European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Nikolina Šajn (1st edition).

On 30 March 2022, the European Commission put forward a proposal for a regulation establishing a general framework for setting ecodesign requirements for sustainable products, repealing rules currently in force which concentrate on energy-related products only. The regulation would lay down rules that would apply to all products on the internal market, with the aim of making them more durable, reusable, reparable, upgradable, recyclable and generally less harmful to the environment. The regulation would include rules on a digital product passport, green public procurement and banning the destruction of unsold goods.

Within the European Parliament, the file has been referred to the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety. The proposal is in line with previous requests by Parliament to broaden the scope of the ecodesign legislation to cover all main product groups, and to introduce a digital product passport and green public procurement criteria.

Reactions of stakeholders to the proposal varied, from calling it a ‘game-changer’ and appealing for swift action on product-specific rules, to worries about possible overlapping requirements and warnings about significant investments that would be required from businesses.

Versions

• June 2022: Ecodesign for sustainable products (1st edition)

Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a framework for setting ecodesign requirements for sustainable products and repealing Directive 2009/125/EC Committee responsible:Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI)COM(2022) 142
30.3.2022Rapporteur:Simona Bonafè (S&D, Italy)2022/0095 (COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Jessica Polfjärd (EPP, Sweden)
Karin Karlsbro (Renew, Sweden)
Malte Gallée (Greens/EFA, Germany)
Sylvia Limmer (ID, Germany)
Alexandr Vondra (ECR, Czechia)
Silvia Modig (The Left, Finland)Ordinary legislative
procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council
on equal footing –
formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Publication of draft report

Written by Branislav Stanicek with Martin Russell.

The countries in the Western Balkans are traditionally a focus of Russian interests. The Russian Federation has strong historical ties with the Western Balkans and holds a relative soft-power attraction for them, yet its influence and economic impact in the region are declining, as investment and aid by the EU-27 and other players, such as China, have been dwarfing Russian investment.

Geopolitical confrontation

The Western Balkans, together with the European Neighbourhood, have emerged as a front in Russia’s geopolitical confrontation with the West. Some argue that this confrontation is deeply rooted in shared geography (Robert Kaplan), others, that it is an expression of different political systems, values and ideologies (Zbigniew Brzezinski). Brzezinski believes that America’s failure to engage with Russia after the end of the Cold War has backfired, giving Russia the energy to focus on securing its authoritarian rule within its own territory and on restoring its influence in the former Soviet Union states and beyond.

The Balkan 2021 Barometer shows constant support for EU membership across the Western Balkans, with 62 % of countries endorsing EU accession in 2020 (59 % in 2019 and 56 % in 2018). However, disillusionment with slow progress towards EU accession and economic stagnation are creating an opening for other geopolitical players. All six Western Balkan countries are still on track for joining the EU, but progress has faltered recently, with only two countries – Montenegro and Serbia – actually in accession negotiations. Furthermore, the Russian war on Ukraine seems to have tipped EU-27 public opinion in favour of swiftly granting EU accession to Ukraine, but not the Western Balkans. Despite successful EU-Western Balkans summits (most recently in Zagreb, 2020, and in Brdo, 2021), some countries, such as Albania and North Macedonia, have not even opened accession negotiations. Simmering ethnic tensions, high unemployment, exodus of youth, and shaky constitutional arrangements in countries such as Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), are creating an opportunity for Russia to leverage its already substantial influence in the region.

Russia’s soft power and economic influence

Cultural and historical ties give Russia considerable soft power, particularly among Serbs. Historical ties go as far back as the pan-Slavic movement of the 19th century and Russia’s support for Serbian independence from the Ottoman Empire. Russia entered World War I on Serbia’s side; in the Kosovo* conflict, it condemned the NATO bombing of Serbia and firmly opposed Kosovar independence. Russia uses its status as a permanent UN Security Council member in Serbia’s favour. In 1994 and 2015, Moscow vetoed two UN Security Council resolutions condemning violence by Bosnian Serbs, the latter resolution qualifying the 1995 Srebrenica massacre as genocide. During the pandemic, this soft power also manifested as ‘vaccine diplomacy’.

Although Russian investment in the region has increased in absolute terms, Russia’s economic footprint as a share of the total economy in the Western Balkans has shrunk or stagnated in the wake of international sanctions over Russia’s annexation of Crimea. Even though Russian economic influence is heavily concentrated in the energy sector, its share as a percentage of GDP is declining across the region. Russia’s energy influence is biggest in Serbia, North Macedonia and BiH, where it supplies close to 100 % of gas needs and owns several assets, such as the Lukoil gas stations network. Russian Gazprom’s South Stream pipeline would have consolidated Moscow’s dominance of gas markets, but it was abandoned in December 2014 after the European Commission ruled that it contravened EU legislation.

On the other hand, Kosovo, Montenegro and Albania currently consume little or no Russian gas, and future supplies are likely to come from Azerbaijan rather than Russian fields, via the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP). Montenegro will probably have to wait several years before the connecting Ionian-Adriatic Pipeline (IAP) is put in place. The IAP is planned to carry natural gas from Albania’s Fier via Montenegro and BiH to Split in Croatia. The 520 km-long pipeline would be bi-directional and have an annual capacity of 5 billion cubic metres. The Western Balkans Investment Framework estimates that constructing the 94 km-long IAP in Montenegrin territory will cost €207 million. In Fier, the IAP would connect to the TAP, built to transport natural gas from the Shah Deniz II field in Azerbaijan to Europe. The first deliveries of Azeri gas to Italy via the TAP were made in 2021. In North Macedonia, Azeri gas is expected to start competing with Russian supplies from 2023. Outside the energy sector, where Russia’s presence is gradually declining, Russia’s economic presence through trade is dwarfed by that of the EU-27 (see Figure 1). However, experts caution that Russia’s major presence in strategic sectors is making the region’s governments vulnerable to its pressure and is accentuating state capture risk.

Figure 1 – Western Balkan countries’ trade with main partners, 2021 (%) Progressive alignment with EU foreign policy: case of sanctions against Russia

Western Balkan countries are also facing the ‘asymmetric assault’ on democracy, launched by Russian media outlets, such as the Sputnik news agency, which set up a base in Belgrade in 2014. Despite Soviet-era disinformation campaigns and diplomatic efforts, the majority of the Western Balkan population supports EU accession and pro-Western policies. In the past, Serbian public opinion was supportive of closer ties with Russia: a poll carried out in mid-2016 by NSPM magazine showed that 72 % were in favour of an alliance with Russia, compared to just 8 % for NATO. However, a February 2022 poll concluded that half of Serbs want to stay neutral when faced with a choice between the EU and Russia. This foreign policy alignment became highly visible in February 2022, when Albania, Kosovo and North Macedonia joined the EU’s sanctions against Russia, while Montenegro announced it would adopt them in April. The Serbian government adopted conclusions in which it voiced support for the territorial integrity of Ukraine but refrained from applying the EU sanctions. Russia remains Serbia’s biggest arms supplier, yet is in increasing competition with China. On 29 May 2022, the Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić announced that his country had signed an agreement on a new three-year gas contract with Russia.

European Parliament position

The Parliament supports the EU prospects of all Western Balkan countries. On 26 April 2022, the Parliament’s President, Roberta Metsola, observed that the EU must ‘think of ways to accelerate the enlargement process in the Western Balkans’, because ‘stability in the immediate neighbourhood is vital for the EU’s own stability’. The Parliament has voiced concern about Russia’s influence in the region and its attempts to destabilise both the region as a whole and individual countries within it (for instance, BiH). The Parliament is concerned that Russian investment in the region poses high risks for corruption and state capture. It has also called on Serbia to align its foreign policy more closely with the EU. The Parliament also expects that the European External Action Service and the European Commission would improve coordination and address disinformation and hybrid threats that seek to undermine the region’s EU prospects.

(*) This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244/1999 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Russia’s influence in the Western Balkans‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Ivana Katsarova.

From 9 to 12 June the New European Bauhaus Festival takes place in Brussels and all over Europe.

The New European Bauhaus initiative is an innovative cooperation project combining sustainability and wellbeing goals. Inspired by the eponymous arts school founded in Germany by Walter Gropius in 1919, the European Commission initiative aims at addressing contemporary and future ecological, economic and societal concerns. Launched by the Commission to help deliver the European Green Deal – geared towards achieving a sustainable economy and eliminating net greenhouse gas emissions by 2025 – the project envisages the participation of a wide range of actors in a vast effort of cooperation between science, technology, the arts and culture.

This first edition of the Festival will thus gather citizens, politicians and professionals to debate and shape ideas for the future landscape of the European Union. On the agenda: exhibitions, artistic performances, conferences, seminars and other gatherings combining a ‘live’ onsite event and a ‘virtual’ online component.

The European Parliament will also dedicate an exhibition, the Sustainability Space (9‑11 June, Gare Maritime Brussels), showcasing a selection of efforts to improve sustainability. Visitors will have an opportunity to hear about environmental activities taking place within the European Parliament and see the ‘Interactive Environmental Dashboard’ used to monitor and assess Parliament’s environmental performance in its own premises. There will also be messages from Members of Parliament and a photo exhibition of ‘Solar Portraits‘ by Rubén Salgado Escudero, depicting the lives of people who accessed electricity for the first time through the power of solar energy.

A new exploratory study on the possibilities offered by the New European Bauhaus, commissioned by STOA – Parliament’s Panel for the Future of Science and Technology – will be officially presented during a workshop, taking place on 13 June at 11:00 am on Parliament’s premises. The aim of the study, entitled ‘The Green Deal ambition: Technology, creativity and the arts for environmental sustainability‘ (by Emanuele Bompan and Elisabetta Tola), is to help inform the debate on the New European Bauhaus within the European Parliament and beyond. It brings together insights from a number of scientific research papers and reports on current experiences of cross-pollination between the cultural and creative and the tech sector. The authors have also gathered the ideas, contributions and perspectives of a selected number of European players with key expertise in design, arts, architecture, new materials, and science and technology. Taken together, this collection of contributions offers a more nuanced view on how the New European Bauhaus could contribute to achieving the goals of the European Green Deal.

Importantly, the authors argue that a prominent role must be given to young people, so that European spaces are defined by those who will live there in the future. Consequently, the vision of the New European Bauhaus must not be just another path set up by ‘those who have an already established position’, but instead become a ‘place of intergenerational confrontation’.

To summarise, these are some of the ideas on offer for what already looks like a very busy weekend …

Reading list:

• EU Prize for Contemporary Architecture / Mies van der Rohe Award: A tribute to Bauhaus, At a glance, Magdalena Pasikowska-Schnass, 2021.
• The Bauhaus movement: Where are the women?, Briefing, Ivana Katsarova, 2021.
• Education and the New European Bauhaus, At a glance, Denise Chircop, 2021.
• Cohesion policy contribution to New European Bauhaus, At a glance, Agnieszka Widuto, 2021.
• What if technology and culture combined to boost a green recovery?, At a glance, Vadim Kononeko, 2020.

Written by Piotr Bąkowski.

In recent times, the European Union (EU) has witnessed a sharp rise in hate speech and hate crime, yet EU law criminalises such conduct only if related to a limited set of protected characteristics, such as race and ethnicity. The Commission, with the support of the Parliament, seeks to address this limitation by extending the list of ‘EU crimes’ included in Article 83 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), to cover hate speech and hate crime. This can only be done by a Council decision adopted by unanimity, with the Parliament’s consent.

Background

According to a 2020 study conducted for the European Parliament and a 2021 study supporting the European Commission’s initiative to counter hate speech and hate crime, the incidence of these phenomena has steadily increased across the EU in recent years. Hate speech in particular thrives on social media, whose users, including political figures, tend to express their thoughts without reserve. Citing several other studies and surveys, the Commission study provides examples of hate speech and hate crime experienced by various targeted groups, and offers some statistics. For instance, 63 % of girls surveyed reported some form of online harassment on social media platforms; 38 % of people with disabilities experienced hate speech in the 12 months preceding the survey; and 17 % of such persons fell victim to physical violence, compared to 8 % of persons without disabilities. These developments have been linked to a perception of increased migration, but also to economic and social crises, the proliferation of conspiracy theories and disinformation, as well as the growing use of the internet, including social media. The coronavirus pandemic – and the insecurity and economic hardship it brought along – seems to have contributed greatly to a surge in hate speech and hate crime.

At the EU level, Council Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA criminalises hate speech and hate crime based on a range of grounds. It prohibits ‘publicly inciting to violence or hatred against a group of persons or a member of such a group defined by reference to race, colour, religion, descent or national or ethnic origin’. It also requires that Member States take measures to ensure that racist and xenophobic motivation is considered an aggravating circumstance by their criminal laws, or alternatively, may be taken into consideration by the courts when setting penalties. The bias motivation is thus the defining element of hate speech and hate crime.

Whereas all EU Member States have criminalised hate speech based on the grounds covered by the 2008 framework decision, national laws differ with regard to other protected characteristics. As for hate crime, it has been broadly criminalised across the EU either as a ‘self-standing’ offence (defined by the bias motivation) or as an aggravating circumstance for any offence or a range of specific offences.

At present, the EU has no competence to criminalise hate speech and hate crime based on grounds not covered by the 2008 framework decision. Article 83 TFEU could serve as a legal basis for such action should these offences become part of an exhaustive list of ‘areas of particularly serious crime with a cross-border dimension resulting from the nature or impact of such offences or from a special need to combat them on a common basis’ (‘EU crimes’). Under this provision, the Parliament and the Council may establish minimum rules regarding the definition of such offences and related sanctions. Moreover, based on ‘developments in crime’, the Council may adopt a decision (subject to the consent of the Parliament) identifying other areas of crime meeting the criteria specified in Article 83 TFEU. The Commission may trigger such a decision by submitting a communication to the Parliament and the Council.

European Commission initiative

On 9 December 2021, the Commission published a communication (COM(2021) 777) inviting the Council to adopt a decision identifying hate speech and hate crime as an area of crime under Article 83(1) TFEU. A proposal for such a Council decision is in the form of an annex to the communication. If adopted, the Commission would follow up with a proposal for a directive on minimum rules concerning the definition of criminal offences and sanctions in this area of crime, which the Parliament and Council would negotiate under the ordinary legislative procedure.

In its communication, the Commission argues that hate speech and hate crime meet the criteria for inclusion in the list as defined by Article 83 TFEU. The Commission considers these offences ‘particularly serious’ due to the harm they cause to individual victims, wider communities, and society as a whole. Their ‘cross-border dimension’ is, in the Commission’s view, related to spillover effect across borders (in particular, but not only, with respect to online hate speech). Moreover, the Commission sees a special need for a common approach to combating these phenomena, as divergent national approaches across the EU have resulted in fragmentation that weakens efforts in this regard.

The Commission’s initiative is part of a broader set of EU policy actions addressing discrimination and violent extremism, including several strategies, among them the one on the rights of persons with disabilities 2021-2030. Moreover, it complements a legislative proposal for a directive to prevent and combat violence against women and domestic violence: while it is true that hate speech and hate crime can target victims because of gender-related bias, the proposal for a directive establishes minimum rules on the definition of criminal offences and penalties in the areas of sexual exploitation and computer crime, thus covering a distinct set of criminal acts.

European Parliament position

The Parliament has addressed hate speech and hate crime in numerous resolutions. In its October 2018 resolution on the rise of neo-fascist violence in Europe (2018/2869(RSP)), it noted a link between the dissemination of hate speech and violence, stressing the negative role that politicians and political parties may play in this respect. It therefore called on the Member States to ‘strongly condemn and sanction hate crime, hate speech and scapegoating by politicians and public officials at all levels and on all types of media, as they directly normalise and reinforce hatred and violence in society’.

In a November 2020 resolution (2020/2009(INI)), the Parliament observed that hate speech and disinformation were increasingly exploited for political purposes as a means of intensifying social polarisation. It recognised a relationship between the business model of social media platforms – which is based on micro-targeted advertising – and the spreading and amplifying of hate speech by these platforms, which may result in radicalisation leading to violent extremism. The Parliament reiterated its calls on the Member States to implement and enforce measures to prevent, condemn and counter hate speech and hate crime. It also pointed to the need of reinforcing the legal framework for tackling hate speech and discrimination, stressing that negotiations on the horizontal anti-discrimination directive, which have been stalled in the Council, should be unblocked to this end.

A March 2021 resolution (2021/2557(RSP)) dealt specifically with hate speech against LGBTIQ people. The Parliament condemned the creation of ‘LGBTI-free zones’ as part of a broader context of increased discrimination and attacks against the LGBTIQ community, which includes a rise in hate speech by public authorities and public media. The problem of hate speech targeting LGBTIQ people was further addressed in a Parliamentary resolution of December 2021 (2020/2035(INL)), which noted that while this form of abuse is ‘pervasively common’ in particular in the online sphere, some Member States have no laws to address it.

In September 2021, the Parliament adopted a legislative resolution (2021/2035(INL)) calling on the Commission to submit a related proposal to identify gender-based violence as a new area of crime under Article 83(1) TFEU. It welcomed the initiative to extend the list of the areas of crime to encompass hate crime and hate speech, recommending that the Commission include sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression and sex characteristics as discrimination grounds specifically covered by this Treaty provision.

The most recent, May 2022, resolution (2021/2055(INI)) pointed to religious-based hate crimes that remain under-reported and unprosecuted, and called for establishing comprehensive data collection systems on hate crimes and other discriminatory acts against belief- or religious communities.

For more information, please see the file on the Parliament’s Legislative Train Schedule.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Combating hate speech and hate crime in the EU‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Citizens often turn to the European Parliament to ask what the European Union (EU) is doing to promote gender equality.

Policies central to promoting gender equality, such as employment and social policy are mainly the responsibility of the EU countries. Nevertheless, the European Union is determined to protect gender equality, which is a fundamental right under EU law. The EU therefore strives to foster gender equality in all its actions. Examples include promoting gender equality and equal pay at the workplace, combating discrimination and gender-based violence, and challenging stereotypes.

Gender equality strategy

In March 2020, the European Commission published its 2020-2025 gender equality strategy, which builds upon the previous 2016-2019 strategy. The key goals include:

• ending gender-based violence;
• ensuring gender equality in the workforce, including equal pay and equal pensions;
• challenging gender stereotypes;
• promoting equality in household chores, including childcare;
• achieving gender balance in decision making and politics.

Equal pay

Equal pay for equal work is a key principle enshrined in the EU treaties. The current legislation on equal pay was originally adopted in 2006. It prohibits both direct and indirect gender discrimination at all stages of employment.

Despite the fact that wage discrimination is illegal, it can be hard to detect when such discrimination occurs. This makes it difficult for victims to bring a legal claim. To tackle this issue through the gender equality strategy, the Commission put forward a legislative proposal on pay transparency in March 2021. This new law would include a number of measures aimed at improving pay transparency, such as:

• Job seekers would enjoy the right to information about the pay range for jobs they are applying for, including information about the pay for men and women in similar positions. Employers would be forbidden from asking applicants their previous salary level.
• Employers with at least 250 employees would be required to report on their gender pay gap, and conduct an assessment if the gap is greater than 5 %.
• Victims of pay discrimination would be better compensated, as it should become easier to bring a successful claim, since the new rules place the burden of proof to show there is no pay discrimination on the employer.
• Workers’ representatives would be more involved, including in leading collective claims for pay discrimination.

Parliament welcomed this strategy in a December 2021 resolution, but called for clearer targets and indicators to close the pay gap. In its position on the legislative proposal adopted in March 2022, Parliament supports stricter measures than those proposed by the Commission. See this press release for details.

Similarly, ministers of EU countries have also called for additional measures to close the pay gap and to prevent discrimination, most recently in June 2019.

Women on Boards

Today, only 30.6% of board members in the EU’s largest publicly listed companies are women, with significant differences among member states (from 45.3% in France to 8.5% in Cyprus).

On 7 June 2022, the European Parliament and EU countries agreed on a bill to increase the presence of women on corporate boards. The provisional agreement aims to ensure gender parity on boards of publicly listed companies in the EU. Parliament succeeded in including an assessment on the scope of the directive at a later stage on whether non-listed companies should be included in the scope of directive. The European Commission first presented its proposal in 2012 and the European Parliament adopted its negotiation position back in 2013. The file was blocked in the Council for almost a decade, until Employment and Social Affairs ministers agreed on a position in March 2022. Parliament and Council will now have to formally approve the agreement and EU countries would then need to implement the directive two years after it has been adopted.

Parental leave

Women are more likely to take a career break during pregnancy and after childbirth. Recognising this exacerbates the gender gap, the EU has set minimum safety standards for pregnant workers. Additionally, the EU also guarantees a minimum of 14 weeks of maternal leave, and 4 months of parental leave for either parent. An employee cannot be fired, or punished in any way, for taking this leave.

Gender-based violence

The proposed 2020-2025 gender equality strategy also aims at combating gender-based violence. First, the EU is pushing for ratification of the Istanbul Convention on violence against women in all EU countries, most of which have already done so.

In a September 2021 resolution, the European Parliament called on the EU to build upon the Istanbul Convention, and to implement even broader legislation. It proposed prevention measures, such as improving education about sexuality and non-violence at an early age, and addressing underlying causes of violence, such as harmful stereotypes. Parliament also called for better support services, improved protection for victims, and minimum standards for law enforcement.

Parliament reiterated some of these demands in the context of online gender-based violence in a December 2021 resolution. Parliament also highlighted that the Covid‑19 pandemic and resulting lockdowns led to an increase in domestic abuse, and called on the Commission to conduct a thorough analysis of this problem.

EU institutions and bodies

The EU is also committed to promoting gender equality in its institutions. 

Parliament has a Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality (FEMM), which makes sure that all EU legislation takes account of gender equality. The committee organises an annual gender equality week to highlight research and promote discussion on this topic.

The proportion of female Members of the European Parliament has steadily increased over the years, and currently stands a little over 40 %. The number of women in key Parliament positions, such as vice-presidents, has also risen. Additionally, for the first time, there are now as many male as female members of the European Commission. Economic decision-making continues to be the  area where the EU scores the lowest in terms of gender equality and women’s representation. Nevertheless, the European Central Bank has set its own targets to promote gender balance.

The EU also established the European Institute for Gender Equality, which collects information about gender equality and advises EU policy makers. It also promotes the practice of gender mainstreaming, which encourages EU policy makers to consider how every new law affects gender equality.

EU fighting for a gender-equal world

In 2020, the Commission put forward a third gender action plan, to promote gender equality and women’s empowerment through all EU external action. This new action plan on gender equality and women’s empowerment in 2021-2025 external action aims at accelerating progress on empowering women and girls, and safeguarding gender equality gains.

In a March 2022 resolution, Parliament welcomed the third gender action plan. It called on the EU to work for stronger and systematic collaboration to promote gender equality in key areas of action:

• eliminating all forms of gender-based violence;
• ensuring access to healthcare for women and sexual and reproductive rights;
• promoting economic and social rights and equality, and ensuring the autonomy of women and girls;
• encouraging participation and leadership by women, girls and young women;
• involving women in peacebuilding and security initiatives;
• ensuring gender-responsive humanitarian actions;
• building a green and digital society;
• creating a true ‘generation equality’.

Further information

• Annual reports on gender equality in the EU, European Commission, 2021
• European Gender Equality Index, European Institute for Gender Equality, 2021
• Gender mainstreaming in the European Parliament: state of play, European Parliamentary Research Service, Study, 2021
• Gender equality in the Recovery and Resilience Facility, European Parliamentary Research Service, Briefing, 2021

Keep sending your questions to the Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (Ask EP)! We reply in the EU language that you use to write to us.

Written by Lasse Boehm, Elena Lazarou and Giulio Sabbati.

The war Russia unleashed on Ukraine has global repercussions, beyond the death toll and the human tragedy in Ukraine itself, and the resulting refugee flows and wider destabilising effects on Europe’s east. This infographic depicts some of the economic consequences of the war, for Europe, but also the rest of the world.

Amongst the effects most directly felt by Europeans are rising energy prices. For years, Russia has been Europe’s largest supplier of coal, oil and gas. The war sent prices rising as Russia stopped supplying some Member States with gas, leading Europe to search for supplies elsewhere and forcing Europeans to pay more for their petrol and household heating. Higher energy prices are also a challenge for industry, which consumes large quantities of Russian gas.

Food prices have also risen since the outbreak of the war due to both Russia and Ukraine being amongst the largest producers of wheat and other commodities. The impact is felt directly by European consumers. Russia’s position as an important commodity exporter also impacts on supply chains for raw materials used by European industry, some of which are listed in these infographics. Rising prices for energy, food and commodities fuel inflation in Europe, and are a daily reminder of the impact of this war of aggression far beyond the borders of Ukraine and the conflict itself.

The consequences of the war are not limited to the European continent. Many countries in North Africa and the Middle East depend on wheat exports from Russia or Ukraine. Ukrainian exports are particularly affected, with Russia occupying parts of south-eastern Ukraine’s coastline, as well as attacking and blockading the remaining Ukrainian ports. Russia, in turn, has deliberately restricted some of its food exports in retaliation against the sanctions that have been imposed. The combined effect of reduced Russian and Ukrainian agricultural products means that the countries dependent on them – especially on wheat exports – will suffer directly as a consequence of the war unleashed by Russia. The combination of declining food exports and higher food prices poses a major risk for food security in some of the most vulnerable societies and countries in the world, further aggravating a situation which had already deteriorated due to pandemic- related food supply issues The World Food Programme estimates that acute hunger could rise to affect an additional 47 million people in the 81 countries it monitors, as a result of Russia’s war on Ukraine.

What these infographics demonstrate is that this is not a localised conflict which can be ignored by the global community. Russia’s war of aggression was not only an assault on the world order. It also directly impacts on millions of people all over the world – on their food supply, the price they pay for their energy, and the industries in which they are employed. These ‘domino effects’ of the war will have far-reaching implications, not only for the EU’s internal policies and its own resilience, but also for its external action and development policy.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Domino effects of the war‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

EU import dependency on cereal Air passenger traffic in Europe EU dependency on Russia in gross available energy Change in cost of food basket EU import dependency on Russia Exports of wheat by Russia and Ukraine Top 5 products exported by Russia worldwide Harmonised index of consumer prices, (HICP) in percentage points Annual capacity in billion m3 per year

Written by Aidan Christie.

Throughout his life, John Hume (1937-2020) sought to improve the circumstances of the people of Northern Ireland, beginning in his home city of Derry (Londonderry to its unionist residents). Born just a decade and a half after partition, and in a city whose hinterland had been divided by the border, he naturally wished for the unification of Ireland. But he saw that that could not be achieved without realistic plans, nor without a partnership between the two major communities in Northern Ireland, unionist and nationalist.

While working as a school-teacher, in the belief that they could themselves better their lot, he drove forward a wide range of actions to improve the economic circumstances of his community – which was far from the priority of the unionist government in Belfast. A nationalist community that was increasingly vocal in calling for fairer treatment brought him a leading role in the civil rights movement in Northern Ireland, before he made the switch to elected office in the Northern Ireland Parliament. The Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) that he co-founded was part of a short-lived power-sharing government in 1974, but it was to be a false dawn, followed by direct rule from London for more than two decades.

With killings a part of everyday life in Northern Ireland during the Troubles, John Hume argued incessantly that violence was not the means to bring about the unification of Ireland, but rather that understanding and respecting each other’s differences was the key to finding peace. He worked continuously to bring together the different parties and governments, all of which needed to be involved to resolve the conflict, as shown by the 1998 Good Friday Agreement. In that, he was inspired by the model of post-war European integration. His own experience as a Member of the European Parliament for 25 years (1979-2004) confirmed that a more collaborative approach to addressing differences could pay off. The design of the structures in the Good Friday Agreement owes much to his European experience, but it is thanks to his perseverance – in the face of considerable risks to both him and his family – in persuading those wedded to violence that there was a peaceful solution, that those institutions became reality.

Read the complete briefing on ‘John Hume: Northern Ireland’s peace-maker and committed European‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Luisa Antunes.

Genome-editing techniques have advanced tremendously in recent decades, especially since the development of CRISPR‑Cas9 by Nobel laureates Jennifer Doudna and Emmanuelle Charpentier. Such technological advances allow precise and targeted alterations to human DNA in a manner that is more efficient, more flexible and relatively less expensive than previous strategies. Coupled with artificial intelligence, this revolutionary technology could open a new field of precision medicine that includes a wide diversity of applications, ranging from uncovering therapeutic options for several allergies to potentially eliminating cancer, curing immunological diseases, antimicrobial resistant infections, cystic fibrosis, sickle cell anaemia and more.

Yet, proposing to alter the human genome conjures images of science fiction and past echoes of eugenics. Associated concerns allude not only to ethics, but also to safety, economic and political implications. What is the limit between a genetic modification aimed at treating a disease and a cosmetic alteration designed to modify a physical aspect of the consumer? Will genome editing replace the lucrative market of plastic surgery? What is the potential sociopolitical impact of unequal economic access to precision therapeutic medicine? Could international technological and regulatory differences carry geopolitical repercussions in the global arena?

To map the scientific and legal framework of genome editing in humans and support policy-makers in their understanding of its technical development and potential impact, the European Parliament Science and Technology Options Assessment (STOA) Panel commissioned a study entitled ‘Genome-editing in humans: A survey of law, regulation and governance principles’. The report was written by Professor Ana Nordberg, of the Faculty of Law, Lund University (Sweden) together with Doctor Luisa Antunes, policy analyst at STOA.

The study provides an overview of genome-editing technologies, the associated potential and risks, followed by a comparative analysis of regulatory frameworks in the European Union and worldwide, and options for political action.

In sum, genome-editing legislation can be introduced either in existing EU regulations (vertical approach), or through specific legislation (horizontal approach), and alternative governance mechanisms can also be explored. In any case, legal harmonisation facilitates the navigation of all stakeholders involved in a currently fragmented EU legal landscape. Moving forward, a few policy options can be envisaged:

1. Resilience mechanisms could be included in legislation to ensure continued correspondence between legislation and ongoing scientific advancements. Terms such as somatic v germline, hereditable genome editing, modifying genetic identity, andhuman enhancement are vague, scientifically outdated and could be updated.
2. Somatic as well as germline applications can pose social and ethical risks. A multi-level, risk-based approach could be used to determine what interventions to ban. The prohibition of genetic eugenics could extend to somatic applications.
3. Assisted reproduction techniques are often linked with the treatment of serious diseases. Scientific criteria used to determine disease seriousness could be harmonised.
4. Legislation on reproductive travel and wellness tourism varies by country. Corresponding EU law could apply extraterritorially.
5. Genome-editing needs to account for fundamental rights and freedoms. Subjects of illicit practices should be treated as victims and be allowed to refuse body-invasive activities, whilst also respecting their privacy, life, integrity and autonomy.
6. Counterfeited services are an intellectual property rights and public health issue. Genome editing could be introduced in existing legislation, including artificial intelligence (AI) legislation, and ethical licensing could be considered.

While genome editing provides great expectations for medicine, several ethical, social and legal questions remain to be addressed and regulatory and governance mechanisms are greatly needed in the EU.

The study was presented at a STOA panel meeting on 7 April 2022, and fostered fruitful discussions between the panel members present, who also raised questions with Professor Ana Nordberg:

Christian Ehler (STOA Chair, EPP, Germany): What is the most urgent legislative measure to be taken?

Professor Nordberg: It is urgent to adapt legal rules so that research on assisted reproduction is not delayed. Secondly, it is important to increase regulation on non-therapeutic uses (somatic interventions). The market for cosmetic products is huge and consumers are not very particular about which products they use, so this is a problematic legal area, which could be subject to further regulation. When patents expire, there will be a strong opportunity to explore the cosmetic products market, so regulation should already be in place. This issue links to questions of medical wellness and reproductive tourism to countries outside the EU.

Pernille Weiss (EPP, Denmark): How can we measure the seriousness of disease in respect to genome editing in assisted reproduction?

Professor Nordberg: There is an ongoing debate on the meaning of disability, which medical criteria are usually used to define. However, such criteria might differ from the patient’s own understanding of their condition. The patient’s view should also be taken into account.

What are the links between genome editing and the proposed artificial intelligence act?

Professor Nordberg: Artificial intelligence can be very helpful in disease diagnosis. Associated with genome editing, it can help correct certain diseases. However, genome editing could also be used to modify traits with no therapeutic objective. It could therefore be considered in the proposed artificial intelligence act.

Maria-Manuel Leitão-Marques (S&D, Portugal): How can we create flexible legislation that can be adapted to such a fast-evolving scientific area? Do you see a parallel with the proposed artificial intelligence legislation? If so, do you think a risk-based approach, as used in the artificial intelligence act proposal, could be adapted and applied to this area?

Professor Nordberg: The field is evolving very fast. Legislation will therefore need to be flexible, adaptive and resilient.

There is a clear parallel with the proposed legislation of artificial intelligence. The study favours a risk-based approach, which already exists in the legislation of pharmaceutical product evaluation and marketing authorisation. Legislation could take the perspective of ethical and social risks and implications, as well as being patient-based. It is also important to add the possibility of flexible legislative definitions, such as annexes, which can be revised easily if the technology moves forward, so that any legislation will not be outdated in just a few years. This can also be seen in the proposed artificial intelligence act.

Ivars Ijabs (Renew, Latvia): What is the threshold between genetic eugenics, which are prohibited, and self-enhancement?

Professor Nordberg: The distinction between eugenics and self-enhancement is very complex. It is therefore difficult to consider concepts such as ‘human enhancement’ in legislation. Human dignity, human autonomy, human agency, are concepts that might be better choices to use in legislation.

It is important to establish boundaries on the definition of eugenics. For instance, private actors can be considered to use a form of eugenics, regardless of the outcome, if they operate outside of the normal informed consent given by an individual subject to an intervention. It is therefore extremely important to prohibit and maintain a ban. Prohibition, in my view, should be clearly extended to private actors.

What is the role of public opinion in EU policies on this issue? As with genetically modified organisms, the EU’s commitment on genome editing in humans seems to be rather conservative. How do we make this democratic participation compatible with the further development of techniques that would improve human life?

Professor Nordberg: There is no single public opinion on elective interventions, but rather a question of public ‘opinions’, since there are many and these depend quite significantly on context. Non-therapeutic (elective) somatic interventions could be regulated. For example, at times, the same people who are very concerned about the safety of a vaccine are then very happy to be subjected to cosmetic modifications, for instance in a beauty salon, without knowing if there are any safety precautions. Legislation in this field is lacking.

The full set of policy options are set out in greater detail in the accompanying STOA options brief. Read the full report and accompanying STOA options brief to find out more.

Your opinion counts for us. To let us know what you think, get in touch via stoa@europarl.europa.eu.

Written by Etienne Deschamps.

In keeping with the wishes of Jean Monnet and his closest colleagues, who dreamt of seeing his family home transformed into a place in which young people could come together to discuss and share ideas, the European Parliament has made this public place of memory a venue of choice for people seeking to learn more about the way the European Union works and discover the environment in which one of the architects of today’s Europe lived and worked.

It was here that many plans which would have a decisive bearing on the future of France and Europe were drawn up. In this place which was close to Paris, but which at the same time offered a refuge from the clamour of the French capital, Jean Monnet developed his vision of peace and European unity. The European Parliament bought the house in 1982. Today, managed on a day-to-day basis by the House of European History, the Jean Monnet House offers, through a permanent multimedia exhibition, an insight into both the private world of Jean Monnet and his career and political ideals. Since 2013, the Jean Monnet House has been officially recognised by the French Government as a ‘Maison des illustres’ and is also part of the Network of Political Houses and Foundations of Leading Europeans, an initiative behind which the European Parliament is a driving force. Today, Parliament is breathing new life into the Jean Monnet House, in order to raise awareness of Monnet’s work and to pass on his values of peace and solidarity to a wider public by organising new activities and hosting numerous events in Houjarray.

Read this briefing on ‘The Jean Monnet House: A place of European memory‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Luisa Antunes.

Genome editing is a powerful new tool allowing precise alterations in the genome. The development of new approaches based on the CRISPR‑Cas9 system has made this process much more efficient, flexible and affordable, relative to previous strategies.

These technological advances originated in remarkable interest in possible applications, both in fundamental research and in the treatment or prevention of disease and disability. Possibilities range from restoring normal function in diseased organs by editing somatic cells to preventing genetic diseases in future children and their descendants by editing the human germline.

As with other medical breakthroughs, each such application comes with its own set of risks, benefits, ethical issues and societal implications, which may require the revision of existing regulatory frameworks. Important questions raised include how to balance potential benefits against unintended harms, how to govern the use of these technologies, how to incorporate societal values into relevant clinical and policy applications, and how to respect the inevitable cultural specificities that shape the future direction of the use of these technologies.

The goal of this study was therefore to provide an overview of the state-of-the-art of the science, as well as an analysis of current and projected regulatory, ethical, legal and social implications. Based on these findings, policy options were provided.

The internal market for health and ‘wellness’ services and products can and is already subject to considerable harmonisation in the European Union. Provided that there is sufficient consensus, there is ample room to either introduce genome editing-related provisions in existing directives and regulations (vertical approach), or to enact specific genome-editing legislation (horizontal approach). Besides legislative intervention, it is also possible to explore alternative or cumulative public and private governance mechanisms.

Harmonised definitions would be beneficial to the internal market for health and wellness services and products. These facilitate legal certainty in the internal market, improving the prospects for citizens (as patients and consumers), companies and healthcare providers (public or private) to navigate the different national rules and a fragmented legal landscape. Uniform definitions facilitate comparison and organic approximation of national legislation, policies, and governance structures.

Legal definitions should include appropriate resilience mechanisms to ensure sustained correspondence with scientific knowledge. From a regulatory perspective, the use of qualifiers such as ‘somatic versus germline‘, ‘hereditable‘ genome editing, or ‘modifying genetic identity‘, is considered scientifically outdated, vague and prone to differing legal interpretations. Somatic as well as germline applications may carry associated dangers. Once clinical safety is established, germline interventions could also have strong therapeutic potential. Possible horizontal harmonisation approaches could include, for example, maintaining a general prohibition, in which the clinical risk-benefit ratio is unacceptable and, additionally, clarifying concepts and, most importantly, creating exceptions for research and future treatments of serious diseases.

Regarding genetic eugenics prohibited by Article 3 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, this study proposes the option of regulation to expressly clarify or extend the prohibition to the actions of private actors and to somatic interventions where these cannot be considered to be the result of informed and free consent, and simultaneously clearly exempting preventive and precision medicine.

Regarding advanced therapeutic product regulation, genome-editing products are currently subject to a centralised approval procedure, but exceptions are decided locally. One option would be to further harmonise exceptions granting patients early access, e.g. compassionate use, named-patient use and hospital exceptions.

As for genome editing in assisted reproduction techniques, rules and proposals to allow editing are often linked with the treatment of serious diseases. There is an urgent need to define and, if possible harmonise science-based criteria used to determine the seriousness of a given disease, including both from a patient-centric perspective and using medical diagnosis elements.

Uncontrolled somatic editing can pose great social and ethical risks (e.g., inequality, public health problems, interventions in children and people unable to consent, discrimination, etc.). Regarding wellness and cosmetic somatic editing (including enhancement), strict regulatory framework for market approval only applies to products used for the treatment, prevention or diagnosis of a disease. The use of ‘human enhancement’ as a criterion for unacceptable interventions is not useful, as it is too vague, value-charged and difficult to enforce. An option would be to ensure public health prevention by determining types of editing that should be prohibited or restricted, practitioners’ professional qualifications, safety and technical requirements. Also here, a multi-level, risk-based approach would allow specific rules to be defined for prohibited and high-risk genome-editing interventions. Possible criteria could include the objectives of the intervention, expected outcomes and levels of risk for individuals and society.

Regarding medical/reproductive travel and beauty/wellness tourism, some countries have more permissive legislation or lack the ability to enforce rules. Restrictions should not hamper access to experimental or recently approved therapeutic options, including the participation in clinical trials. Possible options include the extraterritorial application of EU and Member State law to procedures performed abroad (provided that fundamental rights and freedoms are respected).

As for enforcement and forensic activities, the enforcement of prohibitions needs to account for fundamental rights and freedoms. An option would be to balance the needs for prevention and reintegration relating to the specific illicit conduct with the legal rights, interest and well-being of the victim. Secondly, subjects of illicit genome editing could be treated as victims and could be specifically allowed to refuse privacy or forensic activities invasive to their physical integrity. The long-term monitoring and inclusion in registries must also respect the rights to privacy, family life, personal integrity and autonomy.

Counterfeited or falsified services and products are a known intellectual property rights (IPR) and a public health issue. Genome editing could be included in the sphere of measures included when tackling this problem. Private governance through technology-licensing agreements already plays an important governance role. This study identifies an option to develop general guidance or model clauses for ethical licensing. The use of artificial intelligence (AI) systems for genome editing is a future area of concern and should be the object of consideration in AI-related regulation.

In conclusion, this study shows that while genome editing is the source of great expectations for the medical field, several ethical, social and legal questions remain to be addressed. Regulatory and governance mechanisms are greatly needed in the EU.

Read the complete study on ‘Genome editing in humans: A survey of law, regulation and governance principles‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Gregor Erbach and Liselotte Jensen.

The ‘fit for 55’ package, presented in July and December 2021, is designed to realise the European Climate Law objectives: climate neutrality by 2050 and a 55 % reduction of net greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 2030, compared with 1990 levels. It consists of 13 interlinked proposals to revise existing EU climate and energy laws, and six proposals for new legislation.

The proposals aim to accelerate emission reductions in the sectors covered by the EU emissions trading system (ETS) and the sectors covered by the Effort-sharing Regulation, and to increase carbon removals in the land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF) sector.

Under the new package, road transport and buildings would be included in the revised EU ETS, but would still be covered by the Effort-sharing Regulation. To reduce transport sector emissions, the new ETS for transport fuels would be complemented by stronger CO2 emission standards for new cars and vans, revised rules for alternative fuels infrastructure and new legislation on maritime and aviation fuels. Energy production and use across the economy are addressed by the revision of key EU energy legislation, a new regulation on energy-related methane emissions (within the effort-sharing sector), and a reform of the EU gas markets (Gas and Hydrogen Regulation and Directive). The proposals on ETS, effort-sharing, energy performance of buildings, renewable energy, energy efficiency and the social climate fund address energy use in buildings. Finally, the revision of the LULUCF Regulation is geared towards ensuring that the sector achieves 310 Mt CO2 removals by 2030. There would be certain flexibilities between the LULUCF sector and the effort-sharing sector. The revised Renewable Energy Directive contains sustainability criteria for biofuels, which affect the LULUCF sector. Transport: A challenging sector for climate action

GHG emissions from the transport sector have stagnated over the past decade, while other sectors such as electricity generation and industry achieved substantial emissions reductions, not least thanks to the EU ETS. To ensure that the transport sector contributes to the EU’s climate objectives, the maritime and road transport sectors are to be included in the EU ETS (while still covered by the Effort-sharing Regulation). Together with a review of the Energy Taxation Directive, this would raise the price of GHG emissions in the transport sector. The proposed revision of the Renewable Energy Directive sets requirements for renewable transport fuels, and introduces a credit mechanism to promote electromobility. Specific legislative proposals address emissions reductions and the supply of alternative fuels in the road transport, maritime transport and aviation sub-sectors.

Aviation: Free ETS allowances for airlines are to be phased out, and flights going outside the European Economic Area will become subject to the international CORSIA offsetting scheme. The RefuelEU Aviation proposal promotes sustainable aviation fuels.
Road transport: CO2 emission standards for new cars would become stricter, aiming for 100 % zero-emissions vehicles by 2035. The social climate fund, financed by the new ETS for road transport and buildings, would improve access to zero- and low-emission mobility and transport.
Maritime transport: The sector would be included in the EU ETS. The FuelEU Maritime proposal promotes sustainable maritime fuels. Energy: At the heart of the climate neutrality transition

Several proposals in the ‘fit for 55’ package address energy-related GHG emissions. The principal targets to contribute to the overall 55 % net emissions reduction are a 40 % share of renewable energy sources by 2030, and a substantial reduction of primary and final energy consumption. A higher carbon price through the revision of the EU ETS and the Energy Taxation Directive will drive the roll-out of renewables and energy efficiency improvements.

Links between the proposals: 1. The proposed revised Energy Taxation Directive refers to definitions in the proposed revised Renewable Energy Directive and the proposed revised Alternative Fuels Infrastructure Directive. 2. The proposed revised Gas and Hydrogen Regulation and Gas and Hydrogen Directive refer to the revised Renewable Energy Directive for the definition of renewable gas and low-carbon gas. 3. The proposed revised Renewable Energy Directive refers to the definition of ‘efficient district heating and cooling’ in the proposed revised Energy Efficiency Directive (EED), and the proposed revised Energy Performance of Buildings Directive refers to the definition of ‘energy performance contracting’ in the EED. 4. The proposed revised Energy Efficiency Directive and the proposal for a social climate fund refer to each other with respect to use of the fund. EU ETS: Cornerstone of EU climate action

The ‘fit for 55’ package contains four proposals to raise the ambition of the EU ETS, improve its functioning, broaden its scope to maritime transport, road transport and buildings, and provide for the participation of airlines in the international CORSIA offsetting scheme. These are complemented by proposals for a carbon border adjustment mechanism to safeguard international competitiveness by pricing the carbon emissions of imports, and for a social climate fund to address the social impacts of extending the EU ETS to road transport and buildings.

1. Financing of the social climate fund would come from revenues from the new ETS for transport and buildings. 2. The amount of carbon border adjustment depends on the phasing-out of free allowances in the EU ETS. 3. Allocation of free ETS allowances depends on operators’ compliance with the requirements of the EED. 4. The existing Regulation on monitoring, reporting and verification of maritime transport emissions (the Shipping MRV Regulation) is amended to align with the extension of the ETS to maritime transport. 5. Both proposals concern aviation in the EU ETS and implementation of the international CORSIA system. The second proposal ensures that Member States notify airlines of CORSIA obligations for 2021. EPRS publications

• Effort-sharing Regulation review: EU legislation in progress briefing; initial appraisal of Commission impact assessment
• LULUCF Regulation review: legislation in progress; initial appraisal
• EU ETS Directive review: legislation in progress; initial appraisal
• EU ETS market stability reserve review: legislation in progress
• EU ETS as regards aviation / Notification on CORSIA: legislation in progress; initial appraisal
• Carbon border adjustment mechanism: legislation in progress; initial appraisal
• Renewable Energy Directive review: legislation in progress; initial appraisal
• Energy Efficiency Directive review: legislation in progress; initial appraisal
• Social climate fund: legislation in progress; (no impact assessment prepared by the Commission)
• Energy Taxation Directive review: legislation in progress; (consultation procedure, no initial appraisal)
• Energy Performance of Buildings Directive review: legislation in progress; implementation in action
• Methane regulation: legislation in progress; initial appraisal (forthcoming)
• EU regulation on gas and hydrogen networks recast: legislation in progress; implementation appraisal
• EU directive on gas and hydrogen networks recast: legislation in progress
• CO2 emission standards for cars and vans: legislation in progress; initial appraisal
• Alternative fuels infrastructure regulation: legislation in progress; initial appraisal
• ReFuelEU Aviation: legislation in progress; initial appraisal
• FuelEU Maritime: legislation in progress; initial appraisal

Read this briefing on ‘Fit for 55 package‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Suzana Anghel and Rebecca Torpey.

Russia’s continuing war on Ukraine was central to the EU leaders’ debates at their special meeting on 30-31 May 2022. Closely linked to Ukraine, food security, security and defence, and energy were also high on the agenda. EU leaders approved €9 billion in special macro-financial assistance for Ukraine and agreed on a sixth package of sanctions against Russia, including a ban on seaborne oil (two-thirds of imports) with a temporary exemption for pipeline oil imports. On food security, the European Council strongly condemned the impact of Russia’s war on the global food supply chain and focused on ways to coordinate with international partners to ensure the global security of food supplies. In security and defence, the focus was on consolidation, rather than new strategic guidelines. EU leaders examined, but did not endorse, the ‘investment gaps’ analysis prepared, at their request, by the European Commission and the High Representative/Vice President of the Commission (HR/VP), Josep Borrell. They called on the Council to take forward work on specific items, not least developing a ‘joint EU defence strategic programming and procurement’ function. On energy, the EU leaders took stock of progress made since their Versailles meeting, on phasing out the EU’s dependence on Russian fossil fuels. After presentation of the REPowerEU plan, they agreed that work should continue on supply diversification, renewables, energy efficiency, interconnection, infrastructure and preparedness, including gas storage, price affordability and electricity market optimisation. The President of Cyprus, Nikos Anastasiades, briefed his colleagues on Turkey’s assertive behaviour in the area of Varosha.

1. Background

The European Council meeting began with the customary address by the President of the European Parliament, Roberta Metsola. She stressed that ‘Europe needs our leadership’, as the EU’s joint action ‘in the next months will define our common future’, and emphasised that the Parliament was ready to ‘constructively play its part’. The President of the European Council, Charles Michel, did not submit an updated Leaders’ Agenda, although the latest version expired in March 2022.

2. European Council meeting Ukraine

The European Council condemned Russia’s invasion of Ukraine once again, denouncing the suffering and destruction inflicted on Ukraine and its population, and calling on Russia to allow safe passage, humanitarian assistance and the return of Ukrainians forcibly deported. EU leaders recalled Ukraine’s right to self-defence, renewed their call for an immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Russian troops and equipment from the ‘entire territory of Ukraine within its internationally recognised borders’, and praised the ‘courage and determination’ of the Ukrainians to ‘fight to defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity and freedom of their country’. They confirmed the Union’s support and cooperation with partners, with a view to building ‘a peaceful, democratic and prosperous future’ for Ukraine. Along with sanctions, the most debated items were international justice, the EU’s support for Ukraine, and the war’s impact on neighbouring countries. Addressing the European Council, the President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, stressed the importance of European unity, pointed to the loss of lives, pleaded for the adoption of new sanctions and underlined that ‘there can be no compromises at the expense of (Ukraine’s) territorial integrity’.

Sanctions against Russia

EU leaders agreed on a sixth package of sanctions, expanding the list of Russian individuals and entities subject to sanctions (i.e. banks, military and religious officials, and ‘Russian state outlets‘ spreading disinformation). After a heated debate, they agreed to ban oil imports, with the exception of pipeline oil. In doing so, they stood by the principles outlined – no indirect funding of the war, phasing out of EU dependence on Russian fossil fuels, and economic isolation of Russia so that it ends the war. Charles Michel stressed that the agreement covered ‘more than two-thirds of oil imports from Russia, cutting a huge source of financing for its war machine’. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen indicated that the aim was to progressively target 90 % of Russian oil imports by the end of 2022. EU leaders committed to return to the temporary exception of pipeline oil, mainly benefiting Hungary, at a forthcoming meeting. They also agreed that, in the event of sudden interruptions of supply, ’emergency measures will be introduced to ensure security of supply’. They called on international partners to remain united in coordinating and implementing sanctions.

International law and justice

The European Council stressed that it ‘expects international humanitarian law, including the Geneva Convention relative to the treatment of prisoners of war, to be fully respected’. It has also expressed support for the gathering of evidence and investigation of war crimes carried out by the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court. EU leaders praised the ‘operational support’ provided by Europol and welcomed the creation of a Joint Investigation Team coordinated by Eurojust. They reiterated that those responsible for international law breaches would ‘be held to account for their actions’.

Humanitarian, financial, military, economic and political support for Ukraine

EU leaders reiterated the EU’s multi-dimensional support for Ukraine, confirming that the EU would continue to provide Ukraine with humanitarian aid and ‘commend[ing] the results of the High-level International Donors’ Conference co-hosted by Poland and Sweden’. They highlighted the financial support offered to frontline countries for the reception of Ukrainian refugees, and invited the European Commission to present new funding proposals within the multiannual financial framework (MFF). They also mentioned the EU’s commitment to support Ukraine financially, expressed readiness ‘to grant Ukraine new exceptional macro-financial assistance of up to €9 billion in 2022’, and called for speedy examination of the European Commission’s forthcoming proposal.

On the reconstruction of Ukraine, EU leaders expressed support for a dedicated reconstruction platform bringing together the EU, Member-State governments, the Ukrainian government, international partners and financial organisations, and suggested using frozen Russian assets to fund reconstruction efforts. They also praised Member States’ efforts to enshrine provisions allowing asset confiscation in their national laws and called on the Council to move ‘swiftly’ to examine the European Commission’s proposal to add violation of EU sanctions to the serious crimes with a cross-border dimension listed in Article 83 TFEU.

Ahead of its debate on enlargement, scheduled for 23-24 June 2022, the European Council introduced a first element of conditionality by linking EU support for Ukraine’s reconstruction to its ability to stay the course of reforms and follow its European pathway. It noted the European Commission’s work on opinions on the membership applications of Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia.

With respect to military support, the European Council confirmed the EU’s commitment ‘to continue bolstering Ukraine’s ability to defend its territorial integrity and sovereignty’. It welcomed the increase up to €2 billion of the support offered to Ukraine under the European Peace Facility.

Impact on neighbouring countries

Since the war began, the European Council has been monitoring its impact on neighbourhood countries closely, including on the Western Balkans and Moldova, which need support as they face strong economic, energy and migration pressure. Addressing the European Parliament in plenary, the President of Moldova, Maia Sandu, had outlined the efforts undertaken to cope with the large number of refugees, and underlined that Moldova supported Ukraine’s territorial integrity, stressing that ‘Crimea is Ukraine. Donbas is Ukraine. Kyiv is Ukraine. And they will always be’. The EU leaders also reaffirmed their support for the Belarusian people’s right to ‘new, free and fair elections’.

Main message of the President of the European Parliament: Roberta Metsola called for leadership and for the provision of ‘hope and perspective’ to Ukraine by granting candidate status. She recalled the objective of phasing out Russian fossil fuels and supported the sixth package of sanctions.

Food security and affordability

The war in Ukraine is straining the global food supply chain. Russia and Ukraine account for about 30 % of global exports of wheat, 20 % of corn and mineral fertilisers, and 80 % of the world’s sunflower oil trade. The disruption in fertiliser manufacturing also risks putting next year’s agricultural production under stress. Charles Michel held Russia accountable for the humanitarian crisis that may occur, after witnessing ‘silos full of grain, wheat and corn ready for export … stranded because of the Russian war and blockade of Black Sea ports’. EU leaders reiterated this sentiment by emphasising the impact of Russia’s war on global food security and affordability, calling on Russia to end its blockade of food exports. The European Council went further than it had at its meetings on 24-25 March and in Versailles, at which it focused on ways for the EU and the international community to respond to food supply issues. At this meeting, EU leaders directly denounced Russia’s illegal seizure and destruction of Ukrainian agricultural produce.

In the Middle East, Russia and Ukraine supply around 75 % of wheat imports, a figure reaching 90 % in east Africa. The blockade poses a broader security concern in the EU’s neighbourhood, potentially leading to further humanitarian crises. In this context, the Chair of the African Union, Macky Sall, addressed the European Council, outlining the risks facing Africa as well as possible solutions. The price of food in the EU increased by 8.64 % in April 2022 compared with April 2021, affecting the purchasing power of EU citizens, who are already facing rising energy costs. EU leaders considered ways to bolster food security and affordability, by facilitating food exports from Ukraine; coordinating the international response to a looming global food crisis; and reducing disruptions to fertiliser manufacturing. They signalled their support for specific initiatives at EU and international level, such as ‘solidarity lanes‘, the Food and Agriculture Resilience Mission, the adoption of common agricultural policy strategic plans, and the establishment of the Global Alliance on Food Security. They also called on the Commission to explore the use of European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) reserves and for international partners to promote more efficient use of fertilisers or alternatives.

Main message of the European Parliament President: Roberta Metsola decried Russia’s blackmail, which threatened to plunge vulnerable countries into famine, and signalled support for the Commission’s ‘solidarity lanes’ initiative, backed by the European Council on day two of the meeting.

Security and defence

The European Council considered the joint communication on the defence investment gaps analysis, but did not endorse the document as such. Instead – as flagged up before the meeting in the EPRS outlook – they invited ‘the Council to examine’ a select number of issues, including short-term defence procurement needs allowing stocks to be renewed, ‘the development of a joint EU defence strategic programming and procurement function’, measures to bolster the EU’s defence industry, and the possibility of enhancing the role of the European Investment Bank so as to mobilise up to €6 billion for dual-use projects under its strategic European security initiative. EU leaders stressed that they were looking forward to the Commission’s presentation of the European defence investment programme, which is scheduled for autumn 2022 and expected to include a value added tax exemption.

Commission President Ursula von der Leyen noted that several Member States had announced defence spending increases, amounting cumulatively to €200 billion. She referred to the challenges of fragmentation and duplication and called for better coordinated defence spending. Defence funding, including a possible increase of the European Defence Fund envelope – an aspect considered in the defence investment gaps analysis and supported by the European Parliament – was for now kept out of the debate. As EU leaders committed to keep defence on their agendas, funding might come up for discussion, possibly by mid-2023, if not sooner, when, in accordance with the Strategic Compass, ‘new financing solutions’ for joint procurement are expected.

EU leaders pointed to ongoing shifts in the EU’s close strategic environment as a result of Russia’s war, and stressed the importance of a ‘stronger and more capable’ joint response in security and defence. Whilst reaffirming NATO’s key role in ensuring collective defence for its members, they emphasised that ‘solidarity between (EU) Member States is reflected in Article 42(7) TEU – yet not calling for clarification on the procedure to be observed in the event of a new activation.

Main message of the President of the European Parliament: Roberta Metsola stressed that European security and defence was ‘fast becoming an existential question’, underlining the complementary nature of the EU and NATO. She again called for pooling of resources and better defence spending.

Energy

In light of its earlier commitment to reduce EU dependence on Russian fossil fuels, the European Council took stock of progress made thus far and exchanged views on the REPowerEU plan. It called in particular for accelerated development of renewables and for investment in infrastructure aimed at bolstering renewable energy production. Ursula von der Leyen stressed that ‘renewable energy has the big advantage that it is not only good for the climate but it is also good for our independence and good for our security of supply and it creates jobs at home’.

Energy affordability was a central topic for discussion, leading the European Council to call for joint efforts with like-minded partners to curb energy prices, including by setting temporary price caps. EU leaders encouraged the ‘prompt use’ of the newly established EU Energy Purchase Platform, open to eastern and Western Balkan partners, whilst stressing the need to accelerate winter preparations to avoid disruption, including by completely filling gas storage facilities. They stressed the importance of putting in place coordinated European contingency measures. The reform of the electricity market, supported by several Member States at past meetings, remains a pending issue. EU leaders have invited the European Commission to work on market optimisation and price affordability, on the basis of the report by the EU Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators.

Main message of the President of the European Parliament: Roberta Metsola underlined that consumers must be protected from ‘price fluctuations’ and stressed that investment in energy and in the green transition must be seen ‘as much as a security issue as it is an environmental one’.

Read this briefing on ‘Outcome of the special European Council meeting of 30-31 May 2022‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clare Ferguson.

Parliament meets again in Strasbourg for the first session of June, with Members scheduled to attend a ‘This is Europe’ debate with the Taoiseach of Ireland, Micheál Martin (who is also expected at the inauguration of a statue of former Member, and Nobel Peace Prize-winner, John Hume in the Parliament in Strasbourg). Parliament will also hear European Council and Commission statements on the conclusions of the special European Council meeting of 30‑31 May 2022, and consider a draft resolution on the rule of law and the potential approval of the Polish national recovery plan (RRF). However, the main topic on the agenda is the twin challenge of reducing harm to the environment and fossil fuel use, with a full day of joint debate on the ‘Fit for 55’ package scheduled for Tuesday. On Monday evening, the Parliament is due to hold a question time session with the Commission, in a practice revived earlier this year, this time on the topic of reducing the use of pesticides and strengthening consumer protection.

The first of the files scheduled for Tuesday’s ‘Fit for 55’ joint debate is the proposed review of the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS), aimed at aligning the ETS with the Climate Law target of a 55 % reduction in net EU greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 2030. In its report on the European Commission proposal, Parliament’s Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI) calls for accelerated emissions reduction and for a system to reward best performers and innovation. The committee also proposes to include municipal waste incineration in the ETS from 2026, and to raise ambition in the maritime transport sector. The ENVI committee demands an end to free allowances and that the carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM) is completed earlier – by 2030. The report proposes to increase and rename the Innovation Fund as the Climate Investment Fund and make access to the Modernisation Fund conditional on legally binding climate neutrality targets and respect for the rule of law. Tuesday morning’s joint debate will also discuss Parliament’s position in negotiations with the co-legislators on the proposed EU CBAM, where the ENVI committee has proposed significant amendments to the proposed measures to prevent carbon leakage by levelling the playing field between EU and third-country producers. The proposal entails setting a carbon price for imported products and ending free emissions allowances for European industry. The committee report amends the proposal’s scope: broadening the products and sectors covered and allocating CBAM revenue to the EU budget. However, to support least-developed countries, ENVI suggests earmarking an equivalent amount for their decarbonisation efforts. 

However, GHG emissions in sectors not included in the ETS account for around 60 % of EU emissions. The ‘Fit for 55’ debate therefore continues on Tuesday, with Members expected to discuss the revision of legislation governing measures to control GHG emissions in transport, buildings and agriculture. The Commission’s proposal aims at achieving climate neutrality by establishing binding national targets and setting annual emissions allocations (AEAs) for each EU country. Nevertheless, the ENVI committee calls for greater ambition, to align with the 2050 climate neutrality target. The ENVI committee also demands greater transparency in Member States’ actions under the regulation, including preparation of a Commission report on their AEA achievements. Parliament’s vote on the Effort-sharing Regulation will set its position for negotiations with the co-legislators.

Aviation emissions, projected to increase by 2050, are not included in the transport modes covered by the Effort-sharing Regulation. The ‘Fit for 55’ package aims to tackle these specifically, with Members expected to set Parliament’s position on the proposed revision of the EU ETS as regards aviation following Tuesday morning’s joint debate. The aviation proposal aims at amending the ETS Directive and implementing the current pilot carbon offsetting and reduction scheme for international aviation (CORSIA). Parliament already supports the elimination of the free allowances for emissions from flights to and from third countries, granted due to international pressure. An ENVI committee report on the proposals further calls for a 50 % reduction of these free allowances in 2024, before ending the exception in 2025. The ENVI report also supports the uptake of sustainable aviation fuels, and proposes to direct 75 % of aviation allowance auction revenue to reducing the sector’s total climate impacts internationally.

Other ‘Fit for 55’ package proposals also concern transport sector CO2 emissions, which have barely fallen since 2005. To set Parliament’s position ahead of negotiations with the co-legislators, Members are expected to debate stricter CO2 emissions standards for new cars and vans on Tuesday afternoon (part two of the joint debate). The ENVI committee report on the proposal seeks to increase the 2025 emissions reduction target to 20 % and abolish the incentive mechanism to accelerate market uptake of zero- and low-emission vehicles after 2025. However, the committee insists that assessment of the socio-economic impact of the measures should be more frequent, including whether funding is needed to ensure a just transition in the automotive sector. The ENVI report also calls for a common EU methodology to assess car and van lifecycle CO2 emissions, fuel and energy consumption by 2023. 

Members are also expected to debate Parliament’s position on proposals that aim to boost protection of crucial carbon sinks in the proposed revision of the regulation on land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF), also scheduled for part two of the ‘Fit for 55’ joint debate on Tuesday afternoon. The ENVI committee report on the proposal reiterates Parliament’s support for measures to halt deforestation and encourage sustainable farming, to protect the environment and the economic sectors that depend on it. The report disagrees with moves to merge LULUCF with agriculture measures however, and seeks to set national annual targets for 2026-2029, with penalties for non-compliance. It also underlines the need for coherence between EU policies that protect nature and biodiversity, and carbon storage measures. 

Nonetheless, it is recognised that none of these measures will be cheap. Members will therefore also debate the proposed creation of a social climate fund as part of the joint ‘fit for 55’ debate (on Tuesday morning). This initiative seeks to match funding from EU own resources and Member State contributions to compensate those hardest-hit by the cost of the transition to a more environmentally friendly society – vulnerable households, small businesses and transport users. Parliament’s ENVI and Employment and Social Affairs have produced a joint report outlining expectations for national social climate plans to prioritise ‘clean’ mobility and limit temporary direct income support measures. The joint report defines ‘mobility poverty’, makes disbursement of funds conditional on countries respecting the rule of law, and asks that national plans consider the socio-economic challenges for islands and outermost regions. The fund would be primarily financed through the extension of the EU ETS to cover the buildings and transport sectors. 

While the EU’s desire to become independent of Russian energy supplies has added impetus to the ‘Fit for 55’ initiatives, Parliament’s support for Ukraine in the face of Russia’s aggression means the country remains a major item on Parliament’s agenda. Ruslan Stefanchuk, Speaker of Ukraine’s Parliament, the Verkhovna Rada, is expected to make an address to a formal sitting of Parliament on Wednesday morning. As part of the now regular question time (scheduled for Tuesday evening) with HR/VP Josep Borrell, Members are scheduled to discuss EU external action to address the impact of the war in Ukraine on third countries. They are also due to debate a draft recommendation, prepared by the Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET), on EU foreign, security and defence policy in the light of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The report recommends the EU move swiftly to establish a defence union and to underpin its common defence by implementing the Strategic Compass. It calls for the EU to embrace the aim of strategic autonomy and to hold regular Council meetings of EU defence ministers. Calling to replace the unilateral declaration on political accountability with a bilateral agreement with the HR/VP, AFET underlines the imperative for Parliament to scrutinise the Strategic Compass and use of the European Peace Facility.

Members are expected to debate Parliament’s position on the Commission’s 2021 report on Turkey on Monday evening. Turkey’s EU accession negotiations are currently on hold, due to democratic backsliding. However, relations with the EU have improved slightly, with a recent AFET committee report welcoming Turkey’s mediation in Russia’s war against Ukraine, and underlining the importance of cooperation with a NATO ally in the currently unstable geopolitical situation. The AFET report on the Commission’s 2021 annual report on Turkey’s accession nevertheless notes that the human rights situation in Turkey continues to deteriorate. 

On Wednesday evening, Parliament is due to consider its position on an agreement reached between the co-legislators on the revised proposal for an international procurement instrument (IPI) to facilitate reciprocal access to procurement markets in non-EU (third) countries. The instrument would deter or disqualify tenderers from third countries that close their public procurement markets to EU bidders from bidding in the EU. Parliament successfully negotiated higher thresholds and fewer exceptions to the proposed rules, while minimising the administrative burden.

On Wednesday afternoon, Members are set to debate a crucial issue for Parliament – gaining the right of ‘direct’ legislative initiative. At present, the European Parliament, unlike national parliaments, only enjoys an ‘indirect right’ to propose legislation. This means it must submit a majority request to the Commission to prepare a proposal to implement the EU Treaties. To strengthen the EU’s democratic legitimacy, a report from the Committee on Constitutional Affairs (AFCO) calls for a general and direct right of initiative for Parliament (the only directly elected institution). This would require Parliament to trigger a Treaty change, an issue discussed at the recent Conference on the Future of Europe in respect of the possibility of more far-reaching EU reforms.

The winner of the LUX Audience Award is due to be announced at a ceremony scheduled for lunchtime on Wednesday. The prize celebrates quality cinema in Europe, with the three competing films obtaining help with distribution, including subtitling in the 24 official EU languages and screening at the LUX Film Days in more than 60 cities. The winning film will also be adapted for those with visual and hearing impairments. Previous laureates have gone on to be highly successful in the EU and beyond.

Finally, on Wednesday lunchtime, Members are scheduled to vote on a Fisheries Committee recommendation to grant consent to the conclusion of a new EU–Mauritania Fisheries Agreement and Protocol – the EU’s economically most significant fisheries agreement. In updating this cooperation framework, Parliament supports increased fisheries cooperation between EU partners in West Africa and strengthens calls for a regional fisheries management organisation to deal with shared stocks.

Written by Monika Kiss, Mar Negreiro, Maria Niestadt, Carolien Nijenhuis and Christiaan Van Lierop.

The latest available statistical data on demographic trends in the EU show that population features present in the EU-27 in previous years have persisted, but that the picture is slightly worse due to the Covid-19 pandemic.

The population of the EU represents a progressively shrinking proportion of the world population. While the latter is increasing steadily and is getting proportionally younger, the population of the EU is ageing rapidly, with a median age of 43.9 years in 2020, compared to 38.4 years two decades ago. This is due to increased longevity (a life expectancy of 81.3 years in 2019 compared to 69.86 in the 1960s), but also to a shrinking birth rate, amounting to 4.05 million live births in 2019, compared to 6.79 million in the 1960s. The pandemic led to an increase in ‘excess mortality’ in 2021, the two biggest peaks being in April and November, coinciding with two waves of Covid-19 infections.

Owing to vaccination campaigns and economic incentives, employment figures in 2021 were more positive than during the previous year. This positive development is also due to another phenomenon, the acceleration of the digital transition.

A digital revolution is transforming the world as we know it at unprecedented speed, and there is a growing awareness among EU citizens that digital technologies play an important role in their daily lives; on a societal level, digital technologies have the potential to improve living standards, life expectancy and quality of life. Looking at prospective demographic trends, this technological dependency is expected to continue. According to a 2021 Eurobarometer survey, more than 80 % of EU citizens think that the use of digital tools and the internet by 2030 will be important in their lives, and that they will bring at least as many advantages as disadvantages to them. However, there are differences according to demographic groups, among whom there remains a digital divide. For instance, younger users are more likely to be intensive internet users, and are also twice as likely to worry about the difficulty of disconnecting and finding a good online/offline life balance than those who are aged 55 and over. The use of digital technologies requires a sufficient level of digital skills, and in this respect the EU is still far away from its target (of 80 % of citizens with basic digital skills in 2030, compared to 58 % in 2021), but this is also strongly influenced by socio-demographic aspects.

Children and young people born after 1996 in the EU – sometimes called ‘Generation Z’, ‘Gen Z’ or ‘iGeneration’ – are the first digital natives: they are used to smartphones and tablets, and most have internet access at home. Demographically, though, their part in society is shrinking. Often young people are ahead of older family members in terms of technical competence (such as ICT skills) or time spent on the internet. The Covid-19 pandemic, which led to school closures and restrictions on physical contacts, also led, for the younger generation, to increased screen time and an abrupt transition to distance learning. The EU, its Member States and even private actors put in place initiatives to try and remedy these difficulties – for example, by providing access to hardware and software for pupils in need, partially opening schools, and providing non-digital home-learning resources.

Digitalisation is also changing the work life of young people, by reducing demand for routine and manual tasks while increasing demand for tasks requiring problem-solving and interpersonal skills. Young people often struggle to find a job, or jump from one precarious job to another. This in turn means that young people find it difficult to make the transition to independent life and depend financially, in large part, on their parents.

Apart from a small slice of ‘Generation Z’, it is ‘Generation Y’ or the ‘Millennials’ (those born between 1981 and 1996), as well as ‘Generation X’ (those born between 1964 and 1980) and some of the ‘Baby Boomers’ (the generation born between 1946 and 1964) who are present on the labour market and responsible for meeting the needs of the younger and older cohorts who depend on them. From the point of view of digital technologies, this heterogeneous group faces a lot of work-related challenges. These concern mainly automation, digitisation, the expansion of digital platforms and teleworking. While automated workflows and robots can make up for a lack of workers or perform physically demanding or hazardous tasks, they can also lead to job losses, relating mainly to routine tasks.

Digital technology enables people to work from any location at any time. Teleworking and digital platforms, which witnessed unprecedented growth during the pandemic, also have some drawbacks, mainly concerning work-life balance, digital privacy, and physical and mental health.

An ageing society brings challenges relating to growing demand for health and care services, loneliness, and social inclusion of older people. Digital technology could offer a solution to these problems. For example, it creates significant potential to improve support for older adults’ (often complex) healthcare needs and their need to stay connected with their social circle. However, the digital transformation also poses challenges. It has increased the exclusion of those who are digitally illiterate, who cannot access or afford digital tools or the internet, or who lack motivation and interest. Moreover, the onset of physical or cognitive impairments and inaccessible technology design renders digital engagement more challenging. The EU is aware of these issues and is backing initiatives and projects to overcome the digital gap and stimulate innovation for ageing well.

The EU’s digital transformation is taking place at an uneven pace, with clear differences visible across Europe in a number of different areas. In terms of digital literacy and skills, internet use is generally lower in southern and eastern EU regions than in the north and west, with a similar geographical division for e-commerce. The EU’s outermost regions have some of the lowest levels of digital literacy in the EU, particularly when it comes to social media participation, while residents of rural areas generally have lower levels of digital skills than people living in cities, often linked to low levels of digital connectivity in rural areas. Indeed, a significant urban-rural digital divide exists in all EU Member States, in large part due to the high costs and risks involved in the roll-out of digital infrastructure in less built-up areas. However, the recent expansion in the use of telework and ICT-based mobile work could represent one of the keys to the future development of rural areas.

Read the complete study on ‘Demographic outlook for the European Union 2022‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

EU-27 population pyramids for 2001 and 2019 (number of women and men by age group) Total fertility rate (live births per woman) Life expectancy at birth in the EU-27, between 2002 and 2019 Daily internet users in 2020 Total fertility rates in the EU-27, 2019

Written by Györgyi Mácsai (Members’ Research Service) and Igor Tkalec (GlobalStat, EUI).

This infographic examines some economic differences and similarities among countries of the Gulf region and the EU, like GDP growth, GDP per capita and female labour force participation rate. In terms of trade, the Gulf region stands already as an important source of oil and gas for the EU, these products contributing almost two-third of total imports of the latter from the Gulf region.

Read this ‘infographic’ on ‘The Gulf region: Economic indicators and trade with EU‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Monika Kiss.

In 2018, the United Nations declared 3 June World Bicycle Day. Cycling represents a growing share of mobility. It is a healthy, green and flexible means of transport that helps achieve savings and generate jobs. However, a lot remains to be done when it comes to safety and suitable cycling infrastructure across the EU. Although the regulatory framework on cycling is determined at Member State level, with concrete action shaped locally, the EU provides best practice advice and financial support for infrastructure development. For its part, the European Parliament has regularly highlighted the importance of cycling and supported it as a means of transport.

Cycling in the EU

Today, there are an estimated 1 billion bicycles in the world – about as many as passenger cars. Figures show that bicycles are becoming an ever more important mode of transportation. However, big differences exist between EU Member States. A 2020 Eurobarometer survey shows that, while the use of cars remains dominant, 8 % of EU citizens – mainly in big cities – use a privately owned bike or scooter as their main mode of daily transport, with an additional 1 % using shared bikes or scooters on a daily basis. Numbers are the highest in the Netherlands (41 %), followed by Sweden (21 %). Meanwhile, daily cycling figures remain low (1–5 % of journeys) in about a third of all EU countries.

Cycling has several environmental and health benefits. It is an affordable and flexible means of transport that benefits both society as a whole and its individual members in a number of ways. For example, according to the European Cyclists’ Federation (ECF), cycling generates global benefits of €150 billion per year, of which €90 billion concern the environment, public health and mobility. As a regular physical activity, cycling reduces the risks of heart disease, stroke, certain cancers and diabetes. Cycling can also help lessen greenhouse gas emissions, air pollution and noise. As a means of transport over short distances, it can help reduce traffic congestion, and thus also delays and lost working hours. Moreover, it can contribute to lowering the dependence on fossil fuels.

A more widespread take-up of cycling can also create new, often local jobs – in sectors such as bicycle manufacturing and retail trade, repairs, and infrastructure construction and maintenance, but also for instance in cycling tourism. Meanwhile, bicycle delivery and courier services have been booming since the start of the pandemic and the restrictions and public health measures put in place, which led to rapid development of e-commerce. Cargo bikes transporting goods or people are more and more part of our daily lives, as well.

However, the surge in cycling has come with its challenges. More needs to be done to ensure cyclists’ road safety and avoid accidents. Cyclists’ share of total road deaths in the EU stands at 8 %, and has been slowly rising. Mobility planning needs to be coordinated, and financing for cycling infrastructure secured. Boosting cycling as an attractive means of transport requires sustained investment in networks of safe and comfortable cycle routes in urban, peri-urban and rural areas across the EU. All levels of government, from local to the EU, need to contribute to this goal.

EU action and funding

Cycling policies are the Member States’ responsibility, with each EU country setting up its own regulatory framework. Practical measures (such as developing cycling networks or adapting the public transport network to facilitate combined trips) are taken primarily at local or regional levels, most often in cities.

EU-level intervention consists mainly of promoting cycling, providing financial support, and sharing best practice. The EU has recognised the importance of cycling and its integration in several areas of EU action, such as transport and tourism, energy and environment, regional and cohesion policy, and public health.

Multiple resources support implementation of cycling infrastructure and associated measures; they have been developed at national level or by other interested parties within the EU using EU co-funding. This is true, for instance, for EuroVelo, a European network of currently 17 long-distance cycling routes criss-crossing Europe, under full responsibility of the ECF. The network is in various stages of completion, and can be used by both cycling tourists and locals.

Two major EU funding sources can enhance cycling-related developments: the EU structural and investment funds, part of the regular EU budget, and the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), which aims to address the economic crisis caused by the pandemic. Through the structural funds – particularly the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and the Cohesion Fund – about €2 billion has been invested in cycling during the EU’s 2014–2020 multiannual financial framework (MFF). The current EU budget –the 2021–2027 MFF – is based on two principles: tackling the health and economic challenges caused by the pandemic, and bringing about sustainable transformation to meet the goals of the European Green Deal. The 2021–2017 ERDF and the Cohesion Fund will also support future cycling investments: at least 30 % of the former and 37 % of the latter must be dedicated to climate objectives.

Meanwhile, about half of the national recovery and resilience plans (NRRPs) drawing on the RRF intend to update, upgrade or extend existing national green mobility plans. Quite a few have assigned specific funds to enhance cycling, either as a daily means of transport, or as a sustainable form of tourism, or both. From the NRRPs submitted so far, Belgium is the frontrunner as regards cycling infrastructure, with investment worth €411 million (or 6.9 % of the country’s RRF funding) in 180 kilometres of new and 1 360 kilometres of upgraded cycling paths and secured bicycle parking, including at rail stations. Sizeable investments are also planned in Romania, Italy and France.

Furthermore, the EU supports platforms for the exchange of best practice, for instance the City Vitality Sustainability Initiative (CIVITAS), the European Platform on Mobility Management (EPOMM) and the Urban Mobility Observatory (ELTIS), which hosts cycling data.

Legislative work also focuses more and more on promoting cycling. To protect cyclists and other vulnerable road users more effectively, new features have been added to the EU rules on safety requirements for vehicles. For instance, the revised General Safety Regulation, adopted in November 2019, envisages, as of 2022, to improve direct vision for trucks and buses, reducing ‘blind spots’, and install systems at the vehicle’s front and side to detect and warn of vulnerable road users, especially when making turns. The proposal for a revised Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T) Regulation, published in December 2021 as part of the ‘efficient and green mobility’ package, can be considered a step forward for cycling in urban areas. It aims, among other things, to establish synergies with other policies, such as those to increase bicycle infrastructure, including the EuroVelo routes. The TEN-T proposal also highlights the importance of developing multimodal mobility and sustainable transport modes further. The European urban mobility framework, as part of the same package, discusses multimodality and the use of active travel, encouraging cities to draft sustainable urban mobility action plans, as well as promoting bike transport.

European Parliament’s role

Over the years, the European Parliament has repeatedly highlighted and supported cycling as a transport mode and cyclists’ interests. For instance, it called on the European Commission to develop an EU cycling strategy to get more people to cycle more often. In a September 2015 resolution on the implementation of the 2011 Commission white paper on transport, Parliament stressed the importance of supporting regional programmes for establishing and expanding cycling networks in large European regions to raise citizens’ awareness for environmental matters, give everyone the opportunity to cycle, and reduce air and noise pollution and congestion. The resolution also asked for better data on transport use behaviours, in particular as regards walking and cycling.

In its February 2019 report on the Commission proposal for a revision of the Motor Insurance Directive, the Parliament stressed that the directive should not cover electronic bicycles (such as segways and electric scooters), which – because of their smaller size – are less likely to cause significant damage to people and property. The final directive, adopted on 9 November 2021, took Parliament’s position on board.

In an October 2021 resolution on the 2021–2030 EU road safety policy framework, Parliament made recommendations to the Commission on how best to achieve its ambition of reducing road deaths to almost zero by 2050. The resolution also emphasised how important it is that the cycling and walking infrastructure the Member States deployed in response to the pandemic not only remains in place, but is expanded to further promote safe active travel.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘World Bicycle Day‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Luisa Antunes with Tobias Hoffman.

Since ancient times, from the Roman Empire around the Mediterranean Sea to floating islands used by the Uro people of Peru, civilisations have settled near water.

Today, rising sea levels place coastal cities under constant threat. An estimated 250 million people currently live on land below projected annual flood levels, often in coastal cities such as London, Lagos, Mumbai or Shanghai; and this number may rise to 630 million by the end of the century. An additional 318 million people have been displaced since 2018, due to climate disasters.

Many of these cities have already taken measures to adapt to rising sea levels. Shanghai is protected by a gigantic protection system, while New York City has created a system to shield its island-located economic borough of Manhattan. The government in Indonesia took one of the most drastic actions, deciding to move its entire capital inland, mainly because it was sinking and experienced regular flooding. The location of the new capital, Nusantara, has been criticised for leading to the displacement of indigenous populations and the destruction of vast areas of natural rain forest, essential to counteracting climate change.

Could it be that, instead of humankind fleeing from water, building on it could serve as a better long-term solution? What would the creation of entire water cities entail for societies, economies and the environment? What if populations could live on water instead of facing displacement and migration? The combined effects of climate change, land subsidence and accelerated urbanisation could force us to rethink the use of water surfaces on Earth as potential settlement areas, as an alternative to an Earth surface made uninhabitable by over-population and climate catastrophes.

Potential impacts and developments

Despite a popular image of modernity, the concept of living on water is not new. Overwater structures have been designed, built and used for centuries worldwide. Amsterdam is a present example of a city experimenting with totally floating houses. These are built as small modules, with individual buildings connected by plug-in systems, whose weight is balanced by concrete fundaments lying underwater. Energy, fresh water and internet connections are all provided via a land plug-in.

City planners believe that entire floating districts could both improve the housing crisis that afflicts many coastal cities, such as Amsterdam or Barcelona, and contribute to attenuating flooding crises. A floating system would allow constructions to adapt to waves, tides and even storms, including hurricanes. The flexible plug-in and out system of floating cities would also allow for new ways of city planning: sports stadiums, schools and parks could be easily moved to adapt to new demand. In addition, these flexible modern city models could serve as attractive tourist destinations.

The first overwater cities are expected to be located close to the coast. Such projects would be designed with climate adaptability in mind, while still offering contact with the mainland. Since plug-in systems have water and energy capacity limitations, self-sufficiency through solar power and water heat pumps would be essential.

As heat waves increase in frequency and severity, the surrounding water could be used to cool buildings. Sustainable public infrastructure and transportation strategies will also need to be reimagined. Several current coastal megacities are characterised by an uncontrolled, heterogeneous growth, which leads to high-cost constructions that produce huge amounts of waste. Ocean plastic is already a major issue for the marine ecosystem and tourism, so waste removal will need to be well organised. Cities on water will require a highly functional public sector. An additional risk is the cost itself: if living on water continues to be too expensive for the vast majority of the population, these cities might fall short on providing part of the solution to climate change-caused displacement and migration.

If cities continue to grow on water, additional protection from heavy storms will be necessary, resulting in disturbance of the surrounding marine structures, as this will affect currents and rivers, and inevitably change ecosystems. The ecological equilibrium will be disturbed, as underwater building foundations will create new habitats for micro- and macro-organisms, including pests. While underwater reef structures might pose opportunities for aquaculture and food production, constant maintenance will be required.

Keeping water out of liveable spaces is also not easy. A substantial concern linked to floating constructions is to constantly clean and renew surfaces with material free from leaking pollutants, anticipating how little we know about marine ecosystems. A completely floating city without direct land-based production will force us to find ways to autonomously produce fresh water and energy.

Although cities on water could serve as an answer to climate change, and the associated technology is potentially sustainable, their climate impact might still be immense. To stabilise underwater buildings, huge amounts of concrete are currently used, as concrete displaces water very effectively. However, concrete production contributes to 8 % of global CO2 emissions today, and concrete production has created an international competition for sand, the market for which is currently reaching record prices.

Economic considerations are just one aspect of the huge impact cities on water could have on international relations. Another might be their existence alone: cities on water would change international sea borders as they are currently legally defined. Countries might be tempted to use their floating cities to create additional territories. The growing value of marine territory could intensify, and we are already witnessing the effects of growing global tensions over disputed territorial areas. There is a risk that cities could also establish themselves as extraterritorial city-states outside national legislation and develop as tax havens.

Anticipatory policy-making

The European Union has a history of structuring urban planning, and existing regional urban development plans already address many aspects pertaining to cities on water, such as those on the circular economy, energy transition, housing and sustainable land use. Many outlined requirements, such as the efficient use of solar and waterpower systems, effective energy storage systems and zero pollution policies, are also part of the European Commission’s sustainability goals, namely in the European Green Deal. Furthermore, the European Bauhaus aims to foster sustainable living spaces whilst anticipating future living needs.

Many ‘smart cities’ are located at the coast and, therefore, potentially future cities on water. Anticipatory policy-making could start by integrating current ‘smart-city’-related policies in the projection of future-oriented living models, as well as assessing global needs and fostering international cooperation on worldwide issues. The Netherlands currently take a leading role, with decades-long experience in dealing with challenges posed by cities on and by water.

Legislation will also need to address fundamental housing issues, such as mortgage and financial classification laws. Clear legislation will be instrumental to ensuring future equal access to living spaces on water. The legal status of floating cities is a difficult challenge that requires revisiting long-established international agreements. Who owns cities on water might be one of the most relevant questions in the 21st century. Through its marine science expertise, strategically relevant industries and diplomatic relationships, the EU currently takes a leading international role. As it shares its marine environment, trade, security challenges and opportunities with global partners, the long-term success of the EU’s ocean governance will depend largely upon global action and collaboration.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘What if we built cities on water?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Listen to policy podcast ‘What if we built cities on water?’ on YouTube.

Written by Vasco Guedes Ferreira with Tobias Hoffmann.

A conference entitled ‘From a European to a global green’ held on 12 May 2022, organised jointly by the European Parliament’s Panel for the Future of Science and Technology (STOA) and the Japan-based Science and Technology in Society forum focused on the transition to green energy in the European Union and the wider world.

The conference aimed to open a constructive exchange of views between leading experts on cooperation opportunities in science and technology in the EU, Japan and the rest of the world, which supports the leveraging of the ‘European Green Deal’ to achieve a ‘Global Green Deal’.

In his opening speech, STOA Chair Christian Ehler (EPP, Germany) highlighted that such discussions at the global level are vital to progress on ‘green’ ambitions, noting that ‘We have to “light the torch & carry it forward” like at the Olympics’. Chairman of the STS forum, Professor Hiroshi Komiyama agreed, responding ‘So all of us take action to reach a bright future, move in the right direction and transform society’.

The first panel focused on ‘Green, secure and affordable energy for Europe’ and promoted a debate on the energy dimension of the European Green Deal. Views and statements from the European Commission and the research and business communities on the implementation challenges were debated. President of the European Research Council (ERC), Maria Leptin stressed the important role of curiosity-driven research. She explained that, in her view, research unconstrained by policy priorities needs to be part of any programme and noted that ERC-funded research projects contribute to achieving the EU Green Deal’s ambitions. Panellists discussed possibilities as to how the EU could accelerate the implementation of energy and climate policies, as well as debating the link with energy security and the reduction of energy imports. Panellists highlighted the role of science and technology in ensuring a fair and inclusive clean energy transition, including the investigation of hydrogen technologies. Panellist and President of the German Leibniz Association, Matthias Kleiner emphasised the need for more renewable energy, transnational collaboration and fundamental research to achieve these goals.

The second panel focused on ‘The path to a Global Green Deal’, with the aim of exploring how international cooperation on science and technology could use the European Green Deal to trigger a global green transformation. Questions and discussions focused on how like-minded partners from around the world could work together towards achieving a more sustainable world. The panel promoted the need for dialogue between industry, society and policy-makers from Japan and elsewhere, and developed a shared vision of the challenges, but also potential science and technology breakthroughs. Further discussions also focused on how different approaches from various regions of the world could be brought together to boost shared knowledge

Closing the event, European Parliament Vice-President Eva Kaili emphasised the EU’s commitment to accelerate its efforts in implementing the European Green Deal, which should contribute to ensuring Europe’s energy independence. She also highlighted that STOA is working on a complete analysis of the current situation, including the development of a preparedness plan for Europe, which addresses food, energy and technological security. She invited the STS forum to continue its cooperation with the EU aiming for a more sustainable world that could ultimately contribute to greater geopolitical stability.

The full recording of the event is available here. Your opinion counts for us. To let us know what you think, get in touch via stoa@europarl.europa.eu.

Written by Philip Boucher.

A recently published Panel for the Future of Science and Technology (STOA) study identifies and examines sources of divergence in the obligations facing public and private sector actors when applying artificial intelligence in the draft artificial intelligence act. It focuses in particular upon artificial intelligence (AI) that is designed to manipulate people, social scoring and biometric identification and develops a range of policy options.

Recent reports have examined the use of AI in a range of public-sector activities, in particular for improving the efficiency and quality of public services and citizen engagement. However, concerns have also been identified regarding the use of AI in some specific public-sector domains such as law enforcement. The spectre of ‘social scoring’ and ’emotion recognition’ applications has raised substantial discussion in Europe.

The proposed artificial intelligence act (AIA) places restrictions on how certain public-sector actors may use specific AI applications, most notably on the use of real-time biometric identification for law enforcement purposes, and the use of ‘social scoring’ applications by public authorities. For example, its Article 5 would prohibit:

‘the placing on the market, putting into service or use of AI systems by public authorities or on their behalf for the evaluation or classification of the trustworthiness of natural persons over a certain period of time based on their social behaviour or known or predicted personal or personality characteristics, with the social score leading to either or both of the following:

(i) detrimental or unfavourable treatment of certain natural persons or whole groups thereof in social contexts which are unrelated to the contexts in which the data was originally generated or collected;

(ii) detrimental or unfavourable treatment of certain natural persons or whole groups thereof that is unjustified or disproportionate to their social behaviour or its gravity’

As well as:

‘the use of “real-time” remote biometric identification systems in publicly accessible spaces for the purpose of law enforcement’

Other elements of the proposed AI act would also target public authorities. For example, the following AI applications are defined in Annex III as ‘high risk’ (in the context of migration, asylum and border-control management) and would therefore be subject to stricter market controls:

‘AI systems intended to be used by competent public authorities as polygraphs and similar tools or to detect the emotional state of a natural person’.

By placing obligations specifically upon certain state actors, these articles introduce divergences in the obligations facing public and private sector actors when applying AI. These may raise further questions about whether private sector actors should be able to make use of real-time biometric identification, social scoring and emotion recognition techniques.

The prohibition of ‘real-time’ remote biometric identification systems for law enforcement purposes has been subject to substantial debate in the European Parliament and beyond. Some have called for restrictions on these applications to apply to all actors, and others for the restrictions on state actors to be relaxed, a debate that continues in the negotiations on the draft AIA.

STOA has published a study that identifies and examines these sources of divergence in the obligations facing public and private sector actors when applying AI in the draft AIA. It focuses in particular upon manipulative AI, social scoring and biometric identification and develops a range of policy options in response to the challenges identified.

The study finds that both public and private sector applications of AI could present risks of direct or indirect harms, and that there is a degree of convergence in these risks. They observe that the divergences amount to treating similar AI applications differently depending on the actors that deploy them, while noting that the risk levels associated with these uses do not differ substantially, and exhibit similar degrees of power asymmetry with regards to individuals.

In the final stage of the study, the authors identified three broad policy options. To address incoherence in risk assessments and introduce explicit risk criteria, to consider strengthening information and disclosure obligations with withdrawal rights, and to consider non-linear modes of governing and co-regulation strategies. The full set of policy options are set out in greater detail in the accompanying STOA Options Brief.

Read the full report and STOA options brief to find out more. The study was presented by its authors to the STOA Panel at its meeting on 10 March 2022.

Your opinion counts for us. To let us know what you think, get in touch via stoa@europarl.europa.eu.

Written by Philip Boucher.

A recently published Panel for the Future of Science and Technology (STOA) study examines the use of artificial intelligence in workplace management systems. It explores the deployment and impacts of these technologies in the context of EU law before setting out a range of policy options for several legislative files.

As artificial intelligence (AI) spreads into workplaces, workers and employers are increasingly confronted with applications and software that affect labour relations. While AI systems could be introduced with the explicit aim of improving working conditions, this cannot be expected in general and evidence suggests that it may be the exception. In this context, a new STOA study has been published which examines the use of AI technologies in workplace management in the context of European Union (EU) law.

AI will become prominent in the workplace – Over time, many forms of software, both industry-specific and generalist, will acquire AI functionalities that will impact working conditions. AI is likely to become a prominent feature in many people’s jobs, although applications with particularly far-reaching effects will become prominent in some industries more quickly than others.

Introducing and operating AI at work poses challenges for businesses – Companies will have to reflect carefully on how they can incorporate AI into their business structure to obtain the best results. Many of the best tools will likely be expensive, require additional material and personnel, or demand adjustments to companies’ work organisation.

The functionality and utility of many forms of AI at work remain in doubt – Many of the AI tools currently deployed remain untested, and there are reasons to adopt a cautious and critical attitude towards several applications. Despite some promise for the world of work, AI is not a ‘silver bullet’ solution and requires effort to be implemented successfully without producing excessive adverse effects that could be highly detrimental to workers.

Businesses that lead in developing AI technologies will set the direction that other employers follow – Many employers still lack the hardware, data, staff, etc., required to advance on AI workplace management systems. However, some businesses at the forefront of this technology are already well ahead, setting out the direction that many other employers might follow.

AI has evident impact on working conditions – AI will, among other things, bolster the ‘datafication’ of work, making data protection and privacy rights all the more important. AI may also make work more precarious, increase businesses’ surveillance capabilities, and, in some instances, frustrate trade union activities. Despite some promising uses of AI in occupational safety and health (OSH) and non-discrimination, these technologies also present some threats in these areas. However, with some adjustment, much of the existing regulation can continue to function and steer the implementation of future AI at work in a desirable direction.

Regulatory adjustment will be required in several fields of law – By and large, across multiple areas of labour and employment legislation, AI can be governed if the rules are adequately adapted to the challenges it poses. However, without the necessary regulatory changes and investment in effective enforcement mechanisms in several areas, AI could spiral out of control.

The study, and its accompanying STOA options brief set out a range of policy options for the proposed artificial intelligence act (AIA) and EU directive on platform work, as well as the General Data Protection Regulation, anti-discrimination laws, OSH acquis, the Working Time, Fixed-Term Work, and Transparent and Predictable Working Conditions Directives, and instruments governing workers’ information and consultation.

Read the full report and STOA options brief to find out more. The study was presented by its authors to the STOA Panel at its meeting on 5 May 2022.

Your opinion counts for us. To let us know what you think, get in touch via stoa@europarl.europa.eu.