosy assumptions that were soon disproved by reality, and the Scorpion program was one of the mismatch’s casualties, along with plans to start working on a second aircraft carrier.

Promises were made again in the next 5-year budget plan, while maintenance costs kept increasing to sustain vehicles offering an underwhelming mix of limited protection, autonomy, and mobility. French defense manufacturers also started to sound the alarm as Scorpion became increasingly vital to prevent factory closures. The French DGA defense procurement agency paid heed to their plea and issued a tender limited to national manufacturers. By the end of 2014 the ministry of defense finally initiated the 1st procurement tranche of a program expected to last beyond 2025.

On one hand, the expected turnaround from prototype to delivery in 4 to 6 years is tight and will put pressure on contractors, though they started some early conceptual work in 2010. On the other hand this still amounts to a late and light production schedule for the rest of the decade.

The Scorpion Acquisition VAB Ultima

This major program intends to rationalize a hodgepodge of aging land vehicles and systems while preserving France’s industrial base. The 2 main vehicles in this program share a common chassis and will offer protection from mines and IEDs and ballistic threats at NATO’s STANAG 4569 Level 4. There’s been no public information on engines yet.

Scorpion launch (in French)

The main components of the planned, full acquisition are:

• 1,722 véhicules blindés multi rôles (VBMR)

Dubbed “Griffon”, VBMRs will replace Véhicules de l’avant blindé (VAB) 4×4 infantry carriers acquired starting in 1976 and upgraded in the late 90s. While the ubiquitous VAB turned into 36 variations, no more than a handful of VBMR variants should be created, between troop transport, medical, command/control, and artillery observation purposes.

The 6×6 designs will weight between 20 and 24 tons, with a remotely-operated 7.62mm or 12.7mm machine gun or a 40mm grenade launcher. Deliveries should reach 780 units by 2025. The infantry transport version will carry 8 troops in addition to the crew of 2.

• 248 engins blindés de reconnaissance et de combat (EBRC)

Dubbed “Jaguar”, EBRCs will replace AMX10RC and Sagaie light tanks, as well as VABs in their HOT antitank configuration, to perform combat and reconnaissance missions. These legacy vehicles lost mobility and autonomy with upgrades, but their design remains vulnerable to current threats, and they have become expensive to maintain given their average age. VABs for instance grew from an initial 13 tons to about 16 tons in the latest Ultima configuration.

Jaguar is a 6×6 wheeled 25-ton design with a crew of 3. For armament it will be fitted with a 40mm cannon jointly developed by Nexter and BAE with a 1,500m reach, a remote-controlled 7.62mm machine gun, and MBDA’s MMP (3,500, reach). Deliveries should reach 110 units by 2025.

• 358 lightweight VBMRs

This 10-ton 4×4 design will replace 4-ton Véhicules Blindés Légers (Light armored vehicles) procured since 1990. Deliveries between 2021 and 2025 should reach 200 vehicles.

• The Système d’information du combat SCORPION (SICS)

This common communications platform will replace 6 separate legacy systems, starting in 2016.

• 200 overhauled Leclerc XL tanks

This looks somewhat like an extraneous graft in this program, so that France doesn’t give up entirely on what’s left of its battle tank fleet.

Contracts and Events

June 14/16: The French government has pledged $6.7 billion over 11 years for the Army’s Scorpion modernization program, with more being sought by both the Army and industry members involved. Aspects of the program include the delivery of 780 Griffon multirole troop carriers and 248 units of the light multirole Jaguar combat vehicle by 2020. Also included is an upgrade of the Leclerc tank, a battle management system, crew training with onboard 3D simulation, and maintenance.

Dec. 5/2014: Development contract. French Defense Minister Jean-Yves le Drian announces the phase 1 award in the Scorpion program, in line with commitments made in the 2014-19 defense budget planning law known as LPM. This 1st tranche, worth €752 million ($932M). Deliveries will start in 2018. Nexter, Thales and Renault Trucks Defense (RTD) have partnered to form a temporary consortium for the purpose of this program. Safran will provide optronics, and as noted above, CTA International (a Nexter-BAE joint venture) and MBDA will contribute the most significant weapon systems.

Phase 1

Jan. 16/2014: Préférence nationale. Les Echos reports that the DGA procurement agency restricted its tender to French manufacturers, and cited article 346 of the European Union Treaty to exclude bids from other member states.

Sources: Les Echos: Blindés : l’armée lance un appel d’offres de plus de 2 milliards d’euros | EDA: Article 346 of the TFEU.

Nov. 9/2011: industrial team. Nexter and Renault Truck Defense sign a cooperation agreement to jointly manufacture VBMRs.

Feb. 22/2010: initial decision. An inter-ministerial investment commission approves the start of Scorpion’s research and development phase.

Readings and Sources

• French MINDEF – Official Scorpion presentation [PDF, in French]

• DGA – Scorpion [in French]

• Nexter – 40mm Cased Telescoped Armament System (CTAS): Cannon (CT C).

• France’s DGA – Le canon de 40 mm à munitions télescopées CTCA (Cased Telescoped Canon and Ammunition).