European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Lasse Boehm and Alex Wilson.

The European Union acted decisively and unanimously in condemning the brutal war and its immense human cost, imposing sanctions on Russia and supporting Ukraine. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 also triggered concern over the EU’s energy security. Throughout 2022, Europe showed determination to fill gas storage facilities and find additional gas supplies elsewhere. During the winter of 2022/2023, the EU has fared better than initially feared. Gas demand has been lower than in previous years thanks to EU efforts to save energy, and a major increase in shipments of liquefied natural gas (LNG) helped buffer the reduction of supplies from Russia.

But this should not leave any room for complacency. Part of the EU’s success is down to favourable circumstances such as warmer than usual weather in the winter of 2022/2023 and lower LNG demand in China as a consequence of COVID-related restrictions, and it is not clear yet how enduring the improvements in energy efficiency will be. The prospects for next winter are highly uncertain, given the inherent difficulty in predicting metereological conditions or the state of the global economy, as well as the possibility of a complete interruption of fossil fuel supplies from Russia, which could hamper the ability of storage sites to fill over the summer period.

While actions taken so far have managed to buffer the immediate impact of the war, the harder reality is that the EU remains dependent on outside suppliers for its energy security. In 2023, the EU will have to shift its focus from crisis response mode to a long-term vision of how it wants to manage its energy security – from sprint to marathon. This includes the supply of raw materials, renewables manufacturing, increased interconnections, and the future of joint energy purchasing. High inflation and the growing cost of capital could make it harder for new renewable investments to get off the ground, and the EU remains far from meeting some of its more ambitious goals in this respect.

Read the complete briefing on ‘EU energy security and the war in Ukraine: From sprint to marathon‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

EU dependency on energy imports from Russia (million tonnes of mineral fuels – oil, gas and solid fossil fuels) LNG capacity per Member State (billion m3, October 2022) Gas storage (available storage capacity (Twh) and filling rate)

Citizens often send messages to the President of the European Parliament (or to the institution’s public portal) expressing their views on current issues and/or requesting action from the Parliament. The Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (AskEP) within the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) looks into these issues and replies to the messages, which may sometimes be identical as part of wider public campaigns.

The President of the European Parliament has recently received a large number of messages expressing concerns about the development of the East African Crude Oil Pipeline (EACOP) and calling for the European Union to fund Uganda and Tanzania’s green energy transition. In its resolution of 15 September 2022, Parliament expressed ‘grave concern about the human rights violations in Uganda and Tanzania linked to investments in fossil-fuel projects’. The EU, together with its member countries, is the largest provider of climate financing in the world.

Please find below the main points of the reply sent to citizens who took the time to write to the European Parliament and its President on this matter.

Main points made in the reply in English European Parliament position on the East African Crude Oil Pipeline (EACOP)

The European Parliament is monitoring the political situation in Uganda and Tanzania closely. As you are aware, the European Parliament adopted a resolution on 15 September 2022, in which it expresses ‘grave concern about the human rights violations in Uganda and Tanzania linked to investments in fossil-fuel projects’.

The European Parliament ‘calls for the EU and the international community to exert maximum pressure on Ugandan and Tanzanian authorities, as well as the project promoters and stakeholders, to protect the environment and to put an end to the extractive activities in protected and sensitive ecosystems’. In addition, the European Parliament ‘calls on the promoters of the EACOP project in Uganda and Tanzania to resolve all disputes that should have been resolved prior to the launch of the project’. Finally, Parliament urges TotalEnergies to ‘study the feasibility of an alternative route to better safeguard protected and sensitive ecosystems and the water resources of Uganda and Tanzania.’

Financing of energy transition

The European Union strongly supports the transition to a low-carbon, more resource-efficient and sustainable economy globally. This is part of the EU’s efforts to achieve its climate and energy goals in line with the Paris Agreement and the 2030 UN Sustainable Development Goals.

The EU, together with its member countries, is the largest provider of climate financing in the world. More than a third of its budget for support to neighbouring and developing countries is earmarked for efforts to tackle climate change. The EU continues its commitment towards the jointly set goal of mobilising USD 100 billion per year to 2025, to contribute to climate action support regarding developing economies. The aim is to support developing countries to implement the 2015 Paris Climate Change Agreement.

In 2021, the European Union mobilised €23.04 billion from public sources to support developing countries to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions and adapt to the impacts of climate change.

Written by Marcin Szczepański.

The United States (US) has been imposing sanctions on Russia since its illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014. Since the outbreak of Russia’s war on Ukraine in February 2022, these sanctions have become increasingly severe and far-reaching. The US, together with the European Union and other close allies, has targeted Russian assets, international trade and the economic sectors involved in the war, as well as specific individuals and entities engaged in sanctioned activities.

The sanctions seek to weaken Russia’s ability to wage war by dampening its financial capacity and economy, and by blocking its various sectors, such as industry, defence and energy, from accessing technology and inputs. They are also meant as punishment for Russian elites and their cronies involved in many aspects of the war, from financing to disinformation.

To apply the abovementioned sanctions, the US cooperates with the EU through various fora such as the Trade and Technology Council, focused on export controls. A similar forum is the G7, which is pivotal in the flagship actions against the invaders; examples include blocking Russian banks’ access to the SWIFT payments system and introducing an oil price cap. While often identical or similar, the US and the EU sanction regimes differ in terms of the activities covered and persons and entities targeted.

While all these sanctions have had a tangible negative impact on Russia’s economy and long-term competiveness, they cannot materialise with the same speed as a military attack. Moreover, Russia is making continuous and active efforts to dodge these sanctions, not without help from its allies and trading partners, albeit with varying degrees of success.

The European Parliament has been a staunch supporter of introducing and maintaining sweeping and regularly revised sanctions against Russia. It has also voiced its support for strong transatlantic cooperation on sanctions and has urged the Council of the EU to substantially widen their coverage.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Russia’s war against Ukraine: US sanctions‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Gisela Grieger.

Since Russia launched its unprovoked war against Ukraine on 24 February 2022, the United States (US) has worked in lockstep with allies and partners, notably the European Union, its Member States and other G7 countries, towards a strong collective response. This has included several packages of economic sanctions against Russia aimed at severing the country from technologies and financial sources that fuel its war, and directly targeting the persons and entities involved. The US in cooperation with the EU has garnered support from a large majority of the international community to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as a violation of the United Nations (UN) Charter, and has worked towards isolating Russia in multilateral fora, including within the G20, in defence of the US-led, rules-based international order. Moreover, the US has been at the forefront of multilateral actions to tackle the multiple adverse implications of Russia’s war of aggression both for Ukraine and the whole world, including food and energy insecurity.

The US has provided significant military, financial and humanitarian assistance to Ukraine and its EU neighbours, while steering clear of engaging in direct confrontation with Russia. In January 2023, the US decided to send 31 M1 Abrams tanks, but no fighter jets. By 20 November 2022, the US had provided a total of almost US$48 billion in assistance to Ukraine. In December 2022, the 117th US Congress (2021‑2022) passed government spending legislation that appropriates an additional US$45 billion for Ukraine. By then, Congress had already appropriated a total of US$68 billion in support for Ukraine in three different packages. However, modifications to Congressional appropriations for Ukraine cannot be excluded, owing to the ongoing controversy over raising the US federal debt ceiling. Moreover, the December 2022 government spending legislation authorises for the first time US Department of Justice transfers of assets forfeited by Russian oligarchs to assist Ukraine. Recent polls consistently show a solid majority (65 %) of US respondents support US assistance to Ukraine. However, there is a significant partisan gap in the degree of support, with 47 % of Republicans stating the US spends too much, while only 10 % of Democrats say so.

This briefing complements an earlier ‘At a glance’ note by Matthew Parry and Marcin Szczepański.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Russia’s war against Ukraine: US support‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marianna Pari with Radosław Kleina.

Providing an overview of the European Union’s economic and budgetary situation and challenges for 2023, a year with many unknowns, the publication of the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) seventh annual ‘Economic and Budgetary Outlook for 2023‘, was the occasion for an online roundtable on 7 February 2023. This edition’s special focus sheds light on the EU’s economic governance framework and its impending revision.

Speaking at the event were Nicolae Ștefănuță (Renew, Romania), Member of the Committee on Budgets and rapporteur on the 2023 EU budget, Géraldine Mahieu, Director for Investment, growth and structural reforms at the European Commission’s Directorate‑General for Economic and Financial Affairs and Martin Larch, Head of the Secretariat of the European Fiscal Board. The event was hosted by Etienne Bassot, Director of the EPRS Members’ Research Service. Tim Peters, Head of the EPRS Budgetary Policies Unit, moderated a lively and insightful discussion on the EU’s economic governance framework, the revision of the multiannual financial framework (MFF) and the use of Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) funds.

Is the EU Budget fit for purpose?

In Nicolae Ștefănuță’s opinion, the current multi-annual EU budget is not fit for purpose and does not allow for an adequate response to considerable challenges, such as the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine and the ensuing cost for financial, military and humanitarian assistance as well as high energy prices and inflation. He underlined that a full revision of the MFF, and not merely a limited review, is therefore necessary. Mr Ștefănuță explained the political consequences for EU citizens of the lack of sufficient resources. Referring to the system of own resources, he expressed the opinion that an EU budget capped at around 1 % of the Union’s gross national income (GNI) was far from being sufficient, as already evidenced in the 1977 MacDougall Report.

How do NGEU and the RRF support the European economy?

Referring to the economic outlook for 2023, Géraldine Mahieu of the European Commission remarked that the EU economies had shown remarkable resilience over the past year. She took the audience through the reasons why, despite the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine and the ECB’s tight monetary regime, economic growth had turned out to be higher than initially expected. While this trend could continue in 2023, there are, however, great uncertainties.

Ms Mahieu explained the implementation of RFF funds in detail, standing at €142.3 billion, and the impact they are already having on the economy, not only through the investment component, but additionally through the reform measures included in the national plans. She underlined that acting together also enhanced convergence. According to Ms Mahieu, the total impact was estimated on average at a 1.3 % increase in gross domestic product (GDP), of which one third was the result of positive spill-over effects across Member States. In relation to the energy crisis, Ms Mahieu explained that a total of €270 billion remains available for the Member States for the REPowerEU programme, which aims to achieve independence from Russian fossil fuels while supporting the green transition. Such resources come on top of those already allocated to investment measures for the green transition as part of the agreed national recovery plans. Ms Mahieu pointed out that the experience of implementing the RFF had proved to be crucial in designing an urgent response to the energy crisis. With regard to the economic governance, the aim is to make this framework more simple, more transparent and effective, and increase Member States’ ownership.

Economic outlook for 2023 and economic governance review

The third panellist, Martin Larch provided the European Fiscal Board’s perspective. He explained why 2023 is a very particular year and how views diverge, depending whether we consider yearly or quarterly forecasts. Mr Larch pointed out that, even though from an annual perspective 2023 looks like a year of economic slowdown – based on quarterly data, it appears that the economic slowdown is already behind the EU, with most of the Member States returning to or exceeding pre-pandemic GDP levels. Mr Larch elaborated on how the fiscal response to the energy crisis has affected the terms and balance of trade with countries exporting energy to the EU. Mr Larch also pointed out that the attempt to compensate households for price increases clashes with the European Central Bank’s efforts to stifle inflation.

Focusing on Member States’ indebtedness and the applicable fiscal rules, Mr Larch went on to explain how EU countries are grouped according to their debt-to-GDP ratio, and therefore have varying capacity to overcome shocks and recover and provided insight into how that influences their position during Council discussions on fiscal rules. Continuing his reflections on the future of the economic governance framework Mr Larch pointed out the inherent risk of continuing to govern under unclear rules. In response to a question about the EU having a central fiscal capacity, Mr Larch noted that the European Fiscal Board supports this idea and added that, from a risk-sharing point of view, it would be desirable to have a larger common budget with the possibility of running a deficit when necessary. However, he acknowledged that that presented a political challenge.

During the Q&A session, Mr Ștefănuță evaluated the RRF instrument positively, but defended an enhanced role for the European Parliament, in particular in the scrutiny of expenditure. To ensure democratic legitimacy, the various off-budget instruments should be part of the EU budget, including the funding of a possible future ‘European Sovereignty Fund’. In the lively discussion that followed, Ms Mahieu underlined that the RRF is subject to the discharge procedure, that the European Parliament has been involved in the development of the RRF at several stages, and the continued dialogue and exchange of information between the Commission and Parliament. Ms Mahieu described the measures taken by the European Commission to verify that RRF funds were spent appropriately, including checks and audits of milestones and targets, and the publication of the largest recipients of RRF funds.She also explained the process to ensure that funds are effectively spent on the green and digital transformation.

Written by Gisela Grieger.

On 7 February 2023, the President of the United States, Joe Biden, gave his State of the Union (SOTU) address to a joint session of the 118th US Congress (2023-2024). Unlike in 2022, when the US had a ‘united’ government, with the President’s party, the Democrats, holding the majority in both chambers of Congress, Biden now faces a ‘divided’ government, with a Republican-led House of Representatives, and has to decide on a potential second-term bid in 2024. While in 2022, Russia’s then newly launched war of aggression against Ukraine featured prominently in the SOTU, references to US foreign policy in 2023 played only a marginal role. A key priority of Biden’s speech was to make benefits of his legislative achievements tangible for US voters. In contrast to 2022, President Biden ‘recycled’ several proposals that have not (yet) materialised, rather than presenting new ones.

Background

The SOTU address is mandated by the US Constitution, which in Article II, Section 3, Clause 1 provides that the President ‘shall from time to time give to the Congress Information of the State of the Union, and recommend to their Consideration such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient’. From 1790 to 1946, the speech was referred to as the ‘Annual Message’, and since 1947, it has been known as the SOTU address. Over time, both its content and form have changed. Some US presidents presented the address in writing, albeit most of them in-person. President Biden gave his 2023 SOTU address against the backdrop of a challenging political situation for his domestic policy agenda in the wake of the 2022 mid-term election and ahead of the 2024 presidential elections. Since January 2023, the House of Representatives has a narrow (222-213) Republican majority, while the Senate is controlled by a razor-thin (51-49) Democratic majority. The Republican Party has been engulfed both in infighting over its future direction and in leadership issues, as was on full display during the marathon 15 voting rounds to elect the new Speaker of the House, Kevin McCarthy (R-California). The election process was marked by a group of far-right MAGA (Make America Great Again) and Freedom Caucus holdouts who extracted sweeping House rule concessions from McCarthy in exchange for abandoning their opposition to him. Democrats elected the first House Minority Leader of colour, Hakeem Jeffries (D-New York), unanimously.

Domestic policy

President Biden presented the US economy’s positive trends as regards job creation, the unemployment rate, inflation, energy prices, the number of new small business set-ups, and the reduction of the federal deficit. The data he floated were quickly fact-checked by several media and variously found to be mostly true, to be lacking context and partly exaggerated, or to be inaccurate. Biden also recalled the major tenets of his transformative vision for the US economy. These include building an economy ‘from the bottom up and the middle out, not from the top down’, i.e. an economy that grows the American middle-class by creating new manufacturing jobs through industrial policy initiatives, and reverses a past trend of importing goods and exporting jobs. Biden was eager to show-case how the bills he signed into law would make a difference for individual Americans. The list of bills included, inter alia, the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, the Chips and Science Act, the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), the Bipartisan Safer Communities Act, the Election Count Reform Act and the Respect for Marriage Act. Biden elaborated extensively on the ‘unfair’ US tax system, stressing that he signed into law a minimum corporate tax of 15 %, ‘less than a nurse pays’, and highlighting the need to continue funding long-standing social security and healthcare entitlement programmes, such as Medicare for seniors. He proposed, among other things, to introduce a minimum tax on billionaires who should not ‘pay a lower tax than a school teacher or firefighter’. He ‘recycled’ a laundry list of social policy proposals – including pre-school for 3- and 4-year-olds, paid leave, and restoring the child tax credit to halve child poverty – unlikely ever to get Republican buy-in. He took issue with large US companies, calling out Big Pharma’s prescription drug prices, much higher than those in comparable OECD countries (the IRA caps insulin prescription costs at US$35 per month, but only for seniors on Medicare), and oil companies’ buybacks of their stocks as opposed to investing in fixed assets to exploit more oil and thus reduce energy prices. On the consumer protection agenda, he made the case for a junk fee prevention act to rein in companies requiring excessive fees (‘junk fees’) from consumers, and for adopting bipartisan Big Tech legislation not passed in the last Congress. He called for passing the Protecting the Right to Organize (PRO) Act that seeks to ban ‘non-compete clauses‘, which limit job changes, from being imposed on workers. Against the backdrop of rising crime and police violence against people of colour, Biden called for police reform, a reintroduced ban on assault weapons, and more resources under his new border plan to address illegal immigration at the border with Mexico. Finally, he called for continued efforts on his four-part 2021 Unity Agenda on bipartisan issues: cancer, fentanyl, mental health, and veterans.

Foreign policy: Ukraine and China

In the presence of Ukrainian Ambassador Oksana Markarova, President Biden stated that ‘America is united in our support for your country’, adding, ‘We will stand with you as long as it takes.’ However, Biden did not go into details of past and future US support. Recent polls show that 47 % of Republicans believe the US is doing too much for Ukraine, compared with only 10 % of Democrats. Critics have argued that President Biden missed an opportunity to prepare Americans for a longer war in Ukraine. A Chinese spy balloon intruded into US air space a few days before the SOTU address, hovering over sensitive military facilities before being shot down over the Atlantic Ocean. Biden addressed Republican criticism that the balloon should have been shot down earlier, before completing its mission, and that US national security had been compromised. He stated, ‘Today, we’re in the strongest position in decades to compete with China or anyone else in the world. I am committed to work with China where it can advance American interests and benefit the world. But make no mistake: … if China threatens our sovereignty, we will act to protect our country. And we did.’ At least three such balloon intrusions had occurred under the Trump administration. On 9 February 2023, the House adopted a resolution in a bipartisan 419-0 vote condemning the intrusion.

SOTU address – A launch pad for Biden’s potential presidential bid for 2024?

During his SOTU address, President Biden did not reveal whether he would run for a second term. Some commentators have pointed to hints that could suggest his intention to run again. They include not only Biden’s focus on strong fundamentals of the US economy, legislative accomplishments, and unfinished business, but also his frequent efforts to reach out to his online audience (down 28 % from 2022) and explain in an unfiltered, unedited way how it would benefit from his agenda. His repeated direct appeals to Americans watching from home come as no surprise, as Biden’s approval rating stands in the low 40 %. Six in 10 Americans fail to see how Biden’s legislative wins benefit their daily lives. One reason, according to Biden, is that implementation of laws passed in 2022 has only just begun, and benefits will take time to materialise. A majority of Democrats consider Biden too old to run. However, the discovery of classified documents from his time as vice-president during the Obama administration – both in his former office at the Penn Biden Center for Diplomacy and the Global Engagement think-tank in Washington DC, and in his private home in Wilmington (Delaware) – does not appear to have affected him too much so far. In an ABC News poll of February 2023, 48 % of respondents stated that Biden ‘acted wrongly but not intentionally’, while 45 % said that Trump acted ‘intentionally’ and ‘did something illegal’. Biden had criticised former President Trump in a classified-document case of different dimensions and circumstances.

Working across the aisle with Republicans

During the 2022 mid-term election campaign, Biden warned of MAGA Republicans being a threat to US democracy. In his 2023 SOTU speech, by contrast, he portrayed his ‘Republican friends’ as partners in governance during the first two years of his presidency, putting conciliation over division in line with his aspiration ‘to restore the soul of the nation’ and ‘to unite the country’. In spite of Republican opposition in the House and looming House Oversight Committee investigations, including into his son, Hunter Biden, President Biden repeated his unwavering conviction that, despite their big differences, Democrats and Republicans could come together to craft compromise legislation in the next two years, stressing that he had signed some 300 bipartisan bills since taking office. A first litmus test for bipartisanship will be for President Biden and Speaker McCarthy to hash out an agreement on raising the federal debt ceiling by June 2023 at the latest, to avoid a US debt default either with or without government spending cuts.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘President Biden’s 2023 State of the Union address‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marcin Grajewski.

During his first visit to the European Parliament and the European Council, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy appealed to the European Union to provide his country with aircraft and other military equipment needed to repel Russia’s further military aggression. Greeted with a standing ovation in the European Parliament, Zelenskyy said that Ukraine was not only defending its own independence, but also the ‘European way of life’. EU leaders vowed to stand by Ukraine with steadfast support, but Member States have so far failed to make a firm commitment to send fighter jets to Kyiv.

In recent weeks, Russia has been pouring tens of thousands of freshly mobilised soldiers into Ukraine in a move likely in anticipation of a big offensive in February, coinciding with the first anniversary of the war. Russia has boasted of initial gains, but progress has been incremental at best. Overall, there is little movement at the front-line on either side, as the armies are locked in battle in snow-covered trenches, which both sides describe as the deadliest fighting of the war.

This note gathers links to the recent publications and commentaries from many international think tanks on Russia’s war on Ukraine. Earlier analyses of the war can be found in a previous edition of the ‘What Think Tanks are Thinking’ series.

More intensive arms supplies and training for the Ukrainian army
Centre for Eastern Studies, February 2023

Ukraine business resilience can inform reconstruction
Chatham House, February 2023

How Ukraine’s invention and resilience confounds Russia
Chatham House, February 2023

Germany too slow in arming Ukraine
Chatham House, February 2023

NATO can learn from Ukraine’s military innovation
Chatham House, February 2023

Expert insights: Russia and Ukraine
Clingendael, February 2023

Europe: Crossing the East-West divide
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, February 2023

Sailing through the storm: Türkiye’s Black Sea strategy amidst the Russian-Ukrainian war
European Union Institute for Security Studies, February 2023

Leopard 2 tanks and Ukraine’s war: Keeping an eye on the geopolitical ball
Friends of Europe, February 2023

The Russians aren’t complying with the New START Nuclear Arms Control Treaty: Now what?
Heritage Foundation, February 2023

What is America’s strategic interest in Ukraine?
Hoover Institution, February 2023

Russian offensive campaign update
Institute for the Study of War, February 2023

Russian offensive campaign assessment
Institute for the Study of War, February 2023

A tale of two wars and the pitfalls of success
Rand Corporation, February 2023

Waffenlieferungen an die Ukraine
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, February 2023

No time for timidity in Ukraine
Brookings Institution, January 2023

How the war in Ukraine hinders US-Russian nuclear arms control
Brookings Institution, January 2023

The long war in Ukraine
Brookings Institution, Foreign Affairs, January 2023

Refugees must be central to the reconstruction of Ukraine
Brookings Institution, January 2023

Scholz’s tank decision upends Germany’s long affair with Russia
Carnegie Europe, January 2023

Nearly one year in: How does this war end?
Carnegie Europe, January 2023

Ukraine: A wave of dismissals against a background of corruption
Centre for Eastern Studies, January 2023

Western tanks won’t reach Ukraine before spring
Centre for Eastern Studies, January 2023

Germany, Russia and Ukraine: From ‘turning point’ to missing the point
Centre for European Reform, January 2023

Is European defence missing its moment?
Centre for European Reform, January 2023

The West is sending light tanks to Ukraine: Will they make a difference?
Council on Foreign Relations, January 2023

The Scholz way
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, January 2023

Send in the Leopards: Why Western allies should deliver tanks to Ukraine
European Council on Foreign Relations, January 2023

Digging in for the long haul in Ukraine: The army of the East and the army of the West
Friends of Europe, January 2023

When the Ukraine war ends, the winner will be…Turkey
Friends of Europe, January 2023

How the West can help Ukraine: Three strategies for achieving a Ukrainian victory and rebirth
GLOBSEC, January 2023

Ukrainian refugees in Visegrad countries: Societal attitudes and challenges of accommodating people fleeing thewar
GLOBSEC, January 2023

Interpol is doing Russia’s dirty work
Heritage Foundation, January 2023

How to get a breakthrough in Ukraine
Hoover Institution, January 2023

La Russie en guerre et le monde musulman
Institut français des relations internationales, January 2023

Russia’s war in Ukraine: What are the emerging military lessons?
Institute for International and Strategic Studies, January 2023

Keeping the right balance in supporting Ukraine
International Crisis Group, January 2023

La neutralité, une idée périmée en Europe?
Jacques Delors Institute, January 2023

Russia’s war on Ukraine: A sanctions timeline
Peterson institute for International Economics, January 2023

Avoiding a long war in Ukraine, gun violence, migrant surges
Rand Corporation, January 2023

The opposite of war fatigue: How European support for Ukraine keeps getting stronger Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies, January 2023

Read this briefing on ‘Ukraine: Awaiting Russia’s offensive‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clare Ferguson and Katarzyna Sochacka.

The highlight of the February II 2023 plenary session was a debate with the Council and the European Commission marking one year since Russia’s invasion and the start of its war of aggression against Ukraine. Members also debated the European Union response to the humanitarian situation following the earthquake in Türkiye and Syria. Members discussed EU funding allocated to non-governmental organisations incriminated in recent corruption revelations, following up on measures requested by Parliament to strengthen the integrity of European institutions and to establish an independent EU ethics body.

The European Commission and Council also made statements on a Green Deal industrial plan and access to strategic critical raw materials. Parliament discussed the outcome of the recent special European Council meeting, and among other topics concerning non-EU countries, the further repressions against the people of Belarus, in particular the cases of Andrzej Poczobut and Ales Bialiatski.

Finally, in a formal sitting, Members heard an address by Egils Levits, President of the Republic of Latvia.

REPowerEU chapters in recovery and resilience plans

Members debated and adopted the provisional agreement reached with the Council on REPowerEU chapters in recovery and resilience plans. The amendments to the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) should enable EU countries to use their RRF plans to fund additional energy investment and reform measures necessitated by the twin climate and energy crises. Parliament’s negotiators have ensured that the RRF amendments prioritise tackling energy poverty and small businesses, and that spending under the plans will be fully transparent.

CO2 emission standards for cars and vans

Transport is the only sector in which greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions have continued to rise. In line with measures to tackle climate change, Members held a debate and approved the interinstitutional agreement reached with the Council on reducing road transport emissions under the ‘Fit for 55’ initiative. To set stricter CO2 emission standards for new cars and vans, Parliament’s negotiators have succeeded in introducing more ambitious zero low emission vehicle (ZLEV) incentives; limits to the maximum contribution of sustainable production (or ‘eco-innovation’) to CO2 reduction efforts; and have ensured measures are based on real-world energy consumption and emissions data.

Union secure connectivity programme 2023-2027

Members debated and approved an interinstitutional agreement on a proposal to ensure a resilient, interconnected and secure satellite system for the EU. Known as IRIS², this secure connectivity programme will run until 2027, setting up dedicated EU infrastructure to end EU dependency on other countries’ systems, which will be designed and deployed under private partnership to improve cyber-resilience and cybersecurity, high-speed broadband and seamless connectivity. The agreement on the proposal reflects Parliament’s priority for improved telecommunications security and a more sustainable space policy.

Electoral rights of mobile Union citizens

Parliament considered and adopted reports on two proposals to eliminate barriers to exercising the electoral rights of European citizens resident in Member States of which they are not nationals, such as a lack of information or difficult registration procedures. The Committee on Constitutional Affairs (AFCO) report on electoral rights in European Parliament elections underlines the need for improved access to voting booths, and encourages civil society involvement in ensuring citizens can obtain information, including in their own language. Members also debated and adopted a Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) report on proposals reinforcing mobile citizens’ electoral rights in municipal elections. The LIBE report calls for an end to derogations and restrictions, and urges Member States to facilitate voting for citizens with disabilities. Both files fall under the consultation procedure (where the Council is not bound by Parliament’s opinion), and the Council has to adopt the proposals unanimously.

European Central Bank annual report

Christine Lagarde, President of the European Central Bank (ECB), attended the plenary for a debate on an Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) Committee own-initiative report on the 2021 ECB annual report. The report raises concerns about the high levels of inflation – at 2.6 % on average in 2021, but subsequently reaching 9.2 % in 2022. The ECON committee welcomes ECB measures to raise interest rates and the Bank’s recognition of the need to progress fiscal integration in the EU. However, it also warns that measures must be gradual, targeted and justified. The ECON committee particularly welcomes the ECB’s plans to incorporate climate risk in monetary policy.

EU accession to the Istanbul Convention

The Council of Europe’s Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (known as the Istanbul Convention) sets standards on prevention, protection, prosecution and services for those at risk of gender-based violence. Parliament has repeatedly called for EU accession to the Istanbul Convention as well as its ratification by those individual EU countries that have yet to do so. However, certain ‘deliberate misinterpretations’ persist. Members debated and adopted a joint report from Parliament’s Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality (FEMM) and the LIBE committee on EU accession to the Istanbul Convention. The report calls for constructive dialogue, aimed at dispelling remaining Member State concerns, and stresses that while not exempting individual countries from the need to ratify, EU accession can take place before all have done so.

Question time – Strengthened EU Western Balkan enlargement policy

Members posed questions to Commissioner Olivér Várhelyi regarding the EU’s strengthened Western Balkan enlargement policy. Under Article 49 TEU, the Parliament must consent to any accession to the EU. Its budgetary powers give it direct influence over the amounts allocated to enlargement tools, and Parliament recommends full use of the new EU enlargement methodology to accelerate integration for countries that demonstrate commitment to EU-related reform.

Opening of trilogue negotiations

Members confirmed, without a vote, six mandates to enter into interinstitutional negotiations from the ECON committee, on reports on: i) requirements for credit risk, credit valuation adjustment risk, operational risk, market risk and the output floor; ii) on supervisory powers, sanctions, third-country branches, and environmental, social and governance risks; iii) on delegation arrangements, liquidity risk management, supervisory reporting, provision of depositary and custody services and loan origination by alternative investment funds; iv) on establishing a European single access point providing centralised access to publicly available information of relevance to financial services, capital markets and sustainability; and v) on amending certain directives and vi) regulations as regards the establishment and functioning of the European single access point. Members also confirmed, without a vote, one Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE) decision to enter into negotiations on the report on establishing a framework of measures for strengthening Europe’s semiconductors (‘chips act’), one decision from the LIBE committee on the report regarding digitalisation of the visa procedure, and one decision from the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs (EMPL) on the report on the 2023 European Year of Skills.

Read this ‘plenary at a glance’ on ‘Plenary round-up – February II 2023‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Jaan Soone with Jonas Matthias Winkel.

Resilience in transport refers to the ability of a transportation system to recover from disruptions, adapt to changing conditions and continue to provide users with reliable and efficient services. This resilience can be affected by various factors such as weather events, accidents, equipment failures, system overload, political crises and other unexpected events.

A resilient transport system is one that can quickly respond to these disruptions, recover and return to normal operations. For example, a resilient transport system may have redundancy built into its infrastructure or have contingency plans in place to mitigate the impact of disruptions.

Resilience in transport is important because it ensures that people and goods can continue to move efficiently and safely even in the face of unexpected events. This is particularly important for critical infrastructure such as airports, seaports and highways, where disruptions can have far-reaching impacts on the economy and society.

With the COVID-19 crisis and the war in Ukraine, the EU transport sector has had much to contend with in the last three years. This has further highlighted the importance of looking at the sector’s resilience. The Commission published a new contingency plan for transport in the summer of 2022 and an agreement was reached in December 2022 on improving the resilience of critical entities, including transport companies. 

During the COVID-19 crisis, contact restrictions, public transport closures and border closures affected traffic. In the current crisis, truck drivers have been stranded in conflict zones, the airspace in these conflict zones is closed, and Ukraine’s transport infrastructure has been destroyed and blocked. As a result, supply chains are disrupted and food and energy prices are rising across the world.

The EU decided on a number of immediate measures to support Ukraine’s economy and economic recovery and help to stabilise world food markets and improve global food security, including improvements in transportation links. On 12 May 2022, EU Member States decided to establish alternative transport links between the EU and Ukraine for all modes of transport. These ‘solidarity lanes‘ were developed, in particular, to transport agricultural products from Ukraine and bring the required grain to the world market. Normally, Ukraine delivers about 45 million tonnes of grain annually to the world market, but Russian blockades of Ukrainian ports have prevented grain from being shipped and have caused food prices to rise. The lives of millions of people who depend on this grain are at risk.

The solidarity lanes have already enabled more than 15 million tonnes of grain to be exported by sea, rail and road. In addition, the Black Sea Grain (BSG) initiative has unblocked Ukrainian ports in the Black Sea, helping to end tensions in global food prices. Through the BSG initiative, more than 12 million tonnes of food have already been shipped. The solidarity lanes are also being used for non-agricultural products, such as fuel and aid, and the corridors have already enabled Ukraine to generate more than €15 billion in revenue.

To maintain and further develop the corridors, the EU has mobilised new investment. The Commission is fast-tracking funding of €250 million to expand the corridors and, in the medium term, there will be investment in permanent infrastructure to further expand and strengthen the solidarity lanes. Together with partner financial institutions and the European Investment Bank, the EU is providing a total of €1 billion to strengthen and expand the corridors.

To develop a longer-term approach to ensuring transportation in times of crisis, on 23 May 2022 the Commission published a contingency plan for transport to improve the resilience of the transport sector in the EU in times of crisis. The Commission’s goal is to ensure that, even during crises, flows of goods are not interrupted and transport services can be provided without delay.

To improve crisis preparedness and response capabilities, the Commission is proposing a number of measures to respond quickly and effectively to crises. For example, it wants EU transport legislation to be amended quickly to introduce provisions to improve the way major crises are managed. The connectivity and sustainability of the EU transport system should also be improved and further financial resources mobilised to respond to crises.

Strengthening cybersecurity is an essential tool to improve the resilience of the transport sector, according to the plan. The Commission and EU agencies should therefore continue to support the development of cybersecurity protocols to ensure continuity of operations in the event of a disruption.

The Commission also recommends conducting emergency exercises to assess crisis preparedness. The lessons that can be learned from these exercises should help agencies prepare for emergencies.

The plan promotes several key principles that should apply in crisis response. For example, restricting the movement of goods and personnel must only be a last resort; there must be no discrimination based on nationality when measures are introduced; the measures taken must be coordinated; all measures must be disclosed transparently and be traceable; and attention should be paid to passengers with special needs and transport workers, who should be supported in the best possible way.

A number of other initiatives have been put in place to develop resilience in the EU’s policy measures, including those for improving resilience in transport.

In 2020, the Commission proposed to revise and expand the critical infrastructure directive to further strengthen the rules in light of the new challenges facing the EU, such as the rise of the digital economy, the growing impacts of climate change, and terrorist threats. The Commission argued that recent crises, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, have shown the vulnerability of increasingly interdependent societies in the face of high-impact, low-probability risks and how supply chain disruptions can have a negative economic and societal impact across a large number of sectors and across borders.

Following the changes introduced by the Council and Parliament, the legal act was adopted in December 2022. The directive aims to bolster resilience of ‘critical entities’ – organisations in sectors such as energy, transport, health and drinking water. To this end, EU countries will put in place national strategies, carrying out regular risk assessments, and identify the critical entities that provide essential services. According to the rules, these critically important organisations – such as transport operators, airports, ports and intelligent transport operators – will need to identify the relevant risks that may significantly disrupt the provision of essential services, take appropriate counter-measures to ensure their resilience, and notify authorities of disruptive incidents.

Meanwhile, some current rules on enhancing ship and port facility security, enhancing port security and civil aviation security already require entities in the aviation and maritime transport sectors to prevent incidents caused by unlawful acts and to resist and mitigate the consequences of such incidents. Furthermore, the 2014 EU maritime security strategy and its action plan, which are currently being revised, call for increased protection of critical maritime infrastructure, including underwater infrastructure.

Indeed, the EU has been pushing for greater focus on critical transport and energy protection for some years. The European programme for critical infrastructure protection (EPCIP), set up in 2006, aimed to provide a framework for activities to improve the protection of critical infrastructure in Europe, not only from terrorism but also from criminal activities, natural disasters and other causes of accidents. Meanwhile, a directive on critical infrastructure protection for the energy and transport sectors was adopted in 2008, which the new critical entities directive has replaced.

At the level of strategic planning, the 2020 Strategic Foresight Report aimed to introduceresilience as a new compass for EU policymaking. For example, the report lists transport infrastructure as one of the key enablers of economic resilience. In its 2022 Strategic Foresight Report, the Commission outlined how the policy priorities of greening and digitalisation can foster further resilience in the EU. For example, greater use of digitalisation and autonomous vehicles – which itself will depend on societal acceptance, on investment and on a supportive policy framework – would allow the development of mobility as a service, micromobility, pooling and sharing and new services to improve contact with regions, further improving transport efficiency as well as connectivity and accessibility.

Written by Anne Altmayer (1st edition).

On 14 September 2022, the European Commission presented a proposal for a regulation to prohibit products made using forced labour, including child labour, on the internal market of European Union (EU). The proposed legislation fits into the context of EU efforts to promote decent work worldwide.

The proposal covers all products made available within the EU market, meaning both products made in the EU for domestic consumption and for export, and imported goods. The provisions of the proposal would apply to products of any type, including their components, regardless of the sector or industry.

Member States would be responsible for the enforcement of the regulation’s provisions. Their national authorities would be empowered to withdraw products made using forced labour from the EU market, following an investigation. Customs authorities would identify and stop products made using forced labour at EU borders.

In Parliament, the file has been referred to the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO). Maria‑Manuel Leitão‑Marques has been appointed as rapporteur.

Versions

• February 2023: Proposal for a ban on goods made using forced labour (1st edition)

Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on prohibiting products made with forced labour on the Union market Committee responsible:Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO)COM(2022) 453 final

Rapporteur:Maria-Manuel Leitão-Marques (S&D, Portugal)2022/0269(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Krzysztof Hetman (EPP, Poland)
Svenja Hahn (Renew, Germany)
Anne-Sophie Pelletier (GUE/NGL, France)Ordinary legislative procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council on equal footing
– formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Publication of draft report

Written by Monika Kiss.

Cycling contributes to the EU’s green transition by reducing road congestion and noise pollution, and by improving air quality. It also plays an important role in improving health through cleaner air and more physical exercise, and in enhancing economic growth by creating new, green jobs and encouraging the circular economy. Nevertheless, cycling infrastructure in the EU is inadequate: there is a lack of dedicated cycling lanes (leading to a significant risk of accidents) and there are not enough secured bike parking places. In addition, measures to prevent theft are insufficient and there is a lack of charging stations for e-bikes. This does not allow cycling to expand in urban environments.

Cycling policies are the Member States’ responsibility, with each country setting up its own regulatory framework. Practical measures, such as developing cycling networks or adapting the public transport network to facilitate combined trips, are taken at local or regional level. EU-level intervention consists of promoting cycling, providing financial support – through the European structural and investment funds and the Recovery and Resilience Facility – and sharing best practice. The sustainable and smart mobility strategy, as well as the Commission’s communications on the new EU urban mobility framework and ‘Save Energy‘ all stress the need to increase the modal share of public transport, walking and cycling in urban areas. There is, however, no EU-level strategy.

The European Parliament has repeatedly highlighted and supported cycling as a transport mode, as well as cyclists’ interests. In a 2015 resolution on implementing the 2011 Commission white paper on transport, the Parliament stressed the importance of supporting regional programmes to establish and expand cycling networks in large European regions, and of collecting better data on transport use behaviour regarding cycling. Cycling was also mentioned in a 2020 resolution on the Green Deal, where the Parliament asked for a more comprehensive urban mobility plan to reduce congestion and improve liveability in towns and cities, through support for zero-emissions public transport and cycling and walking infrastructure. In a 2021 resolution on the 2021–2030 EU road safety policy framework, the Parliament emphasised the importance of the cycling infrastructure deployed by Member States in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, which should not only remain in place, but also be further expanded and promoted. The Parliament drafted a resolution on the urban mobility framework in 2022, in which it drew attention to road fatalities in urban areas; 70 % of the victims of these accidents are vulnerable road users, such as pedestrians and cyclists.

European Parliament resolution

The European Parliament has just adopted its first resolution dedicated exclusively to cycling in all its aspects. Calling on the Commission to develop a dedicated European cycling strategy, the resolution also urges the Commission to recognise cycling as a fully-fledged transport mode and to put it on equal footing with the other modes. Cycling should be integrated into urban mobility – for instance, with cycle highways between suburban areas and city centres, secured bike parking facilities close to urban transport nodes, and affordable e-bike and bike-sharing schemes. Cycling should also be integrated into interurban transport – for example, by building cycle lanes parallel to railway tracks or inland waterways when upgrading the TEN-T network, or by making more places available for bikes inside trains.

Cycling is a valuable alternative for travel over short distances in urban and rural areas, and for tourism, but this potential has to be unlocked. Therefore, the resolution asks for more investment by Member States, local authorities and other stakeholders in cycling infrastructure and related facilities, and in cycling-related training and awareness raising. In this way, more people who are interested in cycling could get (back) on a bike. According to the resolution, cycling also has the potential to create 1 million new jobs by 2030 by absorbing and reskilling workers. To achieve this, it is crucial to enhance the production of bikes and e-bikes within the EU.

Cycling can offer an affordable transport alternative for vulnerable social groups who may be exposed to transport poverty. The resolution therefore encourages Member States and local actors to develop support systems to facilitate the purchase of bicycles or participation in bike-sharing systems.

To help prevent accidents, the Commission is invited to work with the Member States to draw up common road-safety guidelines and recommendations for micro-mobility, e.g. on speed limits, helmet requirements and training. The resolution also suggests that the Commission declare 2024 the European Year of Cycling.

The draft resolution was adopted by the TRAN committee on 31 January 2023, and voted in plenary on 16 February. In its plenary statement on the resolution, the Commission noted that cycling has already been taken into account in a number of Commission initiatives, such as REPowerEU and the Fit for 55 package. However, the security of cyclists remains an important issue to resolve. To this end, the Commission plans to set up a dedicated expert group and to come up with recommendations.

Written by Jakub Przetacznik.

As shown by the 2020 presidential elections in Belarus, the power of Aliaksandr Lukashenka depends entirely on Russia. That is why his regime has offered his country’s territory to Russia to support it in its aggression against Ukraine. The question is whether the Belarusian army is capable of supporting Russia in direct battle, without further undermining the stability of Lukashenka’s regime. As bilateral military cooperation progresses, with repetitive military exercises and a growing Russian military presence in Belarus, the answer remains unclear.

Belarusian army power and shared borders

According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies’ Military Balance 2022, the Belarusian army has roughly 48 000 troops (of which 6 150 in special operation forces) and a further 12 000 state border troops. The estimated number of reservists who have served within the past 5 years is 290 000. The Belarusian army ranks 60th in the 2023 global firepower index – behind Hungary and Bulgaria and ahead of Slovakia and Belgium. Both Belarus and Russia are members of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), a Moscow-led military alliance; this year, Belarus holds the CSTO presidency. The length of the Belarusian border is as follows: 1 084 km with Ukraine, 1 250 km with the EU, and 1 283 km with Russia.

Lukashenka’s support for Russia’s war against Ukraine

In November 2021, Lukashenka, whose regime depends on Russian support, abandoned his policy of non-recognition of Russia’s annexation of Crimea and his previously assumed mediating role in the Ukraine conflict, and stated that Crimea is ‘legally Russian’. After Lukashenka pledged loyalty to Moscow, Russian troops entered Belarus and held joint military exercises lasting longer than planned (10‑20 February 2022). The exercises served as a cover-up for the full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February. Russian forces based in Belarus attacked Kyiv and Chernihiv, and initially took control of the Chernobyl power plant, and of nearby cities and villages, such as Irpin and Bucha, where they committed war crimes.

Constitutional referendum in Belarus and the issue of a nuclear-free zone
The attack on Ukraine coincided with a constitutional referendum in Belarus, which took place on 27 February. The referendum replaced an article that had the declared aim of making the country’s territory a nuclear-free zone and the state neutral, with a new article explicitly stating that ‘Belarus excludes military aggression against other states from its territory’ – a commitment already broken at the time of voting – but leaving out the aim of a nuclear-free zone. At the time of writing, Belarus remains a non-nuclear state party to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Currently, as underlined by experts, Belarus supports Russian armed forces in many ways. First, it provides its territory for Russian missile strikes and unmanned aerial vehicle attacks against Ukraine. It also supplies Russia with military equipment, including tanks and ammunition, military training and health care, logistics and other services (e.g. accommodation, fuel-processing and military equipment repairs). Belarus serves as a safe haven for the Russian army. Moreover, the constant threat of invasion across the Belarusian border keeps part of the Ukrainian army there, rather than on the front line where it is most needed.

Furthermore, there are repeated signs that Russia is pressuring Belarus to send its soldiers to Ukraine. Belarusians, regardless of their political position, are against direct military engagement in Ukraine. Some claim that the decision to send troops could spark a new wave of massive protests and expose the lack of Belarusian army support for the regime, with some units putting down arms or switching sides. Besides further destabilising the situation in the region, such a scenario would further increase Lukashenka’s dependence on Russia. Russia, as suggested in the past, might then try to choose a new ruler for Belarus. Some experts argue that for these reasons, the current arrangements may be optimal for both Putin and Lukashenka. The experts add, however, that constant monitoring of the situation (with regard to the scale of Russian troops and equipment on Belarusian soil) is necessary, as this assumption of an optimal scenario for both sides may change or prove incorrect.

Military cooperation

The new military doctrine of the Union State of Belarus and Russia, a slowly-progressing integration framework covering the two countries, was approved on 4 November 2021, 22 years after the Union State was created. The doctrine pays special attention to actions to be taken during a period of perceived increased military threat. These actions include pursuing agreed security and foreign policy, regular joint exercises, deepened defence industry cooperation, coordination of armament procurement and a bi-national Regional Group of Forces (RGF); in 1999 the Treaty on the Union State referred to it as a ‘regional grouping of troops’ (the media use both names). Other actions include infrastructure development and the establishment of an RGF joint command. The doctrine further addresses hybrid threats, including information warfare and cyber. Soon after its adoption, Russia launched its open invasion of Ukraine.

In October 2022, Lukashenka announced that the RGF would be formed on Belarusian territory, owing to an alleged ‘threat’ to the borders of the Union State. Analysts found it possible that, by pointing to a ‘threat’ to Belarus’ external borders, Lukashenka was trying to argue against direct involvement of the Belarusian armed forces in Ukraine. However, as shown below, it only further stepped up Russia’s military presence in Belarus (with the Russian RGF component officially estimated at 9 000 soldiers), accelerated the two armies’ integration, and deepened the regime’s dependency on the stronger partner – Moscow.

December 2022 was marked by many high-level bilateral meetings. On 3 December, the Russian and Belarusian ministers of defence signed a protocol amending the 1997 agreement on the joint provision of regional security in the military sphere. While the content of the amendment remains confidential, some assume it covers the establishment and operation of joint training centres, which would lead to the unification of the two sides’ training systems and increase interoperability. On 19 December, Putin and Lukashenka held a meeting in Minsk where they agreed that Belarus and Russia would create a ‘common defence space’. Experts expect that such a space will translate into even closer joint defence activities and planning, with a permanent Russian military presence in Belarus. On the same day, Lukashenka announced the start of the combat duty of Iskander-M (the short-range ballistic missile system capable of carrying nuclear weapons) and of the S-400 air defence missile system received from Russia. Putin confirmed that Russia would provide training for Belarusian pilots of jets capable of carrying nuclear weapons (Belarus claims that its jets have been modified to be able to carry out this task, although Belarus does not have nuclear weapons). Other December 2022 announcements include joint military exercises in Belarus, Russian support for Belarusian railway troop development (note that Belarusian railway workers managed to disrupt military transit through the country by sabotaging infrastructure) and increased intelligence cooperation.

Joint Russian-Belarusian military exercises took place on Belarusian soil in early 2023, reportedly focusing on urban warfare, followed by air force drills. A key part of the most recent joint staff training of the RGF Joint Command was ‘decision-making on the use of a regional grouping of troops in the interests of ensuring the military security of the Union State’. Reportedly, the training was ‘aimed at increasing the compatibility of the military authorities of the two states’ and ‘is the next stage of preparation for the joint operational exercise ‘Union Shield – 2023’.

According to a leader of the Belarusian opposition, everything is ready for mobilisation in Belarus, as evidenced by Lukashenka’s decision in October 2022 to verify military reservists’ records. Some view this as hidden mobilisation, while for others it is merely a way to check how many reservists have left the country since 2020. In December 2022, Belarus ran a check of its troops’ combat readiness.

European Parliament position

In its resolutions, the European Parliament has repeatedly condemned the use of Belarusian territory for Russian aggression against Ukraine. Moreover, in a resolution of 24 November 2022, it endorsed the position of the Belarusian democratic opposition and civil society that ‘Belarus should be recognised as an occupied or de facto occupied territory’. On 19 January 2023, Parliament stated that the tribunal on the crime of aggression against Ukraine ‘must have jurisdiction to investigate … also Aliaksandr Lukashenka and the political and military leadership in Belarus, as an enabling state’. On 19 October 2022, in its plenary session, the European Parliament debated Lukashenka regime’s active role in the war against Ukraine.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Russia-Belarus military cooperation‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Ralf Drachenberg.

The symbolic attendance of the President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, at the special European Council meeting, and his poignant address to EU leaders, meant that the meeting focused more on Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine than initially envisaged. EU leaders discussed with the Ukrainian President his 10-point peace plan, a possible new sanctions package, additional military, financial and humanitarian support, and the road towards opening Ukraine’s EU accession negotiations. The other points on the agenda were the EU’s economic competitiveness, and migration. On the first point, EU leaders agreed to targeted and temporary support for strategic sectors for the green transition, and to a redeployment of existing EU funding towards sustainable technologies. They also stressed the importance of a strong trade policy in boosting EU competitiveness. On migration, while condemning attempts to instrumentalise migrants for political purposes, EU leaders agreed on immediate measures to reduce pressure at the EU’s external borders, notably through enhanced cooperation with third countries on returns and readmissions.

Following the deadly earthquake on 6 February, EU leaders expressed their condolences to the people of Turkey and Syria, and declared the EU’s readiness to provide further assistance. They also called urgently for progress to be made on the Belgrade–Pristina Dialogue.

1. General aspects

Originally scheduled as a two-day special meeting, the European Council completed its work in one long day − as was also the case with the December 2022 meeting. Despite lasting only one day, the meeting’s conclusions were longer and more detailed than average (more than 50 per cent longer than the average length of conclusions in 2022). After a period of shorter conclusions under former European Council President Donald Tusk, the trend has been for a steady increase in the length of conclusions since Charles Michel took office.

As a result of the attendance of the President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, the customary order of proceedings was modified at this special European Council meeting. Zelenskyy addressed EU Heads of State or Government at the start of the meeting, in the presence of the President of the European Parliament, Roberta Metsola. She took the floor later in the afternoon.

This meeting was most likely the last European Council for the outgoing President of Cyprus, Nicos Anastasiades, as former foreign minister Nikos Christodoulides was elected president on 12 February. Leo Varadkar returned to the European Council, as Irish Taoiseach, after having held this position previously from 2017 to 2020.

Charles Michel did not use the opportunity provided by the meeting to renew the Leaders’ Agenda, the work programme for the European Council indicating future meetings and agenda items. The most recent update of the Leaders; Agenda expired in December 2022.

2. European Council meeting Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine

EU leaders discussed Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine for the ninth time since the outbreak of the war nearly a year ago. Zelenskyy addressed the European Council in person, which was a first, as for the past year he has always spoken with his EU counterparts by video-link. Zelenskyy’s presence in Brussels transformed the meeting from a routine gathering to a special, symbolic and poignant meeting, arguably an historic moment for both the EU and Ukraine. In his address, Zelenskyy thanked the EU leaders for their staunch support, reminded them of Russia’s hybrid warfare activities targeting the EU and its neighbourhood and warned them of Russia’s intensions to replicate the Ukraine scenario elsewhere. He urged them to go further with their sanctions against Russia and include the drone industry, and called for an international tribunal.

Michel greeted Zelenskyy, saying: ‘welcome to the EU, welcome home’. The two presidents held bilateral talks, while a series of four breakaway sessions were held to allow Zelenskyy to meet EU leaders in smaller groups. The day before the meeting, Zelenskyy had met with the French President, Emmanuel Macron, and the German Chancellor, Olaf Scholz, in Paris, where he received assurances that support would continue. Macron stressed that ‘Russia cannot and must not win this war’.

EU leaders reiterated their condemnation of Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine, which breaches the UN Charter. They called once more on Russia to end its aggression, confirmed the EU’s staunch support for Ukraine ‘for as long as it takes’, its territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders and the country’s right to self-defence. EU leaders reiterated their call on Russia to end its attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure in Ukraine and stressed that deported Ukrainians, adults and children, must be allowed to return safely home.

The European Council focused on Zelenskyy’s 10-point peace plan, which it upheld, expressing support for the ‘peace formula’ summit, committing to work to ensure wide participation. EU leaders agreed ‘to maintain and seek to further increase’ pressure on Russia to end the war and withdraw from Ukraine. The European Commission President, Ursula von der Leyen, confirmed that a 10th sanctions package, which could ‘target Putin’s propagandists’ and introduce ‘an additional export ban worth more than €10 billion’, was in preparation. For now, EU leaders have committed only to reinforce existing and anti-circumvention measures, referring to the agreement on a price cap on petroleum products − a measure intended ‘to further raise the cost’ of the war for Russia.

The military, financial and humanitarian support that the EU and its Member States have already given Ukraine totals €67 billion, including nearly €12 billion in military support. As underlined in the joint statement following the 24th EU-Ukraine summit, EU leaders confirmed that the EU would provide Ukraine with ‘political, economic, military, financial and humanitarian support for as long as it takes’. They reiterated their support for the work done jointly with international partners in bolstering the EU solidarity lanes, trade and exports from Ukraine. They also welcomed the launch of the Donor Coordination Platform and called for efforts to step up work on using ‘Russia’s frozen and immobilised assets to support Ukraine’s reconstruction’. EU leaders confirmed that more demining assistance would be provided and, for the first time, acknowledged the importance of the rehabilitation and reintegration of former military personnel.

On accountability, EU leaders stressed the Union’s commitment to hold all perpetrators to account for their war crimes. They confirmed the EU’s support for the establishment of ‘an appropriate mechanism for the prosecution of the crime of aggression‘, for the creation in The Hague of an international centre for the prosecution of the crime of aggression against Ukraine, and for investigations by the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court.

The EU leaders recognised the progress made by Ukraine in fulfilling the conditionality outlined in the European Commission’s opinion on the country’s membership application. Zelenskyy emphasised Ukraine’s goal of opening accession negotiations by the end of 2023. Von der Leyen, however, noted that there was ‘no rigid timeline’, stressing that the Commission would provide an oral report on Ukraine’s progress in the spring and a written report in the autumn.

Main message of the President of the European Parliament: Roberta Metsola warned EU leaders that ‘we cannot allow war fatigue to set in’, calling for more support for Ukraine. Earlier that day, when hosting Zelenskyy in an extraordinary plenary session of Parliament, Metsola stressed that ‘our response must be proportional to the threat − and the threat is existential’.

Economy

At the special meeting, EU leaders discussed the EU’s long-term competitiveness and role in the global setting, in the light of the US Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) − which it is feared will take away EU companies and jobs − and of a general rise in global competition. The EU approach builds on deepening the single market, a success story celebrating its 30th anniversary this year, and on securing a level playing field both internally and globally.

On the basis of the Commission’s Green Deal industrial plan for the net-zero age and the associated forthcoming legislative proposals, the Heads of State or Government defined five lines of action. First, on the adaptation of State-aid policy, despite the differences in views, as highlighted by EPRS, and demonstrated by the arrival doorstep interviews, EU leaders agreed to allow ‘targeted, temporary and proportionate’ support for sectors that are strategic for the green transition. In doing so, they insisted on the need for ‘simpler, faster and more predictable’ procedures. The European Council also asked the Commission to report regularly on the impact of the new State aid policy on the single market and on the EU’s global competitiveness, perhaps to ease the concerns of those Member States that are apprehensive about the IRA’s potential impact on the single market.

Second, EU leaders called for more flexible deployment of existing EU funding to help European industries to roll out key green technologies in a timely and targeted manner. In order to avoid imbalances in the single market, the process should occur in both a fair and a more flexible way, and without compromising cohesion policy objectives. Third, EU leaders also called for a simple, predictable and clear regulatory environment, including simplified administrative and permitting procedures and modernised public procurement rules to promote green industries and EU standards more effectively.

With 2023 designated European Year of Skills, the European Council’s fourth point was a call for increased investment in skills. Considering demographic challenges, job transformation, and labour shortages, the development of skills is considered crucial for the green and digital transitions.

The fifth point focused on closing the EU’s public and private investment gaps, which it is feared could undermine growth. In that context, EU leaders called for an acceleration of work on the capital markets union action plan. They also took note of the Commission’s intention to present a proposal on a European sovereignty fund before summer 2023, to support strategic sectors.

As expected, EU leaders underlined the importance of a strong trade agenda, combining openness and engagement with partners with the use of trade defence instruments to counter unfair practices. The European Council also reiterated its call for increased efforts to diversify supply chains, notably of critical raw materials, that will play an important role in the green tech industry.

Von der Leyen stated that the Commission would table − in time for the March European Council meeting − a concrete proposal taking into account the discussions at the special meeting. Michel noted that the EU’s long-term competitiveness, trade and internal market policy would be discussed at both the March and June 2023 European Council meetings.

Main message of the President of the European Parliament: Metsola pointed to the added value the single market had brought Europe over 30 years and to the need to gain a competitive edge by speeding up investment, sticking to democratic values, and avoiding a protectionist race to the bottom.

Migration

The highly controversial discussions on migration, notably on the question of the financing of fences with EU money, resulted in conclusions framed in language that managed to satisfy the differing positions. Michel reported that the European Council had focused on three areas, namely i) external action, ii) returns and readmissions, and iii) protection of external borders.

The European Council agreed to increase the EU’s external actions to ‘prevent irregular departures and loss of life, to reduce pressure on EU borders and on reception capacities, to fight against smugglers’. This would be achieved through intensified cooperation with countries of origin and transit, and the development of ‘mutually beneficial partnerships’. The EU’s neighbouring countries, the visa policies of which would be strictly monitored, were urged to align with the EU.

To ensure effective returns to countries of origin and transit, all possible forms of leverage would be used, while considering visa restrictions against countries which do not cooperate. EU Member States were invited to recognise each other’s return decisions.

To protect the EU’s external borders, EU leaders stressed the role of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) and called on the Commission to act immediately to ‘mobilise substantial EU funds and means to support Member States in reinforcing border protection capabilities and infrastructure, means of surveillance, including aerial surveillance, and equipment’.

While not focusing on the internal dimension of migration, EU leaders called on the co-legislators to complete work on the migration and asylum pact and on the revised Schengen borders code and the return directive. After having been absent from the European Council agenda in 2019 and 2020, and mainly mentioned in the context of Belarus and Ukraine in 2021 and 2022, EU leaders committed to ‘revert to the matter on a regular basis’. Charles Michel indicated that the European Council meeting of 23-24 March 2023 would already review progress on the implementation of decisions taken at this February special European Council meeting. In the meantime the Council would discuss the implementation of the Dublin roadmap and the matter of operations by private entities in search and rescue operations.

Main message of the President of the European Parliament: Metsola stressed that all the current challenges relating to migration, such as strengthening the EU’s external borders, resolving the issue of secondary movements and enhancing cooperation with third countries, could be dealt with through the European pact on migration and asylum. She insisted, therefore, that ‘it is imperative that negotiations begin between the two co-legislators within the next months, to allow enough time to strike the right balance’.

Read this briefing on ‘Outcome of the special European Council meeting of 9 February 2023‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Tambiama Madiega (1st edition).

The European Commission published a proposal for a directive on adapting non-contractual civil liability rules to artificial intelligence (the ‘AI liability directive’) in September 2022. The Commission proposes to complement and modernise the EU liability framework to introduce new rules specific to damages caused by AI systems. The new rules intend to ensure that persons harmed by AI systems enjoy the same level of protection as persons harmed by other technologies in the EU. The AI liability directive would create a rebuttable ‘presumption of causality’, to ease the burden of proof for victims to establish damage caused by an AI system. It would furthermore give national courts the power to order disclosure of evidence about high-risk AI systems suspected of having caused damage. Stakeholders and academics are questioning, inter alia, the adequacy and effectiveness of the proposed liability regime, its coherence with the artificial intelligence act currently under negotiation, its potential detrimental impact on innovation, and the interplay between EU and national rules.

Versions

• February 2023: Artificial intelligence liability directive (1st edition)

Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on adapting non-contractual civil liability rules to artificial intelligence (AI liability directive) Committee responsible:Committee on Legal Affairs (JURI)COM(2022) 496 final
28.09.022
Rapporteur:Axel Voss (EPP, Germany)2022/0303(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Ordinary legislative procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council on equal footing
– formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Publication of draft report

Written by Lauro Panella.

Although European integration is a key driver of growth, peace, environmental protection and social prosperity, persistent challenges remain and potential crises can be anticipated. Looking forward, a number of possible pathways are open to Europe. The European Parliament favours the path of ambitious, collective EU action, where significant potential gains can be realised, not only for today, but also for various possible future scenarios.

This study seeks to support the European Parliament in defining the political agenda and stimulating debate on a sustainable path forward. It investigates the potential benefits that could be achieved in 50 policy areas, taking into account the state of EU legislation and its untapped potential, and applies quantitative analysis tailored to each policy area. If the EU does not pursue the path of ambitious, collective action, the benefits identified might not materialise fully, leading to a ‘cost of non-Europe’.

The study finds that further EU integration could generate over €2.8 trillion per year by 2032 and help to achieve the EU’s objectives in the areas of social rights, fundamental rights and the environment. Gains from further EU integration would not replace or undermine those from actions taken at national, regional or local level, but rather complement and reinforce them.

A brief summary of quantitative and qualitative impacts follows for each policy area. Quantitative impacts represent annual GDP growth. Qualitative impacts include social and environmental impacts, impacts on fundamental rights and other impacts. Rather than providing an exhaustive summary per policy action and its economic impact, this section highlights key findings from a broader perspective and provides a full range of impacts.

Read the complete study on ‘Increasing European added value in an age of global challenges – Mapping the cost of non-Europe‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Following the path of strategic, collective action could offer the EU potential added value of €2.8 trillion by 2032

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Written by Stefano De Luca (1st edition).

As products have become more complex in the digital age, on 28 September 2022, the European Commission published a proposal for a new directive on liability of defective products. This would revise the existing Product Liability Directive, adopted nearly 40 years ago in 1985. The proposal aims to bring the European Union’s product liability regime up to speed with the digital age, circular economy business models and global value chains.

Addressing the need to ease the burden of proof for consumers seeking compensation for damages suffered because of defective products, the proposal also introduces new provisions to address liability for products such as software (including artificial intelligence systems) and digital services that affect how the product works (e.g. navigation services in autonomous vehicles). As the circular economy is about extending product lifecycles, the proposal clarifies the liability rules for companies that substantially modify products before resale. The proposed rules also ensure that consumers are compensated for defective products manufactured outside the EU. The proposal alleviates the burden of proof for victims under certain circumstances and obliges manufacturers to disclose information where plausible claims for compensation are made.

The next step is for the European Parliament and the Council to consider the proposal. In Parliament, the file has been assigned to the Legal Affairs Committee (JURI) with Pascal Arimont (EPP, Belgium) appointed as rapporteur.

Versions

• February 2023: New Product Liability Directive (1st edition)

Proposal for a directive of the European parliament and of the Council on liability for defective products Committee responsible:Committee on Legal Affairs (JURI)COM(2022) 495
28.09.022
Rapporteur:Pascal Arimont (EPP, Belgium)2022/0302(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Ordinary legislative procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council on equal footing
– formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Publication of draft report

Written by Ionel Zamfir.

Corruption, and particularly grand corruption relating to government officials, has a harmful effect on democracy, the rule of law, human rights, security, the eradication of poverty, and sustainable development, all objectives of the EU’s external action. Corruption in third countries can also affect the functioning of EU democracy with flows of money buying political influence in the EU.

In her 2022 State of the Union address, the European Commission President, Ursula von der Leyen, proposed to include corruption in the EU’s human rights sanctions regime. The Commission cannot initiate the relevant legislation on its own, however. EU sanctions are laid down in common foreign and security policy-related decisions, adopted unanimously by the Council on the basis of a proposal by the High Representative. If such a Council decision includes economic or financial sanctions, these need to be implemented by means of a Council regulation, following a joint proposal of the High Representative and the Commission.

While the drafting of the new legislation has not yet officially begun, the Council is holding debates on the appropriateness of using CFSP sanctions to target corruption. The approach to adopt in order to impose sanctions to target corruption globally could involve creating a horizontal sanctions framework (by expanding the scope of the existing human rights sanctions mechanism adopted in 2020 or by setting up a new dedicated regime), or introducing case-by-case country-specific sanctions regimes.

Although Parliament does not play a formal role in the legislative process leading to the adoption of sanctions, since 2012 – when the international debate on the possibility of establishing such a sanctions regime first arose – it has expressed strong support for an EU sanctions regime applicable to corruption globally, and has asked to be involved in this process.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Towards an EU global sanctions regime for corruption‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Micaela Del Monte and David de Groot (1st edition).

On 25 November 2021, the European Commission submitted a proposal to modify Directive 93/109/EC on the right of mobile European Union (EU) citizens – those residing in a Member State of which they are not nationals – to vote and stand as candidates in elections to the European Parliament. The proposal was presented with three others: to modify the rules on EU citizens’ rights in municipal elections; to set rules on political advertising; and to revise the rules on EU political party and foundation funding. Directive 93/109/EC gives EU citizens the same rights to vote and to be elected in European Parliament elections as the citizens of the Member State in which they reside; Member States have varying rules on the exercise of these rights. The Commission proposal seeks to address some of the concerns raised about the implementation of the directive.

In Parliament, the file was referred to the Committee on Constitutional Affairs. The committee adopted its report on 1 December 2022 and a vote in plenary is scheduled for the February II 2023 plenary session.

Versions

• February 2023: Revision of Council Directive 93/109/EC: Electoral rights of mobile EU citizens in elections to the European Parliament (1st edition)

Proposal for a COUNCIL DIRECTIVE laying down detailed arrangements for the exercise of the right to vote and stand as a candidate in elections to the European Parliament for Union citizens residing in a Member State of which they are not nationals (recast) Committee responsible:Committee on Constitutional Affairs (AFCO)COM(2021) 0732
25.11.2021
Rapporteur:Damian Boeselager (Greens/Germany)2021/0372(CNS)Shadow rapporteurs:Loránt Vincze (EPP, Romania), Pedro Silva Pereira (S&D, Portugal), Sandro Gozi (Renew, France), Leila Chaibi (GUE, France) Next steps expected: Awaiting Parliament’s vote

Written by Antonio Albaladejo Román.

For millennia, farmers have resorted to organic and mineral fertilisers to increase the quality and productivity of their crops. Some studies even date the use of fertilisers in Europe to almost 8 000 years ago. Today, fertilisers remain a key agricultural sector input, with a direct influence on the availability and affordability of food products in the EU. Despite their importance for agriculture, the production and over-use of fertilisers also entails environmental and health risks.

The agri-food sector relies mostly on three mineral substances for fertiliser production: nitrogen, potassium and phosphorus. Nitrogen fertilisers are the most-consumed mineral fertilisers in the EU (10 million tonnes in 2020) and their production process is heavily dependent on natural gas (hydrogen from natural gas and nitrogen from the air are combined to produce ammonia, an intermediate compound later turned into nitrogen-based fertiliser). This reliance on significant energy inputs is a determinant element in the global food crisis that resulted from the COVID‑19 pandemic and the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Following the initial COVID‑19 outbreak, fertiliser producers were hit by travel restrictions and labour shortages, as well as the global logistic bottlenecks that accompanied the post-pandemic economic recovery. The high energy prices recorded in 2021 contributed to the first spike in fertiliser prices in the second half of the year. The Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 later exacerbated this inflationary tendency.

Before the war, Russia represented 16 % of global exports of fertilisers and nearly half of the EU’s imports of natural gas. Seeking to undermine global food security, the regime restricted Russian fertiliser and energy exports, constraining supplies and increasing prices. Although to safeguard global food supplies, the EU avoided targeting Russia’s agricultural production, it sanctioned Belarusian potash exports to curb this importance source of revenue for Minsk. Due to the excessively high prices for natural gas, 70 % of EU industrial production had to shut down in the summer of 2022. As a result, European farmers were hit by soaring fertiliser prices (149 % annual increase in September 2022), on top of higher costs for other critical inputs such as energy, seeds, and feedstuffs. Consequently, there was a dramatic increase in food inflation in the euro area – 13.8 % in December 2022, up from 3.2 % in 2021.

Tackling the rising fertiliser prices was a key priority when the European Commission proposed measures to avert a food security crisis in the aftermath of Russia’s invasion. A temporary crisis framework allowed for State aid measures, to offset rising fertiliser prices. Moreover, in November 2022 the European Commission put forward a communication on ensuring available and affordable fertilisers, outlining a series of domestic and international actions to guarantee the global supply of this critical agricultural input. In the short term, the European Commission encouraged Member States to prioritise fertiliser producers’ access to natural gas in case of shortages. In the medium and longer term, the communication highlighted the common agricultural policy strategic plans’ potential to ensure sustainable fertiliser use through import diversification, increased optimisation, and a greater emphasis on organic and sustainable fertilisers.

The European Parliament has devoted significant attention to the inflationary pressures on the prices of fertiliser. In its 24 March 2022 resolution, Parliament identified fertilisers’ critical role in the agricultural sector and their importance for EU and global food security, calling on the European Commission to ensure a stable and affordable supply. The Parliament’s focus on available and affordable fertilisers has continued into 2023. At the February II 2023 plenary session in Strasbourg, Members are set to question the European Commission on what additional measures will be adopted to ensure fertiliser availability, the EU’s future self-sufficiency in this critical agricultural input, and farmers’ access to information and resources to improve soil fertility and fertiliser management. A vote on a European Parliament resolution on the European Commission’s November communication is expected to follow the debate.

Written by Guillaume Ragonnaud (1st edition).

In 2023, the EU celebrates the 30th anniversary of the single market. Recent shocks have shown not only how vulnerable to crises the single market is, but also the extent to which the EU economy relies on a well-functioning single market. It is now considered to be a key driver of EU resilience.

In September 2022, the Commission put forward a single market emergency instrument (SMEI) package. It includes one main proposal for a regulation establishing a SMEI, and two accompanying proposals amending harmonised product legislation to ensure that strategic goods can be marketed quickly to address shortages in the event of market crises. The main proposal establishes measures for contingency planning, such as an early warning system. A ‘vigilance mode’ could be activated after a threat has been identified. If a wide-ranging crisis hits the single market, an ’emergency mode’ could be triggered.

The proposal is now in the hands of the co-legislators. In the European Parliament, the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO) is responsible for the file. It plans to consider its rapporteur’s draft report on 27-28 March 2023.

Versions

• February 2023: Single market emergency instrument: Protecting the single market in future crises (1st edition)

Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a Single Market emergency instrument and repealing Council Regulation No (EC) 2679/98 Committee responsible:Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO)COM(2022) 459
19.09.022
Rapporteur:Andreas Schwab (EPP, Germany)2022/0278(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:René Repasi (S&D, Germany)
Dita Charanzová (Renew, Czechia)
Anna Cavazzini (Greens/EFA, Germany)
Not yet appointed (ID)
Not yet appointed (ECR)
Anne-Sophie Pelletier (The Left, France)Ordinary legislative procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council on equal footing
– formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Publication of draft report