European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Eric Pichon, Agnieszka Widuto, Alina Dobreva and Liselotte Jensen.

Policy-making is a difficult art. In a globalised world, decisions that do not take account of the bigger picture can have far-reaching unintended consequences. The current global debate on measures to tackle Covid-19 and vaccinate entire populations offers ample examples of just how intertwined are the social, economic, technological and other impacts of any policy. Policy-makers need to be able to trust data to help them make the best decisions.

Rough data are sometimes difficult to get hold of. Various non-governmental organisations (NGOs), academics and think-tanks meanwhile produce tools aimed at interpreting data. These include composite indices that gather data from different sources in order to visualise the multiple dimensions of a specific concept more clearly. A composite index often proposes a ranking of countries. Such indices help to capture a comprehensive overview of a given situation and grasp its constitutive elements more easily. They provide for comparisons between countries or regions on a standard basis, and, when they are updated on a regular basis, give a good overview of the evolution of a situation over time. This can help with designing policies to prevent or mitigate risks and to encourage positive development. Indices can also – up to a certain point – help monitor the impact of policies and support forecasting exercises.

Fulfilling its core mission of ’empowering through knowledge’, in this analysis EPRS proposes a non-exclusive selection – which is in no way to be perceived as a ranking – of 10 composite indices in a range of policy areas. The indices selected are from reliable sources, already used as references by policy-makers. The majority have a good geographical coverage. With one exception – retained on account of its quality and uniqueness – they cover all EU Member States and/or most UN member states. The selection is also designed to cover some key EU policies, and most of the UN 2030 Agenda sustainable development goals (SDGs).

Each index is presented in a dedicated chapter that presents its producers and describes their objectives in publishing the index, the data compiled, and their actual and potential use by policy-makers. The chapters also highlight the potential limitations in using the indices. All composite indices of course are inevitably biased, as they select some indicators and reject others. They also standardise data that originated in heterogeneous units; therefore, the more indicators a composite index encompasses, the more bias it may carry. According to experts, this does not challenge the value of indicators, provided the authors’ vision and biases are acknowledged.

The information provided in this publication is geared towards supporting policy-makers by providing sources of data and by identifying possible biases in using them. Evidence and data are key to policy-making, particularly when it comes to making foresight reports, setting priorities, mitigating negative impacts and finding optimum trade-offs. In this context, when used properly, indicators can underpin better regulation.

Read the complete in-depth analysis on ‘Ten composite indices for policy-making‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

• Media Pluralism Monitor 2021: Risk assessment
• EU-SPI scores 2020
• EU-27 RCI scores 2019
• Commitment to development: Ranking of EU Member States monitored

Written by Silvia Kotanidis and Giulio Sabbati.

The Conference on the Future of Europe is a bottom-up exercise allowing European citizens to express their opinion on the Union’s future policies and functioning. It uses tools such as the Digital Platform and Citizens’ Panels to enable them to discuss topics that matter to them. This EPRS infographic sets out the structures of the conference, how they will work and the topics to be discussed.

Multilingual Platform

The Conference’s multilingual platform is a hub giving European citizens and European civil society organisations the opportunity to share ideas on the future of Europe, and to host and attend events. It will act as a repository of contributions and documents, and as an interactive tool to share and debate ideas of citizens. The platform is open to citizens, civil society, social partners, other stakeholders, public authorities at EU and national, regional, local level.

European Citizens’ Panels

These are vital bodies of the Conference, tasked with debating issues that matter to citizens. The composition of European citizens’ panels (± 200 citizens chosen at random) will be transnational and representative of the EU population, not only with respect to gender but also age, socio-economic background, geographic origin and level of education, with 1/3 of participants between 16 and 25 years of age. The European citizens’ panels will hold debates, including on the basis of contributions from the digital platform, and feed into the discussion of the Conference plenary with recommendations for the EU institutions to follow up. Four thematic citizens’ panels are planned: i) European democracy/values, rights, rule of law, security; ii) climate change, environment/health; iii) stronger economy, social justice, jobs/education, youth, culture, sport/digital transformation; and iv) EU in the world/migration.

European citizens’ panels will meet in deliberative sessions, in different locations and will be dedicated to specific themes. Member States (at national, regional or local level) and other stakeholders (civil society, social partners or citizens) may organise additional citizens’ panels under the umbrella of the Conference, provided they respect the Conference Charter in full.

Joint Presidency

The Conference is under the tripartite authority of the Presidents of the European Parliament, Council of the EU and Commission, respectively David Sassoli, Janez Janša, representing the Slovenian Presidency of the Council until 31 December 2021, and Ursula von der Leyen. Based on the rotation established by Council Decision, the Presidency of the Council was previously held by Portugal (1 January–30 June 2021) and will next be held by France (1 January–30 June 2022). The tripartite Presidency of the Conference is the ultimate body to which the final outcome of the Conference will be reported, so that each institution may provide the appropriate follow-up in accordance with their own competences.

Conference Plenary

The plenary comprises a total of 449 representatives, from the three institutions (Commission, Council of the EU and Parliament), national parliaments, citizens’ panels, the European Committee of the Regions (CoR), European Economic and Social Committee (EESC), national events or panels, social partners and civil society, and as of July, elected local and regional representatives. The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy will be invited when the international role of the EU is discussed. Other stakeholders and experts may also be invited.

The plenary will discuss issues and recommendations coming from national and European citizens’ panels as well as input from the digital platform, grouped by themes. Debates will be open, without a predetermined outcome and without limiting topics to pre-defined policy areas. The plenary decides on a consensual basis (at least between the Parliament, Council, Commission and the national parliaments) on the proposals to be put forward to the Executive Board. The latter is responsible for drafting the final report of the Conference, in full collaboration and in full transparency with the Plenary, which will be published on the digital platform and sent to the Joint Presidency for concrete follow-up.

Executive Board

The Executive Board manages the work of the conference (plenaries, European citizens’ panels, and digital platform), oversees all activities, and prepares meetings of the plenary, including input from citizens, and their follow-up. All three institutions (Parliament, Commission and Council) are equally represented in the Executive Board, each with three members and up to four observers. The Executive Board is co-chaired by a representative of each of the three institutions; in the Council’s case by the rotating presidency. The presidential troika of COSAC (the Conference of Parliamentary Committees for Union Affairs of EU national parliaments) have permanent observer status. The EESC and CoR also have observer status. Following the co-chairs’ proposal, the Plenary endorsed the creation of nine thematic working groups, one for each of the nine topics. The Executive Board may invite experts to participate in events of the Conference.

Secretariat

A common secretariat composed of equal numbers of staff of the European Parliament, General Secretariat of the Council and the Commission, assists the Executive Board in the organisation of the Conference plenary and the European citizens’ panels.

The Conference on the Future

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘The Conference on the Future of Europe‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marie-Laure Augère-Granier and James McEldowney.

On 30 June 2021, the European Commission adopted a communication on its long-term vision for the EU’s rural areas. The communication identifies areas of action with a view to creating new momentum for the EU’s rural areas, while recognising their diversity. In recent decades, in many Member States rural areas have experienced depopulation. Such regions face a range of environmental and socio-economic challenges. These include, for example, lower income per capita, a higher percentage of the population at risk of poverty and social exclusion, a lack of access to basic infrastructure and services, and lower levels of access to fast broadband internet. The EU’s rural development policy has sought to help address these challenges.

Evaluation evidence is emerging on the impact of the common agricultural policy (CAP) on the territorial development of the EU’s rural areas. Measures relating to village renewal and LEADER (Liaison entre Actions de Développement de l’Économie rurale) measures are considered to be well-targeted and relevant to local needs, although they represent a small proportion of CAP financing. Administrative burdens have been raised as an issue that can impact on the developmental process. Recommendations from this evaluation evidence point to the need for better integration of funding streams, the need to maintain a dialogue across the European structural funds, and all the implications this may have for the new CAP strategic plans. The Commission’s recommendations to Member States on their CAP strategic plans highlight a number of recurring themes relating to the employment, education and training needs of rural areas, including the need to address rural depopulation, promote generational renewal, improve connectivity, and address the role played by action taken at local level. The Commission’s communication on a long-term vision for rural areas includes provision for a ‘rural pact’ to engage actors at EU, national, rural and local levels and an EU rural action plan, setting out a range of initiatives and actionable projects. The vision and its supporting analyses will provide a framework for addressing the future of the EU’s rural areas.

Read the complete briefing on ‘EU rural development policy: Impact, challenges and outlook‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Listen to policy podcast ‘EU rural development policy: Impact, challenges and outlook’ on YouTube.

Written by Rafał Mańko.

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s second State of the Union address, scheduled for 15 September 2021, will be delivered at a time when the coronavirus pandemic continues to pose challenges for the European Union and its Member States. At the same time, thanks to the adoption of the multiannual financial framework for the 2021-2027 period, new opportunities lie ahead – the recovery plan for Europe and Next Generation EU. Furthermore, the Conference on the Future of Europe was finally launched on 9 May 2021. Nevertheless, a number of unresolved issues and new challenges remain. These include ensuring that EU values (Article 2 TEU) are upheld in the Member States, including through the application of the recently adopted Conditionality Regulation, addressing the threat of climate change, and equipping Europe for the digital age.

The tradition of EU State of the Union addresses, delivered to the European Parliament by the President of the European Commission, dates back to 2010. The address takes stock of the achievements of the past year and presents priorities for the year ahead. It constitutes an important instrument for the European Commission’s ex-ante accountability vis-à-vis Parliament and is also aimed at rendering the definition of priorities at EU level more transparent, and at communicating those priorities to citizens. The event chimes with a similar tradition in national democracies. The United States, for instance, has a long-standing tradition of presidential State of the Union addresses, in which the President speaks in the Capitol to a joint session of Congress, thus fulfilling a constitutional obligation. In contrast to the US Constitution, the EU Treaties do not prescribe a State of the Union address; the EU version was established by the 2010 Framework Agreement between Parliament and the Commission.

This briefing further updates an earlier one from September 2016, originally written by Eva-Maria Poptcheva.

Read the complete briefing on ‘State of the Union address, European Parliament, 2021‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Philip Boucher.

Deepfakes are hyper-realistic media products created through artificial intelligence (AI) techniques that manipulate how people look and the things that they appear to say or do. They hit the headlines in 2018 with a deepfake video of Barack Obama, which was designed to raise awareness of their challenges. The accessibility and outputs of deepfake generation tools are improving rapidly, and their use is increasing exponentially. A wide range of malicious uses have been identified, including fraud, extortion and political disinformation. The impacts of such misuse can be financial, psychological and reputational. However, the most widespread use so far has been the production of non-consensual pornographic videos, with negative impacts that overwhelmingly affect women. Deepfakes may also contribute to worrying trends in our media, as well as in our social and democratic systems. While the technology itself is legal, some malicious uses are not, and a combination of legal and technical measures may be mobilised to limit their production and dissemination.

The name ‘deepfake’ combines ‘deep’ as in deep learning, and ‘fake’, as in manipulated or entirely fabricated. The best-known examples of deepfakes are videos that manipulate how people look, and the things that they appear to say or do. However, they can also include still images, audio or even written texts that are designed to present a distorted representation of events.

In contrast to more traditional media manipulation techniques, deepfake production relies on an innovative deep learning technique called ‘generative adversarial networks‘ (GANs), which can increase both the degree of automation and the quality of the output compared to conventional techniques. GANs generate deepfakes by pitting two AI agents – also described as artificial neural networks – against each other. While the producer agent learns to create fakes that look just like standard recordings, a detector agent learns to identify whether a media product is fake or authentic. A feedback loop is generated between the two so that, as the producer agent learns, it gets better at fooling the detector by creating more realistic fakes and, as the detector agent learns, it finds more sophisticated ways of identifying the fakes. In the end, the producer agent can create extremely realistic fakes and sometimes only its adversary – the detector agent – can tell that they are not authentic. An interesting side effect of this learning process is that the two agents improve together. So, by creating a great deepfake producer, you also create a great deepfake detector, and vice-versa.

Rudimentary use of deepfake production tools with limited resources may allow some generally low-quality results. However, producing high-quality deepfakes that really pass for authentic recordings requires substantial data and programming skills. Nonetheless, the increasing availability of data and accessible tools is making it easier for more people to make their own deepfakes.

Potential impacts and developments

The number of deepfake videos online is growing exponentially. The best-known examples have used the faces of famous people, such as Barack Obama and Tom Cruise, partly because there is so much data available. However, these examples were clearly labelled as deepfakes, and were designed to show the world what was possible, while highlighting opportunities and challenges. Legitimate applications include art, satire and entertainment, with notable examples including special effects and personal avatars.

Yet, the malicious use of deepfakes can also cause serious harm to individuals, as well as to our social and democratic systems. Deepfakes may be misused to commit fraud, extortion, bullying and intimidation, as well as to falsify evidence, manipulate public debates and destabilise political processes. Political disinformation is often cited as the biggest risk of deepfakes and, indeed, a well-timed deepfake during an election campaign could do enormous damage on several levels. Until now, however, the overwhelming majority of deepfakes have been pornographic videos produced without the consent of the women that are falsely depicted in them. This reveals a substantial gender discrimination aspect of the technology, because the negative impacts disproportionately affect women.

Those that are most directly affected by malicious deepfakes are the individual victims of fraud, blackmail, disinformation and non-consensual pornography. Targets have included citizens, businesses, and public figures. However, perhaps the biggest victim of deepfakes is the notion of truth. Just as manipulated videos can be presented as authentic, genuine recordings may also, as a result, be falsely dismissed as high-quality deepfakes. As such, simply knowing that deepfakes exist can be enough to undermine our confidence in all media representations, and make us doubt the authenticity of everything we see and hear online.

While manipulated media is nothing new, deepfakes may be more difficult to detect than previous techniques. Furthermore, various features of the current technical, social and legal context may enhance the risks associated with the technology. For example, the widespread use of social media and private messaging applications allows for the rapid dissemination and amplification of content with limited oversight. Our social context may also play a role, as deepfakes are well aligned with a growing climate of mistrust and polarisation. The legal status of deepfakes may vary across jurisdictions and could be further complicated by the possibility for malicious users to evade detection and enforcement efforts. Deepfakes are not the sole or even primary source of these social, technological and legal concerns, but they develop synergies with other malevolent elements of this context, benefitting from the environment to prosper while contributing to its maintenance and development.

Anticipatory policy-making

Deepfakes are, in themselves, perfectly legal, although some malicious applications are not. Some risks of malicious deepfakes may be mitigated through technical and legal measures, such as ensuring that they are properly labelled as non-authentic. The European Parliament has called for mandatory labelling of deepfakes, and this does indeed feature in the draft text of the proposed artificial intelligence act. The draft digital services act sets out rules for flagging and removing illegal content, which could help to interrupt their circulation and amplification. Both are currently under negotiation. In terms of technology, the EU’s Horizon 2020 programme also supported the development of innovative responses to the challenges of deepfakes. Such technical and legal measures cannot respond to all risks of malicious deepfakes, and their effectiveness will likely depend upon the technical and legal measures that are introduced to enforce them. Of course, any limitations need to be balanced against freedom of expression and freedom of the arts and sciences. However, while we are free to create media products such as deepfakes, we are not automatically entitled to have them widely circulated and seen. It is important to consider how malicious deepfakes are circulated and amplified online, as well as their role within wider social and political trends, because these are key factors in determining their resonance and impact. In this context, the European Parliament has stressed the importance of media pluralism, quality journalism and awareness-raising.

Read the complete ‘at a glance’ on ‘What if deepfakes made us doubt everything we see and hear?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Listen to policy podcast ‘What if deepfakes made us doubt everything we see and hear?’ on YouTube.

Written by Beatrix Immenkamp.

The departure of United States (US) and NATO troops from Afghanistan marks the end of a 20-year military campaign that was launched in 2001 to eliminate the Taliban’s ability to provide sanctuary to international terrorists, especially al-Qaeda, and stabilise the country with the help of a democratically elected government. However, as the last US soldier boarded a US military plane on 31 August 2021, terrorists were firing rockets at Kabul airport, members of the democratically elected government, including the president, had either fled abroad or where in hiding, and the Taliban were back in control over most of Afghanistan. The Taliban have yet to announce the nature and the full composition of their new government. In the meantime, the humanitarian situation in the country is increasingly desperate. The country relies extensively on foreign aid, most of which is currently suspended, while foreign assets have been frozen.

The Taliban
The predominantly ethnic Pashtun Taliban emerged as a political force in 1996, when they took control of the capital Kabul and changed the name of the country from the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. Their rule was characterised by the near-total exclusion of women from public life and strict application of Islamic law. In December 2001, the Taliban were ousted from government by a coalition of Afghan parties supported by the US. However, the Taliban insurgency against US and NATO forces continued. By some estimates, the Taliban command between 55 000 and 85 000 full-time fighters. The central government sought reconciliation with the Taliban, which the movement refused on the grounds that the US-backed government was ‘illegitimate’. Instead, the Taliban held talks with the US in 2018, culminating in a peace agreement in February 2020.

The US-Taliban Peace Agreement

In February 2020, the US signed a peace agreement with the Taliban. The essence of the agreement was the withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan within 14 months of the agreement. In return, the Taliban committed to put in place guarantees and enforcement mechanisms to prevent the use of Afghan soil by any group or individual – including al-Qaeda – against the security of the US and its allies. Both sides also agreed to release combat and political prisoners. The US also committed to start diplomatic engagement with other members of the UN Security Council and Afghanistan to remove members of the Taliban from the UN sanctions list. The bilateral agreement, concluded without the Afghan government, also envisaged the launch of inter-Afghan talks, with the view to reaching a permanent and comprehensive ceasefire. For its part, the Afghan government committed to these talks by way of a joint declaration with the US. Intra-Afghan peace talks started in Doha in September 2020, but early hopes that these historic talks between the Taliban and the Afghan government would stabilise the country proved elusive. Instead, following the April 2021 announcement that the US would withdraw its forces from the country by September, the Taliban launched an offensive against the Afghan government. Minimal levels of resistance from government security forces allowed the Taliban to re-establish control over most of the country in the record time of four months. On 15 August 2021, as the Taliban entered Kabul ‘virtually unopposed‘, the Afghan president Ashraf Ghani fled abroad.

US and NATO troops – Presence and withdrawal

In 2011, US troops in Afghanistan peaked at around 100 000. At the end of 2018, then US President Donald Trump announced that the remaining US troops in Afghanistan, then numbering 14 000, would start to leave the country. On 13 April 2021, President Biden confirmed that all troops would leave by 11 September 2021. On 31 August 2021, the withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan was completed. This brings to a close a 20-year military presence that is estimated to have cost the US more than US$2 trillion. For its part, NATO began withdrawing its Resolute Support Mission (RSM) on 1 May 2021. As recently as August 2020, the mission had around 10 000 personnel deployed in Afghanistan, from 36 NATO member states and partner countries. The RSM had been established at the invitation of the Afghan government, to help the Afghan security forces and institutions develop the capacity to defend the country. It superseded the earlier NATO led UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), which was deployed in August 2003. At its height, ISAF had more than 130 000 troops from 50 NATO and partner countries. NATO committed at its 2021 summit to continue ‘to stand with Afghanistan, its people, and its institutions’, and to continue to provide financial support to the Afghan security forces until 2024. However, following the Taliban takeover of the country, NATO has suspended all support to the Afghan authorities.

The security situation in Afghanistan

Afghanistan has been plagued by decades of violence; since 2010, the Global Peace Index has ranked Afghanistan consistently amongst the three least peaceful nations in the world. The 2020 US-Taliban peace agreement initially led to a decrease in violence affecting civilians, with civilian casualties in the first nine months of 2020 reaching the lowest number since 2012. However, the start of intra-Afghan peace talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban in September 2020 significantly raised levels of violence, as each side tried to gain leverage through the use of force. In the last quarter of 2020, civilian casualties increased by 45 % compared to the same period in 2019. Some of the worst attacks in Afghanistan (and Pakistan) in recent years, killing people at mosques, public squares and even hospitals, were attributed to adversaries of the Taliban, the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), a regional affiliate of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL/Da’esh). The group has claimed responsibility for the attacks outside Kabul airport on 26 August 2021 that killed an estimated 200 persons, including 13 US soldiers, and for a rocket attack targeting Kabul airport four days later. There are fears that the security situation could deteriorate further and that Afghanistan could once more become a safe haven for terrorists plotting attacks against the West. The Taliban released 5 000 ‘highest value‘ Taliban, al-Qaeda and Islamic State fighters that US and NATO forces had captured and interred at the former American base at Bagram. Resistance against the Taliban is concentrated in the Panjshir valley north of Kabul. Ahmad Masoud, the son of a famous Tajik tribal leader who fought the Taliban in the 1990s and was killed by al-Qaeda in 2001, has refused to surrender to the Taliban and is threatening to mount a rebellion. He has been joined by the ethnic Tajik former vice-president Amrullah Saleh.

The economic and humanitarian situation in Afghanistan

In 2020, violence in Afghanistan is estimated to have cost the country around 40 % of its gross domestic product (GDP), measured in terms of expenditure and economic effect related to ‘containing, preventing and dealing with the consequences of violence’. The economy mainly depends on aid; 90 % of the population lives below a poverty line of US$2 a day. With foreign countries and institutions largely withholding aid and monetary reserves following the Taliban victory, the country is facing economic collapse. The Covid-19 crisis has already impacted the economy heavily and real GDP is estimated to have contracted by around 1.9 % in 2020. Food prices soared with the onset of the pandemic and have only recently levelled off. Of a population of around 38 million, an estimated 4 million Afghans are internally displaced, including 1 million due to natural disasters, including climate-change related disasters such as extreme drought and flash floods. Escalating conflict over the past year has resulted in a further significant rise in the numbers being displaced. An additional 2.5 million Afghan refugees are registered in Iran and Pakistan. According to the World Food Programme, a combination of conflict, drought and the coronavirus pandemic means that up to 14 million Afghans may face starvation. Beyond the immediate humanitarian crisis, the Afghan economy’s reliance on the illegal drug trade is of great concern to the West, as well as other countries including Russia and China. The Taliban have called for foreign aid to help end impoverished communities’ reliance on opium cultivation.

Since 2002, the EU has provided more than €4 billion in development aid to Afghanistan, making the country the biggest recipient of EU aid in the world. At the 2020 Afghanistan Conference held in Geneva, the EU promised another €1.2 billion in financial aid to Afghanistan for the 2021-2025 period. However, at the time, EU support was made conditional upon an inclusive, Afghan-owned, Afghan-led peace process. Development cooperation has now been suspended. In light of the unfolding humanitarian crisis in the country, the European Commission announced that it would allocate more than €200 million in humanitarian aid to Afghanistan for 2021, more than tripling original aid amounts for this year. The EU has made it clear that cooperation with any future Afghan government will be conditioned on a peaceful and inclusive settlement and respect for the fundamental rights of all Afghans, including women, youth and persons belonging to minorities, as well as respect for Afghanistan’s international obligations, commitment to the fight against corruption and preventing the use of Afghanistan’s territory by terrorist organisation. On 10 June 2021, the European Parliament adopted a resolution on the situation in Afghanistan, expressing concern about the consequences of the troop withdrawal. It also called for the adoption of a comprehensive strategy for future EU cooperation with Afghanistan.

Read the complete ‘at a glance’ on ‘Afghanistan once more under Taliban rule‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Lena Hirschenberger

The Conference on the Future of Europe’s aim is to debate how the EU should develop in the future and to give European citizens a voice in the process, announced Commission President Ursula von der Leyen in her inaugural address.

People’s ideas will be collected on the Digital Platform, in European Citizens’ Panels and de-centralised conference events all over Europe. The Conference Plenary – comprised of representatives of the Citizens’ Panels, the Parliament, the Council, the Commission, national parliaments, the Committee of the Regions, the European Economic and Social Committee, social partners and the European Youth Forum – will then discuss the ideas put forward. Launched in April 2021, the conference is expected to reach conclusions and provide guidance for the European institutions to follow up, by spring 2022.

The conference topics are divided into nine areas, with one additional ‘open’ area, reserved for out-of-the-box ideas. The topics are: ‘Climate change and the environment‘, ‘Health‘, ‘A stronger economy, social justice and jobs‘, ‘European Union in the world‘, ‘Values and rights, rule of law, security‘, ‘Digital transformation‘, ‘European democracy‘, ‘Migration‘, ‘Education, culture, youth and sport‘, and ‘Other ideas‘.

Discussion in this category will cover the protection of human rights, rights of victims and children, combatting racism and religious discrimination as well as promoting justice and gender equality and the rights of the LGBTIQ+ communities and those with disabilities. At the same time, we will discuss how we can protects Europeans from acts of terrorism and crime and strengthen the rule of law in the European Union.

To support the proceedings of the conference, our EPRS policy analysts have prepared research material, available here in reverse chronological order. The following list will continually be updated as the conference unfolds:

Human Rights

Understanding EU action against human trafficking
Briefing by Piotr Bakowski and Sofija Voronova, May 2021, 12 pages.

Understanding EU action on Roma inclusion
Briefing by Marie Lecerf, May 2021, 12 pages.

Women leading the fight against COVID-19
Thematic Digest, March 2021, 7 pages.

The impact of the coronavirus crisis on Roma and Travellers
‘At a glance’ note by Marie Lecerf, March 2021, 2 pages.

The principles of equality and non-discrimination, a comparative law perspective – United States of America
Study by EPRS Comparative Law Library, March 2021, 100 pages.

The coronavirus crisis: an emerging gender divide?
‘At a glance’ note by Marie Lecerf and Giulio Sabbati, March 2021, 2 pages.

EU legislation and policies to fight racial and ethnic discrimination
Briefing by David de Groot, March 2021, 12 pages.

Combating Gender based Violence: Cyber Violence
Study by Meenakshi Fernandes, Niombo Lomba and Cecilia Navarra, March 2021, 242 pages.

Women in foreign affairs and international security: Still far from gender equality
Briefing by Ionel Zamfir, March 2021, 11 pages.

Covid-19: The need for a gendered response
Briefing by Rosamund Shreeves, February 2021, 12 pages.

Implementing the Anti-trafficking Directive
‘At a glance’ note by Sofija Voronova, February 2021, 1 page.

Women’s rights: 25-year review of the Beijing Platform for Action
‘At a glance’ note by Rosamund Shreeves, February 2021, 2 pages.

Women in politics in the EU: State of play
Briefing by Rosamund Shreeves, February 2021, 12 pages.

Achieving gender equality in the face of the pandemic and existing challenges
‘At a glance’ note by Rosamund Shreeves, January 2021, 2 pages.

Violence against women in the EU: State of play
Briefing by Martina Prpic and Rosamund Shreeves, November 2020, 12 pages.

European gender equality strategy and binding pay transparency measures – Pre-legislative synthesis of national, regional and local positions on the European Commission’s initiatives
Briefing by Claudio Collova and Laura Zandersone, November 2020, 12 pages.

The rights of LGBTI people in the European Union
Briefing by Rosamund Shreeves, November 2020, 12 pages.

The Istanbul Convention: A tool to tackle violence against women and girls
‘At a glance’ note by Ulla Jurviste and Rosamund Shreeves, November 2020, 2 pages.

Gender balance on company boards
‘At a glance’ note by Martina Prpic, September 2020, 1 page.

Women in local and regional government: Still a long way from achieving parity
Briefing by Vasileios Margaras, March 2020, 4 pages.

Women in films: Still fighting the celluloid ceiling
‘At a glance’ note by Ivana Katsarova, February 2020, 2 pages.

Zero tolerance for female genital mutilation
‘At a glance’ note by Rosamund Shreeves, February 2020, 2 pages.

Jewish communities in the European Union
‘At a glance’ note by Magdalena Pasikowska-Schnass, January 2020, 2 pages.

Children’s rights in the EU: Marking 30 years of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child
Briefing by Ingeborg Odink, November 2019, 11 pages.

EU policies – Delivering for citizens: Human Rights
Briefing by Martina Prpic, Rosamund Shreeves and Ionel Zamfir, June 2019, 12 pages.

Gender Equality
Topical Digest, March 2019, 2 pages.

Rule of Law

Rule of Law
Thematic Digest by various EP contributors, November 2020, 6 pages.

Protecting EU common values within the Member States: An overview of monitoring, prevention and enforcement mechanisms at EU level
Study by Maria Diaz Crego, Rafal Manko and Wouter van Ballegooij, September 2020, 163 pages.

Addressing violations of democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights
Briefing by Wouter van Ballegooij, September 2020, 140 pages.

An EU mechanism on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights
Study by Cecilia Navarra and Wouter van Ballegooij, September 2020, 180 pages.

European added value of an EU mechanism on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights – Preliminary assessment
Briefing by Wouter van Ballegooij, April 2020, 12 pages.

Security

Understanding EU counter-terrorism policy
Briefing by Piotr Bakowskiand Sofija Voronova, May 2021, 12 pages.

Understanding EU action against human trafficking
Briefing by Piotr Bakowski and Sofija Voronova, May 2021, 12 pages.

Understanding EU action against migrant smuggling
Briefing by Katrien Luyten, January 2021, 12 pages.

Understanding the EU response to organised crime
Briefing by Katrien Luyten and Sofija Voronova, August 2020, 12 pages.

Victims of terrorism
‘At a glance’ note by Francois Theron, March 2019, 2 pages.

Written by Mar Negreiro.

As part of its digital decade strategy, the European Commission’s March 2021 communication puts forward its vision for new strategic digital objectives for 2030. These should prepare Europe for the roll-out of the next generation of broadband infrastructure with gigabit speeds, including 5G, as well as for the digital transformation of public and private sectors, to enable an array of new innovative services that should transform the manufacturing, energy, vehicle manufacturing, digital government services and health sectors.

Given its importance for European Union (EU) competitiveness, the European Commission is speeding up the digital transformation by co-financing research, development and deployment of innovative technologies in 2021‑2027, under the €7.5 billion digital Europe programme, the first EU programme fully dedicated to the EU’s digital transformation. Other EU programmes will also play a major role in funding digital infrastructure, including the Connecting Europe Facility and cohesion policy. Furthermore, at least 20 % of the EU Recovery and Resilience Facility funds received by each EU country should be dedicated to the digital transition.

There is some concern that not all consumers and businesses in Europe will benefit from the digital transformation, given the current and future digital divide between urban and rural areas and across EU countries. Given the current climate, the high level of investment needed to achieve the transformation might prove difficult to raise.

To measure progress towards the digital decade, the Commission is working on a digital compass method with indicators, which should be put forward for this task later in 2021. This would enable measurement of four dimensions (or ‘cardinal points’): improved digital skills, secure and sustainable digital infrastructures, digital transformation of businesses and of the public sector.

Read the complete briefing on ‘The EU digital decade: A new set of digital targets for 2030‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Lena Hirschenberger

The Conference on the Future of Europe’s aim is to debate how the EU should develop in the future and to give European citizens a voice in the process, announced Commission President Ursula von der Leyen in her inaugural address.

People’s ideas will be collected on the Digital Platform, in European Citizens’ Panels and de-centralised conference events all over Europe. The Conference Plenary – comprised of representatives of the Citizens’ Panels, the Parliament, the Council, the Commission, national parliaments, the Committee of the Regions, the European Economic and Social Committee, social partners and the European Youth Forum – will then discuss the ideas put forward. Launched in April 2021, the conference is expected to reach conclusions and provide guidance for the European institutions to follow up, by spring 2022.

The conference topics are divided into nine areas, with one additional ‘open’ area, reserved for out-of-the-box ideas. The topics are: ‘Climate change and the environment‘, ‘Health‘, ‘A stronger economy, social justice and jobs‘, ‘European Union in the world‘, ‘Values and rights, rule of law, security‘, ‘Digital transformation‘, ‘European democracy‘, ‘Migration‘, ‘Education, culture, youth and sport‘, and ‘Other ideas‘.

Discussion on ‘Health’ will revolve around how we can secure vaccines and ensure availability of affordable medicines, treatments and medical equipment to fight coronavirus, but also around how countries can coordinate health services better in general: How can we protect ourselves in the event of a crisis? How can we improve European preventive care, treatment and aftercare for major diseases? How can we promote healthy lifestyles in general?

To support the proceedings of the conference, our EPRS policy analysts have prepared research material, available here in reverse chronological order. The following list will continually be updated as the conference unfolds:

EU Covid-19 certificate: A tool to help restore the free movement of people across the European Union
Briefing by David Armand, Jacques Gera de Groot and Costica Dumbrava, May 2021, 12 pages.

What is the European Union doing to fight cancer?
Blogpost by EPRS AskEP unit, May 2021.

The rise of digital health technologies during the pandemic
Briefing by Maria Negreiro Achiaga, April 2021, 10 pages.

Alcohol labelling
Briefing by Tarja Laaninen, April 2021, 12 pages.

Building up resilience to cross-border health threats: Moving towards a European health union
Briefing by Nicole Scholz, April 2021, 10 pages.

EU4Health programme
Briefing by Nicole Scholz, April 2021, 10 pages.

Europe’s Beating Cancer plan: Quick overview and initial reactions
Briefing by Nicole Scholz, March 2021, 12 pages.

Covid-19 vaccination campaigns: The public dimension
Briefing by Nicole Scholz, January 2021, 12 pages.

Coronavirus testing: Contributing to efforts to stem the second wave
Briefing by Nicole Scholz, December 2020, 8 pages.

Next generation or lost generation? Children, young people and the pandemic
Briefing by Nora Milotay, December 2020, 12 pages.

Lifting coronavirus restrictions: The role of therapeutics, testing, and contact-tracing apps ‘In-Depth’ Analysis by Costica Dumbrava, July 2020, 36 pages.
Available in German, English and French

Nutrition labelling schemes used in Member States
Briefing by Tarja Laaninen, July 2020, 12 pages.

Cross-border regional healthcare cooperation to combat the coronavirus pandemic
‘At a glance’ note by Vasileios Margaras, June 2020, 2 pages.

Addressing shortages of medicines
Briefing by Nicole Scholz, April 2020, 12 pages.

Organ donation and transplantation: Facts, figures and European Union action
Briefing by Nicole Scholz, April 2020, 12 pages.

Written by Lena Hirschenberger.

The Conference on the Future of Europe’s aim is to debate how the EU should develop in the future and to give European citizens a voice in the process, announced Commission President Ursula von der Leyen in her inaugural address.

People’s ideas will be collected on the Digital Platform, in European Citizens’ Panels and de-centralised conference events all over Europe. The Conference Plenary – comprised of representatives of the Citizens’ Panels, the Parliament, the Council, the Commission, national parliaments, the Committee of the Regions, the European Economic and Social Committee, social partners and the European Youth Forum – will then discuss the ideas put forward. Launched in April 2021, the conference is expected to reach conclusions and provide guidance for the European institutions to follow up, by spring 2022.

The conference topics are divided into nine areas, with one additional ‘open’ area, reserved for out-of-the-box ideas. The topics are: ‘Climate change and the environment‘, ‘Health‘, ‘A stronger economy, social justice and jobs‘, ‘European Union in the world‘, ‘Values and rights, rule of law, security‘, ‘Digital transformation‘, ‘European democracy‘, ‘Migration‘, ‘Education, culture, youth and sport‘, and ‘Other ideas‘.

Discussion on ‘European Democracy’ will include topics such as ‘How can we strengthen the voices of European citizens in policy-making?’, ‘How can we fight extremism, disinformation and the perceived distance between people and their elected representatives?’, ‘What should the role of media be in this?’, and ‘How can we strengthen our European democracy in general?’

To support the proceedings of the conference, our EPRS policy analysts have prepared research material, available here in reverse chronological order. The following list will continually be updated as the conference unfolds:

Conference on the Future of Europe – EPRS Ideas Papers
Topical Digest by Silvia Kontanidis, May 2021, 5 pages.

Conference on the Future of Europe
Topical Digest by Silvia Kontanidis, May 2021, 4 pages.

Conference on the Future of Europe
Briefing by Silvia Kontanidis, May 2021, 12 pages.

Transnational electoral lists
Study by Maria Diaz Crego, February 2021, 62 pages.

The practice of democracy
Study by Gianluca Sgueo, June 2020, 64 pages.

Parliamentary hearings of the Commissioners-designate: An analysis of the portfolios of the von der Leyen Commission
Briefing by several EPRS authors, November 2019, 140 pages.

Parliament’s committees of inquiry and special committees
In-Depth Analysis by Eva-Maria Alexandrova Poptcheva, June 2016, 22 pages.
Available in German, English and French

The six policy priorities of the von der Leyen Commission: State of play in spring 2021
In-Depth Analysis by Etienne Bassot, May 2021, 22 pages.

The European Parliament’s appointing powers
Briefing by Micaela Del Monte, May 2021, 14 pages.

Understanding trilogue: Informal tripartite meetings to reach provisional agreement on legislative files
Briefing by Micaela Del Monte, May 2021, 12 pages.

Understanding the European Commission’s right to withdraw legislative proposals
Briefing by Silvia Kontanidis, March 2021, 12 pages.

Reform of the Comitology Regulation
Briefing by Rafal Manko, March 2021, 12 pages.

Passerelle clauses in the EU Treaties: Opportunities for more flexible supranational decision-making
Study by Silvia Kontanidis, December 2020, 80 pages.
Available in German, English and French

Unlocking the potential of the EU Treaties: An article-by-article analysis of the scope for action
Study by Etienne Bassot, May 2020, 140 pages.
Available in German, English and French

Parliament’s right of legislative initiative
Briefing by Silvia Kontanidis, February 2020, 12 pages.

Policy Podcast on Parliament’s right of legislative initiative

Rules on political groups in the EP
Briefing by Laura Tilindyte-Humburg, June 2019, 7 pages.
Available in Spanish, German, English, French, Italian, Polish

2019 European elections: National rules
Infographic ‘At a Glance’ note by Alina Dobreva, Giulio Sabbati and Gianluca Sgueo, April 2019, 2 pages
Available in German, English and French

Understanding the d’Hondt method: Allocation of parliamentary seats and leadership positions
Briefing by Silvia Kontanidis, June 2019, 8 pages

Understanding the d’Hondt method – EPRS policy podcast

Implementation of the Treaty provisions concerning enhanced cooperation
Study by Ivana Diendl Kristo, December 2018, 84 pages.

Written by Zsolt G. Pataki.

The global innovation and technology landscape will evolve significantly in the next 20 years, and new and emerging technologies will drive changes in the character of warfare and the capabilities used on the battlefield. Understanding how the technological landscape evolves and what impact this will have on the future battlefield is key to formulating future-proof policies and investment decisions.

In this context, the European Parliament’s Panel for the Future of Science and Technology (STOA)commissioned RAND Europe to examine the challenges and opportunities related to new and emerging technologies expected to shape the 2040 battlefield, following a request from the Subcommittee on Security and Defence (SEDE). The study presents implications stemming from consideration of individual technologies, as well as crosscutting analysis of their interactions with broader political, social, economic and environmental trends. In doing so, the study highlights a need for EU institutions and Member States to pursue a broad range of capability development initiatives in a coherent and coordinated manner, ensure the development of an agile regulatory and organisational environment, and guide investments in technologies most relevant to the European context.

This study investigates the implications of possible advances in six key technology clusters: (1) artificial intelligence, machine learning and big data; (2) advanced robotics and autonomous systems; (3) biotechnology; (4) technologies for the delivery of novel effect; (5) satellites and space-based technologies and assets; and (6) human-machine interfaces. It also identifies several crosscutting implications of new and emerging technologies for future battlefield dynamics and European defence.

One key conclusion of the study is that technological change alone is unlikely to result in fundamental shifts in future battlefield dynamics. Rather, it is the adaptation of military establishments and armed forces (including shifts in strategic mindsets and organisational culture), as well as wider socioeconomic and cultural factors that are likely to shape future trends in the uptake and adoption of new and emerging technologies on the future battlefield. The authors write that technological change, while pervasive, will not diminish the importance of human factors or significantly reduce the uncertainty and unpredictability of the nature of war. Emerging technologies, however, will continue to shape both conventional and unconventional warfare. This will require an equal focus on the impact of technologies on above- and sub-threshold activities, and will potentially blur the boundaries between the two.

To fully understand the future impacts of technological change, interactions among technological trends need to be considered. The extent and manner in which new and emerging technologies are used by European Union (EU) countries’ armed forces will also depend on how these and other technologies will be adopted by adversaries. Access to and control of data represents a key crosscutting enabler on the future battlefield, with new and emerging technologies also providing further opportunities for collecting, managing and analysing data to achieve superiority on the battlefield.

The ability of the EU and its Member States to effectively navigate an increasingly complex technology and innovation landscape represents a key enabler to achieve superiority on the battlefield. Divergences among EU countries, however, may exist with regard to access to new and emerging technologies, financial, cost-related barriers, and differing strategic mindsets. As such, national enablers and barriers may also shape individual adoption pathways for new and emerging technologies among the EU Member States.

This study presents three sets of policy options for EU institutions and Member States to consider in their ongoing effort to prepare for and shape this rapidly evolving landscape, focusing on capability development initiatives, regulatory and organisational environment, and on investment in research, development, technology and innovation (RDT&I).

policy options

• Pursue a broad range of capability development initiatives: Future technological developments may render existing capabilities obsolete and generate requirements for fostering and sustaining new skills, systems and approaches. Future technological developments may also result in a broader spectrum of sub-threshold activities. These will require initiatives to ensure cohesion within the EU and its societies and institutions, as well as its broader alliances and partnerships. Within this context, EU and Member State institutions should continue to pursue a broad range of capability development investments;
• Foster regulatory and organisational agility and absorption capacity: The evolving technology landscape suggests a need for EU institutions and Member State defence establishments to create an environment that is conducive to the effective and efficient harnessing of positive impacts of technological advances and to the mitigation of any vulnerabilities. As such, EU countries’ armed forces and their broader institutional and organisational frameworks should work to foster the capacity and agility required to respond to technological advances;
• Facilitate EU investments and RDT&I activities in relevant technologies by strengthening collaboration with industry: RDT&I in many new and emerging technologies are driven by private sector actors, often originating from outside the traditional defence industrial base. This presents increasing challenges to the EU, its Member States, and their institutions, to harness and adapt to technological advances – especially as these advances occur at a fast pace, are globally accessible, and fall outside their direct or exclusive control.

The STOA Options Brief linked to the study contains an overview of various policy options. Read the full report to find out more, and let us know what you think via stoa@europarl.europa.eu.

Written by Philip Boucher.

Cutting-edge artificial intelligence (AI) techniques have enabled the production of highly realistic videos that manipulate how people look, and the things that they appear to say or do. These fabrications are commonly referred to as ‘deepfakes’. The Panel for the Future of Science and Technology (STOA) commissioned a study to examine deepfakes and to develop and assess a range of policy options focusing in particular upon the proposed AI (AIA) and digital services acts (DSA), as well as the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).

The full study report sets out the key features of deepfake technologies, their technical, societal and regulatory context, and their impacts at individual, group and societal levels, before setting out a range of policy options targeting legislative files that are currently under debate at the European Parliament. These options are also presented in the accompanying STOA Options Brief.

Deepfakes can be used for a wide variety of purposes, with wide-ranging impacts. They can be put to good use in media production, human-machine interactions, video conferencing, satire, creativity and some novel medical applications such as voice creation. However, they also have substantial potential for misuse. The broad range of possible risks can be differentiated into three categories of harm: psychological, financial and societal. The impacts of a single deepfake are not limited to a single type or category of risk, but rather to a combination of cascading impacts at different levels. Since deepfakes tend to have a particular personal target, the impact often starts at this individual level. Yet they can cause harm to specific groups or organisations which can accumulate into widespread harms on the broad societal level. The infographic depicts three scenarios that illustrate the potential impacts of three types of deepfakes on the individual, group and societal levels: a falsified pornographic video; a manipulated sound clip given as evidence in court; and a false statement to influence a political process.

In the final stage of the study, the authors identified several policy options targeting different dimensions of deepfake technologies.

Technology: The technology dimension concerns the underlying technologies and tools that are used for generating deepfakes, and the actors that develop deepfake production systems. Policy options in the technology dimension are particularly relevant in the context of the proposed AIA, and include clarifying the obligations and prohibitions on deepfake technology providers, limiting their spread, developing systems to restrict their impact, and investing in education and awareness raising amongst IT professionals.

© Rathenau Instituut

Creation: While the technology dimension concerns the production of deepfake generation systems, the creation dimension concerns those that use such systems to produce deepfakes. Policy options here include clarifying how deepfakes should be labelled while limiting exceptions and banning certain applications. It also explores whether online anonymity could be limited for some practices, and highlights measures that harness diplomacy, international agreements and technology transfer.

Circulation: Policy options in the circulation dimension are particularly relevant in the context of the proposed DSA, which provides opportunities to limit the dissemination and circulation of deepfakes. They include measures concerning the detection of deepfakes, establishing labelling and take-down procedures, ensuing oversight of content moderation decisions, and slowing the circulation of deepfakes while increasing transparency.

Target: Malicious deepfakes can have severe impacts on targeted individuals, which may be more profound and long-lasting than for many traditional patterns of crime. Policy options in the target dimension include institutionalised support for victims of deepfakes, and addressing authentication and verification procedures for court evidence. Several options are connected with the GDPR, including guidelines on its GDPR application to deepfakes, strengthening the capacity of Data Protection Authorities, extending the scope of personal data protection to include voice and facial data, developing a unified approach for the proper use of personality rights and protecting the personal data of deceased persons.

Audience: Audience response is a key factor to the extent that deepfakes can transcend the individual level and have wider group or societal impacts. Policy options addressing these elements include establishing authentication systems, investing in media literacy, a pluralistic media landscape and high-quality journalism.

Finally, these options are complemented by some overarching institutional and organisational measures to support actions across all five of the dimensions discussed above. These include options to systematise and institutionalise the collection of information with regard to deepfakes to protect organisations against deepfake fraud and to help them identify weaknesses and share best practices.

The full set of policy options are set out in greater detail in the accompanying STOA Options Brief.

Read the full report and accompanying STOA Options Brief to find out more. The study will be presented by its authors at a STOA Panel meeting this autumn.

Your opinion counts for us. To let us know what you think, get in touch via stoa@europarl.europa.eu.

Written by Lena Hirschenberger.

The Conference on the Future of Europe’s aim is to debate how the EU should develop in the future and to give European citizens a voice in the process, announced Commission President Ursula von der Leyen in her inaugural address.

People’s ideas will be collected on the Digital Platform, in European Citizens’ Panels and de-centralised conference events all over Europe. The Conference Plenary – comprised of representatives of the Citizens’ Panels, the Parliament, the Council, the Commission, national parliaments, the Committee of the Regions, the European Economic and Social Committee, social partners and the European Youth Forum – will then discuss the ideas put forward. Launched in April 2021, the conference is expected to reach conclusions and provide guidance for the European institutions to follow up, by spring 2022.

The conference topics are divided into nine areas, with one additional ‘open’ area, reserved for out-of-the-box ideas. The topics are: ‘Climate change and the environment‘, ‘Health‘, ‘A stronger economy, social justice and jobs‘, ‘European Union in the world‘, ‘Values and rights, rule of law, security‘, ‘Digital transformation‘, ‘European democracy‘, ‘Migration‘, ‘Education, culture, youth and sport‘, and ‘Other ideas‘.

The ‘Migration’ conversation is all about finding a predictable, balanced and reliable system. But how? How can asylum and migration in the EU be governed? How do we manage the EU’s external borders, legal migration and integration? How can we deepen international cooperation on migration matters? 

To support the proceedings of the conference, our EPRS policy analysts have prepared research material, available here in reverse chronological order. The following list will continually be updated as the conference unfolds:

EPRS Policy Podcast: The external dimension of the new pact on migration and asylum
May 2021

Pushbacks at the EU’s external borders
Briefing by Anja Radjenovic, EPRS, March 2021

Common procedure for asylum
‘EU Legislation in progress’ briefing by Anita Orav, EPRS, March 2021

Recast Eurodac Regulation
‘EU Legislation in progress’ briefing by Anita Orav, EPRS, March 2021

Proposal for a crisis and force majeure regulation
‘EU Legislation in progress’ briefing by Nikolai Atanassov, EPRS, January 2021

Understanding EU action against migrant smuggling
Briefing by Katrien Luyten, EPRS, January 2021

Reforming asylum and migration management
‘EU Legislation in progress’ briefing by Anja Radjenovic, EPRS, October 2020

Screening of third-country nationals at the EU external borders
‘EU Legislation in progress’ briefing by Costica Dumbrava, EPRS, November 2020

Asylum procedures at the border
European Implementation Assessment by Wouter van Ballegooij and Katharina Eisele, EPRS, November 2020

Hotspots at EU external borders – State of play
Briefing by Katrien Luyten and Anita Orav with Eulalia Claros, EPRS, September 2020

The need for solidarity in asylum policy
‘At a glance’ note by Anja Radjenovic, EPRS, September 2020

The Return Directive 2008/115/EC
European Implementation Assessment by Katharina Eisele, EPRS, July 2020

Unaccompanied migrant children in Greece: New relocation scheme
Briefing by Ingeborg Odink, EPRS, May 2020

Tackling the coronavirus outbreak: Impact on asylum-seekers in the EU
Briefing by Anja Radjenovic, EPRS, April 2020

Solidarity in EU asylum policy
Briefing by Anja Radjenovic, EPRS, March 2020

Emergency measures on migration: Article 78(3) TFEU
‘At a glance’ note by Anja Radjenovic, EPRS, March 2020

Family reunification rights of refugees and beneficiaries of subsidiary protection
Briefing by Anja Radjenovic, EPRS, February 2020

EPRS graphics on migration and refugees

Written by Anna Caprile and James McEldowney.

In May 2020, the European Commission published its ‘farm to fork’ strategy – ‘for a fair, healthy and environmentally friendly food system’ – along with the EU biodiversity strategy, as part of the implementation of the European Green Deal. In those strategies the Commission set a target of 25 % of the EU’s agricultural land to be under organic farming by 2030, as well as a significant increase in organic aquaculture. These targets aim to contribute to improving the sustainability of the food system, to reverse biodiversity loss and to reduce the use of chemical substances in the form of pesticides and fertilisers. The Commission’s 2021 work programme set out its intention to prepare an action plan for the development of organic production for the 2021 to 2027 period, and the action plan was published on 25 March 2021.

Offering an initial analysis of the action plan, this briefing outlines the measures envisaged and the implications for different stages of the food chain in the EU. It also examines the results of the public consultation launched by the Commission in September 2020 to gather stakeholders’ views on the challenges and opportunities for the organic sector. The views of key stakeholders in response to the publication of the action plan are also covered, along with the initial views expressed by the advisory committees.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Development of organic production in the EU: 2021-2027 action plan‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Lena Hirschenberger.

The Conference on the Future of Europe’s aim is to debate how the EU should develop in the future and to give European citizens a voice in the process, announced Commission President Ursula von der Leyen in her inaugural address.

People’s ideas will be collected on the Digital Platform, in European Citizens’ Panels and de-centralised conference events all over Europe. The Conference Plenary – comprised of representatives of the Citizens’ Panels, the Parliament, the Council, the Commission, national parliaments, the Committee of the Regions, the European Economic and Social Committee, social partners and the European Youth Forum – will then discuss the ideas put forward. Launched in April 2021, the conference is expected to reach conclusions and provide guidance for the European institutions to follow up, by spring 2022.

The conference topics are divided into nine areas, with one additional ‘open’ area, reserved for out-of-the-box ideas. The topics are: ‘Climate change and the environment‘, ‘Health‘, ‘A stronger economy, social justice and jobs‘, ‘European Union in the world‘, ‘Values and rights, rule of law, security‘, ‘Digital transformation‘, ‘European democracy‘, ‘Migration‘, ‘Education, culture, youth and sport‘, and ‘Other ideas‘.

‘Europe in the world’ will look at the European Union’s global engagement and covers such questions as: What role should the EU play in the world? How can we ensure security? With which partners, and in which forms, do we want to trade? Who are our neighbours and how should we interact with them? Who do we want to include in the European Union? What should development cooperation look like and which humanitarian aid and civil protection actions should we take?

To support the proceedings of the conference, our EPRS policy analysts have prepared research material, available here in reverse chronological order. The following list will continually be updated as the conference unfolds:

Interactive Infographic on Peace and Security, 2020.

European Peace Facility – Investing in international stability and security
Briefing by Beatrix Immenkamp, June 2021, 12 pages.

European Peace Facility: EPRS Policy Podcast, 2021.

Peace and Security: Non-traditional threats, EPRS In-a-nutshell video, 2021

Critical raw materials in EU external policies: Improving access and raising global standards
Briefing by Marcin Szczepanski, May 2021, 12 pages.  

International trade dispute settlement: WTO Appellate Body crisis and the multiparty interim appeal arrangement
Briefing by Jana Titievskaia, April 2021, 8 pages.  

Understanding EU financing for external action
In-Depth Analysis by Velina Lilyanova, February 2021, 41 pages.  

Charting a course through stormy waters: The EU as a maritime security actor
Briefing by Tania Latici, Eric Pichon, and Branislav Stanicek, February 2021, 12 pages.

Support for democracy through EU external policy: New tools for growing challenges
Briefing by Ionel Zamfir, February 2021, 12 pages.  

EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement: An analytical overview
In-Depth Analysis by Issam Hallak, February 2021, 37 pages.

Qualified majority voting in foreign and security policy: Pros and Cons
Briefing byTania Latici,January 2021, 8 pages.

After Cotonou: Towards a new agreement with the African, Caribbean and Pacific states
Briefing by Eric Pichon, January 2021, 12 pages.

EU-Turkey customs union: Modernisation or suspension?
Briefing by Branislav Stanicek, December 2020, 8 pages.

Global mega-trends: Scanning the post-coronavirus horizon
Briefing by Danièle Réchard, November 2020, 7 pages.  

Understanding EU-NATO cooperation: Theory and practice
Briefing by Tania Latici, October 2020, 12 pages.  

On the path to ‘strategic autonomy’: The EU in an evolving geopolitical environment
Study by various EPRS authors, September 2020, 60 pages.  

Peace and Security in 2020: Overview of EU action and outlook for the future
Study by Elena Lazarou and others, September 2020, 112 pages.  

The future of multilateralism and strategic partnerships
Briefing by Elena Lazarou, September 2020, 12 pages. 

International trade policy
Briefing by Jana Titievskaya, July 2020, 11 pages.

The EU and Russia: Locked into confrontation
Briefing by Martin Russell, July 2020, 12 pages.  

EU-China relations: Taking stock after the 2020 EU-China Summit
Briefing by Gisela Grieger, June 2020, 12 pages.

Towards a new EU strategy with Africa: A renewed focus on outreach
Briefing byErich Pichon, June 2020, 8 pages.  

A new approach to EU enlargement
Briefing by Branislav Stanicek, March 2020, 4 pages. 

Religion and the EU’s external policies: Increasing engagement
In-Depth Analysis by Philippe Perchoc et al, February 2020, 44 pages. 

The European Parliament’s evolving soft power – From back-door diplomacy to agenda-setting: Democracy support and mediation,  
Briefing by Naja Bentzen and Beatrix Immenkamp, September 2019, 8 pages.  

Bilateral and regional free trade agreements (FTAs) have proliferated globally in recent years as major initiatives to reform consensus-driven WTO system have stalled. The EU is working to secure the survival of the multilateral tradi ng system embodied in the WTO, while also seeking bilateral trade agreements with partner countries from Asia to Latin America. The European Parliament, which must give its consent to EU FTAs and investment agreements, has consistently promoted values-based trade, particularly when it comes to the issues of human rights, and social, labour and environmental standards. This topical digest summarises the most recent research written for Parliament policymakers. A topical digest on international trade is also available.

Legislative trains on trade
The Legislative Train Schedule – resembling the arrivals-departures board in a railway station – provides a summary of the state of play of trade legislation and international trade agreements all in one place. 

Trade agreements by continent North America

Climate-proofing transatlantic trade: How green and how open?
Chapter 2.2 in Harnessing the new momentum in transatlantic relations: Potential areas for common action during the Biden presidency, in-depth analysis by Tania Latici, Suzana Anghel, Piotr Bakowski, Meenakshi Fernandes, Liselotte Jensen, Matthew Parry and Marcin Szczepanski, June 2021

EU-US dispute over civil aircraft subsidies
‘At a glance’ note by Jana Titievskaia, November 2020
A short background to the long-lasting WTO dispute, including tariffs, countermeasures and retaliation.

EU-US trade and investment relations: Effects on tax evasion, money laundering and tax transparency
In-depth analysis by Isabelle Ioannides, March 2017
This study analyses EU-US trade and investment relations to assess whether and, if so, to what extent these relations have impacted on issues related to tax evasion, money laundering and tax transparency. Challenges remain on questions of beneficial ownership, cross-border exchange of information, privacy issues, and designated nonfinancial businesses and professions.

US: Economic indicators and trade with EU
‘At a glance’ note by Györgyi Macsai and Giulio Sabbati, June 2021

Asia and Pacific

EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment: Levelling the playing field with China
International agreements in progress, Gisela Grieger, March 2021
The lack of reciprocity in access to the Chinese market and the absence of a level playing field for EU investors in China have posed major challenges for EU-China investment relations in recent years, with the EU considering negotiation of a comprehensive agreement on investment (CAI) key to remedying the situation.

Trade negotiations between the EU and ASEAN member states
Briefing by Krisztina Binder, November 2020
In the longer term, these bilateral FTAs would allow the establishment of a region-to-region FTA, which remains the EU’s ultimate ambition. By bringing together two of the world’s largest economic areas, the agreement would establish a free trade area with a combined market of more than 1 billion people

State of play of EU-New Zealand FTA talks
‘At a glance’ note by Krisztina Binder, November 2020
Negotiations on an EU FTA with New Zealand, one of the fastest-growing developed economies in the world, were launched in June 2018. Eight negotiating rounds took place between July 2018 and June 2020, resulting in the closure of the future FTA’s transparency chapter.

State of play of EU-Australia FTA talks
‘At a glance’ note by Krisztina Binder, November 2020
In May 2018, the Council authorised the Commission to negotiate an FTA with Australia. Negotiations were officially launched in June 2018. Between July 2018 and September 2020, eight negotiation rounds took place. The first chapter of the prospective EU-Australia FTA, concluded at the technical level, concerns small and medium-sized enterprises. The ninth negotiation round started on 30 November 2020.

EU-China geographical indications agreement
‘At a glance’ note, by Gisela Grieger, September 2020
The reciprocal EU-China agreement seeks to protect 100 EU GIs in China and 100 Chinese GIs in the EU against imitation and usurpation. Council endorsed the agreement’s signature on 20 July 2020. The agreement could boost EU exports of high-quality foodstuffs, wines and spirits to the EU’s third-largest destination for agrifood exports, and also foster rural development. It should also expand global recognition of the EU’s GI protection regime, a key EU trade policy objective.

EU-Vietnam trade and investment agreements
Briefing by Martin Russell, February 2020
In 2019, Vietnam became the second south-east Asian country after Singapore to sign trade and investment agreements with the EU. The agreements are expected to bring major economic benefits to both sides, but opinions are divided on whether Parliament should consent to them, owing to human rights issues in Vietnam.

EU free trade agreements with Australia and New Zealand
Briefing by Vadim Kononenko, February 2018
This note offers an initial analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the European Commission’s impact assessment accompanying the FTA proposals, submitted on 13 September 2017 and referred to Parliament’s Committee on International Trade (INTA). For the Commission, the proposals marked a step towards fulfilling key criteria for the EU’s trade relations with third countries.

International agreements in progress: EU-Singapore trade and investment deals pass major milestone
‘At a glance’ note by Krisztina Binder, April 2019
The EU-Singapore agreements are considered a reference as regards the EU’s ambition to conclude trade and investment agreements with other ASEAN members.

International agreements in progress: Bilateral trade deal with Japan – largest to date for EU
‘At a glance’ note by Krisztina Binder, February 2019
Following the signature of the EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) in July 2018, and the conclusion of the ratification procedures by both partners at the end of 2018, the agreement entered into force on 1 February 2019. The agreement is the EU’s largest bilateral trade agreement to date. It establishes a free trade area with a combined market of around 640 million consumers, accounting for roughly a third of the world’s gross domestic product (GDP).

International agreements in progress: EU-Vietnam Trade and Investment Agreements
Briefing by Martin Russell, November 2019
The free trade and investment protection agreements with Vietnam have been described as the most ambitious deal of their type ever between the EU and a developing country. Not only will they eliminate over 99 % of customs duties on goods, they will also open up Vietnamese services markets to EU companies and strengthen protection of EU investment in the country.

India: Economic indicators and trade with EU
‘At a glance’ note by Giulio Sabbati, April 2021

Australia: Economic indicators and trade with EU
‘At a glance’ note by Nadejda Kresnichka-Nikolchova, February 2020

Indonesia: Economic indicators and trade with EU
‘At a glance’ note by Nadejda Kresnichka-Nikolchova, December 2019

China: Economic indicators and trade with EU
‘At a glance’ note by Nadejda Kresnichka-Nikolchova, December 2019

Latin America

EU trade with Latin America and the Caribbean: Overview and figures
In depth analysis by Gisela Grieger, December 2019
This publication provides an overview of trade relations between the EU and Latin American and Caribbean countries and groupings. The EU has fully fledged agreements with two Latin American groupings (Cariforum and the Central America group), a multiparty trade agreement with three members of the Andean Community (Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru), and bilateral agreements with Chile and Mexico. Since November 2017, a new agreement governing trade relations with Cuba has also been provisionally applied.

Modernisation of the trade pillar of the EU-Mexico Global Agreement
Briefing by Gisela Grieger, October 2020
The trade pillar of the Global Agreement was the first trade liberalisation agreement the EU concluded with a Latin American country. It has contributed to a significant increase in EU-Mexico trade in services and industrial goods. However, it has become outdated, as both parties have entered into a wide range of preferential trade agreements with state-of-the art provisions reflecting new developments in trade and investment policies.

Amazon deforestation and EU-Mercosur deal
‘At a glance’ note by Gisela Grieger, October 2020
After coming to a political agreement on the trade pillar of the three-pronged EU-Mercosur association agreement in June 2019, the EU and the four founding members of Mercosur (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay) reached agreement on the political dialogue and cooperation parts in July 2020. However, as environmental deregulation and deforestation continue unabated in Brazil, opposition to the deal is growing. It is unlikely to be submitted to the European Parliament for consent in its current form.

The trade pillar of EU-Mercosur Association Agreement
Briefing by Gisela Grieger, September 2019
On 28 June 2019, the European Union (EU) and the four founding members of Mercosur (the ‘Southern Common Market’) – Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay – reached an ‘agreement in principle’ on a free trade agreement (FTA) as part of a wider association agreement (AA).

Modernisation of the trade pillar of the EU-Chile Association Agreement
‘At a glance’ note by Gisela Grieger, November 2018
In November 2017, the EU and Chile launched negotiations on a modernised trade pillar of the 2002 EU-Chile Association Agreement, based on a Council negotiating mandate which is the first-ever to have been published prior to the start of negotiations with a view to enhancing transparency and inclusiveness.

The trade pillar in the EU-Central America Association Agreement: European implementation assessment
Study by Isabelle Ioannides, October 2018
This evaluation assesses specifically the implementation of the trade and sustainable development (TSD) chapter of the trade pillar of this agreement during the five years of its operation. After briefly outlining the trade interests of this agreement, this study situates sustainable development by explaining its legal foundations in the Association Agreement and reviewing the ex-ante impact assessment conclusions on the issue. It then focuses on the monitoring mechanisms of the Association Agreement, including the European Commission’s annual reports, Parliament’s oversight work, civil society dialogue, and the results of the meetings of the specialised committee and annual Association Committee and Association Council meetings.

Trade agreement between the EU and Colombia and Peru
Study by Anna Zygierewicz, July 2018
This European implementation assessment consists of two parts. The in-house opening analysis (Part I) presents briefly the signature of the trade agreement between the EU and Colombia and Peru. The research paper prepared by external experts (Part II) presents detail analysis of trade in goods and services and foreign direct investments. The paper also evaluates in detail the implementation of the trade and sustainable development chapter of the agreement in both Colombia and Peru.

The effects of human rights-related clauses in the EU-Mexico Global Agreement and the EU-Chile Association Agreement
Study by Isabelle Ioannides, February 2017
The democracy clause in the EU-Mexico Global Agreement and by extension the EU-Mexico Free Trade Agreement calls for respect for fundamental human rights. If these are breached, a sanctioning clause can be invoked. The widely reported violations of human rights in Mexico are tackled through political dialogue. The agreement includes cooperation articles on social policy, the results of which are non-binding. Against this background, it is difficult to make a clear link between the potential effects of human rights-related clauses in the Global Agreement on the human rights situation in Mexico. The EU-Chile Association Agreement (AA) also includes a comprehensive free trade agreement, which is subject to the democracy clause.

Mercosur: Economic indicators and trade with EU
‘At a glance’ note by Giulio Sabbati, December 2021

Africa

An overview of the EU-ACP countries’ economic partnership agreements: Building a new trade relationship
Briefing by Ionel Zamfir, July 2018
In line with the objective enshrined in the Cotonou Partnership Agreement (signed in 2000), the EU has sought to update its preferential trade relationship with the ACP countries by establishing free-trade areas with regional groupings. The negotiation process has been longer and more complicated than initially expected. So far, it has ushered in nine agreements covering more than half (51) of the ACP countries.

International agreements in progress: Economic partnership agreement with the East African Community
Briefing by Eric Pichon, April 2018
The current ACP-EU Partnership Agreement (the ‘Cotonou Partnership Agreement’) features a provision making it possible for the EU to negotiate different economic partnership agreements (EPAs) with regional ACP sub-groups. This provision was needed for the partnership to be brought into compliance with the World Trade Organization’s rules. Negotiations for an EPA with the members of the East African Community (EAC) – at the time: Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda – were finalised in October 2014.

Europe

The level playing-field for labour and environment in EU-UK relations
Briefing by Issam Hallak, April 2021
Although the TCA LPF provisions on labour and environment are in many respects similar to those in the EU’s new generation FTAs, they strengthen the enforcement of non-regression provisions by allowing for remedial measures, and also reinforce the precautionary approach. The TCA also represents a notable innovation with its rebalancing and review provisions.

EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement: An analytical overview
In-depth analysis by Issam Hallak et al, February 2021
This agreement is the institutional framework, that governs the new EU-UK relationship. It establishes trade on zero-tariff/quota terms and covers a wide range of areas, including energy, transport and fisheries.

UK trade agreements with third countries: Implications for the EU
Briefing by Issam Hallak, December 2020
The UK is aiming to become a champion of free trade. As expressed by Secretary of State Liz Truss in February 2020, the UK’s objective is to ‘secure free trade agreements with countries covering 80 % of UK trade within the next three years’ – which leaves no alternative but to secure a deal with the EU. By placing the Pacific area among its highest trade priorities, the UK is also proving to be seeking to ‘diversify [its] trading links and supply chains’, as mentioned in the CPTPP position statement, thus reducing its dependence on the EU.

Excluding Northern Irish imports from EU tariff rate quotas
Briefing by Issam Hallak, December 2020
To address the problem of the proper functioning of the EU single market and to provide legal clarification, the European Commission adopted a legislative proposal on 14 August 2020 stipulating that goods imported into Northern Ireland from non-EU countries would not benefit from EU tariff rate quotas or other import quotas unless ultimately destined for the EU.

Association agreement between the EU and Ukraine: European implementation assessment (update)
Study by Anna Zygierewicz, July 2020
The EU recognises the progress made in implementing the association agreement in Ukraine, but still points to the efforts needed in order to achieve the expected results. According to the latest EU association implementation report, Ukraine successfully completed the presidential and parliamentary electoral cycles and continued to implement several important reforms, with significant involvement of civil society in the process

Association agreement between the EU and the Republic of Moldova: European implementation assessment (update)
Study by Anna Zygierewicz, July 2020
Moldova’s implementation of its association agreement/deep and comprehensive free trade agreement (AA/DCFTA) with the EU is progressing and is influencing the country’s development positively. Despite Moldova being ‘the poorest country in Europe’, various reports underline that it is enjoying economic growth of around 5 % a year and ‘has made significant progress in reducing poverty and promoting inclusive growth since the early 2000s’.

Association agreement between the EU and Georgia: European implementation assessment (update)
Study by Anna Zygierewicz, July 2020
According to the 2019 association implementation report on Georgia by the European Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR/VP), Georgia is continuing to implement the AA/DCFTA within the time limits agreed with the EU, and with ‘extensive commitments in the areas of democracy, human rights and the rule of law’.

UK: Economic indicators and trade with EU
‘At a glance’ note by Giulio Sabbati, February 2020

Trade policy has continued to occupy international headlines since President Trump imposed US tariffs leading to ‘trade wars’; the pandemic has meanwhile highlighted the need to ensure supply chain resilience. In this context, the EU is working to secure the survival of the multilateral trading system, embodied in the WTO, while also seeking bilateral and regional trade agreements with partner countries from Asia to Latin America. The European Parliament promotes values-based trade and the importance of a level playing field, not least when it comes to human rights and social, labour and environmental standards. This topical digest summarises the most recent research written for European Parliament policymakers to help understand this complex and dynamic field, including: horizontal international trade overviews; publications on thematic areas such as the economics of trade, the WTO, investment, trade and sustainable development, digital trade and export control; and overviews of legislation. For an outline of analyses on the EU’s bilateral trade negotiations and relations, see the topical digest on trade and investment agreements.

Legislative trains on trade
The Legislative Train Schedule – resembling the arrivals-departures board in a railway station – provides a summary of the state of play of trade legislation and international trade agreements all in one place.

Horizontal overviews

EU trade policy: Frequently asked questions
In-depth analysis by Jana Titievskaia, October 2019
Offering explanations of key trade concepts, this paper seeks to provide immediate answers to the most commonly asked questions relating to EU trade policy: from the evolution and scope of EU common commercial policy to the role of different EU institutions and the economics of trade. In addition, the paper covers the procedures for the conclusion of international trade agreements, types of trade relationship, and the specific characteristics of EU legal instruments in the area of trade. Lastly, it addresses the issues of trade and sustainable development, which have grown into a key area of concern for Parliament.

Review of EU Enforcement Regulation for trade disputes
Briefing by Gisela Grieger, March 2021
The Enforcement Regulation enables the EU to suspend or withdraw concessions or other obligations under international trade agreements in order to respond to third country breaches of international trade rules that affect the EU’s commercial interests. The proposed amendments were aimed at empowering the EU to impose counter-measures in situations where EU trade partners violate international trade rules and block the dispute settlement procedures included in multilateral, regional and bilateral trade agreements thus preventing the EU from obtaining final binding rulings in its favour.

EU trade policy review
‘At a glance’ note by Krisztina Binder, December 2020
In June 2020, the European Commission launched an EU trade policy review that will lead to a revised strategy to be adopted early in 2021. The aim is to set a new course for trade policy in a changing global context, aligned with EU priorities and supporting recovery from the coronavirus crisis. Parliament contributed to the process with a resolution on 26 November 2020, and will continue monitoring implementation of the new policy in 2021.

Key issues in the European Council: State of play in December 2020
In this quarterly updated publication, the European Council’s commitments are scrutinised and assessed for accountability purposes. The trade chapter (from page 74) provides a useful angle on the European Council’s position with regard to international trade.

Slowing down or changing track?: Understanding the dynamics of ‘Slowbalisation’
Section on ‘Slowing international trade’ by Jana Titievskaia (pp. 5-7), EPRS in-depth analysis, December 2020 Since the aftermath of the global financial crisis, year-on-year annual growth in international trade has been falling. This trend was exacerbated by the onset of US-China trade tensions in 2019. This is striking, given that trade has consistently outpaced GDP since the mid-1800s, with the exception of the interwar years. In nominal terms, trade appears even weaker, failing to keep up with GDP growth owing to the fall in the relative prices of traded goods and services, particularly commodities.

International trade policy
Briefing by Jana Titievskaia, July 2020
In recent years, the multilateral liberal trading order has already facing unprecedented turbulence with the rise of protectionism and zero-sum thinking, trade wars and the blockage within the WTO.

EU international procurement instrument
Briefing by Jana Titievskaia, March 2020
The EU has opened up its public procurement markets to third countries to a large degree, yet many of these countries have not granted the EU comparable access. In 2012, the European Commission tabled a proposal for an international procurement instrument (IPI). It then revised the proposal in 2015, taking on board some recommendations from Council and Parliament.

Trade and competitiveness policies in the European Council: background, current developments and way forward
In-depth analysis by Izabela Bacian and Marko Vukovic, March 2020
In recent years, international trade has gained increasing visibility on the European Council agenda. Profound changes have occurred in the global trading landscape, with common rules and standards questioned and new actors entering the world stage. A high level of economic interconnectedness and the ineluctable rise of emerging economies on the world stage, notably China, have highlighted differences across economic systems and divergences over the impact of certain policies and practices in the global economy.

Delivering for citizens: International trade and globalisation
Briefing by Jana Titievskaia and Roderick Harte, February 2019 Offering a comprehensive summary of the last five years of EU trade policy and detailing what the EU has been doing for citizens on trade and globalisation during the 2014-2019 parliamentary term, this briefing sets out the legal basis for EU trade policy, and the underlying strategies and discourses that drive the EU’s trade policy. It also outlines the state of play in trade negotiations, trade agreements concluded, and the key trade-related legislative developments of the last term.

The power of the European Parliament: Examples of EP impact during the 2014-2019 legislative term,
Chapter on Trade (CETA), pp. 8-9; by Jana Titievskaia, EPRS, April 2019
A good example of the Parliament’s role in trade from the last term is the shift from the controversial investor-state dispute settlement mechanism to a more institutionalised international court system under the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between EU and Canada

Economics of trade

Distortive foreign subsidies regulation: A level playing field for the single market
Briefing by Marcin Szczepański, June 2021
In May 2021, the European Commission published a draft regulation designed to tackle those foreign subsidies that have a distortive effect on the single market. The plan is to give the Commission powers to investigate subsidies granted by non-EU public authorities to companies operating on the internal market. If these are found to be distortive, the Commission would be able to apply redressive measures.

Critical raw materials in EU external policies: Improving access and raising global standard
Briefing by Marcin Szczepański, May 2021
lobal demand for critical raw materials (CRMs) is rising, but export restrictions imposed by resource-rich countries are intensifying the competition for these materials. To boost its access to CRMs, the EU has a dedicated strategy based on three pillars: two internal ones (increasing domestic sourcing and circularity) and an external one, focused mainly on securing supply from third countries.

Understanding trade balances
‘At a glance’ note by Jana Titievskaia, February 2019
A focus on export-import trade balances can be misleading in the trade policy context. Trade balances need to be considered as an integral part of a larger whole, the balance of payments of an economy.

Global and regional value chains: Opportunities for European SMEs’ internationalisation and growth
Briefing by Ioannis Zachariadis, February 2019
International value chains have emerged as the new paradigm for the organisation of production globally. Today, most production processes across the world are vertically fragmented as a result of the increased unbundling of tasks and functions and their sourcing from different geographical locations. This briefing analyses how this situation affects small and medium-sized enterprises in particular.

The added value of international trade and impact of trade barriers: Cost of non-Europe report
Study by Risto Nieminen and Laura Puccio, October 2017
This cost of non-Europe report analyses the economic framework of international trade. The first part contains an overall presentation of international trade and a brief description of the significance of global value chains. The second part analyses the benefits of international trade and the consequences of protectionism.

World Trade Organization

World Trade Organization TRIPS waiver to tackle coronavirus
‘At a glance’ note by Jana Titievskaia, June 2021
Despite embedded flexibilities in the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on Trade-related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), India and South Africa, co-sponsored by a large number of developing countries, submitted an initial proposal for a temporary waiver in response to Covid-19 in October 2020 that met with divided opinions.

International trade dispute settlement: WTO Appellate Body crisis and the multiparty interim appeal arrangement
Briefing by Jana Titievskaia, April 2021
To find a temporary solution to the United States’ blockage of appointments to the WTO Appellate Body, the EU and a number of trade partners set up a multiparty interim appeal arbitration arrangement (MPIA). The parties are continuing to seek resolution of the Appellate Body crisis, and have agreed to use the MPIA as a second instance until the situation is resolved.

WTO e-commerce negotiations
‘At a glance’ note by Jana Titievskaia, October 2020
Members are seeking a high-standard outcome building on WTO agreements, but the legal form of the deal is not yet clear. Participants wish to modernise trade rules to fit the digital age and show that the WTO’s negotiating function can deliver. Key issues in the negotiations include e-contracts and e-signatures, data flows, data localisation requirements, disclosure of source code, and customs duties on electronic transmissions.

US duties on imports of Spanish ripe olives
‘At a glance’ note by Jana Titievskaia, March 2019
In January 2019, the EU launched a case before the WTO against the US challenging duties on imports of Spanish ripe olives. Given the importance of such support for EU farmers, the US measures could have far-reaching consequences for the EU’s agricultural model and set precedents in the WTO.

Multilateralism in international trade: Reforming the WTO
Briefing by Roderick Harte, October 2018
Despite having achieved various successes since its creation, the WTO is currently facing major challenges that undermine its status as the world’s primary forum for negotiating trade rules, settling trade disputes and addressing trade issues. The EU is a strong supporter of the rules-based trade system and therefore has a strong interest in preserving the WTO.

Investment

Multilateral investment court: Framework options
Briefing by Issam Hallak, June 2021
The intergovernmental talks at United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) are aimed at reforming the system with a view to establishing a fully-fledged permanent multilateral investment court with an appellate mechanism and tenured judges. Also see

Multilateral Investment Court: Overview of the reform proposals and prospects,
briefing by Issam Hallak, January 2020

CETA: Investment and the right to regulate
‘At a glance’ note by Laura Puccio, February 2017
Under international public law, states can be asked to compensate investors whenever regulatory measures become expropriation measures or violate standards of treatment, such as the ‘fair and equitable treatment of investors’ obligation. The EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) takes a relatively restrictive approach to these investor rights.

Trade and sustainable development

Trade policy for the biodiversity strategy 2030
‘At a glance’ note by Jana Titievskaia, June 2021
The EU’s biodiversity strategy for 2030 commits to doing more to assess trade agreements’ potential impact on biodiversity and to enforce biodiversity-related provisions. Parliament’s Trade Committee has adopted an opinion on the trade aspects of the new strategy.

Using trade policy to tackle climate change
‘At a glance’ note by Jana Titievskaia, October 2019
European leaders have called for urgent action against climate change. Since the Paris Agreement is binding only in part and aspirational concerning national emissions targets, there are calls to use trade policy instead

Human rights in EU trade agreements: The human rights clause
Briefing by Ionel Zamfir, July 2019
The clause, which also covers democratic principles and often the rule of law, is more than just a legal mechanism enabling the unilateral suspension of trade commitments in times of crisis.

Human rights in EU trade policy: Unilateral measures applied by the EU
Briefing by Ionel Zamfir, May 2018
The generalised system of preferences, which grants certain developing countries preferential trade access to the EU market, covers 90 third countries. The scheme includes explicit human rights conditionality, providing that preferences can be withdrawn in cases of systematic violations of core human or labour rights norms.

Gender equality and trade
‘At a glance’ note by Ionel Zamfir, January 2019
The EU has established specific mechanisms in its trade policy to enforce women’s labour and human rights, and monitor the gender impact of its trade preferences

The Generalised Scheme of Preferences Regulation (No 978/2012): European implementation assessment
Study by Isabelle Ioannides, December 2018
This evaluation is organised in two parts. The first part, which has been prepared internally, focuses on the incentives in the GSP provisions that aim to push beneficiaries to comply with human rights and the extent to which these have been implemented and have had an impact on poverty reduction and good governance

EU aid for trade: Taking stock and looking forward
Briefing by Marta Latek, April 2018
Most commentators agree that aid for trade investments have helped developing countries to improve and diversify their export and trade performance. Its impact on poverty reduction has been much less clear

Trade and sustainable development chapters in CETA
The inclusion by the EU of sustainable development chapters in the free trade agreements concluded with its partners plays a role in ensuring that trade and investment liberalisation does not lead to a deterioration in environmental and labour conditions 

Digital trade

WTO e-commerce negotiations
‘At a glance’ note by Jana Titievskaia, October 2020
Members seek a high-standard outcome building on WTO agreements, but the legal form of the deal is not yet clear. Participants wish to modernise trade rules to fit the digital age and show that the WTO’s negotiating function can deliver. Key issues in the negotiations include e-contracts and e-signatures, data flows, data localisation requirements, disclosure of source code, and customs duties on electronic transmissions

Blockchain for supply chains and international trade
Study for the Scientific Foresight Unit (STOA), May 2020
This study provides an analysis of blockchain technology in the context of international trade. It analyses the potential impacts of blockchain development and applications in eight use cases for supply chains and international trade. It also provides an analysis of the current legislative framework and existing initiatives. Based on this analysis, and following a broad consultation of relevant organisations, the study identifies several challenges in international trade documentation and processes, and presents a range of policy options for the European Parliament

The advent of blockchain in trade
‘At a glance’ note by Krisztina Binder and Angelos Delivorias, July 2018
The use of blockchain in supply chains and trade-related business processes has gained ground in recent years. Start-ups and large companies exploit a wide range of blockchain-based applications in these areas

Export control

Review of dual-use export control
Briefing by Beatrix Immenkamp, January 2021
The proposed regulation will recast the regulation in force since 2009. Among other elements, the proposal explicitly defines cyber-surveillance technology as dual-use technology and introduces human rights violations as an explicit justification for export control. It also includes provisions to control emerging technologies. The proposed regulation introduces greater transparency into dual-use export control by increasing the level of detail Member States will have to provide on exports, licences, licence denials and prohibitions

EU imports and exports of medical equipment
Briefing by Issam Hallak, October 2020
A mapping of EU trade in four categories of product – pharmaceuticals, medical equipment, personal protection and medical supplies – shows that, in all four categories, as few as five trade partners provide about 75 % of EU imports. Exports are more diffuse, with five partners receiving approximately half of EU exports. In 2019, the EU was a net exporter of medical products in all four categories, with pharmaceutical products representing most of its trade surplus of medical products

EU export authorisation scheme for personal protection equipment
Briefing by Issam Hallak, May 2020
A mapping of exports and imports of PPE subject to authorisation shows that, even though the EU runs a large trade surplus for medical products in general, it had been running trade deficits on these specific products for the last decade. The scale of trade in these products is also very small since imports represented as little as 0.05 % of EU gross domestic product (GDP) in 2019. This all goes to show how what amounts to a tiny portion of international trade can have dramatic consequences

Food trade and food security in the coronavirus pandemic
‘At a glance’ note by Krisztina Binder, May 2020
Not only has the pandemic created a global public health crisis, it has also had a significant impact on the global economy and international trade. Measures to deal with the consequences of the pandemic, while affecting food trade have also impacted on the world’s food systems and raised concerns for global food security. The EU is committed to keeping trade flowing and supply chains functioning, and supports international cooperation to promote food security.

Written by Lena Hirschenberger.

The Conference on the Future of Europe’s aim is to debate how the EU should develop in the future and to give European citizens a voice in the process, announced Commission President Ursula von der Leyen in her inaugural address.

People’s ideas will be collected on the Digital Platform, in European Citizens’ Panels and de-centralised conference events all over Europe. The Conference Plenary – comprised of representatives of the Citizens’ Panels, the Parliament, the Council, the Commission, national parliaments, the Committee of the Regions, the European Economic and Social Committee, social partners and the European Youth Forum – will then discuss the ideas put forward. Launched in April 2021, the conference is expected to reach conclusions and provide guidance for the European institutions to follow up, by spring 2022.

The conference topics are divided into nine areas, with one additional ‘open’ area, reserved for out-of-the-box ideas. The topics are: ‘Climate change and the environment‘, ‘Health‘, ‘A stronger economy, social justice and jobs‘, ‘European Union in the world‘, ‘Values and rights, rule of law, security‘, ‘Digital transformation‘, ‘European democracy‘, ‘Migration‘, ‘Education, culture, youth and sport‘, and ‘Other ideas‘.

‘Climate change and environment’ will look at how we can provide healthy and sustainably produced food, how we can power our lives through clean energy, how we can adapt our production, construction and transportation methods all while preserving the balance of our ecosystems and cutting pollution.

To support the proceedings of the conference, our EPRS policy analysts have prepared research material, available here in reverse chronological order. The following list will continually be updated as the conference unfolds:

Climate Change

European climate law
‘EU Legislation in Progress’ briefing by Gregor Erbach, June 2021, 12 pages.

President Biden’s climate summit
‘At a Glance’ note by Liselotte Jensen and Matthew Parry, May 2021, 2 pages.

EU climate action in ocean governance and fisheries policy
Briefing by Frederik Scholaert, April 2021, 12 pages.

EU hydrogen policy: Hydrogen as an energy carrier for a climate-neutral economy
Briefing by Gregor Erbach and Liselotte Jensen, April 2021, 8 pages.

Cohesion policy and climate change
‘At a Glance’ note by Agnieszka Widuto, March 2021, 1 page.
Available in Spanish, German, English, French, Italian and Polish

EU climate action policy: Responding to the global emergency
Study by Gregor Erbach et al., March 2021, 112 pages.

Carbon dioxide removal: Nature-based and technological solutions
Briefing by Gregor Erbach, February 2021, 8 pages.

What if we could engineer the planet to help fight climate change?
‘At a Glance’ note by Lieve Van Woensel, February 2021, 2 pages.

Reducing methane emissions: A new EU strategy to address global warming
Briefing by Henrique Morgado Simoes, December 2020, 8 pages.

EU climate target plan: Raising the level of ambition for 2030
Briefing by Liselotte Jensen, December 2020, 8 pages.

Sustainable aviation fuels
Briefing by Jaan Soone, November 2020, 10 pages.

European climate pact – Pre-legislative synthesis of national, regional and local positions on the European Commission’s initiative
Briefing by Claudio Collova and Vera Vikolainen, October 2020, 12 pages.

A Just Transition Fund for climate-neutral EU regions
Infographics by Sorina Ionescu, Giulio Sabbati and Frederik Scholaert, October 2020, 4 pages.

Transport CO2 emissions in focus
Infographics by Eulalia Claros Gimeno and Marketa Pape, October 2020, 2 pages.

Climate change and climate action
Ideas Paper by Gregor Erbach, July 2020, 11 pages.

EU agricultural policy and climate change
Briefing by James McEldowney, May 2020, 12 pages.

Climate Action: Latest state of play
Briefings by various EPRS authors, 6 pages.
Available for: Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Ireland, Lithuania, Luxembourg and Spain

Environment

Biodiversity protection: Where do we stand?
Briefing by Vivienne Halleux,  June 2021, 8 pages.

Trade policy for the Biodiversity Strategy 2030
‘At a glance’ note by Jana Titievskaia, June 2021, 2 pages.

LIFE programme for 2021-2027
‘At a glance’ note by Dessislava Yougova, April 2021, 2 pages.
Available in Spanish, German, English, French, Italian and Polish

Green and sustainable finance
Briefing by Stefano Spinaci, February 2021, 12 pages.

EU policy on air quality: Implementation of selected EU legislation
Study by Ekaterina Karamfilova, January 2021, 200 pages.

Sustainable Development Goals in EU regions
Briefing by Agnieska Widuto, December 2020, 8 pages.

Forest fires: Environmental stakes
Briefing by Vivienne Halleux, November 2020, 8 pages.

Palm oil: Economic and environmental impacts
‘At a Glance’ note by Martin Russell, November 2020, 2 pages.

Amazon deforestation and EU-Mercosur deal
‘At a Glance’ note by Gisela Grieger, October 2020, 2 pages.

Towards a mandatory EU system of due diligence for supply chains
Briefing by Ionel Zamfir, October 2020, 10 pages.

An EU legal framework to halt and reverse EU driven global deforestation
‘At a Glance’ note by Vivienne Halleux, October 2020, 2 pages.
Available in Spanish, German, English, French, Italian and Polish

An EU legal framework to halt and reverse EU-driven global deforestation: European added value assessment
Study by Tatjana Evas, Aleksandra Heflich and Cecilia Navarra, September 2020, 132 pages.

Decoupling economic growth from environmental harm
‘At a Glance’ note by Eamonn Noonan, July 2020, 2 pages.

Coronavirus and the trade in wildlife
Briefing by Vivienne Halleux, May 2020, 6 pages.

Written by Mihalis Kritikos.

Distributed computing has accelerated Covid‑19 research in molecular dynamics as it allows people to voluntarily make their computers available to scientists for effective virtual screening of chemical compounds. As computing initiatives grow to meet the increasing demand for massive computational power, this analysis examines the current applications and the surrounding legal and policy questions.

Computer simulations and their capacity to process inconceivable amounts of data in a very short time can be extremely effective in helping scientists map the behaviour and reveal the three-dimensional shape of all protein structures of a virus. The need for vast processing power to simulate the folding of the virus proteins can be met in two ways: by using the world’s fastest supercomputers and/or by seizing the opportunities that grid/distributed computing offers.

Edge computing carries the capacity for efficient processing of massive data sets and performing multifaceted simulations of the dynamics of protein molecules to understand the process of protein folding, which could serve as a basis for developing effective therapies. It is based on the integration of distributed resources of many computers into a single unit that effectively takes the form of a ‘virtual supercomputer’. As a form of citizen science (citizens participating in the scientific process via crowd-sourcing without any particular cognitive involvement), distributed computing that enables concurrent computation has been invaluable during the pandemic. It operates on the basis of allocating large computing tasks to different users on the grid and allowing anyone to contribute computing power to a common cause. In the context of Covid‑19, distributed computing has been used extensively to allow millions of volunteers worldwide to lend their processing power to scientists who require borderless access to distributed computing infrastructures and massive amounts of computational power to run complex simulations to model molecular dynamics.

Potential impacts and developments

The scientific community has mobilised a series of voluntary computing initiatives, such as Folding@home and Rosetta@home that simulate protein dynamics to help with the design of drugs to fight Covid‑19. The Folding@home project is by far the most powerful crowd-sourced supercomputer in the world, involving more than 1 000 000 computers, while, before the pandemic, 30 000 devices were running for Folding@home. It currently encompasses approximately 2.4 exaflops of computational power which is more raw computing power than the world’s 500 largest traditional supercomputers combined. The combined computing power of Folding@home, which also makes use of CERN’s computing resources, has been used to virtually screen 800 potential drug compounds.

Rosetta@home is another massive network of volunteer computers that allows citizen scientists to lend their computers’ CPUs and RAM for protein analysis tasks. Currently, Rosetta@home comprises nearly 4 406 203 hosts across 151 countries, collectively enabling an estimated 473 petaflops of volunteer cloud computing power, setting another successful example of donation of computing power for Covid‑19 research. Moreover, it is worth mentioning the OpenPandemics-COVID-19 project coordinated by the World Community Grid, an IBM social impact initiative that is currently screening hundreds of millions of molecules. This grid has accelerated the process of tackling Covid‑19 through the involvement of 7 047 819 devices and aims to develop an open source toolkit that could be used as a basis for seeking treatments in the event of future pandemics. Οther distributive initiatives include DreamLab, a specialised application developed by Vodafone, which accumulates the processing power of smartphones to analyse coronavirus-related complex data while phones are being charged, the Worldwide LHC Computing Grid at CERN, the Berkeley Open Infrastructure for Network Computing, SiDock@home COVID Moonshot and the Open Science Grid.

The European Union has been supporting several citizen science actions, such as the active and voluntary public participation in research as part of its Open Science policy. In the context of Covid‑19, the support has taken many forms and the promotion of distributed computing is one of the most prominent. Among others, Europe-based distributive computing projects include the work carried out by the Slovenia-based COVID.si, the Italian Institute for Nuclear Physics and the HADDOCK service on the WeNMR platform supported by the European Grid Infrastructure, which is the largest distributed computing infrastructure for research, bringing together hundreds of data centres worldwide.

Anticipatory policy-making

The distributed nature of the underlying computing network, where data are processed using computing resources anywhere, carries multiple policy challenges that involve questions about restricting access to the distributed computing system, safeguarding network security and privacy, and ensuring the smooth integration of computing, software and storage resources. More concretely, heterogeneity can become a challenge in the operation of these networks, as a varied group of hardware devices running various operating systems communicate among themselves to serve a particular purpose. Further, network security poses a fundamental challenge in terms of possible data leakage software piracy, integrity infringement and denial of service. The integration of different distributed components and possible malicious devices also creates privacy challenges in addition to more difficulty in troubleshooting and diagnostics due to distribution across multiple servers.

These challenges can be tackled efficiently if policy-makers aim to render distributed computing an essential part of high-computing frameworks and an attractive and trustworthy option for individuals who could donate spare computing power for a social reason. To achieve this, a series of requirements need to be met. First, an EU-wide registry of scientific projects that require computing power for massive and immediate processing could be created. Further, incentives that could bring thousands and/or millions of individual users under the same computing ‘roof’ would also need to be developed. Τhese incentives could take the form of tailoring applications and services to particular users’ specific requirements, and of promoting the benefits of open science and citizen science including the training of users, the empowerment of distributed digital infrastructures and the development of open-source software. Additionally, open-source components that could enable the access and processing of data collected/stored in different platforms and formats could be further developed. The European Commission’s adoption of its new open source software strategy 2020-2023 makes explicit reference to the need for sharing and reusing of software solutions, knowledge and expertise to benefit society.

The European Commission could develop funding schemes for the development of open and flexible distributed computing architecture based on common standards for the smooth integration of hardware and software components, on user-friendly and comprehensive repositories as well as on standards-based common interfaces that could address the challenges of privacy and cybersecurity. Fostering the development of data and computing e-infrastructure at the EU level and achieving their accessibility and interoperability – independent of the different data-driven technologies used – should be prioritised. Ensuring the connectivity of all European households and populated areas, which could further enhance the effectiveness of distributed computing initiatives, is an essential part of the Commission’s vision for Europe’s digital transformation by 2030, as was recently presented in the form of a digital compass. The success of the distributed projects to tackle Covid‑19 illustrates the need for the EU to invest further in the development of efficient, sound and user-friendly crowd-sourced distributed computing projects and for an in-depth examination of the factors that could increase the involvement of volunteers in these bottom-up efforts. This should be seen as part of a broader strategy for enhancing lay participation in scientific endeavours by facilitating digital accessibility and removing computational obstacles for communities and user groups that face serious technical and financial difficulties. The ultimate aim should be the gradual creation of a trustworthy federated European data and distributed computing infrastructure that is based on optimised access to IT equipment and services, on a clear definition of the goals and the objectives of each and every distributed computing project, as well as on the acknowledgment of the cost-effective character of distributed systems compared with the use of expensive supercomputers.

Read the complete ‘at a glance’ on ‘What if we could fight coronavirus by pooling computing power?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Angelos Delivorias.

Initial coin offerings (ICOs) are a relatively new method of raising capital for early-stage ventures. They allow businesses to raise capital for their projects, by issuing digital tokens in exchange for crypto assets or fiat currencies. They constitute an alternative to more traditional sources of start-up funding such as venture capital (VC) and angel finance.

ICOs can potentially offer advantages in comparison with traditional ways of raising capital. At the same time, their opacity and the general tendency for issuers to exploit regulatory loopholes can carry significant risk for investors, may make ICOs vulnerable to money laundering and terrorist financing, and could even create financial stability concerns.

ICOs have been met with a wide range of initial regulatory responses: from an outright ban in the case of China and South Korea, to more supportive approaches in other jurisdictions, with Singapore in Asia and Switzerland in Europe leading the way. As for the European Union (EU) and the United States, the relevant regulatory agencies initially published warning notices, reinforced by statements that securities laws could apply and registration be necessary. The EU went a step further and is currently seeking to partially regulate ICOs, with a proposal for a regulation on markets in crypto-assets (MiCA regulation). Meanwhile, some Member States are currently implementing regulatory sandboxes, to provide an impetus for innovation without imposing the immediate burden of regulation.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Understanding initial coin offerings: A new means of raising funds based on blockchain‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.