European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Martin Russell.

Protests erupted in Kazakhstan on 2 January 2022 and quickly span out of control, resulting in multiple deaths and several days of chaos. Although initially triggered by a fuel price hike, the unrest points to deeper causes of discontent, including poverty, inequality and frustration at the lack of political change. A Russia-led peacekeeping mission has helped to restore order, but could also compromise Kazakh independence.

What is happening in Kazakhstan?

After Ukraine’s 2014 Revolution of Dignity, Armenia’s 2018 Velvet Revolution, fraudulent elections and opposition protests in Belarus, and political turmoil in Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan is the latest post-Soviet country to be hit by unrest. On New Year’s Day 2022, the government lifted the price cap on liquefied petroleum gas, the fuel most commonly used by Kazakh drivers, causing its price to almost double overnight. On 2 January, initially peaceful protests broke out in Zhanaozen, a city in western Kazakhstan, and soon spread to Almaty, former capital and still the country’s largest city.

President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev quickly responded by dismissing the government, and ordered the new administration to reinstate fuel price caps. Despite this, protests continued to escalate, with mobs storming government buildings in Almaty. Denouncing protestors as ‘terrorists’ and ‘bandits’, Tokayev rejected international calls for dialogue, and ordered police to shoot to kill. Over 160, including 16 security officers, were killed in increasingly violent clashes, and as of 11 January, nearly 10 000 had been arrested. During the protests, internet access was blocked for several days, flights from Almaty were cancelled, and large parts of the economy shut down.

On 6 January, Tokayev requested support from the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), the Russia-led military alliance founded in 1992 to which Kazakhstan also belongs. Over 2 000 CSTO peacekeepers were deployed. After a few days of rioting, the government now appears to be back in control, and an uneasy calm has returned to the streets of Almaty.

What caused the protests?

Since the country’s 1991 independence, former President Nursultan Nazarbayev ruled with an iron fist for nearly 30 years. After his retirement in 2019, his ally Tokayev took over the presidency in a stage-managed transition, but with Nazarbayev maintaining considerable influence behind the scenes. One of the most stable and – thanks to huge exports of oil, uranium and other natural resources – prosperous countries in the post-Soviet region, Kazakhstan appeared to be less at risk of unrest than its central Asian neighbours. However, even if the January 2022 protests came as a surprise, they are not unprecedented. The worst previous violence was in 2011, when brutal repression of an oil workers’ strike killed at least 16 people. There were more major protests in 2016 following planned reforms allowing foreigners to buy land; in February 2019 after the deaths of five children in a house fire were blamed on inadequate welfare for poor families; and in March of the same year when newly elected president Tokayev renamed the country’s capital Nur-Sultan after his predecessor.

The fact that violence continued to escalate after the withdrawal of fuel price rises – the initial trigger for protests – points to deeper causes. Kazakh officials claim that protestors were well prepared and coordinated, and spoke foreign languages. However, they have not specified further who the organisers might be. In the past, such incidents were often blamed on exiled banker and former government minister Mukhtar Ablyazov, who leads the opposition Democratic Choice for Kazakhstan movement. Ablyazov himself has called for western intervention, and acknowledged that he has contacts with protestors, but there is no convincing evidence of foreign involvement. Another theory, also as yet unproven, is that rival pro-Tokayev and pro-Nazarbayev factions, and/or criminal gangs were behind the violence.

Protests also reflect long-standing discontent with the status quo. Double-digit inflation has eroded living standards, and many have lost jobs due to the pandemic. Perhaps it is no coincidence that young men, among the worst affected by unemployment, also made up the vast majority of protestors in Almaty. Their grievances are exacerbated by the wealth of the elite, none more so than Nazarbayev and his family, which is reported to have spent at least US$785 million on real estate purchases in Europe and the US since 2000.

Like the March 2019 protests at the start of Tokayev’s presidency, the current unrest may point to frustration at the lack of real political change. At that time, Tokayev promised a ‘listening state’ and a multi-party political system, but the exclusion of genuine opposition parties from the March 2021 parliamentary elections – won overwhelmingly for the sixth consecutive time by Nur Otan, the party founded by Nazarbayev – highlighted the lack of progress to democracy. While Tokayev has made some efforts to assert his independence – for example by removing Nazarbayev’s daughter Dariga, seen as a possible future president, from her position as Senate chair in May 2020 – he is still often perceived as a mere puppet of his predecessor. For this reason, anger was mainly directed at Nazarbayev, with protestors calling on the ‘old man’ to leave, and demolishing statues of him.

What are the implications for Kazakhstan’s future?

In the absence of leaders or a clearly stated agenda, the protests never had much chance of forcing political change. If anything, they may have strengthened Tokayev’s position by allowing him to neutralise Nazarbayev and his supporters. The latter include former prime minister Askar Mamin – now replaced by ex-Finance Minister Alikhan Smailov – and intelligence chief Karim Masimov, who has since been arrested on suspicion of treason. Nazarbayev himself, who has not appeared in public since the protests broke out, was also sidelined, with Tokayev taking over as Security Council chair on 5 January.

On 11 January, Tokayev called for more equal sharing of the country’s wealth, for example through new taxes on mining companies. Yet while such initiatives may go some way towards addressing the economic causes of discontent, the precedent of other post-Soviet countries where protests have occurred – such as Belarus – suggests that political concessions are unlikely.

Tokayev’s request for CSTO peacekeepers could backfire. Until now, Kazakhstan has carefully avoided over-dependence on Russia by building strong ties with other regional players: in 2015, it became the first central Asian country to sign an enhanced partnership and cooperation agreement with the EU, and it is also a leading participant in China’s Belt and Road Initiative. The prolonged presence of (essentially Russian) foreign troops could jeopardise this multi-vector foreign policy. It could also prove unpopular domestically; strong suspicion of foreign influences was previously highlighted by the 2016 land reform protests. In view of these risks, the deployment will only be short-term, with peacekeepers due to leave within two weeks.

For Russia, Kazakhstan’s crisis is both a threat and an opportunity. Unrest could threaten Moscow’s interests in the country, such as the Baikonur space-rocket launch site and a large ethnic Russian minority. With Russian armed forces already thinly stretched, the peacekeeping mission could be an unwelcome distraction from more strategic interests such as Ukraine. On the other hand, the mission could help to draw Kazakhstan closer into Moscow’s orbit. Since November 2020, Russian peacekeepers have been deployed to Nagorno-Karabakh, and a second peacekeeping mission will reinforce Russia’s role as regional security guarantor. Moreover, the mission is the CSTO’s first ever intervention (the Nagorno-Karabakh mission, which is taking place outside the internationally recognised territory of a CSTO state, is exclusively Russian), and as such could give the alliance some much-needed credibility.

International reactions

Unsurprisingly, Russia has sided with Tokayev, echoing his narrative that the protests are the result of foreign meddling – a necessary condition for CSTO intervention given that the alliance’s remit does not extend to purely domestic threats. China has also denounced interference by external forces. For his part, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken, who comments that ‘once Russians are in your house, it’s sometimes very difficult to get them to leave’, is demanding an explanation of the rationale for CSTO involvement, and criticises Tokayev’s shoot-to-kill order. A statement by the EU’s High Representative calls for peaceful resolution of the crisis, condemns the violence, and urges the Kazakh authorities to respect freedoms of assembly, of expression, and of the media. Similar calls for restraint and dialogue come from European leaders, including French President Emmanuel Macron and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, as well as the OSCE and UN Human Rights Commissioner Michelle Bachelet.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Chaos and crackdown in Kazakhstan: What next?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Gianliuca Quaglio.

Since the first successful organ transplant in 1954, the procedure has become increasingly prevalent, revolutionising the treatment of end-stage organ failure. Nevertheless, organ shortage remains a critical problem that could potentially be overcome by xenotransplantation, a promising alternative approach.

While the field of organ and cell allotransplantation (from a donor of the same species) remains limited, xenotransplantation (from the Greek xenos, meaning ‘foreign’) could alleviate the increasing demand for donor organs. Xenotransplantation, defined as the transplantation of animal-derived organs and cells into humans, is currently a very active focus of research, as it over-rides some of the obstacles encountered with tissue engineering, such as revascularisation and innervation. The resurgence of interest in xenotransplantation is mainly attributed to the improvement of gene-editing techniques (such as CRISPR/Cas9), since genetically engineered animals have been bred to overcome organ rejection. However, xenotransplantation also raises multiple biological and ethical questions that should be taken into consideration.

Potential impacts and developments

Pigs, the most suitable xenograft source.The greatest difficulty encountered in transplantation is rejection caused by the mounting of immune responses against the donor organ, perceived as a foreign threat by the human body. Graft rejection can be classified as hyperacute, acute or chronic, depending on the time it takes for antibodies to react against donor antigens, known as substances that trigger the immune system. While non-human primates (NHPs) are phylogenetically closer to humans than pigs, the latter are regarded as a more appropriate xenograft source for multiple reasons.

Pigs not only reproduce easily and have organs of comparable size to humans, they also present physiological similarities. For instance, porcine valve replacement has been successful for over 30 years and is considered a better alternative to mechanical valves, which are more prone to blood clot formation. Attempts have also been made to transplant pig kidneys, corneas and livers, but the main challenge remains that of overcoming the immune barriers to xenotransplantation. Finally, there are fewer ethical and other implications when working with pigs than with NHPs.

Genome editing. The implementation of potent immunosuppressive regimens has helped to prolong xenograft survival significantly by reducing the risk of rejection. However, a number of issues, such as coagulation dysfunction between the pig-derived graft and the human, remain problematic, as certain molecular incompatibilities cannot simply be overcome by immunosuppression. As a result, scientists have focused primarily on the generation of genetically modified pigs.

These not only have engineered organs that are less prone to rejection, but are also protected from a number of viruses that could cause the transmission of zoonoses following xenotransplantation. The dynamic developments in this field of research have occurred mainly as a result of CRISPR/Cas9, a novel gene-editing technology that has revolutionised biomedical research. It basically consists of an enzyme (Cas9) acting as a pair of ‘molecular scissors’ that follow the guide RNA (gRNA) to a target sequence in the DNA in order to introduce changes or make deletions.

Examples of transgenic pigs for xenotransplantation purposes. Pig-antigens are not synthesised by the human species and can cause mounting immune responses that lead to organ rejection. It is therefore of vital importance to eliminate the pig genes responsible for encoding these antigens for the organ recipient. A recent study involving the inactivation of three such pig genes and the insertion of nine human genes using CRISPR/Cas9 technology generated very encouraging results. Importantly, one of the genes inserted plays a crucial role in regulating the coagulation system. The cells resulting from these genetically modified pigs were resistant to rejection, demonstrating greater compatibility with humans in terms of the immune system as well as the blood-coagulation system.

Another promising achievement beyond overcoming rejection is the use of CRISPR/Cas9 technology to limit the risk of cross-species transmission of infectious viruses, therefore removing a major hurdle to using pigs for xenotransplantation. In an attempt to mitigate incompatibility, various studies have so far attempted more than 40 genetic modifications on the pig genome thanks to the development of new gene-editing tools. This global effort has very recently culminated in the first successful pig to human xenotransplantation of a genetically modified heart, raising hopes that we are ‘one step closer to solving the organ shortage crisis’.

Anticipatory policy-making

The rate of organ donations increased by 14 % in the EU between 2010 and 2019, with kidney transplants accounting for 85 % of all transplants. This is partly the result of some EU countries (such as Belgium, Austria and France) adopting the opt-out system and endorsing the principle of presumed consent, according to which all brain-dead individuals are considered donors unless otherwise stated. However, the supply of organ donations does not meet demand, despite overall progress.

This is illustrated by the death in 2020 of 668 individuals who were on the Eurotransplant waiting list. Eurotransplant is an institution that manages an international collaborative framework responsible for allocating donor organs in eight EU Member States. Another key organisation is the European Society for Organ Transplantation (ESOT), which structures and streamlines transplant activities in Europe and worldwide.

The European Medicines Agency (EMA) classifies xenogeneic cell therapy and products as advanced therapy medicinal products (ATMPs). The ATMP regulatory framework centres on Regulation (EC) No 1394, adopted in 2007. This is associated with an EMA guideline issued in 2009 that sets out general principles for the development, authorisation and pharmacovigilance of xenogeneic cell-based medicinal products. Overall, these documents stress the importance of quality and manufacturing aspects of ATMPs, taking into account the source, procurement and processing of xenogeneic materials (e.g. animal tissues and organs).

There have been no major legislative developments specific to xenotransplantation in the EU in recent years however. While the above-mentioned regulation marked an important step towards a unified ethical and legal EU framework on xenotransplantation, a more competent regulatory authority is needed in order for this promising practice to reach its full potential.

As mentioned by the Committee for Medicinal Products for Human Use (CHMP), a quality assurance system specific to xenotransplantation is crucial to guarantee the correct pathogen-free health status of donor animals. It is also vital to ensure that the animals are kept under the best possible conditions, so as to prevent their suffering during the procedure before organ explant. These issues are also being addressed by the World Health Organization and the International Xenotransplantation Association (IXA), both of which play a critical role in the drafting of xenotransplantation directives, notably regarding preclinical efficacy requirements.

In conclusion, multiple issues have still to be resolved before xenotransplantation becomes commonplace in clinical practice. However, the EU regulatory aspects of xenotransplantation were drafted in part at a time when the risks involved with the procedure were higher, not reflecting the latest ground-breaking developments in this fast-evolving field. Their revised interpretation by regulatory authorities and research institutes could therefore facilitate the safer design and conduct of clinical trials, in order to arrive at an appropriate compromise between existing and adapted guidelines.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘What if xenotransplantation was the answer to the donor organ shortage?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Listen to policy podcast ‘What if xenotransplantation was the answer to the donor organ shortage?’ on YouTube.

Written by Stefano Spinaci (1st edition).

Green bonds are committed to financing or re-financing investments, projects, expenditure or assets helping to address climate and environmental issues. Both governments and companies use them to finance the transition to a more sustainable and low-carbon economy.

Since the EIB inaugurated the green bond market in 2007 with its Climate Awareness Bond, the market has grown very fast, but it still represents only about 3 to 3.5 % of overall bond issuance. The green bond market needs to grow more quickly to achieve the targets in the Paris Agreement.

The Commission’s proposal aims to establish an official EU standard for green bonds aligned with the EU taxonomy for sustainable activities, based on a registration system and supervisory framework for external reviewers of European green bonds.

The proposal is currently being examined by the co-legislators. Within the European Parliament, the file has been assigned to the ECON committee. In the Council, the working party on financial services is meeting to discuss the dossier.

Versions

• January 2022: European green bonds: A standard for Europe, open to the world (1st edition)

Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on European green bonds Committee responsible:Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON)COM(2021) 391
6.7.2021Rapporteur:Paul Tang (S&D, The Netherlands)2021/0191(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Christophe Hansen (EPP, Luxembourg)
Gilles Boyer (Renew, France)
Bas Eickhout (Greens/EFA, The Netherlands)
Gunnar Beck (ID, Germany)
Andżelika Anna Możdżanowska (ECR, Poland)
José Gusmão (The Left, Portugal)Ordinary legislative procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Consideration of draft report in committee

Written by Angelos Delivorias.

Payment systems are of vital importance for today’s economies and are the core activity of central banks. To adapt to recent trends – including the decline in cash usage, the surge in online commerce and contactless forms of payment, and the creation of cryptocurrencies – central banks have, in recent years, explored the possibility of issuing digital currencies themselves.

Proponents of central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) note that, among other things, they can: alleviate the problem of concentration of the payments infrastructure; facilitate instantaneous and cheaper execution of payments; discourage illicit activity and rein in the shadow economy; spur competition in the payment industry; reduce the problem of banks being ‘too big to fail’; promote financial inclusion; contribute to financial stability; preserve the EU’s sovereignty over transactions; help facilitate monetary policy; and support the international role of the euro.

Critics of CBDCs range from those who question the need for such currencies altogether, to those who point out the risks, including the possibility that CBDCs could: amplify the international spillover effects of shocks; curtail the autonomy of less powerful economies in their monetary policy, and even substitute their domestic currency; facilitate tax avoidance or a loss of domestic oversight capabilities; put at risk the variety of payment instruments available to households; create undesired volatility in exchange rates; and put banks’ deposit bases under threat, with negative implications for credit provision and output.

The European Central Bank (ECB) is involved in the general discussion about the design and launch of CBDCs. In October 2020, it published a report on a digital euro, identifying and discussing features of and options for a euro-area CBDC. In July 2021, the ECB launched an investigation phase, which should last 2 years and aims to address key issues of design and distribution. The European Parliament, as well as other stakeholders, is expected to participate actively in this phase.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Central bank digital currencies: Evolution or revolution?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Listen to policy podcast ‘Central bank digital currencies: Evolution or revolution?‘ on YouTube.

Written by Ionel Zamfir (1st edition).

On 21 September 2021, the Commission published its proposal for a new EU scheme of generalised preferences. Two of the current scheme’s three components are due to expire at the end of 2023, which would deprive developing countries of a vital opportunity to trade under preferential terms with the EU. Therefore, renewing the scheme appears to be both a necessity and an opportunity to strengthen its conditionality in the light of lessons learned and the increased urgency for dealing with the climate.

The Commission considers that the scheme has delivered on its objectives, and proposes some ‘fine-tuning’. To ensure that its benefits remain broadly shared, it proposes changes to the economic vulnerability criteria for GSP+ and to the product graduation threshold for Standard GSP. Taking on board proposals from civil society, but also from the Parliament, the Commission proposes to extend negative conditionality to environmental and good governance conventions, and to improve monitoring and stakeholders’ involvement overall.

Civil society organisations and other stakeholders have put forward some more ambitious proposals, such as making the monitoring fully transparent and rewarding countries that fulfil jointly agreed benchmarks related to the conventions under the GSP with additional preferences.

Versions

• New EU scheme of generalised preferences (1st edition)

Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on applying a generalised scheme of tariff preferences and repealing Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council Committee responsible:International Trade (INTA)COM(2021) 579
22.9.2021Rapporteur:Heidi Hautala (Greens/EFA, Finland)2021/0297(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Gabriel Mato (EPP, Spain)
Raphaël Glucksmann (S&D, France)
Jordi Cañas (Renew, Spain)
Marco Campomenosi (ID, Italy)
Emmanouil Fragkos (ECR, Greece)
Helmut Scholz (The Left, Germany)Ordinary legislative procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Vote in committee on draft report

Current beneficiaries of the EU GSP

Written by Etienne Bassot.

Two years of pandemic have taught us – institutions, researchers and citizens alike – how much today’s issues are global. From fighting the virus to addressing climate change or securing supply chains, the pandemic has accelerated our awareness of our common destiny. Global issues call for global solutions and global leadership − solutions that can inspire other countries and continents all over the world.

Watch the video on “Ten issues to watch in 2022“.

To help us to understand these global challenges and make sense of what is unfolding before our eyes, the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) asked its policy analysts to identify ten issues to watch in 2022. With so many burning issues in Europe and in the world, a selection of just ten is by definition subjective. Yet, it is the opportunity to shine the spotlight on a series of topics selected for their obvious importance or their relevance to global leadership. EPRS then tasked the experts selected to explain why these issues matter particularly in 2022 and what we might expect in the year to come. For other issues that remain ‘hot’, such as migration at Europe’s borders and the situation in Ukraine, readers will find our analysis in previous editions of this publication (listed under the ‘Further reading section’) and in the thousands of publications EPRS has issued online and in paper over the years.

While the previous edition of this publication, and the associated introductory event, had highlighted the interdependence of the selected issues, the underlying theme of this 2022 edition is the global nature of the issues. This is seen in the written contributions but also inspires the visual representation of the ten issues on the cover of this publication. The ten topics selected either affect the world as a whole − achieving zero greenhouse gas emissions while maintaining economic growth, securing supply chains, moving towards sustainable agriculture, ensuring nuclear non-proliferation − or present standards, solutions or ways ahead that could be taken up worldwide. These include shaping the recovery, striking the right monetary policy balance between continued favourable financing conditions to support the recovery and addressing inflation concerns, setting standards for the internet of things, the potential of the truly innovative participatory democracy experience of the Conference on the Future of Europe, the vision of a continent where people in all their diversity are equal, and strengthening a defence union when the European Union is experiencing ‘loneliness’ (solitude) in transatlantic relations and needs to define its ‘narrative’ (récit), to quote Luuk van Middelaar’s geopolitical analysis.  

The year 2022 brings us into the third year of a pandemic that is far from over, although the resilience of people and societies has been tested to the limits. But 2022 also means the next European elections are just two years off, with a series of issues where the European Union has demonstrated its capacity to rebound, shape its future, and project its leadership worldwide, and where the European Parliament is in the vanguard. This 2022 edition brings some notes of hope at the start of a critical year. We hope that you will enjoy reading this latest edition of ‘Ten Issues to Watch’ and that it will stimulate your own reflection, and ignite your curiosity as you explore the challenges and opportunities of 2022.

Read the complete in-depth analysis on ‘Ten issues to watch in 2022‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Or watch the video on ‘Ten issues to watch in 2022‘ on YouTube.

Chips global supply chain Global fabrication capacity by region, 2019 (%) Developments in EU defence under the current Commission

Written by Silvia Kotanidis.

At the January 2022 plenary sitting, the European Parliament (EP) is due to elect its 33rd President, to hold office for the second half of the current term, up to the next European elections, following which the new Parliament will elect its President in July 2024. The President has an important and increasingly visible function in the EU institutional and international setting, mirroring the influential role of the Parliament as shaper of EU policies and as co-legislator.

Election procedure

Until 1979, EP Presidents were chosen on an annual or biennial basis. Since the first EP election by universal suffrage in 1979, the President is elected to the office for a renewable period of two and a half years. During each legislative term, a first election is normally held in July, immediately after the election of the new Parliament, and a second mid-term election is held two and a half years later, in January. It is currently envisaged that the January 2022 session will be held with Members present, but to ensure physical distancing, two additional rooms may be used simultaneously with the hemicycle.

According to Article 14(4) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), the European Parliament elects its President from among its Members. The Parliament’s Rules of Procedure (RoP), as last revised in 2020 and 2021, set out the procedure for this election.

The President is elected based on nominations, which may be handed in before each round of the ballot, with the nominees’ consent. Candidates are proposed by political groups, but may also be nominated by a number of Members reaching at least the ‘low threshold’, i.e. one-twentieth (36) of Parliament’s Members, (Rules 15 and 179). During the first plenary sitting after the election of a new Parliament, or at the sitting designated to elect the President for the mid-term election, the procedure is chaired by the outgoing President, or by one of the outgoing Vice-Presidents in order of precedence or, in their absence, by the MEP having held office for the longest period (Rule 14). The Parliament cannot deal with any other activity until the election of the new President is concluded (Rule 14(2)).

The vote is by secret ballot (Rule 15). Prior to January 2017, Rule 15 provided that, if the number of candidates (for President, Vice-Presidents and Quaestors) was less than or equal to the number of seats to be filled, the election may be held by acclamation. Rule 15 now provides that, in those circumstances, the election shall be held by acclamation unless a number of Members or political group(s) reaching at least the ‘high threshold’, i.e. one-fifth of Members (141), request a secret ballot. This provision is, however, unlikely to apply to the presidential election, where traditionally more than one nominee runs for the seat.Rule 16 provides that after nominations have been handed to the provisional chair of the plenary sitting, the latter announces them in plenary. The President is elected by an absolute majority of votes cast, i.e. 50 % +1, which can be less than an absolute majority of all Members since abstentions and spoilt or blank votes do not count. Rule 16 provides for a maximum of four ballots. If, after the third ballot, no absolute majority is reached, the fourth ballot is confined to the two candidates who obtained the highest number of votes in the third ballot, in which case the victory is attributed to the candidate (among the two) with the higher score. In the case of a tie at the fourth ballot, Rule 16(1) assigns the presidency to the older candidate. In electing the President, Vice-Presidents and Quaestors, account should be taken of the need to ensure a fair representation of political views, geographical balance and gender balance (Rule 15(2)). The elected President is the sole person entitled to give an opening address.

Duties of the President Figure 1 – European Parliament Presidents

The President enjoys executive and representative powers, as well as responsibility for ensuring the rules of procedure are respected. The President directs all of Parliament’s activities, including the duty to ‘open, suspend and close sittings; to rule on the admissibility of amendments and other texts put to the vote, as well as on the admissibility of parliamentary questions’. Order is maintained during sittings by the President giving the floor to speakers. The President also closes debates, puts matters to the vote, announces the results of votes and makes relevant communications to committees. The President’s responsibility extends also to the security and inviolability of the Parliament’s premises (Rule 22). Rule 22(4) attributes to the President the power to represent Parliament in international relations, on ceremonial occasions and in administrative, legal and financial matters, although some of these powers may be delegated.
The powers of the President, however, extend far beyond the mere letter of Rule 22. They also include, for example, the power to convene the conciliation committee, under both ordinary legislative procedure and in the budgetary procedure, in agreement with the President of the Council, and to chair Parliament’s delegation to the conciliation committee (although under the ordinary legislative procedure this duty has often been delegated); to chair formal sittings when visiting heads of state address the Parliament; and during important votes or debates.

Since the late 1980s, the practice of the EP President addressing the European Council at the opening of all its meetings has developed, a sign of the increased visibility and recognition of the role in relation to the other institutions and the outside world. The President chairs both the EP Bureau and the Conference of Presidents, and may cast a deciding vote in the Bureau in the event of a tie. One significant symbol of the extent to which Parliament’s powers have evolved is that the EP President co-signs, with the President of the Council, legislative acts adopted under the ordinary legislative procedure (Article 297(1) TFEU). And, at the end of the annual budgetary procedure, it is the EP President who declares the EU budget adopted (Article 314(9) TFEU).

Election of Vice-Presidents and Quaestors

Rule 15 makes it explicit that, after the election of the President, Members then elect the other main political office-holders of the Parliament – required for the correct functioning of the institution’s activities. First the 14 Vice-Presidents, and then the 5 Quaestors, are elected in plenary. Nominations are made on the same basis as for the President (Rule 15). Under Rule 17, the 14 Vice-Presidents are elected in a single ballot by a majority of votes cast. If the number of successful candidates is less than 14, a second vote is held to assign the remaining seats under the same conditions (absolute majority of votes cast). If a third vote is necessary, a relative majority is sufficient to fill the remaining seats (abstentions and spoilt votes do not count). Vice-Presidents take precedence in the order in which they are elected and, in the event of a tie, by age. If voted by acclamation, a vote by secret ballot determines the order of precedence. The election of Quaestors follows the same procedure as that for the election of Vice-Presidents (Rule 18).

In practice, the political groups aim to ensure that the Parliament’s Bureau, made up of the Vice‑Presidents, and the Quaestors, broadly reflect the numerical strength of the groups, including taking into account the results of the election of the President.

This is a further update of an ‘at a glance’ note, the most recent edition of which was published in June 2019.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Electing the European Parliament’s President‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Lucienne Attard (Legislative Planning and Coordination Unit, Directorate-General for the Presidency).

France will hold the Presidency of the Council of the EU in the first half of 2022. It will initiate the work of the Trio Presidency composed of France, Czechia and Sweden. Executive power is exercised by the President of the Republic, who is elected by direct, popular vote, and the Government. The Prime Minister, appointed by the President, together with the Ministers, is answerable to the National Assembly, the lower house of Parliament, and they can be removed by a vote of censure. Parliament consists of the National Assembly and the Senate. The National Assembly is the principal parliamentary body, composed of 577 members, who are elected directly for five-year terms. The Presidential election will coincide with the French Presidency, in April 2022.

France is a founding Member State of the European Union, and has already held the rotating Presidency of the Council 13 times. The French President, Emmanuel Macron, will present the political priorities of the Presidency to the European Parliament during the January plenary session in Strasbourg.

While the last French Presidency, in 2008, was characterised by the global financial crisis, the forthcoming one is expected to be dominated by the ongoing Covid pandemic, the cost of energy crisis and the aftermath of Brexit. The French Presidency will very likely give special impetus to the conclusion of the Conference on the Future of Europe, which should take place in the first half of 2022. The plan is for the Trio Presidency, in its role as member/observer in the Executive Board of the Conference, to draw on the outcomes of the various activities and citizens’ recommendations, outline how they define the future of the Union, and start the implementation process.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Priority dossiers under the French EU Council Presidency‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Yann-Sven Rittelmeyer.

Introduction to France’s parliamentary system

The role of the French Parliament has varied under successive French Republics. The Constitution of the Fifth Republic, adopted in 1958, was amended by referendum in 1962 to establish the direct election of the President by universal suffrage. This created a hybrid political regime with some presidential and some parliamentary characteristics, sometimes described as a ‘semi-presidential regime’ or a ‘hyper-presidential’ regime.

The government is responsible to Parliament, but contrary to classical parliamentary regimes, the President plays an important role. The President has the power to dissolve the National Assembly (Assemblée nationale). He or she appoints the Prime Minister, as well as – on the recommendation of the Prime Minister – the other members of the government.

Traditionally, the Prime Minister makes the government’s programme or a general policy statement an issue of a vote of confidence before the National Assembly. The latter can overthrow the government, but is largely subordinate to the executive – consisting of the President and the government placed under the authority of the Prime Minister. In periods of ‘cohabitation‘, the National Assembly plays a greater role in supporting the Prime Minister, who in this specific configuration acts as leader of the majority.

Legislative powers are exercised by the two houses, who vote on laws, monitor government action and assess public policy. The National Assembly (Assemblée nationale) is elected for five years by direct universal suffrage. The indirectly elected Senate (Sénat) represents the ‘territorial communities of the Republic’ (Article 24 of the Constitution) and shares legislative power with the National Assembly. It embodies continuity, as it cannot be dissolved and half of its Members are renewed every three years. However, in cases of disagreement, the National Assembly has the final say.

Read the complete briefing on ‘The French Parliament and EU affairs‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Nera Kuljanic with Carl Pierer.

Technological sovereignty is an important ambition for the European Union (EU). The Covid‑19 pandemic has drawn attention to critical technologies, due to its impact on many value chains. However, there is no common definition of technological sovereignty. The resulting ambiguity can lead to divisive rhetoric that threatens the EU’s ambitions, since the policy objectives and the fulfilment of the corresponding aspirations depend on the definition of the term.

In EU industrial policy, certain technologies are considered particularly critical for advancement, growth and sovereignty. Among them are six key enabling technologies (KETs): advanced manufacturing, advanced (nano)materials, life-science technologies, micro/nano-electronics and phototonics, artificial intelligence, and security and connectivity technologies. Concretely, these overarching clusters of technologies have applications in autonomous systems and Industry 4.0, in biomaterials and rapid prototyping, in neurotechnology and bioelectronics, in quantum computing, in robotics, and in cryptography, among other things. Mastering these six KETs could therefore make Europe more resilient and competitive in a global context.

A new STOA study proposes a definition of technological sovereignty for the EU, and analyses how the EU is performing in developing and protecting ownership and know-how in these critical technologies, especially in comparison with strong global players such as China and the United States of America (USA). Based on the challenges identified in the analysis, it discusses policy options for strengthening the EU’s technological sovereignty.

Europe losing ground despite strong commitments

According to the study, technological sovereignty can be understood as Europe’s ability to develop, provide, protect and retain critical technologies required for European citizens’ welfare and business prosperity, as well as the ability to act and decide independently in a globalised environment.

In pursuing technological sovereignty in KETs, the EU faces five major obstacles:

• Lack of resources/raw materials: Europe is dependent on third countries for access to many of the critical raw materials or resources needed in the context of KETs.
• Dependence on non-European suppliers: in several KETs, many of the supply and value chains depend on non-European organisations and know-how.
• Digital skills: a lack and drain of technological experts and know-how can be observed, compromising European industry and academia.
• Commercialisation of research results: Europe struggles to turn good scientific research results into commercial products and to retain them in Europe.
• Regulatory fragmentation: there is a lack of joint action and coordination between different levels of governance and sometimes between different policies.

The analysis shows that Europe has made strong efforts to support the development of KETs, evidenced in dedicated investment programmes, research successes resulting in patents, and a competitive start-up ecosystem. However, the analysis also shows that Europe lags behind China and the USA due to a lack of research and development (R&D) funding, especially from the private sector, a lack of qualified skills in technology, and a lack of industrial leaders in KETs. Ultimately, Europe loses ground with its many good ideas and companies being acquired by non-European players.

The road to EU technological sovereignty

To address these difficulties, to avoid losing ground to other geopolitical actors, and to ensure the EU’s technological sovereignty, the study puts forward a total of 25 policy options organised in 4 ‘packages’. The first package outlines a proposal for a new EU strategy for KETs based on an institutionalised policy dialogue between all the relevant players: EU institutions; Member States; regions; and academic and industry stakeholders, including SMEs. The other three packages address the four key challenges across the KETs. They are, however, not KETs-specific, and should therefore contribute to improving the endowment of raw materials, reducing dependence on non-European suppliers, advancing skills and commercialisation overall. Most policy options target EU policy-makers, but some could be taken up at national level.

The study was complemented with an online event organised by STOA, which took place on 15 June 2021. Chaired by STOA Second Vice-Chair Ivars Ijabs (Renew, LV), it featured presentations by one of the study authors, Michael Flickenschild, Consultant with the Economic Growth team of Ecorys, and by Daniel Fiott, Security and Defense Editor at the European Union Institute for Security Studies.

Read the full report and accompanying Options Brief to find out more.

Your opinion counts for us. To let us know what you think, get in touch via stoa@europarl.europa.eu.

Written by Piotr Bakowski (1st edition).

On 20 July 2021, the European Commission presented a package of legislative proposals in the area of anti-money-laundering efforts and countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT). The package includes a proposal for a regulation on preventing the use of the financial system for money laundering or terrorist financing. The proposed regulation would be the central element of what is commonly referred to as an EU ‘single rulebook’ on AML/CFT. Its detailed and directly applicable provisions would replace the minimum rules of the EU AML directives currently in force.

The package has been adopted in response to repeated calls by the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union to enhance the EU’s regulatory framework on AML/CFT. The aim is for the framework to become more coherent, keeping in step with technological innovations and related new forms of crime, as well as remaining in line with international standards in the field. In Parliament, the Committees on Economic and Monetary Affairs and on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs are jointly responsible for the file.

Versions

• December 2021: Proposal for a regulation to fight money laundering and counter terrorist financing (1st edition)

Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing Committee responsible:Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) and Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) (jointly under Rule 58)COM(2021) 420
20.7.2021Rapporteurs:Eero Heinäluoma (S&D, Finland) and
Damien Carême (Greens/EFA, France)2021/0239(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Ralf Seekatz (EPP, Germany); Franco Roberti (S&D, Italy); Dragoş Pîslaru (Renew, Romania); Ramona Strugariu (Renew, Romania); Kira Marie Peter‑Hansen (Greens/EFA, Denmark); Jean-Paul Garraud (ID, France); Jadwiga Wiśniewska (ECR, Poland); Roberts Zīle (ECR, Latvia); Clare Daly (The Left, Ireland); Martin Schirdewann (The Left, Germany)Ordinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Publication of draft report

Written by Ionel Zamfir with Linda Tothova.

The Summit for Democracy, a pledge of US President Joe Biden’s 2020 electoral campaign, came to fruition on 9‑10 December 2021. The first-ever global summit dedicated to harnessing international support for democratic renewal launched the 2022 ‘year of action’, aimed at fostering resilient democracies worldwide.

Background

On 9-10 December 2021, United States President Joe Biden hosted a virtual two-day Summit for Democracy, bringing together heads of state, civil society, and the private sector. During the summit, President Biden warned that democratic erosion is ‘the defining challenge of our time’. In fact, for the fifth year in a row, the number of countries moving towards authoritarianism exceeds the number of countries progressing towards democracy. The summit agenda focused on strengthening democratic institutions and solidarity amongst democracies globally in three areas: defending against authoritarianism; addressing and fighting corruption; and promoting respect for human rights. The summit organisers – the White House, the US Department of State and USAID – created three civil society working groups within the three pillars, which held consultations leading up to the summit. The stated purpose was not to create a permanent secretariat or a new organisation, but to launch a ‘year of action’ in the three core areas.

Attempts to build coalitions of democracies are nothing new
The idea of an alliance of democratic states has deep historical conceptual roots. Democracies are considered more likely to cooperate and are more peaceful and inherently respectful of norms. There have been prior attempts to bring democratic alliances to life, but to date these remain limited either in membership or objectives. Established in 2000, the Community of Democracies (CoD) is a global intergovernmental coalition of 106 states that adhere to common democratic values and standards. With an ambitious strategic plan for 2018-2023, it aims to respond to democratic backsliding and shrinking civic space both within and outside its membership. The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) works to advance democracy worldwide, by providing assistance and advice on democratic processes and elections. The G7 is an informal group of democracies, albeit limited to the world’s seven largest liberal democratic economies, with a significant influence on major global issues. Experts have suggested transforming the G7 into a D10 global steering group, including Australia, South Korea, and possibly India (all invited as guests to the most recent G7 Summit). The need for democracies to cooperate and coordinate globally is increasingly recognised, to impose human rights and economic sanctions, in international forums and to uphold multilateral rules, and on strategic and security issues. Participation

The US Department of State released the full list of 110 participants on 24 November 2021. Although most invitees (69 %) are from fully ‘free’ countries according to the Freedom House classification, ‘partly free’ (28 %) and ‘not free’ (3 %) countries also received invitations. The choice of invitees was, according to some analysts, inevitably controversial from the start. Moreover, Taiwan’s participation was another contentious issue, while China was not invited (even though the USA is officially committed to a one-China policy), risking the creation of an additional rift between Washington and Beijing. Despite international divisions regarding formal recognition, Kosovo also attended. The Philippines, India and Brazil were invited, despite constituting some of the most prominent cases of democratic backsliding in the world. The invitation of Angola, Iraq and Democratic Republic of Congo, all ‘not free’ countries, also puzzled commentators. A possible explanation is that Biden’s administration perceived regional diversity and potential for democratic progress as being more important than a sterling record of democratic practices. The invitation of countries such as Serbia, Ukraine and Pakistan also reflects US geostrategic considerations. The exclusion of Hungary – the sole EU country not to receive an invitation could reflect genuine US concerns over negative developments in Hungary, but also over Viktor Orbán’s government’s ties to illiberal groups in the USA.

Some countries reacted to their exclusion with anger. On 1 December 2021, the Hungarian Ambassador to the EU indicated that Hungary would not support a common EU position at the summit. China’s reaction was fiercely critical, with the government taking the opportunity to tout its system as the better democracy model – ‘more extensive and genuine’ than that of the USA. Ahead of the summit, Chinese officials released a 30‑page white paper elaborating on China’s respect for democratic institutions and ‘development of people’s democracy’. An opinion piece by the Russian and Chinese Ambassadors to the USA calls on countries to ‘stop using “value-based diplomacy” to provoke division and confrontation’. Although invited, Pakistan surprisingly skipped the summit, possibly to protect its strategic alliance with China.

Main outcomes

On 9 December 2021, the US Department of State announced a Presidential Initiative for Democratic Renewal to provide financial assistance of US$424.4 million to support free and independent media, fight corruption, advance technological solutions for democracy, foster democratic reforms and defend free and fair electoral processes. The USA, Australia, Denmark and Norway signed the Export Controls and a Human Rights Initiative, while Canada, France, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom expressed their support. The initiative aims to curb the misuse of dual-use, cyber- and surveillance technologies – increasingly used by authoritarian regimes – and will involve drafting a voluntary written code of conduct. Participating countries committed to measures to improve democracy both internally and externally, such as increased funding for United Nations bodies dealing with human rights (Belgium, Canada), initiatives to bolster technology’s role in democracy (Denmark), and the fight against corruption (Japan), amongst other proposed initiatives. Under the umbrella of actionable commitments, a global follow-up, in-person summit of democracies is expected to take place in late 2022.

Reactions

Commentators emphasised that the outcome did not always match initial promises, but that the summit’s success should be judged based on its capacity to deliver. The possibility that the summit positions could remain empty rhetoric was a frequent concern. The summit allowed the USA to showcase its democracy agenda at a time when democracies are under stress worldwide, but questions remain over the credibility of American democracy itself. Some commentators expressed concern that the summit would strengthen authoritarian regimes’ resolve and coordination, particularly Russia and China, or that it would deepen global rifts, endangering much-needed collective action to tackle global problems. China’s fierce reaction, as well as Russia’s criticism of the summit, show that both countries consider it a potentially effective initiative. Transparency International welcomed the initiatives to fight corruption, but warns that several countries directly linked to cross-border corruption did not pledge new measures and that authoritarian invitees are unlikely to make significant progress. Brookings notes that the summit will allow civil society to push through some of the ambitious pledges at the national level. Human Rights Watch suggests the USA should disinvite countries from next year’s planned summit, should they fail to deliver on commitments.

European Union position

Article 21 TEU commits the EU to ‘advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights’ and to ‘develop partnerships with third countries … which share the[se] principles’. During the EU-US summit in June 2021, the two parties reaffirmed their intention to ‘partner in the Summit for Democracy’ and ‘to lead by example at home’. In November 2021, the EU launched the Team Europe Democracy Initiative to bolster coordination actions amongst the Member States in support of democracy. Coinciding with the summit, the EU launched the Human Rights and Democracy programme under the Global Europe instrument, with a total budget of €1.5 billion available to 2027. European Council President Charles Michel’s intervention at the summit focused on the opportunities and challenges digital technologies present for democracy; an issue equally emphasised by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen in her speech.

In a resolution of 7 July 2021, the European Parliament expressed support for President Biden’s decision to hold the global summit. On 6 October 2021, Parliament noted the summit will serve as a way to advance value-based multilateralism and strengthen solidarity amongst democracies.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Summit for Democracy‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Lieve Van Woensel with Virginia Mahieu.

In an increasingly digital world, Parliament’s Science and Technology Options Assessment (STOA) Panel is expanding its online foresight capabilities. In partnership with the Danish Board of Technology, STOA recently conducted an online stakeholder engagement exercise and published an in-depth analysis with the outcomes, to elucidate the societal concerns surrounding a highly topical and controversial issue – gene editing in crops – as part of its mission to support decision-making by the Members of the European Parliament. The purpose is to inform them about the challenges of genome editing, and the societal hopes and concerns surrounding the possible implementation of this new technology to support European food production.

New genetic technologies (NGTs) – mainly CRISPR-Cas9 – have come to the forefront of discussions for their potential to contribute to agricultural sustainability, particularly in relation to the European Green Deal objectives. Traditional breeding methods can improve crops, but NGTs can make the process faster and easier. Genetic modification techniques are strictly regulated in the EU under the Genetically Modified Organism (GMO) Directive. The question is whether NGTs should be treated differently or even exempt from the current directive.

The directive defines GMO as ‘an organism, with the exception of human beings, in which the genetic material has been altered in a way that does not occur naturally by mating and/or natural recombination’. Whether changes made with NGTs could also occur naturally is an issue of ongoing debate. In 2018, the European Court of Justice ruled that NGTs would be subject to the same requirements as older techniques (therefore coming under the GMO Directive), but amendments and revisions of the European Union legislation are not excluded. However, NGTs are a subject of controversy as, while some believe they can bring improvements to European crop production, others worry about the risks and other potential problems associated with their use. Thus, the debate continues.

When making evidence-based policy decisions about new and influential technologies, it is essential to factor in not only the scientific evidence, but also the societal context in which the technology would be applied. To this end, STOA performed a foresight study with a stakeholder engagement component in order to gain an overview of the concerns (hopes and fears) present in a representative group of stakeholders that work with or are impacted by NGTs. This exercise included an online survey and a workshop with key stakeholders from diverse fields affected by NGTs. The online survey used hypothetical policy options, borrowed from the 2019 report by the Rathenau Instituut on ‘Genome editing in plants and crops‘, to guide stakeholders in identifying arguments for and against several potential regulation scenarios, ranging from full regulation as for conventional GMOs, to a levelled approach based on the societal and ethical assessment of the value of the application. The concerns and arguments were then refined with the help of the stakeholders themselves during a subsequent workshop.

STOA identified relevant organisations and experts and sent out 52 invitations for participation in this stakeholder engagement exercise. Of these, 40 completed the survey, including respondents from actors representatives of agrarian industry and research, farming, environmental NGOs, administrations, trade, food science, consumer and lobby watch organisations, as well as some experts in behavioural sciences.

The key categories of concerns expressed included general concerns about the EU policy-making process, the practical implementation of new legislation and societal safeguards, uncertainty and unknowns surrounding the new technology, and the implications of potential legislative changes for innovation and competition within and outside the EU. Some further specific examples included concerns over social acceptability and consumers’ freedom of choice, traceability, the justification and application of the precautionary principle, as well as potential health and environmental risks and associated liability issues. They are presented in the in-depth analysis in multiple grouped formats to facilitate reading: condensed according to topic (chapter 3), organised according to the relevant European Parliament committee (chapter 4), and summarised concisely (chapter 5). The original format (grouped per policy option), obtained as a result of the workshop, is presented in Appendix I.

Your opinion counts for us. To let us know what you think, get in touch via stoa@europarl.europa.eu.

Written by Suzana Anghel and Ralf Drachenberg.

‘The European Council will revert to the issue’ or ‘reiterates’ its view, were probably the most used sentences in the conclusions issued following the 16 December 2021 meeting of the Heads of State or Government. For many of the issues on the agenda, such as energy, where the geopolitical stakes are high, differences in position remain in the European Council; achieving consensus is therefore part of a longer process. On security and defence, no big decisions, but specific guidelines and targeted requests, defined this summit. As regards the discussions on both Covid-19 and migration, the conclusions mainly include reiterations of previous commitments.

Within the broad bouquet of external relations topics, EU leaders warned Russia of ‘massive consequences’ in case of further military escalation in Ukraine. They also denounced the instrumentalisation of migrants and refugees by the Belarusian regime for political purposes, and called for ‘the immediate and unconditional release of all political prisoners’. EU leaders also reaffirmed the Union’s commitment to cooperation with the Southern Neighbourhood, calling to speed up work on the new Agenda for the Mediterranean, praised the mediation efforts of the African Union (AU) in Ethiopia, calling for ‘an unconditional ceasefire’ and dialogue, and prepared for the 17-18 February 2022 EU-AU Summit. President Charles Michel recalled EU Member States’ solidarity when mentioning the unacceptable pressure exerted by China on Lithuania. As for the Euro Summit, it called again for the completion of Banking Union and the Capital Markets Union.

1.     General aspects

The meeting opened with an address by the President of the European Parliament, David Sassoli. At this final European Council meeting under the Slovenian Council Presidency, the Slovenian Prime Minister, Janez Janša, reported on the follow-up to previous European Council conclusions. The December meeting was also the first European Council meeting for the new Chancellor of Germany, Olaf Scholz, the recently elected Prime Minister of Sweden, Magdalena Andersson, and the new Chancellor of Austria, Karl Nehammer. Two other new EU leaders, the new Prime Minister of Czechia, Petr Fiala, and the new Bulgarian Prime Minister, Kiril Petkov, are expected to attend European Council meetings as of 2022.

President Michel used the opportunity of the last meeting in 2021 to update the European Council’s indicative Leaders’ Agenda 2021-2022. This is the third update under Michel’s presidency of the original Leaders’ Agenda – launched under his predecessor, Donald Tusk – which now sets out a work programme for the European Council up to March 2022. Besides adding the priority topics and the European Council-related events under the French Presidency of the Council, the main change in this update is the removal from the agenda of a discussion of the Conference on the Future of Europe, originally planned for the March 2022 meeting. The topic might, however, be discussed by the European Council at its June 2022 meeting. The President of the European Parliament, David Sassoli, stressed that ‘the Conference on the Future of Europe should help us find innovative ways of reawakening the feeling that Europe is a project with which all Europeans can identify’, and recalled that ‘it will soon be time for the initial conclusions to be drawn’.

2.     European Council meeting Covid-19

The European Council discussed the epidemiological situation in the EU in the context of an emerging variant of concern (Omicron), with the conclusions focusing on the Covid-19 response more broadly. EU leaders reiterated the importance of vaccines, including booster doses, in the fight against Covid-19. Furthermore, the European Council underlined the importance of overcoming vaccine hesitancy, specifically through combatting disinformation. EU leaders called for progress on the EU strategy for Covid-19 therapeutics, which will form part of the European Health Union.

The European Council stressed the importance of global cooperation in the fight against Covid-19. EU leaders outlined four actions to meet that aim: i) developing genome-sequencing capacity internationally; ii) exporting and sharing vaccines, particularly with the countries most in need; iii) removing obstacles to the global delivery of vaccines; and iv) strengthening coordination with vaccine manufacturers, the World Health Organization (WHO), COVAX and other partners.

As anticipated in the EPRS outlook, the European Council welcomed an agreement by WHO member countries to start negotiations on a convention, agreement or other international instrument on pandemic prevention, preparedness and response. President Michel first proposed an international treaty on pandemics in November 2020. EU leaders endorsed the suggestion at their meeting on 25 February 2021, and they have now explicitly supported this objective on four occasions.

EU leaders invited the Council to follow up on the fulfilment of vaccine pledges. In May, the European Council committed to donating at least 100 million doses by the end of 2021 – this target has already been surpassed. The EU has now committed to donating 700 million doses by mid-2022.

Main message of the President of the European Parliament: David Sassoli underlined that the EU should strive for a Health Union and increase prevention, protection and crisis-preparedness efforts.

Crisis management and resilience

As flagged up in the EPRS outlook, in advance of the meeting, EU leaders welcomed the Council conclusions of 23 November 2021 on resilience and crisis response, calling notably for strengthening the EU’s crisis response and preparedness in a comprehensive manner, and building and monitoring resilience in areas where the EU is exposed. They invited the Council to take work forward and to regularly review progress.

Main message of the President of the EP: President Sassoli stressed that ‘protecting Europeans means being better able to prepare our response to all of tomorrow’s crises – be they environmental, economic, diplomatic or military’.

Energy prices

EU leaders once again addressed the recent spike in energy prices, but without adopting any conclusions. President Michel stressed the impact on households and their purchasing power, welcomed the reports presented to date by the European Commission at the European Council’s request, and acknowledged the lingering divergences in Member States’ views on energy policy. Two core issues remain particularly divisive, namely the energy market and the EU ‘taxonomy’.

Several EU leaders recalled the geopolitical dimension of the energy price crisis, with the Prime Minister of Latvia, Krišjānis Karinš, stressing Russia’s deliberate attempt to circumvent Ukraine and hence pressing for the operationalisation of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline. As regards the energy market, not much has moved since October 2021 when EU leaders last discussed the issue. Spain continued to champion ‘an overhaul of the bloc’s wholesale energy market’ and Poland to call ‘to suspend and reform’ the ETS system. However, diverging views persist on the speculative nature of market activities in recent months. When it comes to the sustainable finance taxonomy, the most sensitive issue remains the classification of gas and nuclear energy as either ‘green’ or ‘transitional’ in an imminent European Commission delegated act. Charles Michel stressed that it is the Commission’s responsibility to decide on this, and not that of the European Council, while mentioning that EU leaders were not in agreement on the question.

Main message of the President of the EP: David Sassoli spoke of a ‘Europe that protects’, stressed that ‘no one in Europe should be abandoned to energy poverty’ and that the EU ‘has to find bold solutions to keep all Europeans secure’.

Migration

EU Heads of State or Government concentrated in their discussions on the ‘external aspects of migration’, and refrained, again, from addressing internal questions, especially issues linked to asylum. Even on external aspects of migration, the focus of the discussion was very narrow, looking mostly at cooperation with countries of origin and transit, as well as the implementation of previous European Council conclusions. EU leaders reiterated their calls from the October 2021 meeting, notably to the Commission to ensure, i) that the recent action plans for countries of origin and transit be made operational and implemented without further delay; and ii) that adequate financing be clearly identified and mobilised without delay for migration-related action on all routes.

EU leaders stressed the importance of addressing all migratory routes, in a comprehensive approach, and invited the Council and the Commission to consider ways to support Member States facing specific challenges at the EU’s external borders, including as regards deployment of border guards as well as aerial surveillance. They also called again for a more unified EU returns policy. While EU leaders reiterated their condemnation of attempts by third countries to instrumentalise migrants for political purposes, migration aspects related to Belarus which were dealt with under the heading of migration at the October 2021 meeting, were this time dealt with as a specific agenda point under external relations issues.

Main message of the President of the EP: David Sassoli stressed that protecting Europeans also involves taking resolute action to better integrate our migration and external border management policies.

Security and defence

EU leaders confirmed their commitment to multilateralism, reaffirming the United Nations’ pivotal role in maintaining a rules-based international order. They reiterated their intention to strengthen cooperation with like-minded partners ‘in order to address common threats and challenges together’. EU Heads of State or Government underlined again the Union’s willingness to ‘take more responsibility for its own security and in the field of defence’, as well as the need to ‘increase the Union’s ‘capacity to act autonomously’ and to ‘promote its interests and values’.

EU leaders followed up on their Brdo pri Kranju debate, focussing on two key issues – the Strategic Compass and cooperation with NATO. As regards the Strategic Compass, they tasked the Council to continue work towards ‘an ambitious and actionable Strategic Compass’, recognising that it ‘sets out a common strategic vision for the next decade’. The High Representative, Josep Borrell, stressed that the Strategic Compass is intended to ‘increase the resilience of the European Union’ and its ‘defensive capacities’. On EU-NATO cooperation, EU leaders recalled ‘the principles of inclusiveness, reciprocity and decision-making autonomy of the EU’, which are crucial for closer cooperation with NATO, stressing that a more capable and complementary EU can only benefit transatlantic security.

Main message of the President of the EP: The EU will be able to ‘act together more swiftly, and more incisively, when [its] interests are threatened’, if it strengthens its security and defence.

External relations

As flagged up in the EPRS outlook, EU leaders focused on the tense situation at Ukraine’s border, calling on Russia to de-escalate tensions. President Michel stressed the ‘unfailing and total unity in the EU in expressing solidarity for the sovereignty and integrity of Ukraine’. He stressed that Russia would face ‘very serious consequences’ in the event of military aggression towards Ukraine, and underlined the Union’s readiness to coordinate ‘any operational measures’ with its partners. Commission President Ursula von der Leyen underlined that the EU maintained its ‘call on Russia to de-escalate tensions and refrain from any further aggression’, stressed that the EU would like to have good relations with Russia but that it is prepared to adopt sanctions ‘that could extract a massive cost’. She confirmed that the EU has been closely coordinating with partners, including the United States, on possible sanctions and was prepared, if need be, to operationalise them.

EU leaders also confirmed their support to the ‘Normandy format’ diplomatic dialogue, conducted by France and Germany with Ukraine and Russia. The format, instituted in June 2014, has, however, not delivered so far on the implementation of the Minsk Agreements.

The European Council meeting took place back-to-back with the Eastern Partnership Summit, which brought together the EU leaders and their opposite numbers from Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. In a joint declaration, they committed to cooperating on the basis of ‘common fundamental values, mutual interests and shared ownership’. An empty chair symbolised openness to cooperation with a democratic Belarus (the sixth Eastern Partnership country) ‘as soon as necessary conditions for peaceful democratic transition are in place’. The European Council denounced the ‘hybrid attack’ and the humanitarian crisis induced at the EU’s border with Belarus, underlining, inter alia, the importance of ‘ensuring unhindered access for international organisations in Belarus’ and ‘stepping up humanitarian support’.

3.     Euro Summit

EU leaders also met in the Euro Summit in inclusive format (with all 27 Member States participating). The President of the European Central Bank, Christine Lagarde, briefed them on recent monetary policy decisions and on the outlook for growth and inflation. The leaders then held a discussion on further integration in the Banking Union and Capital Markets Union. The resulting Euro Summit statement stressed the importance of a ‘completed Banking Union and a deep, integrated and well-functioning Capital Markets Union’. To that end, the entry into force of the agreement amending the Treaty on the European Stability Mechanism, as well as the early introduction of the backstop to the Single Resolution Fund, were identified as milestones. The reference to the timing for the implementation of both measures – envisaged for 2022 – did not appear in the formal statement. The statement also expressed urgency concerning the deepening of the Capital Markets Union, and formally requested the Eurogroup to present ‘a stepwise and time-bound work plan’ for the completion of Banking Union.

Read this briefing on ‘Outcome of the meetings of EU leaders of 16 December 2021‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Beatrix Immenkamp.

Enormous natural gas resources have turned Qatar into one of the world’s richest countries. The 11 610 km2 nation currently has the fourth highest GDP per capita in the world. The absolute monarchy’s estimated 340 000-350 000 citizens benefit from free education, free healthcare, virtually guaranteed – and well paid – employment, and pay almost no taxes. However, the great majority of the emirate’s nearly 3 million inhabitants live in very different conditions. Qatar has the highest ratio of migrants in the world: 85 % of its population are migrants and 94 % of its workforce comes from abroad, mostly from south Asia and Africa. In contrast to the small percentage of expatriates from the West and other Gulf States, Asian and African migrants live and work in harsh conditions. Around 1 million are employed in construction, and 100 000 are domestic workers.

In December 2010, FIFA, world football’s governing body, granted Qatar the right to host the 2022 World Cup, which is scheduled to take place from 21 November to 18 December. Expanding on an existing development programme enshrined in the Qatar National Vision 2030, the country embarked on an extensive building programme to prepare for the World Cup, involving an estimated 1 million migrant workers. However, these preparations placed the spotlight on Qatar’s poor treatment of migrant workers. In response to international pressure, Qatar has introduced important legal changes to improve the situation of these workers, which the EU has welcomed. However, according to human rights organisations, the country needs to take further steps to stop abuses. Of particular concern is the kafala sponsorship system, which is widely used throughout the six Gulf Cooperation Council States and gives disproportionate power to employers, leading to widespread abuse of migrant workers’ rights. Even though Qatar has started to dismantle the kafala system, important elements remain in place. Moreover, ensuring compliance with more favourable labour laws remains a challenge. Since 2008, the European Parliament has adopted four resolutions addressing the situation of migrant workers in Qatar; it has called on Qatar to end the ‘deplorable situation’ of migrant workers and prevent preparations for the 2022 World Cup from being ‘overshadowed by allegations of forced labour’.

Read the complete briefing on ‘The 2022 FIFA World Cup in Qatar: Turning the spotlight on workers’ rights‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Katarzyna Sochacka and Clare Ferguson.

Due to the deteriorating Covid‑19 situation, Members were again able to choose to vote remotely during the December plenary session in Strasbourg. Parliament nevertheless held a joint debate on the preparation of the European Council meeting of 16‑17 December 2021 and the EU’s response to the global resurgence of Covid‑19 and new emerging variants. Members debated statements by High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the Commission, Josep Borrell, on the situation in Nicaragua, at the Ukrainian border, and in the Russian-occupied territories of Ukraine. Members also debated a number of Council and European Commission statements, including on: the proposed Council decision on provisional emergency measures on the external border with Belarus; the state of play of the Recovery and Resilience Facility, plans to further undermine fundamental rights in Poland; on the EU response to transport poverty; taking stock of the European Year of Rail; the outcome of the Global Summit on Nutrition for Growth and increased food insecurity in developing countries; and on an EU ban on the use of wild animals in circuses.

In a formal sitting, Parliament heard an address by Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo-Addo, President of Ghana.

Sakharov Prize 2021

A key annual highlight in the European Parliament’s continual defence of human rights is the award of the Sakharov Prize in honour of the work of brave human rights defenders. This year, and following an attempt on his life, Parliament awarded the prize to imprisoned Russian opposition leader Alexey Navalny. Parliament has repeatedly expressed concern about Navalny’s situation, calling for his immediate release. With this award, Parliament emphasises its position on Russia’s systematic silencing of dissident voices, and its failure to uphold its international commitments to human rights. Daria Navalnaya, Navalny’s daughter, received the 2021 Sakharov Prize on behalf of her father in a ceremony during the plenary session.

Digital markets act

Parliament debated and adopted its position on an Internal Market and Consumer Protection Committee (IMCO) report on the proposed digital markets act (DMA), which seeks to regulate big digital platforms in the EU. The committee’s report proposes to extend the scope of the DMA to include web browsers, virtual assistants and connected televisions, and to increase the threshold for a company to be considered a ‘gatekeeper’. It also seeks stronger obligations on companies that act as internet gatekeepers, to ensure messaging and social media is interoperable and to make it easier to unsubscribe, as well as strengthening the rules on advertising and fair access. The European Commission will enforce the terms of the DMA, with fines for non-compliance ranging from 4 to 20 % of a company’s total worldwide turnover. The text now constitutes Parliament’s position for the forthcoming negotiations with the Council.

European Year of Youth 2022

The coronavirus pandemic has had terrible consequences for young people, with their lives and education completely disrupted by successive lock-downs. The European Commission has therefore proposed to concentrate efforts to improve their situation, by making 2022 the European Year of Youth. Following calls from Parliament’s Committee on Culture and Education (CULT) for additional efforts to include disadvantaged young people, and its successful negotiation of an additional €8 million funding for the Erasmus+ and European Solidarity Corps programmes, Parliament adopted an agreement reached between the co-legislators, so that the arrangements can be put in place in time for 1 January 2022.

Health technology assessment

The successful roll-out of coronavirus vaccine programmes in Europe underlined the benefits of swifter assessment of innovative health solutions. While EU countries are responsible for their healthcare policies, introducing EU-wide cooperation on research to assess the value of new health technologies should help make it swifter and easier to introduce new medicines and medical devices. Parliament has insisted that there be full transparency in the way the proposed coordination groups would work, to ensure that there is no conflict of interest in their consultations with experts, patient representatives and industry stakeholders. Parliament debated and adopted at second reading a new regulation on stronger EU cooperation on health technology assessment, allowing for the final act to be signed on 15 December 2021 and to apply three years after it enters into force.

New orientations for the EU’s humanitarian action

Together, the EU and its Member States already contribute more than one third of global humanitarian assistance. Parliament has pushed for a follow up to the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid, which sets out why, how and when the EU acts in response to humanitarian crises. Members therefore debated a Committee on Development (DEVE) own-initiative report on the Commission’s proposed new guidelines for EU humanitarian action, voting in favour of seeking swift action supported by more predictable and flexible funding, as well as sanctions for those who commit violations of international humanitarian law.

Cooperation on the fight against organised crime in the Western Balkans

Criminal activities, such as human trafficking and migrant smuggling, carried out by transnational organised crime groups in the Western Balkans are detrimental to victims, citizens of the region and the EU alike. Although cooperation with the EU and its agencies is already under way, an own-initiative report by Parliament’s Foreign Affairs (AFET) Committee underlines that accelerating reforms in the fight against transnational organised crime in the region, in line with the demands of the EU integration process, would greatly improve the situation, as well as trust in democracy in the region. Parliament debated and adopted a resolution on cooperation in the fight against organised crime in the Western Balkans.

Combating gender-based cyber-violence

The issue of cyber-violence has grown increasingly critical with the rise in the use of the internet and social media, exacerbated by the anonymity available to perpetrators. As no EU legislation currently specifically addresses gender-based violence, including cyber-violence, Parliament is keen to see these issues tackled in the European Commission’s expected proposal on combating online violence early in 2022. Members debated and adopted a legislative-initiative resolution tabled by Parliament’s Committees on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality (FEMM) and Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE), on combating gender-based cyber-violence. The committees would like to see the new legislation include measures that set out a legal definition of gender-based cyber-violence, EU-wide sanctions and improved support for victims.

European framework for employees’ participation rights and the revision of the European Works Council Directive

Members debated and adopted an own-initiative report prepared by the Employment and Social Affairs (EMPL) Committee proposing to revise the framework of EU laws that supports EU countries’ efforts to promote democracy at work. While the current EU laws to promote employee participation and representation rights have proved somewhat contradictory, new social, economic and pandemic-related challenges for workers mean that it is more important than ever that employees themselves have a say in the changes to come. The EMPL committee report therefore underlines the need for a new EU framework on information, consultation and board-level employee representation, including revamped European works councils, to reinforce employees’ rights.

Opening of trilogue negotiations

Members confirmed, without a vote, two mandates for negotiations from the Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) Committee on the proposal for an amending directive on digital operational resilience requirements and on the proposal for a directive on digital operational resilience for the financial sector. Members also confirmed a mandate from the Fisheries (PECH) Committee on the proposal for a regulation on management, conservation and control measures applicable in the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC) Area of Competence.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Plenary round-up – December 2021‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marcin Grajewski.

Russia’s military build-up along its border with Ukraine, and its masterminding – alleged by many politicians and analysts – of the refugee crisis on the borders of Belarus with Poland and Lithuania, have sparked concerns over the implications of Moscow’s aggressive foreign policy. Russia has amassed nearly 100 000 troops near the Ukrainian border, provoking renewed fears that Moscow is about to invade, seven years after it annexed the Crimean peninsula and destabilised the eastern regions of Ukraine. In Belarus, President Alexander Lukashenko, a close ally of Russian President Vladimir Putin, has allowed migrants to take flights into the country to purposely transfer them on to Belarus’s borders with neighbouring EU Member States.

This note gathers links to recent publications and commentaries from many international think tanks on Russia’s foreign and security policy and its implications for neighbouring countries, the European Union and global geopolitics.

Why Russia could invade Ukraine again
European Council on Foreign Relations, December 2021

Small victories: Why US-Russia relations could improve under Biden
European Council on Foreign Relations, December 2021

Russia’s destabilisation of Ukraine: A litmus test for transatlantic partners
European Policy Centre, December 2021

Ukraine: Conflict at the crossroads of Europe and Russia
Council on Foreign Relations, December 2021

Russia’s threats place Europe at a pivotal moment
Chatham House, December 2021

What Biden should say to Putin on Ukraine
Brookings Institution, December 2021

Why is Russia amassing troops at its border with Ukraine?
International Institute for Strategic Studies, December 2021

Russia and China mobilize transatlantic partners
Carnegie Europe, December 2021

NATO must adapt to an era of hybrid threats
Carnegie Europe, December 2021

Responding to Russia’s new military buildup near Ukraine
International Crisis Group, December 2021

Greece, Russia and the EU: The way forward
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, December 2021

Will Putin miscalculate?
Brookings Institution, November 2021

The Kremlin’s strange victory: How Putin exploits American dysfunction and fuels American decline
Brookings Institution, November 2021

Russia’s military movements: What they could mean for Ukraine, Europe, and NATO
European Council on Foreign Relations, November 2021

How the Kremlin has weaponized the Facebook files
Brookings Institution, November 2021

When security in Europe conflicts with democracy in Poland
Brookings Institution, November 2021

How to energize NATO’s response to Russia’s threats against Ukraine
Council on Foreign Relations, November 2021

Why the West should deter a Russian attack on Ukraine
Centre for European Reform, November 2021

Putin, Lukashenko and lessons learned from Zapad-2021
Casimir Pulaski Foundation, November 2021

Russia on the path of confrontation
Casimir Pulaski Foundation, November 2021

Vladimir Putin’s Ukraine obsession could spark a major European war
Atlantic Council, November 2021

Is Europe in denial about Russia?
Carnegie Europe, November 2021

How the German ‘traffic light’ coalition can solve the EU border crisis
European Council on Foreign Relations, November 2021

No quiet on the eastern front: The migration crisis engineered by Belarus
European Council on Foreign Relations, November 2021

Russia conducts direct-ascent anti-satellite test
International Institute for Strategic Studies, December 2021

The last of the offended: Russia’s first post-Putin diplomats
European Council on Foreign Relations, November 2021

Three decades of Russian policy in the European part of the post-Soviet space: Swimming against the current
Finnish Institute of Foreign Relations, November 2021

Russian policy towards Central Asia 30 years after the collapse of the Soviet Union: Sphere of influence shrinking?
Finnish Institute of Foreign Relations, November 2021

The young and the restless: Europe, Russia, and the next generation of diplomats in the Eastern Partnership
European Council on Foreign Relations, November 2021

Moldova’s gas deal with Russia: David tries to draw with Goliath
European Council on Foreign Relations, November 2021

Ukraine-Russia relations
Chatham House, November 2021

Lukashenko is the problem, not the migrants
Centre for European Reform, November 2021

Lukashenko uses migrants to exploit Europe’s vulnerability
Carnegie Europe, November 2021

Lessons from EU-Belarus relations
Bertelsmann Stiftung, November 2021

Russia’s Ukrainian dilemma: Moscow’s strategy towards Kyiv
Center for Eastern Studies, November 2021

Support for Lukashenko. Russia’s response to the migration crisis
Center for Eastern Studies, November 2021

Russia–Belarus: A sham acceleration of integration
Center for Eastern Studies, November 2021

Attribution als Herausforderung für EU-Cybersanktionen
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, November 2021

Dealing with Russia in the Arctic: Between exceptionalism and militarization
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, November 2021

The comeback kid: Russia in Latin America
European Union Institute for Security Studies, November 2021

French and German approaches to Russia
Chatham House, November 2021

Russia’s ‘gas pivot’ to Asia: How Europe can protect itself and pursue the green transition
European Council on Foreign Relations, October 2021

Is Russia using energy as a weapon again?
Council on Foreign Relations, October 2021

Why the United States should have invited Russia to join the counter-ransomware initiative
Council on Foreign Relations, October 2021

EU sanctions on Belarus as an effective policy tool
Center for Social and Economic Research, October 2021

Covid-19 in Russia: What are the economic, political and human effects?
Institut français des relations internationales, October 2021

The V4 towards a new NATO Strategic Concept and the EU Strategic Compass
Europeum, Antall József Knowledge Centre, Casimir Pulaski Foundation, Slovak Security Policy Institute, October 2021

What deters Russia: Enduring principles for responding to Moscow
Chatham House, October 2021

Russia’s defensive economic model: Paper tiger reforms and state-led investment spending as patchwork fixes
Bertelsmann Stiftung, October 2021

Russian gas on the EU market: Increased transmission and continuing uncertainty
Center for Eastern Studies, October 2021

Lithuania’s reactions to the escalating migration crisis
Center for Eastern Studies, October 2021

Putin’s pipeline is a strategic weapon: It must be stopped
Atlantic Council, October 2021

Possible instruments to better operationalise the EU strategy towards Russia
Polish Institute of International Affairs, October 2021

Advanced military technology in Russia
Chatham House, September 2021

How half-hearted sanctions put the future of Belarus at risk
European Council on Foreign Relations, September 2021

Russia, elections, and the West: Ten years later
European Council on Foreign Relations, September 2021

Russian parliamentary elections: Mission accomplished
Bertelsmann Stiftung, September 2021

Why we must not recognize Russia’s fraudulent election
Atlantic Council, September 2021

Elections in Russia: A measure for nothing or relevant after all?
Egmont, September 2021

Russia and 9/11: Roads not taken
Chatham House, September 2021

America must lead the international response to Russia’s human rights crisis
Atlantic Council, September 2021

Nord Stream 2 comes on stream: Good business or bad geopolitics?
Friends of Europe, September 2021

America must lead the international response to Russia’s human rights crisis
Atlantic Council, September 2021

How Russia made Apple and Google complicit in its internet crackdown
Atlantic Council, September 2021

Read this briefing on ‘The EU and Russia: A fragile neighbourhood‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Suzana Anghel, Ralf Drachenberg, Anna Krozser and Rebecca Torpey.

Established as an informal summit meeting in 1975, the European Council became a formal European Union institution, with a full-time President, in 2009, on the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon. It consists of the Heads of State or Government of the 27 EU Member States, the President of the European Council and the President of the European Commission (Article 15(2) of the Treaty on European Union, TEU). The latter two individuals have no voting rights. Meetings of the European Council are normally also attended by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. The President of the European Parliament is ‘invited to speak’ as the first item on the European Council’s agenda, followed by an exchange of views (Article 235(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU, TFEU). At its formal meetings, normally four per year, the European Council adopts ‘conclusions’ that are aimed at identifying policy priorities and action to be taken by the Union as a whole.

Agenda-setting and crisis management

The European Council’s role is to ‘provide the Union with the necessary impetus for its development and define the general political directions and priorities’ (Article 15(1) TEU). It cannot exercise legislative functions. At the beginning of the 2014-2019 and the 2019-2024 institutional cycles, the European Council adopted an agenda of strategic priorities, designed to guide the work of the European Union over the five-year period.

Reflecting the direction taken by the 2017 Rome Agenda set out on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the Rome Treaties, the 2019-2024 strategic agenda, adopted by the Heads of State or Government at their meeting in June 2019, defines migration and the protection of citizens as the top priorities for action in the upcoming five years. Then, comes the development of a stronger economic base, including the fight against unemployment, followed by climate change and social issues. Finally, it looks to increase the EU’s influence and defend its interest in the world. The four core priorities set out in the 2019-2024 strategic agenda broadly correspond to the concerns of EU citizens at the time, as reflected by the 2019 standard Eurobarometer.[1]

The outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic in early 2020 and the prospect of a protracted economic recession of unknown length and severity has, however, prompted EU Heads of State or Government to review the above priorities in order to provide for a coordinated approach and joint action to tackle the crisis. They met virtually on a number of occasions, with their attention shifting from the initial pandemic-related crisis management to the more medium-term recovery process.

At their first video-conference dedicated to the management of the health crisis, on 10 March 2020, the 27 EU Heads of State or Government, alongside the Presidents of the European Commission and the European Central Bank and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, agreed to work together along four main axes, with a view to: i) limiting the spread of the virus; ii) providing medical equipment; iii) promoting research, for instance on development of a vaccine; and iv) tackling the socio-economic consequences of the crisis. The EU leaders underscored the need for a joint European approach and close coordination with the European Commission in combating the pandemic.

Given the serious human, economic and social consequences of the health crisis, criticism has been directed towards the lack of overall preparedness in combatting the pandemic across the EU, and the lack of coordination among Member States at the start of the outbreak. Indeed, EU leaders have acknowledged that the EU needed to become better at ‘developing its executive capacity and at managing crises in a coordinated fashion’.

Following the immediate crisis-management phase, the European Council therefore shifted its focus more towards the medium-term recovery process, with the aim of relaunching and transforming the EU’s economies. In a ‘Joint Statement of the Members of the European Council’ adopted on 26 March 2020, EU leaders mandated the Presidents of the European Council, Charles Michel, and the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, to put forward a roadmap for recovery.

Submitted on 21 April, the recovery plan places particular emphasis on the opportunities offered by the green transition and digital transformation, which are expected to foster new forms of growth and contribute to a more innovative and resilient EU. This dual transformation has been given a central role in the EU’s medium- to long-term action, and forms part of a broader ambition aimed at achieving ‘European strategic autonomy‘. Charles Michel mentioned the concept of strategic autonomy several times over the year 2020; most prominently, on 28 September, when he stated that ‘European strategic autonomy – these are not just words. The strategic independence of Europe is our new common project for this century. It’s in all our common interest’. This concept was then formally endorsed by the European Council, which presented it as ‘a key objective of the Union’ in its 1-2 October 2020 conclusions. Recent developments in Afghanistan are likely to give new impetus to the debate on the EU’s strategic autonomy, as events in August 2021 have highlighted once again the need for the EU to strengthen its defence cooperation.

As regards the funding for the EU recovery process, this will come from the Next Generation EU (NGEU) recovery fund, set up as a temporary mechanism and linked to the 2021-2027 multiannual financial framework (MFF). Yet, it was only after months of remote meetings that the European Council was able to convene again in person to discuss the financial package, and an intensive four-day meeting was needed on 17-21 July, to reach political agreement on the 2021-2027 MFF and NGEU. Together, the two instruments amount to €1 824.3 billion, with €360 in loans and €390 billion in grants making up the latter. After several negotiation meetings between European Parliament and Council representatives, a political agreement on the package was reached on 10 November 2020. However, following the refusal by Hungary and Poland to endorse the outcome, citing concerns with the rule of law mechanism, it took the European Council another two meetings, a video-conference on 19 November and a meeting in person on 11-12 December 2020, to finally agree on clarifications to the rule-of-law conditionality mechanism, thus paving the way for the adoption of the MFF and the NGEU.

One and a half years after the outbreak of the crisis, boosting the EU economy and ensuring its future resilience remain the key priority of the EU. An improving health situation – coupled with increasing vaccination levels – allowed for the gradual restart of EU economies, which in turn led to a brighter economic outlook, with GDP forecast to grow by 4.8 % in 2021 in the EU. However, the speed of recovery varies by Member State and by sector.

Thus, immediately after the Commission’s first-ever bond issuance to feed the Recovery and Resilience Facility, the June 2021 European Council pushed for swift adoption by the Council and rapid implementation of the National Recovery and Resilience Plans, with the aim of ensuring balanced recovery throughout the continent.

Hence, despite an evolution in the ranking of European citizens’ priorities for EU action as identified in the most recent standard Eurobarometer, the horizontal policy orientations set by the European Council in its 2019-2024 strategic agenda appear to remain fully relevant and in line with the expectations of citizens, who now consider the economic situation as their top concern at EU level.

Specific Treaty-based role

In addition to its horizontal priority-setting role as defined in Article 15(1) TEU, the European Council is also tasked with identifying the Union’s strategic interests, determining the objectives of, and defining general guidelines for common foreign and security policy (Article 26 TEU). Following a request by EU leaders, the then High Representative, Federica Mogherini, presented an EU global strategy, which the European Council welcomed in June 2016. The strategy sets five broad priorities for the EU external action in coming years: the security of the Union, state and societal resilience to the east and south, an integrated approach to conflict and crisis, cooperative regional orders, and global governance for the 21st century.

Furthermore, the European Council defines the strategic guidelines for legislative and operational planning in the area of freedom, security and justice (Article 68 TFEU). For the period until 2019, the priorities for the European Union in the area of freedom, security and justice, were to ‘better manage migration in all aspects; prevent and combat crime and terrorism; [and] improve judicial cooperation among EU countries’. Following the outbreak of the migration crisis, and a series of terrorist attacks on European soil, key strategic documents, notably the European agenda on security and the European agenda on migration, were adopted in 2015, either at the request of or with the endorsement of the European Council. A new set of ‘strategic guidelines for legislative and operational planning’ were expected to be adopted by the European Council at its meeting of 26‑27 March 2020. Since the ordinary spring European Council meeting had to be postponed because of the coronavirus crisis. However, more than a year and a half later, and despite the 15 European Council meetings held in the meantime, EU leaders have still not complied with this Treaty obligation, nor is the topic mentioned in the indicative Leaders’ Agenda 2021-2022.

The European Council has also to ‘consider each year the employment situation in the Union and adopt conclusions thereon, on the basis of a joint annual report by the Council and the Commission’ (Article 148 TFEU).

Decision-making procedures and working methods

The European Council’s decisions are taken mainly by consensus, but in certain cases, the European Council can also decide by qualified majority. For example, the President of the European Council is elected by qualified majority vote for a once-renewable term of two and a half years. The President’s role is ‘to ensure the preparation and continuity of the work of the European Council in cooperation with the President of the Commission’, chair its meetings, ‘facilitate cohesion and consensus within the European Council’, and to ensure ‘the external representation of the Union on issues concerning its common foreign and security policy, without prejudice to the powers of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy’ (Article 15(5) TEU). The first two full-time Presidents of the European Council, Herman Van Rompuy and Donald Tusk, served five years each between 2009 and 2019. The third permanent President of the European Council, Charles Michel, began his mandate at the beginning of December 2019.

While not directly accountable to the European Parliament, the President of the European Council presents a report to the Parliament after each (formal) meeting of the Heads of State or Government (Article 15(6)(d) TEU). Usually this takes the form of a declaration in person, followed by a plenary debate.

One of the most striking development in recent years has been the substantial evolution in the working methods and formations of the European Council. As a result of the series of crisis of the last decade, we have witnessed an exponential increase in the number and types of meetings. All meetings are indeed meetings of Heads of State or Government, but not all meetings are formal European Council meetings.

Over recent years, members of the European Council have met in seven different formats:

Next to 1) regular meetings of the European Council on a quarterly basis (Article 15(3) TEU), mentioned earlier, the President can convene 2) special meetings of the European Council ‘when the situation so requires’ (Article 15(3) TEU). In principle, conclusions are also adopted at these special meetings. But, there can be exceptions, e.g. the special meeting of February 2020 on the MFF.

In addition, 3) informal meetings of Heads of State or Government take place traditionally twice per year in the country holding the rotating presidency of the Council, such as for instance the Porto meeting on 8 May 2021, in connexion with the social summit.

As a result of, inter alia, the financial crisis, the UK’s decision to leave the Union, the Leaders’ Agenda proposed by the previous President of the European Council, Donald Tusk, in 2017, and the coronavirus pandemic, meeting formations have evolved substantially.

The financial crisis has led to the increase in the number of special European Council meetings as well as to the establishment of the 4) Euro Summit, created as an informal gathering in 2008 and formalised in 2012 with the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the EMU. In principle, Euro Summits include the EU Member States which have adopted the common currency, currently 19 countries. However, more and more meetings take place in an inclusive format, i.e. with the participation of all 27 Member States. This was the case for instance of the June 2021 Euro Summit. This broad involvement could be linked to the fact that the Euro Summits are not crisis meetings anymore; they now aim at bringing forward the reform of EMU, which is of concern for all the Member States.

From June 2016, following the UK referendum, EU leaders felt the need to discuss a number of things among the 27. Thus, a number of informal meetings of Heads of State or Government at 27 took place without the UK to discuss the future of Europe, notably in Bratislava in 2016, Rome in 2017 and Sibiu in 2019. On those occasions a series of landmark declarations were adopted, which were not formal conclusions. Once the UK had triggered Article 50 and notified its intention to leave, then a new formal format was set up, the 5) European Council (Article 50), which adopted formal conclusions.

As for 6) Leaders’ meetings, they were set up under President Tusk in 2017 and aimed at discussing sensitive issues in an informal way. Such discussions were based, not on draft conclusions, but on short notes prepared by the President. The idea is to have an open, relatively unstructured debate on controversial but highly consequential issues, with a view to facilitating agreement at a follow-up European Council meeting.

The 2019-2024 strategic agenda was prepared in very much the same way, by using the working method developed under the Leaders’ Agenda. Just ahead of the 2019 European elections, the EU‑27 met on 9 May 2019 in the Romanian city of Sibiu to assess the implementation of previous policy objectives and to reflect informally on future EU action over the coming five years. The EU leaders’ discussion was informed by President Tusk’s Leaders’ Agenda note, ‘Strategic agenda 2019-2024 – Outline’, which provided a first overview of the topics for future action. The 2019-2024 strategic agenda was then adopted at the June 2019 formal European Council meeting.

The process consisting of first holding an informal or inconclusive discussion on a topic and then seeking to adopt conclusions at a subsequent meeting has been kept in the Leaders’ Agenda 2020-2021, put forward by President Charles Michel at the special European Council meeting of 1‑2 October 2020 and then in the new indicative Leaders’ Agenda 2021-22, presented in June 2021. The idea is that, ‘where no immediate conclusions are drawn, the outcome of the debates will be reflected in later conclusions’. Designed to provide an important structuring framework for the European Council’s activities, both the 2020-21 and 2021-22 Leaders’ Agendas outline the planned meetings and main policy topics that EU Heads of State or Government are called to address in the months ahead. The third edition of the Leaders’ Agenda however, the indicative nature of which is specified in the title, appears to be less detailed and less comprehensive when compared to the first and second editions. Moreover, whilst maintaining the Leaders’ Agenda framework, Mr Michel seems more recently to have dropped the practice of preparing special notes and of organising an informal meeting to discuss sensitive issues.

Moreover, a number of EU priority topics appear to be missing in the listing of issues for discussion outlined in the latest Leaders’ Agenda. This is the case of migration for instance. Owing to the sensitivity of the issue and because EU leaders have not thus far been able to agree on the distribution of migrants beyond the Member State of arrival, migration has been absent from the European Council’s meeting agendas in 2019 and 2020. However, EU discussions on migration have resurfaced recently: the issue was debated at length at the October 2021 European Council meeting and is likely to feature among the highly sensitive topics of the coming months.

The newest feature of meetings of Heads of State or Government are video-conference meetings. In a context of lockdown, this new form of meeting has enabled EU leaders to take joint action to tackle the crisis. Video-conference meetings are clearly linked to the ongoing coronavirus crisis. However, it can be assumed that they be a lasting feature. Indeed, next to the coronavirus pandemic, other topics were often touched upon at video-conference meetings, thus using the opportunity of a virtual meeting to move forward on other pressing or even less pressing issues.

Obviously video technology enables urgent meetings to take place, and for the EU to take action if needed between physical meetings. Thus, given there is the necessary political will, the use of video-conferences could provide a new dynamic to the European Council, increasing its adaptability and reaction capacity.

Nevertheless, even if video-conferences are a good vehicle for rapid consultation, this type of meeting has its limits: Video-conferences are inappropriate to discuss sensitive issues, such as foreign affairs or budgetary matters. In such a format, EU leaders tend to be more cautious and to keep to their written statements, because the confidentiality of discussions is not ensured and participation is (de facto) broader than in formal physical meetings. Moreover, considering the particular nature of the European Council, small bilateral or side-meetings are crucial for achieving agreements on sensitive issues. We have witnessed it in the context of the negotiations on MFF in July 2020, when a physical meeting was necessary to enable political agreement to be reached on the MFF, and with the postponement of the discussion on Russia at the March European Council, which had to be held online due to the public health situation.

Altogether, the European Council has been active during the coronavirus crisis, and the institution has taken a digital leap. But video-meetings are unlikely to replace physical meetings fully when crucial decisions are on the agenda.

Read the complete study on ‘Key issues in the European Council: State of play in December 2021‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Anita Orav.

Each year, 18 December is observed as International Migrants’ Day. So designated by the United Nations General Assembly on 4 December 2000, in response to increasing migration in the world, the day aims to draw attention to the human rights of migrants and highlight their contribution to our societies.

Background

The number of international migrants in the world has grown rapidly over the past two decades. The UN reports that the global number reached 281 million in 2020, as compared to 221 million in 2010 and 173 million in 2000. Nearly two thirds of all international migrants live either in Europe (87 million) or North America (59 million), followed by northern Africa and western Asia (50 million combined). This new reality creates challenges as well as opportunities for the societies in both regions of origin and of destination.

Global cooperation on migration

On 19 September 2016, all 193 UN member states adopted the New York Declaration, making a set of commitments aimed at strengthening the protection of people on the move. The declaration led to the adoption on 17 December 2018 of two new global compacts – on refugees and on migrants – which established a new international framework for support to refugees and host communities. The process also relaunched a call to improve data on migration. Because of the lack of legal identification, many migrants remain ‘invisible’, as they are not registered. While it might be too soon to say how the UN member states will implement this recommendation and, given the fact that international data are scarce, a priority should be given to international efforts to collect, analyse and share migration data.

Migration management in the EU

The EU and its Member States have shared competence as regards migration. In recent years, the priority accorded to migration has found reflection in the EU budget, with €22.7 billion allocated to migration and security over the 2021-2027 period. Acknowledging that Europe has to move away from ad hoc solutions and put in place a predictable and reliable migration management system, the EU is seeking ways to increase legal channels to the EU, be it through the EU Blue Card for labour mobility, resettlement or community sponsorship. At the same time, the national and local levels are mostly in charge of integrating migrants into the host society, by giving them access to the labour market, language training and education.

European Parliament position

The European Parliament has advocated a humane, solidarity-based and common approach to migration in its various resolutions and reports. In its resolution of 12 April 2016 on the situation in the Mediterranean and the need for a holistic EU approach to migration, the Parliament emphasised the need for developing safe and lawful routes for asylum-seekers and refugees into the EU. In its 2017 resolution on addressing refugee and migrant movements: the role of EU external action, the Parliament recalled that international migration can contribute to socio-economic development, as it has done historically, and called on governments to address migration as a regular human phenomenon. Furthermore, taking into consideration that total labour supply in the euro area is projected to fall by 13 % (20 million people) between 2019 and 2070, the Parliament has encouraged the development of adequate legal economic migration channels, most recently in its resolution of 25 November 2021. To respond to Europe’s demographic challenges and to match migrants’ skills with labour market needs effectively, Parliament is asking for an update of EU rules on legal labour migration by the end of January 2022.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘International Migrants’ Day – 18 December‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Martin Russell.

For the second time in 2021, a massive Russian military build-up and increasingly hostile rhetoric point to a planned attack on Ukraine. Whereas the previous build-up ended in April with the withdrawal of most troops, this time the signs are more worrying. Russia is demanding a halt to NATO activity in and around Ukraine. The US and the EU are threatening harsh new sanctions against Russia if the attack goes ahead.

Threatening Russian manoeuvres close to the Ukrainian border

In October 2021, reports began emerging that large contingents of Russian troops were being moved close to the Ukrainian border, supported by lethal weapons such as tanks and Buk missiles of the type used to shoot down flight MH17 in July 2014. The number of troops involved is thought to be already over 90 000 and, according to US intelligence, it could reach 175 000 by January 2021. Although not all the logistical support is yet in place, Ukrainian defence officials suggest that there is a very real possibility of a large-scale Russian attack beginning in January or February 2021. They also claim that Russia has already blocked access to two-thirds of the Azov Sea around the illegally annexed Crimean Peninsula.

Troop movements on a similar scale were seen close to the Ukrainian border in spring 2021. On that occasion, most of the personnel involved were subsequently moved away from Ukraine in April, while much of their equipment was left behind, facilitating future rapid deployment to the region.

The current movements are mostly taking place at night-time, unlike the previous more overt manoeuvres – according to analysts, a possible sign that Russia’s intentions are more serious this time. In contrast to the spring, Russia is not even pretending to be carrying out military exercises. Another worrying sign is the Kremlin’s increasingly bellicose rhetoric. Already in July 2021, an essay by Vladimir Putin on the ‘historical unity’ of Moscow and Kyiv cast doubt on Ukrainian statehood and argued that some Ukrainian territory legitimately belonged to Russia – practically a declaration of war, according to one commentator. On 9 December, Putin warned of ‘genocide’ in Ukraine’s eastern Donbas region, where Ukrainian government troops are fighting pro-Russia separatists. This was perhaps an attempt to create a pretext for an attack, given that Russia’s 2014 military doctrine lists protection of Russian citizens abroad as one of the cases justifying the use of military force.

Kremlin officials deny that Russia is planning an attack. They put the blame for the latest standoff on NATO – describing the presence of US warships in the Black Sea as a ‘provocation’ – and Ukraine, which has allegedly deployed 125 000 troops to Donbas. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov accuses NATO of risking ‘the nightmare scenario of a military confrontation’, while his deputy, Sergei Ryabkov, compares the situation to the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, which brought the world to the brink of nuclear war.

What is Russia trying to achieve?

In spring 2021, many observers dismissed Russia’s threatening moves as mere ‘sabre-rattling’, possibly as an attempt to force concessions in the stalemated Donbas conflict. This time again, there are links to the Donbas situation – the first signs of a military build-up coincided with Ukraine’s first use in October of lethal Turkish-made drones against separatists.

However, Russia’s main concern appears to be NATO’s presence in and around Ukraine. It has consistently identified the presence of NATO military infrastructure close to its borders as a serious threat, for example, in its 2021 national security strategy. Putin is demanding security guarantees from the Alliance: no eastwards expansion, no offensive strike weapons – such as missiles – in states bordering Russia, and no military exercises close to Russia.

In fact, NATO presence in Ukraine remains limited. Cooperation has increased since 2014 but has mainly focused on helping Kyiv to restructure its armed forces and improve resilience. There are trainers, but no permanent troops. US military aid to Ukraine (US$450 million so far in 2021) includes some lethal weapons, such as anti-tank missiles. On the other hand, enlargement to Ukraine and Georgia, while it has never been explicitly excluded, remains a distant prospect.

US President Joe Biden has ruled out a unilateral US military intervention, and Ukraine could hardly defeat Russia on its own. However, Ukrainian armed forces are now significantly more capable than they were in 2014 and could inflict serious losses on Russian invaders. Russia might hope to secure strategically important assets, such as the Azov sea port of Mariupol or freshwater supplies, to relieve Crimea’s chronic water shortage. However, such acquisitions could hardly outweigh the huge economic costs imposed by Western sanctions (see below). While annexing Crimea gave Putin’s popularity a huge boost, escalating tensions with the West have not boosted his flagging approval ratings so far. There appears to be little appetite among ordinary Russians for renewed conflict with Ukraine, most likely involving heavy casualties; nearly half of respondents to surveys by independent pollsters Levada Centre view Ukraine favourably, over half would like to see friendly relations between Russia and Ukraine as independent states, and less than one-fifth subscribe to the view that the two countries should be united. Nor would a Russian invasion be welcomed in Ukraine, where attachment to the ‘Russian World’ has faded, even among ethnic Russians.

Western responses

The US has offered ‘ironclad’ support for Ukrainian sovereignty, and Biden has firmly rejected Kremlin red lines on NATO expansion. NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg insists on Ukraine’s right to choose its own path. While a military response is not currently on the table, Washington and Brussels are considering economic sanctions that, according to US National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan, go far beyond those adopted in 2014. A 12 December statement by the G7 countries condemns ‘Russia’s military build-up and aggressive rhetoric’ and warns that aggression will carry severe costs.

The US and the EU have not revealed what sanctions they might impose. However, Sullivan has mentioned excluding Russia from the international SWIFT bank messaging system – described in 2015 as a last-resort ‘nuclear option’ –as one of the probable measures. Although Russian banks have made efforts to prepare by developing alternative systems, some experts still claim that exclusion from SWIFT would have a devastating economic impact, by making it harder for Russia to receive payments for its exports. Germany has warned that Russia’s Nord Stream 2 pipeline – currently awaiting regulatory approval – will not be allowed to come into service in the event of a new escalation in Ukraine.

Biden has telephoned Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy and the leaders of nine NATO countries that are neighbours or near-neighbours of Ukraine, to assure them that they will be involved in any decisions. French President Emmanuel Macron and UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson have met virtually with Putin; on both occasions, Putin reiterated his earlier demands to Biden for security guarantees from NATO.

Outlook

Several weeks after the 2021 spring military build-up, Joe Biden and Vladimir Putin’s first summit in June 2021 appeared to put US-Russia relations on a better track by launching dialogue on security issues. There was no meeting of minds at the 7 December 2021 video-call between the two leaders; however, some observers see it as a positive sign that they have at least agreed to keep talking. Putin accuses the West of dismissing Russia’s security concerns; in the best-case scenario, he might be prepared to de-escalate in exchange for some kind of assurances. On the other hand, further talks may simply give him more time to prepare an attack. According to some, the worst-case scenario could even see fighting spreading to other European countries.

European Parliament (EP) position: in its April 2021 resolution on Russia, adopted soon after the end of the previous military build-up, the EP condemned Russia’s ‘threatening and destabilising actions’ and praised Ukraine for its ‘proportionate response’. The EP called on Russia to fully withdraw its troops and end its provocations. In the event of a future invasion of Ukraine, the EP suggested that the EU could stop importing Russian oil and gas, exclude Russia from the SWIFT payment system, and impose asset freezes and visa bans on oligarchs close to the Russian authorities and their families.
On 14 December 2021, the EP debated the situation at the Ukrainian border and in Russian-occupied territories of Ukraine in the presence of EU High Representative Josep Borrell. A resolution on the subject is due to be voted on 16 December.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Is Russia about to start a new war in Ukraine?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.