European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Maria Niestadt.

Tourism plays an enormously important role in the EU economy and society. It generates foreign exchange, supports jobs and businesses, and drives forward local development and cultural exchanges. It also makes places more attractive, not only as destinations to visit but also as locations to live, work, invest and study. Furthermore, as tourism is closely linked with many other sectors – particularly transport – it also affects the wider economy.

The coronavirus pandemic has hit the tourism sector hard. The impact on various tourist destinations in the EU has been asymmetrical and highly localised, reflecting differences in types of tourism on offer, varying travel restrictions, the size of domestic tourism markets, level of exposure to international tourism, and the importance of tourism in the local economy. At the beginning of summer 2021, several EU Member States started to remove certain travel restrictions (such as the requirements for quarantine or testing for fully vaccinated travellers coming from certain countries). However, all continue to apply many sanitary and health measures (such as limits on the number of people in common areas, and cleaning and disinfection of spaces). Such measures and restrictions change in line with the evolving public health situation, sometimes at short notice, making recovery difficult for the sector. The EU and its Member States have provided the tourism sector with financial and other support. Some measures were already adopted in 2020. Others were endorsed only shortly before the beginning of summer 2021. One flagship action has been the speedy adoption of an EU Digital Covid Certificate. This certificate harmonises, at EU level, proof of vaccination, Covid-19 test results and certified recovery from the virus. However, it does not end the patchwork of travel rules. Despite efforts to harmonise travel rules at Council level, Member States still apply different rules to various categories of traveller (such as children or travellers arriving from third countries).

Read the complete briefing on ‘Re-starting tourism in the EU amid the pandemic‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

• Contribution of travel and tourism to GDP (2020 change compared with 2019)
• Contribution of travel and tourism to employment (2020 change compared with 2019)

Written by Philip Boucher and Carl Pierer.

The European Commission published the much-anticipated Artificial Intelligence Act (AIA), an ambitious cross-sectoral attempt to regulate artificial intelligence (AI) applications on 21 April 2021. Its aim is to ensure that all European citizens can trust AI by providing proportionate and flexible rules – harmonised across the single market – to address the specific risks posed by AI systems and set the highest standards worldwide.

The proposal sets out a risk-based approach to regulating AI applications: those presenting an ‘unacceptable risk’ would be banned, those presenting a ‘high-risk’ would be subjected to additional requirements before entering the market, and others, such as chatbots and ‘deep fakes’, would be subject to new transparency requirements. Applications presenting ‘low or minimal risk’ – the vast majority of AI applications – could enter the market without restrictions, although voluntary codes of conduct may be developed. Other proposed measures include a European AI Board to monitor implementation and regulatory sandboxes to facilitate innovation.

In the context of the legislative proposal, STOA convened a meeting with the members of its International Advisory Board (INAB) on 24 June 2021, inviting Board members to present their views on the AIA and discuss them with the STOA Members. Participants welcomed the proposal as a timely and necessary step in the right direction. The Board members broadly agreed with the aims and approach of the AIA, but raised several points that they felt might require further reflection and discussion during the negotiation period.

Continuity from the AI White Paper’s focus on ‘AI Excellence’

Several key elements of the AIA were first set out in the AI White Paper. Some participants noted that the White Paper’s ambitious support for ‘AI excellence’ figures less prominently in the legislative proposal. Others highlighted what they saw as a missed opportunity to align AI development to the realisation of the Sustainable Development Goals. Other participants responded that the AIA focused upon product safety, and that support for innovation would be provided through other mechanisms. While many participants were pleased that the AIA proposed sandboxes for controlled experimentation with novel AI applications, they suggested that the explanation of how they would function in practice was insufficient. The Commission has indicated that further details would be set out in implementing acts.

List-based approach

The AIA includes list-based approaches to two of its key elements. First, the definition of AI technologies makes use of a list of techniques set out in Annex I. Second, the definition of high-risk applications includes safety components of products that are already subject to conformity assessment due to sectoral rules, as well as a list of additional applications categorised as high-risk applications, which is provided in Annex III. The Commission can update both annexes. Several participants argued that such an approach could lead to the AIA quickly becoming outdated, forcing the institutions into a constant ‘catch up’ stance following the emergence of new technologies, applications, and risks. It was suggested that, instead of lists, it may be better to rely upon criteria or principles to determine whether a specific piece of software would be defined as AI and to which risk category its applications may belong.

Some participants highlighted that the risk-based approach might not be appropriate for managing applications that are low-risk but high-frequency, such as targeted content delivery. It was suggested that low-risk applications could cumulate and interact to generate high-impact outcomes, some of which may be as serious as high-risk applications. Furthermore, high-risk applications in the AIA focus upon ‘critical’ domains of activity, such as essential services, infrastructure, employment and law enforcement. However, it was highlighted that AI systems that reinforce gender and racial discrimination remain an extremely serious risk, even in non-critical domains of activity. In this sense, the AIA may underestimate the pervasive character of the serious risks posed by AI throughout all domains of activity. It was also suggested that the focus on specific applications could represent a missed opportunity to address general purpose AI, which could become increasingly important in the years to come.

Governance and enforcement

A substantial part of the discussion focussed on enforcement and oversight, with several participants agreeing that reflection on the rules should go hand in hand with reflections on their enforcement. In the proposed AIA, national authorities would be responsible for enforcement of the AIA. An AI Board would be set up to monitor implementation and provide guidance. This Board would be comprised of Member State representatives and the European Data Protection Supervisor. Some participants were concerned that this approach could lead to uneven enforcement across the EU. In addition, some participants proposed that a group of experts could assist and advise the Board in their decisions on technically complex matters. Indeed, while it is not present in the AIA itself, the Commission has indicated its intention to establish such an expert group during the implementation process. Moreover, several participants highlighted the need for innovative approaches to regulation and implementation to keep up with the rapidly developing technology, welcoming the sandbox approach and calling for the elaboration of a wider range of innovative regulatory tools.  

Conformity assessment

Several participants raised issues relating to conformity assessment, in particular the question of who would be responsible for conducting it. For example, since the developers and deployers of AI systems are not always the same, it was suggested that the AIA should make a clearer distinction between these roles and their respective responsibilities when it comes to compliance and conformity assessment. Participants were concerned that failure to do so could have a chilling effect upon open source innovation.

Many participants commented on the need for access to data and algorithms in order to assess their conformity with the new rules. While AI providers may have the most profound understanding of their own data and algorithms, their role in assessing their own conformity may give raise to conflicts of interest and enforcement issues. On the other hand, it was suggested that some firms might be unwilling to provide authorities with access to their data and algorithms without guarantees about their use and safeguarding. Some participants stated that the key to conformity assessment would be to foster a healthy market for high-quality independent third party auditors, capable of assessing compliance while protecting firms’ data and algorithms. There was broad agreement on the importance of reflecting upon the role of data spaces and wider data governance issues, which are subject to other complementary initiatives.

Consumer protection

Some participants regretted the limited reference to consumer protection, as this could weaken the AIA’s effectiveness. They mentioned in particular the lack of mechanisms to address economic harms, to notify consumers of breaches, and to enable complaints and legal remedies. Furthermore, by prohibiting applications that intentionally manipulate behaviour in a way that gives rise to harms – rather than restricting any application that has this effect, regardless of intentions – some participants felt that the regulation might fail to effectively protect consumers. The AIA also includes specific protections for people with age-related or physical or mental vulnerability. While some participants suggested that the AIA should go further to protect vulnerable citizens, in particular children, others reasoned that the complexity of AI systems makes all consumers vulnerable in the sense that they struggle to make informed choices, and that the protections set out for vulnerable people in the draft AIA should apply to all citizens.

Next steps

The AIA is now subject to negotiation between the European Parliament and the Council. Meanwhile, other relevant legislative files are also under discussion, including the Data Governance Act, Digital Services Act, and a forthcoming Data Act.

There will be further opportunities for STOA and INAB members to discuss these proposals in the coming months. Meanwhile, stay informed about STOA’s Centre for AI and the International Advisory Board on the STOA website, or by following us on Twitter at @EP_ScienceTech.

Your opinion counts for us. To let us know what you think, get in touch via stoa@europarl.europa.eu.

• STOA meets its International Advisory Board to discuss the Artificial Intelligence Act
• STOA meets its International Advisory Board to discuss the Artificial Intelligence Act – Eva Kaili speaking

Written by Nicole Scholz.

While the pandemic is primarily a physical health crisis, it has also had widespread impact on people’s mental health, inducing, among other things, considerable levels of fear, worry, and concern. The growing burden on mental health has been referred to by some as the ‘second’ or ‘silent’ pandemic.

While negative mental health consequences affect all ages, young people, in particular, have been found to be at high risk of developing poor mental health. Specific groups have been particularly hard hit, including health and care workers, people with pre-existing mental health problems, and women. The pandemic has also appeared to increase inequalities in mental health, both within the population and between social groups.

To address the population’s increased psycho-social needs, the World Health Organization Regional Office for Europe established an expert group on the mental health impacts of Covid-19 in the European region. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development has issued analyses and guidance on mental health in general and the pandemic’s impact on mental health in particular.

At European Union level, a December 2020 European Commission communication addressed the pandemic’s impact on mental health. In May 2021, the Commission organised a major online stakeholder event, and published best practice examples of solutions presented.

A July 2020 European Parliament resolution recognises mental health as a fundamental human right, calling for a 2021-2027 EU action plan on mental health. Members of the European Parliament have also called on the Commission to put mental health at the heart of EU policymaking. Stakeholders broadly rally around calls for programmes and funding to improve citizens’ mental health, not least to respond to the pandemic’s long-term implications.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Mental health and the pandemic‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

The Western Balkan countries – Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), North Macedonia, Kosovo,(*) Montenegro and Serbia – have developed enduring relationships with the EU in their efforts to join the Union. At the 2003 Thessaloniki Summit, EU Member States engaged to fully and effectively support the European perspective of the Western Balkan countries, so that they would become an integral part of the EU once they meet the established criteria. However, over the years, expected progress has faltered. Regional disputes, such as the unresolved Serbia-Kosovo issue, as well as the fragile internal political environment in some of the countries, have effectively hindered the accession process. Following the 2008-2009 crisis, economies and investment have not developed fast enough either. The slow pace of reforms overall and the increasingly uncertain domestic context, coupled with growing influence of external actors, and the EU’s own internal difficulties, have complicated the case for enlargement. Many challenges remain, and the Covid‑19 pandemic put the region in the spotlight, deepening the gap between their European potential and realities on the ground, where the EU is competing with other global actors, such as Russia and China. In recent months, the Western Balkans have come under increased EU attention.

In February 2020, the European Commission presented a new enlargement methodology. The new approach aims to strengthen the process by pushing reforms forward, notably in the areas of rule of law and the economy. It aims to make the accession negotiations more credible, more predictable, more dynamic and guided by a stronger political steer. However, this new methodology could slow down accession negotiations, if internal reforms are not adopted at a certain pace. In March 2020, the European Council sent a positive signal by giving the green light to open accession negotiations with Albania and North Macedonia. However, substantive talks have not yet started. In May 2020, the EU-Western Balkans Summit in Zagreb reaffirmed unequivocal support for the European perspective of the Western Balkans. The EU is determined to strengthen its support to the region’s political, economic, and social transformation. The Investment Plan, adopted in October 2020, will use some €9 billion with the aim of spurring the long-term economic recovery of the region and its convergence with the European Union. Slovenia, which holds the Presidency of the Council of the European Union, between 1 July and 31 December 2021, strongly supports the Western Balkan countries’ accession process, and has announced that it will host an EU–Western Balkans summit in autumn 2021.

EPRS publications

Albania: No closer to joining the EU
‘At a glance’ note by Branislav Stanicek, June 2021
A candidate country since 2014, Albania has made slow progress in its advance to EU membership. This is particularly due to persistent corruption, lack of media freedom and minority rights, as well as a dysfunctional judicial system.

North Macedonia’s accession prospects dimmed
‘At a glance’ note by Branislav Stanicek, June 2021
North Macedonia became an EU candidate country in 2004, but bilateral disputes with neighbouring Greece and Bulgaria have so far blocked its accession negotiations.

Serbia: EU accession progress stalled
‘At a glance’ note by Branislav Stanicek, June 2021
The EU launched accession negotiations with Serbia in 2013, but since then the process has stalled due to unresolved regional issues such as the dialogue with Pristina.

Bosnia and Herzegovina: Difficult path towards EU membership
‘At a glance’ note by Branislav Stanicek, June 2021
Despite Bosnia and Herzegovina being identified as an accession candidate in 2003, internal political instability and lack of political reforms have dampened the country’s prospects of joining the EU.

Montenegro: 2019 and 2020 country reports
‘At a glance’ note by Branislav Stanicek, May 2021
The European Commission’s reports on Montenegro in 2019 and 2020 confirmed progress in accession negotiations. However, the Commission deplored the state of freedom of expression and media freedom.

EU support for vaccination efforts in the Western Balkans
‘At a glance’ note by Branislav Stanicek, May 2021
The coronavirus pandemic has accentuated the call for global solidarity and increased the need for health care and social support in the Western Balkans. The EU’s response has included the ‘Team Europe’ facility, but also delivery of vaccines to the region, where the EU is competing with other global actors, such as Russia and China.

Belgrade-Pristina dialogue: The rocky road towards a comprehensive normalisation agreement
Briefing by Branislav Stanicek, March 2021
Despite the initial success of the Brussels Agreement in 2013, the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue remains stalled due to deep-rooted historical tensions and asymmetrical expectations regarding the normalisation agreement.

Macro-financial assistance to enlargement and neighbourhood partners in the coronavirus crisis
‘At a glance’ note by Branislav Stanicek, May 2020
In April 2020, the European Commission submitted a proposal for a decision for macro-financial assistance (MFA) to support ten enlargement and neighbourhood partner countries in their efforts to mitigate the economic and social consequences of the coronavirus pandemic, for a total amount of €3 billion.

A new approach to EU enlargement
Briefing by Branislav Stanicek, March 2020
A revised methodology for EU enlargement was announced in February 2020, aiming to boost the accession process by making negotiations more transparent and efficient.

Further reading

The six policy priorities of the von der Leyen Commission. State of play in spring 2021
In-depth Analysis, edited by Étienne Bassot, April 2021
See chapter, ‘A stronger Europe in the world’, by Branislav Stanicek

Towards a more resilient Europe post-coronavirus. Options to enhance the EU’s resilience to structural risks
Study by EPRS, DGs IPOL and EXPO, European Parliament, April 2021
See chapter, ‘Stabilising the European Neighbourhood’, by Branislav Stanicek

EPRS Graphics Warehouse COVID-19 pandemic: annual excess mortality rate in the European Union and in the Western Balkans

COVID-19 pandemic: annual excess mortality rate in the European Union and in the Western Balkans

Български (jpg | pdf) – Deutsch (jpg | pdf) – Ελληνικά (jpg | pdf) – English (jpg | pdf) – Français (jpg | pdf) – Hrvatski (jpg | pdf) – Italiano (jpg | pdf) – Magyar (jpg | pdf) – Română (jpg | pdf) – Slovenščina (jpg | pdf) – SV (jpg | pdf)

Graphic taken from the EPRS At-a-glance Note ‘EU support for vaccination efforts in the Western Balkans‘.

Written by Issam Hallak.

On 3 March 2021, the United Kingdom (UK) Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Brandon Lewis, announced in a written statement to the UK Parliament, and without consulting the European Union (EU) in advance, that the grace period on border controls on a series of food and live products shipped from Great Britain to Northern Ireland would be extended. This meant that products of animal origin, composite products, food and feed of non-animal origin and plants and plant products could continue being shipped from Great Britain to Northern Ireland without the official certification, such as health and phytosanitary certificates, required by the Protocol on Ireland / Northern Ireland (the Protocol) of the Withdrawal Agreement (WA).

In response to the UK’s decision, the EU launched legal action against the UK for breaching the provisions of the Protocol, as well as the good faith obligation under the WA. According to the Protocol, the UK must establish border controls on goods moving between Great Britain and Northern Ireland according to EU law. The application of EU law to Northern Ireland, together with the conduct of border controls within the UK, was designed to prevent the establishment of physical border controls (a ‘hard border’) on the island of Ireland, so as to safeguard the Good Friday/Belfast Agreement which brought peace in Northern Ireland, while preserving the integrity of the EU’s single market.

The grace period on border controls was agreed by the EU and the UK in December 2020 as a temporary solution to problems raised by the UK. The UK government has reiterated that it intends to implement the Protocol, but that the border controls are causing trade disruption between Great Britain and Northern Ireland and require time to be resolved. It has also mentioned other issues involving areas as diverse as medicinal supplies and parcel shipments, as well as the complexity of customs systems and implementation of exchange of information between the EU and the UK. On 30 June 2021, the EU and the UK reached an agreement on some solutions, including the extension of the grace period on meat products, conditional on tight controls.

Read the complete briefing on ‘EU-UK relations: Difficulties in implementing the Northern Ireland Protocol‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

• Northern Ireland purchases/imports and sales/exports, 2018
• EU share of total trade (imports plus exports) by UK nation, 2017-2020

Written by Katarzyna Sochacka and Clare Ferguson.

During the July 2021 plenary session in Strasbourg, Parliament continued to debate and adopt Multiannual Financial Framework programmes for 2021-2027, this time finalising programmes in the justice and home affairs, fisheries and infrastructure areas. Debates on a number of Council and Commission statements were held, including on the programme of activities of the Slovenian Council Presidency, on the conclusions of the European Council meeting of 24-25 June 2021, on the Commission’s 2022 work programme, on the state of play of implementation of the EU Digital Covid Certificate Regulation, on the impact of the Covid-19 crisis in aviation, and on the 70th anniversary of the Geneva (refugee) Convention. A number of other debates were held, inter alia on the rule of law and fundamental rights in Hungary and Poland, on amendments to the Visa Information System, and on European Investment Bank activities in 2019. Members also debated international policy issues – the situation in Nicaragua, the repression of the opposition in Turkey, and the situation in Tigray, Ethiopia.

Connecting Europe Facility and smart ‘TEN-T’

Following a joint debate, Members adopted at second reading agreements on the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) and ‘smart TEN T’. These legislative initiatives seek to renew not only trans-European transport networks (TEN-T), but also energy and digital connections across the Union. While the proposals for a ‘smart TEN-T’ aim at financing a programme of swifter transport permit processes, the CEF proposal aims at establishing a funding infrastructure to facilitate investment in key network projects. The €30 billion allocated to the CEF will be shared between measures to upgrade transport, energy and digital networks.

Eighth Environment Action Programme

Members debated and adopted Parliament’s negotiating position on the Commission’s proposal on the eighth EU environment action programme for 2021‑2030 that should encourage a societal step-change, through a ‘sustainability first’ approach, to implementing measures to reach the EU’s long-term environmental goals. The Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI) Committee may now start trilogue negotiations. The committee calls for priority objectives to be achieved by 2030, including ending fossil fuel subsidies by 2025, with the programme becoming a governance tool for environmental policy beyond the Green Deal.

Justice and home affairs funds

Following a joint debate, Members adopted at second reading the agreed texts of the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund and the Integrated Border Management Fund for 2021-2027. The first aims at strengthening the common European asylum system, supporting legal migration and countering irregular migration, as well as managing migrants’ return and readmission to third countries. Parliament has succeeded in ensuring the fund better focuses on solidarity and responsibility, including legal migration, as well as efficient management of migration flows. The second fund provides financial support, allocated proportionately to the countries most affected by requirements for external border management and visas. Parliament also adopted, at second reading, the new Internal Security Fund (ISF) to tackle terrorism and radicalisation, organised crime and cybercrime, and to assist victims. With a final budget allocation of €1.9 billion, the ISF aims to ensure a high level of security within the EU aligned with fundamental rights protection.

European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund

Members adopted a hard-won agreement at second reading with the Council to continue funding the common fisheries policy through the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund. The change to the fund’s name reflects an increased focus on aquaculture. While financial assistance to shipping fleets would be extended to cover 12‑24 m vessels, stricter conditions will apply.

European Medicines Agency

Members adopted Parliament’s negotiating position on the Commission proposal to reinforce and extend the mandate of the European Medicines Agency (EMA), referring it back to the ENVI committee for trilogue negotiations. The proposal aims at stronger EMA coordination of the EU response to health crises, particularly in respect of monitoring and mitigating critical medicine and medical device shortages, which proved to be a weakness during the pandemic, as well as greater EU coordination of clinical trials.

Draft Amending Budget No 3/2021

Members adopted Amending Budget No 3/2021, which enters the 2020 general budget surplus, totalling almost €1.77 billion (less than in the previous year), as revenue in the 2021 budget. The surplus mainly results from higher than expected customs duties and lower expenditure – partly due to Covid‑19. Under the current rules, Member States’ gross national income contributions to the 2021 budget will be reduced, but Parliament wants all available funding used to boost the coronavirus recovery, and accordingly calls for Member States to dedicate the surplus amounts to assisting victims of the pandemic.

Financial activities of the European Investment Bank (EIB) – Annual report 2019

Financing the Green Deal and Europe’s long-term climate ambitions is increasingly the focus of the European Investment Bank (EIB). However, the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (CONT) on the control of the EIB’s financial activities in 2019 highlights the danger that a lack of transparency and accountability could lead to fraud and corruption in respect of the bank’s operations. Members endorsed the committee’s report following a debate in the presence of Werner Hoyer, President of the EIB.

Protection of the EU’s financial interests

Members also voted on a CONT committee report on the European Commission’s 2019 report on protection of the EU’s financial interests and the fight against fraud – an issue of particular concern given the need to ensure sound management of coronavirus recovery funding. Fraudulent activity appears stable in 2019, although detection remains difficult and violations of public procurement rules in the health sector are of particular concern. The CONT committee notes that over half the reported fraud in 2019 concerns only two Member States, and calls for improved information exchange, data collection and control.

EU privacy rules conflicting with measures to combat child sexual abuse online

Members debated and adopted an agreement at first reading on EU privacy rules with measures to combat child sexual abuse online. The proposal to exempt internet providers from e‑privacy measures temporarily, so that they can legitimately remove child sexual abuse material online, raises serious concerns, particularly in respect of the unintended consequences for fundamental rights to privacy and data protection. Parliament’s negotiators have secured the exclusion of audio communications from the regulation’s scope, as well as mandatory impact assessments of data protection, and compulsory human review.  

LGBTI rights in the EU – Recent developments following the Hungarian law

Members debated and adopted a resolution on breaches of EU law and on the right of LGBTIQ citizens in Hungary as a result of the adopted legal changes in the Hungarian Parliament. On 15 June 2021, the Hungarian Parliament adopted a law originally intended to fight paedophilia, but which includes clauses prohibiting the portrayal to minors of homosexuality and gender reassignment. Additionally, the law prohibits homosexuality and gender reassignment from being featured in sex education classes, and stipulates that such classes can now only be taught by registered organisations. The law came into force on 8 July and has generated widespread criticism at EU level.  

Opening of trilogue negotiations

Members confirmed the mandate for negotiations from the Transport and Tourism (TRAN) Committee on the proposal for a regulation on the capacity of the European Aviation Safety Agency to act as performance review body for the Single European Sky.

Read this at a glance note on ‘Plenary round-up – July 2021‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Micaela Del Monte and Rafał Mańko.

Law-making by the executive is a phenomenon that exists not only in the European Union (EU) but also in its Member States, as well as in other Western liberal democracies. Many national legal systems differentiate between delegated legislation − adopted by the executive and having the same legal force as parliamentary legislation − and purely executive acts −aimed at implementing parliamentary legislation, but that may neither supplement nor modify it.

In the EU, the distinction between delegated acts and implementing acts was introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon. The distinction, laid down in Articles 290 and 291 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), seems clear only at first sight. Delegated acts are defined as non-legislative acts of general application, adopted by the European Commission on the basis of a delegation contained in a legislative act. They may supplement or amend the basic act, but only as to non-essential aspects of the policy area. In contrast, implementing acts are not defined as to their legal nature, but to their purpose − where uniform conditions for implementing legally binding Union acts are needed. Under no circumstances may an implementing act modify anything in the basic act.

Delegated acts differ from implementing acts in particular with regard to the procedural aspects of their adoption − the former after consulting Member States’ experts, but their view is not binding; the latter in the comitology procedure, where experts designated by the Member States, sitting on specialised committees, can object to a draft implementing act. In the case of delegated acts, however, the Parliament and Council can introduce, in the delegation itself, a right to object to a draft act or even to revoke the delegation altogether.

Both delegated and implementing acts are subject to judicial review by the Court of Justice of the EU which controls their conformity with the basic act.

Read the complete in-depth analysis on ‘Understanding delegated and implementing acts‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Costica Dumbrava.

The EU and its Member States are increasingly turning to artificial intelligence (AI) technologies in their efforts to strengthen border control and mitigate security risks related to cross-border terrorism and serious crime. This is a recent manifestation of a broader trend towards a ‘smartening’ of EU borders, a trend that also includes the development and interlinking of large-scale centralised information systems and the deployment of a decentralised information exchange mechanism for borders and security. These systems have gradually been expanded and upgraded in order to cover ever more categories of persons (that is, to close ‘information gaps’) and to process increasingly varied types of data (including an increased processing of biometric data).

In the course of history, states have been quick to co-opt ‘new’ technologies in order to solve the typically modern problem of accurately identifying individuals for the purpose of controlling mobility and tackling crime. Regardless of the sophistication and effectiveness of various identification technologies and tools (passports, body measurements, fingerprinting, photography, lie detectors or face recognition systems), their adoption has always reflected the scientific, social and political views and concerns that dominated in the relevant times and locations.

This paper identifies and discusses four major types of AI applications that the EU is using or considering using in the context of border control and border security: 1) biometric identification (automated fingerprint and face recognition); 2) emotion detection; 3) algorithmic risk assessment; and 4) AI tools for migration monitoring, analysis and forecasting.

The EU’s centralised information systems for borders and security are increasingly incorporating biometric technologies for the purpose of identity verification or identification. Automated fingerprint identification technology is currently used in three information systems (the Schengen Information System, the European dactyloscopy database (Eurodac) and the Visa Information System) and will also be used in another two (the Entry/Exit System and the European Criminal Record Information System for third-Country nationals). Automated face recognition technology (FRT) is not yet used in any EU information system, but all systems except one (the European Travel Information Authorisation System) are expected to process facial images in the near future for the purpose of verification and/or identification.

Emotion detection technologies constitute one of the most controversial applications of AI at borders and elsewhere. Whereas there are currently no emotion-detection systems deployed at EU borders, a number of EU-funded projects and initiatives have explored and piloted such technologies for the purpose of enhancing border control.

Apart from verifying and identifying known persons, AI algorithms are also used to identify unknown persons of interest based on specific data-based risk profiles. Algorithmic profiling for assessing individual risks of security and irregular migration is currently being developed in the context of the Visa Information System and the European Travel Information Authorisation System. Automated, intelligence-driven risk assessment is carried out by Member States in the framework of the exchange of passenger data among them.

The EU is also investing in AI-based tools for monitoring, analysing and forecasting migration trends and security threats. The European Asylum Support Office is currently using an early warning and forecasting system to predict the number of asylum applications. The European Commission and the EU agencies in the area of freedom, security and justice are exploring other applications in this field, including in the context of the development of the Frontex EUROSUR system and the Europol innovation hub.

There are clear benefits to be reaped from a careful adoption of AI technologies in the context of border control, such as increased capacity to detect fraud and abuses, better and timely access to relevant information for taking decisions, and enhanced protection of vulnerable people. However, these benefits need to be balanced against the significant risks posed by these technologies to fundamental rights.

Despite progress regarding biometric identification technologies, the accuracy of the results still varies across technologies and depends on contextual factors. Even the relatively well-established fingerprint identification applications face challenges, in particular at the stage of the collection of biometric data (related to, for example, subjects’ age and environmental conditions). The reliability of face recognition technologies in ‘real world’ settings is highly dependent on the quality of the images captured and on the quality of the algorithms used for biometric matching. The quality of the algorithms depends, in turn, on the quality of the training datasets (including the quality, completeness and relevance of training images) and the various optimisation techniques. Serious doubts exist about the scientific basis and reliability of emotion-detection algorithms. Concerns about data accuracy have been raised with regard to many EU information systems and information exchange frameworks for borders and security.

Face recognition technologies have come under increased scrutiny due to concerns about fundamental rights, in particular risks related to bias and discrimination, data protection and mass surveillance. Whereas great attention has been paid to the issue of bias and discrimination, it must be noted that even accurate and unbiased AI systems may pose significant other risks, including to data protection and privacy. The increased use of biometric data in EU information systems amplifies the risk of unlawful profiling (for example, facial images may reveal ethnic origin). Even when profiling is not based on biometric or personal data, other types of data or combinations thereof used for algorithmic profiling may lead to discrimination based on prohibited grounds. Existing safeguards, such as the human-in-the-loop safeguard (requiring human interaction) and the right to explanation may not be sufficient to tackle these risks. As transpired in the case of an EU-funded research project focused on developing emotion-detection technologies, there is a need to enhance the transparency and oversight of EU funding on AI research, in particular in highly consequential areas such as borders and security.

Finally, the development and adoption of powerful AI technologies would benefit from a full understanding of and reflection on broader aspects, including the historical roots of technologies and the prevailing social and political views and expectations. Adopting technologies without confronting pitfalls such as technological determinism and the myth of technological neutrality would further weaken fundamental rights, transparency and accountability.

Read the complete in-depth analysis on ‘Artificial intelligence at EU borders: Overview of applications and key issues‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Overview of the European information systems for borders and security

Citizens often send messages to the President of the European Parliament (or to the institution’s public portal) expressing their views on current issues and/or requesting action from the Parliament. The Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (Ask EP) within the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) looks into these issues and replies to the messages, which may sometimes be identical as part of wider public campaigns.

The President of the European Parliament has recently received a large number of messages asking for the liberation of Leonard Peltier, a Native American activist who was convicted to two consecutive life sentences for the murders of two FBI agents in 1977 and has been imprisoned ever since. Citizens first began to write in June 2021 to ask the European Parliament and its President to intervene in favour of the release of Leonard Peltier.

Please find below the main points of the reply sent to citizens who took the time to write to the President of the European Parliament on this matter (in English and Italian).

Main points made in the reply in English

The President of the European Parliament has no mandate to resolve situations that fall within the remit of national authorities, in particular regarding administrative and judicial proceedings. Furthermore, the European Parliament President is not permitted to give instructions to Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) who, under Article 2 of the Statute for Members of the European Parliament, exercise their mandate freely and independently.

Several Members of the European Parliament have previously raised the case of Leonard Peltier. For example, on 19 May 2015, MEPs addressed a parliamentary question regarding the imprisonment of Leonard Peltier to the former Head of EU diplomacy Federica Mogherini. The EU’s chief diplomat is in charge of shaping and carrying out the EU’s foreign and security policy. In her reply, Ms Mogherini declared that she was aware of the situation concerning Mr Leonard Peltier. However, she stated she was not aware of any link between Mr Peltier’s advocacy activities and his prosecution and sentencing for murder, nor with the refusal of his request for parole.

Main points made in the reply in Italian

Il Presidente del Parlamento europeo non ha alcun mandato per risolvere situazioni che rientrano nelle competenze delle autorità nazionali, in particolare per quanto riguarda i procedimenti amministrativi e giudiziari. Inoltre, non può dare istruzioni di voto ai deputati al Parlamento europeo, che sono liberi e indipendenti nel loro ruolo, come previsto dall’articolo 2 dello statuto dei deputati del Parlamento europeo.

Diversi deputati al Parlamento europeo hanno sollevato in precedenza il caso di Leonard Peltier. Ad esempio, il 19 maggio 2015 i deputati hanno presentato un’interrogazione parlamentare, relativa alla detenzione di Leonard Peltier, a Federica Mogherini, ex capo della diplomazia UE. Il ruolo del capo della diplomazia UE è quello di definire e attuare la politica estera e di sicurezza dell’Unione. Nella sua risposta, la sig.ra Mogherini ha dichiarato di essere a conoscenza di questa situazione. Tuttavia, la sig.ra Mogherini ha affermato di non essere a conoscenza di alcun nesso tra l’attivismo politico di Peltier e la sua incriminazione e condanna per omicidio, e nemmeno con il rifiuto della sua richiesta di libertà condizionale.

Written by Beata Rojek.

Each year, millions of live animals are transported by road, sea, rail and air within, and to and from, the European Union, for a number of reasons, such as slaughter, fattening or breeding. To protect their welfare during those journeys, the EU adopted Regulation 1/2005 on the protection of animals during transport. An evaluation of the regulation showed that, when correctly implemented and enforced, it had a positive impact on animal welfare. However, in some areas weaknesses still persist, largely due to insufficient implementation. In the light of these conclusions, and bearing in mind its 2012-2015 animal welfare strategy, the European Commission announced its intention to revise the animal welfare legislation, including legislation on animal transport. Despite the action taken, however, in recent years, repeated breaches of the rules, resulting in accidents and severe animal welfare crises, have been highlighted by EU and national control bodies and by animal welfare organisations.

On 19 June 2020, the European Parliament set up the Committee of Inquiry on the Protection of Animals during Transport (ANIT). The work of the committee focused on investigating how EU rules laid down in Regulation 1/2005 are being implemented by Member States and enforced by the European Commission. It held public hearings with the participation of stakeholders, representatives of national authorities and experts. Insight from these debates fed into the committee’s report and recommendations to Council and the Commission.

This briefing is one of four requested by the ANIT committee to provide research and analysis following the results of a questionnaire sent out by the committee to Member States. It gives an overview of available data on the transport of live animals.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Protection of animals during transport: Data on live animal transport‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

The development of novel health technologies is a complex and costly process that follows an extensive set of regulatory guidelines and legal provisions intended to ensure that the treatments reach the patients that need them in a highly controlled and standardised manner. In the European Union (EU), the first step in the path to market access for a new therapeutic intervention is the marketing authorisation procedure coordinated by the European Medicines Agency (EMA), in which applicants have to provide evidence of the safety, quality and efficacy of their product, which is mainly derived from the conduct of clinical trials. Once approval has been granted, each individual EU Member State will decide on how the drug will be introduced into their healthcare systems based on nationally diverging criteria determining its price setting, reimbursement conditions and clinical application.

However, in recent years, this established paradigm has faced increasing criticism from authors in the field, especially in relation to cancer treatment, who have highlighted its contribution to the existence of a research gap between the pre-approval development of anticancer medicines and their post-approval use in real-life practice. A drug-centred attitude dominates the present framework, leaving important patient-focused aspects relating to the real-world utilisation of antitumor therapies unaddressed, including how to combine them with existing health technologies, how their effectiveness compares to that of therapeutically relevant alternatives, how long they have to be administered to achieve the desired effects, whether a lower dose could produce the same results with potentially fewer toxic side effects and how they perform in terms of patient-relevant outcome measures such as quality of life and overall survival.

This situation has led to calls for a transition towards a new paradigm that puts the patient at the centre of clinical drug development and places a strong emphasis on treatment optimisation.Treatment optimisation, which has also been called applied research, seeks to optimise the way health technologies are used in real-world conditions through the conduct of studies designed to provide an answer to one or more of the above mentioned questions. It is not intended to replace the current clinical research framework; instead, it aims to generate results complementing those of the registrational trials as a way to bridge the research gap. However, a number of crucial questions remain regarding the ideal features of treatment optimisation studies, as well as their acceptability among the actors involved in the development and adoption into practice of novel therapies.

Read the complete study on ‘Treatment optimisation in drug development‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marcin Szczepański (1st edition) .

With public financing of enterprises on the rise globally, and substantially increased as a result of the pandemic, subsidisation has become an issue of growing concern in competitive markets. In May 2021 the European Commission published a proposal for a regulation on distortive foreign subsidies. It follows a 2020 white paper that identified gaps in the trade laws and put forward ways to close them. The draft regulation aims to tackle those foreign subsidies that have a distortive effect on the single market. It proposes to do so by giving the Commission powers to investigate subsidies granted by non-EU public authorities to companies operating on the internal market. If these are found to be distortive, the Commission will be able to apply redressive measures. The regulation proposes three new tools: two are notification-based, enabling the Commission to: investigate foreign subsidies in companies’ mergers and acquisitions; and investigate the bids in large public procurement procedures, involving third-country government support. The acquirer or bidder will be required to give ex-ante notification of external financial contribution. The third tool is an ex‑officio tool enabling the Commission to take the initiative to investigate other market situations. As co-legislators, Parliament and Council will now begin analysing the proposal.

Versions

Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on foreign subsidies distorting the internal market Committee responsible: International Trade (INTA) COM(2021) 0223 of 5.5.2021 Rapporteur:

To be appointed

2020/0114(COD) Shadow rapporteurs: To be appointed Ordinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Initial discussions in committee

Written by Svetla Tanova-Encke.

The planned deployment of 5G technology in Europe comes with many expectations, but also with some serious concerns. What do we know about the technology behind the fifth generation of mobile networks? What are the benefits for society and the economy? How will the new technologies be implemented and regulated? Does 5G have an impact on our health and on the environment? Is 5G a security risk?

The new 5G digital knowledge map from the European Science-Media Hub (ESMH; https://map.sciencemediahub.eu/5g) addresses this complex topic in a new interdisciplinary and interactive way. It looks at the new technology from different angles: from the technology itself and the politics surrounding it, to business, health concerns, cybersecurity and impacts on society. The idea is to present all these aspects and the interlinkages among them as objectively as possible in a wider context.

An interactive, playful way to explore a complex issue

The vast content, equivalent in terms of size to an 80‑page publication, is presented in a visual, interactive and non-linear way, allowing the reader to explore the information across different layers.

At first glance, you will see an overview of the map with all its parts. (5G technology, regulation and politics, economy, health concerns, and impact on society). From this first level, zoom in to click on in-depth information on your chosen topic. The details can be found in 81 different explanatory ‘bubbles’. These highlight scientific findings wherever possible and for full transparency, provide links to a total of 488 sources.

The map is enriched with 11 interviews (the majority in video format) with experts in the different fields. Nine infographics complement the content visually. Finding specific information is made easy through a search bar and table of contents, and a glossary explains the technical terms. The ESMH team worked with many knowledgeable experts, including within EPRS, to ensure the information is trustworthy. The map was produced in cooperation with Kontextlab (Munich, Germany), who developed software combining the visual structures of mind and concept maps with multiple layers and a content management system, to build and publish digital knowledge maps. Their expertise lies in using new techniques to explain complex topics in the most accessible way for a general audience.

What content can you find in the different sections? 5G technology

This section explains the technological details. This part of the map presents the 5G system, the underlying technological components and key services made available by 5G from a technical point of view – such as Massive Machine Type Communication or Ultra Reliable Low Latency Communication. Several infographics illustrate technical aspects in detail.

Regulation and politics

In this important section, the map covers policy-making, the standard-setting process and the related work at the European level. The international relations and cybersecurity aspects of 5G are also explained here. The map includes interviews with several policy-making, international relations and cybersecurity experts.

Economy

This section shows expectations related to businesses and jobs. The map explores what 5G means more concretely for the future of e.g. e-health, smart cities and smart factories, self-driving vehicles or augmented virtual reality.

Health concerns

A major part of the map is dedicated to health concerns. Here, the main takeaways from two STOA studies (recently completed) dealing with the impact of 5G on health and the environment are incorporated. The aim is also to illustrate the scientific discussion and link it to the currently available knowledge – from researchers and from entities such as the World Health Organization (WHO) and its International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC), or the International Commission on Non-Ionizing Radiation Protection (ICNIRP).

Impact on society

Here, we explain the positive expectations, as well as the concerns around 5G technologies. Experts discuss the relationship between technologies, people, democracy and data protection. In this section, you will also find information about the phenomena of conspiracy theories and misinformation.

Follow us on Twitter at @EP_ScienceTech to stay informed about our activities. https://twitter.com/EP_ScienceTech/status/1400107164686077955

Your opinion counts for us. To let us know what you think, get in touch via stoa@europarl.europa.eu.

Written by Beata Rojek with Morgane Speeckaert.

Each year, millions of live animals are transported by road, sea, rail and air within, and to or from, the European Union, for a number of reasons, such as slaughter, fattening or breeding. To protect their welfare during those journeys, the EU adopted Regulation 1/2005 on the protection of animals during transport. An evaluation of the regulation showed that, when correctly implemented and enforced, it had a positive impact on the welfare of animals. However, in some areas weaknesses still persist, largely due to insufficient implementation. In light of these conclusions, and bearing in mind its 2012-2015 animal welfare strategy, the European Commission developed guidelines for handling animals during transport, to be disseminated and used for training of transport personnel and enforcement agents. Despite these measures, however, in recent years, repeated breaches of the rules, resulting in accidents and severe animal welfare crises, have been highlighted by EU and national control bodies and by animal welfare organisations.

On 19 June 2020, the European Parliament set up the Committee of Inquiry on the Protection of Animals during Transport (ANIT). The work of the committee focussed on investigating how EU rules are being implemented by Member States and enforced by the European Commission. It held public hearings with the participation of stakeholders, representatives of national authorities, and experts. Insight from these debates fed into the committee’s report and recommendations to the Council and the Commission.

This briefing is one of four requested by the ANIT Committee to provide research and analysis following the results of a questionnaire sent out by the Committee to Member States. It focuses on one of the topics investigated by the Committee, namely the use and dissemination in Member States of guidelines on the protection of animals during transport. It also gives an overview of available species-specific research on the welfare of animals during transport.

Read this complete briefing on ‘Protection of animals during transport: Guidelines and research‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Klemen Žumer and Yann-Sven Rittelmeyer.

Since 1991 the Republic of Slovenia has had a parliamentary system composed of the Državni zbor (National Assembly) and the Državni svet (National Council). The Slovenian Parliament has the features of an ‘incomplete bicameral system‘, based on ‘asymmetric duality‘ – the National Council has less authority and fewer competences than the National Assembly, in accordance with Chapter IV of the Constitution.

The National Assembly is described as the ‘supreme representative and legislative institution, exercising legislative and electoral powers as well as control over the Executive‘. Its members are elected every four years from nine constituencies by a universal, equal, direct, and secret vote. Different, specific, rules apply to the election of one member each of the Italian and Hungarian national communities. The Government of Slovenia is accountable to the National Assembly, and the Prime Minister is elected by the National Assembly by a majority vote of all of its members.

The National Council is the representative body for social, economic, professional, and local interests and has mainly a consultative role. According to Article 96 of the Constitution, it is composed of a fixed number of representatives of labour and social interests (employers, employees, farmers, crafts and trades, independent professions and non-commercial fields) and representatives of local interests (territorial interests). The members do not hold office professionally and are elected for a five-year term from the relevant interest organisations or local communities. Political parties are not specifically represented in the National Council but it is not entirely free of political influence, especially when it comes to members representing local interests.

The National Assembly is the sole body that can adopt laws, under a legislative procedure governed by the Constitution and the Rules of Procedure of the National Assembly. Legislative proposals may be initiated by the Government, any Assembly member, a minimum of 5 000 voters (Article 88 of the Constitution), or by the National Council (Article 97). Whereas the National Assembly is in charge of adopting the laws, the primary role of the National Council is to convey its opinion and it has a ‘suspensive veto’ that allows to ask the National Assembly to examine a law once more, within seven days of its adoption and before its promulgation. Like the National Assembly, the National Council can also demand inquiries on matters of public importance, when this is requested by a third of its members (Article 93).

Read this complete briefing on ‘The Slovenian Parliament and EU affairs‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Philip Boucher.

When we talk about artificial intelligence (AI), we often use metaphors. Even the term ‘AI’ relies upon a metaphor for the human quality of intelligence, and its development is regularly described as a ‘race’. While metaphors are useful in highlighting some features of their subject, they can be so powerful that it becomes difficult to imagine or discuss their subject in other terms. Here, we examine some challenges presented by the central metaphor of ‘intelligence’, and whether metaphors for AI and its development emphasise competition at the cost of cooperation. Perhaps new metaphors could help us to articulate ambitious visions for AI, and new criteria for success.

Metaphors play a remarkable role in human history. They provide useful shortcuts to help us understand complex concepts, as well as powerful images of the world and how it could or should be in future. Whether unintentionally framing subjects or deliberately mobilising arguments, metaphors open some ways of thinking while closing others down. So, while they are an integral part of language and communication, specific choices of metaphors are worth reflection and care in how they are used.

AI is an umbrella term which refers to a wide range of technologies. It includes ‘expert systems’ – whereby humans encode their own knowledge and experience into rules – as well as ‘machine learning’ systems that identify patterns in data to generate rules by themselves. Discussions of AI are replete with metaphors for both the technology and its development.

Potential impacts and developments

The choice of the term ‘intelligence’ is a legacy of early scholarship and ambitions in the discipline. However, it poses some enduring difficulties for the definition of the technology. First, since human intelligence is itself a subjective and contested concept, the concept of AI is also destined for constant debate and reinterpretation. Second, by defining AI with reference to how we evaluate its apparent performance (intelligence), rather than by what it does (applications) or how it does it (techniques), AI can refer to almost any technology – from thermostats to ‘terminators’ – whether they exist or not. And third, since the various AI applications have such a diverse range of impacts, using the same word to refer to all of them can amplify the appearance of disagreements and make debates less productive. Technologists have long recognised these limitations, and tend to prefer more precise alternatives such as ‘machine learning’ or, simply, ‘statistics’. Nonetheless, AI retains its usage in public and policy settings.

Metaphors have linked minds and machines for centuries. From hydraulics to telegraphs and computers, we have conceptualised the brain with reference to the key technologies of our times. Today, we also reverse these metaphors to explain technologies in terms of human functions. For example, ‘artificial neural networks‘ (ANNs) invoke the neural networks in our brains. The metaphors of machine ‘vision’, ‘learning’, ‘recognition’, and ‘understanding’ suggest that machines fulfil the same functions as humans, in the same kind of way. While this is misleading, the comparison is so well established that, since the Turing test, AI advancement has been continually measured and evaluated against human performance of the same tasks. Contemporary assessments and ambitions for AI tend to focus on trustworthiness and trust which, as metaphors for the qualities of the AI and our relationship with it, can anthropomorphise the technology and divert accountability from those responsible for its use when something goes wrong.

Neuroscientists are concerned that metaphors reduce our brains to the status of computers, and make it difficult to imagine other – perhaps better – conceptualisations of what a technology does, and how. Likewise, metaphoric thinking elevates our software to the status of our minds. This poses several risks for AI development. First, it might tempt us to over-estimate the capabilities of AI tools and entrust them with tasks that they are not competent to perform. Indeed, this is the danger at the heart of many of the highest-risk AI applications. Second, when something goes wrong, we might be tempted, as alluded to above, to assign fault to the machine itself, rather than the people and organisations that inappropriately delegate tasks to them. Third, and perhaps most importantly, by reinforcing the idea of equivalence between what humans and computers do and how they do them, we position them in competition to perform the same kinds of tasks, rather than in cooperation to perform complementary tasks. The engrained language of AI as doing things ‘like humans’ imposes a potent conceptualisation for our future relationship with machines. It shapes how we articulate our ambitions, prioritise our development paths, and evaluate our progress.

We also find several powerful metaphors in debates about the international dimensions of AI development. Perhaps the most prominent is that of the ‘global AI race‘, often positioning the EU as struggling for a bronze medal behind the USA and China. This provides an intuitive framing for AI development at global scale. However, a race implies a single ‘finish line’, which fails to capture that AI is a range of technologies and applications used by actors with different strengths, priorities and values. In turn, a single ‘finish line’ implies a single ‘winner’ of a zero sum game in which those that did not win must have lost. In doing so, the race metaphor emphasises competition over cooperation, sharing and mutual benefits. It may compel us to follow the direction and pace of those we consider to be in front, rather than following our own path. A more specific version of this metaphor invokes an ‘AI arms race‘, a framing which has been criticised for closing down debate and transforming investments in militarised AI from options into necessities.

Finally, metaphors are also used to refer to positions in the AI debate. For example, the ‘terminator’ metaphor often serves to frame concerns about AI development as unjustified fears of fictional technologies that reveal a misunderstanding of its capabilities. However, studies of Europeans’ attitudes towards robotics and AI show that citizens overwhelmingly associate robots with production-line machines, and not humanoid forms like the terminator. Indeed, respondents were broadly supportive of AI while expressing some concrete concerns about today’s applications, notably their impacts on employment. While the terminator metaphor misrepresents how people make sense of AI, it serves as a powerful metaphor for public perspectives that may undermine questions about the concrete impacts of today’s AI.

Anticipatory policy-making

The definition of AI as ‘systems that display intelligent behaviour’ – as used in the 2018 European Commission communication AI for Europe – would be too ambiguous for a legal text. Notably, the recent AI Act was more precise, defining AI not by apparent intelligence, but with reference to specific techniques such as machine learning, expert systems, and statistics. That such a diverse range of tools came to be bundled together in a ‘tech-specific’ legislative proposal is testament to the power of the AI metaphor in policy.

In debates about AI, we could follow the approach of many developers in referring to specific techniques and application contexts. For example, if we target messages towards ‘machine learning diagnostic support’ or ‘biometric identification in public spaces’ rather than just ‘AI’, we might reveal more common ground between our positions. Furthermore, by reducing our reliance on core metaphors such as ‘intelligence’ and ‘trust’, which allude to human qualities and capabilities, we could create space for new metaphors that describe AI in its own terms. In doing so, we would be better placed to articulate visions for the future and benchmarks for success, which focus on complementing rather than competing with humanity. Likewise, when talking about competition in global AI development, we could move on from the ‘race’ metaphor to speak of an ‘AI Olympics’ which celebrates a plurality of global achievements, or of ‘moonshots’ that invoke the Apollo project to inspire grand ambitions for the benefit of all humanity. While still capturing the notion of competition in global development, they would articulate a role for cooperation, sharing and mutual benefits. Ultimately, whichever metaphors we use, it is important that they articulate agency for Europe to define the direction and pace of its development, and the criteria for evaluating its success.

Read the complete briefing on ‘What if we chose new metaphors for artificial intelligence?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Listen to policy podcast ‘What if we chose new metaphors for artificial intelligence?’ on YouTube.

Written by Clare Ferguson.

Parliament sits again in plenary in Strasbourg for the last session before the summer break – and the first for the incoming Slovenian Council Presidency – with the final adoption of a number of funding programmes for the 2021-2027 period on the agenda. It is Slovenia’s second turn in the Council chair since joining the EU in 2004, and the parliamentary dimension has grown in importance in the meantime, with the Slovenian parliament taking on the role of facilitating national parliaments’ contribution to EU work over the coming six months.

Parliament continues to work with the European Commission and Council to revise the EU legislative framework on asylum and migration, but in the meantime, the institutions have agreed on the measures the new specific heading on financing migration and border management in the EU’s 2021‑2027 multiannual financial framework should fund. Following a joint debate scheduled for Tuesday evening, Members will consider adoption at second reading of the agreed text on the proposed Asylum, Migration & Integration Fund 2021-2027. This fund aims at strengthening the common European asylum system, supporting legal migration and countering irregular migration, as well as managing migrants’ return and readmission to third countries. Parliament has succeeded in changing the name of the fund to the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF) to better reflect the focus on solidarity and responsibility, including legal migration, as well as efficient management of migration flows. Under the revised agreement, those Member States most affected by migration and asylum challenges should receive appropriate and proportionate financial and practical assistance. Parliament is also expected to consider its formal adoption at second reading of an agreement on establishing an Integrated Border Management Fund to provide financial support, allocated proportionately to the countries most affected by requirements for external border management and visas. Parliament has been keen to ensure that the instrument respects fundamental rights, fair treatment of third-country nationals and the right to asylum and international protection, including the obligation to save people in danger at sea.

One of the objectives of the Integrated Border Management Fund is to operate in conjunction with the new Internal Security Fund (ISF) to tackle terrorism and radicalisation, organised crime and cybercrime, and to assist victims. On Tuesday lunchtime, Members are scheduled to vote on adoption of an agreement on the proposal to establish the ISF to ensure a high level of security within the EU, at second reading. The agreement takes account of Parliament’s demand to align the actions funded with fundamental rights, and extends the objectives of the funding to better preparation and protection against security risks, with a final budget allocation of €1.9 billion.

While health matters have long been the exclusive prerogative of national governments, the Covid‑19 pandemic underlined the need for an EU-wide health policy. To date, Parliament’s focus has been on better protecting people in Europe by ensuring medicines and medical devices are both accessible and available. On Wednesday afternoon, Members will consider Parliament’s position at first reading on European Commission proposals to reinforce and extend the mandate of the European Medicines Agency (EMA). The proposal aims at stronger EMA coordination of the EU response to health crises, particularly in respect of monitoring and mitigating critical medicine and medical device shortages, which proved to be a weakness during the pandemic, as well as greater EU coordination of clinical trials. Parliament’s Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI) would like to see much more transparency built in to the proposals, including for a digital platform to monitor medical supplies, as well as within the work of the proposed steering group.

Parliament’s Committee on Budgets is keen to see all available funding used to boost the coronavirus recovery, and accordingly calls for the EU budgetary surplus resulting from higher revenues and unspent funding in 2020 to be dedicated to assisting victims of the pandemic. The surplus mainly results from higher than expected customs duties and lower expenditure – itself partly due to Covid‑19. On Tuesday lunchtime, Members will vote to adopt Parliament’s position on Draft Amending Budget No 3/2021, which aims at entering the 2020 general budget surplus, totalling almost €1.77 billion (less than in the previous year), as revenue in the 2021 budget. If agreed, under the current rules, the move will reduce Member States’ gross national income contributions to the 2021 budget.

Action to preserve a healthy environment can also protect people’s health and wellbeing. With the aim of ‘living well, within planetary boundaries’, the proposed eighth EU environment action programme for 2021‑2030 should encourage a societal step-change through a ‘sustainability first’ approach that accelerates measures to reach the EU’s long-term environmental goals. On Wednesday afternoon, Members will consider an ENVI committee report on the Commission’s proposal, with a view to fixing the committee’s mandate for trilogue negotiations. Aiming to ensure the changes required by the environmental and climate transition do not lead to inequality, the committee calls for priority objectives to be achieved by 2030, including ending fossil fuel subsidies by 2025, with the programme becoming a governance tool for environmental policy beyond the Green Deal. The committee notes that a sustainability agenda can indeed boost prosperity and proposes integrating the sustainable development goals, biodiversity, and social objectives into the European Semester process.

Financing the Green Deal and Europe’s long-term climate ambitions is increasingly the focus of the European Investment Bank (EIB), the world’s largest multilateral banking facility. However, the Committee on Budgetary Control’s (CONT) report on the control of the EIB’s financial activities in 2019 highlights the danger that a lack of transparency and accountability could lead to fraud and corruption in respect of the bank’s operations. Members will consider the committee’s report on Monday afternoon, in a joint debate in the presence of Werner Hoyer, President of the EIB. On Tuesday lunchtime, Members will also vote on Parliament’s position on a CONT committee report on the European Commission’s 2019 report on protection of the EU’s financial interests and the fight against fraud – an issue of particular concern given the need to ensure sound management of coronavirus recovery funding. Fraudulent activity appears stable in 2019, although detection remains difficult and violations of public procurement rules in the health sector are of particular concern. The CONT committee notes that over half the reported fraud in 2019 concerns only two Member States, and calls for improved information exchange, data collection and control. The committee also welcomes the recent adoption of conditionality rules aimed at protecting the Union budget.

Seamless networks are also key to promoting growth and competitiveness in the EU, as well as strengthening cohesion and boosting sustainability. Following a joint debate scheduled for Tuesday morning, Members will consider Parliament’s formal adoption at second reading of agreements on the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) and ‘smart TEN T’. These legislative initiatives seek to renew not only European transport networks, but also energy and digital connections across the Union. While the proposals for a ‘smart TEN-T‘ aim at financing a programme of swifter transport permit processes, the CEF proposal aims at establishing a financing infrastructure to facilitate investment in key network projects. The €30 billion allocated to the proposed CEF will be shared between measures to upgrade transport, energy and digital networks. This is, however, significantly less than Parliament had requested.

The proposal to exempt internet providers from e‑Privacy measures temporarily, so that they can legitimately remove child sexual abuse material online, raises serious concerns, particularly in respect of the unintended consequences for fundamental rights to privacy and data protection. Parliament’s Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) recommended significant additional privacy safeguards and a shorter application period. Parliament’s negotiators have secured the exclusion of audio communications from the proposed regulation’s scope and mandatory impact assessments of data protection, as well as compulsory human review. On Monday evening, Members will consider the resulting agreement on this sensitive file at first reading, aiming to square EU privacy rules with measures to combat child sexual abuse online.

Finally, EU funding support for the fisheries sector has changed greatly since the 1970s, with increasing focus on the social and environmental aspects of the sector. However, this shift is not without contention, as the regulators grapple with the issue of avoiding that investment in fishing capacity leads to overfishing. On Monday evening, Members will consider Parliament’s second-reading position on a hard-won agreement with the co-legislators to continue funding the common fisheries policy through the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund. The change to the fund’s name reflects an increased focus on aquaculture. While financial assistance to shipping fleets would be extended to cover 12‑24 m vessels, stricter conditions will apply.

Written by Piotr Bąkowski and Sofija Voronova.

On 14 April 2021, the European Commission presented its new 2021-2025 strategy on combating trafficking in human beings – 10 years after the adoption of Directive 2011/36/EU, the core EU instrument addressing this phenomenon and protecting its victims. Despite some progress achieved in recent years, a number of challenges still lie ahead.

Human trafficking is not only a serious and borderless crime, but also a lucrative business, driven by demand for sexual (and other) services. Criminals exploit vulnerable people (increasingly children), making high profits and taking relatively low risks. Vulnerability can result from a whole range of factors, including socio-economic ones, and migrants are a particularly vulnerable group.

Gender also plays an important part, as women and men are not trafficked in the same way or for the same purpose. Women and girls represent a disproportionately high number of victims, both globally and at EU level, especially in terms of sexual exploitation. This form of exploitation is still dominant in the EU, even though other forms are on the rise, such as exploitation for forced labour and for criminal activities.

The Covid-19 pandemic has brought new challenges for victims, as well as amplifying the vulnerabilities of those most at risk. Traffickers – like legal businesses – moved to digital modi operandi, making victims even less visible and less able to ask for help and protection. In its efforts to eradicate human trafficking, the EU has not only created a legal framework, comprising an anti-trafficking directive and instruments to protect victims’ rights and prevent labour exploitation; it has also put in place an operational cooperation network involving EU decentralised agencies, including Europol, Eurojust, CEPOL and Frontex. Moreover, trafficking in human beings is a priority of the EU policy cycle for organised and serious international crime. The European Parliament plays a major role, not only in designing policies but also in evaluating their implementation.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Understanding EU action against human trafficking‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Listen to policy podcast ‘Understanding EU action against human trafficking’ on YouTube.

Written by Denise Chircop.

European Union cooperation in the field of education and training has developed in a number of areas that now have well-established roots. The best-known example is possibly the Bologna Process that led to the establishment of the European higher education area. The Copenhagen Declaration lent impetus to a process of cooperation in vocational education and training. This was accompanied by two strategic framework agreements for European cooperation in education and training (ET2010 and ET2020).

The stocktaking on the expiry of the second framework for cooperation – ET 2020 – revealed some positive trends as the numbers of both young children in early childhood education and of graduates rose. However, the number of underachieving 15 year-olds remains high and the participation of adults in learning is low.

The European Commission, the Council of the EU and the European Parliament seem to concur that cooperation in education and training needs to be reinforced. The Commission has set out its vision for a European education area in three communications, which show that this is still work in progress. The Council, on the other hand, has endorsed another framework for cooperation up to 2030, which is clearly aimed at supporting the implementation of such an area. The May 2021 Education Council conclusions give pointers as to how aspects of this area are to be addressed.

The debate in the European Parliament is in its initial phase with the rapporteur noting that, while there is agreement on the need for a European education area and ongoing cooperation, the European institutions have yet to adopt a single approach.

Read the complete briefing on ‘The European Education Area and the 2030 strategic framework for education and training‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Listen to policy podcast ‘The European Education Area and the 2030 strategic framework for education and training’ on YouTube.

Written by Beatrix Immenkamp.

A key objective of the EU’s external action is to preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter. In the context of its common foreign and security policy (CFSP), the Union offers assistance to third states, international organisations and regional organisations engaged in peace support operations. Moreover, the EU’s common security and defence policy (CSDP) – part of the CFSP – provides the Union with its own operational capacity, allowing it to deploy civilian and military assets (provided by the EU Member States) in third countries. While many of the operations and missions the EU supports have military and defence implications, the EU cannot finance activities with military or defence implications from the EU budget. EU Member States therefore have mechanisms to fund expenditure with military and defence implications directly from national budgets.

The European Peace Facility (EPF) is a new off-budget fund with a financial ceiling of €5.692 billion financed by Member State contributions. The EPF, which will be operational by 1 July 2021, will make it easier for Member States to share the costs of EU military operations. It will also help the EU to support military peace-support operations conducted by third countries and regional organisations, anywhere in the world. Controversially, for the first time, the EU will be able to provide the armed forces of partner countries with infrastructure and equipment, including weapons. Several non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have warned that the new facility risks fuelling conflict and human rights abuses around the world. They warn that this could exacerbate violence and arms proliferation, and fuel the very dynamics the EPF seeks to address. By contrast, practitioners believe the facility will ensure that the EU is taken seriously as a security provider and is able to maintain its influence in conflict areas. The Council has called for swift operationalisation of the EPF and has invited Member States and the High Representative to present proposals for assistance measures.

Read the complete briefing on ‘European Peace Facility – Investing in international stability and security‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Listen to policy podcast ‘European Peace Facility – Investing in international stability and security’ on YouTube.

• Military CSDP operations
• African-led peace support operations with ongoing APF/future EPF funding