European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Marcin Grajewski.

Russia’s war on Ukraine has reduced supplies of gas and oil to the European Union and other regions, increasing energy prices and complicating efforts to cut emissions of greenhouse gases. Faced with oil and gas shortages, some countries have started to fire up polluting coal power plants which had previously been shut down, or have postponed their planned closure. Burning coal or lignite emits much more carbon dioxide than using oil and gas to produce electricity.

Scientists and analysts are urging swift, radical action on climate change, pointing to this and last year’s extreme weather – severe floods, fires, and more frequent hurricanes. Governments across the world are preparing for the next climate change conference, to be held in Sharm El-Sheikh at the end of 2022. The meeting is to provide more details of how countries plan to achieve the agreed goal of limiting global warming to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels, as set out in the 2015 Paris Agreement.

This note offers links to recent commentaries, studies and reports from international think tanks on climate issues. More papers on the topic can be found in a previous edition of ‘What Think Tanks are Thinking.

Sea level rise from climate change is threatening home septic systems and public health
Brookings Institution, June 2022

A global sustainability program: Lessons from the Marshall Plan for addressing climate change
Brookings Institution, June 2022

How can the European Union adapt to climate change?
Bruegel, June 2022

The EU and climate security: Toward ecological diplomacy
Carnegie Europe, Open Society, June 2022

Will green activism save Turkey’s democracy?
Carnegie Europe, June 2022

Does the EU need treaty change?
Carnegie Europe, June 2022

Think basins, not borders
Centre for European Policy Studies, June 2022

World climate and security report
Clingendael, June 2022

Green peace: How Europe’s climate policy can survive the war in Ukraine
European Council on Foreign Relations, June 2022

Solidarity, sustainability and well-being at the heart of the EU mission
European Policy Centre, June 2022

Reconciling EU energy security with climate policies: Rethinking European gas markets
Istituto Affari Internazionali, June 2022

Climate change and security in the Mediterranean: Exploring the nexus, unpacking international policy responses
Istituto Affari Internazionali, June 2022

Thirty years of UN climate talks: New challenges for cooperation
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, June 2022

CO2 extraction as an integral component of the European “Green Deal”
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, June 2022

Becoming global climate governors: How cities are moving from climate ambition to coordinated action and delivery
Barcelona Centre for International Affairs, May 2022

The Global quest for green growth: An economic policy perspective
Bruegel, May 2022

How to make EU fiscal rules compatible with net zero

Centre for European Reform, May 2022

Sustainable agriculture and food systems
Chatham House, May 2022

Climate change: The only option is action
Chatham House, May 2022

The CBAM effect: How the world is responding to the EU’s new climate stick
Clingendael, May 2022

EU plans to import hydrogen from North Africa
Corporate Europe Observatory, May 2022

Carbon dioxide removal: Climbing up the EU climate policy agenda
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, May 2022

6 things to know about direct air capture
World Resources Institute, May 2022

The European tank storage sector 2050 and beyond
The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, May 2022

The rising national security threats from climate change in the Mediterranean region
Atlantic Council, April 2022

The US should treat climate policy as economic policy
Brookings Institution, April 2022

Climate migration: What do we really know?
Bruegel, April 2022

Low-carbon technologies and Russian imports
Centre for European Policy Studies, April 2022

European green deal for militaries to strengthen Europe’s defence
Clingendael, April 2022

The EU emissions trading system after the energy price spike
Centre for European Reform, April 2022

Multilateral trade arrangements and climate provision
Centre for International and Strategic Studies, April 2022

Reflecting sunlight to reduce climate risk
Council on Foreign Relations, April 2022

EU regions in the transformation towards a climate-neutral future
Ecologic Institute, April 2022

The Green Agenda for the Western Balkans
European Policy Centre, April 2022

The future of energy poverty: Will the social climate fund be enough for a just transition?
Europeum, April 2022

Energy transitions and environmental geopolitics in the Southern Mediterranean
Istituto Affari Internazionali, April 2022

Environmental degradation: impacts on agricultural production
Institute for European Environmental Policy, April 2022

Ocean-based measures for climate action
Institute for Sustainable Development and International Relations, April 2022

5 ways to cut oil and gas use through clean transportation
World Resources Institute, April 2022

Russia’s Ukraine invasion and climate change go hand in hand
Carnegie Europe, March 2022

From carbon pricing to climate clubs
Centre for European Policy Studies, March 2022

From NGEU to a Green Capital Markets Union
Centre for European Policy Studies, March 2022

Carbon removals on the road to net zero
Centre for European Policy Studies, March 2022

The EU must triple down on green investment
Centre for European Reform, March 2022

How to make EU emissions trading system work for consumers
Centre for European Reform, March 2022

Could nuclear power cut Europe’s dependence on Russian energy?
Council on Foreign Relations, March 2022

Can a climate club accelerate industrial decarbonisation?
E3G, March 2022

Making EU climate governance fit for net zero
Ecologic Institute, March 2022

What if the Helsinki spirit was revived by climate change
Egmont, March 2022

Climate mitigation potential of large-scale nature restoration in Europe
Institute for European Environmental Policy, March 2022

No more free lunch: Ending free allowances in the EU ETS to the benefit of innovation  

Jacques Delors Institute, March 2022

Will the climate agenda unravel?
Peterson Institute for International Economics, March 2022

6 pressing questions about beef and climate change, answered
World Resources Institute, March 2022

Greening Europe’s post-COVID-19 recovery
Bruegel, February 2022

Three key areas of Europe’s climate diplomacy
European Council on Foreign Relations, February 2022

Read this briefing on ‘Climate change‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Hendrik Mildebrath.

As Pegasus revelations gain momentum and the first EU Member States become implicated, one of the most high-profile spying scandals of recent years is coming to light in Europe. The Canadian interdisciplinary laboratory Citizen Lab first discovered traces of Pegasus spyware in 2015, but it was only in 2021 that the scandal broke on a global level through a joint effort by Citizen Lab, Amnesty International, Forbidden Stories and 17 media organisations. Reports revealed that authoritarian and democratic governments around the world were using Pegasus to spy on journalists, lawyers, activists, politicians, and high-ranking state officials. Investigators link the spyware to human rights harms including intimidation, harassment, detention, and murder. Pegasus was developed by the NSO Group and is designed to breach mobile phones and extract vast amounts of data stored or processed by the target system, including text messages, call interceptions, passwords, locations, microphone and camera recordings, and information from apps.

In the European Union, the Hungarian and Polish governments were the first to be caught in the eye of the storm, after media organisations uncovered extensive use of Pegasus spyware by public authorities against opposition figures and government critics. Meanwhile, Spain finds itself in the throes of the Pegasus ‘cyclone’ after Citizen Lab revealed extensive Pegasus spyware operations against Catalans (‘CatalanGate’). Reportedly, Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands also have Pegasus at their disposal, while Cyprus and Bulgaria may have served as countries of export, raising questions about export destinations and authorisations. These revelations raise concerns on various levels of the European legal order with respect to data protection and privacy, freedom of expression, freedom of the press, freedom of association, redress mechanisms, and democratic processes and institutions. In response to abusive surveillance practices, individuals and authorities are sounding out redress and enforcement options, such as individual litigation, formal complaints, infringement procedures and sanctions mechanisms for qualified rule of law deficiencies. The European Parliament has set up a committee of inquiry to investigate the use of Pegasus and equivalent surveillance spyware.

As the Pegasus revelations shed light on the adverse effects of trade in and abuse of cyber-surveillance technologies, policymakers are seeking adequate responses. While the EU has made substantial progress in clarifying and strengthening its legislation in the area of cybersecurity, reinforcing civil liability and privacy rules may help prevent the abuse of spyware. To curb internal spyware abuse, the EU could promote public and private enforcement of data and privacy rights and further clarify the preconditions and parameters for cyber-surveillance and public-private surveillance cooperation. In a more determined approach, the EU may introduce human rights controls in procurement directives, ensure that unlawfully obtained evidence is inadmissible (misconduct defeats its purpose), and stimulate discussions on the legal limits of intelligence outsourcing as well as on enhanced accountability mechanisms. Additionally, the EU or its Member States could promote responsible behaviour of cyber-espionage professionals, if necessary, by reasonably regulating the spyware industry without driving it away or underground (path of legality). To curb external (third-country) abuse, the EU may consider further promoting the adequate and uniform application of export controls and pursuing coherent foreign policies that limit the proliferation and abuse of spyware. To achieve greater impact, the EU may simultaneously pursue a multilateral approach, partnering with like-minded countries to steer the global spyware market and ostracise malicious actors. In all domains, civil society and regulators call for adequate, coherent and uniform implementation of existing and future policies, as well as practical guidance. To ensure a future-proof iteration of the next policy cycle, it appears beneficial to broaden research to include the design, trade and use of cyber-weapons in general.

Read the complete study on ‘Europe’s PegasusGate: Countering spyware abuse‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Guillaume Ragonnaud (1st edition).

The current Machinery Directive (Directive 2006/42/EC) was designed to allow the free movement of machinery within the internal market, while ensuring a high level of protection of health and safety of users. To reduce the occurrence of accidents, it promotes inherently safe design and construction of machinery, and proper installation and maintenance.

On 21 April 2021, the Commission put forward a proposal for a regulation on machinery products, part of a wider ‘artificial intelligence package’. The need for an update stemmed in particular from recent developments in digital technologies, such as artificial intelligence, the internet of things, and robotics, which have raised new safety challenges. The proposed revision also intends to ensure more coherent interpretation of the scope and definitions, enhance safety for traditional technologies, reassess machines considered as ‘high risk’ and the conformity assessment procedures, reduce paper-based requirements for documentation, ensure coherence with other product safety legislation and avoid divergences in interpretation stemming from transposition.

On 3 May 2022, Parliament’s Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO) adopted its report, along with the decision to enter into interinstitutional negotiations, with the committee report as mandate. The plenary endorsed that decision on 20 May 2022, opening the way for the committee to start interinstitutional negotiations with the Council.

Versions

• July 2022: Ensuring the safety of machines in the digital age: Revision of the Machinery Directive (1st edition)

Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on machinery products Committee responsible:Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO)COM(2021)202
21.4.2021Rapporteur:Ivan Štefanec (EPP, Slovakia)2021/0105(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Adriana Maldonado López (S&D, Spain)
Svenja Hahn (Renew, Germany)
David Cormand (Greens/EFA, France)
Marco Campomenosi (ID, Italy)
Carlo Fidanza (ECR, Italy)
Kateřina Konečná (The Left, Czechia)Ordinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Trilogue negotiations

Written by Marcin Szczepański.

The 48th G7 Summit took place at Schloss Elmau, Germany, on 26-28 June 2022. Russia’s war on Ukraine has heavily affected the G7’s deliberations this year and created pressing new global challenges that were discussed both in the preparatory meetings and at the summit itself. The resulting communiqué focuses on supporting Ukraine, on reducing the impact of the war on the global economy, security of supply and prices of energy and food, climate challenges and the new G7 partnership for infrastructure and investment in developing countries.

Background

In January 2022, Germany identified ‘Progress towards an equitable world’ as an overarching theme of its G7 presidency. However, since the invasion of Ukraine has had profound and transformative global repercussions, it was a major item on the agenda both during the ministerial meetings and in the discussions between the leaders. After the first condemnatory statement on the day of the invasion (24 February), the leaders released four more in which they committed to various actions against Russia (see Figure 1). The Speakers and Presidents of Parliament of the G7 have also condemned the attack and supported strong countermeasures. Essentially, the war unleashed a chain of destabilising political, economic and social effects worldwide and exacerbated the economic impact of the pandemic. Problems such as the rising cost of living and inflationary pressures, threats to energy security, a looming global food crisis, a deteriorating Euro-Atlantic security environment and growing climate concerns made for a tense background to the summit.

Figure 1 – Main G7 commitments on Russia

The key summit agenda items were: (1) shaping the global economy; (2) promoting partnerships for infrastructure and investment; (3) cooperating on foreign and security policy; (4) the world in conflict: Ukraine (joined virtually by President Zelenskyy); (5) investing in climate, energy, and health; (6) addressing food security and advancing gender equality; and (7) strengthening international cooperation, the multilateral and digital order. A major goal of the summit was to show unity and resilience against Russia’s aggression. The EU was represented by Charles Michel, President of the European Council, and Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission. The EU’s priorities included: (1) actions to support Ukraine and put sanctions on Russia; (2) the status of Ukraine’s EU membership bid; (3) Russia’s responsibility for soaring food and energy prices, rising inflation, and supply chain disruptions; (4) the need to raise global climate ambition; (5) EU support for the Just Energy Transition Partnerships (JETPs); (5) perspectives for the G20, and; (6) the future pandemic prevention instrument.

Outcome

The G7 leaders adopted the main communiqué and four stand-alone statements. They pledged to ‘stand with Ukraine for as long as it takes, providing the needed financial, humanitarian, military, and diplomatic support’ and to help rebuild the war-damaged country through an international reconstruction conference and plan. The G7 will continue to seek ways to prevent Russia from profiting from the war and to cut its revenues from sales of gas and oil, including through possible coordinated price caps, which could also help to reduce energy price surges. In addition, the G7 will target Russia’s gold, its third largest export after oil and gas. The leaders also pledged to take action to secure energy supply, in coordination with the International Energy Agency, and to phase out energy from Russia. To help relieve the pressures created by the war, the leaders agreed that public investment in the gas sector can be an appropriate temporary response and mentioned the increased importance of LNG. To improve access to food, which is also deteriorating because of Russia’s invasion, the group will contribute an additional US$4.5 billion to the Global Alliance for Food Security, which makes a total of over US$14 billion in joint G7 commitments to increase global food security in 2022. The G7 leaders announced their commitment to minimise the global economic impact of the war, and reduce negative effects on their own countries, also by stability- and growth-oriented macroeconomic policies, tackling rising costs of living and boosting the resilience of supply chains. The Group also criticised the violations of human rights in China, while calling on Beijing to press Russia to withdraw its troops from Ukraine. 

Furthermore, the communiqué announced the establishment of a Climate Club, to support the implementation of the Paris Agreement. This is to be done by accelerating climate action and increasing its ambition, and addressing risks of carbon leakage for emission-intensive goods. To that end, they committed to stop new direct public support for the international unabated fossil fuel energy sector by the end of 2022, and achieve a highly decarbonised road sector by 2030, as well as a fully or mostly decarbonised power sector by 2035. The G7 will also step up its efforts to mobilise the collective US$100 billion in climate finance by 2025. In order to narrow the global investment gap, the G7 aims to mobilise US$600 billion over the next five years under the new Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII). It will support, with the involvement of private finance, ‘sustainable, inclusive, climate resilient and quality infrastructure based on intensified cooperation, democratic values, and high standards’. It will also finance the creation of additional JETPs. India, Indonesia, Senegal and Vietnam will follow the first JETP with South Africa, which was launched in 2021.

Views

Recent years have been rather turbulent for the G7. After the suspension of Russia from the Group (then the G8) – due to its 2014 annexation of Crimea – came the Trump years, marked by divisions over issues such as climate and trade. While during the financial crisis the majority of observers argued that it was the G20 which was critical to the global response, during the pandemic the roles reversed and the G7 reacted more swiftly. Some experts view the Group as incoherent over the dual threat of Russia and China: the US views both as serious threats, while the others tend to avoid confrontation with China.

Perhaps owing to the multitude of difficult issues at stake, G7 summits tend to produce mixed reactions, and the Schloss Elmau summit was no different. On food security, organisations fighting poverty and injustice considered that the G7 funding commitments fall way short of the necessary minimum of US$28.5 billion coming from UN appeals. There was no breakthrough on ending the blockages of grain shipments in the Black Sea. Environmental groups criticised the G7 for watering down pledges on climate action in the face of the energy crisis, failure to deliver on the climate finance front and the lack of a deadline for phasing out coal.

On the other hand, the University of Toronto G7 Research Group considered that the summit produced the strongest performance since the first G7 summit took place in 1975, based on the number of commitments, their level of ambition, and the money mobilised. Although not explicitly mentioned, it is widely held that the PGII is being set up to counter China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Analysts appreciated that there was a clearer commitment to finance hard infrastructure projects in the Partnership. They also considered the new approach to financing the projects, based on deploying limited public finance to mobilise larger volumes of private capital, to be promising. Anti-corruption activists welcomed the commitment to strengthen efforts to combat kleptocracies and corruption, while calling for more details and swift action.

From the EU perspective, particularly positive outcomes included the launch of the PGII and Climate Club, the declaration of the G7’s long-term help for Ukraine, and the start of work on future pandemic readiness.

Read this at a glance on ‘The 2022 G7 Summit: Against the backdrop of Russia’s war on Ukraine‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Eric Pichon.

Adopted in 2015 by the United Nations (UN), the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development – ‘the blueprint to achieve a better and more sustainable future for all’ – clearly links the 17 sustainable development goals (SDGs) that it introduced to a series of targets to be reached by 2030. The 2030 Agenda includes a detailed mechanism to monitor progress with regard to these targets. At the core of this mechanism are a number of quantified indicators for each target that are regularly revised by the UN and other international agencies. These agencies and the EU provide support to national statistical services across the world in collecting data for the SDG indicators in order to gather reliable and comparable datasets. These data feed the voluntary national reports that countries prepare to exchange good practices and advice on tackling the challenges they encounter in implementing their SDG strategies. High-level forums take stock of both progress and weaknesses in implementation, so as to ensure that everybody is on track in pursuing the SDGs.

The EU has long experience in collecting consistent data from its Member States. The European Union Statistical Office (Eurostat) has created a set of sustainable development indicators that provide a good overview of progress within the EU. EU development cooperation services have devised a framework of indicators to assess how EU support contributes to other countries’ implementation of the SDGs. However, the European Parliament and other stakeholders regret that the spill-over effect of EU policies on third countries remains a blind spot in the evaluation of the EU’s contribution to the SDGs.

Although technical in nature, SDG indicators and data also have a political dimension, as they clearly measure countries’ and other stakeholders’ achievements against their own commitments.

This is an update of a Briefing published in December 2019.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Reporting on SDG implementation: UN mechanisms and the EU approach‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Ionel Zamfir.

The 16th Sustainable Development Goal (SDG16) to ‘Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels’ represents a new milestone compared with the earlier millennium development goals. While several of its targets (such as peace, corruption-free institutions and freedom from violence) were once seen as prerequisites of sustainable development, the adoption of SDG16 marked the first time that they were globally recognised as development objectives in themselves. To achieve universal recognition, SDG16 leaves out explicit reference to internationally recognised political and civil rights norms, attracting some criticism. Its very general scope has also stirred controversy regarding the type of data required in order to assess progress rigorously.

The state of play with regard to the implementation of SDG16 indicates that substantial progress is still needed in order to achieve the SDG targets by 2030. Violent conflicts continue to affect many parts of the world, societal violence remains widespread in many countries and violence against children in particular remains a pervasive phenomenon, especially in developing countries. The pandemic has erased much previous progress on the SDGs, and led to restrictions on freedoms and more limited government accountability. The war in Ukraine, meanwhile, with its negative spill-overs on other SDGs demonstrates once more the crucial role of peace.

The EU has committed to contributing to the achievement of all the SDGs, and the specific targets of SDG16 have been given special recognition. From the Global Strategy to the ‘new consensus on development’, various policy documents acknowledge the crucial role of peace, democracy, human rights and the rule of law for sustainable development. The interconnection between the pursuit of these fundamental values and EU efforts to help developing countries achieve the SDGs is obvious in numerous measures undertaken in the framework of EU external action. The European Parliament is a strong champion for these values in the world.

This is an update of a Briefing published in February 2020.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Peace, justice and strong institutions: EU support for implementing SDG 16 worldwide‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Sector-specific distribution of EU and EU Member States’ development aid for governance and civil society (2016-2020, in € billion) Share of countries: by degree of achievement of SDG16 and by current degree of progress towards SDG16

Written by Agnieszka Widuto.

In 2020, about 36 million Europeans were unable to keep their homes adequately warm. Energy poverty is a multi-dimensional phenomenon, considered to be caused by a combination of low income, high energy expenses, and poor energy efficiency in buildings.

The EU has been addressing this issue in various legislative and non-legislative initiatives, most recently in the context of its climate policies and energy transition. The Gas and Electricity Directives call for the protection of vulnerable consumers, and the Energy Efficiency and Energy Efficiency of Buildings Directives require measures to alleviate energy poverty alongside efficiency efforts. The ‘renovation wave’ initiative under the European Green Deal aims to boost structural renovation in private and public buildings, while the Social Climate Fund includes households in energy poverty among its main beneficiaries.

The 2020 European Commission recommendation on the topic defines energy poverty as a situation in which households are unable to access essential energy services. It also provides a set of indicators relating for instance to the inability to keep a home adequately warm, arrears on utility bills, and a high share of income spent on energy bills. At the same time, no binding EU-level definition currently exists, and the proposed indicator set is not monitored systematically by Eurostat.

A number of possible policy options exist to address energy poverty under energy policy, social policy, or a mix of various regulatory solutions. Specific measures range from price regulation and tax breaks, to limits on disconnection, to social tariffs, energy efficiency improvements, and energy savings. Against the backdrop of security of energy supply concerns, the expected further rise in energy prices, and the ongoing EU transition to climate neutrality, the issue of energy poverty will be a crucial one in the months and years to come.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Energy poverty in the EU‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Michael Adam, Isabel Moran Vidal and Louise van de Pol.

The European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) organised an online roundtable on 28 June 2022 on one of the most-discussed technology concepts of today: the metaverse. Describing the metaverse as an immersive and constant virtual three-dimensional world, where people interact by means of an avatar to carry out a wide range of activities Anthony Teasdale, Director-General of EPRS introduced the event. He welcomed the panel of speakers and presented the briefing ‘Metaverse: Opportunities, risks and policy implications’, prepared by the Digital Policies Unit of the Members’ Research Service at EPRS. The roundtable discussion, moderated by Michael Adam, Head of the Digital Policies Unit, assessed the opportunities and risks deriving from the evolution of the metaverse and its potential impact on policy-making.

Axel Voss (EPP, Germany), Member of the EP Committee on Legal Affairs and previously Rapporteur on the report of the Special Committee on Artificial Intelligence in a Digital Age and on the own-initiative report on a civil liability regime for artificial intelligence, opened the event and set the scene. He recalled that the metaverse is the next big disruptive step in the digital world. It has the economic potential of turnover in trillions of euros. He stressed the legal uncertainties regarding data protection, intellectual property, cybercrime, e-identity and consumer and children protection. To prevent an evolution similar to the creation of social media, where regulations were drafted after tech companies had already fully developed social media platforms, it is necessary to start thinking now about regulation to secure European values in the metaverse.

During her keynote speech, European Parliament Vice-President with responsibility for STOA and Informatics and Telecommunication, Eva Kaili (S&D, Greece), applauded the EPRS initiative to discuss the metaverse at this early stage. She encouraged policy-makers to harness all the benefits of the metaverse and grasp the opportunity to deal with this technological change in the EU from the beginning. She pointed to a number of areas in which the European Parliament is already working on metaverse-related aspects. Technology always brings opportunities and challenges, but there is also always an option to decide how to use technology in the right way.

The ensuing panel discussion began with an introduction from Frank Steinicke, Professor for Human-Computer Interaction at Universität Hamburg. Professor Steinicke described the technological aspects of the metaverse. Noting that the building blocks needed to create the metaverse are: realistic avatars; mixed reality technologies; 5G; artificial intelligence machine learning; and blockchain. He added that the computer rendering would improve in such a way that real and virtual worlds will no longer be distinguishable. Professor Steinicke is in favour of building a ‘Euroverse’ – a European metaverse. Acknowledging that the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), and forthcoming digital markets and digital services acts are good frameworks for the metaverse, the challenge lies in the enforcement of those regulations. He stressed the need to build a partnership with non-EU metaverse companies, to make Europe attractive for IT experts, and to invest in computation education.

Rehana Schwinninger-Ladak, Head of Interactive Technologies, Digital for Culture and Education Unit, Directorate-General for Communications Networks, Content and Technology (CNECT) at the European Commission, then took the floor to present the European Commission position. The Commission is moving forward by investing in research and innovation activities in extended reality – a core technological building block of the metaverse – through the Horizon Europe programme, as well as by funding content creation through the Creative Europe programme (with a specific action on videogames and immersive storytelling). The aim is to build a consolidated European ecosystem by bringing together technology developers, producers, integrators, and user industries. To facilitate dialogue between all these actors and policy-makers and identify key challenges, the Commission has recently implemented the XR4ALL community and the VR/AR Industrial Coalition.

Yuval Rooz, Co-Founder and CEO of Digital Asset and creator of Daml provided a view from the private sector of the opportunities and challenges of the metaverse. In comparison to the internet, governing the metaverse is not a bigger challenge. He recommends regulators consider whether existing regulations are sufficient and create tools that would be able to efficiently enforce those regulations in the metaverse, potentially with the help of companies and innovators. Two key components of the metaverse are identity and financial interoperability. One way of protecting identity in the metaverse is the creation of a wallet of identities, where, for different activities, different levels of identity authentication would be required.  

In her presentation, Verity McIntosh, Senior Lecturer and expert in virtual reality at the University of West of England shared some of the results from the report she co-authored, ‘Safeguarding the metaverse’, with the audience. Existing harms associated with the proto-metaverse spaces include unsupervised use of virtual space, ineffective age limitation validation, exposure to age-inappropriate or illegal content and behaviours, failure to differentiate between virtual and real-world reality, harassment and abuse. Because the metaverse transcends geographical boundaries, the question of who will monitor the safety of its users is not straightforward. Other risks examined during research that need to be addressed were: who owns the behavioural data generated; neurological rights; digital poverty and inclusion; and impacts on the future of work. She recommended that policy-makers invest in inclusive infrastructure and skills, in immersive literacy, to provide appropriate legislation and designate competent institutions to empower consumers in connection with metaverse companies.

To watch this event online, please click here.

Written by Vitalba Crivello.

Much has been said and written about mis- and disinformation in science in recent years. The outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic in 2020 and the related health crisis inevitably triggered growing concern about the negative effects of false news and deceptive narratives on the public, notably on the level of trust which communities have in science, and on media reporting on scientific subjects. The European Science-Media Hub (ESMH) workshop ‘Promoting trust in science to combat misinformation’, hosted by the European Parliament Liaison Office (EPLO) in Spain (Madrid) in May 2022 offered an opportunity to share some insights.

Spanish community of science journalism reunited at the ESMH workshop

With evident enthusiasm, one of the 60 science journalists and communicators attending the event told us: ‘We have not sat together in the same room for a long time! What a great chance the ESMH has given to us to meet and talk once again about science!‘. The EPLO Office in Madrid’s Sala Europa was indeed packed for the panel’s debate, as the event was successfully held in-person, having been delayed by many months of Covid‑19 related restrictions.

The seminar began with Member of the European Parliament and Panel for the Future of Science and Technology (STOA) member Lina Gálvez Muñoz (S&D, Spain), speaking on the engagement of and the critical role played by the European Parliament to promote quality information, and a warm welcome from EPLO Press Officer Damián Castaño Martín. Vitalba Crivello, STOA Policy Analyst, then spoke about the specific role of the ESMH in providing evidence-based science communication and gave a short introduction on the activities of the Hub.

The floor was then left to the experts, with a roundtable on the importance of trust in science in tackling misinformation. The conversation was shaped by Michele Catanzaro, science journalist, who moderated the debate between Cary Funk, Director of science and society research at Pew Research Center, Sonia Contera, Professor of Biological Physics at the University of Oxford and Senior Fellow at the Oxford Martin School and Green Templeton College, Patricia Férnandez de Lis, Director of Materia, ElPáis, and Pampa García Molina, Editor-in-chief at Agencia SINC and Director of the Science Media Centre Spain. The workshop was held in Spanish, with some interpretation from English. You can watch the workshop and listen to the main messages here.

Engaging with the community of science journalism in Europe

What tools can science journalists and communicators use to combat misinformation?

What role can they play in the current complex information arena?

How can we engage the public in quality science information, based on trust?

These questions – among others – are recurrent in ESMH networking workshops for journalists and science communicators, Science-Media Days, which ESMH has been organising over the last two years.

These seminars are part of the ‘Engaging science journalists in the activities of the ESMH’ project, launched in 2019. Aiming at increasing its visibility among science journalists, the project intended to reach media-makers working for national or local media outlets and institutions in a decentralised country-by-country approach. Six countries were chosen to be part of a pilot project: Czechia, Germany, Finland, France, Spain and Sweden.

The project should deliver two main outputs:

1. a focus group study on media working standards, including a survey on science media representatives specific needs and expectations for better access to information at the European level;
2. country-specific workshops – ‘Science-Media Days’ – to promote networking and to match the ESMH seminars to their audiences’ expectations and needs.

Within that context, the pilot study investigated the media environment and setting for science journalism and science communication in the selected countries. It combined an overview of the European science-media landscape with the opinions of selected journalists, interviewed as part of a focus group. The objective was also to show media-makers that the ESMH can offer them some opportunities. The study also allowed first contacts to be established with local communities, in view of organising seminars in situ later on.

ESMH Science-Media Days

Due to the pandemic, in-person workshops obviously could not take place during the last two years, and had to be postponed. At the same time, however, the health crisis clearly demonstrated the need for evidence-based science information and the crucial role quality science journalism plays in our society. The crisis also showed how important good interaction between policy-makers, scientists and media is in promoting sound science. Adapting to the pandemic context, the ESMH organised the first two networking workshops online, in close cooperation with the EPLOs in the respective countries:

• ‘Science & misinformation: the first pandemic in the digital age‘, 22 March 2021, in cooperation with EPLO Lisbon, in Portuguese;
• ‘Coronavirus: is misinformation more contagious than the virus?’, September 2020, in cooperation with EPLO Berlin, in English.

The ESMH plans to organise further ‘Science-Media Days’ in other EU Member States in the near future, to continue promoting the role of the Hub in the European science-media landscape and seeking for further and closer cooperation with the various media communities. The final objective remains the same, consistent with the Hub’s mandate, i.e.promoting and implementing a quality and evidence-based science communication based on trust and capable of engaging the public in the conversation about science and technology topics.

Written by Marcin Grajewski.

Russia’s war on Ukraine has sent global food prices soaring. It has fuelled inflation in the European Union, the United States and many other countries, while threatening hunger in some poorer regions. Russia and Ukraine play a major role in food and fertiliser supply. They export about 30 per cent of the world’s wheat and 75 per cent of its sunflower oil. Some countries in Africa and the Middle East are nearly 100-per cent dependent on Russian or Ukrainian food. According to the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, food prices in May were up by nearly 30 per cent from a year earlier. Western countries are debating a plan to open up supply chains, for example by unblocking Ukrainian ports on the Black Sea, and to provide foodfinancing to developing countries.

This note gathers links to the recent publications and commentaries from international think tanks on the impact of the war on global and European food markets. Analyses on the Ukraine war and its implications for the energy market can be found in a previous edition of the ‘What Think Tanks are Thinking’ series.

The war in Ukraine triggered a global food shortage
Brookings Institution, June 2022

Food security: The role and limits of international rules on export restrictions
Bruegel, June 2022

Russia is intensifying the global food crisis
Centre for Eastern Studies, June 2022

Can the West afford to let the world go hungry? Overcoming challenges to establishing a humanitarian corridor in the Black Sea
Istituto Affari Internazionali, June 2022

Authoritarian leaders are turning to food export bans amid war in Ukraine
Peterson Institute for International Economics, June 2022

Production and export of food from Ukraine during the war with Russia
Centre for Eastern Studies, May 2022

Sustainable agriculture and food systems
Chatham House, May 2022

Why Ukraine’s ports are vital for global food prices
Heritage Foundation, May 2022

India’s wheat export ban: Bad economics, good politics, modest impact
Peterson Institute for International Economics, May 2022

The Ukraine war and food security in Africa: ‘Meeting the acute needs is not solving the general problem’
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, May 2022

The Ukraine war is deepening global food insecurity: What can be done?
United States institute of Peace, May 2022

The Ukraine war and threats to food and energy security
Chatham House, April 2022

Ukraine’s bread basket is emptying fast
Chatham House, April 2022

How Russia’s war in Ukraine could amplify food insecurity in the Mideast
Council on Foreign Relations, April 2022

Food crisis: Wheat imports from Russia and Ukraine
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, April 2022

Food price inflation continues to worsen: Here’s what should be done about it
Heritage Foundation, April 2022

Rising food prices: Global risks and vulnerabilities
Italian Institute for International Political Studies, April 2022

Russia’s war with Ukraine will force the acceleration of food production reforms in Africa
Polish Institute of International Affairs, April 2022

The Russian invasion of Ukraine endangers African food security in the long-term
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, April 2022

Obscured by the energy crisis, a food crisis unfolds
Atlantic Council, March 2022

East Africa’s growing food crisis: What to know
Brookings Institution, March 2022

The impact of the war in Ukraine on food security
Bruegel, March 2022

The economic policy consequences of the war
Bruegel, March 2022

Russia’s invasion leaves North Africa with a food crisis: What can Europe do?
European Centre for Development Policy Management, March 2022

Putin’s war: Driving Ukrainians into hunger, and the rest of the world as well
Friends of Europe, March 2022

Long-run impacts of the conflict in Ukraine on food security in Africa
Institut für Weltwirtschaft Kiel, March 2022

Guerre en Ukraine: Comment sauver la sécurité alimentaire sans sacrifier la transition agroécologique ?
Terra Nova, March 2022

Read this briefing on ‘Russia’s war on Ukraine and food security‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Frederik Scholaert.

The Russian war against Ukraine has led to high operating costs for the seafood sector. In late March 2022, the EU responded with temporary State aid and exceptional support for the current programming period under the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund (EMFAF). On 23 April 2022, the Commission adopted a new proposal amending the fund for the 2014-2020 programming period, so that its remaining budget can also be used to support the sector. During the July plenary session, Parliament is due to vote on its position on the file.

Background

The Russian war against Ukraine has significantly affected fishermen, aquaculture farmers and fish‑processing companies. In particular, increased energy prices threaten the profitability of the fishing industry. The monthly marine gasoil price increased from about €0.60 per litre in January 2022 to €1.00 in May 2022. While the EU sanctions do not include a ban on seafood trade, with the exception of some luxury seafood products, trade flows have been severely hampered, especially for EU fish-processing companies that rely on supplies of whitefish from Russia. In addition, Black Sea fisheries face a direct security threat.

First package of measures

In March 2022, the Commission adopted a package of measures to support the economy in the context of Russia’s invasion. Temporary State aid rules allow fishery and aquaculture companies to receive up to €35 000 in aid, and all companies affected by the crisis to get liquidity support and compensation for the high energy prices. In addition, the Commission triggered the EMFAF Regulation crisis mechanism, by declaring an event causing significant disruption to markets. This allows Member States to compensate operators for lost income or additional costs and producer organisations for the storage of fishery products.

Commission proposal

On 13 April 2022, the Commission adopted a new proposal to amend the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund (EMFF) – the predecessor of the EMFAF – which covered the 2014-2020 programming period. This would allow the taking of similar emergency measures to those activated under the EMFAF, namely financial compensation for additional costs, for income forgone and for the storage of products. Temporary cessation of fishing activities would be supported where they are currently unsafe. The proposal comes in the form of an amending regulation, as the EMFF does not contain a crisis mechanism to trigger emergency measures in the event of a crisis.

European Parliament position

Given the urgency of ensuring aid to the sector, Parliament’s Committee on Fisheries (PECH) acted quickly on the legislative proposal. On 20 June 2022, PECH unanimously adopted its report on the file, in which it proposed extending support for temporary cessation to all fishing activities where economic viability is impeded. As the PECH report is aligned with the position of the Council, no interinstitutional negotiations will be needed. The text is scheduled to be voted in plenary in July 2022.

First-reading report: 2022/0118(COD); Committee responsible: PECH; Rapporteur: Nuno Melo (EPP, Portugal). For further information, see the EPRS ‘At a glance’ note on the first package of measures.

Read this at a glance on ‘Russia’s war against Ukraine: Support for the seafood sector using leftover 2014-2020 budget‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Isabel Teixeira Nadkarni (Legislative Planning and Coordination Unit, Directorate-General for the Presidency).

INTRODUCTION

Czechia is a parliamentary republic with a head of government – the prime minister – and a head of state – the president. The current Prime Minister is Petr Fiala, from the Civic Democratic Party (ODS). He has been in office since November 2021 and was preceded by Andrej Babiš (2017-2021), the founder of the party ANO 2011. Czech President Miloš Zeman was first elected to the post in 2013 and had previously served as prime minister, from 1998 to 2002.

The supreme executive body is the government. It is led by the prime minister and appointed by the president of the republic. The president also appoints other government members based on the prime minister’s recommendations. Before it is installed, the government must win a vote of confidence in the Chamber of Deputies.

The Spolu alliance, formed for the 2021 legislative election, was composed of the Civic Democratic Party (ODS), KDU-ČSL (Christian and Democratic Union), and TOP 09 (Tradition, Responsibility, Prosperity). It currently governs the country in a coalition with the Pirates and Mayors’ alliance.

The Czech Parliament is bicameral. The upper house is the Senate (81 members elected for six years) and the lower house is the Chamber of Deputies (200 members elected for four years). There are currently seven parties in the Chamber of Deputies:

• ANO 2011 (ANO) – 72 members
• Civic Democratic Party (ODS) – 34 members
• Mayors and Independents (STAN) – 33 members
• Christian and Democratic Union – Czechoslovak People’s Party (KDU-ČSL) – 23 members
• Freedom and Direct Democracy (SPD) – 20 members
• TOP 09 – 14 members
• Czech Pirate Party (Pirati) – 4 members

All of these parties except the SPD also have seats in the Senate, where the Czech Social Democratic Party (ČSSD) and the Green Party (Z) also have seats. The Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM) holds no seats in the Chamber or the Senate but has one elected member of the European Parliament and representatives at regional level.

Czechia will hold the Presidency of the Council of the EU for the second time. The previous time was in the first half of 2009, coinciding with the last months of the sixth legislative term of the European Parliament and with the European elections, held between 4 and 7 June 2009.

The programme of the Trio formed together with France and Sweden has as its thematic priorities to protect citizens and freedoms; to promote a new growth and investment model for Europe; to build a climate-neutral, green, fair and social Europe; and to promote Europe’s interests and values in the world.

PART A: POLITICAL PRIORITIES OF THE CZECH PRESIDENCY

The Czech Presidency comes at a crucial time for the EU, faced with the challenges posed by the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine. Politically, the current security and geo-political situation will have an impact on the work of the Presidency and could well dominate the coming six months. Many issues will need to be addressed, particularly in the field of defence, refugees, displaced persons, financial aid and the accession perspective for Ukraine.

The ramifications of the war, including its impact on energy policy and the ‘Fit for 55’ package, on the EU’s economic recovery and its democratic resilience, as well as on the unity and internal dynamics of the Union, are likely to be high up on the agenda.

The motto of the Czech Presidency, ‘Europe as a task’, is inspired by a speech delivered by former Czech President Václav Havel in Aachen, at the Charlemagne Prize ceremony, in 1996. The triple challenge is to ‘rethink, rebuild, repower’ Europe.

The Czech priorities for the second half of 2022 will focus on the following topics:

• Managing the refugee crisis and Ukraine’s post-war recovery,
• Energy security,
• Strengthening Europe’s defence capabilities and cyberspace security,
• Strategic resilience of the European economy,
• Resilience of democratic institutions.

In light of the developments brought about by the Ukrainian refugee crisis, the Presidency aims to take work forward on the Pact on Migration and Asylum, presented by the Commission on 23 September 2020 (both Parliament and Council still have to adopt their respective positions on the proposals). The Czech Presidency will build on the principles of solidarity, efficiency and flexibility in this area.

The Fit for 55 climate package will also be high on the Czech Presidency’s agenda. Ensuring access to affordable, sustainable and reliable energy sources is one of the biggest challenges the EU is facing. In the next six months, the green and digital transitions will continue to be in the spotlight, but also security, in particular the implementation of the Strategic Compass, approved by the Council on 21 March 2022. The Czechs are due to take forward the Versailles agenda, based on the declaration adopted by EU leaders on 10-11 March 2022, which outlines how the EU can bolster defence capabilities, reduce energy dependency and build a more robust economic base.

The Czech Presidency will lead crucial legislative files in the Council, such as those in the Fit for 55 package, through interinstitutional negotiations and will be closely involved in the initiatives aimed at mitigating the impact of the energy crisis in Europe, including the RePowerEU plan. An important aspect is the diversification of sources including logistics, energy savings and acceleration of the transition to low-emission and renewable energy sources. The Presidency will work on the implementation of the regulation of gas reserves, i.e. filling storage facilities in the run-up to winter, and the promotion of voluntary joint purchases, so that the EU uses its combined weight in a similar way as with the purchase of Covid-19 vaccines.

Strengthening the single market, boosting innovation and competiveness, and reducing dependence on hostile or unstable regimes will be paramount for the resilience of the European economy. The European Chips Act, which aims to bolster Europe’s competitiveness and resilience in semiconductor technologies and applications, is a key proposal for the Czech Presidency, alongside the Artificial Intelligence Act and cybersecurity. It will also strive for the adoption of the European Digital Identity Wallet (a secure and trustworthy pan-European tool for proving a citizen’s identity) and the creation of an efficient and fair data market.

In 2022, the Single Market celebrates its 30th anniversary. Taking into account the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic in the single market and the challenging geopolitical context, the EU will need to identify further growth potential and address businesses and consumers’ concerns. Measures to ensure food security inside and outside the EU in light of the Russian invasion of Ukraine should also be considered during the coming months.

Furthermore, the Czech Presidency plans to focus on a number of trade agreements, with South American countries, Australia and New Zealand. Cooperation with Indo-Pacific partners is also due to be a priority issue, particularly in areas such as cybersecurity, supply chain security and space.

On social policy, the Czech Presidency will continue with the implementation of the European Pillar of Social Rights. The Trio committed itself to improving working conditions, including in the digital economy and for people working through platforms, to tackle gender inequalities in the labour market, including through measures to close the gender pay gap and through the promotion of equal opportunities for women and men to reconcile work, family and private life.

As regards democratic resilience, the Czechs aim to focus on media freedom (the Commission is due to present the European Media Freedom Act proposal in the third quarter of 2022), on transparency in financing political parties in the EU and on the rule of law, including in Hungary and Poland.

Still on the topic of democratic resilience, the Czech Presidency is expected to make progress on the proposal on Strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs) and on the proposal on transparency and targeting of political advertising.

In relation to the ongoing hearings under Article 7(1) TEU concerning Poland and Hungary, in a resolution approved on 5 May 2022 the European Parliament urged the upcoming presidencies to organise the hearings ‘regularly and at least once per presidency’. It called on the Council to ensure that hearings under Article 7(1) TEU also address new developments, including those related to violations of fundamental rights. The Council has so far organised five hearings on Poland and, by the end of May 2022, four hearings on Hungary within the framework of the General Affairs Council (GAC).

The Western Balkans region is also due to be among the regional priorities of the Czechs.

PART B: TOPICAL INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES Conference on the Future of Europe

The follow-up of the Conference on the Future of Europe’s final report – with 49 proposals to reform the EU, including Treaty change – delivered to the Presidents of the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission on 9 May 2022, will also need to be carried out by the Czech Presidency. In the 18-month programme of the Council, the French, Czech and Swedish Presidencies state that, based on the political conclusions of the Conference, ‘they will begin implementing them, as appropriate’.

The Czech Presidency aims to make use of these ideas and to create a space for the continuation of the debate. While implementing the European Year of Youth 2022, the Presidency will put emphasis on improving dialogue with young people and promoting their participation in political/policy processes.

EU budget for 2023

The draft general budget for 2023, presented by the Commission on 7 June 2022, will have to be negotiated between the Czech Presidency of the Council and the European Parliament by the end of this year. Uncertainty in the economic outlook persists, in the light of factors such as supply chain disruption, high energy prices, rising inflation and the continuing Covid-19 pandemic, as well as the consequences of the war in Ukraine.

The EU budget will continue to mobilise significant investments to boost Europe’s strategic autonomy, the ongoing economic recovery, safeguard sustainability and create jobs. It should prioritise green and digital investments while addressing pressing needs arising from recent and current crises. Additional proposals to finance the impact of the war in Ukraine both externally and internally are due to be tabled later in the year, on the basis of a more precise assessment of needs.

Furthermore, in its resolution on general guidelines for the preparation of the 2023 budget, approved in plenary on 5 April 2022, Parliament stresses that ‘a revision of the current MFF [Multiannual Financial Framework 2021-2027] is indispensable’, calling on the Commission to ‘assess when an MFF revision would be appropriate’.

Reform of the Electoral Act

Following Parliament’s legislative resolution on the reform of the EU’s electoral law, adopted on 3 May 2022, the Czech Presidency is due to steer negotiations in the Council, where unanimity will be needed on this matter. The formalisation of the lead candidate (Spitzenkandidat) process and the introduction of a Union-wide constituency, from which 28 members of the European Parliament would be elected (transnational list), are among Parliament’s proposals.

Programming of legislative priorities: Joint Declaration

It is also under the Czech Presidency that the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission should agree on the joint programming of legislative priorities in the form of a Joint Declaration, signed by the three Presidents, which is expected to cover 2023 as well as the first half of-2024, to coincide with the next European elections. The Czech Presidency will also carry on with the implementation of the Joint Declaration 2022, as negotiated at the end of the Slovenian Presidency.

The need to address the consequences of the war in Ukraine and the conclusions of the Conference on the Future of Europe are among the issues that should be reflected in the Commission work programme (CWP) for 2023. The current situation and the need to adopt emergency measures may require that the Commission postpones some of the initiatives planned for 2022 (the Commission has committed itself to duly inform Parliament of any delays).

Read this briefing on ‘Priority dossiers under the Czech EU Council Presidency‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Luisa Antunes.

The rapid growth of genetic databases worldwide, coupled with fast-decreasing costs and the rapid pace of technological change, has increased the possibility of every human genome on Earth being sequenced this century. This raises ethical and legal questions on data privacy and ownership. While a global genetic database would revolutionise preventive medicine and research, new forms of surveillance, discrimination and power imbalances could emerge. The global interplay between the individual, the state and private individuals could shift, requiring modern and flexible legislation to protect the rights of the individual.

When genome-sequencing technology – the ability to read each ‘letter’ of our DNA code – was first developed in the 1970s, it involved a laborious process of sequentially identifying each base pair (between A, T, G or C). This revolutionary technology became the ‘gold standard’ used until the 2000s, including in the first successful cloning of a mammal, Dolly the sheep, born in 1996. The 1990s also saw a race for the first human genome sequence, achieved in 2001. Newer, next-generation sequencing techniques have since evolved, allowing for faster and cheaper results. Where sequencing a human genome (more than 3 billion base pairs) cost US$95 million in 2001, it is now feasible for under €500 and within 24 hours. Yet, the first fully complete human genome sequence was only published in early 2022, with the sequencing of the missing 8 %.

Alongside these technological advances, the last 30 years have seen the emergence of DNA databases hosted by governments and companies for forensic or health purposes. The first was created in the United Kingdom in 1995. It hosts DNA from 6.6 million individuals linked to crime scenes, but has been accused of racial bias, since 40 % of the DNA samples came from males of ethnic minority origin, in contrast to 9 % from white men. The United States database (with 9 million profiles) has come up against the same criticism. Questions of data privacy and human rights loom over China’s profiling of more than 40 million individuals, including ethnic minorities. In Kuwait, DNA testing was made mandatory for the entire population in 2015 as an anti-terrorism measure, a requirement abandoned only two years later, because of privacy concerns. Closer to home, France hosts the EU’s biggest forensic database, with 1.9 million DNA profiles, while Interpol has access to 54 national DNA databases.

Health genetic testing started in the mid-1980s, to detect cystic fibrosis and other rare genetic conditions. Estonia and Iceland were pioneers, with 15 % and 8 % of their respective populations now sequenced, which has allowed research on national ancestry and the epidemiology of rare genes. The UK, the Faroe Islands and three northern provinces in the Netherlands also have large databases. The USA has sequenced 1 million genomes. In Dubai, a large-scale project was launched in 2018, to prevent genetic disease. In Russia, the processing of personal data, including beliefs and sexual identity, is permitted for research purposes without personal consent. Privately owned databases entered the market in the late 1990s. They offer direct-to-consumer (DTC) genetic testing for genealogy and health purposes. The largest are AncestryDNA, with 14 million records, followed by 23andMe (9 million), MyHeritageDNA (3 million), and Family Tree DNA (2 million).

We carry 10 times more microbial cells in our bodies than human cells. The bacteria and other microorganisms that live in our skin, intestines, mouth and sexual organs contribute to the normal functioning of the immune system and help combat the development of several diseases, including Covid‑19. It can therefore be argued that a world human genome database would not be complete without including microbiome data. The Human Microbiome Project, which ran from 2007 to 2016, collected 32 terabytes of metagenomic data on the link between our microbiota and common diseases.

Potential impacts and developments

The rapid development of public and private databases, along with fast-declining costs and ever-evolving technology, is opening the door to a future where all human genomes could be sequenced. However, the first impact may well be the production of copious amounts of data, requiring improved data processing and storage.

The medical field is likely to be revolutionised, with advances in the research and treatment of both common and rare diseases. Medical research may become more equitable, if the genetic diversity of existing databases, currently heavily biased towards those of European descent, is widened. BRCA1/2 gene screening made news headlines in 2015, when actor and United Nations (UN) Special Envoy Angelina Jolie went public with her decision to undergo a double mastectomy to reduce her chances of developing breast cancer. Preventive medicine could become standard in the detection of cancers and Alzheimer’s disease. However, genetic predisposition is not always deterministic, as environment, personal health and life choices also play a significant role in disease development. Genetic screening has also been shown to temporarily increase psychological stress for individuals. Should genome editing lead to increased population longevity, it is to be expected that there will be implications for demography, the economy, education, employment, the environment, healthcare, housing and pensions .

In evolutionary anthropology, a recent study revealed links between genetics and migratory historical events during the Spanish Reconquista. The large hereditary investigation market opened by DTC testing could have serious consequences, if information on all human genomes becomes freely accessible, with implications for family relations, as well as data ownership and privacy rights, in the particular cases of sperm donation and adoption.

Genetic surveillance will also be affected. In a world where everyone has their genome sequenced, a clear legal framework will be crucial in defining who has access to and who owns the data (the state, private companies and/or individuals). One option would be for every human to have their own DNA privately stored and to be able to decide when to share it with trusted entities – doctors for example.

Questions of data privacy also link to ethical and equity issues. Widely accessible genetic information could open the door to new forms of discrimination in the workplace (recruitment based on genetic disease risk), in education (selection based on genetic traits), in healthcare and by insurance companies (more expensive rates for those with unfavourable traits).

Anticipatory policy-making

In a future where all human genomes are sequenced, legislators will need to address ethical and privacy concerns. This calls for interdisciplinary ethical bodies with experts in legal, societal and medical fields. The UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) considers genetic data to be a human rights issue. The 1997 Oviedo Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine (not yet signed by all EU Member States) is the only international legally binding instrument on the protection of human rights in biomedicine, including genetic data. Genomic sequencing has since expanded, and framework gaps and the need for privacy safeguards have become increasingly clear. As genetic data has become a source of profit for insurance and DTC companies, future legislation will need to differentiate between commercial and public health interests. While restrictive legislation on accessing genetic data might offer protection against discrimination, the same restrictions could prevent researchers from investigating novel medical approaches. Two legislative acts are relevant in this field. The European Commission’s European health data space (EHDS) proposal is aimed at ensuring a clear legal framework, while empowering individuals’ control over their health data. The proposed AI act will play a key role in genetic data governance, as digital rights extend to personal genetic data. On the privacy of genetic data, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) offers a starting point for effective policy-making. Legislation will need to address companies offering DTC testing, where a regulated market could help set up quality assurance for genetic testing services. The Council of Europe has adopted a recommendation stating that insurance companies should not request genetic testing. Finally, EU legislation should address the potential international impacts of sequencing all human beings. International agreements on genetic data usage are desirable; otherwise, countries with fewer regulations could offer loopholes for more heavily regulated business sectors in the EU.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘What if we sequenced all human genomes?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Listen to policy podcast ‘What if we sequenced all human genomes?’ on YouTube.

Written by Agnieszka Widuto.

The Sustainable Development Goals were established in 2015 as part of the United Nations (UN) 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. The signatories adopted a policy framework with 17 goals, addressing issues such as poverty, hunger, health and wellbeing, education, gender equality, environment and climate, strong institutions, peace and justice. Sustainable development aims at balancing social, economic and environmental aspects, seeing them as interconnected.

The European Union (EU) has contributed to both setting and implementing the SDGs. It has committed to deliver on the 2030 Agenda through its internal and external policies, as outlined in the Towards a Sustainable Europe by 2030 reflection paper, the European Green Deal and the European Commission’s political priorities and work programme. To measure their progress towards achieving the goals, EU Member States prepare voluntary national reviews, in line with UN guidelines. EU-level progress is measured through a set of indicators adapted to the EU context, and Eurostat publishes annual monitoring reports on the results. The objectives of the SDGs were integrated into the European Semester in 2019.

The SDGs also have a regional dimension, sometimes called ‘localisation’. Achieving around 65 % of the targets is estimated to depend on input from local and regional authorities. Numerous regions and cities, including in the EU, have expressed support for the SDGs and many have integrated them in their policy frameworks. Efforts to localise the SDGs are ongoing and regional achievements are featured in the national reviews presented at international conferences. Monitoring SDGs at the regional level can thus help support the overall implementation of the SDGs, reinforce national efforts, support regional development strategies, and provide a broader picture of within-country trends. The European Parliament has expressed its support for an EU sustainable development strategy and enhanced involvement of regional, local and civil society stakeholders in SDG implementation.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in EU regions‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Listen to policy podcast ‘Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in EU regions‘ on YouTube.

Written by Clare Ferguson.

The last plenary session before the summer recess takes place in Strasbourg on 4-7 July 2022, with Members set to consider a packed agenda of policy decisions, many of which address the new geopolitical and economic realities resulting from Russia’s war against Ukraine. Unsurprisingly therefore, Czechia’s priorities for its second six-month Presidency of the Council of the EU include protecting EU citizens and freedoms, and its interests and values on the world stage; providing momentum for growth and investment; and supporting the ongoing EU climate and social policies. Members will consider the planned programme of activities, which began on 1 July 2022, in a key debate on Wednesday morning. A debate on the conclusions of the 23-24 June 2022 European Council meeting will follow. This session’s ‘This is Europe‘ debate is scheduled to take place on Tuesday morning, with the Prime Minister of Greece, Kyriakos Mitsotakis.

Parliament is set to approve two important pieces of proposed legislation following a debate on Monday evening, – the digital markets act and the digital services act – following a political agreement reached between the co-legislators. The digital markets act is the EU’s answer to tackling the dominance of a few large platforms that act as gatekeepers, controlling access to digital markets, and distorting competition. Through its three main provisions, the legislation should provide a definition of a large platform (those with €7.5 billion in annual turnover and €75 billion in market capitalisation), will oblige them to ensure their services are interoperable, and will ban them from giving preference to their own products in search results or re-using personal data. The European Commission will enforce the law, with the possibility to levy fines of up to 20 % of a company’s worldwide turnover. The new digital services act should boost consumer protection through rules promoting a safer and more transparent online environment. Parliament has ensured that the new law makes the platforms hosting online search engines, social media and marketplace platforms, responsible for protecting users against harmful and illegal content. Online platforms will also be obliged to be more transparent and accountable, with larger platforms subject to stricter rules. The European Commission will share enforcement with national authorities, according to the size of the platform concerned.

On Monday evening, and in advance of an important step set for 1 January 2023, Members are expected to consider a Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) report on Croatia’s pathway to its adoption of the euro. The report concurs with European Commission and European Central Bank assessments that price stability, fiscal sustainability, exchange rate fluctuations and long-term interest rates in the country prove that Croatia is ready to adopt the euro. The legal act is expected to be adopted by the Council in July.

Against the background of Russia’s continued aggression against Ukraine, and following EU leaders’ 23 June decision to grant EU candidate status to Ukraine and Moldova and to confirm Georgia’s European perspective, Members turn once again to prospects for EU enlargement, this time in the Western Balkans. Members are set to debate Foreign Affairs (AFET) Committee reports on the Commission’s 2021 assessment of accession prospects for Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Kosovo[1] on Tuesday afternoon. The AFET report on Bosnia and Herzegovina underlines the pressing need for a broader strategic and security approach to the Western Balkans, and calls for elections and electoral reform to go ahead in the country as planned. The AFET committee notes Kosovo‘s intention to apply for EU membership in 2022, but stresses that, as for other new applicants, there is no fast-track procedure. While judicial independence and reform is one issue to resolve before Kosovo can advance its European ambitions, another is the normalisation of relations with Serbia. While the committee reconfirms unequivocal support for the EU-facilitated Belgrade–Pristina dialogue, the AFET report on Serbia‘s progress towards accession in 2021 obviously underlines the country’s ambivalent attitude to EU policies and values and its reluctance to stand against Russia.

In the context of Russia’s war against Ukraine, Members are set to vote on additional crisis measures to support the EU fishery and aquaculture sectors on Wednesday lunchtime. Given the urgency to act, Parliament’s Committee on Fisheries (PECH) swiftly approved the proposal to provide support for the seafood sector, hard-hit by rising fuel prices and trade disruption, by using amounts leftover from the 2014‑2020 budget.

Returning to the ‘Fit for 55’ package aimed at cutting EU emissions, Members will consider a Committee on Transport and Tourism (TRAN) report on the proposed RefuelEU aviation initiative on Thursday morning. While the initiative seeks to increase availability of sustainable aviation fuels at EU airports, the TRAN committee seeks a wider scope, proposing that more sustainable fuels are made available at more airports and for more aircraft. While the report seeks a wider definition of renewable fuel to include electricity, it supports the exclusion of food and feed based fuel, as well as further research into alternatives.

Ahead of the 15th Conference of the Parties (COP15), Parliament will use the revived ‘question time’ scheduled for Tuesday afternoon to scrutinise the Commission on EU biodiversity protection. Parliament strongly supports the current initiatives to protect and restore biodiversity in the EU, and advocates EU-wide mandatory pesticide reduction.

Finally, Parliament is committed to making EU laws and policies simpler and easier for people and businesses. On Thursday morning, Members consider a Legal Affairs Committee (JURI) report that seeks to strengthen the EU strategy on better regulation, outlined in the Commission’s 2021 communication. The JURI committee insists on the need for transparency and openness, particularly as regards the Regulatory Scrutiny Board and the ‘one in, one out’ approach, whereby each new piece of legislation adopted leads to the removal of an older or outdated law. The committee also wishes to see children’s rights mainstreamed throughout EU legislation.

[1] This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244/1999 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.

Written by Anna Caprile and Eric Pichon.

At least one of the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) set by the United Nations (UN) will be missed in 2030 – SDG 2 – ‘zero hunger’ – also endangering the accomplishment of the rest of the SDG goals under Agenda 2030. Hunger and malnutrition are rising dramatically across the world, a trend aggravated by the pandemic. In 2020, 811 million people in the world were facing hunger, the highest level since 2014, and 3 billion people were without access to a healthy diet. The fight against hunger and malnutrition has been the focus of two global summits, namely the UN Food Systems Summit (September 2021), which committed to a deep reform of global food systems, and the Nutrition for Growth Summit (December 2021), which saw the biggest pledge since 2013. In the EU itself, considered one of the most food-secure regions in the world, nearly 7 million people were already experiencing severe food insecurity before the pandemic, and malnutrition is on the rise, as demonstrated by obesity and pre-obesity prevalence rates.

SDG 2 aims not only at achieving food security but also at improving nutrition and promoting sustainable agriculture. These objectives have been mainstreamed in the recently reformed common agricultural policy and the ‘farm to fork’ and biodiversity strategies. In developing countries, the EU is strongly committed to achieving SDG 2. The EU institutions and Member States, which collectively provide more than half of official development assistance worldwide, have reaffirmed this commitment in the new European ‘consensus on development’. Alongside development aid, the EU has several levers at its disposal to act on food insecurity causes, such as security and defence missions and comprehensive strategies in conflict areas, as well as substantial research capacities. >The fact that its internal policies, in particular agricultural, climate and trade policies, have a spill-over effect on other food systems in the world, in particular in poorer countries, also make the EU a significant player.

Read the complete briefing on ‘SDG 2 – zero hunger, and EU action against hunger and malnutrition‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Listen to policy podcast ‘SDG 2 – zero hunger, and EU action against hunger and malnutrition‘ on YouTube.

Written by Frederik Scholaert and Karin Jacobs.

The United Nations 2030 Agenda and the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), adopted in 2015, set the global roadmap for achieving sustainable development. It includes SDG 14 on ‘life below water’, which focuses on the sustainability of the oceans, thereby recognising their essential role in life on our planet. Oceans contain 80 % of all life forms, produce more than 50 % of the Earth’s oxygen and play a central role in regulating the climate. In addition, the ‘blue economy’ provides 4.5 million direct jobs in the EU. It covers traditional sectors, such as fisheries, maritime transport and coastal tourism, as well as innovative sectors, such as renewable ocean energy and the blue bioeconomy, which show great potential for sustainable blue growth. However, human activities threaten the health of our oceans. The effects of climate change are devastating, resulting in rising water temperatures, acidification, increased flooding and loss of marine biodiversity. The combination with other man-made stressors, such as pollution, including from land-based resources, and overexploitation of marine resources exacerbates the problem, reduces the resilience of oceans and poses a serious threat to the planet as a whole.

To manage maritime activities sustainably and cope with different environmental pressures, the EU has implemented a wide range of policies. This includes established policies, such as the common fisheries policy, the marine strategy framework directive and the maritime spatial planning directive, as well as specific legislation related to marine litter. Other new initiatives under the European Green Deal also play an important role in relation to ocean governance and sustainable blue growth, such as the 2030 biodiversity strategy, the offshore renewable energy strategy, the ‘Fit for 55’ package and the new guidelines on aquaculture. The external dimension of EU policies, its international ocean governance agenda and its global commitments make the EU a global player in shaping ocean governance and contribute to its commitment to deliver fully on SDG 14. On the occasion of World Oceans Day on 8 June 2022, this publication provides an overview of the main EU policies and initiatives in the field of ocean governance.

Read the complete briefing on ‘EU action on ocean governance and achieving SDG 14‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Listen to policy podcast ‘EU action on ocean governance and achieving SDG 14‘ on YouTube.

Written by Vivienne Halleux (1st edition).

The European Green Deal envisages a review of measures addressing pollution from large industrial installations, with a view to aligning existing legislation with the EU’s zero pollution ambition, as well as its energy, climate and circular economy policy goals. On 5 April 2022, the European Commission tabled a proposal to revise the Industrial Emissions Directive, the main European Union instrument regulating pollutant emissions from industry, together with a proposal to revise the Regulation establishing the European Pollutant Release and Transfer Register, related to environmental information. The proposal aims at upgrading the existing register to a more comprehensive and integrated industrial emissions portal, enabling more accurate monitoring of the environmental performance of large industrial activities. The main changes proposed include better alignment with the Industrial Emissions Directive, both in terms of activities covered and reporting level; inclusion of reporting on the use of resources; and integration in the database of additional relevant environmental data reported under other related EU legislation.

In Parliament, the file has been referred to the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety. The same rapporteur and shadow rapporteurs will handle the revision of the European Pollutant Release and Transfer Register Regulation and that of the Industrial Emissions Directive.

Version

• June 2022: Establishing an industrial emissions portal (1st edition)

Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on reporting of environmental data from industrial installations and establishing an industrial emissions portal Committee responsible:Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI)COM(2022) 157
05.04.2022Rapporteur:Radan Kanev (EPP, Bulgaria)2022/0105 (COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Mohammed Chahim (S&D, the Netherlands)
Michal Wiezik (Renew, Slovakia)
Eleonora Evi (Greens/EFA, Italy)
Anna Zalewska (ECR, Poland)
Marisa Matias (The Left, Portugal)Ordinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Publication of draft report

Written by Vivienne Halleux.

Covering some 52 000 large agro-industrial installations EU-wide, the Industrial Emissions Directive is the main EU instrument regulating pollutant emissions from industry. The proposal for a revision tabled by the European Commission on 5 April 2022 aims to bring it into line with the EU’s zero pollution ambition, energy, climate and circular economy policy goals under the European Green Deal. The main changes include expanding the scope (in terms of sectors covered and thresholds), strengthening permit requirements to authorise installations to operate, and measures to promote innovation.

Stakeholders’ reactions to the text were mixed. Industry and farming representatives expressed strong concerns about the added complexity, timeliness and practical implementation of the proposal. While welcoming many improvements, non-governmental organisations criticised the missed opportunity to make the directive fit for climate protection, and the proposed new regime for intensive livestock rearing. In Parliament, the file has been referred to the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI), which appointed Radan Kanev as rapporteur.

Version

• June 2022: Revision of the Industrial Emissions Directive (1st edition)

Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2010/75/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 on industrial emissions (integrated pollution prevention and control) and Council Directive 1999/31/EC of 26 April 1999 on the landfill of waste Committee responsible:Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI)COM(2022) 156
05.04.2022Rapporteur:Radan Kanev (EPP, Bulgaria)2022/0104 (COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Mohammed Chahim (S&D, the Netherlands)
Michal Wiezik (Renew, Slovakia)
Eleonora Evi (Greens/EFA, Italy)
Anna Zalewska (ECR, Poland)
Marisa Matias (The Left, Portugal)Ordinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Publication of draft report Sectoral shares of IED installations in 2018

Written by Ralf Drachenberg.

The June 2022 European Council meeting marked a potentially historic moment: EU leaders granted Ukraine and Moldova candidate status and also confirmed Georgia’s European perspective. Although highly anticipated, this major step was neither obvious nor uncontroversial, as for the first time it concerned a country still at war, generating intense discussions both within the European Council and with partner countries. On Ukraine, EU leaders took stock of the situation in the country, confirmed their commitment to increased military support and financial assistance, and called on like-minded partners to align with EU sanctions. Regarding relations with non-EU partners in Europe, the European Council had its first strategic discussion on the ‘European political community’ concept (EPC), with a possible first EPC summit to take place under the upcoming Czech Presidency. Turkey’s assertiveness in the eastern Mediterranean and the Belarus people’s right to ‘free and fair elections’ were also discussed.

On other topics, however, not least on the Conference on the Future of Europe, the results were underwhelming, as EU leaders took no concrete follow-up decision, simply leaving it to each EU institution to do so within its own sphere of competence. Moreover, no breakthrough was possible regarding the Western Balkans – neither at the leaders’ meeting nor at the European Council itself.

The last component of the two days of meetings saw a Euro Summit in inclusive format. EU leaders discussed two major issues, the current economic situation, notably the rise in prices of energy, food and commodities, and the EU’s financial architecture, reiterating their commitment to the completion of the banking and capital markets unions.

1. General aspects

The European Council meeting began with the customary address by the President of the European Parliament, Roberta Metsola, who had also attended the Western Balkans Leaders’ Meeting the same morning. She stressed that ‘this is a moment where we must remain together. It is a moment we did not choose, but one that we have no choice but to meet’. Her intervention was followed by a discussion in which at least 10 EU Heads of State or Government took part, indicating that the interest in and quality of the exchanges with the President of the Parliament continue to increase.

The President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, addressed the European Council once again (remotely), reaffirming that Ukraine was capable of becoming a fully fledged member of the European Union.

The President of the European Council, Charles Michel, did not use the opportunity of this meeting to update the indicative Leaders’ Agenda. It was last updated in December 2021, and covered the period up to March 2022.

On the suggestion of the Prime Minister of Italy, Mario Draghi, the organisation of another special European Council meeting, either before or just after the summer break, and dedicated to economic issues, was debated within the European Council, with varying opinions expressed on the idea.

2. European Council meeting Wider Europe

EU leaders held a first exchange of views on French President Emmanuel Macron’s proposal to launch a ‘European political community’ (EPC), and will revert to the subject at one of their forthcoming meetings. The aim of the EPC would be to ‘strengthen the stability and security of the European continent’ and ‘offer a platform for political coordination’ with ‘all European countries with whom we have close relations’, with meetings taking place at leaders’ level. While stressing that the Western Balkan countries had reacted ‘rather in a positive and favourable way’ to the EPC concept, Charles Michel – and the European Council conclusions – strongly underlined that the EPC was not seen as an alternative to enlargement, so reassuring those countries that had expressed concerns prior to the meeting.

Ukraine

EU leaders discussed Russia’s war on Ukraine once again, reaffirming the latter’s legitimate right to defend itself, its territorial integrity and its sovereignty. They deplored the attacks targeting the civilian population and infrastructure, and called on Russia to ‘immediately and unconditionally withdraw all its troops and military equipment from the entire territory of Ukraine within its internationally recognised borders’. The European Council reconfirmed the EU’s staunch support for Ukraine, and discussed humanitarian, financial, economic, social and military aid. As regards financial assistance, European leaders took note of the fact that the European Commission would be presenting a proposal for macro-financial assistance of up to €9 billion, which they had green-lighted at their meeting on 30-31 May 2022. On military support, they confirmed the EU’s commitment, and called on the Council to ‘swiftly work on a further increase of military support’. Since the start of the war, the EU has committed €2 billion under the European Peace Facility.

EU leaders stressed that international humanitarian law ‘must be respected’, reiterated their demand that Russia allow the immediate return of Ukrainians, in particular children abducted to Russia, and stressed that war crimes will be prosecuted and punished. No further sanctions were agreed, the focus being put on implementation and avoidance of circumvention. The EU leaders agreed that the sanctions had mounted pressure on Russia, calling on like-minded partners to align with the EU sanctions, and on the Council to finalise the ‘decision adding the violation of Union restrictive measures to the list of EU crimes’. The European Council also strongly emphasised that, by weaponising food in its war against Ukraine, Russia was solely responsible for the current food crisis, and reiterated its call on Russia to cease these detrimental activities. In recent speeches, Charles Michel had clearly underlined that food security issues were not caused by EU sanctions, but rather by Russia ‘stealing grain, blockading ports’ and targeting agricultural resources. A central point in the discussion concerned how to get millions of tonnes of Ukrainian grain out of the country. To this end, EU leaders signalled their support for solidarity lanes and for the UN’s attempts to unblock exports through an agreement on secure corridors between Russia, Turkey and Ukraine. In order to respond effectively to global food security concerns, the European Council also called on the Commission and the Member States to increase their support for developing countries with supply chain issues, help them develop their manufacturing capacities, and hasten the delivery of relevant initiatives from the EU-African Union Summit.

Main message of the President of the European Parliament: Roberta Metsola warned against ‘war fatigue’ fuelled by inflation and disinformation. She stressed that the EU needed ‘to break free from Russian energy’, start preparing the next sanctions package, push back against false food security narratives, and avoid new ‘iron curtains and spheres of influence’. She expressed her support for an expansion of solidarity lanes, and stressed that Russia was responsible for any impending food crisis.

EU membership applications of Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia

The European Council took the important decision to grant candidate country status to Ukraine and Moldova, and to offer a European perspective to Georgia. The three countries’ progress towards membership would be subject to conditionality. However, only Georgia still needs to first fulfil certain conditions set by the European Commission in its opinion issued in response to the membership applications. Prior to the summit, Roberta Metsola and Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas had issued a joint opinion piece, in which they stressed that a clear message to Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia would give ‘hope’ and show ‘a strong signal of belief in shared European values’. Just before the summit started, the European Parliament adopted a resolution supporting candidate country status for Ukraine and Moldova and Georgia, by a majority of 529 votes.

EU leaders noted that enlargement was a merit-based process and that each country’s progress would be assessed individually against the Copenhagen criteria, albeit also with respect to the ‘EU’s capacity to absorb new members’ – a criterion that clouds clarity on the final outcome

Main message of the President of the European Parliament: Roberta Metsola stressed that it ‘would have been a historically wrong decision not to grant candidate status to Ukraine and Moldova today, or give a clear perspective to Georgia’.

Western Balkans

Prior to the European Council meeting, EU and Western Balkan leaders met for a leaders’ meeting, which some Balkan leaders had even threatened to boycott. Given the disappointment expressed by Western Balkan countries on the lack of progress on their membership applications, no declaration was adopted. Their criticism even prompted Charles Michel to adjust the order of the agenda points at the European Council, initiating a roundtable discussion on the Western Balkans ahead of that on the membership application of Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia.

The High Representative/Vice President of the European Commission Josep Borrell stated that ‘we are not where we should be with the Western Balkans’. In that context, he stressed the importance of rethinking the decision-making process and pointed to the failure of the unanimity rule.

The European Council conclusions expressed ‘full and unequivocal commitment to the EU membership perspective of the Western Balkans’, recalled the ‘reversible and merit-based’ principle of the revised enlargement methodology, stressed the importance of reforms and of an independent judiciary, and called for the fight against corruption to continue. However, EU leaders also felt the need to clarify the ‘status’ of three applicant countries: North Macedonia, Serbia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, giving an encouraging tone to the conclusions. The EU leaders called ‘for a swift resolution’ of the dispute between Bulgaria and North Macedonia, ‘so that accession negotiations could be opened without delay’. The French Presidency presented a proposal, which received the backing ‘in extremis’ of the Bulgarian parliament on 24 June 2022; it now requires the approval of North Macedonia to enable a breakthrough. EU leaders also called urgently for ‘tangible progress’ to be made on resolving outstanding disputes, particularly in the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue on normalisation of relations between Serbia and Kosovo, which is a prerequisite for progress on Serbia’s accession process. The European Council had a long discussion on Bosnia and Herzegovina. Welcoming the political agreement of 12 June 2022, EU leaders indicated that they would be ready to grant candidate country status as soon as the 14 priorities identified in the Commission’s opinion had been implemented, notably the long overdue constitutional and electoral reform.

Main message of the President of the European Parliament: Roberta Metsola called for the launch of accession negotiations with Albania and North Macedonia and for Kosovo to be granted visa liberalisation. She stressed that the Western Balkan countries ‘need to see hope lead to results’.

Conference on the Future of Europe (CoFoE)

Discussions on the follow-up to the Conference on the Future of Europe were rather short and the results were underwhelming. The European Council only ‘took note’ of the CoFoE proposals. While calling for ‘an effective follow-up ‘, they did not provide concrete guidelines in this respect, just stating that each EU institution should do this ‘within their own sphere of competences’, rather than doing it jointly among the EU institutions. EU Heads of State or Government also noted the importance of ensuring that citizens are informed of the follow-up to the proposals made in the report. The president of France, Emmanuel Macron, indicated that the European Council would continue with its debate on this issue.

Main message of the President of the European Parliament: Roberta Metsola told the EU Heads of State or Government to be ambitious and to enhance the Union’s capacity to act in vital areas such as health, energy, defence and fundamental values. She stressed that the Parliament’s views, as expressed in its two resolutions, should not be ignored. She reiterated the Parliament’s desire to hold a convention, which would ‘keep the conversation on our EU project going’. Ms Metsola also confirmed Parliament’s readiness to face the challenges jointly with the other EU institutions and Member States. 

Economic issues

As anticipated in the EPRS outlook for the meeting, EU leaders generally endorsed the integrated country-specific recommendations. They welcomed the fulfilment by Croatia of all the convergence criteria to join the euro area, endorsed the Commission’s proposal that Croatia should adopt the euro on 1 January 2023, and invited the Council to adopt the relevant Commission proposals swiftly.

Given the reluctance of certain EU Member States towards market intervention at EU level, EU leaders reiterated their call on the Commission to explore with international partners ways of curbing rising energy prices, including the feasibility of introducing temporary price caps where appropriate. Faced with Russia’s weaponisation of gas, the European Council invited the Commission to pursue its efforts to secure energy supply at affordable prices.

3. Euro Summit

EU leaders also held a Euro Summit meeting in inclusive format, with all 27 Member States participating, as well as the President of the European Central Bank, Christine Lagarde, and the President of the Eurogroup, Pascal Donohoe. They discussed the current economic situation in the EU, notably rising inflation, which as Charles Michel stated, is ‘a major concern for all of us’. He underlined that ‘Russia’s war of aggression is pushing up the price of energy, food and commodities, and that all of this has a direct impact on our citizens and businesses’. EU leaders agreed to coordinate their economic responses to the rising cost of living closely. In their statement, EU leaders reiterated their commitment to completing banking union, with future steps to follow, and called for efforts to deepen the capitals market union to be stepped up.

Read this briefing on ‘Outcome of the meetings of EU leaders on 23-24 June 2022‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.