European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Ralf Drachenberg with José Ernault.

The regular European Council meeting on 26 and 27 October will be the third meeting of EU Heads of State or Government in three weeks. The EU multiannual financial framework and the situation in the Middle East are set to be the main issues discussed by EU leaders. On the EU’s long-term budget, the European Council will aim to close the gap between Member State positions, thereby preparing the ground for an agreement later in 2023. As for the Middle East, amid risks of a wider conflagration, EU leaders are likely to continue discussion on the situation and its potential consequences for the EU, already the main topic of the extraordinary video-conference meeting on 17 October.

Ukraine, the economy and migration are also important topics on the agenda. The European Council is expected to reaffirm its support to the Ukrainian people, as it has done at all European Council meetings since Russia’s attack on Ukraine. Concerning economic issues, EU leaders are expected to concentrate on measures to enhance the EU’s economic resilience and productivity. As migration remains a core concern across the EU, the European Council is set to hold a strategic debate on the matter, with only limited conclusions expected. The European Council is also expected to prepare for the 2023 United Nations Climate Change Conference in Dubai (COP28), to discuss damage to critical infrastructure in the Baltic Sea, and to raise a series of topics on EU external relations, notably the deteriorating situation in the Sahel. The European Council meeting will be followed by a Euro Summit meeting on 27 October, dealing with economic governance and policy coordination.

1.     General

The European Council meeting will begin with the traditional exchange with the President of the European Parliament. It is also expected that Ukraine’s President, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, will address the European Council by video-conference. In the latest change to European Council membership, the 26-27 October meeting will see the return of Robert Fico, Slovakia’s new prime minister.

As is the case for most European Council meetings, Members of the European Parliament discussed the summit in a plenary debate on 18 October, with many calling for the EU to present a united position on the world stage. These pre-summit plenary debates, together with those following European Council meetings, underline the European Parliament’s scrutiny role and contribute to the European Council’s democratic accountability.

2.     European Council meeting Ukraine

As indicated by European Council’s President, Charles Michel, in his invitation letter, the EU leaders are expected to reiterate previous messages standing up for Ukraine, and to underline the EU’s unwavering support, including on defence. Total EU and Member State assistance to Ukraine now exceeds €82 billion, of which more than €25 billion is support for the Ukrainian army. EU leaders are likely to discuss the possible adoption of the eighth set of assistance measures under the European Peace Facility (EPF), which is currently blocked by Hungary. EU leaders may also discuss High Representative/Vice President (HR/VP) Josep Borrell’s proposal to create a €20 billion instrument under the EPF specifically for Ukraine, as part of the European Council’s security commitments to Ukraine. However, little progress is expected on this proposal, which is expected to be discussed in more depth in December. Prime Minister Robert Fico’s return could pose an additional hurdle, as he has pledged to end any military aid from Slovakia to Ukraine, and to restore relations with Russia.

As has become the tradition at European Council meetings since the invasion of Ukraine, President Zelenskyy is expected to address EU leaders by video-link. With Ukrainian forces still engaged in heavy fighting as part of their counter-offensive, he may be expected to stress the urgent need to speed up the delivery of air defence systems to protect critical infrastructure and cities likely to be targeted by Russian armed forces over the winter. President Zelenskyy may also reiterate his call for a 12th sanctions package targeting Russia’s nuclear industry, Russia’s diamond exports, and Iran, which supplies Russia with combat drones. President Zelenskyy’s request was made in his address to EU Foreign Ministers on 2 October 2023, at the first Council meeting held outside the borders of the EU, in Kyiv. On that occasion, he also welcomed the proposed €20 billion EPF instrument for Ukraine.  

Moreover, EU leaders could also reiterate their support for President Zelenskyy’s Ukrainian peace formula, and (following two preparatory meetings in Copenhagen and Jeddah) discuss the organisation of a Global Peace Summit with the Ukrainian president. The third preparatory meeting on the Ukraine peace formula is set to take place immediately after the European Council meeting, in Malta on 28 and 29 October 2023.

Migration

EU leaders are expected to take part in a ‘strategic’ discussion on migration, notably on its external dimension. An in-depth exchange on this dimension took place during the Justice and Home Affairs Council of 19 October. Only very limited conclusions are expected to result from the discussions, to avoid a further instance of lack of consensus on the text of the meeting’s conclusions. However, should the Hungarian and outgoing Polish governments again decline to agree migration-related conclusions, Charles Michel could once again issue conclusions of the President of the European Council on the topic.

The discussion on migration is closely linked to the ongoing revision of the multiannual financial framework (MFF – see below) and potential new migration waves resulting from the conflict in the Middle East. Likewise, the terrorist attack in Brussels, carried out by a migrant in an irregular situation, is expected to arise in the course of the discussion, as could the urgent need to complete the pact on migration before the elections to the European Parliament in June 2024 – which Members underlined in their pre-European Council meeting plenary debate.

Economy

Considering the difficult geopolitical situation, a stronger EU technological and industrial base, in line with the Granada and Versailles declarations, is more urgent than ever. Work on strengthening competitiveness, attracting investment, ensuring affordable energy supplies, assessing strategic dependencies and evaluating the regulatory burden is critical in this respect. With the European elections approaching, only a few months remain to complete legislation on essential issues. Thus, EU leaders are expected to call on the co-legislators to urgently finalise key files – the proposed critical raw materials act, net-zero industry act and the reform of electricity market design. Furthermore, the European Commission has published a recommendation on critical technology areas, ahead of the meeting, which looks at advanced semiconductors, artificial intelligence, quantum and biotechnologies. The European Council is likely to take note of this recommendation and ask the Commission and the Member States to pursue work on risk assessments. Moreover, global competitors’ increased use of state subsidies, notably the US Inflation Reduction Act, has ignited the discussion on this topic in recent months. EU leaders are therefore likely to address the distortive effect these subsidies are having on the EU’s competitiveness, and call for action to address this challenge.

Multiannual financial framework

The European Council will hold an in-depth discussion on the mid-term review of the 2021‑2027 multiannual financial framework (MFF). Due to the unexpected challenges arising since the adoption of the 2021‑2027 long-term EU budget, notably Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the resulting inflation, as well as the increase in irregular migration, resources have been prematurely exhausted, hindering the EU’s capacity to address even the most urgent challenges. Consequently, the European Commission proposed to reinforce the MFF in June 2023.

The EU Member States’ positions are still far apart on many aspects of this proposed revision, i.e. not only on the amount of fresh money needed, but also on the political priorities to favour. While all Member States agree on the provision of additional money to support Ukraine, some – Finland, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden – have indicated they would not agree to additional funding in other areas. At the same time, a number of Member States, including Greece, Italy and Portugal, called for more money to face the migration challenge. A final agreement between Member States is not likely at this stage, but the provision of political guidelines could be the outcome.

External relations Middle East

Faced with a rapidly evolving situation, EU-leaders will return to the situation in the Middle East, amid threats of a wider escalation of the conflict. The European Council held an extraordinary meeting by video-conference on 17 October following the Hamas-led terrorist attacks on Jewish communities in Israel, which killed at least 1 400 people, whilst 200 were taken hostage. Ahead of that virtual meeting, and amid concerns about the lack of unity among EU actors in the wake of the conflict, EU leaders issued a statement condemning Hamas’s attacks against the Israeli people, calling for the immediate release of the hostages, and underlining Israel’s right to defend itself in accordance with international and humanitarian law. The statement also mentioned the need to ensure the protection of civilians and to continue to provide humanitarian aid to the civilian population in Gaza.

Since the 17 October meeting however, the number of victims of Israel’s retaliation in the Gaza Strip is continually increasing – although not a reliable source, as it is Hamas-controlled, the Palestinian Health Ministry estimates mention 5 000 victims to date. Even though some humanitarian aid convoys have been able to enter the Gaza Strip from Egypt since 21 October, the situation remains dramatic, and aid insufficient.

The risk of a wider conflagration in the Middle East led the Spanish Presidency to activate the full mode of Integrated Political Crisis Response (IPCR), the mechanism to support rapid and coordinated decision-making at EU political level for major crises. Thus, the Middle East crisis will be at the centre of EU leaders’ discussions, and require a strong and united EU position.

While all Member States are united in their support for Israel and its right to defend itself following the attacks, Israel’s response has revealed some divisions among EU leaders. EU leaders such as German Chancellor Olaf Scholz and Czech Prime Minister Petr Fiala have underlined their strong support for Israel and its right to defend itself against terrorism. Others, such as Belgian Prime Minister Alexander De Croo have deemed the siege of Gaza and Israel’s cutting off access to water and energy unacceptable, a position shared by Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez. Similarly, French President Emmanuel Macron called for immediate access for humanitarian aid to Gaza. Speaking on 21 October at the Cairo Peace Summit hosted by the Egyptian President Abdel Fattah Al‑Sissi, European Council President Charles Michel reaffirmed the EU leaders’ position and their support for peace, stability and security in the region. Although the summit did not produce a joint declaration, and highlighted differences amongst participants, it reiterated the call for humanitarian aid. When meeting President of the United States Joe Biden, ahead of the summit, Charles Michel stressed the importance of the EU-US alliance in tackling current challenges.

Following UN Secretary-General António Guterres’s call for a humanitarian cease-fire, the EU’s stance on the matter was a key topic at the Foreign Affairs Council. Josep Borrell put forward the idea of a humanitarian pause – less ambitious than a cease-fire, but necessary to allow humanitarian aid to reach the Gaza Strip. Ireland and Spain supported the initiative, while others – Italy and Germany – stressed that no cease-fire could be achieved without Hamas also ceasing to launch rockets at Israel. Thus, EU leaders will also need to find consensus on the proposed humanitarian pause. 

South Caucasus

EU leaders will also discuss relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan, with concerns remaining high regarding further Azerbaijani military operations. EU leaders are likely to express support for Armenia, including through humanitarian assistance.

Sahel

EU leaders could also consider the deteriorating security situation in the Sahel region, condemn the military coup in Niger, and call for the immediate release of overthrown President Mohamed Bazoum. They could express their support for action by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to restore the constitutional order in Niger. On 23 October, EU foreign ministers adopted a framework for restrictive measures against the military junta.

Serbia and Kosovo

EU leaders will raise relations between Serbia and Kosovo, amid heightened tensions and the fear of an escalation. With Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić expected in Brussels in parallel with the European Council meeting, an attempt will be made to de-escalate the conflict and restore dialogue. 

Other items 2023 Climate Change Conference (COP28) preparations

With the COP28 opening in Dubai at the end of November, leaders are set to define the EU’s position, based on the conclusions reached by EU environment ministers. As in 2022 and 2021, the European Council is likely to reiterate the urgent need to keep the 1.5°C global warming limit within reach.  

3.     Euro Summit

The Euro Summit is likely to hear an update on the digital euro project, to discuss the future of European capital and financial markets and to exchange views on the economic situation in Ukraine.

Read this briefing on ‘Outlook for the meetings of EU leaders, 26-27 October 2023‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Balazs Andras Szechy.

If you live in a city, you may experience some of the common disadvantages of urban life in your daily environment, such as air pollution, traffic congestion, noise or a lack of green spaces. The United Nations designated 31 October as World Cities Day. Observing this annual day aims to create awareness of the role of urbanisation in global sustainable development and social inclusion. The theme of the day is ‘Better City, Better Life’, while each year a different sub-theme and location are selected. This year’s theme is ‘Financing a sustainable urban future for all’, and the host city is Üsküdar in Turkey. Marking a world day provides an opportunity to look at how the EU helps cities to grow sustainably through sharing knowledge, and most importantly, funding transformative investment in urban planning.

Urban challenges and opportunities

In our fast-changing world, urban areas across the EU face a wide range of challenges, including providing affordable housing, integrating migrants, combating social segregation, reducing their environmental footprint, and coping with the effects of climate change, and an ageing urban population. Cities are often on the frontline in delivering solutions. Urban areas offer a wide range of jobs, goods and services. They are the engines of the European economy and act as catalysts for creativity and innovation throughout the Union.

Europe’s urban areas are home to over two-thirds of the EU’s population, they account for about 80 % of energy use, represent 70 % of European CO2 emissions, and generate up to 85 % of Europe’s GDP. The urban agenda for the EU (aimed at giving cities a greater say in how policy is decided on issues affecting them directly), recognises cities’ importance in driving the transition towards a sustainable way of living. It seeks to support urban partners to improve the quality of life by transforming transport, energy, industry and housing – not least because no single entity can manage this complex transition process alone.

How does the EU support its cities?

The EU has taken many initiatives to help national governments to enhance urban dwellers’ quality of life. The European Parliament, in particular, has long been a strong advocate of inclusive, sustainable, and innovative cities. The EU adopts legislation and policies with a direct impact on the urban level, for instance in environment or transport, by encouraging cooperation between cities and exchanges of experience, and by providing financial support for projects improving urban infrastructure.

From 2014 to 2020, around €115 billion in EU cohesion policy funding was invested in cities, towns or suburban areas. Of the total urban investment, around €17 billion was implemented locally, through more than 900 integrated and sustainable urban development (SUD) strategies using funding programmed under different EU territorial investment tools (Integrated Territorial Investments, Community-Led Local Development).

Which EU funds are involved?

Cohesion policy support for SUDs has been reinforced from 2021 to 2027, with funds now amounting to €28 billion. The resources come from four EU funds: the vast majority, €24.4 billion, are allocated through the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF). However, EU Member States have significantly exceeded the 8 % target set for the allocation of ERDF resources for urban projects, as they have earmarked almost 12 % for these purposes.  Other EU funds, such as the European Social Fund (ESF+), the Cohesion Fund (CF), the Just Transition Fund (JTF) and the Interreg (ERDF) will contribute the remaining €4 billion needed. Sustainable urban development features in all ERDF policy objectives, as shown in the chart below.

Figure – Cohesion sustainable urban development investment by policy objective

Source: European Commission

In addition, the European urban initiative provides direct support for cities, to help them turn their most ambitious, creative projects into reality. The EUI operates Portico, a ‘gateway to urban learning’ – a knowledge-sharing and community platform for sustainable urban development. The platform provides easy access to the latest knowledge and practical resources to help cities make the most of the possibilities provided by the EU to strengthen economic and social cohesion between regions. It also hosts the Portico Community, providing networking and peer exchange opportunities for urban practitioners. The goal is to generate innovation and prototypes, which can be replicated across Europe.

Below, we take a look at some examples of EU cohesion policy initiatives to support green and social urban development.

In one example, the European Commission announced in June 2023 that 14 cities would receive support, in the context of the New European Bauhaus, for their plans for green construction, green renovation, affordable housing, cultural heritage, and many other innovative projects. The New European Bauhaus initiative aims at helping to link sustainability, aesthetics and inclusion in building design across the EU.

Cities can also benefit from EU-led schemes, tools, initiatives and technical assistance partnerships. The EU programme for integrated urban development, URBACT IV, enables cities to develop integrated solutions to common urban challenges by networking, learning from experience, drawing lessons and identifying good practices to improve urban policies.

The REGIO Peer2Peer + tool enables public body staff involved in managing and implementing ERDF, CF and JTF programmes to meet and exchange knowledge and good practice on both a bilateral and multilateral level.

A joint European Commission and European Investment Bank initiative, in collaboration with the Council of Europe Development Bank, JESSICA provides Member States with the option to use some of their EU grant funding to make (repayable) investments in projects forming part of an integrated plan for sustainable urban development. These investments, which may take the form of equity, loans and/or guarantees, are delivered to projects via urban development funds and, if required, holding funds.

ELENA provides technical assistance for energy efficiency and renewable energy investment targeting buildings and innovative urban transport. Typically, ELENA supports investment programmes worth over €30 million, with a three-year implementation period for energy efficiency (including residential) projects and a four-year period for those on urban transport and improving mobility. ELENA encourages and supports the aggregation of different projects to increase their attractiveness for contractors and financers. Activities eligible for ELENA grants include: technical studies, energy audits, business plans and financial advice, legal advice, tendering procedure preparation, project bundling and project management.

A technical assistance partnership between the European Commission, the European Investment Bank and the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), JASPERS also helps cities and regions deliver high-quality projects. It provides independent advice to beneficiary countries to help prepare high-quality major projects for co-financing under two EU structural and investment funds, the ERDF and the Cohesion Fund.

The EU also recognises the role of small and medium-size cities and functional area approaches (addressing urban areas that straddle national or administrative borders), as important driving forces for regional and rural attractiveness. Development dynamics rarely follow neat administrative boundaries, so functional urban areas encompass densely inhabited cities and their less densely populated commuting zones. This is a field where integrated strategies have a clear added value, as they cross administrative boundaries. Functional urban areas are instrumental in tackling urban-rural linkages.

The EU not only supports cities through its cohesion policy, but a significant amount of money from the Next Generation EU recovery instrument is devoted to urban projects. Other European policies and programmes also provide direct support for cities. Key recent examples are the EU initiatives on climate-neutral and smart cities, as well as the Horizon Europe programme strand on adaptation to climate change.

Written by Andrés García Higuera.

Generative artificial intelligence applications, such as ChatGPT, are powered through complex learning processes by comprehensive datasets of – potentially dubious – human-created content. There are concerns that such tools could develop consciousness and spark emergent behaviour that is, by definition, unpredictable and therefore potentially unsafe. Do these concerns point to a need to look again at the relevant legislation?

Artificial intelligence (AI) is a very generic and far-reaching concept that is often used when discussing more specific technologies, such as machine learning, neural networks and deep learning. Recent discussions around the possibility of a somehow unexpected or ‘emergent‘ behaviour associated with AI, really have to do with deep learning in neural networks, since these refer to generic structures that do not incorporate set rules or decision trees (or other tools such as genetic algorithms) but need to be trained on coherent data sets to eventually produce proper results.

Neural networks are structures inspired by the human brain. They are composed of a colony of elementary cells, or neurons, that are massively interconnected. Through various training methods, the information providing the desired behaviour is stored as a set of ‘weights’ in those interconnections. ‘Weight’ here refers to the strength of the signal at the receiving neuron when the interconnection is activated by the neuron at the other end of that specific link. Neurons are simple cells whose main function is to pass on the signals according to weights. They also have to adjust those weights, in an ongoing learning process, according to a system of rewards depending on the quality of the overall results, which are, to some extent, unpredictable. Consciousness can eventually spark at a higher level in colonies of cells that are big enough, as is the case for the human brain.

Ant colonies and beehives have a similar model of interconnected nodes without individuality. In these cases, however, the level of consciousness seems very limited, perhaps because the interactions between individuals are very limited too, despite showing characteristics of emergent behaviour. In this sense, a network of humans corresponds much more closely to the conditions found in a neural network because, thanks to language, the links are stronger and the communication much better. Although networks of people do not seem to have consciousness, human society – and its overall behaviour – can become very complex, and has empowered humankind with decisive tools, such as civilisation, through a very deep sharing of knowledge. This is behind the idea of ‘collective consciousness’ expressed by Durkheim: ‘The totality of beliefs and sentiments common to the average members of a society forms a determinate system with a life of its own. It can be termed the collective or common consciousness’. Collective consciousness is not unique and can vary, for instance, between different nationalities.

The real question may be how to define consciousness. Since Freud divided human consciousness into three levels of awareness: unconsciousness, preconsciousness and consciousness, philosophers have described consciousness and its levels in varying ways, from mere self-awareness and survival instinct to societal contribution. Zukerfield highlighted the concept of self in relation to society, and others, such as Seth, concentrate on individual emotions. Gramsci called ‘collective consciousness’ a ‘living organism’ and related it to the class struggle and solidarity movements among oppressed people. Other authors refer to ‘collective imagination‘ to stress the relationship between social movements and policy.

Potential impacts and developments

Generative AI applications (that use models based on neural networks to identify patterns and structures within existing data to generate new and original content) have become very popular, but also controversial, with the recent deployment of new versions of ChatGPT and other new large language models (LLM). While artificial intelligence in general has been the focus of attention and the subject of legislative work at EU level for some time, the release of new generative systems has shown that technological change may be happening too fast for EU law to keep up. However, as was the case with search engines such as Google, some chatbots have appeared as data pre-processing interfaces, meeting the gap in the market caused by the exponential rise in the volume of information available on the internet and our limited capacity, as humans, to process it. Generative AI is here to stay.

Since generative AI is usually trained on data available on the internet, it is bound to mirror the overall collective consciousness of the society generating that data. It is that collective consciousness that is reflected, for instance, in chatbots based on generative AI. However, there is no guarantee that a collective consciousness will always lead to wise decisions. For example, a mob will do things that most of its individual members would never do alone. Although collective consciousness may have no sense of ‘collective remorse’, the individuals constituting it would blame the mob as an independent entity. Inadequate decisions based on biased information can be even more harmful than malicious or selfish acts; and they are usually harder to assess. The danger is that a conscious AI might have spurious motivations such as gaining more ‘likes’ on Twitter (now X), potentially fuelling dangerous populism.

For historian Yuval Noah Harari, there is a real danger that sentient machines, having mastered language, will go on to influence people and destroy our ability to have meaningful conversations, leading to the destruction of democracy. However, the question now is not whether a single computer can do this, since that one computer can be controlled or curated in some way, but whether a group of interconnected computers could behave as a neural network and gain a separate uncontrolled consciousness residing in the cloud, leading to emergent behaviour.

Anticipatory policymaking

Neurons are very basic cells without individual consciousness, whereas human society is composed of conscious individuals. While computers do not have individual consciousness, they may incorporate alternative data sets and act according to specific rules interfering with the network at a higher level. This is why a network of computers would behave in a way that is more comparable to a network of individuals, to a society or, considering all the shared previous knowledge and rules of conduct, even to a culture or civilisation. This should leave generative AI far from individual consciousness and shy of Harari’s apocalyptic scenarios or examples depicted in film, such as ‘Skynet’ in Terminator, ‘Hal’ in 2001: A space odyssey, and the spaceship autopilot in Wall-e.

However, even the most advanced societies are not safe from generating ‘mobs’ (think of the attack on the US Capitol in 2021). Arguably, incomplete and biased information, fake news and disinformation can feed back, producing a magnifying effect through generative AI that may be unpredictable. The regulation of artificial intelligence must be closely linked to proper regulation of data and its governance and the concept of liability. After recently passing legislation such as the Digital Services Act, the Digital Markets Act, the Data Act and the Data Governance Act, the EU is now finalising work on the artificial intelligence act. This will define generic mechanisms to regulate the application and development of AI, assess how this regulation should be applied to generative AI and help decide whether additional regulatory instruments are needed.

The European Parliament will be monitoring implementation of the EU’s Horizon programme, which facilitates and funds research on artificial intelligence among other things. It will also oversee the 2030 ‘Path to the digital decade‘ policy programme, with the target of 75 % of EU companies using the cloud/AI/big data by 2030. The EU will also continue to shape policies in areas strongly affected by generative AI, such as the creative economy, education, health and many more industrial, social and cultural domains.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘What if generative artificial intelligence became conscious?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Mar Negreiro (1st edition).

Managed security services are services carrying out or providing assistance for activities relating to customers’ cybersecurity risk management. They are gaining increasing importance in the prevention and mitigation of cybersecurity incidents. Yet they were not included in the scope of the EU cybersecurity certification framework within the Cybersecurity Act from 2019. As some Member States have begun adopting certification schemes for managed security services that are divergent or inconsistent, there is a need to avoid fragmentation in the internal market. The present proposal therefore includes targeted amendments to the scope of the Cybersecurity Act, seeking to enable managed security services schemes by means of Commission implementing acts.

In Parliament, the file has been assigned to the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE), where the rapporteur published her report on 7 September 2023. The amendments tabled in the ITRE committee were published on 21 September 2023. The vote in committee is scheduled for 25 October 2023.

Versions

• October 2023: Managed security services (1st edition)

Regulation amending Regulation (EU) 2019/881 as regards managed security servicesCommittees responsible:Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE)COM(2023)0208
18.4.2023Rapporteur:Josianne Cutajar (S&D, Malta)2023/0108(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Angelika Niebler (EPP, Germany)
Bart Groothuis (Renew, the Netherlands)
Ville Niinistö (Greens/EFA, Finland)
Evzen Tošenovský (ECR, Czechia)Ordinary legislative
procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council
on equal footing –
formerly ‘co-decision’)Next steps expected: Vote in committee on draft report

Written by Rebecca Torpey with Christoffer Nielsen.

On 17 October 2023, EU leaders held an extraordinary meeting to address the escalating situation in the Middle East and to unify the messaging of the various EU actors. Building on the EU leaders’ joint statement of 15 October, the European Council’s President, Charles Michel, emphasised the importance for the European Council of setting a common line and establishing a clear and unified course of action. At the meeting, EU leaders identified four strands of action to guide the work of EU foreign ministers. Given the rapidly evolving nature of the conflict and its importance for regional, EU and international security, the leaders are likely to return to the issue at the next European Council meeting, on 26-27 October 2023.

1.     Background

On 7 October, Hamas militants launched a terrorist attack on Jewish settlers close to the Gaza Strip, killing at least 1 300 people and taking roughly 200 hostages. The recent escalation of Israeli-Palestinian violence is the most recent chapter in a longstanding and often violent conflict.

The Israeli–Palestinian conflict has been a subject of the EU’s foreign policy debates for decades. Member States signed the Venice Declaration in 1980, recognising both Israel’s right to live in peace and security, and the Palestinians’ right to self-determination. Since then, the EU has continually reiterated its commitment to a two-state solution – with an independent Palestine and Israel co‑existing peacefully. In its most recent resolution dated 12 July 2023, the European Parliament adopted a set of recommendations on how the EU should continue to engage with the Palestinian Authority. Members (MEPs) recommended in particular that the EU should ‘reiterate [its] unwavering support for the two-state solution, as the only viable solution to the conflict, with the state of Israel and the state of Palestine living democratically side by side in peace, complete with guaranteed security, mutual recognition under the 1967 borders, mutually agreed-upon equivalent land swaps and Jerusalem as the capital of both states, based on the parameters in the Council conclusions of July 2014′.

Given the urgent need for EU leaders to discuss the evolving situation in the Middle East, Michel called an extraordinary meeting via video-conference, to maximise EU leaders’ participation. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán was the only EU leader not to participate, owing to a pre‑planned trip to China; he was represented by the Austrian Chancellor. This was the European Council’s first video‑conference since March 2021, during the pandemic.

2.     Initial reactions of the EU and the international community European Commission

On Thursday 10 October, the High Representative/Vice-President of the Commission (HR/VP), Josep Borrell, made a statement condemning the attacks perpetrated in Israel by Hamas, calling for an immediate cessation of ‘attacks and violence’, and also stating that the EU stood in solidarity with Israel and that Israel had the right to defend itself in line with international law. The following day, the College of Commissioners held a minute’s silence for the victims of the terrorist attack.

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen was criticised by some Member States and MEPs, both for undertaking a trip to Israel on 13 October without prior consultation, and because the statement she made during her visit emphasised Israel’s right and ‘duty’ to defend itself, without calling for Israel to uphold international law. The Irish President criticised her publicly, ‘I don’t know where the source of those decisions was. I don’t know where the legitimation for it was and I don’t know where the authority for it is and I don’t think it was helpful’. He called for ‘better performance in relation to European Union diplomacy and practice’.

The criticism follows the disjointed Commission messaging on the provision of aid to Palestinians, with Neighbourhood and Enlargement Commissioner Olivér Várhelyi first announcing that all payments were under review. Commissioner for Crisis Management Janez Lenarčič then clarified that humanitarian aid to Palestinians would continue. A formal statement by the Commission was issued later that day underlining that the deployment of humanitarian aid would not be impacted. The Commission spokesperson confirmed that Varhelyi’s comments had not been preceded by consultations with any other member of the College.

European Parliament

On 11 October, the European Parliament held a moment of remembrance for the victims of the Hamas attacks in Israel. In her statement, Parliament’s President, Roberta Metsola, expressed solidarity with the Israeli people, condemned ‘the appalling acts of terror and murder’, and demanded the immediate release of the hostages. She stated that Hamas was a terrorist organisation and separate from the ‘legitimate aspirations of the Palestinian people’. In a strong show of support for Israel, Metsola went to Israel at the invitation of the Israeli Parliament to express solidarity and to reiterate Parliament’s rejection of terrorism. When Metsola opened the 16‑19 October plenary session, she immediately addressed the situation in Israel and Gaza, underlining that Hamas was a terrorist organisation that needed to be stopped. She underlined that the focus had to be on ensuring that the hostages were unconditionally released, that humanitarian aid reached those in need and that civilians were not targeted. She signalled her support for continued engagement with the legitimate representatives of the Palestinian people and regional actors to reduce tensions.

The leadership of the biggest political groups in Parliament expressed varying positions on the conflict in advance of the European Council meeting. The Chair of the EPP group, Manfred Weber, has repeated his condemnation of the terrorist attacks carried out by Hamas and his support for Israel. In a post on Twitter (X), following a meeting with relatives of hostages taken by Hamas, he said, ‘We support Israel to do whatever it takes to get the hostages back’. The Chair of the S&D group, Iratxe García Pérez, said that von der Leyen and Metsola were right to show Europe’s solidarity and condemn the Hamas attack. Nevertheless, she felt that they had failed in their duty to represent the positon of the Union and its Member States. The Chair of the Renew group, Stéphane Séjourné, criticised the lack of coherence in the EU’s response to the situation in Israel-Palestine; he added that there needed to be a reflection on how the institutions could speak with one voice, and stated that qualified majority voting in the Council could result in a more consistent approach to foreign policy.

United Nations (UN)

The Secretary-General of the UN, António Guterres, has made several statements on the situation in Israel and Palestine since the Hamas attack, focusing on the humanitarian situation. Guterres’ statement on 9 October is the closest to the language adopted by EU leaders, albeit referring to Israel’s ‘security concerns’ rather than to the ‘right to self-defence’, which is the phrasing used by EU leaders. The UN Security Council (UNSC) has thus far been unable to agree on a resolution; a first resolution, proposed by Russia, did not gain enough votes owing to the lack of an explicit condemnation of Hamas. A second, from Brazil, which called for humanitarian pauses, and condemnation of Hamas and of all terrorist acts against civilians also failed to be adopted.

European Council President and Member States

In a statement on 15 October, EU Member States jointly condemned the attacks by Hamas against the Israeli people. However, the Member States’ responses to the overall conflict varied in the run-up to the meeting. Some Member States have placed themselves firmly behind Israel and its right to self-defence. Others have agreed with Israel’s right to self-defence but included the caveat that Israel’s response should be in line with international and humanitarian law; others meanwhile have been openly critical of the impact that Israel’s retaliation and siege of Gaza would have on civilians. The aforementioned confusion regarding EU aid to Palestine also sparked another debate between those wanting EU aid to Palestine to continue or even be increased, and those concerned that EU aid might benefit Hamas. Prior to the video-conference meeting, Denmark announced it would send DKK50 million in humanitarian aid to Gaza and the West Bank.

In his first tweet on the conflict, on 7 October, Charles Michel condemned the attacks against Israel and signalled the EU’s solidarity with the Israeli people. He attended the moment of remembrance for the victims of the terrorist attacks in Israel at the European Parliament on 11 October, alongside other EU leaders. In his invitation letter to EU leaders, Michel outlined the importance of the European Council defining a common line and establishing a clear and unified course of action. Given the disjointed response from the Commission regarding aid to Palestinians, the criticism by Member States and MEPs of the visit to Israel and the European Council’s Treaty role, the EU needed a common approach that could be communicated by EU leaders; the European Council was the EU institution best placed to take the lead on the response to this conflict.

3.     European Council video-conference: Four strands of action

The meeting began with a minute of silence to honour the innocent victims who had lost their lives in Israel and in Palestine, as well as the victims of recent terror attacks perpetrated in Europe. Michel outlined the two guiding pillars to the European Council’s approach – unity and coherence. This joint approach was an answer to the criticism according to which the EU had been disjointed in its response to the situation in Israel and Palestine. He referred again to the points made in the European Council statement issued the previous Sunday and supported by all Member States, which included a condemnation of the Hamas terrorist attacks, the recognition of Israel’s right to defend itself while upholding international law, and also the EU’s commitment to a two-state solution.

In order to ensure EU unity and coherence, the European Council has tasked EU foreign ministers and ambassadors with carrying out work in a coordinated manner across four strands of action.

Humanitarian assistance: Before the latest escalation in the conflict, the EU was already the biggest donor of aid to Palestinians in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. The humanitarian situation on the ground in Gaza is dire. On humanitarian aid, several areas for action were outlined: i) coordinate with the UN to ensure that people in need have access to basic necessities; ii) work with those trying to clarify the status of the hostages and mediate their complete and immediate and unconditional release; iii) work with international partners to evacuate foreign citizens from Gaza. Ursula von der Leyen confirmed that the EU had created an air-bridge to Egypt near the Gaza border with staff on the ground ready for the quick transfer of humanitarian aid. The grave situation was clearly demonstrated when news came through during the meeting that a hospital in Gaza had been bombed, resulting in numerous casualties. When asked about this during the press conference, Michel confirmed that targeting civilian infrastructures was ‘not in line with international law’. With regard to the previously mentioned concerns of some Member States that EU aid could benefit Hamas, von der Leyen stated that the Commission was not aware of any EU funding going to any terrorist organisations. She noted that there would be an internal review of aid and that the Commission would coordinate with any Member States who were carrying out their own reviews. The Commission announced that the EU would triple humanitarian aid to Palestine for this year.

Engagement with partners: The European Council reiterated its support for the two-state solution as the best basis for achieving sustainable peace, committing to continue to engage politically and diplomatically with regional partners. The two main objectives of this strand of action are: i) to avoid further escalation in the region, which would have dangerous knock-on effects for the region and the world (this would be all the more problematic as Ukraine, the EU’s direct neighbour, is already at war); and ii) assess the impact of the war on countries neighbouring the conflict area (Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon). The conflict could have destabilising effects on their populations.

Domestic security issues: The conflict has divided communities globally. Protestors on both sides, have been taking to the streets around the world. European society has not been immune to this division and polarisation. The recent terror attacks in Brussels (which occurred the evening before the video-conference) and in France, may have underlined the security risks relating to hate speech and societal fragmentation, as all were fuelled by hate. EU leaders agreed that there needs to be collaboration at EU level to defuse tensions, fight all forms of hate speech and strengthen cooperation between Member States’ security services to mitigate further security risks.

Migration: The backdrop of the terrorist attack in Brussels was also relevant for the discussion on migration. A radicalised migrant, living illegally in Belgium, was responsible for the attack, which resulted in the deaths of two Swedish nationals. Before the European Council video-conference, the Swedish Prime Minister said he expected a continuation of the discussions on migration, notably on the need for better control of the EU’s external borders and over people entering the EU. Migration has recently returned to the European Council agenda and has been a topic on which EU Member States have struggled to find complete agreement. At its video-meeting, the European Council discussed how the conflict in the Middle East could have an impact on migratory flows to the EU as well as to neighbouring countries, notably Egypt. In his press conference, Michel noted that, if migration flows were not managed, this could lead to onward migration flows to the EU. The countries neighbouring the conflict zone are already home to millions of refugees, fleeing other conflicts and political instability in the region. According to Michel, the Arab Republic of Egypt is reluctant to open the border with Gaza, as it does not want to be responsible for thousands more refugees; this factor is making it difficult to get aid into Gaza.

Although the extraordinary European Council meeting was aimed primarily at discussing the situation in the Middle East, both Michel and von der Leyen reiterated their unwavering support for Ukraine for ‘as long as it is needed’. Assistance to Ukraine, notably financial support, is due to be discussed by EU leaders at their meeting on 26-27 October. Ahead of that meeting, the Foreign Affairs Council will meet on 23 October to act on the strands of action set out by EU leaders at their video-meeting on 17 October and to prepare for the 26-27 October European Council meeting.

Main message of the President of the European Parliament: Roberta Metsola stressed the importance of remaining coherent and united in ensuring the release of hostages, in refusing to excuse terrorism in any form, and in finding solutions that mitigate the humanitarian consequences in Gaza ‘in line with our obligations and international law’.

Read this briefing on ‘Outcome of the European Council video-conference of 17 October 2023‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clare Ferguson and Katarzyna Sochacka.

During the October II plenary session, Members debated with the Council and Commission the despicable terrorist attacks by Hamas against Israel, Israel’s right to defend itself in line with humanitarian and international law, and the humanitarian situation in Gaza. Another important debate followed the Commission’s statement on its work programme for 2024.

Members also debated a range of other topics, including the effectiveness of the EU sanctions on Russia, the situation of Ukrainian women refugees, the Islamist terrorist attack on French schools and the need to protect people and promote social cohesion, the outcome of the SDGs summit in New York, the International Day for the Eradication of Poverty, water scarcity in the EU, the need for a coordinated European response and legislative framework on intensive spyware, the rule of law in Malta, fighting disinformation and dissemination of illegal content in the context of the Digital Services Act, and the proposed Council recommendation on developing social economy framework conditions.

Martin Hojsík was elected a Vice-President of the Parliament, and Isabel Wiseler-Lima a Quaestor. Finally, Nikol Pashinyan, Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia, addressed Members in a formal sitting. 

Establishing the Ukraine Facility

Members debated a report jointly prepared by the Committees on Budgets (BUDG) and Foreign Affairs (AFET) on establishing the Ukraine Facility, to support the country’s recovery from Russia’s aggression and its EU ambitions. Sourcing the proposed €50 billion of financial support, in the form of grants and loans, would however necessitate a revision of the EU’s multiannual financial framework. This means that support from EU governments must be unanimous. Parliament’s committees propose that the Facility enable the use of frozen Russian assets to finance Ukraine’s reconstruction. Agreement on establishing the Ukraine Facility is urgent if the EU is to continue to support Ukraine without interruption in 2024. The report now sets Parliament’s mandate for interinstitutional negotiations with the Council.

Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform (STEP)

Recent events have heightened the demand for 21st century technologies, such as artificial intelligence, 5G, semiconductors, green technologies and biotechnologies. Parliament debated a report, drawn up jointly by the Committees on Budgets (BUDG) and on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE), on a proposal to set up a platform on strategic technologies for Europe (STEP) to help ensure EU industry can access the technologies it needs. Using reprogrammed EU funding to leverage investment, and with a €10 billion reinforcement from the EU budget, the platform would direct funding towards achieving the green and digital transitions. The report now sets Parliament’s position for negotiations with the Council.

Fisheries control

The EU’s common fisheries policy aims to conserve fish stocks and ensure European fishing fleets work in a sustainable manner. The EU fisheries control system seeks to ensure everyone follows the rules, but the current framework has long been due a complete overhaul. Members considered and adopted an agreement reached with the Council to revise the EU fisheries control system. The new legislation introduces tracking of all fishing vessels, electronic reporting of all catches, monitoring of recreational fisheries and improved product traceability – with CCTV to monitor vessels at high risk of not complying with their obligation to land all catches and conserve fish stocks.

General budget of the European Union for 2024

Parliament debated the BUDG committee report on amendments to the Council’s position on the draft EU budget for 2024. The report stresses the need for additional funding to address both the economic and social consequences arising from the COVID‑19 pandemic and Russia’s war against Ukraine, the worsening climate crisis and resulting extreme weather events. The report aligns with Parliament’s position to raise budgetary ceilings in the mid-term revision of the 2021‑2027 multiannual financial framework (MFF), and to integrate funding for STEP (see above), aid, migration and neighbourhood policies – and reverses the Council’s proposed reductions. The adopted report constitutes Parliament’s reading of the 2024 EU budget, and its position for conciliation talks with the Council, which are scheduled to run until 13 November.

Discharge 2021 – European Council and Council  

As every year, the European Parliament continues to closely scrutinise how the EU budget has been implemented. Members voted on a report by the Committee on Budgetary Control (CONT) which concludes that, due to a lack of cooperation from the Council, it cannot take an informed decision on granting discharge for the European Council and the Council for their 2021 budget, and thus Parliament rejected the discharge for them, as it has every year since 2009. The CONT committee calls on the Council to improve its legislative transparency.

Amending budget 3/2023 – Update of revenue and other technical adjustments

Members voted the BUDG committee report on draft amending budget No 3/2023. The report endorses the Council’s position to update the revenue side of the 2023 EU budget to account for the latest economic forecasts. It also makes adjustments to accommodate expenditure related to the new Defence Industrial Reinforcement Instrument and the European Chips Act; the cancellation of appropriations from the reserve line for the sustainable fisheries partnership; and the reinforcement of the budget of the European Data Protection Supervisor.

European Citizens’ Initiative – ‘Fur Free Europe’

EU citizens are strongly opposed to fur farming, on animal welfare grounds, but also due to the environmental risks of the toxic chemicals used in fur production and the animal waste from intensive farms, not to mention the potential for the development of infectious disease. However, Europe is a major producer of fur products, with Poland, Lithuania, Greece and Finland major producers of farmed mink. Members debated a 1.5 million-signature European Citizens’ Initiative, demanding that the EU ban fur farms and their products. While support for a ban on fur farms is overwhelming, the economic consequences for fur farmers will have to be mitigated.

2022 report on Montenegro

Despite Montenegro’s majority support for joining the EU, and with a new prime minister designate (Milojko Spajić, from the ‘Europe Now!’ movement), seeking to form a new government, Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee (AFET) report scrutinising the European Commission’s 2022 report on Montenegro’s progress towards EU accession regrets the country’s failure to build on this support to achieve consensus. Members debated the AFET report, which expresses particular concern about the consequent delays to the reforms necessary for the country to aspire to EU membership. Nevertheless, AFET welcomes Montenegro’s alignment with the EU on foreign and security policy, particularly on sanctions following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Question Time with the Commission – European Measures to prevent and to fight the rise of organised crime

Margaritis Schinas, Vice-President of the Commission, answered the questions put by Members regarding EU policy on tackling organised crime during the question time session.

Opening of trilogue negotiations

Three decisions to enter into interinstitutional negotiations were approved without a vote: on a report on statistics on population and housing, from the EMPL committee; on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings and protecting its victims, from the LIBE and FEMM committees; and on liability for defective products, from the IMCO and JURI committees.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Plenary round-up – October II 2023‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Citizens have called on the European Parliament to take a stance against the death penalty. Many citizens have written to the President of the European Parliament on this subject since September 2023, ahead of the World Day against the Death Penalty. The European Parliament is consistent in its strong and clear position against the death penalty.

We replied to citizens who took the time to write to the President (in French):

English

The European Union (EU) and the European Parliament have a strong and clear position against the death penalty, both within the EU’s borders and worldwide. All EU countries have abolished the death penalty. The EU actively works towards the worldwide abolition of the death penalty through diplomatic, political and financial means.

To mark World Day against the Death Penalty in 2020, President Roberta Metsola wrote on Twitter (now X) that ‘the death penalty is an affront to human dignity and cannot be tolerated under any circumstances’. She also stressed that Parliament is committed to defending human rights and that it will keep calling on all countries to end the death penalty.

In a 2023 resolution, the European Parliament reaffirms its principled opposition to the death penalty, considering it a cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment. It calls upon the EU and EU countries to defend abolition in all international forums and to seek broad support for this position.

French

L’Union européenne (UE) et le Parlement européen s’opposent résolument à la peine de mort, tant à l’intérieur des frontières de l’UE que dans le reste du monde. Tous les pays de l’UE ont aboli la peine de mort. L’UE œuvre activement à l’abolition de la peine de mort dans le monde par divers moyens diplomatiques, politiques et financiers.

À l’occasion de la Journée mondiale contre la peine de mort en 2020, la Présidente Metsola a déclaré sur Twitter (maintenant X) que la peine de mort est un affront à la dignité humaine et qu’elle ne peut être tolérée en aucune circonstance. Elle a également souligné que le Parlement s’engage à défendre les droits humains et qu’il continuera à appeler tous les pays à mettre fin à la peine de mort.

Dans une résolution de 2023, le Parlement européen réaffirme son opposition de principe à la peine de mort, qu’il considère comme un traitement cruel, inhumain et dégradant. Il invite l’UE et ses pays membres à plaider en faveur de l’abolition de la peine de mort dans toutes les enceintes internationales et à rechercher un large appui en faveur de cette position.

Background

Citizens often send messages to the President of the European Parliament expressing their views and/or requesting action. The Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (AskEP) within the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) replies to these messages, which may sometimes be identical as part of wider public campaigns.

Citizens have called on the European Parliament not to appoint Wopke Hoekstra, a former Dutch Deputy Prime Minister, as new Commissioner for climate action. Many citizens have written to the President of the European Parliament since mid-September 2023 expressing concerns about Wopke Hoekstra’s credentials to run the EU’s climate policy, in particular because of his past work for the Shell oil company.

We replied to citizens who took the time to write to the President (in French).

English Hearings of Wopke Hoekstra and Maroš Šefčovič

On 2 October 2023, Wopke Hoekstra had a hearing before the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI) as part of the process to become European Commissioner for Climate Action. On 3 October, the hearing of Executive Vice-President Maroš Šefčovič was also held, regarding his expanded role in the European Green Deal.

These hearings followed Frans Timmermans’ resignation and the reallocation of his responsibilities. The President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, reallocated Frans Timmermans’ portfolio, dividing his duties in two and placing Wopke Hoekstra under the guidance of Maroš Šefčovič.

Each of the hearings lasted three hours, and was intense. Neither produced an immediate outcome. Members asked the two candidates to answer additional written questions after their hearing.

During his hearing, Wopke Hoekstra stressed the importance of the European Green Deal and his commitment to an ambitious European climate policy. He said that he hoped to swiftly conclude all ongoing climate negotiations and propose an ambitious climate target for 2040. He also emphasised the importance of phasing out fossil fuels, as well as fossil fuel subsidies. Further details can be found in this press release. You can also watch the video of Wopke Hoekstra’s hearing.

At his hearing, Commission Executive Vice-President Maroš Šefčovič underlined the need to finalise the work on the European Green Deal ‘with urgency and courage’. He said he would focus on three main tasks: seeking citizens’ support for the Green Deal, bringing all pending proposals to fruition and ensuring the files are implemented where an agreement has already been reached. You can find more information in this press release as well as in the video of the hearing.

On 5 October, Parliament approved Wopke Hoekstra for the role of Commissioner for Climate Action and Maroš Šefčovič as Executive Vice-President for the European Green Deal. Wopke Hoekstra was approved with 279 votes in favour, 173 against and 33 abstentions. Further details can be found in this press release.

The European Parliament’s position on climate change

The European Parliament calls for more ambitious climate and biodiversity legislation. It is therefore a supporter of the European Green Deal, a comprehensive plan that aims to grow the EU economy while reducing greenhouse gas emissions and the amount of resources used. With the help of the Green Deal, Europe strives to become the first climate-neutral continent by 2050.

In its resolution on the Green Deal, Parliament stresses the urgent need for ambitious action to tackle climate change and environmental challenges. It also emphasises that the Green Deal must aim for a prosperous, fair and competitive economy that works for all, across all regions in Europe.

Parliament closely follows the UN Climate Change Conferences and regularly sends a delegation, led by its ENVI Committee to the Conference of the Parties (COP), which takes place once a year. In preparation for COP27 in 2022, the European Parliament called for continued work to set more ambitious targets, given that the EU should continue to lead by example.

French Auditions de Wopke Hoekstra et de Maroš Šefčovič

Le 2 octobre dernier, Wopke Hoekstra a été auditionné par la commission de l’environnement, de la santé publique et de la sécurité alimentaire (ENVI) pour devenir commissaire européen en charge du climat. Le 3 octobre, le Vice-président exécutif Maroš Šefčovič a également été auditionné sur son rôle élargi dans le pacte vert pour l’Europe (European Green Deal).

Ces auditions faisaient suite à la démission de Frans Timmermans et à la réorganisation de ses responsabilités. La Présidente de la Commission européenne, Ursula von der Leyen, a réattribué les tâches de Frans Timmermans et les a scindées en deux parties, plaçant Wopke Hoekstra sous la direction de Maroš Šefčovič.

Les deux auditions ont duré trois heures, étaient intenses et n’ont pas abouti à des résultats immédiats. Les députés européens ont demandé aux deux candidats de répondre à des questions écrites supplémentaires après leur audition.

Pendant son audition, Wopke Hoekstra a souligné l’importance du Pacte vert pour l’Europe et son engagement pour une politique climatique européenne ambitieuse. Il a déclaré qu’il espérait pouvoir conclure rapidement les négociations climatiques en cours et proposer un objectif climatique ambitieux pour 2040. Il a également insisté sur l’importance de supprimer progressivement les combustibles fossiles, ainsi que les subventions aux combustibles fossiles. Plus d’informations sont disponibles dans ce communiqué de presse. Vous pouvez également regarder la vidéo de l’audition de Wopke Hoekstra.

Quant au vice-président exécutif Maroš Šefčovič, lors de son audition, il a souligné la nécessité de finaliser les travaux sur le Pacte vert pour l’Europe “en urgence et avec courage”. Il a mis en avant trois tâches principales : solliciter le soutien des citoyens en faveur du Pacte vert, concrétiser toutes les propositions en suspens et veiller à la mise en œuvre des dossiers dans lesquels un accord a déjà été conclu. Pour plus d’informations, vous pouvez consulter ce communiqué de presse ainsi que la vidéo de l’audition.

Le 5 octobre, le Parlement a approuvé Wopke Hoekstra comme commissaire chargé de l’action climatique et Maroš Šefčovič en tant que vice-président exécutif du Pacte vert pour l’Europe. Wopke Hoekstra a été confirmé avec 279 voix pour, 173 contre et 33 abstentions. Plus de détails sont disponibles dans ce communiqué de presse.

Position du Parlement européen sur le changement climatique

Le Parlement européen plaide en faveur d’une législation plus ambitieuse en matière de climat et de biodiversité. De ce fait, il soutient le pacte vert pour l’Europe, un plan global qui vise à faire croître l’économie de l’UE tout en réduisant l’utilisation de ressources et la génération des gaz à effet de serre. Grâce au pacte vert, l’Europe veut devenir le premier continent neutre pour le climat d’ici 2050.

Dans sa résolution sur le pacte vert, le Parlement souligne la nécessité urgente d’une action ambitieuse pour faire face aux défis liés au changement climatique et à l’environnement. Il souligne également que le pacte vert doit aspirer à une économie prospère, juste et compétitive qui soit au service de tous, dans toutes les régions d’Europe.

Le Parlement suit de près la Conférence des Nations unies sur les changements climatiques et envoie régulièrement une délégation menée par la commission ENVI aux conférences de parties (COP) qui se tiennent chaque année. Dans le cadre de la préparation de la COP27 en 2022, il a demandé la poursuite des travaux visant à fixer des objectifs plus ambitieux, considérant que l’UE doit continuer à donner l’exemple.

Background

Citizens often send messages to the President of the European Parliament expressing their views and/or requesting action. The Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (AskEP) within the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) replies to these messages, which may sometimes be identical as part of wider public campaigns.

Written by Marcin Grajewski.

The European Commission is due to publish its annual ‘Enlargement Package‘, a set of documents explaining its policy on EU enlargement, ahead of the European Council’s conclusions on the issue expected in December 2023. The European Union has found new impetus for enlargement in the wake of Russia’s war on Ukraine, leading to progress in the long-stalled process that was once known as the EU’s most successful policy.

A year ago, the EU granted Ukraine and Moldova official EU candidate status, and also opened this possibility for Georgia. Politicians and analysts are increasingly saying that the EU should become more involved in the Western Balkan countries – which saw their membership prospects initiated 20 years ago – or risk them drifting away politically from the Union which would exacerbate conflicts in the post-Yugoslavia region.

‘We need to set out a vision for a successful enlargement. I believe that the next enlargement must also be a catalyst for progress’, said the European Commission’s President, Ursula von der Leyen, during her annual ‘State of Union’ speech in September 2023. The EU itself will have to undergo profound reforms before it embarks on a next enlargement wave, politicians and analysts say.

This note gathers links to the recent publications and commentaries from many international think tanks on enlargement and the problems of EU accession countries. More papers on this issue can be found in a previous item in the series.

Moldova’s European future: A call to open accession talks
European Policy Centre, October 2023

Can the European political community survive?
Centre for European Reform, October 2023

Sustain and prosper: How Europeans can support Ukraine
European Council on Foreign Relations, October 2023

Western Balkans ‘nearshoring’ can turn the region into a strategic asset for the EU
Atlantic Council, September 2023

The tyranny of EU treaties
Bruegel, September 2023

A reluctant magnet: Navigating the EU’s absorption capacity
Carnegie Europe, September 2023

The EU’s Eastern enlargement and differentiated democracy support
Carnegie Europe, September 2023

The EU cannot give up on Serbia and Kosovo
Carnegie Europe, September 2023

Turkey’s European goals: Prospects and impediments as seen from Brussels
Carnegie Europe, September 2023

Balkans occidentaux: Le cep défend l’idée d’une réforme institutionnelle en vue d’un élargissement rapide de l’Union
Centre de politique européenne, September 2023

A difficult but essential partner: How Ukraine sees Germany
Centre for Eastern Studies, September 2023

The potential impact of Ukrainian accession on the EU’s budget
Centre for European Policy Studies, September 2023

The EU and Ukraine
Clingendael, September 2023

Before it’s too late: How the EU should support the Western Balkans’ EU accession
European Council on Foreign Relations, September 2023

From rhetoric to action on enlargement: A three-pronged way forward
European Policy Centre, September 2023

The perennial question: To widen or to deepen?
European Policy Centre, September 2023

Time for the Georgian dream to deliver Georgia’s dream
European Policy Centre, September 2023

A different way of thinking about EU enlargement and reform
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, Internationale Politik, September 2023

How Germany can realize friend-shoring in its neighbourhood
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, September 2023

Sailing on high seas: Reforming and enlarging the EU for the 21st century
Franco-German working group on EU institutional reform, September 2023

Looking beyond the war: Planning for Ukraine’s reconstruction
Rand Corporation, September 2023

Four big geopolitical tests the European Union faces this year
Atlantic Council, August 2023

The fading star pupil: ten years of Croatia’s membership in the European Union
Centre for Eastern Studies, August 2023

Embracing the Western Balkans’ accession process: A vital question mark for the EU
Fondation Européenne d’Etudes Progressistes, August 2023

Montenegro’s political transition: From Djukanović to where?
Fondation Européenne d’Etudes Progressistes, August 2023

Five things to expect from Spain’s EU presidency
Atlantic Council, July 2023

Russia’s influence in the Balkans: The interplay of religion, politics, and history
Berkeley Center, July 2023

Want Ukraine in the EU? You’ll have to reform the EU, too
Brookings Institution, July 2023

EU enlargement and the resolution of bilateral disputes in the Western Balkans
Centre for European Policy Studies, July 2023

Vision 2030: Four steps towards the new EU enlargement
European Council on Foreign Relations, July 2023

The next European Union member is…
Atlantic Council, June 2023

Overcoming EU accession challenges in Eastern Europe: Avoiding purgatory
Carnegie Europe, June 2023

Eastern Europe joins the Western Balkans: A new start for the EU’s enlargement Policy?
German Marshal Fund, June 2023

Enlargement of the European Union: An unexpected revival
Institut Jacques Delors, June 2023

The legality of a temporal suspension of veto rights for new EU Member States
Open Society Foundation, CEPS, June 2023

European Political Community: Opportunities for the Western Balkans
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, June 2023

Read this briefing on ‘EU enlargement‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marcin Szczepański.

The European Union-United States Trade and Technology Council (TTC), which has met twice a year since 2021, aims to revitalise transatlantic cooperation, boost bilateral trade and investment, and strengthen the parties’ technological and industrial leadership while preserving shared values. The bi-annual ministerial meetings steer cooperation within the TTC and guide its work on areas such as technology standards, secure supply chains, tech regulation, global trade challenges, climate and green technologies, investment screening and export controls. Observers agree that since Russia’s war on Ukraine, the forum has become more geopolitical and strategic in nature, reflecting the growing importance of working out a common position on challenges posed by a rapidly changing world.

The TTC’s first three meetings focused on launching the forum, setting its agenda, and establishing political alignment and convergence of views. The most recent meeting, held in May 2023 in Luleå, (Sweden), is considered by many to have been the most productive so far, with an increasing number of results either materialising or having their pathways established.

The main outcomes included work on emerging technologies (e.g. artificial intelligence, quantum tech, 6G); standardisation (e.g. the standards related to charging heavy-duty electric vehicles); the green transition (e.g. through the EU-US Clean Energy Incentives Dialogue and the Transatlantic Initiative on Sustainable Trade, and through work on critical minerals); trade (e.g. on mutual recognition agreements and conformity assessment initiatives); and economic security tools (investment screening, export controls and economic coercion). The TTC also launched projects supporting the roll-out of digital connectivity in Costa Rica and the Philippines, and measures protecting human rights defenders, promoting a safe online environment for youth and children as well as addressing foreign information manipulation and interference. While a majority of observers welcome the TTC’s shift more towards results, some argue that many of the above initiatives and projects are far from completion, and that the TTC should step up its green transition ambition.

Read the complete briefing on ‘EU-US Trade and Technology Council: Political alignment yields results‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Gisela Grieger.

On 4 October 2023, the European Commission published a notice of initiation of EU anti-subsidy investigations into EU imports of battery electric vehicles (BEVs) from China. This has already been announced by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen during her State of the Union Address on 13 September 2023. She stated that the ‘global market is flooded with cheaper electric vehicles’ the price of which ‘is kept artificially low’ owing to ‘huge state subsidies’. The probe comes after a surge in EU imports of electric vehicles (EVs) from China, outstripping other Chinese export markets. It may result in the Commission levying countervailing tariffs on EU imports of BEVs from China to offset state subsidies, if substantiated, and to level the playing field.

Background on EU anti-subsidy investigations

Anti-subsidy measures seek to offset international trade distortion and are one of three types of EU trade defence instruments (TDIs), which also include anti-dumping and safeguard measures. The EU TDI legislative framework is derived from and thus consistent with the three respective multilateralWorld Trade Organizationagreements. Anti-subsidy probes determine whether there is evidence that a non-EU country offers subsidies to industries exporting certain products to the EU that cause or threaten to cause injury to EU industries manufacturing similar products without benefiting from such subsidies, owing to strict EU State-aid rules. As anti-subsidy probes target state behaviour, they are politically sensitive and the EU uses them less than anti-dumping probes, which target companies instead. This is owing to the lack of transparency around state subsidy flows in non-EU countries and their lack of cooperation. By the end of 2022, 21 anti-subsidy versus 117 anti-dumping measures were in force. The United States (US), by contrast, uses anti-subsidy probes much more often. Investigations are typically triggered by EU industry complaints, but as for BEVs, ex-officio investigations need not arise from complaints if sufficient evidence is available. After investigations of up to 9 months, the Commission may impose provisional, and after 13 months definitive, countervailing tariffs for 5 years. These may be renewed for a similar period once a review proves that injury persists. EU Member States can block definitive tariffs based on a qualified majority of votes.

Why probe EU imports of BEVs from China? BEV exports from China by region, 2018-2022 in € billion

On 4 October 2023, the European Commission formally initiated anti-subsidy investigations into EU imports of BEVs from China. The aim is to establish whether Chinese BEV exporters’ competitive edge is genuine or artificial, and also whether EV imports from China have caused injury or threat of injury to the upscaling of the nascent EU EV industry. The probe alleges a recent surge in imports of EVs, at prices reportedly 20 % lower than those of similar EU products. Low-priced EVs, linked to a fierce price war on the Chinese EV market, may reflect battery oversupply and growing excess capacity in China. Allianz puts the EU car industry’s potential annual loss in net profits due to Chinese competition at above €7 billion by 2030. Figure 1 shows that China’s BEV exports have gone mainly to the EU – rather than to other markets. The US 27.5 % tariff on EVs from China (former US president Donald Trump imposed an additional 25 % on a range of imports from China in 2018 under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974), together with recent US green policies, e.g. the 2022 Inflation Reduction Act subsidies, act as a barrier to US market access, while the 10 % EU EV import duty has a ‘pull’ effect.

EU-China BEV trade, 2018-2022, in € billion

According to the Commission, the share of EVs from China sold in the EU recently jumped from less than 1 % to 8 %. This share could soar to 15 % by 2025. European car association ACEA suggests that the share of BEVs from China in total EU EV sales rose from 0.4 % in 2019 to 3.7 % in 2022. Various sources have stressed that Chinese firms’ EV export numbers remain small (e.g. BYD, Nio, and Xpeng), and that two-thirds of EU imports of EVs from China are from legacy EU and US firms manufacturing in China. Nonetheless, Western carmakers’ share of global EV markets has trended downwards (also because of a chips shortage), while BYD and Geely-Volvo have trended upwards. Moreover, EU-China BEV trade is becoming increasingly asymmetric (Figure 2). This has brought back memories of the EU market being flooded, more than a decade ago, with cheap Chinese solar panels, which continues to put pressure on an EU industry from which China had absorbed the technology. There is a sense of urgency for the EU to pre-empt a similar fate for the EU EV industry.

The anti-subsidy probe comes at a time when the EU is running a growing trade deficit with China (it reached an all-time high of almost €400 billion in 2022), which is likely linked in part to practices that call for an assertive use of the EU’s autonomous trade measures, including TDIs, to level the playing field. It also comes at a time when a new dependency on BEV imports from China would run counter to the European economic security strategy call for ‘de-risking’, and the proposed net zero industry act, designed to boost the manufacture of ‘strategic’ net-zero technologies, including solar and battery technologies. On the other hand, the EU has decided to phase out internal combustion engine vehicles by 2035 and to boost the EU’s green transition, spurring EV demand in the EU that Chinese EV firms are eager to tap into, as the Chinese economy continues to slow. Increasing the price of BEV imports from China through additional tariffs may prompt Chinese retaliation, e.g. in the form of export controls undercutting the EU’s still challenging access to critical raw materials. This may threaten the EU’s wider goal of reaching its Green Deal targets through affordable and widely available green goods.

Where does the Chinese BEV manufacturers’ competitive edge come from?

Chinese EV firms owe their competitive edge to government support and incentive policies that began two decades ago when the EU car industry was still focused on internal combustion engine vehicles, while Chinese R&D investment objectives into BEVs were integrated into the 10th 5-year plan (2001-2005) and the 11th 5-year plan (2007-2010). Speeding up BEV development became one of the ‘leapfrog development‘ priorities of the 12th 5-year plan (2011-2015) and the EV industry was identified as one of the seven strategic emerging industries. The 2015 ‘Made in China 2025‘ strategy includes BEVs as one of 10 strategic industries in which China seeks global leadership by 2049, with 80 % of BEVs to be made in China by 2025. Since 2009, China has used a variety of subsidies to scale up BEV production, boost market penetration, build a BEV charging station infrastructure and achieve global leadership. China’s early 2000s ‘going out policy’ to acquire overseas mining assets (e.g. the 2008 minerals-for-infrastructure deal with the Democratic Republic of Congo known as the Sicomines pact securing China’s access to cobalt supplies), and its 2013 flagship Belt and Road Initiative helped China reach a dominant position in cobalt and lithium refining that it can now leverage.

Stakeholders’ views

Some experts have taken the view that the probe will spark controversy between proponents of the EU’s autonomous trade measures and critics of protectionism. Others have warned that countervailing tariffs would make green goods more expensive, would fail to solve circumvention and competition issues in third markets, and are likely to trigger ‘tit-for-tat’ measures. European car association ACEA has called for a comprehensive industrial strategy to enable EU industry to compete on an equal footing. China’s Ministry of Commerce has criticised the EU probe as a ‘blatantly protectionist act’.

European Parliament position
In its 2021 resolution on a new EU-China strategy Parliament expressed its concern about the ‘increasingly unbalanced bilateral economic and trade relationship between the EU and China’ and stressed that ‘rebalancing and a more level playing field are vital to EU interests’.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘EU anti-subsidy probe into electric vehicle imports from China‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Guillaume Ragonnaud and Marin Mileusnic (1st edition).

In June 2023, the European Commission tabled a proposal for a regulation establishing a new strategic technologies for Europe platform (STEP). STEP would rely on the reprogramming of funds under existing EU instruments. It would also come with an additional budget of €10 billion. Overall, the platform could leverage up to €160 billion in investment, of which €110 billion would be triggered by the top-up. STEP would direct funding to strategic projects supporting the development and manufacturing of deep and digital technologies, clean technologies and biotechnologies, and the strengthening of their value chains, to meet the challenges of the green and digital transitions. This would help the EU limit or prevent strategic dependencies. STEP would be a test for, possible, further steps towards a European sovereignty fund.

The proposal is now in the hands of the co-legislators. In the Parliament, the file was allocated jointly to the Committees on Budgets (BUDG) and Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE) (Rule 58 of Parliament’s Rules of Procedure); they adopted their report on 9 October 2023. The report is due to be put to the vote in plenary during the October II plenary, fixing Parliament’s position for negotiations with the Council, which has not yet adopted its mandate.

Versions

• October 2023: Strategic technologies for Europe platform (STEP) (1st edition)

Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform (‘STEP’) and amending Directive 2003/87/EC, and Regulations (EU) 2021/1058, (EU) 2021/1056, (EU) 2021/1057, (EU) 1303/2013, (EU) 223/2014, (EU) 2021/1060, (EU) 2021/523, (EU) 2021/695, (EU) 2021/697 and (EU) 2021/241Committees responsible:Committee on Budgets (BUDG)
Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE)COM(2023)335 
20.6.2023Rapporteurs:Christian Ehler (EPP, Germany)
José Manuel Fernandes (EPP, Portugal)2023/0199(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Matthias Ecke (S&D, Germany)
Jonás Fernández (S&D, Spain)
Valérie Hayer (Renew, France)
Rasmus Andresen (Greens/EFA, Germany)
Henrike Hahn (Greens/EFA, Germany)
Izabela-Helena Kloc (ECR, Poland)
Bogdan Rzońca (ECR, Poland)
Cornelia Ernst (The Left, Germany)
Younous Omarjee (The Left, France)Ordinary legislative
procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council
on equal footing –
formerly ‘co-decision’)Next steps expected: Vote in plenary

Written by Clare Ferguson with Rebecca Fredrick.

Members gather for the second plenary session of October against a backdrop of continued and worsening geopolitical tension. The agenda features a formal address by Nikol Pashinyan, Prime Minister of Armenia – with Members having recently called for the country to receive all necessary assistance to deal with the humanitarian crisis due to the violence in Nagorno‑Karabakh. Council and Commission representatives are also expected to make statements on the recent Hamas attack against Israel, condemned by President Roberta Metsola as ‘terrorism in its worst form’, and on the effectiveness of EU sanctions on Russia. A Commissioner will respond to Members’ questions regarding EU policy on tackling organised crime during the question time session. Following Council and Commission presentations, Members are scheduled to debate the forthcoming European Council meeting. The president of the Court of Auditors, Tony Murphy, is expected to be present for a debate on the Court’s 2022 annual report.

On Monday evening, Members are set to consider a report jointly adopted by the Committees on Budgets (BUDG) and Foreign Affairs (AFET) on establishing the Ukraine Facility, to support the country’s recovery from Russia’s aggression and its EU ambitions. Sourcing the proposed €50 billion of financial support, in the form of grants and loans, would however necessitate a revision of the EU’s multiannual financial framework. This means that support from EU governments and Parliament must be unanimous. Parliament’s committees wish to see greater ambition and more accountability on use of the funding. They also propose that the Facility enable the use of frozen Russian assets to finance Ukraine’s reconstruction. Agreement on establishing the Ukraine Facility is urgent if the EU is to continue to support Ukraine without interruption in 2024. Parliament’s decision on the file will set its mandate for interinstitutional negotiations with the Council.

Despite Montenegro’s majority support for joining the EU, and with a new prime minister designate (Milojko Spajić, from the ‘Europe Now!’ movement), seeking to form a new government, Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee (AFET) report scrutinising the European Commission’s 2022 report on Montenegro’s progress towards EU accession regrets the country’s failure to build on this support to build consensus. On Tuesday afternoon, Members are expected to debate the AFET report, which expresses particular concern about the consequent delays to the reforms necessary for the country to aspire to EU membership. Nevertheless, AFET welcomes Montenegro’s alignment with the EU on foreign and security policy, particularly on sanctions following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Recent events have heightened the demand for 21st century technologies, such as artificial intelligence, 5G, semiconductors, green technologies and biotechnologies. On Monday evening, Parliament is set to consider a report, drawn up jointly by the Committees on Budgets (BUDG) and on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE), on a proposal to set up a platform on strategic technologies for Europe (STEP) to help ensure EU industry can access the tech it needs. Using reprogrammed EU funding to leverage investment, and with a €10 billion reinforcement from the EU budget, the platform would direct funding to projects strategic to achieving the green and digital transition. The STEP platform should encourage EU development and manufacturing of digital and net-zero technologies, as well as biotechnologies and life sciences and medicines. The report as voted will form Parliament’s position for interinstitutional negotiations with the Council.

All of the above initiatives will require sufficient budget to achieve the EU’s goals. On Tuesday afternoon, Parliament is scheduled to debate the BUDG committee report on amendments to the Council’s position on the draft EU budget for 2024. The report stresses the need for additional funding to address both the economic and social consequences arising from the COVID‑19 pandemic and Russia’s war against Ukraine, the worsening climate crisis and resulting extreme weather events. The BUDG position aligns with Parliament’s position to raise budgetary ceilings in the mid-term revision of the 2021‑2027 multiannual financial framework (MFF), and to integrate funding for STEP (see above), aid, migration and neighbourhood policies – and reverses the Council’s proposed reductions. Once adopted, the report will constitute Parliament’s reading of the 2024 EU budget., and its position for conciliation talks with the Council, which are scheduled to run until 13 November.

Turning to the current year’s budget, on Wednesday, Members are expected to vote on a BUDG committee report on draft amending budget No 3/2023. The BUDG report endorses the Council’s position to update the revenue side of the 2023 EU budget to account for the latest economic forecasts. It also makes adjustments to accommodate expenditure related to the new Defence Industrial Reinforcement Instrument and the European Chips Act; the cancellation of appropriations from the reserve line for the sustainable fisheries partnership; and the reinforcement of the budget of the European Data Protection Supervisor.

And, as every year, the European Parliament continues to closely scrutinise how the EU budget has been implemented. On Tuesday, Members are due to vote on a report by the Committee on Budgetary Control (CONT) which concludes that, due to a lack of cooperation from the Council, it cannot take an informed decision on granting discharge for the European Council and the Council for their 2021 budget, and thus Parliament should reject the discharge for them. The CONT committee calls on the Council to improve its legislative transparency, as it has every year since 2009.

EU citizens are strongly opposed to fur farming, on animal welfare grounds, but also due to the environmental risks of the toxic chemicals used in fur production and the animal waste from intensive farms, not to mention the potential for the development of infectious disease. However, Europe is a major producer of fur products, with Poland, Lithuania, Greece and Finland major producers of farmed mink. On Thursday morning, Members are set to debate a 1.5 million-signature European Citizens’ Initiative, demanding that the EU ban fur farms and their products. While support for a ban on fur farms is overwhelming, the economic consequences for fur farmers will have to be mitigated.

The EU’s common fisheries policy aims to conserve fish stocks and ensure European fishing fleets work in a sustainable manner. An EU fisheries control system makes sure everyone follows the rules, but the current framework has long been due a complete overhaul. On Monday evening, Members are expected to consider an agreement reached with the Council to revise the EU fisheries control system. The new legislation introduces tracking of all fishing vessels, electronic reporting of all catches, monitoring of recreational fisheries and improved product traceability – with CCTV to monitor vessels at high risk of not complying with their obligation to land all catches and conserve fish stocks. Parliament’s negotiators have succeeded in ensuring that the revised legislation will harmonise sanctions for non-compliance throughout the EU, where there are currently wide disparities between countries.

FURTHER READING

European Citizens’ Initiative: ‘Fur free Europe’

New EU fisheries control system

Strategic technologies for Europe platform

2022 report on Montenegro

Establishing the Ukraine Facility

Parliament’s reading of the 2024 EU budget

Discharge for the 2021 budget: European Council and CouncilAmending budget 3/2023: Revenue, Defence Industrial Reinforcement Instrument and European Chips Act

Written by Ivana Katsarova (1st edition).

On 5 July 2023, the Commission tabled a proposal for a regulation on certain new genomic techniques (NGTs). It establishes two categories of plants obtained by NGTs: plants comparable to naturally occurring or conventional plants, and plants with modifications that are more complex. The two categories will be subject to different requirements to reach the market, taking into account their different characteristics and risk profiles.

Feedback from stakeholders is mixed. While industry interest groups hailed the ‘game-changing proposals’ bringing innovation in plant breeding, the organic food and farming movement criticised the Commission’s plan to take NGTs out of the existing legal framework, as it could leave organic food systems unprotected.

In Parliament, the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI) is responsible for the file under the co-decision procedure.

Versions

• October 2023: Plants produced by new genomic techniques (1st edition)

Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on plants obtained by certain new genomic techniques and their food and feed, and amending Regulation (EU) 2017/625Committee responsible:Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI)COM(2023)411 final
05.07.2023Rapporteur:Jessica Polfjärd (EPP, Sweden)2023/0226(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Christophe Clergeau (S&D, France)
Pietro Fiocchi (ECR, Italy)
Silvia Sardone (ID, Italy)Ordinary legislative
procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council
on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’)Next steps expected: Publication of draft report

Written by Marcin Grajewski.

In her annual State of the Union speech to the European Parliament on 13 September, the European Commission’s President, Ursula von der Leyen announced an anti-subsidy probe into Chinese electric vehicles, steps to be taken to help Europe’s wind industry as well as measures to make business easier for small companies and to address the problem of labour shortages.

Von der Leyen presented her Commission as a promoter of European business and green policies, as she set out its track-record ahead of elections to the European Parliament next year. ‘In a world of uncertainty, Europe once again must answer the call of history’, she said about a wide range of policies, notably the EU’s support for Ukraine, green energy development and defence of business against unfair competition.

The Commission’s investigation could lead to countervailing duties to protect EU producers against cheaper Chinese electric vehicle imports if they are deemed to benefit from excessive state subsidies. Von der Leyen reiterated the EU’s unwavering support for Ukraine in its struggle against Russia’s military aggression, and the possibility of the country’s EU accession one day.

This note offers links to recent commentaries and reports from international think tanks on the State of the Union and related issues. Topical papers on the war on Ukraine can be found in a recent edition of What Think Tanks are Thinking.

Reactions to the State of the Union speech

The tyranny of EU treaties
Bruegel, September 2023

Making the most of Europe’s anti-subsidy probe into Chinese electric vehicles
Bruegel, September 2023

State of the Union: From Putin’s war to a trade war?
Centre for European Reform, September 2023

Rescue mission: Von der Leyen’s call of history and the rules-based global order
European Council on Foreign Relations, September 2023

The Commission’s balance sheet is positive, but the level of ambition is still too low
European Policy Centre, September 2023

Assessing the European Citizens’ Panels: Greater ambition needed
European Policy Centre, September 2023

Dear Commission President, a good speech on the State of the Union but what about defending it?
Friends of Europe, September 2023

How upbeat should the EU’s messaging be?
Friends of Europe, September 2023

Sailing on high seas: Reforming and enlarging the EU for the 21st century
Jacques Delors Institute, September 2023

Earlier publications:

The State of the European Union speech must address the return of economic policy trade-offs
Bruegel, September 2023

A new governance framework to safeguard the European Green Deal
Bruegel, September 2023

Making sense of the European Commission’s fiscal governance reform plan
Bruegel, September 2023

Can the EU be a global player?
Carnegie Europe, September 2023

Entre inflation et croissance: Pour une BCE au service de la puissance et de l’autonomie stratégique européenne
Fondation Robert Schuman, September 2023

Europe, passer à l’Union pour répondre aux citoyens
Institut français des relations internationales, September 2023

Bipolar, multipolar, nonpolar all at once: Our world at the time of the Russia–Ukraine war
Istituto Affari Internazionali, September 2023

The crisis governance of the European Union
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, September 2023

Four big geopolitical tests the European Union faces this year
Atlantic Council, August 2023

A roadmap for European asylum and refugee integration policy
Brookings Institution, August 2023

The war in Ukraine is about Europe’s future
Carnegie Europe, August 2023

The BRICS summit and Europe’s China challenge: A better EU offer for the global south
European Council on Foreign Relations, August 2023

Onwards and outwards: Why the EU needs to move from strategic autonomy to strategic interdependence
European Council on Foreign Relations, August 2023

The tech standards that shape the future: How Europeans should respond to China’s rising influence
European Council on Foreign Relations, August 2023

EU-Ukraine wartime trade: Overcoming difficulties, forging a European path
European Policy Centre, August 2023

Regional actor, global: Can the EU get the best of both worlds?
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Centre for European Policy Studies, August 2023

Development aid and geopolitics: the EU’s Global Gateway initiative
Real Instituto Elcano, August 2023

Strategic security and critical raw materials: The role of the European Investment Bank
Istituto Affari internazionali, August 2023

Want Ukraine in the EU? You’ll have to reform the EU, too
Brookings Institution, July 2023

Ukraine has not transformed EU foreign policy
Carnegie Europe, July 2023

EU enlargement and the resolution of bilateral disputes in the Western Balkans
Centre for European Policy Studies, July 2023

The legality of a temporal suspension of veto rights for new EU Member States
Centre for European Policy Studies, July 2023

Building UK-EU bridges: Convergent China policies
Centre for European Reform, July 2023

EU migration policy: Another Groundhog Day?
Egmont, July 2023

Unlocking Global Gateway towards the Green Transition
Egmont, July 2023

If the EU was a State in the United States: Comparing Economic Growth between EU and US States
European Centre for International Political Economy, July 2023

Spirit of ambition: The Ukraine war and European defence integration
European Council on Foreign Relations, July 2023

Strengthening the European financial architecture for development through better coordination
European Centre for Development Policy Management, July 2023

Pour les générations qui bougent en Europe, encore tellement d’obstacles. Une odyssée européenne
Fondation Robert Schuman, July 2023

Green Deal watch, No. 10
Istituto Affari Internazionali, July 2023

EU tackles changes in global economic competition
Polish Institute of International Affairs, July 2023

Rethinking European energy relations in times of crisis
Clingendael, June 2023

Economic security: A new EU paradigm?
European Policy Centre, June 2023

What would Europeans want a European defence union to look like?
Bruegel, June 2023

European strategic autonomy 2.0: What Europe needs to get right
Carnegie Europe, June 2023

What the Russian crisis means for Europe
Carnegie Europe, June 2023

The European Political Community from Paris to Chisinau: An idea taking shape?
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, June 2023

How stringent would the new Stability and Growth Pact be? And for who?
Jacques Delors Institute, June 2023

The international role of the euro remains stable, but it needs more attention
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, June 2023

An assessment of the state of the EU Schengen Area and its external borders
Centre for European Policy Studies, May 2023

The European Political Community: From Prague to Chisinau and beyond
European Policy Centre, May 2023

EU convergence: Geographical dimension, impact of COVID-19 and the role of policy
Centre for European Policy Studies, April 2023

Europe’s policies for a green transition: The European Commission’s geopolitical turn and its pitfalls
Finnish Institute for International Affairs, April 2023

Commission and Parliament propose changes to electoral law in the EU
Polish Institute of International Affairs, April 2023

Read this briefing on ‘State of the Union‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Nera Kuljanic and Mihalis Kritikos.

Algorithm-generated diets tailored to our individual needs could bring health benefits, but at the cost of having to share our most personal data, such as our DNA. The promises are many, but so are the open questions about interactions between genes, nutrients, environment and health, and the role of socioeconomic factors underlying food choices. Precision nutrition advice, services and products will need to be governed by a range of laws and policies, as they are at the intersection between food and medicine.

What we eat and drink can be adapted to help us live with conditions such as coeliac disease, phenylketonuria and lactose intolerance, and healthy diets are an important factor in preventing non-communicable diseases such as cardiovascular diseases, type-2 diabetes and cancer. However, it is becoming increasingly clear that there is no one-size-fits-all solution when it comes to dietary recommendations. Nutrigenomics studies the relationships between nutrients, diet, gene expression and, subsequently, health. Coupled with developments in advanced technologies, such as artificial intelligence and big data, this points to a future where our diets could be specifically tailored to our individual profiles for better health outcomes. Could such precisely personalised diets become a part of precision medicine, helping us to live longer and healthier lives?

Potential impacts and developments

Rapid advances in this area have been made possible thanks to data science. The use of smart phones allows easier tracking of food and medicine intake, and biosensors of all kinds can monitor movement, sleep, blood parameters, the presence of infection and the effects of treatment. Biochemical and genetic assays can screen the human genome, the metabolome (small molecules involved in metabolism), and the microbiome (microbes living on and inside the human body). ‘Deep phenotyping‘ can unveil previously unknowable details of disease in individuals. The cost of such analysis is decreasing. At the same time, data processing capacities are growing thanks to advanced algorithms that extract meaningful patterns from big data. For example, one algorithm has been trained to predict the glycaemic response after a meal, on the basis of blood parameters, dietary habits, anthropometrics, physical activity and gut microbiota. In a modified diet based on this algorithm, test subjects improved their blood glucose levels and microbiota configuration. Research also shows that individuals, even identical twins, may respond differently to the same foods. This is where precision nutrition comes in, as it seeks to understand and manipulate the complex relationships between an individual’s metabolism, microbiome, genome, phenotype (the observable physical properties of an organism), lifestyle, and outside influences on the one hand, and their nutrition on the other.

The potential is fascinating but, for now, the science is not reliable enough to support precision nutrition services. More research and stronger evidence are required before scientists will be able to point out with confidence, and algorithms effectively predict, gene-diet-health relationships and outcomes. Before precision nutrition can become a reality, desired health outcomes and ways to identify and measure them will need to be defined. This will be highly important for people suffering from several or particularly complex health problems. For them, the same nutrients or foods may help with one issue, but worsen others, which means that the algorithms would have to ‘know’ what to prioritise when giving dietary advice. Moreover, as we grow older and our bodies and health change, we will have to regularly re-evaluate our needs and our bodies’ responses.

Another question is what conditions, health problems or genetic predispositions can really be influenced by diet. We eat a wide variety of foods, and our biology has a complex relationship with the factors shaping our environment. This alone represents a great challenge for nutrigenomic research. Furthermore, groups with a low socioeconomic status often make less healthy food choices. Precision nutrition advice alone is unlikely to help this situation. It remains to be seen whether such interventions could play a role in countering the obesity epidemic and decreasing public healthcare costs.

A range of soft impacts – such as more pressure to adapt to trendy, healthy behaviours, with related problems of self-image – is also probable. Preparing and eating food plays a strong social and psychological role. As we hand over more authority and autonomy to algorithms, any deviation from the prescribed diet may leave us with a feeling of guilt, draining some of the joy we get from food. Finally, focusing excessively on molecular-level health outcomes by following nutrition advice may affect our perception of health.

Another challenge relates to consumer protection: claims linking genetic information and dietary advice with effects on health need to be evidence-based and at the same time easy for ordinary people to understand. Ultimately, consumer acceptance of this technology will depend on whether the precision nutrition approach delivers clear benefits, with acceptable trade-offs (e.g. sharing of personal data) and price.

Nevertheless, early applications could target groups that have similar dietary requirements or roughly the same health status (for instance, pregnant women or the elderly), or provide information on how our bodies react to specific foods. More futuristic scenarios may involve continuous data gathering facilitated by omnipresent sensors in our living space, and in and/or on our bodies, to calculate optimal daily nutrition requirements and send the information directly to our household food printer.

Anticipatory policymaking

Neither the EU nor its Member States have legal instruments dealing specifically with precision nutrition services. To fill the gap, various existing pieces of legislation could be applied and some new ones may have to be adopted. One of the key challenges is that personalised nutrition is at the intersection between food and medicine, because some personalised nutrition products could help a person prevent the development of a disease to which they are genetically predisposed.

From a legal and regulatory perspective, there are several important aspects that need to be considered. Precision nutrition services are data intensive, as they rely on personal health data and genetic data for the advice they provide. This triggers questions about data protection, privacy and intellectual ownership. Whether it is developing and selling services and products or collecting data through medical devices and genetic testing, all these activities need to meet a set of rules and standards. Marketing activities – such as advice and claims about health effects made as part of precision nutrition services – would have to be regulated as well, to ensure that the information supplied to consumers is evidence-based and not misleading. Similar rules are already built into the Regulation on nutrition and health claims for foods. Protecting those receiving precision nutrition advice may mean adapting the consumer rights framework.

The research behind precision nutrition needs financial support to gather consistent high-quality evidence about why and how people respond differently to the same food, and what kind of approaches are effective and for whom. The cost of the benefits people can obtain from such hyper-personalised dietary advice will largely define its accessibility to those outside a small group of wealthy users. Nevertheless, even with affordable effective precision nutrition services, a broad set of policy measures is needed to make healthy eating and lifestyle choices easy and safe for everyone.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘What if algorithms decided what we should eat by looking at our DNA?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Listen to podcast ‘What if algorithms decided what we should eat by looking at our DNA?‘ on YouTube.

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Citizens are calling on the European Parliament to strengthen its transparency rules. Many citizens have written to the President of the European Parliament on this subject in September 2023. The European Parliament has swiftly taken a number of measures to strengthen its integrity, independence and accountability throughout 2023. 

We replied to citizens who took the time to write to the President (in English, French, German, Spanish, Finnish, Croatian, Hungarian, Dutch and Portuguese):

English

The European Parliament has swiftly taken a number of measures to strengthen its integrity, independence and accountability throughout 2023, while protecting Members of the European Parliament’s free mandate. These measures include: 

• An awareness-raising campaign on ethics and transparency obligations for Members and staff. Compliance and whistleblowing training will also be introduced.
• A six-month cooling-off period for former Members of Parliament following the end of their mandate for those who wish to lobby Parliament. Current Members are also banned from engaging with former Members who have left Parliament in the previous six months.
• Mandatory registration in the Transparency Register for any event on European Parliament premises in which interest representatives participate (12 000 events per year will be subject to the new rules).
• Members must declare a conflict of interest immediately. All Members taking a lead role on a file must submit a declaration of any conflict of interests.
• All Members and staff who have an active role on a file must declare meetings with diplomatic representatives of non-EU countries and with other interest representatives.
• Tighter rules on ‘unofficial groupings’ such as friendship groupings with non-EU countries where official Parliamentary interlocutors already exist and such groupings could cause confusion.
• Stricter rules for access to Parliament’s premises including registration of all visitors entering the Parliament.
• Access badges for former Members will be allocated on a daily rather than permanent basis.
• More transparency on Members’ employment elsewhere and their outside activities, with a revised declaration form on financial interests providing greater detail. Any remuneration over €5 000 per year must be declared in a detailed manner.
• A more powerful role for theAdvisory Committee on the Conduct of Members
• Stronger cooperation with national authorities to boost the fight against corruption.
• More severe penalties in cases of a serious breach of the rules. Members could lose up to 60 days of daily allowance (twice the current 30 days), and be banned from representing the European Parliament in delegations or conferences for up to a year. 
• Tighter rules on gifts valued above €150 and on declaring travel/daily allowances paid by third parties.
• Members must declare their assets at the beginning and end of every term of office (irrespective of requirements under national law).

How the measures were decided

The European Parliament adopted these new measures in several ways, by:

• European Parliament Bureau (senior Members of the European Parliament) decisions strengthening integrity, independence and accountability (See a detailed overview and press release on some of the new measures adopted in July 2023).
• European Parliament resolution to modify Parliament’s Rules of Procedure, with a view to strengthening integrity, independence and accountability (See procedural details in the Legislative Observatory; video of the parliamentary debate; text of the parliamentary debate; press release on the changes to the Rules of Procedure, from September 2023).
• Special Parliamentary Committee (ING2) investigation into disinformation, and the strengthening of integrity, transparency and accountability in the European Parliament (See resolution and press release of July 2023).

Proposed EU ethics body

The European Parliament has long called for the establishment of an independent EU ethics body with investigative powers. In a resolution adopted in July 2023, Parliament regrets that the initial European Commission proposal on an EU ethics body lacked ambition, and called for the body to have stronger investigative powers (for more information, see the press release and the Legislative Observatory). [BD1] 

French

Le Parlement européen a rapidement pris un certain nombre de mesures visant à renforcer son intégrité, son indépendance et sa responsabilité tout au long de l’année 2023, tout en protégeant le libre mandat des députés au Parlement européen. Ces mesures sont notamment les suivantes: 

• Une campagne de sensibilisation aux obligations en matière d’éthique et de transparence pour les députés et le personnel. Des formations axées sur la conformité et la dénonciation des dysfonctionnements seront également mises en place.
• Une période de carence de six mois pour les anciens députés après la fin de leur mandat pour ceux qui souhaitent exercer des activités de lobbying auprès du Parlement. Il est également interdit aux députés actuels de dialoguer avec les anciens députés qui ont quitté le Parlement au cours des six derniers mois.
• L’inscription obligatoire au registre de transparence pour tout événement dans les locaux du Parlement européen auquel participent des représentants d’intérêts (12 000 manifestations par an seront soumises aux nouvelles règles).
• L’obligation pour les députés de déclarer immédiatement un conflit d’intérêts. Tous les députés jouant un rôle de premier plan dans un dossier sont tenus de présenter une déclaration de conflit d’intérêts, le cas échéant.
• L’obligation pour tous les députés et membres du personnel jouant un rôle actif dans un dossier de déclarer les réunions organisées avec les représentants diplomatiques de pays tiers et avec d’autres représentants d’intérêts.
• Des règles plus strictes concernant les «groupements non officiels», tels que les groupements d’amitié avec des pays tiers où des interlocuteurs parlementaires officiels existent déjà et de tels groupements pourraient prêter à confusion.
• Des règles plus strictes pour l’accès aux locaux du Parlement, y compris l’enregistrement de tous les visiteurs entrant dans le Parlement.
• Des badges d’accès pour les anciens députés attribués sur une base quotidienne et non permanente.
• Davantage de transparence sur l’emploi et les activités extérieurs des députés, avec un formulaire de déclaration révisé qui demande plus de détails sur les intérêts financiers. Toute rémunération supérieure à 5 000 EUR par an doit être déclarée de manière détaillée.
• Un rôle renforcé pour le comité consultatif sur la conduite des députés.
• Une meilleure coopération avec les autorités nationales afin de renforcer la lutte contre la corruption.
• Des sanctions plus sévères en cas d’infraction grave aux règles. Les députés pourraient perdre jusqu’à 60 jours d’indemnité journalière (le double des 30 jours actuels) et se voir interdire de représenter le Parlement européen dans les délégations ou les conférences pendant une durée maximale d’un an. 
• Des règles plus strictes en ce qui concerne les cadeaux d’une valeur supérieure à 150 EUR et la déclaration des indemnités journalières/de voyage versées par des tiers.
• L’obligation pour les députés de déclarer leur patrimoine au début et à la fin de chaque mandat (indépendamment des exigences du droit national).

Comment ces mesures ont-elles été décidées?

Le Parlement européen a adopté ces nouvelles mesures de plusieurs manières:

• Par des décisions du Bureau du Parlement européen (membres de haut rang du Parlement européen) qui visent à renforcer l’intégrité, l’indépendance et la responsabilité (voir un aperçu détaillé et le communiqué de presse sur certaines des nouvelles mesures adoptées en juillet 2023).
• Par la résolution du Parlement européen qui modifie le règlement intérieur du Parlement en vue de renforcer l’intégrité, l’indépendance et l’obligation de rendre des comptes (voir les détails de procédure dans l’Observatoire législatif; la vidéo du débat parlementaire; le texte du débat parlementaire; le communiqué de presse sur les modifications du règlement intérieur de septembre 2023)
• Par l’enquête de la commission parlementaire spéciale (ING2) sur la désinformation et le renforcement de l’intégrité, de la transparence et de la responsabilité au Parlement européen (voir la résolution et le communiqué de presse de juillet 2023).

Proposition relative à un organisme européen chargé des questions d’éthique

Le Parlement européen demande depuis longtemps la création d’un organisme européen indépendant chargé des questions d’éthique doté de pouvoirs d’enquête. Dans une résolution adoptée en juillet 2023, le Parlement déplore le manque d’ambition de la proposition initiale de la Commission européenne relative à un organisme européen chargé des questions d’éthique et a demandé que cet organisme dispose de pouvoirs d’enquête renforcés (pour de plus amples informations, voir le communiqué de presse et l’Observatoire législatif).

German

Das Europäische Parlament hat rasch mehrere Maßnahmen ergriffen, um seine Integrität, Unabhängigkeit und Rechenschaftspflicht während des gesamten Jahres 2023 zu stärken und gleichzeitig das freie Mandat der Mitglieder des Europäischen Parlaments zu schützen. Hier einige dieser Maßnahmen:

• Eine Sensibilisierungskampagne zu Ethik- und Transparenzpflichten für Mitglieder und Bedienstete. Außerdem sollen es Schulungen zur Einhaltung der Vorschriften und zur Meldung von Missständen geben.
• Eine sechsmonatige Karenzzeit nach Ablauf ihres Mandats für ehemalige Mitglieder des Parlaments, die Lobbyarbeit im Parlament betreiben möchten. Aktuellen Mitgliedern ist es auch untersagt, mit ehemaligen Mitgliedern zusammenzuarbeiten, die in den letzten sechs Monaten aus dem Parlament ausgeschieden sind.
• Obligatorische Registrierung aller Veranstaltungen in den Räumlichkeiten des Europäischen Parlaments, an denen Interessenvertreter teilnehmen, im Transparenzregister (die neue Regelung betrifft 12 000 Veranstaltungen pro Jahr).
• Die Mitglieder müssen Interessenkonflikte umgehend melden. Alle Mitglieder, die eine führende Rolle bei einem Dossier übernehmen, müssen eine Erklärung über etwaige Interessenkonflikte abgeben.
• Alle Mitglieder und Bediensteten, die eine aktive Rolle bei einem Dossier spielen, müssen Treffen mit diplomatischen Vertretern von Staaten außerhalb der EU und anderen Interessenvertretern melden.
• Strengere Vorschriften für sogenannte inoffizielle Gruppierungen wie Freundschaftsgruppen mit Staaten außerhalb der EU, in denen es bereits offizielle parlamentarische Gesprächspartner gibt und derlei Gruppierungen Verwirrung stiften könnten.
• Strengere Vorschriften für den Zugang zu den Räumlichkeiten des Parlaments und Registrierung aller Besucherinnen und Besucher, die das Parlament betreten.
• Zugangsausweise für ehemalige Mitglieder werden für einzelne Tage und nicht dauerhaft ausgestellt.
• Mehr Transparenz mit Blick auf die Arbeitstätigkeit von Mitgliedern an anderen Orten und ihre Nebentätigkeiten durch überarbeitetes, detaillierteres Formular für die Erklärung über die finanziellen Interessen. Vergütungen von mehr als 5 000 EUR pro Jahr sind ausführlich anzugeben.
• Die Rolle des Beratenden Ausschusses zum Verhalten von Mitgliedern wird gestärkt.
• Engere Zusammenarbeit mit den Behörden der Mitgliedstaaten im Interesse der Korruptionsbekämpfung.
• Strengere Sanktionen bei schwerwiegenden Verstößen gegen die Vorschriften. Die Mitglieder könnten bis zu 60 Tagegeldsätze einbüßen (doppelt so viel wie die bisher geltenden 30 Tagegeldsätze) und dürfen das Europäische Parlament in Delegationen oder bei Konferenzen bis zu einem Jahr lang nicht mehr vertreten.
• Strengere Vorschriften für Geschenke, die mehr als 150 EUR wert sind, und für die Meldung von Reise- und Tagegeldern, die von Dritten gezahlt werden.
• Die Mitglieder müssen ihr Vermögen zu Beginn und am Ende jeder Amtszeit angeben (unabhängig von den Anforderungen des nationalen Rechts ihres Mitgliedstaats).

Wie wurden die Maßnahmen beschlossen?

Das Europäische Parlament nahm diese neuen Maßnahmen auf verschiedene Weise an, nämlich durch

• Beschlüsse des Präsidiums des Europäischen Parlaments (leitende Mitglieder des Europäischen Parlaments) zur Stärkung von Integrität, Unabhängigkeit und Rechenschaftspflicht (hier ein ausführlicher Überblick und eine Pressemitteilung zu einigen der im Juli 2023 angenommenen neuen Maßnahmen).
• Entschließung des Europäischen Parlaments zur Änderung der Geschäftsordnung des Europäischen Parlaments zur Stärkung von Integrität, Unabhängigkeit und Rechenschaftspflicht (Einzelheiten zum Verfahren finden Sie bei der Legislativen Beobachtungsstelle;Video der Parlamentsdebatte; Text der Parlamentsdebatte; Pressemitteilung zu den Änderungen der Geschäftsordnung ab September 2023),
• Untersuchung des Sonderausschusses (ING2) zu Desinformation und zur Stärkung der Integrität, Transparenz und Rechenschaftspflicht im Europäischen Parlament (siehe Entschließung und Pressemitteilung vom Juli 2023).

Vorgeschlagenes EU-Ethikgremium

Das Europäische Parlament fordert seit langem die Einrichtung eines unabhängigen EU-Ethikgremiums mit Untersuchungsbefugnissen. In einer im Juli 2023 angenommenen Entschließung bedauerte das Parlament, dass der ursprüngliche Vorschlag der Kommission für ein Ethikgremium der EU nicht weit genug ging, und forderte mehr Untersuchungsbefugnisse für diese Gremium (mehr dazu in dieser Pressemitteilung und bei der Legislativen Beobachtungsstelle).

Spanish

El Parlamento Europeo ha adoptado rápidamente una serie de medidas para reforzar su integridad, independencia y rendición de cuentas a lo largo de 2023, protegiendo al mismo tiempo el libre mandato de los diputados y diputadas al Parlamento Europeo. Entre las medidas se incluyen las siguientes. 

• Una campaña de sensibilización sobre las obligaciones éticas y de transparencia para los diputados y el personal. También se introducirá formación en materia de denuncia de irregularidades y de cumplimiento.
• Un período de reflexión de seis meses para los antiguos diputados al Parlamento Europeo tras el final de su mandato para aquellos que deseen ejercer presión en el Parlamento. También se prohíbe a los diputados actuales colaborar con antiguos diputados que hayan abandonado el Parlamento durante los seis meses anteriores.
• Inscripción obligatoria en el Registro de transparencia de cualquier acto en las instalaciones del Parlamento Europeo en el que participen representantes de intereses (12 000 actos al año estarán sujetos a las nuevas normas).
• Los diputados deben declarar un conflicto de intereses inmediatamente. Todos los diputados que desempeñen un papel principal en un expediente deben declarar todo conflicto de intereses.
• Todos los diputados y miembros del personal que desempeñen un papel activo en un expediente deben declarar sus reuniones con representantes diplomáticos de países que no pertenezcan a la UE y con otros representantes de intereses.
• Normas más estrictas sobre las «agrupaciones no oficiales», como las agrupaciones amistosas con países no pertenecientes a la UE donde ya existen interlocutores parlamentarios oficiales y que, por lo tanto, podrían causar confusión.
• Normas más estrictas para el acceso a las instalaciones del Parlamento, incluido el registro de todos los visitantes que entren en el Parlamento.
• Las tarjetas de acceso para los antiguos diputados se asignarán diariamente y no de forma permanente.
• Mayor transparencia sobre el empleo de los diputados en otros lugares y sobre sus actividades externas, con un formulario de declaración sobre los intereses económicos revisado que ofrezca más detalles. Toda remuneración superior a 5 000 EUR anuales deberá declararse de forma detallada.
• Un papel más importante para el Comité Consultivo sobre la Conducta de los Diputados.
• Una cooperación más estrecha con las autoridades nacionales para reforzar la lucha contra la corrupción.
• Sanciones más severas en caso de infracción grave de las normas. Los diputados podrían perder hasta sesenta días de dietas (el doble de los treinta días actuales) y se les prohibiría representar al Parlamento Europeo en delegaciones o conferencias durante un máximo de un año. 
• Normas más estrictas sobre los obsequios con un valor superior a 150 EUR y sobre la declaración de dietas (incluidas las de viaje) financiadas por terceros.
• Los diputados deben declarar sus activos al principio y al final de cada mandato (con independencia de los requisitos establecidos por la legislación nacional).

Cómo se decidieron las medidas

El Parlamento Europeo aprobó estas nuevas medidas de varias maneras.

• Decisiones de la Mesa del Parlamento Europeo (altos cargos del Parlamento Europeo) sobre el refuerzo de la integridad, la independencia y la rendición de cuentas (véanse un resumen detallado y un comunicado de prensa sobre algunas de las medidas aprobadas en julio de 2023).
• Resolución del Parlamento Europeo para modificar el Reglamento interno del Parlamento con vistas a reforzar la integridad, la independencia y la rendición de cuentas (véanse los detalles del procedimiento en el Observatorio Legislativo; vídeo del debate parlamentario; texto del debate parlamentario; y comunicado de prensa sobre las modificaciones del Reglamento interno, de septiembre de 2023).
• Investigación de la Comisión Especial (ING2) sobre la desinformación y el refuerzo de la integridad, la transparencia y la rendición de cuentas en el Parlamento Europeo (véanse la resolución y el comunicado de prensa de julio de 2023).

Propuesta de un órgano de la UE encargado de las cuestiones de ética

El Parlamento Europeo pide desde hace tiempo la creación de un órgano independiente de la Unión con competencias de investigación encargado de las cuestiones de ética. En una resolución aprobada en julio de 2023, el Parlamento lamentaba la falta de ambición de la propuesta inicial de la Comisión Europea sobre un órgano de la Unión encargado de las cuestiones de ética y pedía que el órgano tuviera mayores competencias de investigación (para más información, véanse el comunicado de prensa y el Observatorio Legislativo).

Finnish

Euroopan parlamentti toteutti vuoden 2023 aikana nopeasti useita toimenpiteitä vahvistaakseen lahjomattomuuttaan, riippumattomuuttaan ja vastuuvelvollisuuttaan suojellen samalla Euroopan parlamentin jäsenten edustajantoimen riippumattomuutta. Näitä toimenpiteitä ovat muun muassa:

• Tiedotuskampanja eettisistä ja avoimuusvelvoitteista jäsenille ja henkilöstölle. Lisäksi otetaan käyttöön sääntöjen noudattamista ja väärinkäytösten paljastamista koskeva koulutus.
• Kuuden kuukauden karenssiaika entisille parlamentin jäsenille heidän toimikautensa päättymisen jälkeen, jos he haluavat harjoittaa lobbaustoimintaa parlamentissa. Nykyiset jäsenet eivät myöskään saa olla yhteydessä entisiin jäseniin, jotka ovat lähteneet parlamentista kuuden edellisten kuukauden aikana.
• Pakollinen rekisteröiminen avoimuusrekisteriin, kun on kyse Euroopan parlamentin tiloissa järjestettävistä tilaisuuksista, joihin edunvalvojat osallistuvat (uudet säännöt koskevat 12 000:ta tapahtumaa vuodessa).
• Jäsenten on ilmoitettava eturistiriidasta välittömästi. Kaikkien jäsenten, jotka ovat vastuussa asiakokonaisuuden valmistelusta, täytyy tehdä ilmoitus mahdollisista eturistiriidoista.
• Kaikkien jäsenten ja henkilöstön, joilla on aktiivinen rooli asiakokonaisuuksien valmistetussa, on ilmoitettava tapaamisista EU:n ulkopuolisten maiden diplomaattisten edustajien ja muiden edunvalvojien kanssa.
• ”Epävirallisia ryhmittymiä” koskevien sääntöjen tiukentaminen. Esimerkkeinä ystävyysryhmät sellaisten EU:n ulkopuolisten maiden kanssa, joissa on jo virallisia parlamentaarisia keskustelukumppaneita, sillä tällaiset ryhmittymät voivat aiheuttaa sekaannusta.
• Tiukemmat säännöt pääsystä parlamentin tiloihin. Esimerkiksi kaikki parlamenttiin saapuvat vierailijat rekisteröidään.
• Kulkuluvat entisille jäsenille myönnetään päiväkohtaisesti eikä pysyvästi.
• Lisää avoimuutta jäsenten työskentelystä muualla ja viranhoitoon kuulumattomista toimista. Taloudellisten sidonnaisuuksien ilmoittamiseen tarkoitettua lomaketta on tarkistettu, ja se nyt yksityiskohtaisempi. Kaikki 5000 euroa vuodessa ylittävät korvaukset on ilmoitettava yksityiskohtaisesti.
• Vahvempi asema jäsenten toimintaa käsittelevälle neuvoa-antavalle komitealle.
• Tiiviimpi yhteistyö kansallisten viranomaisten kanssa korruption torjunnan tehostamiseksi.
• Ankarammat seuraamukset, jos sääntöjä rikotaan vakavasti. Jäsenet voivat menettää jopa 60 päivän päivärahan (kaksinkertainen määrä nykyiseen 30 päivään verrattuna), ja heitä voidaan kieltää edustamasta Euroopan parlamenttia valtuuskunnissa tai konferensseissa enintään vuoden ajan.
• Tiukemmat säännöt, jotka koskevat yli 150 euron arvoisia lahjoja sekä kolmansien osapuolten maksamien matka- ja päivärahojen ilmoittamista.
• Jäsenten on annettava ilmoitus varallisuudestaan kunkin toimikauden alussa ja lopussa (kansallisen lainsäädännön vaatimuksista riippumatta).

Kuinka toimenpiteistä päätettiin

Euroopan parlamentti hyväksyi uudet toimenpiteet monin tavoin:

• Euroopan parlamentin puhemiehistön (Euroopan parlamentin johtavat jäsenet) päätökset lahjomattomuuden, riippumattomuuden ja vastuuvelvollisuuden vahvistamisesta (ks. yksityiskohtainen katsaus ja lehdistötiedote joistakin heinäkuussa 2023 hyväksytyistä uusista toimenpiteistä).
• Euroopan parlamentin päätöslauselma parlamentin työjärjestyksen muuttamisesta lahjomattomuuden, riippumattomuuden ja vastuuvelvollisuuden vahvistamiseksi (ks. menettelyn yksityiskohdat Lainsäädäntövahdista; video parlamentin keskustelusta; parlamentin keskustelun teksti; lehdistötiedote työjärjestyksen muutoksista, syyskuu 2023).
• Parlamentin erityisvaliokunta (ING2) tutkii disinformaatiota sekä lahjomattomuuden, avoimuuden ja vastuuvelvollisuuden vahvistamista Euroopan parlamentissa (ks. päätöslauselma ja lehdistötiedote heinäkuulta 2023).

Ehdotettu EU:n eettinen elin

Euroopan parlamentti on jo pitkään kehottanut perustamaan riippumattoman EU:n eettisen elimen, jolla on tutkintavaltuudet. Parlamentti antoi heinäkuussa 2023 päätöslauselman, jossa se piti valitettavana, ettei alkuperäinen Euroopan komission ehdotus EU:n eettisestä elimestä ollut kunnianhimoinen, ja kehotti vahvistamaan elimen tutkintavaltuuksia (lue lisää lehdistötiedotteesta ja Lainsäädäntövahdista).

Croatian

Europski parlament je brzo poduzeo niz mjera da ojača svoj integritet, neovisnost i odgovornost u 2023. štiteći istodobno slobodni mandat zastupnika u Europskom parlamentu. Neke od mjera su: 

• kampanja podizanja svijesti o obvezama u pogledu etike i transparentnosti za zastupnike i osoblje. Uvest će se također osposobljavanja na temu usklađenosti i zviždača
• šestomjesečno razdoblje mirovanja za bivše zastupnike u Europskom parlamentu nakon isteka njihova mandata za one koji žele lobirati u Parlamentu. Uz to, sadašnjim zastupnicima je zabranjeno surađivati s bivšim zastupnicima koji su napustili Parlament tijekom prethodnih šest mjeseci
• obvezni upis u Registar transparentnosti za bilo koje događanje u prostorima Europskog parlamenta u kojem sudjeluju predstavnici interesnih skupina (nova pravila primjenjivat će se na 12 000 događanja godišnje)
• zastupnici moraju odmah prijaviti sukob interesa svi zastupnici koji imaju glavnu ulogu u nekom predmetu moraju podnijeti izjavu o postojanju bilo kakvog sukoba interesa
• svi zastupnici i osoblje koji imaju aktivnu ulogu u nekom predmetu moraju obavijestiti o sastancima s diplomatskim predstavnicima trećih zemalja i drugim predstavnicima interesnih skupina
• stroža pravila o „neslužbenim skupinama” kao što su prijateljske skupine s trećim zemljama gdje su službeni parlamentarni sugovornici već prisutni i gdje bi takve skupine mogle izazvati zabunu
• stroža pravila za ulazak u prostore Parlamenta uključujući prijavu svih posjetitelja koji ulaze u Parlament
• iskaznice za pristup za bivše zastupnike neće biti trajne, nego će se dodjeljivati na dnevnoj bazi
• više transparentnosti o drugim poslovima zastupnika i njihovim vanjskim aktivnostima s pomoću revidiranog obrasca izjave o financijskim interesima s jasnijim pojedinostima. Svaka naknada veća od 5 000 EUR godišnje mora biti prijavljena na detaljan način
• jača uloga Savjetodavnog odbora o ponašanju zastupnika
• bolja suradnja s nacionalnim vlastima kako bi se potaknula borba protiv korupcije
• strože kazne u ozbiljnim slučajevima kršenja pravila. Zastupnici bi mogli izgubiti dnevnicu za razdoblje do 60 dana (dvostruko više od trenutačnih 30 dana) i dobiti zabranu da predstavljaju Europski parlament u delegacijama ili na konferencijama za razdoblje do jedne godine 
• stroža pravila o darovima čija je vrijednost veća od 150 EUR i o prijavljivanju putnih naknada/dnevnica koje su isplatile treće strane
• zastupnici moraju prijaviti svoju imovinu na početku i kraju svakog mandata (neovisno o uvjetima nacionalnog zakonodavstva).

Kako su mjere uvedene

Europski parlament je uveo nove mjere putem:

• odluke Predsjedništva Europskog parlamenta (stariji zastupnici Europskog parlamenta) za jačanje integriteta, neovisnosti i odgovornosti (pogledajte detaljni opis i priopćenje za medije o nekima od novih mjera uvedenih u srpnju 2023.)
• rezolucije Europskog parlamenta o izmjenama Poslovnika Europskog parlamenta radi jačanja integriteta, neovisnosti i odgovornosti (pogledajte pojedinosti o postupku na internetskim stranicama Zakonodavnog opservatorija, u videozapisu parlamentarne rasprave, tekstu parlamentarne rasprave i priopćenju za medije o izmjenama Poslovnika Europskog parlamenta iz rujna 2023.)
• istrage Posebnog odbora (ING2) o dezinformiranju i jačanju integriteta, transparentnosti i odgovornosti u Europskom parlamentu (pogledajte rezoluciju i priopćenje za medije iz srpnja 2023.)

Prijedlog o osnivanju tijela EU-a za etička pitanja

Europski parlament već duže vrijeme poziva na osnivanje neovisnog tijela EU-a za etička pitanja s istražnim ovlastima. U rezoluciji donesenoj u srpnju 2023. Parlament je izrazio žaljenje što prvi prijedlog Europske komisije o osnivanju tijela EU-a za etička pitanja nije bio dovoljno ambiciozan te je pozvao na osnivanje tijela s jačim istražnim ovlastima (za više informacija pogledajte priopćenje za medije i Zakonodavni opservatorij).

Hugarian

Az Európai Parlament 2023 folyamán számos gyors intézkedést hozott feddhetetlenségének, függetlenségének és elszámoltathatóságának megerősítése érdekében, miközben arról is gondoskodott, hogy az európai parlamenti képviselők továbbra is szabadon gyakorolják megbízatásukat. Ilyen intézkedés például: 

• Tájékoztató kampányok a képviselők és a személyzet etikai és átláthatósági kötelezettségeiről. Új képzések a képviselők részére a megfelelés és a visszaélések bejelentése kapcsán.
• Hat hónapos várakozási időszak a hivatalukból távozó képviselőknek a mandátumuk lejártát követően arra az esetre, ha lobbizni kívánnak a Parlamentben. Az aktív képviselők szintén nem léphetnek kapcsolatba olyan volt képviselőkkel, akik az előző hat hónapban távoztak a Parlamenttől.
• Az Európai Parlament épületeiben tartott minden olyan rendezvény kötelező regisztrálása az átláthatósági nyilvántartásban, amelyen érdekképviselők vesznek részt (az új szabály évi 12 000 rendezvényt érint).
• Az esetleges összeférhetetlenségek haladéktalan bejelentése. A témavezető szerepet betöltő képviselőknek nyilatkozatot kell tenniük a fennálló összes összeférhetetlenségről.
• Egy adott témában aktív képviselőknek és alkalmazottaknak be kell jelenteniük a nem uniós országok diplomáciai képviselőivel és az egyéb érdekképviselőkkel tartott találkozókat.
• Szigorúbb szabályok a „nem hivatalos csoportosulásokra”, például azokra a nem uniós országokkal kialakított baráti csoportosulásokra, amelyekkel párhuzamosan már létezik hivatalos parlamenti tárgyalópartner az adott országban, és amelyek így megtévesztőek lehetnek.
• Szigorúbb szabályok a Parlament épületeibe való belépésre, többek között a Parlamentbe belépő valamennyi látogató kötelező nyilvántartásba vétele.
• Napi belépőkártyák a volt képviselőknek állandó belépők helyett.
• Fokozott átláthatóság a képviselők Parlamenten kívüli foglalkoztatása és külső tevékenységei tekintetében, többek között a pénzügyi érdekeltségeikről szóló részletesebb, átdolgozott nyilatkozat révén. A képviselőknek minden évi 5000 eurót meghaladó díjazásról részletes nyilatkozatot kell tenniük.
• Több hatáskör a képviselők magatartásával foglalkozó tanácsadó bizottság számára.
• Szorosabb együttműködés a Parlament és a nemzeti hatóságok között a korrupció elleni küzdelem fokozásához.
• Súlyosabb szankciók a szabályok súlyos megsértése esetén. A képviselők a jelenlegi 30 nap helyett 60 napi napidíjtól eshetnek el, és akár egy évig nem képviselhetik az Európai Parlamentet küldöttségi látogatásokon vagy konferenciákon.
• Szigorúbb szabályok a 150 eurót meghaladó értékű ajándékokra és a harmadik felek által fizetett utazások/napidíjak bejelentésére.
• Kötelező nyilatkozat a vagyoni eszközökről a képviselők megbízatásának kezdetén és végén (a nemzeti jog követelményeitől függetlenül).

Kik és hogyan hozták meg ezeket az intézkedéseket?

Az Európai Parlamenten belül több fronton is történtek lépések:

• Az Európai Parlament Elnökségének tagjai (az Európai Parlament vezető tisztségviselői) határozatokat fogadtak el a feddhetetlenség, a függetlenség és az elszámoltathatóság megerősítéséről (a 2023 júliusában elfogadott új intézkedések egy részéről itt talál részletes áttekintést és sajtóközleményt).
• Az Európai Parlament állásfoglalást fogadott el a Parlament eljárási szabályzatának módosításáról, hogy erősítse feddhetetlenségét, függetlenségét és elszámoltathatóságát (az eljárás részleteit lásd: Jogalkotási Figyelő; a parlamenti vita felvételről; a parlamenti vitáról készült jegyzőkönyv; az eljárási szabályzat módosításáról szóló sajtóközlemény, 2023. szeptember).
• Parlamenti különbizottság (ING2) folytatott belső vizsgálatot a dezinformációról, valamint a feddhetetlenség, az átláthatóság és az elszámoltathatóság Európai Parlamenten belüli megerősítéséről (lásd a 2023 júliusában elfogadott állásfoglalást és a kapcsolódó sajtóközleményt).

Javaslat egy uniós etikai testület felállítására

Az Európai Parlament régóta szorgalmazza egy vizsgálati hatáskörrel rendelkező független uniós etikai testület létrehozását. A Parlament egy 2023 júliusában elfogadott állásfoglalásában sajnálatosnak tartotta, hogy az uniós etikai testület létrehozására irányuló eredeti bizottsági javaslat nem kellőképpen ambiciózus. A képviselők nagyobb vizsgálati hatáskört kértek a leendő testületnek (további információkért lásd a kapcsolódó sajtóközleményt és a Jogalkotási Figyelőt).

Dutch

Het Europees Parlement heeft snel een aantal maatregelen genomen om zijn integriteit, onafhankelijkheid en verantwoordingsplicht in 2023 te versterken en tegelijkertijd het vrije mandaat van de Parlementsleden te beschermen. Het gaat onder meer om de volgende maatregelen: 

• Een bewustmakingscampagne over ethische en transparantieverplichtingen voor Parlementsleden en personeel. Ook komen er trainingen over de naleving van de regels en klokkenluiden.
• Een afkoelingsperiode van zes maanden na afloop van hun ambtstermijn voor voormalige Parlementsleden die bij het Parlement willen lobbyen. Daarnaast mogen de huidige leden geen contact hebben met voormalige leden die het Parlement in de afgelopen zes maanden hebben verlaten.
• Verplichte inschrijving in het Transparantieregister voor elk evenement in de Parlementsgebouwen waaraan belangenvertegenwoordigers deelnemen. Deze nieuwe regels zullen van toepassing zijn op 12 000 evenementen per jaar.
• De leden moeten een belangenconflict onmiddellijk melden. Alle leden die een leidende rol spelen in een dossier moeten een verklaring inzake belangenconflicten indienen.
• Alle Parlementsleden en personeelsleden die een actieve rol spelen in een dossier moeten vergaderingen melden met diplomatieke vertegenwoordigers van niet-EU-landen en met andere belangenvertegenwoordigers.
• Strengere regels voor “niet-officiële groeperingen”, zoals vriendschapsgroeperingen met landen van buiten de EU waar er al officiële parlementaire gesprekspartners zijn en zulke groeperingen verwarring kunnen veroorzaken.
• Strengere regels voor de toegang tot de gebouwen van het Parlement. Alle bezoekers die het Parlement binnenkomen, moeten zich registreren.
• Toegangspassen voor voormalige leden zullen niet meer op een permanente, maar op een dagelijkse basis worden toegewezen.
• Meer transparantie over functies van de leden buiten het Parlement en hun nevenactiviteiten, samen met een gedetailleerder herzien opgaveformulier over financiële belangen. Elke bezoldiging van meer dan 5000 euro per jaar moet in detail worden opgegeven.
• Een sterkere rol voor het raadgevend comité voor het gedrag van de leden.
• Nauwere samenwerking met de nationale autoriteiten om de strijd tegen corruptie op te voeren.
• Strengere straffen bij ernstige schendingen van de regels. De leden kunnen tot zestig dagen dagvergoeding verliezen − tweemaal zoveel als de huidige dertig dagen − en mogen het Europees Parlement tot maximaal een jaar niet vertegenwoordigen in delegaties of conferenties. 
• Striktere regels voor geschenken die meer dan 150 euro waard zijn en voor het vermelden van reis- en dagvergoedingen die door derden worden betaald.
• De leden moeten aan het begin en het einde van elke ambtstermijn een verklaring van hun vermogen geven, ongeacht de vereisten van het nationale recht.

Hoe zijn deze maatregelen tot stand gekomen?

Het Europees Parlement heeft deze nieuwe maatregelen op verschillende manieren vastgesteld, namelijk door

• besluiten van het Bureau van het Europees Parlement, dat bestaat uit hooggeplaatste Parlementsleden, om de integriteit, onafhankelijkheid en verantwoordingsplicht van het Parlement te versterken. Meer informatie vindt u in dit gedetailleerde overzicht en het persbericht over enkele van de nieuwe maatregelen die in juli 2023 zijn vastgesteld.
• de resolutie van het Europees Parlement om het Reglement van het Parlement te wijzigen voor meer integriteit, onafhankelijkheid en een grotere verantwoordingsplicht. Details van het reglement zijn terug te vinden in het Wetgevingsobservatorium, de video van het parlementair debat, het verslag van het parlementair debat, het persbericht over de wijzigingen van het Reglement van het Parlement van september 2023.
• het onderzoek van de Bijzondere Commissie buitenlandse inmenging over desinformatie en de versterking van de integriteit, transparantie en verantwoordingsplicht in het Europees Parlement. Meer informatie vindt u in de resolutie en het persbericht van juli 2023.

Voorgesteld ethisch orgaan van de EU

Het Europees Parlement heeft lang gepleit voor de oprichting van een onafhankelijk ethisch orgaan van de EU met onderzoeksbevoegdheden. Het Europees Parlement betreurde in een aangenomen resolutie van juli 2023 het gebrek aan ambitie van het voorstel van de Europese Commissie voor een ethisch orgaan van de EU. In de resolutie pleitte het Parlement voor een orgaan met meer onderzoeksbevoegdheden. Voor meer informatie kunt u het persbericht en het Wetgevingsobservatorium raadplegen.

Portuguese

O Parlamento Europeu tomou rapidamente uma série de medidas para reforçar a sua integridade, independência e responsabilização ao longo de 2023, protegendo simultaneamente o mandato livre dos deputados ao Parlamento Europeu. Estas medidas incluem: 

• uma campanha de sensibilização para as obrigações éticas e de transparência dos deputados e do pessoal. Realizar-se-ão também ações de formação em matéria de conformidade e denúncia de irregularidades;
• um período de incompatibilidade de seis meses para os antigos deputados após o termo do seu mandato, para aqueles que pretendam exercer a atividade de lóbi junto do Parlamento. Os atuais deputados estão igualmente proibidos de dialogar com antigos deputados que tenham saído do Parlamento nos seis meses anteriores;
• inscrição obrigatória no Registo de Transparência para todos os eventos nas instalações do Parlamento Europeu em que participem representantes de interesses (12 000 eventos por ano serão sujeitos às novas regras);
• os deputados devem declarar imediatamente um conflito de interesses. Todos os deputados que assumam um papel principal num dossiê devem apresentar uma declaração de conflito de interesses;
• todos os deputados e pessoal que desempenhem um papel ativo num dossiê devem declarar reuniões com representantes diplomáticos de países terceiros e com outros representantes de interesses;
• regras mais rigorosas para os «agrupamentos não oficiais», como os agrupamentos de amizade com países terceiros, onde já existem interlocutores parlamentares oficiais, podendo esses agrupamentos causar confusão;
• regras mais rigorosas para o acesso às instalações do Parlamento, incluindo o registo de todos os visitantes que entram no Parlamento;
• os cartões de acesso aos antigos deputados serão atribuídos diariamente e não de forma permanente;
• maior transparência no que respeita ao emprego dos deputados noutros locais e às suas atividades externas, com um formulário de declaração revisto e mais detalhado sobre os interesses financeiros. Qualquer remuneração superior a 5 000 euros por ano deve ser declarada de forma pormenorizada;
• um fortalecimento do papel doComité Consultivo sobre a Conduta dos Deputados;
• reforço da cooperação com as autoridades nacionais para reforçar a luta contra a corrupção;
• sanções mais severas em caso de violação grave das regras. Os deputados podem perder até 60 dias de ajudas de custo (o dobro dos atuais 30 dias) e ser proibidos de representar o Parlamento Europeu em delegações ou conferências durante um período máximo de um ano; 
• regras mais rigorosas em matéria de presentes de valor superior a 150 euros e de declaração de despesas de deslocação/ajudas de custo diárias pagas por terceiros;
• os deputados devem declarar os seus bens no início e no fim de cada mandato (independentemente dos requisitos previstos na legislação nacional).

Como foram decididas as medidas

O Parlamento Europeu adotou estas novas medidas de várias formas, através:

• das decisões da Mesa do Parlamento Europeu (destacados deputados ao Parlamento) que reforçam a integridade, a independência e a responsabilização (ver uma panorâmica pormenorizada e um comunicado de imprensa sobre algumas das novas medidas adotadas em julho de 2023);
• da resolução do Parlamento Europeu sobre a alteração ao Regimento do Parlamento, com vista a reforçar a integridade, a independência e a responsabilização (ver pormenores processuais no Observatório Legislativo, no vídeo do debate parlamentar, no texto do debate parlamentar e no comunicado de imprensa sobre as alterações ao Regimento, de setembro de 2023);
• da investigação da comissão parlamentar especial (ING2) sobre a desinformação e o reforço da integridade, da transparência e da responsabilização no Parlamento Europeu (ver resolução e comunicado de imprensa de julho de 2023).

Proposta de um organismo de ética da UE

Há muito que o Parlamento Europeu apelou à criação de um organismo de ética independente da UE, com poderes de investigação. Numa resolução aprovada em julho de 2023, o Parlamento lamenta que a proposta inicial da Comissão Europeia relativa a um organismo de ética da UE não tenha sido ambiciosa e apelou a que o organismo disponha de poderes de investigação mais fortes (para mais informações, consultar o comunicado de imprensa e o Observatório Legislativo).

Background

Citizens often send messages to the President of the European Parliament expressing their views and/or requesting action. The Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (AskEP) within the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) replies to these messages, which may sometimes be identical as part of wider public campaigns.

Citizens have expressed concern regarding the proposal to revise EU rules on driving licences. Many citizens have written to the European Parliament on this subject since September 2023, contesting the introduction of medical examinations for elderly drivers, new restrictions on novice drivers and changes in the maximum weight for vehicles that can be driven with a category B driving licence.

We replied to the citizens who took the time to write to the European Parliament (in German):

English The European Commission proposal

Given the still unacceptably high number of road deaths in the European Union, in 2017, EU transport ministers called on the European Commission to take action.

The Commission presented a legislative proposal for changes to the law on driving licenses, aimed at reducing the number of accidents and, in particular, the number of road deaths. The proposal was based on a comprehensive assessment of the impact of the changes, written in English and based on numerous academic studies on the issue.

Among other things, the impact assessment states that age is a key factor in determining a person’s mental and physical fitness to drive and their risk of being involved in a car accident. Driving licences for people over the age of 70 should therefore be renewed every five years, with the person being required to pass an examination verifying their competence as a driver before having their license renewed. In most EU countries, the validity of driving licenses is limited, and the proposed revision of the law would make this validity the same throughout the EU.

As new drivers also cause a higher than average number of accidents, training standards should be higher and a probationary period of at least two years should be introduced, during which a zero-tolerance approach would apply to driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs. That said, EU countries can allow people to learn to drive at age 17.

The proposal would set vehicle weight restrictions for holders of category B driving licences at 3 500 kg. However, after a two-year trial period the weight limit would increase to 4 250 kg – but only for electric vehicles.

All the documents published on this proposed revision of EU law are available on the European Commission’s ‘Revision of the Driving Licence Directive‘ website.

Consideration of the proposal at the European Parliament

The Committee on Transport and Tourism (TRAN) is working on this topic at the European Parliament.

The draft report drawn up by rapporteur Karima Delli (Greens/EFA, France), which you have probably read about in the news, is the first step towards determining Parliament’s position. It represents the rapporteur’s position and does not reflect the position of the European Parliament on the legislative proposal. MEPs have tabled amendments to the draft report, which are expected to be debated at the end of October 2023. It is anticipated that Parliament will adopt its position on the proposal in December 2023 at the earliest.

Next steps

Once both the Parliament and the Council (ministers of EU countries) have adopted their positions, the two institutions will negotiate an agreement on a final text.

You can follow this procedure using Parliament’s Legislative Observatory and its Legislative Train Schedule.

German Der Vorschlag der Europäischen Kommission

Da die Zahl der Toten im Straßenverkehr in der Europäischen Union nach wie vor unannehmbar hoch war, forderten die EU-Verkehrsminister die Europäische Kommission 2017 auf, tätig zu werden.

Dementsprechend legte die Kommission einen Gesetzesvorschlag vor, um die Zahl der Unfälle und insbesondere der Verkehrstoten zu reduzieren. Die Kommission hat sich dabei auf eine umfangreiche Folgenabschätzung (in englischer Sprache) gestützt, die auf zahlreichen Studien basiert.

Dort heißt es unter anderem, dass das Alter ein wichtiger Faktor sei, wenn es um die geistige und körperliche Eignung zum Führen eines Fahrzeugs und die Gefahr gehe, in einen Autounfall verwickelt zu werden. Führerscheine für Personen im Alter von über 70 Jahren sollen deshalb nach jeweils fünf Jahren erneuert werden, wozu eine Fahrtüchtigkeitsuntersuchung erfolgreich absolviert werden muss. Die Gültigkeit von Führerscheinen ist in den meisten EU-Ländern bereits begrenzt, hier soll eine Vereinheitlichung der Fristen erfolgen.

Da auch Fahranfänger überdurchschnittlich viele Unfälle verursachen, soll die Ausbildung verbessert und eine Probezeit von mindestens zwei Jahren eingeführt werden, während der Nulltoleranz für das Fahren unter Alkohol- oder Drogeneinfluss gelten soll. Andererseits können die EU-Länder ermöglichen, bereits mit 17 Jahren fahren zu lernen.

Was das Gewicht der Fahrzeuge anbelangt, werden keine Einschränkungen des derzeit für Führerscheine der Klasse B zulässigen Gewichts (3 500 kg) vorgeschlagen. Im Gegenteil: Nach einer zweijährigen Probezeit würde die Gewichtsgrenze bei Elektrofahrzeugen auf 4 250 kg steigen.

Auf der Webseite der Kommission „Überarbeitung der Führerscheinrichtlinie“ finden Sie Links zu sämtlichen Dokumenten, die bisher zu diesem Gesetzgebungsverfahren veröffentlicht wurden.

Behandlung des Vorschlags im Europäischen Parlament

Im Europäischen Parlament befasst sich der Ausschuss für Verkehr und Tourismus (TRAN) mit dem Vorhaben.

Der Berichtsentwurf der Berichterstatterin Karima Delli, über den Sie wahrscheinlich in der Presse gelesen haben, ist der erste Schritt auf dem Weg zum Standpunkt des Parlaments. Er stellt die Position der Berichterstatterin dar und gibt nicht den Standpunkt des Europäischen Parlaments zum Gesetzvorschlag wieder. Die Abgeordneten haben Änderungsanträge zu dem Berichtsentwurf eingereicht, über die voraussichtlich Ende Oktober debattiert wird. Das Parlament wird seinen Standpunkt zu dem Vorschlag voraussichtlich frühestens im Dezember 2023 festlegen.

Das weitere Verfahren

Wenn das Parlament und der Rat (die Minister der EU-Länder) beide ihren Standpunkt beschlossen haben, müssen sich die beiden Organe in Verhandlungen auf einen gemeinsamen Text einigen.

Über die Legislative Beobachtungsstelle und den Legislativfahrplan des Parlaments können Sie den genauen Ablauf des Gesetzgebungsverfahrens verfolgen.

Background

Citizens often send messages to the President of the European Parliament or to the institution as such expressing their views and/or requesting action. The Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (AskEP) within the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) replies to these messages, which may sometimes be identical as part of wider public campaigns.

Written by Györgyi Mácsai, Members’ Research Service (EPRS) with Raffaele Ventura, GlobalStat, EUI.

This infographic provides an insight into the economic performance of Kazakhstan compared with the European Union (EU) and looks at the trade dynamics between them. Kazakhstan’s unemployment rate recorded a slight but steady decrease, stabilizing at 4-5% in the decade 2010-2020. Inflation rates, on the other hand, show less stability throughout the time series, and in 2022 reached their second-highest value since 2007. Foreign direct investment (FDI) fluctuated, with a notable spike in 2016, when Kazakhstan attracted record levels of FDI in12.5 % of gross domestic product (GDP). This was followed by a steep decrease in the inflows that in subsequent years have never exceeded 5% of the gross domestic product. Despite a significant yearly fluctuation, the EU’s trade with Kazakhstan shows a general upward trend, with a sharp increase after the 2020 global economic slowdown.

Read this infographic on ‘Kazakhstan: Economic indicators and trade with EU‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

EU imports of goods from Kazakhstan (2022) EU exports of goods to Kazakhstan (2022) Kazakhstan’s share in EU total trade (exports plus imports) Top EU partners (2022) Trade in goods Main trade partners (2022) Trade in goods, exports plus imports EU trade with Kazakhstan Kazakhstan’s business environment and socio-economic indicators FDI and remittances Public finances, monetary and financial data Female labour force participation rate (% of female population aged 15+) GDP growth (Annual change, %) Total unemployment rate (% of total labour force) Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita

Written by Ralf Drachenberg with José René Ernault.

EU leaders met on 5 and 6 October 2023 in Granada for an informal meeting of the European Council, preceded by a meeting of the European Political Community (EPC). On 5 October, leaders at the EPC issued messages of unity in support of Ukraine in the wake of Russia’s war against it. On other topics, such as facilitating peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan, the EPC made little headway.

At their informal meeting on 6 October, EU leaders adopted the Granada Declaration, taking stock of progress made in achieving the objectives set at Versailles in March 2022. This follow-up exercise was crucial, as EU leaders are starting a discussion process on two critical and intertwined topics: i) the future political priorities to underpin the 2024-2029 strategic agenda, and ii) the process of EU enlargement and its consequences for EU institutions and policies. Furthermore, EU leaders discussed migration, reference to which was excluded from the Granada Declaration on account of opposition from Poland and Hungary. The European Council President thus issued a declaration on migration in his own name for the second time in a row, with the support of the other 25 Member States.

1.  The European Political Community meeting

On 5 October, the Spanish Presidency hosted the third meeting of the EPC – the constitutive meeting of which was held in Prague in October 2022, followed by a highly symbolic meeting in Moldova in June 2023. Originating in a proposal made by French President Emmanuel Macron, the EPC was designed as a forum to promote political dialogue and cooperation between EU and non-EU countries, while contributing to peace and security on the European continent. It brings together the heads of state or government of 47 countries, excluding Belarus and Russia, and the leaders of the EU institutions. The EPC has so far remained a largely informal platform, with no budget or secretariat to ensure continuity between meetings. The organisation of the summits has relied on the host countries, with little involvement on the part of the EU institutions.

EPC meeting format

The summit began with a plenary session opened by Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez. The session was dominated by messages of unity in support of Ukraine – tragically intensified by news of a Russian missile attack on civilian areas in the north of the country. Ukraine’s President, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, stressed the need to defeat Russia on the battlefield to avoid a new frozen conflict, and reiterated the need to offer security guarantees to countries vulnerable to Russia.

In his address, Sánchez stressed the shared aspiration of EPC members to tackle common challenges, such as energy sovereignty, artificial intelligence, digitalisation and how to maintain the international rules-based order. These challenges were then discussed in three thematic clusters: i) digitalisation; ii) energy, environment and the green transition; and iii) multilateralism and geostrategy. Unlike in Moldova, the theme of enlargement did not feature in the plenary session.

Outcome of the EPC meeting

The EPC meeting took place amid growing criticism of its loose format and unclear purpose. The final press conference, which was to outline results and hand over the preparation of the next EPC meeting to the United Kingdom (UK), was cancelled. Concrete outcomes indeed appear limited. Although stronger cooperation between EPC countries in the field of cybersecurity was one point agreed upon, as stressed by Macron, the meeting failed to make any significant progress in resolving conflicts between participating countries. Hopes for mediation between Kosovo and Serbia were dashed, with Kosovo President Vjosa Osmani refusing to meet Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić unless sanctions were taken against Serbia after the recent spike in violence in northern Kosovo.

Likewise, the prospect of facilitating peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and addressing the humanitarian crisis in Nagorno-Karabakh, was undermined by the non-attendance of Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev and Türkiye’s President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. The issue was however raised in a meeting between European Council President Charles Michel, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, Macron and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan. They expressed unwavering support for the territorial integrity of Armenia, condemned Azerbaijan’s military operation in Nagorno-Karabakh and called for the resumption of dialogue. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced that the EU’s humanitarian aid to Armenia would be doubled from €5 million to €10 million. European Parliament President Roberta Metsola met with Pashinyan and invited him to address the European Parliament’s next plenary session.

Migration

Although the Spanish Presidency had not put the issue of migration on the agenda – an issue that had featured on the Moldova meeting agenda – the topic was mentioned in Michel’s speech as a challenge the EPC should address together, alongside its conflict resolution mission. Migration was discussed on the sidelines, notably at a meeting convened by UK Prime Minister Rishi Sunak, including Italy, the Netherlands, France, Albania and the European Commission. The participants committed to help one another tackle the challenges of irregular migration, fight smuggling, and develop comprehensive partnerships. The possibility of UK cooperation with the EU border agency Frontex was also discussed.

2. The informal meeting of the European Council

The informal European Council meeting began with an exchange with Metsola, who underlined that as a result of a series of crises, the EU’s budget was now stretched to its limit. In the context of the on-going revision of the EU’s multiannual financial framework, she stressed that to be able to address migration, support Ukraine, help Member States struck by natural disasters, and generate sustainable growth, the EU needed a budget that was ‘fit for purpose’. This was the first EU leaders’ meeting attended by Evika Silina as Prime Minister of Latvia.

The future of the European Union: The 2024-2029 Strategic Agenda

As proposed by Michel, EU leaders started a reflection process on the EU’s future priorities, the results of which would feed into the 2024-2029 strategic agenda to be adopted in June 2024. The discussion was based on general questions: ‘what do we want to do together? How can we assure we will be able to act together? How should our common ambitions be financed?

The topics that were identified for the discussion in Granada and the reflection process were: i) security, defence and cyber-resilience; ii) long-term competitiveness and the EU single market; iii) crisis-preparedness; iv) the green and digital transitions; v) multilateralism and global partnerships; vi) migration; and vii) enlargement and absorption capacity. The European Council President’s idea is to have specific topics dealt with in smaller groups, with discussions then scheduled for the various regular European Council meetings. First drafts are expected to be put forward in spring 2024. However, not all Member States were enthusiastic about the small groups’ approach, as some fear being excluded from parts of the debate.

Some EU institutions and Member States have begun offering input for the future strategic priorities and potential Treaty reform in the context of EU enlargement. The Spanish Presidency put forward its own paper, Resilient EU2030. The Commission contributed to the future priority policy objectives by outlining ways to increase EU resilience, competitiveness and sustainability. A much-discussed Franco-German reflection paper on the future of the EU, suggesting an EU made up of four distinct tiers: i) the inner circle, ii) the EU, iii) associated members, and iv) the EPC, each with different competences and obligations, also contributed to the debate. The proposals resulting from the Conference on the Future of Europe, at which Member States, EU institutions and citizens together indicated political priorities for the future, provided another contribution.

Granada Declaration

The objective of the Granada Declaration was to take stock of the progress made since the Versailles Declaration, adopted in March 2022 under the French Presidency of the Council, and which focused on the areas of defence, energy, and supply chain resilience. In the words of Michel, ‘Granada is the time to look back and critically assess progress in strengthening our European sovereignty, identifying our achievements as well as areas that still require our political action’.

The Granada Declaration calls on the EU to take action in the following areas:

• the EU’s defence readiness and capabilities;
• the EU’s resilience and global long-term competitiveness;
• reduction in vulnerabilities and improved crisis-preparedness;
• a more cohesive, innovation-driven, and interconnected single market;
• affordable energy, EU energy sovereignty and lower external dependencies;
• engagement with partners and protection of the rules-based international order;
• preparation for enlargement, both in future Member States and in the EU itself.

Until the last moment, it was unclear whether the Granada Declaration would obtain the support of all 27 Member State leaders needed for its adoption. In the end, Hungary and Poland only agreed on the declaration if all references to migration were deleted. While this position must be seen in the context of the upcoming Polish elections on 15 October 2023 and the national referendum on migration the same day, the difficulties in agreeing on the Granada Declaration indicate a crisis of unity in the European Council. For the second time in a row EU leaders could not agree on a common text owing to disagreements on migration (see EPRS Post-European Council Briefing, June 2023).

Since the European Council is responsible for ‘defin[ing] the EU general political directions and priorities’ (Article 15 of the Treaty on European Union), the difficulties encountered when drafting the Granada Declaration do not bode well for the discussion process on the next strategic agenda. The European Council is also responsible for defining ‘the strategic guidelines for legislative and operational planning within the area of freedom, security and justice’ (Article 68 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union), something EU leaders have not been able to agree on since 2019, mainly on account of differences over EU migration policy.

Migration

This informal leaders’ meeting also discussed European migration policy, notably its external dimension. Reporting on the discussions, both Michel and von der Leyen welcomed the Council’s recent agreement on a negotiating mandate for the regulation on crisis situations, a big step towards completing the European migration and asylum reform package. The agreement in the Council reached by qualified majority was however criticised by Poland and Hungary, which expressed their disagreement by again opposing the adoption of text on migration by EU leaders. Prior to the meeting, the Polish government stated that it would ‘present a tough veto against illegal immigration at the European Council’, while Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán stated that there would be ‘no compromise on migration. Not today, and not in the upcoming years’.

In the end, Michel issued a separate declaration on migration in his capacity as European Council President. The declaration summarises the EU’s comprehensive approach to migration, which combines: i) external action, notably mutually beneficial comprehensive partnerships with countries of origin and transit; ii) measures to address the root causes of migration; iii) opportunities for legal migration; iv) more effective protection of EU external borders; v) a resolute fight against organised crime, human trafficking and smuggling, and instrumentalisation of migration as a hybrid threat; vi) a higher rate of returns; and vii) internal aspects, in compliance with international law, EU principles and values, and the protection of fundamental rights. Michel stressed that migration would be on the agenda of the next formal European Council meeting on 26-27 October 2023.

Main message of the President of the European Parliament: Metsola reported on a detailed exchange with EU leaders on migration and stressed that for the first time in decades there was a realistic possibility of agreeing on a common European asylum and migration system. She criticised the lack of political will in the past to adopt ambitious legislation. Rather than making decisions supported by a majority of Member States, consensus had been sought, leading to a de facto veto in a policy area where the veto cannot be used. She stressed the public is very concerned about migration, having recently stated that ‘migration is the challenge of our generation’.

Enlargement

Michel indicated that discussions on enlargement had focused on ‘the consequences this expansion may entail’. Member States’ views are quite diverse on the matter, both on the question of internal reforms and regarding a possible date. While some, such as Lithuania, would prefer a quick enlargement ahead of any potential institutional reforms, many others, including Germany, acknowledge the need to carry out internal reforms first, this potentially even leading to Treaty reform, in order for an enlarged EU to be able to function.

Michel’s proposal of setting 2030 as the possible date for enlargement has been met by reservations on the part of many Member States, including the Netherlands, but also from the European Commission. The Irish Taoiseach, Leo Varadkar, stressed the need to be ‘honest with people. From becoming a candidate to actually joining the EU takes many years’. Others, such as Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas believe that 2030 is ‘too far away’ for enlargement. The Prime Minister of Hungary, Viktor Orbán, even shed doubt on the added value for the EU of Ukrainian membership.

One idea suggested by various actors – Member States and think-thanks – is that of ‘gradual integration’, by which candidate countries would be offered visible and tangible benefits early on to motivate their reform process and reduce the waiting time for full membership. Consequently, they could potentially already participate in some policies and/or EU institutions (without voting rights) before formally acceding to the EU. Ursula von der Leyen has indicated that the Commission will publish its progress reports in early November. A decision on opening negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova could potentially be taken at the 14-15 December 2024 European Council meeting.

Main message of the President of the European Parliament: Metsola described enlargement as the Union’s strongest geopolitical tool. The EU now needed to discuss its absorption capacity and internal reform, because ‘what works for 27 will not work for 32, 33 or 35’ EU Member States.

Read this briefing on ‘Outcome of the meetings of EU leaders, 5-6 October 2023‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.