European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Ionel Zamfir with Linda Tothova.

The Summit for Democracy, a pledge of US President Joe Biden’s 2020 electoral campaign, came to fruition on 9‑10 December 2021. The first-ever global summit dedicated to harnessing international support for democratic renewal launched the 2022 ‘year of action’, aimed at fostering resilient democracies worldwide.

Background

On 9-10 December 2021, United States President Joe Biden hosted a virtual two-day Summit for Democracy, bringing together heads of state, civil society, and the private sector. During the summit, President Biden warned that democratic erosion is ‘the defining challenge of our time’. In fact, for the fifth year in a row, the number of countries moving towards authoritarianism exceeds the number of countries progressing towards democracy. The summit agenda focused on strengthening democratic institutions and solidarity amongst democracies globally in three areas: defending against authoritarianism; addressing and fighting corruption; and promoting respect for human rights. The summit organisers – the White House, the US Department of State and USAID – created three civil society working groups within the three pillars, which held consultations leading up to the summit. The stated purpose was not to create a permanent secretariat or a new organisation, but to launch a ‘year of action’ in the three core areas.

Attempts to build coalitions of democracies are nothing new
The idea of an alliance of democratic states has deep historical conceptual roots. Democracies are considered more likely to cooperate and are more peaceful and inherently respectful of norms. There have been prior attempts to bring democratic alliances to life, but to date these remain limited either in membership or objectives. Established in 2000, the Community of Democracies (CoD) is a global intergovernmental coalition of 106 states that adhere to common democratic values and standards. With an ambitious strategic plan for 2018-2023, it aims to respond to democratic backsliding and shrinking civic space both within and outside its membership. The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) works to advance democracy worldwide, by providing assistance and advice on democratic processes and elections. The G7 is an informal group of democracies, albeit limited to the world’s seven largest liberal democratic economies, with a significant influence on major global issues. Experts have suggested transforming the G7 into a D10 global steering group, including Australia, South Korea, and possibly India (all invited as guests to the most recent G7 Summit). The need for democracies to cooperate and coordinate globally is increasingly recognised, to impose human rights and economic sanctions, in international forums and to uphold multilateral rules, and on strategic and security issues. Participation

The US Department of State released the full list of 110 participants on 24 November 2021. Although most invitees (69 %) are from fully ‘free’ countries according to the Freedom House classification, ‘partly free’ (28 %) and ‘not free’ (3 %) countries also received invitations. The choice of invitees was, according to some analysts, inevitably controversial from the start. Moreover, Taiwan’s participation was another contentious issue, while China was not invited (even though the USA is officially committed to a one-China policy), risking the creation of an additional rift between Washington and Beijing. Despite international divisions regarding formal recognition, Kosovo also attended. The Philippines, India and Brazil were invited, despite constituting some of the most prominent cases of democratic backsliding in the world. The invitation of Angola, Iraq and Democratic Republic of Congo, all ‘not free’ countries, also puzzled commentators. A possible explanation is that Biden’s administration perceived regional diversity and potential for democratic progress as being more important than a sterling record of democratic practices. The invitation of countries such as Serbia, Ukraine and Pakistan also reflects US geostrategic considerations. The exclusion of Hungary – the sole EU country not to receive an invitation could reflect genuine US concerns over negative developments in Hungary, but also over Viktor Orbán’s government’s ties to illiberal groups in the USA.

Some countries reacted to their exclusion with anger. On 1 December 2021, the Hungarian Ambassador to the EU indicated that Hungary would not support a common EU position at the summit. China’s reaction was fiercely critical, with the government taking the opportunity to tout its system as the better democracy model – ‘more extensive and genuine’ than that of the USA. Ahead of the summit, Chinese officials released a 30‑page white paper elaborating on China’s respect for democratic institutions and ‘development of people’s democracy’. An opinion piece by the Russian and Chinese Ambassadors to the USA calls on countries to ‘stop using “value-based diplomacy” to provoke division and confrontation’. Although invited, Pakistan surprisingly skipped the summit, possibly to protect its strategic alliance with China.

Main outcomes

On 9 December 2021, the US Department of State announced a Presidential Initiative for Democratic Renewal to provide financial assistance of US$424.4 million to support free and independent media, fight corruption, advance technological solutions for democracy, foster democratic reforms and defend free and fair electoral processes. The USA, Australia, Denmark and Norway signed the Export Controls and a Human Rights Initiative, while Canada, France, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom expressed their support. The initiative aims to curb the misuse of dual-use, cyber- and surveillance technologies – increasingly used by authoritarian regimes – and will involve drafting a voluntary written code of conduct. Participating countries committed to measures to improve democracy both internally and externally, such as increased funding for United Nations bodies dealing with human rights (Belgium, Canada), initiatives to bolster technology’s role in democracy (Denmark), and the fight against corruption (Japan), amongst other proposed initiatives. Under the umbrella of actionable commitments, a global follow-up, in-person summit of democracies is expected to take place in late 2022.

Reactions

Commentators emphasised that the outcome did not always match initial promises, but that the summit’s success should be judged based on its capacity to deliver. The possibility that the summit positions could remain empty rhetoric was a frequent concern. The summit allowed the USA to showcase its democracy agenda at a time when democracies are under stress worldwide, but questions remain over the credibility of American democracy itself. Some commentators expressed concern that the summit would strengthen authoritarian regimes’ resolve and coordination, particularly Russia and China, or that it would deepen global rifts, endangering much-needed collective action to tackle global problems. China’s fierce reaction, as well as Russia’s criticism of the summit, show that both countries consider it a potentially effective initiative. Transparency International welcomed the initiatives to fight corruption, but warns that several countries directly linked to cross-border corruption did not pledge new measures and that authoritarian invitees are unlikely to make significant progress. Brookings notes that the summit will allow civil society to push through some of the ambitious pledges at the national level. Human Rights Watch suggests the USA should disinvite countries from next year’s planned summit, should they fail to deliver on commitments.

European Union position

Article 21 TEU commits the EU to ‘advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights’ and to ‘develop partnerships with third countries … which share the[se] principles’. During the EU-US summit in June 2021, the two parties reaffirmed their intention to ‘partner in the Summit for Democracy’ and ‘to lead by example at home’. In November 2021, the EU launched the Team Europe Democracy Initiative to bolster coordination actions amongst the Member States in support of democracy. Coinciding with the summit, the EU launched the Human Rights and Democracy programme under the Global Europe instrument, with a total budget of €1.5 billion available to 2027. European Council President Charles Michel’s intervention at the summit focused on the opportunities and challenges digital technologies present for democracy; an issue equally emphasised by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen in her speech.

In a resolution of 7 July 2021, the European Parliament expressed support for President Biden’s decision to hold the global summit. On 6 October 2021, Parliament noted the summit will serve as a way to advance value-based multilateralism and strengthen solidarity amongst democracies.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Summit for Democracy‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Lieve Van Woensel with Virginia Mahieu.

In an increasingly digital world, Parliament’s Science and Technology Options Assessment (STOA) Panel is expanding its online foresight capabilities. In partnership with the Danish Board of Technology, STOA recently conducted an online stakeholder engagement exercise and published an in-depth analysis with the outcomes, to elucidate the societal concerns surrounding a highly topical and controversial issue – gene editing in crops – as part of its mission to support decision-making by the Members of the European Parliament. The purpose is to inform them about the challenges of genome editing, and the societal hopes and concerns surrounding the possible implementation of this new technology to support European food production.

New genetic technologies (NGTs) – mainly CRISPR-Cas9 – have come to the forefront of discussions for their potential to contribute to agricultural sustainability, particularly in relation to the European Green Deal objectives. Traditional breeding methods can improve crops, but NGTs can make the process faster and easier. Genetic modification techniques are strictly regulated in the EU under the Genetically Modified Organism (GMO) Directive. The question is whether NGTs should be treated differently or even exempt from the current directive.

The directive defines GMO as ‘an organism, with the exception of human beings, in which the genetic material has been altered in a way that does not occur naturally by mating and/or natural recombination’. Whether changes made with NGTs could also occur naturally is an issue of ongoing debate. In 2018, the European Court of Justice ruled that NGTs would be subject to the same requirements as older techniques (therefore coming under the GMO Directive), but amendments and revisions of the European Union legislation are not excluded. However, NGTs are a subject of controversy as, while some believe they can bring improvements to European crop production, others worry about the risks and other potential problems associated with their use. Thus, the debate continues.

When making evidence-based policy decisions about new and influential technologies, it is essential to factor in not only the scientific evidence, but also the societal context in which the technology would be applied. To this end, STOA performed a foresight study with a stakeholder engagement component in order to gain an overview of the concerns (hopes and fears) present in a representative group of stakeholders that work with or are impacted by NGTs. This exercise included an online survey and a workshop with key stakeholders from diverse fields affected by NGTs. The online survey used hypothetical policy options, borrowed from the 2019 report by the Rathenau Instituut on ‘Genome editing in plants and crops‘, to guide stakeholders in identifying arguments for and against several potential regulation scenarios, ranging from full regulation as for conventional GMOs, to a levelled approach based on the societal and ethical assessment of the value of the application. The concerns and arguments were then refined with the help of the stakeholders themselves during a subsequent workshop.

STOA identified relevant organisations and experts and sent out 52 invitations for participation in this stakeholder engagement exercise. Of these, 40 completed the survey, including respondents from actors representatives of agrarian industry and research, farming, environmental NGOs, administrations, trade, food science, consumer and lobby watch organisations, as well as some experts in behavioural sciences.

The key categories of concerns expressed included general concerns about the EU policy-making process, the practical implementation of new legislation and societal safeguards, uncertainty and unknowns surrounding the new technology, and the implications of potential legislative changes for innovation and competition within and outside the EU. Some further specific examples included concerns over social acceptability and consumers’ freedom of choice, traceability, the justification and application of the precautionary principle, as well as potential health and environmental risks and associated liability issues. They are presented in the in-depth analysis in multiple grouped formats to facilitate reading: condensed according to topic (chapter 3), organised according to the relevant European Parliament committee (chapter 4), and summarised concisely (chapter 5). The original format (grouped per policy option), obtained as a result of the workshop, is presented in Appendix I.

Your opinion counts for us. To let us know what you think, get in touch via stoa@europarl.europa.eu.

Written by Suzana Anghel and Ralf Drachenberg.

‘The European Council will revert to the issue’ or ‘reiterates’ its view, were probably the most used sentences in the conclusions issued following the 16 December 2021 meeting of the Heads of State or Government. For many of the issues on the agenda, such as energy, where the geopolitical stakes are high, differences in position remain in the European Council; achieving consensus is therefore part of a longer process. On security and defence, no big decisions, but specific guidelines and targeted requests, defined this summit. As regards the discussions on both Covid-19 and migration, the conclusions mainly include reiterations of previous commitments.

Within the broad bouquet of external relations topics, EU leaders warned Russia of ‘massive consequences’ in case of further military escalation in Ukraine. They also denounced the instrumentalisation of migrants and refugees by the Belarusian regime for political purposes, and called for ‘the immediate and unconditional release of all political prisoners’. EU leaders also reaffirmed the Union’s commitment to cooperation with the Southern Neighbourhood, calling to speed up work on the new Agenda for the Mediterranean, praised the mediation efforts of the African Union (AU) in Ethiopia, calling for ‘an unconditional ceasefire’ and dialogue, and prepared for the 17-18 February 2022 EU-AU Summit. President Charles Michel recalled EU Member States’ solidarity when mentioning the unacceptable pressure exerted by China on Lithuania. As for the Euro Summit, it called again for the completion of Banking Union and the Capital Markets Union.

1.     General aspects

The meeting opened with an address by the President of the European Parliament, David Sassoli. At this final European Council meeting under the Slovenian Council Presidency, the Slovenian Prime Minister, Janez Janša, reported on the follow-up to previous European Council conclusions. The December meeting was also the first European Council meeting for the new Chancellor of Germany, Olaf Scholz, the recently elected Prime Minister of Sweden, Magdalena Andersson, and the new Chancellor of Austria, Karl Nehammer. Two other new EU leaders, the new Prime Minister of Czechia, Petr Fiala, and the new Bulgarian Prime Minister, Kiril Petkov, are expected to attend European Council meetings as of 2022.

President Michel used the opportunity of the last meeting in 2021 to update the European Council’s indicative Leaders’ Agenda 2021-2022. This is the third update under Michel’s presidency of the original Leaders’ Agenda – launched under his predecessor, Donald Tusk – which now sets out a work programme for the European Council up to March 2022. Besides adding the priority topics and the European Council-related events under the French Presidency of the Council, the main change in this update is the removal from the agenda of a discussion of the Conference on the Future of Europe, originally planned for the March 2022 meeting. The topic might, however, be discussed by the European Council at its June 2022 meeting. The President of the European Parliament, David Sassoli, stressed that ‘the Conference on the Future of Europe should help us find innovative ways of reawakening the feeling that Europe is a project with which all Europeans can identify’, and recalled that ‘it will soon be time for the initial conclusions to be drawn’.

2.     European Council meeting Covid-19

The European Council discussed the epidemiological situation in the EU in the context of an emerging variant of concern (Omicron), with the conclusions focusing on the Covid-19 response more broadly. EU leaders reiterated the importance of vaccines, including booster doses, in the fight against Covid-19. Furthermore, the European Council underlined the importance of overcoming vaccine hesitancy, specifically through combatting disinformation. EU leaders called for progress on the EU strategy for Covid-19 therapeutics, which will form part of the European Health Union.

The European Council stressed the importance of global cooperation in the fight against Covid-19. EU leaders outlined four actions to meet that aim: i) developing genome-sequencing capacity internationally; ii) exporting and sharing vaccines, particularly with the countries most in need; iii) removing obstacles to the global delivery of vaccines; and iv) strengthening coordination with vaccine manufacturers, the World Health Organization (WHO), COVAX and other partners.

As anticipated in the EPRS outlook, the European Council welcomed an agreement by WHO member countries to start negotiations on a convention, agreement or other international instrument on pandemic prevention, preparedness and response. President Michel first proposed an international treaty on pandemics in November 2020. EU leaders endorsed the suggestion at their meeting on 25 February 2021, and they have now explicitly supported this objective on four occasions.

EU leaders invited the Council to follow up on the fulfilment of vaccine pledges. In May, the European Council committed to donating at least 100 million doses by the end of 2021 – this target has already been surpassed. The EU has now committed to donating 700 million doses by mid-2022.

Main message of the President of the European Parliament: David Sassoli underlined that the EU should strive for a Health Union and increase prevention, protection and crisis-preparedness efforts.

Crisis management and resilience

As flagged up in the EPRS outlook, in advance of the meeting, EU leaders welcomed the Council conclusions of 23 November 2021 on resilience and crisis response, calling notably for strengthening the EU’s crisis response and preparedness in a comprehensive manner, and building and monitoring resilience in areas where the EU is exposed. They invited the Council to take work forward and to regularly review progress.

Main message of the President of the EP: President Sassoli stressed that ‘protecting Europeans means being better able to prepare our response to all of tomorrow’s crises – be they environmental, economic, diplomatic or military’.

Energy prices

EU leaders once again addressed the recent spike in energy prices, but without adopting any conclusions. President Michel stressed the impact on households and their purchasing power, welcomed the reports presented to date by the European Commission at the European Council’s request, and acknowledged the lingering divergences in Member States’ views on energy policy. Two core issues remain particularly divisive, namely the energy market and the EU ‘taxonomy’.

Several EU leaders recalled the geopolitical dimension of the energy price crisis, with the Prime Minister of Latvia, Krišjānis Karinš, stressing Russia’s deliberate attempt to circumvent Ukraine and hence pressing for the operationalisation of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline. As regards the energy market, not much has moved since October 2021 when EU leaders last discussed the issue. Spain continued to champion ‘an overhaul of the bloc’s wholesale energy market’ and Poland to call ‘to suspend and reform’ the ETS system. However, diverging views persist on the speculative nature of market activities in recent months. When it comes to the sustainable finance taxonomy, the most sensitive issue remains the classification of gas and nuclear energy as either ‘green’ or ‘transitional’ in an imminent European Commission delegated act. Charles Michel stressed that it is the Commission’s responsibility to decide on this, and not that of the European Council, while mentioning that EU leaders were not in agreement on the question.

Main message of the President of the EP: David Sassoli spoke of a ‘Europe that protects’, stressed that ‘no one in Europe should be abandoned to energy poverty’ and that the EU ‘has to find bold solutions to keep all Europeans secure’.

Migration

EU Heads of State or Government concentrated in their discussions on the ‘external aspects of migration’, and refrained, again, from addressing internal questions, especially issues linked to asylum. Even on external aspects of migration, the focus of the discussion was very narrow, looking mostly at cooperation with countries of origin and transit, as well as the implementation of previous European Council conclusions. EU leaders reiterated their calls from the October 2021 meeting, notably to the Commission to ensure, i) that the recent action plans for countries of origin and transit be made operational and implemented without further delay; and ii) that adequate financing be clearly identified and mobilised without delay for migration-related action on all routes.

EU leaders stressed the importance of addressing all migratory routes, in a comprehensive approach, and invited the Council and the Commission to consider ways to support Member States facing specific challenges at the EU’s external borders, including as regards deployment of border guards as well as aerial surveillance. They also called again for a more unified EU returns policy. While EU leaders reiterated their condemnation of attempts by third countries to instrumentalise migrants for political purposes, migration aspects related to Belarus which were dealt with under the heading of migration at the October 2021 meeting, were this time dealt with as a specific agenda point under external relations issues.

Main message of the President of the EP: David Sassoli stressed that protecting Europeans also involves taking resolute action to better integrate our migration and external border management policies.

Security and defence

EU leaders confirmed their commitment to multilateralism, reaffirming the United Nations’ pivotal role in maintaining a rules-based international order. They reiterated their intention to strengthen cooperation with like-minded partners ‘in order to address common threats and challenges together’. EU Heads of State or Government underlined again the Union’s willingness to ‘take more responsibility for its own security and in the field of defence’, as well as the need to ‘increase the Union’s ‘capacity to act autonomously’ and to ‘promote its interests and values’.

EU leaders followed up on their Brdo pri Kranju debate, focussing on two key issues – the Strategic Compass and cooperation with NATO. As regards the Strategic Compass, they tasked the Council to continue work towards ‘an ambitious and actionable Strategic Compass’, recognising that it ‘sets out a common strategic vision for the next decade’. The High Representative, Josep Borrell, stressed that the Strategic Compass is intended to ‘increase the resilience of the European Union’ and its ‘defensive capacities’. On EU-NATO cooperation, EU leaders recalled ‘the principles of inclusiveness, reciprocity and decision-making autonomy of the EU’, which are crucial for closer cooperation with NATO, stressing that a more capable and complementary EU can only benefit transatlantic security.

Main message of the President of the EP: The EU will be able to ‘act together more swiftly, and more incisively, when [its] interests are threatened’, if it strengthens its security and defence.

External relations

As flagged up in the EPRS outlook, EU leaders focused on the tense situation at Ukraine’s border, calling on Russia to de-escalate tensions. President Michel stressed the ‘unfailing and total unity in the EU in expressing solidarity for the sovereignty and integrity of Ukraine’. He stressed that Russia would face ‘very serious consequences’ in the event of military aggression towards Ukraine, and underlined the Union’s readiness to coordinate ‘any operational measures’ with its partners. Commission President Ursula von der Leyen underlined that the EU maintained its ‘call on Russia to de-escalate tensions and refrain from any further aggression’, stressed that the EU would like to have good relations with Russia but that it is prepared to adopt sanctions ‘that could extract a massive cost’. She confirmed that the EU has been closely coordinating with partners, including the United States, on possible sanctions and was prepared, if need be, to operationalise them.

EU leaders also confirmed their support to the ‘Normandy format’ diplomatic dialogue, conducted by France and Germany with Ukraine and Russia. The format, instituted in June 2014, has, however, not delivered so far on the implementation of the Minsk Agreements.

The European Council meeting took place back-to-back with the Eastern Partnership Summit, which brought together the EU leaders and their opposite numbers from Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. In a joint declaration, they committed to cooperating on the basis of ‘common fundamental values, mutual interests and shared ownership’. An empty chair symbolised openness to cooperation with a democratic Belarus (the sixth Eastern Partnership country) ‘as soon as necessary conditions for peaceful democratic transition are in place’. The European Council denounced the ‘hybrid attack’ and the humanitarian crisis induced at the EU’s border with Belarus, underlining, inter alia, the importance of ‘ensuring unhindered access for international organisations in Belarus’ and ‘stepping up humanitarian support’.

3.     Euro Summit

EU leaders also met in the Euro Summit in inclusive format (with all 27 Member States participating). The President of the European Central Bank, Christine Lagarde, briefed them on recent monetary policy decisions and on the outlook for growth and inflation. The leaders then held a discussion on further integration in the Banking Union and Capital Markets Union. The resulting Euro Summit statement stressed the importance of a ‘completed Banking Union and a deep, integrated and well-functioning Capital Markets Union’. To that end, the entry into force of the agreement amending the Treaty on the European Stability Mechanism, as well as the early introduction of the backstop to the Single Resolution Fund, were identified as milestones. The reference to the timing for the implementation of both measures – envisaged for 2022 – did not appear in the formal statement. The statement also expressed urgency concerning the deepening of the Capital Markets Union, and formally requested the Eurogroup to present ‘a stepwise and time-bound work plan’ for the completion of Banking Union.

Read this briefing on ‘Outcome of the meetings of EU leaders of 16 December 2021‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Beatrix Immenkamp.

Enormous natural gas resources have turned Qatar into one of the world’s richest countries. The 11 610 km2 nation currently has the fourth highest GDP per capita in the world. The absolute monarchy’s estimated 340 000-350 000 citizens benefit from free education, free healthcare, virtually guaranteed – and well paid – employment, and pay almost no taxes. However, the great majority of the emirate’s nearly 3 million inhabitants live in very different conditions. Qatar has the highest ratio of migrants in the world: 85 % of its population are migrants and 94 % of its workforce comes from abroad, mostly from south Asia and Africa. In contrast to the small percentage of expatriates from the West and other Gulf States, Asian and African migrants live and work in harsh conditions. Around 1 million are employed in construction, and 100 000 are domestic workers.

In December 2010, FIFA, world football’s governing body, granted Qatar the right to host the 2022 World Cup, which is scheduled to take place from 21 November to 18 December. Expanding on an existing development programme enshrined in the Qatar National Vision 2030, the country embarked on an extensive building programme to prepare for the World Cup, involving an estimated 1 million migrant workers. However, these preparations placed the spotlight on Qatar’s poor treatment of migrant workers. In response to international pressure, Qatar has introduced important legal changes to improve the situation of these workers, which the EU has welcomed. However, according to human rights organisations, the country needs to take further steps to stop abuses. Of particular concern is the kafala sponsorship system, which is widely used throughout the six Gulf Cooperation Council States and gives disproportionate power to employers, leading to widespread abuse of migrant workers’ rights. Even though Qatar has started to dismantle the kafala system, important elements remain in place. Moreover, ensuring compliance with more favourable labour laws remains a challenge. Since 2008, the European Parliament has adopted four resolutions addressing the situation of migrant workers in Qatar; it has called on Qatar to end the ‘deplorable situation’ of migrant workers and prevent preparations for the 2022 World Cup from being ‘overshadowed by allegations of forced labour’.

Read the complete briefing on ‘The 2022 FIFA World Cup in Qatar: Turning the spotlight on workers’ rights‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Katarzyna Sochacka and Clare Ferguson.

Due to the deteriorating Covid‑19 situation, Members were again able to choose to vote remotely during the December plenary session in Strasbourg. Parliament nevertheless held a joint debate on the preparation of the European Council meeting of 16‑17 December 2021 and the EU’s response to the global resurgence of Covid‑19 and new emerging variants. Members debated statements by High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the Commission, Josep Borrell, on the situation in Nicaragua, at the Ukrainian border, and in the Russian-occupied territories of Ukraine. Members also debated a number of Council and European Commission statements, including on: the proposed Council decision on provisional emergency measures on the external border with Belarus; the state of play of the Recovery and Resilience Facility, plans to further undermine fundamental rights in Poland; on the EU response to transport poverty; taking stock of the European Year of Rail; the outcome of the Global Summit on Nutrition for Growth and increased food insecurity in developing countries; and on an EU ban on the use of wild animals in circuses.

In a formal sitting, Parliament heard an address by Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo-Addo, President of Ghana.

Sakharov Prize 2021

A key annual highlight in the European Parliament’s continual defence of human rights is the award of the Sakharov Prize in honour of the work of brave human rights defenders. This year, and following an attempt on his life, Parliament awarded the prize to imprisoned Russian opposition leader Alexey Navalny. Parliament has repeatedly expressed concern about Navalny’s situation, calling for his immediate release. With this award, Parliament emphasises its position on Russia’s systematic silencing of dissident voices, and its failure to uphold its international commitments to human rights. Daria Navalnaya, Navalny’s daughter, received the 2021 Sakharov Prize on behalf of her father in a ceremony during the plenary session.

Digital markets act

Parliament debated and adopted its position on an Internal Market and Consumer Protection Committee (IMCO) report on the proposed digital markets act (DMA), which seeks to regulate big digital platforms in the EU. The committee’s report proposes to extend the scope of the DMA to include web browsers, virtual assistants and connected televisions, and to increase the threshold for a company to be considered a ‘gatekeeper’. It also seeks stronger obligations on companies that act as internet gatekeepers, to ensure messaging and social media is interoperable and to make it easier to unsubscribe, as well as strengthening the rules on advertising and fair access. The European Commission will enforce the terms of the DMA, with fines for non-compliance ranging from 4 to 20 % of a company’s total worldwide turnover. The text now constitutes Parliament’s position for the forthcoming negotiations with the Council.

European Year of Youth 2022

The coronavirus pandemic has had terrible consequences for young people, with their lives and education completely disrupted by successive lock-downs. The European Commission has therefore proposed to concentrate efforts to improve their situation, by making 2022 the European Year of Youth. Following calls from Parliament’s Committee on Culture and Education (CULT) for additional efforts to include disadvantaged young people, and its successful negotiation of an additional €8 million funding for the Erasmus+ and European Solidarity Corps programmes, Parliament adopted an agreement reached between the co-legislators, so that the arrangements can be put in place in time for 1 January 2022.

Health technology assessment

The successful roll-out of coronavirus vaccine programmes in Europe underlined the benefits of swifter assessment of innovative health solutions. While EU countries are responsible for their healthcare policies, introducing EU-wide cooperation on research to assess the value of new health technologies should help make it swifter and easier to introduce new medicines and medical devices. Parliament has insisted that there be full transparency in the way the proposed coordination groups would work, to ensure that there is no conflict of interest in their consultations with experts, patient representatives and industry stakeholders. Parliament debated and adopted at second reading a new regulation on stronger EU cooperation on health technology assessment, allowing for the final act to be signed on 15 December 2021 and to apply three years after it enters into force.

New orientations for the EU’s humanitarian action

Together, the EU and its Member States already contribute more than one third of global humanitarian assistance. Parliament has pushed for a follow up to the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid, which sets out why, how and when the EU acts in response to humanitarian crises. Members therefore debated a Committee on Development (DEVE) own-initiative report on the Commission’s proposed new guidelines for EU humanitarian action, voting in favour of seeking swift action supported by more predictable and flexible funding, as well as sanctions for those who commit violations of international humanitarian law.

Cooperation on the fight against organised crime in the Western Balkans

Criminal activities, such as human trafficking and migrant smuggling, carried out by transnational organised crime groups in the Western Balkans are detrimental to victims, citizens of the region and the EU alike. Although cooperation with the EU and its agencies is already under way, an own-initiative report by Parliament’s Foreign Affairs (AFET) Committee underlines that accelerating reforms in the fight against transnational organised crime in the region, in line with the demands of the EU integration process, would greatly improve the situation, as well as trust in democracy in the region. Parliament debated and adopted a resolution on cooperation in the fight against organised crime in the Western Balkans.

Combating gender-based cyber-violence

The issue of cyber-violence has grown increasingly critical with the rise in the use of the internet and social media, exacerbated by the anonymity available to perpetrators. As no EU legislation currently specifically addresses gender-based violence, including cyber-violence, Parliament is keen to see these issues tackled in the European Commission’s expected proposal on combating online violence early in 2022. Members debated and adopted a legislative-initiative resolution tabled by Parliament’s Committees on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality (FEMM) and Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE), on combating gender-based cyber-violence. The committees would like to see the new legislation include measures that set out a legal definition of gender-based cyber-violence, EU-wide sanctions and improved support for victims.

European framework for employees’ participation rights and the revision of the European Works Council Directive

Members debated and adopted an own-initiative report prepared by the Employment and Social Affairs (EMPL) Committee proposing to revise the framework of EU laws that supports EU countries’ efforts to promote democracy at work. While the current EU laws to promote employee participation and representation rights have proved somewhat contradictory, new social, economic and pandemic-related challenges for workers mean that it is more important than ever that employees themselves have a say in the changes to come. The EMPL committee report therefore underlines the need for a new EU framework on information, consultation and board-level employee representation, including revamped European works councils, to reinforce employees’ rights.

Opening of trilogue negotiations

Members confirmed, without a vote, two mandates for negotiations from the Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) Committee on the proposal for an amending directive on digital operational resilience requirements and on the proposal for a directive on digital operational resilience for the financial sector. Members also confirmed a mandate from the Fisheries (PECH) Committee on the proposal for a regulation on management, conservation and control measures applicable in the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC) Area of Competence.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Plenary round-up – December 2021‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marcin Grajewski.

Russia’s military build-up along its border with Ukraine, and its masterminding – alleged by many politicians and analysts – of the refugee crisis on the borders of Belarus with Poland and Lithuania, have sparked concerns over the implications of Moscow’s aggressive foreign policy. Russia has amassed nearly 100 000 troops near the Ukrainian border, provoking renewed fears that Moscow is about to invade, seven years after it annexed the Crimean peninsula and destabilised the eastern regions of Ukraine. In Belarus, President Alexander Lukashenko, a close ally of Russian President Vladimir Putin, has allowed migrants to take flights into the country to purposely transfer them on to Belarus’s borders with neighbouring EU Member States.

This note gathers links to recent publications and commentaries from many international think tanks on Russia’s foreign and security policy and its implications for neighbouring countries, the European Union and global geopolitics.

Why Russia could invade Ukraine again
European Council on Foreign Relations, December 2021

Small victories: Why US-Russia relations could improve under Biden
European Council on Foreign Relations, December 2021

Russia’s destabilisation of Ukraine: A litmus test for transatlantic partners
European Policy Centre, December 2021

Ukraine: Conflict at the crossroads of Europe and Russia
Council on Foreign Relations, December 2021

Russia’s threats place Europe at a pivotal moment
Chatham House, December 2021

What Biden should say to Putin on Ukraine
Brookings Institution, December 2021

Why is Russia amassing troops at its border with Ukraine?
International Institute for Strategic Studies, December 2021

Russia and China mobilize transatlantic partners
Carnegie Europe, December 2021

NATO must adapt to an era of hybrid threats
Carnegie Europe, December 2021

Responding to Russia’s new military buildup near Ukraine
International Crisis Group, December 2021

Greece, Russia and the EU: The way forward
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, December 2021

Will Putin miscalculate?
Brookings Institution, November 2021

The Kremlin’s strange victory: How Putin exploits American dysfunction and fuels American decline
Brookings Institution, November 2021

Russia’s military movements: What they could mean for Ukraine, Europe, and NATO
European Council on Foreign Relations, November 2021

How the Kremlin has weaponized the Facebook files
Brookings Institution, November 2021

When security in Europe conflicts with democracy in Poland
Brookings Institution, November 2021

How to energize NATO’s response to Russia’s threats against Ukraine
Council on Foreign Relations, November 2021

Why the West should deter a Russian attack on Ukraine
Centre for European Reform, November 2021

Putin, Lukashenko and lessons learned from Zapad-2021
Casimir Pulaski Foundation, November 2021

Russia on the path of confrontation
Casimir Pulaski Foundation, November 2021

Vladimir Putin’s Ukraine obsession could spark a major European war
Atlantic Council, November 2021

Is Europe in denial about Russia?
Carnegie Europe, November 2021

How the German ‘traffic light’ coalition can solve the EU border crisis
European Council on Foreign Relations, November 2021

No quiet on the eastern front: The migration crisis engineered by Belarus
European Council on Foreign Relations, November 2021

Russia conducts direct-ascent anti-satellite test
International Institute for Strategic Studies, December 2021

The last of the offended: Russia’s first post-Putin diplomats
European Council on Foreign Relations, November 2021

Three decades of Russian policy in the European part of the post-Soviet space: Swimming against the current
Finnish Institute of Foreign Relations, November 2021

Russian policy towards Central Asia 30 years after the collapse of the Soviet Union: Sphere of influence shrinking?
Finnish Institute of Foreign Relations, November 2021

The young and the restless: Europe, Russia, and the next generation of diplomats in the Eastern Partnership
European Council on Foreign Relations, November 2021

Moldova’s gas deal with Russia: David tries to draw with Goliath
European Council on Foreign Relations, November 2021

Ukraine-Russia relations
Chatham House, November 2021

Lukashenko is the problem, not the migrants
Centre for European Reform, November 2021

Lukashenko uses migrants to exploit Europe’s vulnerability
Carnegie Europe, November 2021

Lessons from EU-Belarus relations
Bertelsmann Stiftung, November 2021

Russia’s Ukrainian dilemma: Moscow’s strategy towards Kyiv
Center for Eastern Studies, November 2021

Support for Lukashenko. Russia’s response to the migration crisis
Center for Eastern Studies, November 2021

Russia–Belarus: A sham acceleration of integration
Center for Eastern Studies, November 2021

Attribution als Herausforderung für EU-Cybersanktionen
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, November 2021

Dealing with Russia in the Arctic: Between exceptionalism and militarization
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, November 2021

The comeback kid: Russia in Latin America
European Union Institute for Security Studies, November 2021

French and German approaches to Russia
Chatham House, November 2021

Russia’s ‘gas pivot’ to Asia: How Europe can protect itself and pursue the green transition
European Council on Foreign Relations, October 2021

Is Russia using energy as a weapon again?
Council on Foreign Relations, October 2021

Why the United States should have invited Russia to join the counter-ransomware initiative
Council on Foreign Relations, October 2021

EU sanctions on Belarus as an effective policy tool
Center for Social and Economic Research, October 2021

Covid-19 in Russia: What are the economic, political and human effects?
Institut français des relations internationales, October 2021

The V4 towards a new NATO Strategic Concept and the EU Strategic Compass
Europeum, Antall József Knowledge Centre, Casimir Pulaski Foundation, Slovak Security Policy Institute, October 2021

What deters Russia: Enduring principles for responding to Moscow
Chatham House, October 2021

Russia’s defensive economic model: Paper tiger reforms and state-led investment spending as patchwork fixes
Bertelsmann Stiftung, October 2021

Russian gas on the EU market: Increased transmission and continuing uncertainty
Center for Eastern Studies, October 2021

Lithuania’s reactions to the escalating migration crisis
Center for Eastern Studies, October 2021

Putin’s pipeline is a strategic weapon: It must be stopped
Atlantic Council, October 2021

Possible instruments to better operationalise the EU strategy towards Russia
Polish Institute of International Affairs, October 2021

Advanced military technology in Russia
Chatham House, September 2021

How half-hearted sanctions put the future of Belarus at risk
European Council on Foreign Relations, September 2021

Russia, elections, and the West: Ten years later
European Council on Foreign Relations, September 2021

Russian parliamentary elections: Mission accomplished
Bertelsmann Stiftung, September 2021

Why we must not recognize Russia’s fraudulent election
Atlantic Council, September 2021

Elections in Russia: A measure for nothing or relevant after all?
Egmont, September 2021

Russia and 9/11: Roads not taken
Chatham House, September 2021

America must lead the international response to Russia’s human rights crisis
Atlantic Council, September 2021

Nord Stream 2 comes on stream: Good business or bad geopolitics?
Friends of Europe, September 2021

America must lead the international response to Russia’s human rights crisis
Atlantic Council, September 2021

How Russia made Apple and Google complicit in its internet crackdown
Atlantic Council, September 2021

Read this briefing on ‘The EU and Russia: A fragile neighbourhood‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Suzana Anghel, Ralf Drachenberg, Anna Krozser and Rebecca Torpey.

Established as an informal summit meeting in 1975, the European Council became a formal European Union institution, with a full-time President, in 2009, on the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon. It consists of the Heads of State or Government of the 27 EU Member States, the President of the European Council and the President of the European Commission (Article 15(2) of the Treaty on European Union, TEU). The latter two individuals have no voting rights. Meetings of the European Council are normally also attended by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. The President of the European Parliament is ‘invited to speak’ as the first item on the European Council’s agenda, followed by an exchange of views (Article 235(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU, TFEU). At its formal meetings, normally four per year, the European Council adopts ‘conclusions’ that are aimed at identifying policy priorities and action to be taken by the Union as a whole.

Agenda-setting and crisis management

The European Council’s role is to ‘provide the Union with the necessary impetus for its development and define the general political directions and priorities’ (Article 15(1) TEU). It cannot exercise legislative functions. At the beginning of the 2014-2019 and the 2019-2024 institutional cycles, the European Council adopted an agenda of strategic priorities, designed to guide the work of the European Union over the five-year period.

Reflecting the direction taken by the 2017 Rome Agenda set out on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the Rome Treaties, the 2019-2024 strategic agenda, adopted by the Heads of State or Government at their meeting in June 2019, defines migration and the protection of citizens as the top priorities for action in the upcoming five years. Then, comes the development of a stronger economic base, including the fight against unemployment, followed by climate change and social issues. Finally, it looks to increase the EU’s influence and defend its interest in the world. The four core priorities set out in the 2019-2024 strategic agenda broadly correspond to the concerns of EU citizens at the time, as reflected by the 2019 standard Eurobarometer.[1]

The outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic in early 2020 and the prospect of a protracted economic recession of unknown length and severity has, however, prompted EU Heads of State or Government to review the above priorities in order to provide for a coordinated approach and joint action to tackle the crisis. They met virtually on a number of occasions, with their attention shifting from the initial pandemic-related crisis management to the more medium-term recovery process.

At their first video-conference dedicated to the management of the health crisis, on 10 March 2020, the 27 EU Heads of State or Government, alongside the Presidents of the European Commission and the European Central Bank and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, agreed to work together along four main axes, with a view to: i) limiting the spread of the virus; ii) providing medical equipment; iii) promoting research, for instance on development of a vaccine; and iv) tackling the socio-economic consequences of the crisis. The EU leaders underscored the need for a joint European approach and close coordination with the European Commission in combating the pandemic.

Given the serious human, economic and social consequences of the health crisis, criticism has been directed towards the lack of overall preparedness in combatting the pandemic across the EU, and the lack of coordination among Member States at the start of the outbreak. Indeed, EU leaders have acknowledged that the EU needed to become better at ‘developing its executive capacity and at managing crises in a coordinated fashion’.

Following the immediate crisis-management phase, the European Council therefore shifted its focus more towards the medium-term recovery process, with the aim of relaunching and transforming the EU’s economies. In a ‘Joint Statement of the Members of the European Council’ adopted on 26 March 2020, EU leaders mandated the Presidents of the European Council, Charles Michel, and the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, to put forward a roadmap for recovery.

Submitted on 21 April, the recovery plan places particular emphasis on the opportunities offered by the green transition and digital transformation, which are expected to foster new forms of growth and contribute to a more innovative and resilient EU. This dual transformation has been given a central role in the EU’s medium- to long-term action, and forms part of a broader ambition aimed at achieving ‘European strategic autonomy‘. Charles Michel mentioned the concept of strategic autonomy several times over the year 2020; most prominently, on 28 September, when he stated that ‘European strategic autonomy – these are not just words. The strategic independence of Europe is our new common project for this century. It’s in all our common interest’. This concept was then formally endorsed by the European Council, which presented it as ‘a key objective of the Union’ in its 1-2 October 2020 conclusions. Recent developments in Afghanistan are likely to give new impetus to the debate on the EU’s strategic autonomy, as events in August 2021 have highlighted once again the need for the EU to strengthen its defence cooperation.

As regards the funding for the EU recovery process, this will come from the Next Generation EU (NGEU) recovery fund, set up as a temporary mechanism and linked to the 2021-2027 multiannual financial framework (MFF). Yet, it was only after months of remote meetings that the European Council was able to convene again in person to discuss the financial package, and an intensive four-day meeting was needed on 17-21 July, to reach political agreement on the 2021-2027 MFF and NGEU. Together, the two instruments amount to €1 824.3 billion, with €360 in loans and €390 billion in grants making up the latter. After several negotiation meetings between European Parliament and Council representatives, a political agreement on the package was reached on 10 November 2020. However, following the refusal by Hungary and Poland to endorse the outcome, citing concerns with the rule of law mechanism, it took the European Council another two meetings, a video-conference on 19 November and a meeting in person on 11-12 December 2020, to finally agree on clarifications to the rule-of-law conditionality mechanism, thus paving the way for the adoption of the MFF and the NGEU.

One and a half years after the outbreak of the crisis, boosting the EU economy and ensuring its future resilience remain the key priority of the EU. An improving health situation – coupled with increasing vaccination levels – allowed for the gradual restart of EU economies, which in turn led to a brighter economic outlook, with GDP forecast to grow by 4.8 % in 2021 in the EU. However, the speed of recovery varies by Member State and by sector.

Thus, immediately after the Commission’s first-ever bond issuance to feed the Recovery and Resilience Facility, the June 2021 European Council pushed for swift adoption by the Council and rapid implementation of the National Recovery and Resilience Plans, with the aim of ensuring balanced recovery throughout the continent.

Hence, despite an evolution in the ranking of European citizens’ priorities for EU action as identified in the most recent standard Eurobarometer, the horizontal policy orientations set by the European Council in its 2019-2024 strategic agenda appear to remain fully relevant and in line with the expectations of citizens, who now consider the economic situation as their top concern at EU level.

Specific Treaty-based role

In addition to its horizontal priority-setting role as defined in Article 15(1) TEU, the European Council is also tasked with identifying the Union’s strategic interests, determining the objectives of, and defining general guidelines for common foreign and security policy (Article 26 TEU). Following a request by EU leaders, the then High Representative, Federica Mogherini, presented an EU global strategy, which the European Council welcomed in June 2016. The strategy sets five broad priorities for the EU external action in coming years: the security of the Union, state and societal resilience to the east and south, an integrated approach to conflict and crisis, cooperative regional orders, and global governance for the 21st century.

Furthermore, the European Council defines the strategic guidelines for legislative and operational planning in the area of freedom, security and justice (Article 68 TFEU). For the period until 2019, the priorities for the European Union in the area of freedom, security and justice, were to ‘better manage migration in all aspects; prevent and combat crime and terrorism; [and] improve judicial cooperation among EU countries’. Following the outbreak of the migration crisis, and a series of terrorist attacks on European soil, key strategic documents, notably the European agenda on security and the European agenda on migration, were adopted in 2015, either at the request of or with the endorsement of the European Council. A new set of ‘strategic guidelines for legislative and operational planning’ were expected to be adopted by the European Council at its meeting of 26‑27 March 2020. Since the ordinary spring European Council meeting had to be postponed because of the coronavirus crisis. However, more than a year and a half later, and despite the 15 European Council meetings held in the meantime, EU leaders have still not complied with this Treaty obligation, nor is the topic mentioned in the indicative Leaders’ Agenda 2021-2022.

The European Council has also to ‘consider each year the employment situation in the Union and adopt conclusions thereon, on the basis of a joint annual report by the Council and the Commission’ (Article 148 TFEU).

Decision-making procedures and working methods

The European Council’s decisions are taken mainly by consensus, but in certain cases, the European Council can also decide by qualified majority. For example, the President of the European Council is elected by qualified majority vote for a once-renewable term of two and a half years. The President’s role is ‘to ensure the preparation and continuity of the work of the European Council in cooperation with the President of the Commission’, chair its meetings, ‘facilitate cohesion and consensus within the European Council’, and to ensure ‘the external representation of the Union on issues concerning its common foreign and security policy, without prejudice to the powers of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy’ (Article 15(5) TEU). The first two full-time Presidents of the European Council, Herman Van Rompuy and Donald Tusk, served five years each between 2009 and 2019. The third permanent President of the European Council, Charles Michel, began his mandate at the beginning of December 2019.

While not directly accountable to the European Parliament, the President of the European Council presents a report to the Parliament after each (formal) meeting of the Heads of State or Government (Article 15(6)(d) TEU). Usually this takes the form of a declaration in person, followed by a plenary debate.

One of the most striking development in recent years has been the substantial evolution in the working methods and formations of the European Council. As a result of the series of crisis of the last decade, we have witnessed an exponential increase in the number and types of meetings. All meetings are indeed meetings of Heads of State or Government, but not all meetings are formal European Council meetings.

Over recent years, members of the European Council have met in seven different formats:

Next to 1) regular meetings of the European Council on a quarterly basis (Article 15(3) TEU), mentioned earlier, the President can convene 2) special meetings of the European Council ‘when the situation so requires’ (Article 15(3) TEU). In principle, conclusions are also adopted at these special meetings. But, there can be exceptions, e.g. the special meeting of February 2020 on the MFF.

In addition, 3) informal meetings of Heads of State or Government take place traditionally twice per year in the country holding the rotating presidency of the Council, such as for instance the Porto meeting on 8 May 2021, in connexion with the social summit.

As a result of, inter alia, the financial crisis, the UK’s decision to leave the Union, the Leaders’ Agenda proposed by the previous President of the European Council, Donald Tusk, in 2017, and the coronavirus pandemic, meeting formations have evolved substantially.

The financial crisis has led to the increase in the number of special European Council meetings as well as to the establishment of the 4) Euro Summit, created as an informal gathering in 2008 and formalised in 2012 with the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the EMU. In principle, Euro Summits include the EU Member States which have adopted the common currency, currently 19 countries. However, more and more meetings take place in an inclusive format, i.e. with the participation of all 27 Member States. This was the case for instance of the June 2021 Euro Summit. This broad involvement could be linked to the fact that the Euro Summits are not crisis meetings anymore; they now aim at bringing forward the reform of EMU, which is of concern for all the Member States.

From June 2016, following the UK referendum, EU leaders felt the need to discuss a number of things among the 27. Thus, a number of informal meetings of Heads of State or Government at 27 took place without the UK to discuss the future of Europe, notably in Bratislava in 2016, Rome in 2017 and Sibiu in 2019. On those occasions a series of landmark declarations were adopted, which were not formal conclusions. Once the UK had triggered Article 50 and notified its intention to leave, then a new formal format was set up, the 5) European Council (Article 50), which adopted formal conclusions.

As for 6) Leaders’ meetings, they were set up under President Tusk in 2017 and aimed at discussing sensitive issues in an informal way. Such discussions were based, not on draft conclusions, but on short notes prepared by the President. The idea is to have an open, relatively unstructured debate on controversial but highly consequential issues, with a view to facilitating agreement at a follow-up European Council meeting.

The 2019-2024 strategic agenda was prepared in very much the same way, by using the working method developed under the Leaders’ Agenda. Just ahead of the 2019 European elections, the EU‑27 met on 9 May 2019 in the Romanian city of Sibiu to assess the implementation of previous policy objectives and to reflect informally on future EU action over the coming five years. The EU leaders’ discussion was informed by President Tusk’s Leaders’ Agenda note, ‘Strategic agenda 2019-2024 – Outline’, which provided a first overview of the topics for future action. The 2019-2024 strategic agenda was then adopted at the June 2019 formal European Council meeting.

The process consisting of first holding an informal or inconclusive discussion on a topic and then seeking to adopt conclusions at a subsequent meeting has been kept in the Leaders’ Agenda 2020-2021, put forward by President Charles Michel at the special European Council meeting of 1‑2 October 2020 and then in the new indicative Leaders’ Agenda 2021-22, presented in June 2021. The idea is that, ‘where no immediate conclusions are drawn, the outcome of the debates will be reflected in later conclusions’. Designed to provide an important structuring framework for the European Council’s activities, both the 2020-21 and 2021-22 Leaders’ Agendas outline the planned meetings and main policy topics that EU Heads of State or Government are called to address in the months ahead. The third edition of the Leaders’ Agenda however, the indicative nature of which is specified in the title, appears to be less detailed and less comprehensive when compared to the first and second editions. Moreover, whilst maintaining the Leaders’ Agenda framework, Mr Michel seems more recently to have dropped the practice of preparing special notes and of organising an informal meeting to discuss sensitive issues.

Moreover, a number of EU priority topics appear to be missing in the listing of issues for discussion outlined in the latest Leaders’ Agenda. This is the case of migration for instance. Owing to the sensitivity of the issue and because EU leaders have not thus far been able to agree on the distribution of migrants beyond the Member State of arrival, migration has been absent from the European Council’s meeting agendas in 2019 and 2020. However, EU discussions on migration have resurfaced recently: the issue was debated at length at the October 2021 European Council meeting and is likely to feature among the highly sensitive topics of the coming months.

The newest feature of meetings of Heads of State or Government are video-conference meetings. In a context of lockdown, this new form of meeting has enabled EU leaders to take joint action to tackle the crisis. Video-conference meetings are clearly linked to the ongoing coronavirus crisis. However, it can be assumed that they be a lasting feature. Indeed, next to the coronavirus pandemic, other topics were often touched upon at video-conference meetings, thus using the opportunity of a virtual meeting to move forward on other pressing or even less pressing issues.

Obviously video technology enables urgent meetings to take place, and for the EU to take action if needed between physical meetings. Thus, given there is the necessary political will, the use of video-conferences could provide a new dynamic to the European Council, increasing its adaptability and reaction capacity.

Nevertheless, even if video-conferences are a good vehicle for rapid consultation, this type of meeting has its limits: Video-conferences are inappropriate to discuss sensitive issues, such as foreign affairs or budgetary matters. In such a format, EU leaders tend to be more cautious and to keep to their written statements, because the confidentiality of discussions is not ensured and participation is (de facto) broader than in formal physical meetings. Moreover, considering the particular nature of the European Council, small bilateral or side-meetings are crucial for achieving agreements on sensitive issues. We have witnessed it in the context of the negotiations on MFF in July 2020, when a physical meeting was necessary to enable political agreement to be reached on the MFF, and with the postponement of the discussion on Russia at the March European Council, which had to be held online due to the public health situation.

Altogether, the European Council has been active during the coronavirus crisis, and the institution has taken a digital leap. But video-meetings are unlikely to replace physical meetings fully when crucial decisions are on the agenda.

Read the complete study on ‘Key issues in the European Council: State of play in December 2021‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Anita Orav.

Each year, 18 December is observed as International Migrants’ Day. So designated by the United Nations General Assembly on 4 December 2000, in response to increasing migration in the world, the day aims to draw attention to the human rights of migrants and highlight their contribution to our societies.

Background

The number of international migrants in the world has grown rapidly over the past two decades. The UN reports that the global number reached 281 million in 2020, as compared to 221 million in 2010 and 173 million in 2000. Nearly two thirds of all international migrants live either in Europe (87 million) or North America (59 million), followed by northern Africa and western Asia (50 million combined). This new reality creates challenges as well as opportunities for the societies in both regions of origin and of destination.

Global cooperation on migration

On 19 September 2016, all 193 UN member states adopted the New York Declaration, making a set of commitments aimed at strengthening the protection of people on the move. The declaration led to the adoption on 17 December 2018 of two new global compacts – on refugees and on migrants – which established a new international framework for support to refugees and host communities. The process also relaunched a call to improve data on migration. Because of the lack of legal identification, many migrants remain ‘invisible’, as they are not registered. While it might be too soon to say how the UN member states will implement this recommendation and, given the fact that international data are scarce, a priority should be given to international efforts to collect, analyse and share migration data.

Migration management in the EU

The EU and its Member States have shared competence as regards migration. In recent years, the priority accorded to migration has found reflection in the EU budget, with €22.7 billion allocated to migration and security over the 2021-2027 period. Acknowledging that Europe has to move away from ad hoc solutions and put in place a predictable and reliable migration management system, the EU is seeking ways to increase legal channels to the EU, be it through the EU Blue Card for labour mobility, resettlement or community sponsorship. At the same time, the national and local levels are mostly in charge of integrating migrants into the host society, by giving them access to the labour market, language training and education.

European Parliament position

The European Parliament has advocated a humane, solidarity-based and common approach to migration in its various resolutions and reports. In its resolution of 12 April 2016 on the situation in the Mediterranean and the need for a holistic EU approach to migration, the Parliament emphasised the need for developing safe and lawful routes for asylum-seekers and refugees into the EU. In its 2017 resolution on addressing refugee and migrant movements: the role of EU external action, the Parliament recalled that international migration can contribute to socio-economic development, as it has done historically, and called on governments to address migration as a regular human phenomenon. Furthermore, taking into consideration that total labour supply in the euro area is projected to fall by 13 % (20 million people) between 2019 and 2070, the Parliament has encouraged the development of adequate legal economic migration channels, most recently in its resolution of 25 November 2021. To respond to Europe’s demographic challenges and to match migrants’ skills with labour market needs effectively, Parliament is asking for an update of EU rules on legal labour migration by the end of January 2022.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘International Migrants’ Day – 18 December‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Martin Russell.

For the second time in 2021, a massive Russian military build-up and increasingly hostile rhetoric point to a planned attack on Ukraine. Whereas the previous build-up ended in April with the withdrawal of most troops, this time the signs are more worrying. Russia is demanding a halt to NATO activity in and around Ukraine. The US and the EU are threatening harsh new sanctions against Russia if the attack goes ahead.

Threatening Russian manoeuvres close to the Ukrainian border

In October 2021, reports began emerging that large contingents of Russian troops were being moved close to the Ukrainian border, supported by lethal weapons such as tanks and Buk missiles of the type used to shoot down flight MH17 in July 2014. The number of troops involved is thought to be already over 90 000 and, according to US intelligence, it could reach 175 000 by January 2021. Although not all the logistical support is yet in place, Ukrainian defence officials suggest that there is a very real possibility of a large-scale Russian attack beginning in January or February 2021. They also claim that Russia has already blocked access to two-thirds of the Azov Sea around the illegally annexed Crimean Peninsula.

Troop movements on a similar scale were seen close to the Ukrainian border in spring 2021. On that occasion, most of the personnel involved were subsequently moved away from Ukraine in April, while much of their equipment was left behind, facilitating future rapid deployment to the region.

The current movements are mostly taking place at night-time, unlike the previous more overt manoeuvres – according to analysts, a possible sign that Russia’s intentions are more serious this time. In contrast to the spring, Russia is not even pretending to be carrying out military exercises. Another worrying sign is the Kremlin’s increasingly bellicose rhetoric. Already in July 2021, an essay by Vladimir Putin on the ‘historical unity’ of Moscow and Kyiv cast doubt on Ukrainian statehood and argued that some Ukrainian territory legitimately belonged to Russia – practically a declaration of war, according to one commentator. On 9 December, Putin warned of ‘genocide’ in Ukraine’s eastern Donbas region, where Ukrainian government troops are fighting pro-Russia separatists. This was perhaps an attempt to create a pretext for an attack, given that Russia’s 2014 military doctrine lists protection of Russian citizens abroad as one of the cases justifying the use of military force.

Kremlin officials deny that Russia is planning an attack. They put the blame for the latest standoff on NATO – describing the presence of US warships in the Black Sea as a ‘provocation’ – and Ukraine, which has allegedly deployed 125 000 troops to Donbas. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov accuses NATO of risking ‘the nightmare scenario of a military confrontation’, while his deputy, Sergei Ryabkov, compares the situation to the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, which brought the world to the brink of nuclear war.

What is Russia trying to achieve?

In spring 2021, many observers dismissed Russia’s threatening moves as mere ‘sabre-rattling’, possibly as an attempt to force concessions in the stalemated Donbas conflict. This time again, there are links to the Donbas situation – the first signs of a military build-up coincided with Ukraine’s first use in October of lethal Turkish-made drones against separatists.

However, Russia’s main concern appears to be NATO’s presence in and around Ukraine. It has consistently identified the presence of NATO military infrastructure close to its borders as a serious threat, for example, in its 2021 national security strategy. Putin is demanding security guarantees from the Alliance: no eastwards expansion, no offensive strike weapons – such as missiles – in states bordering Russia, and no military exercises close to Russia.

In fact, NATO presence in Ukraine remains limited. Cooperation has increased since 2014 but has mainly focused on helping Kyiv to restructure its armed forces and improve resilience. There are trainers, but no permanent troops. US military aid to Ukraine (US$450 million so far in 2021) includes some lethal weapons, such as anti-tank missiles. On the other hand, enlargement to Ukraine and Georgia, while it has never been explicitly excluded, remains a distant prospect.

US President Joe Biden has ruled out a unilateral US military intervention, and Ukraine could hardly defeat Russia on its own. However, Ukrainian armed forces are now significantly more capable than they were in 2014 and could inflict serious losses on Russian invaders. Russia might hope to secure strategically important assets, such as the Azov sea port of Mariupol or freshwater supplies, to relieve Crimea’s chronic water shortage. However, such acquisitions could hardly outweigh the huge economic costs imposed by Western sanctions (see below). While annexing Crimea gave Putin’s popularity a huge boost, escalating tensions with the West have not boosted his flagging approval ratings so far. There appears to be little appetite among ordinary Russians for renewed conflict with Ukraine, most likely involving heavy casualties; nearly half of respondents to surveys by independent pollsters Levada Centre view Ukraine favourably, over half would like to see friendly relations between Russia and Ukraine as independent states, and less than one-fifth subscribe to the view that the two countries should be united. Nor would a Russian invasion be welcomed in Ukraine, where attachment to the ‘Russian World’ has faded, even among ethnic Russians.

Western responses

The US has offered ‘ironclad’ support for Ukrainian sovereignty, and Biden has firmly rejected Kremlin red lines on NATO expansion. NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg insists on Ukraine’s right to choose its own path. While a military response is not currently on the table, Washington and Brussels are considering economic sanctions that, according to US National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan, go far beyond those adopted in 2014. A 12 December statement by the G7 countries condemns ‘Russia’s military build-up and aggressive rhetoric’ and warns that aggression will carry severe costs.

The US and the EU have not revealed what sanctions they might impose. However, Sullivan has mentioned excluding Russia from the international SWIFT bank messaging system – described in 2015 as a last-resort ‘nuclear option’ –as one of the probable measures. Although Russian banks have made efforts to prepare by developing alternative systems, some experts still claim that exclusion from SWIFT would have a devastating economic impact, by making it harder for Russia to receive payments for its exports. Germany has warned that Russia’s Nord Stream 2 pipeline – currently awaiting regulatory approval – will not be allowed to come into service in the event of a new escalation in Ukraine.

Biden has telephoned Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy and the leaders of nine NATO countries that are neighbours or near-neighbours of Ukraine, to assure them that they will be involved in any decisions. French President Emmanuel Macron and UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson have met virtually with Putin; on both occasions, Putin reiterated his earlier demands to Biden for security guarantees from NATO.

Outlook

Several weeks after the 2021 spring military build-up, Joe Biden and Vladimir Putin’s first summit in June 2021 appeared to put US-Russia relations on a better track by launching dialogue on security issues. There was no meeting of minds at the 7 December 2021 video-call between the two leaders; however, some observers see it as a positive sign that they have at least agreed to keep talking. Putin accuses the West of dismissing Russia’s security concerns; in the best-case scenario, he might be prepared to de-escalate in exchange for some kind of assurances. On the other hand, further talks may simply give him more time to prepare an attack. According to some, the worst-case scenario could even see fighting spreading to other European countries.

European Parliament (EP) position: in its April 2021 resolution on Russia, adopted soon after the end of the previous military build-up, the EP condemned Russia’s ‘threatening and destabilising actions’ and praised Ukraine for its ‘proportionate response’. The EP called on Russia to fully withdraw its troops and end its provocations. In the event of a future invasion of Ukraine, the EP suggested that the EU could stop importing Russian oil and gas, exclude Russia from the SWIFT payment system, and impose asset freezes and visa bans on oligarchs close to the Russian authorities and their families.
On 14 December 2021, the EP debated the situation at the Ukrainian border and in Russian-occupied territories of Ukraine in the presence of EU High Representative Josep Borrell. A resolution on the subject is due to be voted on 16 December.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Is Russia about to start a new war in Ukraine?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Andrés García with Laia Delgado Callico and Liliia Hrytsai.

This year, STOA’s Annual Lecture focused on critical technologies that, with the roll-out of artificial intelligence and the dramatic increase in new capabilities and online solutions, are bound to have an unprecedented effect on all our lives. It is estimated that the explosion in the number of connected devices will result in more than 500 billion of them worldwide by 2025 – nearly 100 smart objects per inhabitant of the planet. In this context, the event investigated the problem of jointly optimised communication efficiency and resources over wireless networks to leverage massive distributed data and computation resources.

The event was moderated by STOA Chair Eva Kaili (S&D, Greece), who began by highlighting the European commitment to developing critical technologies and the relevance of semiconductors for achieving strategic autonomy for Europe in the future geopolitical arena. Eva Kaili also referred to the emerging European deep-technology start-up scene and discussed the digital Europe programme, which will provide strategic funding to tackle the challenge of making Europe greener and more digital.

Following this introduction, the European Commissioner for the Internal Market, Thierry Breton, delivered a scene-setting speech on the subject of edge computing, 6G and satellite communications. He argued that, as Europe moves forward on critical technologies, it is necessary to establish clear and robust rules enabling everyone to benefit from innovation. Commissioner Breton remarked that Europe’s digital sovereignty, industrial leadership and resilience are conditioned by the capacity to develop these critical technologies. He went on to provide an overview of the multiple initiatives related to digital technologies that Europe is pursuing to meet its current needs and face the ongoing evolution, as well as the industrial data revolution. He specifically mentioned initiatives such as the artificial intelligence act, the digital services act (DSA), the digital marketsaAct (DMA) and the data governance act (DGA).

Commissioner Breton considers 6G to be a game-changer, which is expected to dramatically increase performance, capacities and signal response time standards. Development of this new technology will be conditioned on its cybersecurity dimension, for which the European Commission will be providing an equivalent updated version of the 5G Security Toolbox. He further commented on the dedicated initiative on space-based connectivity, to be launched in 2022. Providing broadband access to everyone in Europe and the whole African continent, its infrastructure will integrate quantum encryption features and low-orbiting satellites.

This was followed by a discussion also moderated by Eva Kaili with the participation of several Members of the European Parliament. Eva Maydell (EPP, Bulgaria) commented on the legislative instruments required to make all these technologies future-proof, as well as on the role of industry and public‑private partnerships (PPP). Maria‑Manuel Leitão Marques (S&D, Portugal) highlighted several points related to international cooperation and the need for strategic autonomy.

As keynote speaker, Vincent Poor of Princeton University explained the motivation behind 6G and its new requirements, in addition to its performance metrics such as communication speed and efficiency. He also discussed the new paradigm shifts that are expected, and several application scenarios and key sectors that could be particularly impacted by 6G. Vincent Poor also presented some network security concerns for 6G and how they could be addressed, concluding with a review of enabling technologies and some comments on the way in which 6G will affect future communication networks.

The event continued with brief interventions from renowned experts in the field. Yuanyuan Yang, of the United States National Science Foundation/Stony Brook University, gave a presentation of the challenges and opportunities posed by the use of smart devices, applications and edge computing. Eleni Diamanti of the French National Centre for Scientific Research (CNRS) followed, speaking about the two pillars of quantum technologies: quantum computing and quantum communication. She stated that quantum technologies offer a new paradigm for processing information and how we conceive infrastructure, in respect of cybersecurity. Finally, Gerhard Fettweis, of TU Dresden, pointed out that 5G provides the basis for remote control of robots, or what is known as personal mobile robotics. As coordinator of the 5G Lab Germany, he clarified the various implementation issues from the European perspective. In his view, all industry will be robotised, so we need to develop trust, authenticity, privacy, accountability and availability of our technologies according to EU values.

Eva Kaili then kicked-off the discussion with questions regarding blockchain, security, trust, 5G and the cloud. Eva Maydell commented on the challenges regarding changes in requirements for internet communication and the increasing need for standards. Maria‑Manuel Leitão‑Marques mentioned the Gaia‑X project and its chances to become an effective European cloud. The discussion was especially oriented towards the EU’s role and its capability to drive a human-centric approach for safe exploitation of the opportunities created by these critical technologies. A sustainable digital transformation is bound to have a significant impact on our technological, economic and societal development. It is imperative, according to the participants in the discussion, that the EU maximise the opportunities offered by digital and communication technologies while managing the risks, to ensure citizens have adequate access to safe, secure, inclusive and cost-effective solutions. The panellists agreed that the next five years will define the role of the different players in the area and that there was a need for action to ensure the EU remains ahead in this global competition.

Eva Kaili concluded the Annual Lecture by pointing out that critical technologies will definitely transform the world, offering new opportunities to all citizens. She added that Europe leads the way to human-centric innovation, therefore it is important to make sure that other countries will follow the same path, because technologies go beyond physical borders.

The full recording of the workshop is available here.

Your opinion counts for us. To let us know what you think, get in touch via stoa@europarl.europa.eu.

Written by Magdalena Pasikowska-Schnass.

From his childhood in the Warsaw Ghetto to his tragic death in a road accident while working at the European Parliament in 2008, Bronisław Geremek faced many personal, professional and political challenges during a period of constant turbulence. A world-renowned historian, he was interested in the poor, the excluded and the marginalised during the Middle Ages, mainly working as a researcher at the Sorbonne and Warsaw University.

The Soviet army’s invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 marked the start of his political involvement with those opposing the communist regime. He secretly gave history lectures, spoke in defence of workers persecuted following the cost-of-living riots in 1976, and went to Gdańsk in August 1980 to support the strike led by Lech Wałęsa. Geremek subsequently became an adviser to the founder of the Solidarność trade union.

His involvement led to his imprisonment following the military coup in December 1981 and the loss of his position as a professor, but guaranteed his place in negotiations between the communist regime and the democratic opposition in 1989. As a member of the first semi-democratic parliament in the Soviet bloc, he subsequently became Foreign Minister and started the negotiations for Poland’s accession to the European Union. He was elected as a Member of the European Parliament in 2004.

His research as a historian focused on Europe as a civilisation, on questions of European identity and integration, and on civil society. Due to his historical research, he had a capacity for in-depth analysis that he used in his European political work and involvement. He concluded that a European public space was essential in order to encourage European civic engagement and awareness.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Bronisław Geremek: In search of a united Europe‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Liselotte Jensen.

At a time when the European Union (EU) is preparing a major revision of its climate and energy framework in line with the objectives of the European Green Deal and the targets set in the European Climate Law, this briefing looks at overall progress on climate action.

Although the EU met its 2020 targets for reducing greenhouse gases (GHG) and increasing renewable energy use and energy efficiency in the extraordinary context of the coronavirus crisis, pandemic recovery led energy consumption and emissions to rebound in 2021. Member States are required to invest 37 % of EU Recovery and Resilience Facility Funds on climate objectives.

The European Climate Law sets the targets of reducing net GHG emissions by ‘at least’ 55 % by 2030, compared with 1990, and achieving climate neutrality by 2050. However, current climate and energy legislation for the 2021-2030 period is still based on a lower 2030 target of 40 % emission reduction, as are Member States’ national energy and climate plans (NECPs) for the 2021-2030 period, required by the Governance Regulation. With the ‘fit for 55’ package presented in July 2021, the Commission is aiming to bring EU climate and energy legislation in line with the new targets. Member States need to update their NECPs by June 2024.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Climate action in the European Union: Latest state of play‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Renewable energy shares and targets per Member State Renewable energy share of gross final energy consumption (EU-27) Average EU-27 emissions: New passenger cars (g CO2/km) Primary and final energy consumption (Mtoe, EU-27) Emissions under the Effort-sharing Decision/Regulation (MtCO2e, EU-27) Total GHG emissions by sector (MtCO2e) (rounded data, EU-27) Carbon intensity of the EU-27 economy: GHG emissions (gCO2e) per unit of GDP (euro in 2015 prices) Emissions and allocations per policy sector (EU-27) Total, LULUCF and net greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (MtCO2e, EU-27) Total greenhouse gas emissions (tCO2e) per inhabitant in 2019

Citizens often turn to the European Parliament to ask what the European Union (EU) is doing to handle future epidemics of illnesses transmitted from animals to humans. Over the past decades, a number of diseases transmitted from animals to humans – known as zoonotic diseases – have resulted in various epidemics and pandemics. The coronavirus pandemic is the most notable, but previous examples include SARS, Ebola, avian influenza (‘bird flu’), and HIV/AIDS.

In the health policy area, the European Union’s role is limited to supporting and coordinating the policies of EU countries. Within these limited powers, the EU has taken action to reduce the risk of future epidemics, and to be better prepared to deal with large outbreaks.

Preventing future epidemics

One of the risk factors that can lead to diseases being transmitted from animals to humans is a sharp decline in biodiversity. The loss of habitat can force wild animals closer to livestock and inhabited areas, increasing the chance of infection. In addition, less biodiversity can sometimes lead to more animals carrying diseases that could potentially infect humans, or carrying parasites that could do so (known as vector species).

As a result, the EU has taken steps to protect biodiversity and prevent deforestation, in particular as part of the Green Deal. A core part of the Green Deal is the biodiversity strategy. Additionally, the farm to fork strategy for sustainable agriculture aims to lessen the chances of another epidemic by promoting genetic diversity on farms.

The European Parliament welcomed these efforts in an October 2021 resolution. It also explicitly recognised the link between biodiversity loss and the spread of disease in another resolution on protecting biodiversity in October 2021. In this resolution, Parliament called for the EU to address the root cause of biodiversity loss. It also called on the European Commission to submit a proposal to ensure that EU consumption does not lead to deforestation, and to promote a diversity in agricultural crops and seeds.

Some diseases can be transferred from livestock to humans through the contamination of food. As a result, the EU is taking action to combat disease in livestock and to reduce the risk of contamination. This includes routinely vaccinating farm animals and reducing the use of antibiotics.

Improving epidemic preparedness

Through the Horizon 2020 programme, the EU has invested heavily in research on infectious diseases. In particular, it has invested in developing vaccines, including novel technologies such as mRNA vaccines, which have been instrumental in combatting coronavirus.

The European Parliament calls for greater cooperation between EU countries on healthcare. Most notably, in a July 2020 resolution, Parliament demanded the establishment of a European Health Union, to promote cooperation in healthcare, by sharing information and supplies, and by improving coordination.

In response to the Parliament’s demands, as well as to the coronavirus pandemic, the European Commission established the Health Emergency Preparedness and Response Authority (HERA) to:

• detect and evaluate health threats
• promote research into safe, effective, and affordable medical countermeasures
• procure, stockpile, and distribute medical supplies
• share knowledge and best practices
• coordinate EU countries and other stakeholders during (potential) health crises
• contribute to global preparedness to epidemics, for example through training, sharing knowledge, and improving the supply chains for medical equipment and medicine

The aim is that HERA will be fully operational by early 2022.

The European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) also plays an important role in monitoring the spread of disease, providing important data and advice, and promoting the sharing of knowledge and best practices.

Further reading

• The link between biodiversity loss and the spread of zoonotic diseases, European Parliament Policy Department for Economic, Scientific and Quality of Life Policies, December 2020
• Foodborne zoonotic diseases, European Food Safety Authority, 2021
• Eradication, control and monitoring programmes to contain animal diseases, European Court of Auditors special report, 2016

Keep sending your questions to the Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (Ask EP)! We reply in the EU language that you use to write to us.

Written by Ionel Zamfir.

A landmark UNHRC resolution has recognised the human right to a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environment, endorsing the broad recognition of the link between human rights and the environment. The right to a healthy environment is already enshrined in numerous national and regional instruments. Although non-binding, the resolution can spur change, with the Council of Europe already taking the first steps in this regard.

Legal recognition of the right to a healthy and sustainable environment

In a resolution of 8 October 2021, the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) recognised, with 43 votes in favour and 4 abstentions, that access to a healthy and sustainable environment is a universal right. Although non-binding, this resolution could be a first step towards filling a significant gap in international law.

Legal recognition in the UN treaties

International human rights law does not guarantee the right to a clean and safe environment. UN human rights treaties – most of which were adopted before environmental protection came under the focus of international attention – do not explicitly endorse this right, but some make indirect references to it. The 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights provides in its Article 12 for the right to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health, and calls on states parties to take steps to improve all aspects of environmental and industrial hygiene. The 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child provides that states parties shall take appropriate measures to combat disease and malnutrition through the provision of adequate nutritious foods and clean drinking water, taking into consideration the dangers and risks of environmental pollution (Article 24). UN human rights treaty bodies, through their case law or other declarations, have driven a ‘greening’ of human rights by arguing that many human rights, such as the right to life, private life, health, water and property, depend on a healthy environment.

Legal recognition in regional human rights and environmental treaties The link between human rights and the environment, including climate change
This important link has been recognised by the UN human rights bodies (e.g. the Human Rights Council) and the treaty bodies, and has been embedded in the UN special procedures. This link works in two directions: 1) environmental protection is instrumental to the enjoyment of a number of human rights (as explained above), and 2) the exercise of human rights (particularly procedural rights such as access to information, public participation and access to effective judicial and administrative proceedings, including redress and remedy) is vital for effective environmental protection – an approach upheld most staunchly by the Aarhus Convention. The 1972 Stockholm Declaration on the human environment was the first international document to recognise the link between human rights and the environment. The Paris Climate Agreement (2015) is the first binding multilateral environmental agreement to include an explicit human rights reference. Its preamble acknowledges that states ‘should, when taking action to address climate change, respect, promote and consider their respective obligations on human rights’. The Glasgow Climate Pact adopted at COP26 reaffirms these obligations.

Recognition under international regional treaties is stronger but remains unequal. In total, over 120 states are parties to at least one binding regional treaty proclaiming the right to a healthy environment. Among these, the Aarhus Convention in Europe stands out through its focus on procedural rights (rights of access to information, public participation, and access to justice with respect to the environment). The European Convention on Human Rights does not contain any provisions referring to a right to a healthy environment, but on 29 September 2021, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe recommended the drafting of an additional protocol in this respect. Article 37 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union provides that a high level of environmental protection must be integrated in EU policies, but does not recognise an individual right to a healthy environment.

Table 1 – Relevant international regional agreements

Regional conventionsAarhus Convention (1998)African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (1991)Arab Charter of Human Rights (2004)Protocol of San Salvador (1969)States parties46 (plus the EU)541616Relevant provisionsPreamble: ‘every person has the right to live in an environment adequate to his or her health and well-being’Article 24: ‘all peoples shall have the right to a general satisfactory environment favorable to their development’Article 38: ‘every person has the right […] to a healthy environment’Article 11: ‘everyone shall have the right to live in a healthy environment’ In national constitutions and law

According to a 2019 report by the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and the Environment, ‘There are 110 States where this right enjoys constitutional protection…[and] 101 States where this right has been incorporated into national legislation…In total, more than 80 percent of States Members of the United Nations (156 out of 193) [including those bound by a treaty] legally recognize the right to a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environment’. Moreover, 19 out of 27 EU countries have enshrined this right in their constitutions (some only implicitly) and 17 in their national law. Austria, Denmark, Germany, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Sweden have done neither, but are parties to the Aarhus Convention.

The landmark UNHRC resolution on the right to a healthy environment

The October 2021 resolution was the result of a years-long campaign by numerous civil society organisations and other stakeholders. The process was also driven by a 2018 joint report by the former and current UN Special Rapporteurs for Human Rights and the Environment, John Knox (2012-2018) and David Boyd (2018-) respectively, which made the case for the UN ‘to formally recognize the human right to a healthy environment’. The resolution asks states to adopt policies for the enjoyment of such a right, including with respect to biodiversity and ecosystems, and lists climate change in its recitals as one of the major obstacles to the enjoyment of a healthy and sustainable environment. The central provision ‘recognizes the right to a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environment as a human right that is important for the enjoyment of human rights’. The resolution also highlights the link with other rights.

Though not legally binding, the resolution signals the UN member states’ strong political commitment to such a right and could be a catalyst for change. It is expected to produce positive environmental results by raising public awareness and improving accountability and enforcement. In particular, it can provide a strong basis for environmental litigation in courts. Across the world, the link between human rights and the environment and climate is increasingly being invoked before the courts. Cases in the EU include the Urgenda case in the Netherlands, Affaire climat in Belgium and L’affaire du siècle in France.

Though the resolution does not provide a definition of the new right, a 2019 UNHRC report identified the ‘vital elements’ that could be part of such a definition: the right to: clean air, clean water and adequate sanitation, healthy and sustainable food, a safe climate, and healthy biodiversity and ecosystems. Who are the new right’s holders and duty bearers? Some argue that the holders of this new right ‘are not only the present generation but also future generations’. States are the primary duty bearers as regards human rights; therefore, they have a positive obligation ‘to mitigate climate change and ensure that all persons have the necessary capacity to adapt to its consequences’, including with respect to populations outside their territories. In line with the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, businesses should be accountable for the realisation of such a right too. Experts have warned about the difficulties in codifying such a right into law. European Parliament position

The European Parliament, in its June 2021 resolution on the EU biodiversity strategy for 2030, considers that the right to a healthy environment should be recognised in the EU Charter and that the EU should take the lead on the international recognition of such a right.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘A universal right to a healthy environment‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Costica Dumbrava.

Democracy relies on citizens’ abilities to obtain information on public matters, to understand them and to deliberate about them. Whereas social media provide citizens with new opportunities to access information, express opinions and participate in democratic processes, they can also undermine democracy by distorting information, promoting false stories and facilitating political manipulation. Social media risks to democracy can be classified according to five aspects that generate risks surveillance, personalisation, disinformation, moderation, and microtargeting.

Firstly, social media provide new and more effective ways to monitor people online, which can be used by governments to target politically active citizens and silence dissent (political surveillance). Even in the absence of explicit coercion, citizens who suspect they are the target of online surveillance may suppress their political expression online for fear of retribution. The massive collection of data by social media creates privacy risks to users and may affect their capacity to form and express political opinions (loss of privacy and autonomy). The attention capture model used by social media seeks to exploit human needs and biases in order to increase engagement, but at the same time it undermines individual autonomy. Social media may also contribute to citizens’ decreasing levels of interest in politics, even if they are not directly responsible for this (political disengagement). Certain effects of social media are a by-product of a particular business model focused on engagement at all costs. This indifference of social media to democracy contrasts with the fact that they have a growing impact on democracy.

Secondly, the promotion of personalised content on social media may lock citizens in informational bubbles, thus affecting their capacity to form opinions (narrowed worldviews). Whereas content personalisation can help citizens deal with the problem of information overload, it can also limit the range of information available to them. Moreover, the segmentation of information and engagement may reinforce group boundaries and reduce opportunities for political dialogue (social and political fragmentation). Yet, despite widespread concern, existing empirical evidence suggests that the personalisation and filtering effects of social media are less severe and pervasive than initially feared. Whereas the negative political effects of personalisation seem less severe and widespread, the risk of societal fragmentation and polarisation remains. It must be noted that evaluations of the political effects of social media may also depend on political (ideological) assumptions about the nature and conditions of democratic politics.

Thirdly, the spread of false information on social media can undermine citizens’ capacity to form and express political views (distortion of political views and preferences). Despite growing evidence of people’s significant exposure to political disinformation online, the actual impact of disinformation on their views and preferences is difficult to assess. Although the reach and impact of disinformation seem to have been over-estimated, there is evidence of negative effects in particular contexts and on specific groups. Disinformation can be used to persuade or confuse voters and to mobilise or demobilise citizens to cast a vote, which may, in certain conditions, be a determinant of election outcomes (distortion of electoral outcomes). Importantly, widespread disinformation and acute public perception thereof (amplified by lack of research and inadequate reporting) may undermine trust in (all) online information and democratic institutions. Despite recent media attention being focused primarily on disinformation disseminated by foreign actors (e.g. foreign governments or intermediaries seeking to influence electoral outcomes in another country), disinformation is also spread by domestic actors (e.g. political parties and politicians seeking to influence pulblic opinion in their own country). Sometimes, this happens as a result of entrepreneurs promoting highly engaging content to make profits from selling ads. Moreover, automated accounts and algorithms contribute to the spread of disinformation on social media (automated disinformation). However, effective disinformation campaigns are a result of a complex interaction between humans and algorithms. For example, automated tools for spreading false information exploit human biases and predispositions, such as human confirmation bias, inclination to believe repeated stories, and attraction to novel content.

Fourthly, efforts by social media platforms to tackle disinformation and other forms of deception online may undermine users’ freedom of expression and enable control over public opinion (political censorship). Whereas all moderation measures are risky, content removal is particularly problematic when targeted content is not explicitly illegal. Deleting and labelling content can be counterproductive, as it may reinforce perceptions about unfair and unjustified censorship of particular views and groups. Whereas automation can alleviate some burdens of human moderation, it can also amplify errors and automate pre-existing bias (algorithmic bias). Increased pressure on social media to tackle problematic content may push platforms to rely even more strongly on automated tools, which leads to more censorship and bias. Despite efforts to make moderation more transparent and systematic, moderation measures adopted by social media remain largely unclear, arbitrary, and inconsistently applied. The risk is that social media platforms take decisions with significant consequences for individuals and democracy without proper accountability (lack of accountability).

Fifthly, social media platforms rely on a variety of user data to profile people and sell targeted advertising (microtargeting). Whereas political microtargeting can serve to re-engage citizens in politics, it can also be used to manipulate citizens’ views and expectations (political manipulation). The covert or hidden nature of microtargeting increases the risk of manipulation and thus undercuts citizens’ capacity to form and make political choices. Political microtargeting also challenges existing electoral rules concerning transparency, campaigning and political funding, and can distort elections (distortion of the electoral process). Whereas evidence about the widespread use of political microtargeting is growing, its actual impact remains uncertain. Given the nature of political competition, it is possible that political microtargeting campaigns can determine the outcome of elections, in particular in winner-takes-all electoral systems. Even if microtargeting cannot be blamed for tipping recent elections, the risks it creates are likely to increase, given the high political and economic interests at stake and future technological advances.

The EU already has laws and policies in place to tackle many of the social media risks to democracy (for example, strong data protection rules) and is spearheading efforts to counteract new challenges (such as new legislative proposals on digital services). There are seven key approaches to tackling social media risks to democracy.

EU competition measures can be used to further combat abuses of market dominance, for example, by controlling social media platforms’ ability to integrate behavioural data from various services and advertising networks and by promoting data portability and interoperability solutions to reduce the cost of switching between platforms. Further clarification and stricter enforcement of EU data protection and digital privacy rules can help to prevent abuses of personal data and provide safeguards for fair and democratic elections. Amid widespread calls for increasing social media responsibility for promoted content, there is an ongoing reflection on the need to review and clarify EU content liability rules on online content. Special attention has also been given to increasing transparency and accountability of online platforms for filtering and moderating content, including for the use of algorithms. The EU is gradually moving towards a co-regulatory approach that would require social media platforms to assume stricter transparency and accountability obligations. Specific rules are also forthcoming to prevent abuse and manipulation through targeted political advertising. Lastly,addressing the social media risks to democracy cannot succeed without empowering citizens to understand and fend off online risks, for example, by improving digital literacy, promoting citizen-centred approaches to tackling online challenges, and supporting public-oriented institutions such as independent media.

Read this ‘in-depth analysis’ on ‘Key social media risks to democracy: Risks from surveillance, personalisation, disinformation, moderation and microtargeting‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Liselotte Jensen (1st edition).

To align regulations and policies with the legally binding goals – delivering, by 2030, a 55 % net greenhouse gas emissions reduction compared to 1990, and reaching climate neutrality in Europe by 2050 – on 14 July the European Commission presented its first proposals under the ‘fit for 55’ package. One of these proposals involves amending Regulation (EU) 2018/841 on emissions and removals from land use, land-use change and forestry (the LULUCF Regulation). Among the main changes envisaged are to merge, as of 2030, the LULUCF sector with the non-CO2 agricultural sector in a new climate pillar, which would have to achieve climate neutrality by 2035. Moreover, by 2030, LULUCF carbon removals would have to increase to 310 million tonnes of CO2 equivalent (CO2e). For the post-2025 period, the Commission would set individual targets for each Member State.

The proposal has been referred to the European Parliament’s Committee on Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI), which appointed Ville Niinistö (Greens/EFA, Finland) as rapporteur.

Versions

• December 2021: Revision of the LULUCF Regulation: Strengthening the role of the land use, land-use change and forestry sector in climate action (1st edition)

Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2018/841 on the inclusion of greenhouse gas emissions and removals from land use, land use change and forestry in the 2030 climate and energy framework Committee responsible:Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI)COM(2021) 554
14.7.2021Rapporteur:Ville Niinistö (Greens/EFA, Finland)2021/0201(COD)Next steps expected:Dan-Ştefan Motreanu (EPP, Romania)
Delara Burkhardt (S&D, Germany)
Martin Hojsík (Renew, Slovakia)
Anna Zalewska (ECR, Poland)
Manuel Bompard (The Left, France)Ordinary legislative procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Publication of draft report

Written by Joanna Apap with Paulien Van de Velde-Van Rumst

On Tuesday 16 November 2021, the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS), the European University Institute (EUI) and the EP’s Directorate-General for Internal Policies of the Union (IPOL) jointly organised an online policy roundtable on ‘The political science of Next Generation EU’. The roundtable explored the potential impacts of Next Generation EU (NGEU), with the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) at its heart, and resulted in a fruitful exchange of views between parliamentarians, high-level academics and policy analysts. From the outset, the introductory remarks highlighted the innovative nature of the new recovery fund – both in terms of its scope and means of financing – and its great symbolic and institutional implications. Three subsequent panels discussed these implications and the potential of NGEU as a model for the future.

The potential impact of NGEU on EU institutional dynamics and balance

A first panel delved into NGEU’s impact on EU institutional dynamics and on EU-Member State relations. The speakers identified clear shifts in the role of the EU institutions, as well as more positive politicisation and a more cooperative dynamic between the institutions, compared with during the Eurozone crisis. The NGEU’s anchoring in the EU budget was generally welcomed in light of the European Parliament’s scrutiny role. Further institutional gains for the Parliament include the Recovery and Resilience dialogue with the European Commission and the agreement that future measures based on Article 122 TFEU will be adopted after a structured dialogue with the Commission and the Council, even though this arrangement is not formally provided for in the Treaties. The RRF, however, relies greatly on national recovery and resilience plans (NRRPs) and thus on projects generated by the Member States. The oversight of these plans lies with the Commission, in addition to its responsibility for the borrowing operation required for NGEU. The Commission’s role has thus been reinforced, whilst the final say on the NRRPs remains with the Council, which entrusted the Commission with the operation of all the programmes.

In parallel, the more ‘bottom-up’ exercise with the Member States to come up with NRRPs is an innovative aspect, introducing a decentralisation and democratisation of economic governance. Such ‘bottom-up’ involvement could help to repurpose the European Semester and lead to the creation of a permanent fund that could be combined with the establishment of an industrial policy dialogue with all stakeholders.

Last but not least, the European Court of Auditors (ECA) is a key player in scrutiny because of its mandate to audit NGEU. The NGEU’s clear objectives of funding the green and digital transition and of addressing social inequality might make it appear easier to assess Member States’ compliance and results. Nonetheless, several challenges were mentioned in this regard: How will a partial achievement be considered? How can one assess whether reforms have actually resulted in the intended structural changes? Considering the Member States’ financial and administrative absorption capacity, how much additional public investment will the RRF actually generate? The ECA has in any case put a comprehensive audit strategy in place with a robust method to assess compliance and a sequence of performance audits for selected aspects.

The first panel agreed that implementation of NGEU by the different EU institutions will prove to be key and that citizens must be at the heart of considerations: value for money and visibility of the objectives of NGEU funding are vital.

The potential impact of NGEU in shaping public perceptions of the EU

A second panel assessed the potential impact of NGEU to shape public perceptions of the EU. As Member States implement the NGEU programmes, public perception of the EU is dependent on national administrations. To bridge this gap, the EU plays an important role in scrutinising the NRRPs. The Flash Eurobarometer on NGEU showed that the public position aligns with the Parliament’s: the rule of law conditionality enjoys great support and there is a call for transparency and effective control of NGEU. The public is also in favour of consultation with regional governments, municipalities and civil society on how the funding is spent. The successful implementation of NGEU could therefore have a considerable impact on the elections to the European Parliament in 2024. For NGEU to influence public perceptions of the EU, it must be salient to citizens. If the recovery and the green and digital transitions are successful, all spending will appear national. ‘The NGEU’s repayment and potential decision to make it permanent will also be significant to public opinion’. Linking up these targets and conditionality with the EU’s long-term budget would also be desirable – even more so, considering the findings of the ‘Green Wedge’ study. Public attention to spending could be drawn by two very different types of dissent: young activists are judging all government-bodies on how fast and effectively they are taking climate action, while anti-climate populism is growing. Should there be an intention to make NGEU programmes more permanent, progress on real own resources could be the way to escape the debate on net contributors versus net beneficiaries of the EU budget. The new own resources are moreover imperative to be able to speak of a ‘Next Generation’ EU. An issue that came up regularly in discussion in the third panel.

How to ensure effective democratic control and parliamentary oversight of NGEU?

The third and final panel addressed democratic oversight of NGEU and accountability at the European and national level. As discussed in the second panel, the public has clear priorities on a number of issues touched upon by NGEU. To fulfil these expectations and to make NGEU a success, democratic input and parliamentary oversight are of crucial importance. It was pointed out that NGEU brings along a huge consideration of distributional fairness. Such fairness cannot be established without representation. Citizen representation should not only take place within the EU institutions: national scrutiny is more important than ever. However, parliamentary scrutiny is rather limited in this respect. National parliaments scrutinised ex-ante their general budget priorities linked to the NRRPs. National control and auditing systems, that have the backing of the ECA, had to be put in place. Moreover, there is considerable variation between Member States in levels of transparency, debate, and the inclusion of regional and local authorities, civil society organisations and social partners. Consequently, there is a need for a democratic panopticon around the NGEU that would ensure citizens have access to information on how and where the money is spent. To enhance the European Parliament’s role in this context, the panellists from academia made a couple of suggestions. As the Commission largely designed and is managing NGEU, the European Parliament could focus its energies on providing itself with a similar level of expertise. In doing so, it will gain a respected reputation on its pronouncements on the fiscal impact of decisions, independent of the executive and the Member States. The creation of a European Parliament Budgetary Office, which could provide non-partisan and reliable expertise, could be an option in this regard. We could also rethink the role of the European Parliament as a debating chamber whose role is to provide a forum in which citizens’ representatives find ways to reach out to other stakeholders in the European polity. Lastly, an electoral campaign intended to dictate the agenda for the executive, could allow citizens to express their opinion on this agenda.

To date, the European Parliament has managed to live up to its ambitions and is in a position to exert pressure on the other institutions involved. It acquired several tools for scrutiny over the course of the NGEU negotiations. The Parliament has a right to full access to information on an equal footing with the Council, there is the Recovery and Resilience Dialogue, and the Parliament will review the reports the Commission has to deliver for the evaluation of NGEU. In parallel, an internal working group in the Parliament will perform its own evaluation and provide input to the Commission. Moreover, to look after the ‘Next Generation’, the Parliament has pushed for an interinstitutional agreement, including a roadmap, to create the new own resources for the EU that need to be sufficient for repayment of the NGEU debt.

Nonetheless, the Members of Parliament taking part in the panel identified a number of challenges. Firstly, national parliament participation should be improved, as only a few of them have actually voted on their respective NRRPs. Secondly, one Member of Parliament denounced the Council’s refusal to allow the creation of a digital platform listing all beneficiaries of funding. Such a platform could have provided the start of a democratic panopticon. Thirdly, ongoing scrutiny of the payment requests under NGEU is indispensable. Instead of a mere transfer of funds into national budgets, NGEU established European priorities and the control of issues such as greenwashing, fraud, the effectiveness of projects, should therefore be upheld within the European Parliament. Finally, how NGEU could become a permanent structure should be discussed. Such a permanent structure would be part of a new economic governance model and could restore the principle and credibility of the European Semester. The six pillars of the NGEU (green transition; digital transformation; economic cohesion, productivity and competitiveness; social and territorial cohesion; health, economic, social and institutional  resilience; policies for the next generation), should also be maintained and inserted in other programmes.

In sum, the whole chain of democracy and accountability has to come together: how the money is spent will depend on the citizens, stakeholders, partners and governments at national level. Nevertheless, what happens at the national level needs to be empowered and enabled by what happens in Brussels. In this respect, it is also of great importance to communicate to citizens and to help them understand the considerable role that the European Parliament has played and continues to play in NGEU.

Conclusion

The NGEU provides an opportunity for the institutions to connect and reconnect with citizens. We can no longer imagine a world without NGEU, but it is important to keep in mind the significant strain it puts on the institutions and other EU initiatives, such as cohesion policy. The numerous accountability mechanisms could possibly work at cross-purpose and complicate the works on an already crowded institutional agenda, both nationally and at European level. The most recent budget negotiations are nonetheless a hopeful sign: they are conducted with the NGEU repayments in mind, to ensure a budget for the next generation.

To watch this event online, please click here.

You can find the next coming EPRS online events here

Relevant links for further information on this theme:

• Green Wedge? Mapping Dissent Against Climate Policy in Europe – Counterpoint: https://counterpoint.uk.com/mapping-dissent-against-climate-policy-in-europe/
• The Flash Eurobarometer on the State of the European Union: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/at-your-service/files/be-heard/eurobarometer/2021/soteu-flash-survey/soteu-2021-report-en.pdf
• Recovery plan for Europe: State of play, September 2021, EPRS Briefing, September 2021
• Topical Digest 2021-2027 MFF and NGEU,  EPRS, May 2021

Written by Suzana Anghel and Ralf Drachenberg.

The last regular European Council meeting of 2021, on 16 December, will discuss a broad range of topics, notably the coronavirus pandemic, crisis management and resilience, energy prices, security and defence, migration, and external relations. In the context of the worsening epidemiological situation and the emergence of the Omicron variant, EU leaders will address progress in vaccination across the EU and the impact of new restrictions on the single market. They will also discuss international solidarity and ways of ensuring global vaccine coverage. Their debate on security and defence will probably focus on two intertwined outstanding issues, the Strategic Compass and the forthcoming cooperation declaration with NATO. On migration, EU leaders are expected to review the follow-up to their previous commitments and address the migration situation in the English Channel. In the external relations field, they will most likely discuss the situation in Ukraine and at the Belarus border, the developments in Ethiopia as well as preparations for the EU-African Union summit. As the European Council meeting will take place back to back with the Eastern Partnership Summit, EU leaders could take stock of the outcome of the latter. The Euro Summit directly after the European Council meeting will focus on the Covid recovery and review progress on the Banking and Capital Markets Unions.

1. European Council agenda points

The indicative Leaders’ Agenda 2021-22, adopted in June 2021, had already outlined coronavirus, crisis management and resilience, and Africa as topics for the regular December meeting. While the former two feature prominently on the draft agenda, the latter issue is not specifically mentioned as a discrete agenda point (although the General Affairs Council of 23 November noted that the European Council will prepare the EU-African Union summit of 17-18 February 2022). The European Council will also come back again to energy prices as well as security and defence, as stated in previous European Council conclusions.

Policy area Previous commitment Occasion on which commitment was made Coronavirus The European Council will return to this issue regularly. 1-2 October 2020 Security and defence Keep under regular review 26 February 2021 Energy prices Review the issue at future meetings 21-22 October 2021

While the December meeting will be the last under Slovenian Council Presidency, it will be the first European Council meeting for four new members: the new Chancellor of Germany, Olaf Scholz, the recently elected Prime Minister of Sweden, Magdalena Andersson, the new Prime Minister of Czechia, Petr Fiala, and the new Chancellor of Austria, Karl Nehammer.

2. European Council meeting Covid-19

This meeting will mark the 20th discussion of Covid-19 in the European Council, with nine of those being by video-conference. The European Council is likely to discuss the Omicron variant, which was first detected on 11 November 2021 in Botswana and on 14 November 2021 in South Africa. On 26 November, it was designated a variant of concern by the World Health Organization (WHO), and there are a growing number of Omicron cases detected in the EU. However, EU leaders are expected to adopt a broader approach to Covid-19 calling for the roll-out of vaccination to all, the deployment of booster doses, following a joint statement by the European Medical Agency and ECDC advocating their usefulness, as well as for measures to tackle the risk of variants.  

EU leaders may also discuss ways of combating vaccine hesitancy and disinformation, as wide divergences in the rate of fully vaccinated adults still exist between Member States. Omicron is a strong reminder that in order to reduce the potential of the virus mutating, its circulation in the population needs to be reduced. The European Council may call for greater coordination efforts to avoid the varying restrictions introduced by Member States in response to Omicron impairing the Single Market and having too strong an impact on travel within the Union.

The European Council may welcome an agreement by WHO member countries to start negotiations on an international treaty on pandemic preparedness, prevention and response. On previous occasions, EU leaders had called for such a treaty, and recently, Charles Michel, President of the European Council, spoke at the special session of the WHO on the need for better preparedness for a future pandemic. The European Council will mostly likely reiterate its commitment to contribute to the global response to Covid-19, particularly ensuring access to vaccines. This has been repeated by the European Council in nine of its meetings since the outbreak of the pandemic.  

Crisis management and resilience

EU leaders are expected to follow up on their discussions from the June European Council, when they addressed the initial lessons from the pandemic and invited the Slovenian Presidency to take work forward in the Council to enhance the EU’s collective preparedness, response capability and resilience to future crises as well as to protect the functioning of the internal market. They are expected to endorse the Council conclusions of 23 November 2021 on resilience and crisis response. These conclusions take a horizontal approach to resilience and crisis response, as they address different elements from various policy areas, notably the Integrated Political Crisis Response (IPCR) arrangements, the European Health Union and the Health Emergency Preparedness and Response Authority (HERA), the fight against disinformation, a possible revision of the Schengen Borders Code, avoiding disruptions to global supply chains and upholding the functioning of the single market, as well as the EU’s Strategic Compass.

Energy prices

For the third meeting in a row, EU leaders will address the spike in energy prices. The debate promises to be heated once again as Member States continue to diverge on the transitory versus long-lasting effects of the current increase in energy prices and, hence, on the EU’s long-term response. France and Germany reportedly support different positions on a key issue, the overhaul of the energy and carbon market. The European Commission will most likely present the results of the preliminary assessments made, at the request of the European Council, by the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) and by the European Securities Markets Authority (ESMA). ACER concluded that ‘no obvious wholesale market manipulation’ had occurred on the energy market, whilst ESMA outlined that the ‘increase in the number of market participants by itself cannot be taken as proof for any patterns of disorderly trading or abusive behaviour present in the carbon market’. More in-depth reports are expected by April 2022.

EU leaders could also take stock of progress made in implementing the short-term measures agreed by the European Council and the Council in October 2021. This includes the European Commission’s toolbox, which offers Member States a wide range of instruments to counter the growing risk of energy poverty, which affects the most vulnerable European households in particular.

Security and defence

On 15 November 2021, the High Representative, Josep Borrell, presented a first draft of the Strategic Compass in the Council. The document is intended to provide ‘political-strategic guidance on the EU approach to security and defence in the next 5 to 10 years’. Some of its aspects, most notably the EU Rapid Deployment Capacity, a flexible modular force of up to 5 000 troops, have already raised mixed reactions from the Member States. Most of the concerns expressed so far question the rationale of ‘adding more new tools, while not using the potential of existing ones’, such as the EU Battlegroups, which had been declared operational in 2007 but have never been used.

The European Council is expected to focus on ‘fine tuning’ and building political consensus on the Strategic Compass. Addressing the European Defence Agency’s recent annual conference, Charles Michel announced that ‘the European Council will provide further guidance in December’, and that EU leaders ‘hope to endorse’ the Strategic Compass at their meeting in March 2022. He has also recalled the EU’s Strategic Agenda commitment to increase the EU’s ‘capacity to act autonomously’, with the aim of becoming a more robust international actor, ‘exerting greater influence’, defending its values and interests, and being able to choose to cooperate with partners or act alone whenever necessary. He has also stressed that the EU should use not only defence-related instruments, but all other instruments at its disposal, ‘in a more coordinated manner’.

External relations

EU leaders will most probably consider Russia’s military build-up at its border with Ukraine, which remains a matter of deep concern for European security. The French President, Emmanuel Macron, and the German Chancellor, Olaf Scholz, might inform their colleagues of the state of play of the Normandy Format talks, which are in need of new impetus. Consequently, in the absence of full implementation of the Minsk agreements, EU leaders will most probably greenlight the extension of the current economic sanctions, which are due to expire in January 2022, by a further six months.

Recently France, Germany, Italy, the UK and the US reaffirmed the centrality of the Normandy Format talks to conflict resolution in eastern Ukraine, and called for a ‘coordinated and comprehensive approach’ of NATO allies and EU partners. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen warned that, in case of further escalation in Ukraine or of any other malicious activities originating from Russia, the EU was prepared to set, in close coordination with ‘like-minded partners’, expanded as well as additional sanctions. In July 2021, during bilateral talks with US, which covered the highly sensitive question of Nord Stream 2, Germany had committed to ‘take actions at the national level and press for effective measures at the European level, including sanctions, to limit Russian export capabilities in the energy sector’, should Russia use energy as a weapon against Ukraine.

The European Council will take place back to back with the Eastern Partnership Summit being held on 15 December, and EU leaders might take stock of the outcome of the summit.

Migration

After a long absence from the agenda, migration returned to the European Council at both its June and October 2021 meetings. While the December European Council is again expected to concentrate mainly on the external aspects of migration, there are still a number of issues to be dealt with, notably the situation of migrants at the border with Belarus, the death of migrants in the English Channel, and increasing cooperation with countries of origin and transit.

At the October European Council meeting, EU leaders called for changes to the EU’s legal framework in order to address the instrumentalisation of migrants for political purposes. On 1 December, the European Commission followed up on this and proposed temporary legal and practical measures to address the emergency situation at the EU’s external border with Belarus. EU leaders might discuss this proposal and reiterate their condemnation of all hybrid attacks at the EU’s borders.

Regarding the migration challenges in the Channel and southern North Sea, Belgium, Germany, France and the Netherlands issued a joint declaration on 28 November. Their recommendations include strengthened cooperation between the Member States against smuggling networks, as well as enhanced collaboration with the UK. They called specifically for Frontex to deploy more resources in the region, including aerial surveillance.

EU leaders are also likely to review the Commission’s follow-up activities to their June and October conclusions regarding the launch of action plans for priority countries of origin and transit as well as the use of 10 % of the NDICI financial envelope for actions related to migration. It is also likely that the European Council will refer to secondary migration, and express its support to the conclusions of the Justice and Home Affairs Council meeting of 9-10 December.

3. Euro Summit

The statement issued after the 25 June 2021 Euro Summit specified that the focus of the December 2021 Euro Summit meeting would be on the Covid recovery, as well as on progress made in the fields of Banking Union and the Capital Markets Union. In the Covid context, the Euro Summit might take stock of economic recovery and of the fiscal support measures in light of the European Semester autumn package from the Commission.

EU leaders are likely to reiterate their commitment to the completion of Banking Union, with notable progress achieved on risk reduction in the banking system, as Eurogroup President Paschal Donohoe concluded after the Eurogroup’s November meeting, while cautioning continued vigilance due to the pandemic. A further development since the summer is the new banking package, proposed by the Commission on 27 October, which includes a review of EU banking rules in the shape of the Capital Requirements Regulation and the Capital Requirements Directive, aimed at strengthening resilience in the banking sector and finalising the implementation of the Basel III agreement in the EU. As regards the Capital Markets Union, EU leaders could take note of the legislative package proposed by the Commission on 25 November – including reviews of the Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive (AIFMD), the European Long-term Investment Funds (ELTIF) Regulation, and the Markets in Financial Instruments Regulation (MiFIR), and creation the European single access point (ESAP) – whilst reiterating their call for its adoption in the near term.

Written by Clare Ferguson.

Members of the European Parliament meet again in hybrid format for the last plenary session of the year, with expectations that Parliament will finalise its position on several important files on the agenda, including the digital markets act and measures to combat gender-based cyber-violence. As every December, the accent is on human rights and the rule of law, with the Sakharov Prize ceremony taking place on Wednesday. Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo‑Addo, President of Ghana will make a formal address to Parliament on Tuesday.

Parliament is expected to adopt its position on an Internal Market and Consumer Protection Committee (IMCO) report on the proposed digital markets act (DMA), which seeks to regulate big digital platforms in the EU on Tuesday morning. Once approved, the text would form Parliament’s position for the DMA negotiations with EU governments. The committee’s report proposes to extend the scope of the DMA to include web browsers, virtual assistants and connected televisions, and to increase the threshold for a company to be considered a ‘gatekeeper’. The committee also seeks stronger obligations on companies that act as internet gatekeepers, to ensure messaging and social media is interoperable and to make it easier to unsubscribe, as well as strengthening the rules on advertising and fair access. If Parliament and the other institutions agree, the European Commission will enforce the terms of the DMA, with fines for non-compliance ranging from 4‑20 % of a company’s total worldwide turnover.

The award of the annual Sakharov Prize, which honours the work of brave human rights defenders in the name of Soviet-era dissident Andrey Sakharov, is a key annual highlight in the European Parliament’s regular defence of human rights. This year, Parliament will award the prize to Alexey Navalny, in a ceremony on Wednesday at noon (although the Russian opposition activist is expected to be represented by his daughter, Daria Navalnaya, as he is currently imprisoned in Russia). The EU responded to the attempt to assassinate Navalny by adopting chemical weapons sanctions against Russian officials, and Parliament has repeatedly expressed concern about Navalny’s situation, calling for his immediate release. With this prize, Parliament underlines its position on Russia’s systematic silencing of dissident voices and its failure to uphold its international commitments to human rights.

The rule of law is also a major focus of EU enlargement policy and Parliament is due to debate an own-initiative report on cooperation in the fight against organised crime in the Western Balkans on Tuesday afternoon. The Foreign Affairs Committee (AFET) stresses that criminal activities, such as human trafficking and migrant smuggling, carried out by transnational organised crime groups in the Western Balkans are detrimental to victims, citizens of the region and the EU alike. Although cooperation with the EU and its agencies is already under way, the committee underlines that accelerating reforms in the fight against transnational organised crime in the region, in line with the demands of the EU integration process, would greatly improve the situation, as well as trust in democracy in the region.

Turning to democracy closer to home – in our workplaces – on Tuesday afternoon, Members are expected to consider an own-initiative report prepared by the Employment and Social Affairs (EMPL) Committee proposing to revise the framework of EU laws that supports EU countries’ efforts to promote democracy at work. While the current EU laws to promote employee participation and representation rights have proved somewhat contradictory, new social, economic and pandemic-related challenges for workers mean that it is more important than ever that employees themselves have a say in the changes to come. The EMPL committee therefore underlines the need for a new EU framework on information, consultation and board-level employee representation, including revamped European works councils, to reinforce employees’ rights.

The coronavirus pandemic has also had terrible consequences for young people, with their lives and education completely disrupted by successive lock-downs. The European Commission has therefore proposed to concentrate efforts to improve their situation, by making 2022 the European Year of Youth. Parliament’s Committee on Culture and Education (CULT) has called for additional efforts to include disadvantaged young people, and successfully negotiated an additional €8 million funding for the Erasmus+ and European Solidarity Corps programmes. Parliament is expected to consider an agreement reached between the co-legislators on the proposals on Tuesday morning, so that the arrangements can be put in place in time for 1 January 2022.

The successful and swift roll-out of coronavirus vaccine programmes in Europe have underlined the benefits of swifter assessment of innovative health solutions. On Monday evening, Parliament will debate a provisional agreement on the proposal for stronger EU cooperation on health technology assessment. While EU countries are responsible for their healthcare policies, the EU could help make it swifter and easier to introduce new medicines and medical devices, by introducing EU-wide cooperation on research to assess the value of new health technologies. Parliament has insisted that there is full transparency in the way the proposed coordination groups would work, to ensure that there is no conflict of interest in their consultations with experts, patient representatives and industry stakeholders.

The issue of cyber-violence has grown increasingly critical with the rise in the use of the internet and social media, exacerbated by the anonymity available to perpetrators. The effects of such violence are considerable, with 92 % of respondents to an Economist Intelligence Unit survey reporting that the violence they had experienced or witnessed had harmed their wellbeing. As no EU legislation currently specifically addresses gender-based violence, including cyber-violence, Parliament is keen to see these issues tackled in the European Commission’s proposal, expected early in 2022, on combating online violence. On Monday evening, in advance of this proposal, Members will consider a legislative-initiative report tabled by Parliament’s committees on Women’s Rights & Gender Equality (FEMM) and Civil Liberties, Justice & Home Affairs (LIBE), on combating gender-based cyber-violence. The committees would like to see the new legislation include measures that set out a legal definition of gender-based cyber-violence, EU-wide sanctions and improved support for victims.

Finally, with some 274 million people expected to need humanitarian aid in 2022, Parliament has called for action to follow up on the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid, which sets out why, how and when the EU acts in response to humanitarian crises. On Tuesday afternoon, Members are expected to debate a Committee on Development (DEVE) own-initiative report on the European Commission’s proposed new guidelines for EU humanitarian action. Together, the EU and its Member States already contribute more than one third of global humanitarian assistance, but the DEVE committee would like to see swift action supported by more predictable and flexible funding, as well as sanctions for those who commit violations of international humanitarian law.

Written by Marcin Grajewski.

The current crisis on the Poland–Belarus border and renewed attempts by migrants to cross the Channel from France to the United Kingdom have put a new spotlight on the dilemma of how the European Union should deal with refugees escaping repression and poverty in countries such as Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria, and some parts of Africa. In Belarus, authorities have allowed migrants to take flights into the country to purposely transfer them to their borders with the neighbouring EU Member States of Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. Meanwhile, London and Paris are discussing ways to clamp down on migrants’ attempts to cross the Channel. The Turkish and Mediterranean migration routes from Africa to Italy and Spain also remain active.

This note gathers links to the recent publications and commentaries from many international think tanks on migration in Europe and on debates on how to reform its rules.

Migration crisis on the EU Eastern border: How the EU can protect borders and human rights
European Council on Foreign Relations, November 2021

No quiet on the eastern front: The migration crisis engineered by Belarus
European Council on Foreign Relations, November 2021

When security in Europe conflicts with democracy in Poland
Brookings Institution, November 2021

Britain and France should stand together
Centre for European Reform, November 2021

Poland’s many problems and how to solve them
Centre for European Reform, November 2021

Lukashenka is the problem, not the migrants
Centre for European Reform, November 2021

Lukashenko uses migrants to exploit Europe’s vulnerability
Carnegie Europe, November 2021

Libya’s migrants and crimes against humanity
Brookings Institution, November 2021

Cities and their networks in EU‑Africa migration policy
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, November 2021

The politicization and framing of migration in West Africa: Transition to democracy as a game changer?
Brussels School of Governance, November 2021

Lithuania’s reactions to the escalating migration crisis
Centre for Eastern Studies, November 2021

Support for Lukashenka: Russia’s response to the migration crisis
Centre for Eastern Studies, November 2021

Young people’s priorities on climate migration
Chatham House, November 2021

From debunking to prebunking: How to get ahead of disinformation on migration in the EU
European Foundation for Progressive Studies, November 2021

Migration, borders, and the EU’s capacity to act
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, November 2021

Migration as coercion
Barcelona Centre for International Affairs, November 2021

Philanthropy and migration in Europe: What role for foundations?
Institut français des relations internationales, October 2021

Statelessness is a big problem, so let’s revive ‘Nansen’ passports
Friends of Europe, October 2021

Europe’s new walls
Carnegie Europe, October 2021

Philanthropy and migration in Europe: What role for foundations?
French Institute of International Relations, October 2021

Can the new European Pact on Immigration and Asylum respond to the next migration challenges?
Fondation Robert Schuman, October 2021

Back to Geneva: Reinterpreting Asylum in the EU
Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies, October 2021

Vital yet vulnerable: Europe’s intra-EU migrant caregivers
European Foundation for Progressive Studies, October 2021

Why Europe must end limbo for Afghans seeking asylum
Chatham House, October 2021

Global migration: Working together
Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, October 2021

How we talk about migration: The link between migration narratives, policy, and power
Migration Policy Institute, October 2021

Updating the global refugee regime
Carnegie Europe, September 2021

Bringing border cities into the center of migration governance
German Marshall Fund, September 2021

How half-hearted sanctions put the future of Belarus at risk
European Council on Foreign Relations, September 2021

European added value of EU legal migration policy and law
Centre for European Policy Studies, September 2021

The European Commission’s legislative proposals in the New Pact on Migration and Asylum
Centre for European Policy Studies, September 2021

EU sanctions on Belarus as an effective policy tool
Centre for Social and Economic Research, September 2021

Support for Lukashenka: Russia’s response to the migration crisis
Centre for Eastern Studies, September 2021

‘Diversifying’ social investment: European welfare states and immigrant integration
Migration Policy Institute, September 2021

Healing the gap: Building inclusive public-health and migrant integration systems in Europe
Migration Policy Institute, September 2021

Pushed to the limit? Italian and Spanish lessons from the migration crises
International Centre for Defence and Security, September 2021

The legacy of state socialism on attitudes toward immigration
Zentrum für europäische Wirtschaftsforschung, September 2021

A ‘new’ pact on migration and asylum? The European migration policy path-dependency
Europeum, September 2021

Humanitarians’ migration conundrum
Clingendael, August 2021

Dependent on the ‘kindness of strangers’: Britain’s post-Brexit border reality
European Council on Foreign Relations, August 2021

Europe and asylum: From a protection area to a protected area
Jacques Delors Institut, August 2021

Migration: Portraits from a world that is on the move
Chatham House, August 2021

Grand redesigns: Explainer on the EU’s New Pact on Migration and Asylum
Irish Institute of International and European Affairs, August 2021

Structured approach: How the EU can prepare itself for the next wave of migration
European Council on Foreign Relations, July 2021

A new migration crisis may be brewing
Centre for European Reform, July 2021

Future scenarios for global mobility in the shadow of pandemic
Migration Policy Institute, July 2021

‘When Mayors Make Migration Policy’: The future of city diplomacy
European Policy Centre, June 2021

The women, peace and security agenda in EU border management
Österreichische Institut für internationale Politik, June 2021

Read this briefing on ‘Migration: Latest challenges‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.