European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Cécile Remeur.

At a time when global and cross-border crises are highlighting the interconnections between health, environment, peace, food security and energy sufficiency, notions such as externalities, public goods and biodiversity boundaries are gaining renewed interest, as a strong grasp of the various aspects of challenging situations becomes essential to help frame policy responses.

The notion of externalities is about asking whether all elements have been accounted for in price setting. When this is not the case, the mismatch is described as a positive or negative externality. The question then is how to correct the situation through pricing and with a price signal – something that can be achieved through taxation or regulation.

Beyond pricing, public goods – as opposed to private goods – are goods and services that can be enjoyed by all. They bring advantages to society as a whole, and their geographical scope can vary from local and regional to global.

Moving one step further, it is necessary to consider the effects on public goods of activities that might not be seen or occur at the same time or in the same place as the activities themselves. This relates to notions such as tipping points, footprints, sustainability and the preservation of biodiversity.

This briefing aims to shed light on those invisible effects, to complement existing discussions and pave the way for new tools to address environmental challenges.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Understanding silent and invisible assets‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Eric Pichon with Alessandra De Martini.

On 15 April 2023, violent armed clashes flared up again in Sudan between the main two military factions battling for control of the country: the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), led by former Sovereign Council leader General Muhammad Hamdan ‘Hemedti’ Dagolo; and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), headed by Sudan’s de facto President, General Abdel Fattah Al‑Burhan. The armed attacks are causing numerous civilian casualties as well as massive population displacements to neighbouring countries, while foreign powers are evacuating their citizens. Despite a succession of ceasefires, the conflict seems likely to continue for the near future, with major repercussions for the regional balance of power.

Background

After Al-Bashir was deposed by a coup d’état in April 2019, Sudan attempted a transition to democracy. A transitional government led by a civilian Prime Minister, Abdalla Hamdok, and a Sovereign Council, headed by Lieutenant General Abdel-Fattah Al‑Burhan and General Muhammad Hamdan ‘Hemedti’ Dagolo, shared the power. The two military officers represented the competing military pillars of Al‑Bashir’s government: Al‑Burhan is a former Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) commander in Central Darfur State and in Yemen, and Hemedti is chief of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) – a paramilitary group in control of the mining sector (mainly gold in Darfur).

In November 2021, the military dissolved the Sovereign Council and the transitional government fell. After weeks of mass protests, Hamdok was reinstated as Prime Minister, but resigned in January 2022 due to a political deadlock. Al‑Burhan took control of the government and established a new ruling Sovereign Council, declining African Union (AU) and EU-Norway-UK-US mediation to resolve Sudan’s political crisis.

After months of negotiations and peace talks, political and military leaders and civilians signed a framework agreement in December 2022, envisaging the removal of the military’s involvement in the government and economy and establishing a 2-year transition period with a civilian-led administration prior to elections. In March 2023, the same stakeholders agreed to adopt a new constitution and to transfer the power to a civilian administration the following month.

The power struggle continued, however, and these deadlines were not met. One of the main disputes between the two military factions is the integration of the RSF into the national armed forces: Hemedti wants to postpone this procedure for 10 years, while Al‑Burhan aims to unite the two military forces within 2 years.

Current political and humanitarian situation

Fighting between the main two military factions reached a new level of violence in the capital on 15 April 2023. Khartoum emerged as the epicentre of the uprising, as it hosts some key locations, including the national intelligence services, the international airport and institutional buildings. The fighting quickly spread around the country, becoming a serious threat to regional stability. Some analysts have also reported a sharp increase in inter-tribal violence in the country’s west and south, owing to the current political and economic instability. Furthermore, they warn about the repercussions of refugee displacement to neighbouring countries, such as Egypt, Chad, Ethiopia or the Central African Republic. On 27 April 2023, the two sides agreed to extend a 72‑hour Saudi-US-mediated humanitarian ceasefire (which began on 24 April), for another 72 hours. On 1 May 2023, the United Nations envoy in Sudan, Volker Perthes, announced that Al-Burhan and Hemedti were willing to enter into talks. On 2 May, South Sudan announced it had brokered a 7‑day ceasefire between the RSF and SAF from 4 to 11 May.

The ceasefires failed and the spiral of violence is increasing daily. Air attacks and shooting persists and neither the RSF nor the SAF have manifested an intention to withdraw. Meanwhile, living conditions for civilians are dramatic. Civilian deaths are estimated at over 400, but statistics are difficult to gather. On 2 May 2023, UN agencies estimated that over 100 000 people had fled Sudan to neighbouring countries, including refugees from these countries – and this figure may quickly amount to 800 000. More than 330 000 people have been displaced within the country. Most of the hospitals are closed, or operate only in some emergencies. Stores, markets and banks have halted business, fearing bomb attacks. Accordingly, food prices are rising and the already acute food and drinking water shortage is worsening. The humanitarian needs are escalating rapidly as 65 % of Sudan’s population lived below the poverty line even before the latest clashes. Western embassies are evacuating their nationals.

Regional and international repercussions

Sudan’s power struggles will have severe repercussions on the country’s attempts to transition to democracy, as well as on stability at regional level. Previously, the AU, the EU and the US have strongly supported the implementation of democratic reforms and provided considerable funding. However, this has failed to help achieve the negotiated targets (which included establishing a transitional civilian government, transitional justice and security and military reform).

Both sides have been trying to strengthen alliances inside and outside the country. Al‑Burhan has the support of veteran Darfuri rebels and some Islamist groups. Hemedti won ‘the favor of some democrats by criticizing the Islamists’ strong return‘, according to a Sudanese editorialist. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), as well as the Wagner Group, reportedly provided weapons, training and troops for Hemedti’s RSF.

Several regional and international powers have economic and political interests in the sub‑Saharan country, which a democratic transition could have threatened. Egypt has sided with Al‑Burhan, until recently an ally against the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on the River Nile, and ‘probably to try to prevent a dangerous precedent of successful transition from military autocracy to civilian democracy’, according to one security expert.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE supported the overthrowing of Al‑Bashir in 2019, and have sided with Hemedti, who provided them with troops to fight in Yemen. China and Russia have invested heavily in extracting Sudanese natural resources and it is expected that they will try to preserve their economic and security interests. According to experts, the fighting will continue for the foreseeable future. Strong diplomatic efforts involving regional players, such as the AU, the Arab League and the Horn of Africa’s Inter‑Governmental Association for Development (IGAD) may play a significant role in preventing the escalation of the conflict and in providing humanitarian help for civilians to overcome the crisis. An International Crisis Group expert suggests that one of the Arab countries might drive the dialogue for the cessation of hostilities, as these countries are the most affected by the crisis.

EU involvement
The day before the outbreak of the crisis, the EU and its partners expressed concern about the tensions. Shortly after, the EU High Representative called for a ceasefire and for humanitarian corridors to be set up. The EU special representative for the Horn of Africa has entered discussions with the AU and other stakeholders on ending the conflict. On 24 April 2023, the EU Foreign Affairs Council discussed evacuation plans and mediation possibilities to prevent the escalation of the conflict. EU Member State-led operations have evacuated most of the 1 700 EU citizens present in Sudan, as well as non-EU citizens. Humanitarian supply distribution and refugee corridors are among the first EU humanitarian priorities. During the 24 April Council meeting, Finland’s Minister for Foreign Affairs Pekka Haavisto, (Special EU Envoy to Sudan in 2021), highlighted the risks of further Wagner Group engagement in the region, considering the lack of involvement from Western democracies. Some analysts recommend that the EU should take on a mediator role to support civilian actors in the political process.
Members from the European Parliament‘s Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) visited Sudan in September 2022, to urge ‘all parties to come to an agreement’ to resume the path to democracy. They also expressed their concern that ‘further delay in agreeing on the way out of the crisis [would…] aggravate the already immense challenges that the people of Sudan are facing’.
AFET and the Committee on Development (DEVE) discussed the situation in Sudan on 26 April 2023. A particular focus was on evacuation plans activated for EU citizens living and working in the country. The committees urged cooperation with regional powers, to reach an agreement to enhance peace, development and humanitarian access. The committees also highlighted the importance of avoiding the regionalisation of the conflict, or a prolonged ceasefire that would allow both militias to resupply.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Sudan crisis: Developments and implications‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Gregor Erbach (1st edition).

Road transport is a major contributor to climate change, and CO2 emissions from heavy-duty vehicles have grown by 29 % since 1990, accounting for over a quarter of road transport CO2 emissions.

On 14 February 2023, the European Commission tabled a legislative proposal to revise Regulation (EU) 2019/1242 setting CO2 emission standards for new heavy-duty vehicles in the EU. The proposed revision would expand the scope of the regulation to include urban buses, coaches, trailers and other types of lorries. The average CO2 emissions of heavy-duty vehicles, compared with 2019 levels, would have to fall by 45 % from 2030, by 65 % from 2035, and by 90 % from 2040 onwards. The proposal sets CO2 requirements for new trailers and targets 100 % of newly registered urban buses to be zero-emission vehicles from 2030.

In the European Parliament, the proposal has been referred to the Committee on Environment, Public Health and Food Safety. The Council is examining the proposal at working party level.

Versions

• May 2023: CO₂ emission performance standards and reporting obligations for new heavy-duty vehicles (1st edition)

Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2019/1242 as regards strengthening the CO₂ emission performance standards for new heavy-duty Committee responsible:Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI)COM(2023) 88 final
14.2.2023Rapporteur:Yannick Jadot (Greens/EFA, France)2023/0042(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Jens Gieseke (EPP, Germany)
Christel Schaldemose (S&D, Denmark)Ordinary legislative procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council on equal footing
– formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Publication of draft report

Written by Clare Ferguson.

Members of the European Parliament meet in plenary from 8 to 11 May, a significant week in the European Union calendar, as Europe Day, celebrating peace and unity, falls on 9 May. That day, the Chancellor of Germany, Olaf Scholz, is due to attend the plenary to take part in the latest ‘This is Europe’ debate. The following day, the President of Portugal, Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa, is expected to address Members in a formal sitting. On Tuesday, The Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell is due to make a statement on the situation in Sudan, where violence is aggravating the already immense challenges the people of Sudan are facing in plenary on Tuesday.

The biggest issue on Parliament’s plenary agenda for this session is the EU budget. Members are expected to hold a joint debate on the current EU budget and own resources on Monday evening. The EU’s current financial situation is very tight, with rising EU recovery instrument (EURI) borrowing costs undermining the EU’s capacity to finance its priorities. Members are set to debate a Committee on Budgets (BUDG) report urging a revision of the EU’s long-term budget before 2024. To avoid having to cancel existing programmes due to lack of funds, the committee calls on the Council to act urgently to adopt the stalled Own Resources Decision.

To ensure the transparent and democratic scrutiny of how public funds are spent, Parliament’s elected Members decide whether the EU institutions have disbursed their budget in accordance with the rules. On Tuesday, Members are due to discuss a number of files concerning the discharge procedure for the EU’s 2021 budget. The Committee on Budgetary Control (CONT) recommends granting discharge to all 33 EU decentralised agencies and 9 joint undertakings. However, the committee also draws attention to the European Court of Auditors’ recommendations, including the need for all joint undertakings to adopt common guidelines. In the light of the continued institutional differences between Parliament and the European Council and the Council, the committee once again proposes to postpone the decision on discharge of their 2021 budget. In the interests of transparency, Parliament has refused to grant discharge to the Council each financial year since 2009. In contrast, the CONT committee proposes to grant discharge to all other EU institutions and bodies, although it again makes observations on opportunities to improve budgetary management. For the first time, the discharge procedure for the European Commission will also apply to the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF). Here, the Commission appears to have taken previous CONT committee criticism on board, and CONT proposes that Parliament grant discharge to the Commission, all executive agencies and for the European Development Funds for 2021. However, it also draws attention to the need for stronger control on spending by national authorities and non-governmental organisations.

Members continue to focus on efforts towards mitigating climate change on Monday evening. The oil, gas and coal sectors are responsible for more than a third of man-made methane emissions worldwide. Parliament’s Committees on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety and on Industry, Research and Energy have examined the European Commission’s proposals for an EU strategy to reduce energy sector methane emissions and Members are due to debate their joint report on Monday evening, with the aim of fixing the institution’s position for trilogue negotiations. Among other changes, the report seeks to oblige the Commission to set a binding 2030 methane emissions reduction target for all actors in the sector.

To prevent companies making bogus claims about the environmental impact of their products, among other things, the Committee on Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO) have prepared a report that seeks to strengthen protection and legal certainty for consumers and economic operators alike, in the context of a Commission proposal to empower consumers for the green transition. Members are due to debate the report on Tuesday evening, with the resulting text setting Parliament’s position for trilogue negotiations with the Council.

In a joint debate also scheduled for Tuesday evening, Members are due to consider a recommendation from the Committees on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality (FEMM) and Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) to grant the Council’s request for Parliament’s consent for ratification of EU accession to the Istanbul Convention. First proposed in 2016, six EU countries have refused to ratify the Istanbul Convention on violence against women. However, as the European Court of Justice has ruled that unanimity in the Council is not necessary in this case, the way is open for a broader EU accession to an agreement that addresses gender-based violence (GBV).

Each year, Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) reviews the Commission’s reports on reform progress in countries hoping to join the EU. Members are due to debate the committee’s findings on two of these reports, for 2022, on Tuesday evening. In the first, on Serbia, the committee welcomes the country’s continued ambition for EU membership. However, it regrets Serbia’s failure to align with EU sanctions against Russia and its continued difficult relations with Kosovo. Normalising relations between Belgrade and Pristina would be an important step forward on Serbia’s path to EU membership. Although the second report, on Kosovo, calls for a commitment to genuine dialogue with Serbia, the AFET committee commends Kosovo’s progress on reforms and fighting corruption, and particularly praises Kosovo’s condemnation of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine.

With over 1.1 million signatures, the European Citizens’ Initiative ‘Stop Finning – Stop the trade‘ has earned support across the EU. Members are therefore due to debate the defence of sharks and rays on Thursday morning. The initiative aims to ban fin trading – other than when naturally attached to the shark’s body – in the EU, which remains one of the biggest exporters and transit centres for shark fins. Indeed catching sharks is now largely for fin trading, according to the ECI’s organisers, in particular with the aim of exporting to Asian regions.

Agenda Plenary Session May I 2023

• Situation in Sudan
• EU Budget Discharge 2021 – European Commission
• EU Budget Discharge 2021 – Other institutions
• EU Budget Discharge 2021 – Decentralised agencies
• Impact on the 2024 EU budget of increasing borrowing costs for the European Union Recovery Instrument
• Reducing methane emissions in the energy sector
• Empowering consumers for the green transition
• EU accession to the Istanbul Convention
• 2022 report on Serbia
• 2022 report on Kosovo
• ‘Stop Finning – Stop the Trade!’: European Citizens’ Initiative in defence of sharks and rays

Written by Nera Kuljanic with Michael Sicaud-Clyet.

Over the past 3.8 billion years, nature has been engineering itself to survive. It has also developed efficient and sustainable adaptation mechanisms against changing environmental conditions. To further the EU’s political ambitions, could we employ biomimicry to mitigate climate change and achieve climate neutrality?

Since the dawn of the industrial revolution, societies have gone from a set of metabolisms – using energy from water, wind and living beings – to a techno-industrial metabolism in which the economic and productive systems rely on carbon-based energy and excessive non-sustainable exploitation of natural resources. This new relationship between human beings and their environment has led to ecosystemic challenges such as climate change and diminishing biodiversity. Thus, over the past 200 years, the planet has been experiencing further biophysical transformations than what would otherwise have occurred naturally. While techno-industrial societies rely on fossil fuels, high temperatures and pressure to transform materials or create movement, natural ecosystems rely on molecular chemistry or physics, giving us clues on how we can use energy with maximum efficiency and adapt to changing environments.

Biomimicry comes from the Greek words bios (life) and mimikos (one who imitates). It is not a new practice; the most famous example of biomimicry is Leonardo Da Vinci’s flying machine inspired by birds. Biomimicry is a multidisciplinary approach that seeks to learn from nature’s biological mechanisms and imitate them to solve system problems. It is linked to biomimetics – the ‘interdisciplinary cooperation of biology and technology or other fields of innovation with the goal of solving practical problems through the function analysis of biological systems, their abstraction into models, and the transfer into and application of these models to the solution’.

There are three levels of practice in biomimicry. The organism level involves copying the form, shape or structure of a specific organism. The behaviour level involves imitating natural processes, such as the interaction between an ecosystem and its surroundings. The ecosystem level is about imitating the working principles of ecosystems, i.e. how different parts of an organism interact on a large scale.

Potential impacts and developments

At the organism level, most biomimicked structures fulfil an aesthetic purpose. Over the centuries, trees and plants have served as a source of inspiration for structures such as the ornamental structural columns in Greek and Roman classical architecture. In some rare cases, bio-inspired structures can interact with the environment. One such example is the Taichung Metropolitan Opera House in Taiwan, which can collect rainwater that is then filtered and reused.

At the behaviour level, biomimicry can make a greater contribution to fighting climate change and its impacts. A well-known example is the Harare Eastgate Centre, designed to resemble the shape and functioning of a termite mound. Termite mounds have a climate control function. Similarly, the way the centre extends upwards, the different wind velocities at its top and bottom, the fresh air that is drawn by means of a Venturi effect, as well as the heat emitted by the people and machinery on its premises give the building an impressively stable interior temperature, achieved without resorting to costly and energy-hungry air-conditioning. The building thus both mitigates climate change, by reducing energy consumption, and adapts to extreme heat events.

It is at the ecosystem level that biomimicry could have the biggest mitigating effect on climate change. An example includes the natural carbon removal process. Decomposition of organic matter ‘includes physical, chemical and biological mechanisms that transform organic matter into increasingly stable forms’. In boreal ecosystems, plant litter serves as a carbon source for micro-organisms that can degrade cellulose, hemicellulose and lignin. Bacteria provide trees with a number of substances (nitrogen, phosphorus, phytohormones and natural antibiotics) that improve their growth and protect them from disease. Fungi provide the forest ecosystem with nutrients, water and minerals. They also completely digest the lignin and produce humus, an organo-mineral complex that consists of about 60 % carbon, 6 % nitrogen, and smaller amounts of phosphorus and sulphur. The formation of this humic substance contributes to soil fertility and carbon storage. Fungi secrete glomalin (a glycoprotein made of glucose), which is estimated to contain a third of the carbon sequestered in the Earth’s soils. Finally, earthworms help to store carbon by mixing humus and clay provided by trees. Through all the above processes, decomposition plays an important role in the global carbon cycle by fixing nearly as much carbon as photosynthesis does. In 2019, natural land sinks, such as forests, grasslands and wetlands, fixed around 11.5 Gigatons of CO2, which is about 28 % of human-caused emissions. Thus, a whole ecosystem composed of trees, litter and micro-organisms produces an efficient process of carbon capture and storage.

There is currently no technology mimicking decomposition as a way to mitigate climate change. An ongoing ERC-funded project, CO2LIFE, ‘intends to develop a biomimetic chemical process that converts CO2 into valuable molecules using membrane technology’. CO2LIFE’s starting point is acknowledging nature’s effective mechanism to concentrate CO2 and fixate it into organic material, especially glucose, by means of enzymatic action. The findings of this project could make an important contribution towards developing a technology that imitates nature’s biological processes to mitigate climate change.

Anticipatory policy-making

An important issue regarding the further development of biomimetic solutions is the overall lack of financial investment in nature-based solutions and biodiversity restoration. Indeed, the development of biomimetic solutions could benefit from more substantial policy support, as is the case in the United States, where the government has provided funding for biomimicry research. In the EU, Germany hosts more than 100 public research institutions conducting biomimicry-related research and development, and a pioneering research centre in biomimicry was established in France in 2014. The EU has been funding work such as the Horizon 2020 AIRCOAT project and the Horizon Europe Nature4Nature project.

The role of education policy is important to further the understanding of the complexities of natural ecosystems. There are a number of higher education programmes in biomimicry in the EU – for instance, in the Netherlands, Spain and France – aimed at understanding nature’s capacity for solving system problems.

Finally, carbon-farming methods, where CO2 is removed from the atmosphere and stored in plant materials or soils, might need to be certified as part of the recently proposed regulation establishing a Union certification framework for carbon removals. Similar schemes could apply to future biomimetic technologies replicating chemical and biological processes from nature, to store and convert carbon.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘What if nature taught us to adapt to climate change?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Listen to podcast ‘What if nature taught us to adapt to climate change?’ on YouTube.

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Written by Marcin Grajewski.

Türkiye holds presidential and parliamentary elections on 14 May 2023, which could mark a political turnaround after two decades of increasing autocratic rule of the conservative Justice and Development Party (AKP) and its leader, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Erdogan faces an unprecedented challenge from the main opposition candidate Kemal Kilicdaroglu, the head of the Republican People’s Party (CHP) and presidential nominee for the six-party Nation Alliance bloc.

The elections take place amid a serious economic crisis and what analysts say is democratic erosion under Erdogan’s government. Polls predict a record voter turnout, and a tight race between the incumbent president and Kilicdaroglu. Under the Erdogan party’s rule, the Muslim country has abandoned its secularist tradition and turned into an increasingly difficult partner for the West, including the European Union and NATO.

This note gathers links to the recent publications and commentaries from many international think tanks on Türkiye’s election, its relations with the EU and its internal and foreign policies.

Letter from Istanbul: Turkey has difficult years ahead
Brookings Institution, April 2023

Green politics could have an outsized impact on Türkiye’s elections
Carnegie Europe, April 2023

The strategic consequences of a Kılıçdaroğlu victory over Erdoğan
Carnegie Europe, April 2023

What the 2023 Turkish general election could mean for the EU-Turkey elections
Centre for European Reform, April 2023

Experts insights: Turkish elections
Clingendael, April 2023

Erdoğan is losing but the Turkish opposition is far from an assured victory
Democracy Paradox, April 2023

How the West should prepare for the Turkish elections
European Council on Foreign Relations, April 2023

La Turquie, nouveau leader des non-alignés? Analyse de son repositionnement géostratégique
Groupe de Recherche et d’Information sur la Paix et la Sécurité, April 2023

A new new Turkey? What an opposition victory would mean for Ankara’s foreign policy
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, April 2023

Un équilibre entre sécurité et innovation: La vision de l’opposition turque sur les politiques numériques du pays
Institut français des relations internationales, April 2023

Les coalitions politiques en Turquie à la veille des élections de 2023
Institut français des relations internationales, April 2023

Turkey goes to the polls: What lies ahead for its relations with the EU?
Istituto Affari Internazionali, April 2023

EU-Turkey-UK triangulation: The key to Euro-Atlantic security
Istituto Affari Internazionali, April 2023

At a crossroads: What is at stake in Turkey‘s elections?
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, April 2023

What Turkey’s elections mean for Ukraine
Wilson Center, April 2023

Will earthquake be Erdogan’s Tarpeian rock?
Barcelona Centre for International Affairs, March 2023

The EU and Turkey after the elections: The start of a new chapter
Centre for European Reform, March 2023

Erdoğan is in danger
Council on Foreign Relations, March 2023

Has there been a rapprochement between Turkey and the West after the invasion of Ukraine
Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey, March 2023

Turkey vis-à-vis Russia’s war against Ukraine
Istituto Affari Internazionali, March 2023

Turkey’s foreign policy in the eastern Mediterranean: Peace-making in Cyprus at a cross-road
IPC-Mercator, March 2023

Consequences of the war in Ukraine: Two Areas of contention -Turkey and the Balkans
Rand Corporation, March 2023

Political and economic implications of the Turkish earthquakes:
Centralisation of power has eroded state capacity
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, March 2023

The politics of Türkiye’s earthquake
Carnegie Europe, February 2023

Sailing through the storm: Türkiye’s Black Sea strategyaAmidst the Russian-Ukrainian war
Carnegie Europe, February 2023

Turkey’s neutral stance in Ukraine: How sustainable will it be?
Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, February 2023 

Turkey’s profound transformation matters to Europe
Carnegie Europe, January 2023

Is the EU ready for and/or willing to a change in Turkey?Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey, January 2023

From aid to inclusion: A better way to help Syrian refugees in Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan
European Council on Foreign Relations, January 2023

Turkey’s Kurds: Kingmakers in the upcoming elections?
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, January 2023

Governance practices in Turkey: A comparative perspective
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, January 2023

U.S., Turkey sanction ISIS financial network
Wilson Center, January 2023

Turkey’s global military footprint in 2022
Atlantic Council, December 2022

Turkey learns that hard power is a global common currency: Defense diplomacy elevates Ankara’s status on the international stage
Atlantic Council, December 2022

Understanding Turkey’s geostrategic posture
Carnegie Europe, November 2022

Bromance: Turkey’s activity in the Western Balkans
Centre for Eastern Studies, November 2023

Turkey’s Eurasian ambitions at a time of geopolitical uncertainty
Centre for European Policy Studies, November 2022

Read this briefing on ‘Türkiye’s high-stakes elections‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Citizens often turn to the European Parliament to ask about the European Union’s rules regarding the Schengen Area and EU visa policy.

The Schengen area enables EU citizens and non-EU nationals, who are legally present in the EU, to travel between countries without being checked at national borders. It contributes to the free movement of citizens, allowing them to live, work and move around without formalities.

Twenty-seven countries are part of the Schengen agreement. They include most EU countries as well as four non-EU countries (Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland).

The EU Member States Bulgaria, Cyprus, Ireland and Romania are not Schengen countries. Ireland has opted out of joining the agreement, while Bulgaria, Cyprus and Romania are expected to join in the future.

Common rules for border checks

To ensure safe and controlled entry into the Schengen area, the Schengen Borders Code sets common rules for checks at the external border. These include checks on persons, duration of stay, as well as harmonised visa requirements for the Schengen area.

Member countries are evaluated regularly through the Schengen Evaluation and Monitoring Mechanism, to verify that the rules concerning the Schengen area are being applied.

In December 2021, the European Commission presented a proposal to amend the Schengen Borders Code, which aims to improve the Schengen system’s resilience to serious threats, and to adapt it to new challenges. The proposal, which falls under the ordinary legislative procedure, is at the initial stage of the legislative process.

Common visa policy

The EU has established a common visa policy for travellers transiting or intending to stay for a short period in the Schengen area. It facilitates the entry of legal visitors into the EU, while strengthening internal security.

The most common type of visa for non-EU citizens is a short-stay visa, entitling a person to stay up to 90 days in a period of 180 days. Any of the Schengen countries can grant a visa, according to the Visa Code, which was updated in November 2021 to make the application process faster and easier, as well as to improve cooperation with non-EU countries. Visa requests for longer stays are managed by the EU country in which the visa applicant wishes to stay.

The EU has a common list of countries whose citizens must have a visa when crossing the external borders and a list of countries whose citizens are exempt from that requirement. These lists are set out in a 2021 regulation.

Temporary reintroduction of internal border controls

While the EU aims to keep the internal borders of the Schengen area open to facilitate free movement, member countries have the right to reintroduce internal border controls temporarily in exceptional circumstances, for instance:

• foreseeable events (e.g. sports events) drawing significant attention (renewable periods of 30 days, up to 6 months);
• immediate action that needs to be taken to respond to a threat (renewable periods of 20 days, up to 2 months);
• persistent serious deficiencies relating to external border control (3 renewals of any period up to 2 years).

These measures should only be introduced as a last resort to protect common interests within the Schengen Area. Recent examples include: some countries introduced internal border controls during the large-scale arrivals of migrants and refugees into the EU in 2015; and temporary internal border controls and travel restrictions from 2020 onwards, to prevent the spread of the coronavirus.

While sometimes necessary, internal border controls or closures can have a negative effect on both the economy and the fundamental freedoms of EU citizens. The European Parliament considers the Schengen Area a key EU achievement. In a 2021 resolution, Parliament expressed its commitment to safeguarding border-free movement.

Schengen enlargement

Croatia joined the Schengen area on 1 January 2023, following a period of intensive preparation and substantial efforts to meet all the necessary requirements.

Bulgaria and Romania have not yet joined the Schengen area, although they fulfil the criteria for full membership. The decision to allow new states to enter the border-free zone is taken unanimously by national governments. In a resolution on Bulgarian and Romanian accession to the Schengen area, adopted in October 2022, the European Parliament reiterated its long-standing position that Bulgaria and Romania should be allowed to join the Schengen area.

Further information

• The impact of coronavirus on Schengen borders, European Parliamentary Research Service, Briefing, April 2020
• Temporary border controls in the Schengen area, European Parliamentary Research Service, At A Glance, March 2020
• Revision of the common visa code, European Parliament, Legislative Train
• Schengen, Borders and Visa, European Commission

Keep sending your questions to the Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (Ask EP)! We reply in the EU language that you use to write to us.

Citizens often send messages to the President of the European Parliament (or to the institution’s public portal) expressing their views on current issues and/or requesting action from the Parliament. The Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (AskEP) within the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) looks into these issues and replies to the messages, which may sometimes be identical as part of wider public campaigns.

The President of the European Parliament has recently received a large number of messages calling on the Parliament to defend the immunity of Clara Ponsatí Obiols, Member of the European Parliament (Junts per Catalunya – Lliures per Europa, Spain), in the context of legal proceedings in Spain related to the 2017 Catalonia independence referendum.

Citizens first began to write to the President on this subject at the end of March 2023, when Clara Ponsatí was briefly arrested – and subsequently released – in Barcelona.

Please find below the main points of the reply sent to citizens who took the time to write to the President of the European Parliament on this matter (in Catalan, English, French, Spanish, Italian and Portuguese).

Main points made in the reply in English

The immunity of Members of the European Parliament is regulated by the Protocol on the Privileges and Immunities of the European Union and the Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament (Rules 7-9). A request by a Member for his or her immunity to be defended is announced in Parliament’s plenary and referred to the committee responsible – the Committee on Legal Affairs. The Committee examines the admissibility of the request, and may ask for any information or explanation which it deems necessary. The Member concerned is given an opportunity to be heard, and to present any documents or other written evidence.

Meeting in camera, the Committee on Legal Affairs adopts a recommendation to the whole Parliament to approve or reject the request. At the plenary session following the Committee decision, Parliament reaches a decision by a simple majority vote. Following the vote, the President immediately communicates Parliament’s decision to the Member concerned and to the competent authority of the Member State concerned.

On 29 March 2023, at the resumption of the plenary session in Brussels, the President of the European Parliament announced that Clara Ponsatí Obiols had submitted a request for defence of her parliamentary immunity in the context of legal proceedings in Spain. The request was referred to the Committee on Legal Affairs, following the procedure laid down in Rule 9 of Parliament’s Rules of Procedure.

Main points made in the reply in Catalan

La immunitat dels diputats al Parlament Europeu està regulada pel Protocol sobre els privilegis i les immunitats de la Unió Europea i el Reglament intern del Parlament Europeu (articles 7 a 9). La petició d’un diputat perquè es defensi la seva immunitat s’anuncia al ple del Parlament i es remet a la comissió competent, que és la Comissió d’Assumptes Jurídics. Aquesta comissió examina l’admissibilitat de la petició i pot sol·licitar qualsevol informació o explicació que consideri necessària. El diputat interessat té l’oportunitat de ser escoltat i de presentar qualsevol document o altra prova escrita.

La Comissió d’Assumptes Jurídics adopta, a porta tancada, una recomanació a tot el Parlament perquè aprovi o rebutgi la sol·licitud. En el ple posterior a la decisió de la comissió, el Parlament pren una decisió per majoria simple dels vots. Després de la votació, el president comunica immediatament la decisió del Parlament al diputat interessat i a l’autoritat competent de l’Estat membre en qüestió.

El 29 de març de 2023, en la represa del ple a Brussel·les, la presidenta del Parlament Europeu va anunciar que la Sra. Clara Ponsatí Obiols havia presentat una sol·licitud de defensa de la seva immunitat parlamentària en el marc de procediments judicials a Espanya. La sol·licitud es va remetre a la Comissió d’Assumptes Jurídics, seguint el procediment establert a l’article 9 del Reglament intern del Parlament Europeu.

Main points made in the reply in French

L’immunité des députés au Parlement européen est régie par le protocole sur les privilèges et immunités de l’Union européenne et le règlement intérieur du Parlement européen (articles 7 à 9). La demande de défense de l’immunité d’un député est annoncée en séance plénière au Parlement et transmise à la commission compétente, à savoir la Commission des Affaires Juridiques. La commission examine la recevabilité de la demande et peut demander toute information ou explication qu’elle juge nécessaire. Le député concerné a la possibilité d’être entendu et de présenter tout document ou autre preuve écrite.

Réunie à huis clos, la Commission des Affaires Juridiques adopte une recommandation invitant le Parlement à approuver ou rejeter la demande. Pendant la session plénière suivant la décision de la commission, le Parlement se prononce par un vote à la majorité simple. À la suite du vote, la Présidente communique sans délai la décision du Parlement au député intéressé et à l’autorité compétente de l’État membre concerné.

Le 29 mars 2023, lors de la reprise de la session plénière à Bruxelles, la Présidente du Parlement européen a annoncé que Clara Ponsatí Obiols avait introduit une demande de défense de son immunité parlementaire dans le cadre d’une procédure judiciaire en Espagne. La demande a été transmise à la Commission des Affaires Juridiques, conformément à la procédure prévue à l’article 9 du règlement du Parlement.

Main points made in the reply in Spanish

La inmunidad de los diputados al Parlamento Europeo está regulada por el Protocolo sobre los Privilegios e Inmunidades de la Unión Europea y el Reglamento interno del Parlamento Europeo (arts. 7 a 9). Toda solicitud de un diputado con objeto de que se ampare su inmunidad se comunica al Pleno del Parlamento Europeo y se remite a la comisión competente, es decir, la Comisión de Asuntos Jurídicos. La Comisión examina la admisibilidad de la solicitud, pudiendo pedir toda información o explicación que estime necesaria. El diputado en cuestión tiene la oportunidad de ser oído y puede presentar los documentos o cualquier otra prueba escrita que proceda.

Reunida a puerta cerrada, la Comisión de Asuntos Jurídicos aprueba un documento en el que recomienda al Parlamento como institución que apruebe o desestime la solicitud. Durante la sesión plenaria subsiguiente a la decisión de la Comisión, el Parlamento toma una decisión por mayoría simple. Tras la votación, el presidente comunica de inmediato la decisión del Parlamento al diputado interesado, así como a las autoridades competentes del Estado miembro en cuestión.

El 29 de marzo de 2023, durante la reanudación de la sesión plenaria en Bruselas, la Presidenta del Parlamento Europeo comunicó que Clara Ponsatí Obiols había enviado una solicitud de amparo de su inmunidad parlamentaria, en relación con un procedimiento en España. La solicitud se ha remitido a la Comisión de Asuntos Jurídicos, de conformidad con el artículo 9 del Reglamento interno del Parlamento.

Main points made in the reply in Italian

L’immunità dei deputati al Parlamento europeo è disciplinata dal protocollo sui privilegi e sulle immunità dell’Unione europea e dal regolamento del Parlamento europeo (articoli da 7 a 9). Ogni richiesta presentata da un deputato in difesa dalla sua immunità è comunicata in Aula e deferita alla commissione competente, ossia la commissione giuridica. La commissione esamina l’ammissibilità della richiesta e può chiedere le informazioni o spiegazioni che ritiene necessarie. Al deputato interessato viene offerta l’opportunità di essere ascoltato e di presentare documenti o prove.

In una riunione a porte chiuse, la commissione giuridica adotta una raccomandazione all’intero Parlamento affinché quest’ultimo approvi o respinga la richiesta. Durante la sessione plenaria successiva alla decisione della commissione, il Parlamento adotta una decisione a maggioranza semplice. In seguito alla votazione, il Presidente comunica immediatamente la decisione del Parlamento al deputato interessato e all’autorità competente dello Stato membro in questione.

Il 29 marzo 2023, in occasione della ripresa della sessione plenaria a Bruxelles, la Presidente del Parlamento europeo ha comunicato che l’on. Clara Ponsatí Obiols aveva presentato una richiesta di difesa della sua immunità parlamentare nel quadro di un procedimento giudiziario in Spagna. Conformemente alla procedura di cui all’articolo 9 del regolamento del Parlamento europeo, la richiesta è stata deferita alla commissione giuridica.

Main points made in the reply in Portuguese

A imunidade dos eurodeputados é regulada segundo o Protocolo relativo aos Privilégios e Imunidades da União Europeia e pelo Regimento do Parlamento Europeu (Artigos 7 – 9). Um pedido de um deputado para a defesa da sua imunidade é anunciado em sessão plenária e enviado à comissão competente, a Comissão dos Assuntos Jurídicos. A comissão examina a admissibilidade do pedido e pode solicitar informações ou esclarecimentos que considere necessários para determinar se a imunidade deve ser levantada ou defendida. O deputado em causa deve ter a oportunidade de ser ouvido e pode apresentar todos os documentos ou outros elementos de prova escritos que entender oportunos.

Numa reunião à porta fechada, a Comissão de Assuntos Jurídicos adota uma recomendação para o Parlamento aprovar ou rejeitar o pedido. Na sessão plenária a seguir à decisão da comissão, o Parlamento chega a uma decisão com maioria simples. Após a votação, a Presidente comunica de imediato a decisão do Parlamento ao deputado em causa e à autoridade competente do Estado Membro em questão.

A 29 de março de 2023, no reinício da sessão plenária em Bruxelas, a Presidente do Parlamento Europeu anunciou o pedido de Clara Ponsatí Obiols para a defesa da sua imunidade parlamentar, no quadro de um processo em Espanha. O pedido foi enviado à Comissão de Assuntos Jurídicos, de acordo com os princípios do artigo 9.º do Regimento do Parlamento Europeu.

Written by Györgyi Mácsai, Members’ Research Service (EPRS) with Mira Manini Tiwari, GlobalStat, EUI.

This infographic showcases major economic indicators for the six Western Balkan (WB) countries that are at various stages on the path towards the EU. All six exhibit a relatively consistent rise in GDP per capita, and they also show similar trends in falling unemployment rates. The female labour force participation rate hovers around 50 % (except for Bosnia and Herzegovina and North Macedonia, with lower rates), similar to the EU. EU trade in goods (imports and exports) with the Western Balkans has risen steadily since 2006, whereas trade in services has experienced slower growth. The EU has almost equal imports and exports of services from the WB states, while in terms of goods the EU’s exports have continually exceeded imports, by roughly 30 % in 2021. Serbia leads the EU’s trade with the Western Balkans, holding 50 % of goods and 44 % of services trade respectively. This paper updates previous individual publications for each of the six countries.

Read this infographic on ‘Western Balkans: Economic indicators and trade with EU‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Maria Diaz Crego.

In 1993, the United Nations (UN) General Assembly declared 3 May World Press Freedom Day, acting on a recommendation adopted by UNESCO’s General Conference in 1991. This year will mark the 30th anniversary of the day, with UNESCO and other international partners organising special events around the world.

State of play of media freedom: From 1993 to the present

The date of 3 May was chosen to be World Press Freedom Day to mark the anniversary of the Declaration of Windhoek promoting an independent and pluralistic African press. Adopted by the journalists participating in a seminar organised by UNESCO in Windhoek, Namibia, in spring 1991, the declaration highlighted the essential link between democracy and independent, pluralistic and free media, and called on the African countries and the international community to strengthen media freedom on the African continent. Although the declaration focused on the challenges faced by African countries in ensuring a free and pluralistic media landscape in the early 1990s, many of these challenges remain valid to this day in Africa and the rest of the world.

Examples of these challenges include: capture of media outlets by governmental, political or economic powers; establishment of media monopolies; exposure of journalists to all kinds of repression, from murder to unlawful detention; fragility of professional associations of journalists and editors unable to protect their members’ interests and rights; and excessive administrative barriers obstructing the setting up of new media outlets.

Digital technologies have now taken the world by storm and changes in news consumption, often accelerated by the pandemic, have brought new challenges. Newspaper sales continue to plummet while the number of internet and social media users continues to rise. Readers and advertisers are increasingly choosing the internet as their source of information and the place to buy and sell products. All this is calling the economic viability of traditional media into question. Internet intermediaries are now the gatekeepers of freedom of expression and information, influencing critically the way we receive and impart information and sometimes acting as vectors or even accelerators of misinformation and disinformation. Governments around the world are resorting to internet shutdowns and other measures to silence online speech.

In light of these developments, the latest UNESCO Global report on world trends in freedom of expression and media development (2021/2022), with information from 144 countries, raised the alarm about the decline in press freedom worldwide. According to UNESCO, between 2016 and 2021, 85 % of the world’s population suffered an erosion of press freedom in their country. The report also identified three major challenges inhibiting access to information: the safety of journalists; the regulation of online speech and the functioning of digital gatekeepers; and the economic viability of the media. The latest Reporters Without Borders (2022, 2022) and Freedom House (2022, 2019) reports concur, pointing at record numbers of journalists imprisoned or killed and a deterioration of media freedom around the world.

Media freedom as a fundamental right and journalism as a public good

Against this backdrop, 3 May reminds us that freedom to seek, disseminate and receive information on issues of public interest is a public good and vital to building a healthy and pluralistic civic space in which democratic institutions can flourish. Without free and pluralistic media acting as public watchdogs, citizens cannot access to the information they need to make sound political choices, and accountability is severely impaired. The media also offer citizens analysis of ongoing events, serve as a public forum in which different voices can be heard, and interact with and help citizens to understand an increasingly complex world.

The meaningful role played by the media in healthy democratic societies is recognised by the main universal and regional treaties on human rights, which entrench media freedom and pluralism in their provisions on freedom of expression and information. Already in 1948, the Preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights includes freedom of speech as one of four rights that represent ‘the highest aspirations of the common people’ (the remaining three being freedom of belief, freedom from fear and and freedom from want). The declaration’s Article 19 enshrines freedom of opinion and expression, including the right not only to hold opinions but also to seek, receive and impart information and ideas ‘through any media and regardless of frontiers’. Freedom of information is also upheld in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Article 19), the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (Article 13) and the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (Article 21), as well as in the main regional treaties on human rights: the European Convention on Human Rights (Article 10), the American Convention on Human Rights (Article 13) and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Article 9).

Considering the international obligations assumed by countries around the world, 3 May acts as a reminder of their commitment to respecting media freedom. However, it is not only about commitments. As highlighted by UNESCO and the UN, 3 May is also a day to pay tribute to journalists who have lost their lives in pursuit of a story, to defend media from attacks on their independence, to assess the state of play of media freedom worldwide, and to reflect about issues relating to press freedom and professional ethics.

EU actions to protect media freedom and pluralism

Within the European Union, media freedom and pluralism are also codified as fundamental rights in Article 11 of the Charter of fundamental rights of the EU. Moreover, the Court of Justice of the EU has systematically stressed the link between the safeguarding of those rights and the flourishing of a democratic and pluralistic society (C‑555/19; C‑719/18). In this vein, EU institutions are increasingly dedicating attention and resources to monitoring the state of play of media freedom and pluralism in the EU and addressing the risks identified through their monitoring work.

The European Commission monitors risks to media freedom in the EU Member States in its annual rule of law report (with editions from 2020, 2021 and 2022). Additionally, since 2014, the Media Pluralism Monitor project, co-funded by the EU, has been publishing reports assessing weaknesses in the EU Member States’ and candidate countries’ media systems that could hinder media pluralism. The 2022 editions of these reports show a negative shift as regards the journalistic profession, owing to an increase in the number of threats to journalists and strategic lawsuits filed against the media for providing information on issues of public interest (also known as SLAPPs). Both 2022 reports also highlight concerns about the high news media concentration in the EU, while also pointing to the need for further transparency of media ownership in many Member States and the need for stronger protection of the media (especially the public media) from political control.

The EU institutions have increasingly paid attention to the need to guarantee media freedom and pluralism within the EU. The European Parliament has been an outspoken advocate for freedom of information and the protection of journalists both within (2021, 2020, 2017) and outside (2022, 2021, 2019) the EU. The Council too has adopted conclusions on the protection and safety of journalists (2022) and on safeguarding a free and pluralistic media system (2020). In its European democracy action plan (2020) and its action plan to support recovery and transformation of Europe’s media (2020), the Commission has provided financial support for EU media companies to help them address their viability problems and face the twin digital and green transitions. It also focused on the safety of journalists in its recommendation on the protection, safety and empowerment of journalists (2021), addressed to the EU Member States. The Commission’s legislative proposal for an anti-SLAPPs directive meanwhile aims to protect not only journalists but anyone exercising their freedom of expression and information as regards issues of public interest, from abusive and manifestly unfounded lawsuits. The Commission has also addressed the phenomenon of disinformation, including by giving support to the drafting of the 2018 Code of Practice on Disinformation, recently strengthened (2022) by Commission guidance.

The Commission recently put forward a legislative proposal for a European media freedom act. This far‑reaching proposal includes measures to protect journalistic sources and media and journalists from the use of surveillance technologies; enhance media ownership transparency and editorial independence of media providers providing news; establish common rules for a transparent and non-discriminatory allocation of state advertising to media; ensure further independence of public media; and address a number of issues concerning the provision of media services in the digital environment.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘2023 World Press Freedom Day‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marcin Grajewski.

The European Union faces a number of geopolitical challenges, which are often interwoven. Russia’s war on Ukraine is affecting the EU’s relations with China, and encouraging the EU to be more open to the Global South, not least to try to persuade these countries not to back Russia in the military conflict. The war reinforces the need to maintain strong security relations with the United States at a time of increasing technological, economic and military rivalry between Washington and Beijing.

The EU has a major stake in shaping the international regulatory order, notably in digital and climate change policies. The Union’s goal to be the global leader in the fight against climate change requires extra efforts to counter green technology subsidies in the US and China.

This note gathers links to the recent publications and commentaries from many international think tanks on the EU’s global challenges. Earlier analyses on climate changes can be found in a previous edition of the ‘What Think Tanks are Thinking’ series. Papers on de-globalisation are gathered in another item in the series.

China and India: The future of the global consumer market
Brookings Institution, April 2023

Addressing the looming sovereign debt crisis in the developing world: It is time to consider a ‘Brady’ plan
Brookings Institution, April 2023

How Russia’s invasion of Ukraine tested the international legal order
Brookings Institution, April 2023

Can Europe forge a common China policy?
Carnegie Europe, April 2023

How can Europe help the next phase of the Summit for Democracy?
Carnegie Europe, April 2023

The EU-Africa partnership and development aid: Assessing the EU’s actorness and effectiveness in development policy
Centre for European Policy Studies, April 2023

Rising to the challenge: EU actorness in climate policy and its global impact
Centre for European Policy Studies, April 2023

Franco-German cooperation will be crucial for the future of European security
Centre for European Policy Studies, April 2023

How to fight back against China’s global media and information offensive
Council on Foreign Relations, April 2023

Here are four things the West gets wrong about Africa
Egmont, April 2023

The CRM Act in a global perspective
Egmont, April 2023

Strengthening the global role of the euro
Foundation for European Progressive Studies, April 2023

It’s time to get a grip on Africa-EU relations: A test for two continents
Friends of Europe, April 2023

Xi’s visit to Moscow exposed Russia’s weakness
International Institute for Strategic Studies, April 2023

Russia’s mining strategy: Geopolitical ambitions and industrial challenges
Institut français des relations internationales, April 2023

China/United States: Europe off balance
Institut français des relations internationales, April 2023

De la Russie à la Chine, Emmanuel Macron et l’illusion de la «puissance d’équilibre»
Institut Thomas More, April 2023

Global monetary order at the critical juncture: The impact of digitalisation and geoeconomic fragmentation
Istituto Affari Internazionali, April 2023

Taïwan et l’autonomie stratégique européenne
Institut Jacques Delors, April 2023

Internet governance and the UN in a multiplex world order era?
Norwegian Institute for International Affairs, April 2023

Key transatlantic implications of the Inflation Reduction Act
Real Instituto Elcano, April 2023

A threat to global food security
Wilson Center, April 2023

Is the global economy deglobalizing? And if so, why? And what is next?
Brookings Institution, March 2023

Much of the Global South is on Ukraine’s side
Bruegel, March 2023

Economic efficiency versus geopolitical resilience: Strategic autonomy’s difficult balancing act
Bruegel, March 2023

Putin and Xi are making the war in Ukraine a global contest
Carnegie Europe, March 2023

Learning to do no harm to democracy in engagement with authoritarian states
Carnegie Europe, March 2023

US-China rivalry in the Global South? Insights from a public opinion survey
Central European Institute of Asian Studies, March 2023

A digital connectivity masterplan for the Global Gateway
Centre for European Policy Studies, March 2023

Different futures for a digitalised global financial system
Clingendael, March 2023

How to read Xi’s muscular message on China’s global role
Council on Foreign Relations, March 2023

Opening the Global Gateway: Why the EU should invest more in the southern neighbourhood
European Council on Foreign Relations, March 2023

China’s global security initiative
European Union Institute for Strategic Studies, March 2023

European defence partnerships
European Union Institute for Strategic Studies, March 2023

États-unis: Chine, la tension monte
Fondation Jean Jaurès, March 2023

What is the future for global cooperation on democracy?
Forum 2000, March 2023

Europe’s delicate balancing act
German Marshall Fund, March 2023

Is realism policy relevant? Evidence from Ukraine and Taiwan
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, March 2023

Xi the peacemaker? China’s rise on the global stage
Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, March 2023

Europe and Russia on the Balkan front: Geopolitics and diplomacy in the EU’s backyard
Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, March 2023

The Global South and the Ukraine war at the UN
International Crisis Group, March 2023

What does Russia’s war on Ukraine mean for the international order?
Rand Corporation, March 2023

The EU and the negotiations for a binding treaty on business and human rights
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, March 2023

Climate versus trade? Reconciling international subsidy rules with industrial decarbonisation
Bruegel, February 2023

After Russia’s war against Ukraine: What kind of world order?
Carnegie Europe, February 2023

Getting global development back on track: Focus and start at home
Clingendael, February 2023

United West, divided from the rest: Global public opinion one year into Russia’s war on Ukraine
European Council on Foreign Relations, February 2023

Progressive pathways to European strategic autonomy
Foundation for European Progressive Studies, February 2023

Multipolarity after Ukraine: Old wine in new bottles?
Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, February 2023

Global defence spending: Strategic vs economic drivers
International Institute for Strategic Studies, February 2023

The US-China technology war and its effects on Europe
Real Instituto Elcano, February 2023

Read this briefing on ‘The EU’s international challenges‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Micaela Del Monte.

In December 2019, Directive (EU) 2019/1937 on the protection of persons who report breaches of Union law (hereafter ‘the directive’) entered into force. Member States had 2 years to transpose the directive into their domestic legal systems. Prior to the entry into force of the directive, the legal framework was fragmented at national level and limited in scope to specific sectors at EU level (i.e. financial services and transport safety). Transposition did not prove easy, and the European Commission was obliged to open infringement procedures against a number of Member States.

The directive came into force after major cases of whistle-blowing (Panama Papers, Dieselgate, Wikileaks, Luxleaks, Cambridge Analytica) drew strong public attention to the situation of those who reveal misconduct and malpractice in public and private entities. Those who ‘blow the whistle’, and also their colleagues and their relatives, can face retaliation and suffer both economic and reputational harm. Fear of retaliatory measures can foster a culture of silence, with a dissuasive effect on individuals who are willing to report unlawful practices (‘chilling effect’).

The EU legislator has recognised the positive impact of whistle-blowers who act as public watchdogs. They promote a culture where speaking out is not penalised and where disclosing information in the public interest increases transparency, improves integrity and ensures public accountability. Whistle-blowers help the public to access accurate information on matters of public concern.

Nevertheless, it has been pointed out that legislation alone is not enough, a cultural change in the workplace will also be necessary to ensure that those blowing the whistle are not stigmatised and do not suffer social, professional and personal repercussions. 

Read the complete briefing on ‘Protecting whistle-blowers in the EU‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Citizens often send messages to the President of the European Parliament (or to the institution’s public portal) expressing their views on current issues and/or requesting action from the Parliament. The Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (AskEP) within the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) looks into these issues and replies to the messages, which may sometimes be identical as part of wider public campaigns.

The President of the European Parliament has recently received a large number of messages calling on the President to protest against the Willow oil-drilling project in Alaska. Citizens expressed concern that the project could be detrimental to the climate and to the rights of indigenous people in Alaska. They called on the European Parliament to adopt a resolution asking the United States Government to respect the rights of indigenous people.

Please find below the main points of the reply sent to citizens who took the time to write to the European Parliament and its President on this matter (in English and German).

Main points made in the reply in English European Parliament position

In a resolution on the Arctic of October 2021, the European Parliament stresses that Arctic exploration and exploitation of natural resources should adhere to international law and comply with stringent precautionary environmental standards. The protection of the environment should be a key objective. The European Parliament ‘discourages the exploitation of Arctic resources if it is scientifically proven to cause irreparable damage to the ecosystem of the Arctic and beyond’.

As regards the Paris Climate Agreement and human rights, the European Parliament’s October 2022 resolution emphasises the importance of protecting, conserving and restoring nature and ecosystems to achieve the Paris Agreement objectives. It also stresses the importance of safeguarding and strengthening human rights and the rights of indigenous peoples in this context.

EU Arctic policy

As part of its Arctic policy, the European Union (EU) intends to push for oil, coal and gas to remain in the ground, building on partial moratoriums on fossil fuel exploration in the Arctic. The EU also supports comprehensive, inclusive and sustainable development of the Arctic regions for the benefit of current inhabitants and future generations, with a particular emphasis on the needs of indigenous peoples, women and young people.

Further information is available in the European Commission’s press release and on the dedicated questions and answers webpage.

European Union Diplomatic Service and EU foreign policy

Regarding the United States’ plans to proceed with the Willow oil-drilling project in Alaska, diplomatic relations between the EU and non-EU countries are not directed by the European Parliament, but rather by the European External Action Service (EEAS). The EU has a Delegation to the United States of America, which promotes EU policies in the United States. In foreign policy, the EU’s ultimate decision-making body is the European Council, comprised of EU countries’ heads of state or government.  

Main points made in the reply in German Standpunkt des Europäischen Parlaments

In einer Entschließung zur Arktis vom 21. Oktober 2021 betont das Europäische Parlament, dass bei der Exploration und Gewinnung natürlicher Ressourcen in der Arktis das Völkerrecht sowie strenge vorbeugende Umweltstandards eingehalten werden sollten. Der Umweltschutz sollte ein zentrales Ziel sein. Das Parlament „rät davon ab, die Ressourcen in der Arktis auszubeuten, wenn es wissenschaftlich erwiesen ist, dass dadurch für das Ökosystem in der Arktis und darüber hinaus ein nicht wiedergutzumachender Schaden entsteht’.

Was das Klimaschutzübereinkommen von Paris und die Menschenrechte betrifft, hat das Europäische Parlament in einer Entschließung vom Oktober 2022 unterstrichen, dass es wichtig ist, die Natur und die Ökosysteme zu schützen, zu erhalten und wiederherzustellen, um die Ziele des Übereinkommens von Paris zu verwirklichen. Das Parlament hob dabei auch hervor, dass dies mit dem Schutz und der Stärkung der Menschenrechte und der Rechte indigener Völker einhergehen muss.

Die Arktis-Politik der Europäischen Union (EU)

Im Rahmen ihrer Arktis-Politik setzt sich die EU dafür ein, dass Erdöl, Kohle und Erdgas auch in den arktischen Regionen im Boden bleiben, wobei sie sich auf die partiellen Moratorien für die Exploration von Kohlenwasserstoffen in der Arktis stützt. Die EU unterstützt außerdem eine inklusive und nachhaltige Entwicklung der arktischen Regionen zum Nutzen ihrer Bewohner und künftiger Generationen, unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Bedürfnisse der indigenen Bevölkerung, von Frauen und jungen Menschen.

Weitere Informationen finden Sie in der Pressemitteilung der Europäischen Kommission und in der Webseite mit Fragen und Antworten zum Thema.

Der Auswärtige Dienst der Europäischen Union und die EU-Außenpolitik

Im Zusammenhang mit den Plänen der Vereinigten Staaten, das Willow-Erdölförderprojekt in Alaska voranzutreiben, ist anzumerken, dass die diplomatischen Beziehungen der EU mit Drittstaaten nicht vom Europäischen Parlament, sondern vom Europäischen Auswärtigen Dienst (EAD) geleitet werden. Die EU betreibt eine Delegation in den Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika (in englischer Sprache), die die Politik der EU in den Vereinigten Staaten vorantreibt. In letzter Instanz werden Entscheidungen über die Außenpolitik der EU vom Europäischen Rat getroffen, der sich aus den Staats- und Regierungschefs der EU-Länder zusammensetzt.

Written by Karin Jacobs.

Did you know a total 37 000 navigable kilometres connect 13 European Union (EU) countries? These inland waterways play an important role in transporting goods in Europe. As part of the EU effort to reduce CO2 emissions from transport, the European Commission proposes to accelerate the shift of freight transport to less polluting and more energy efficient modes, such as the inland shipping sector, under the European Green Deal and the EU’s sustainable and smart mobility strategy. Unlike the European road network, there is also sufficient waterway capacity to cope with an increase in traffic.

However, to play its role to the full, the inland waterways transport sector needs to overcome certain challenges to becoming greener, digital and climate resilient. These include protecting waterways from the effects of flooding and drought, which have happened frequently in Europe in recent years. Inland waterway vessels therefore need to become ‘smart’, and infrastructure, including in ports, needs to be improved. Greater investment is also needed in digital technologies, as well as ensuring there is a sufficient and qualified workforce. The European NAIADES III programme (2021-2027) supports these objectives and reforms, aiming at better navigability and setting ports as multimodal hubs and providers of alternative fuels, as promoted under the EU’s Fit for 55 package, the building block for the Green Deal.

The European Parliament strongly supports the decarbonisation of transport through this modal shift. In its most recent resolution, Parliament demands the establishment of dedicated EU funding for the inland waterways transport sector, as well as the creation of a framework of rules to support inter-modality and improve connections between national waterways. Parliament’s focus on the shift from road to inland waterways and the development of a future-proof inland waterways transport system includes making ports energy hubs, ensuring better working conditions for personnel and stimulating urban transport. Parliament has insisted that funding match the EU’s ambitions for cleaner transport.

During its April 2023 plenary session, Parliament also took important decisions on the Fit for 55 package. These add to those taken earlier in 2023 on alternative fuels infrastructure (AFIR), including onshore power and electricity and alternative fuels for vessels at inland ports. Parliament has also given its approval for the revision of the Trans-European Network for Transport (TEN-T), focusing on ensuring a good navigation status for the core network and minimising waiting times at locks. Maritime ports connected to inland waterways will need to be equipped with dedicated handling capacity for inland waterway vessels. For both inland and maritime ports, connectivity requirements and obligations to provide alternative fuels have now been updated.

The EU funding for inland waterways transport reform is made available under several streams of the current European multi-annual financial framework. An important part of the funding is managed by the European Climate Infrastructure and Environment Executive Agency (CINEA). This is the case for among others the TEN-T Connecting Europe Facility (CEF). Funding is also provided under the financial instrument for the environment (LIFE programme) and the Horizon research programme for waterborne research and investment projects. Other funding is available under i.e. the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), Invest EU, and the Innovation Fund.

Under the Horizon programme, the Commission finances an important flagship project – Platina 3. This project serves as a platform of 14 key inland waterways transport partners and provides a €2 million budget for the implementation of the NAIADES III action programme. During the EU Inland Navigation Week, which took place at the end of March 2023, this particular platform attracted a great deal of attention. At its final event, looking back at its contribution to the EU objectives for inland waterways transport, Platina 3 focused on four different aspects: markets, the inland waterways transport fleet, jobs and skills, and infrastructure. The project has helped to increase innovation and research and development, digitalisation and automation, competitiveness and economic viability, as well as to create the necessary regulatory framework and coordinate EU countries’ interactions on all these four aspects. Platina 3 has produced several reports, studies and pilots addressing the challenges concerned and their possible solutions, taking different approaches. These include:

• creation of a European inland waterways transport policy (and funding) observatory;
• investment in sustainable alternative fuels (bio liquid natural gas, bio methanol, hydrogen, and biofuels), including certification and uptake;
• research and investment to create zero-emission solutions for (pilot) vessels (i.e. electrification);
• improved energy efficiency;
• better design and retrofitting, digitalisation/automated navigation;  
• climate resilient vessels and infrastructure, including ports;
• jobs and adapted skills for alternative energy carriers and automation.

The current focus for inland waterways transport is on the implementation of the current NAIADES III programme. Flagship projects, such as the Platina 3 platform make a significant contribution in this case. At the same time, the sector is in need of additional funding for the execution of the necessary reforms and measures, which, could come from national governments, stakeholders and from the EU. The European Commission is expected to present a review of the current Directive on River Information Services (RIS) later in 2023, which should further improve inland navigation.

‘This is Europe’ – an initiative proposed by the President of the European Parliament, Roberta Metsola – consists of a series of debates with EU leaders to discuss their visions for the future of the European Union. In his address to the European Parliament on 19 April 2023, the Prime Minister of Luxembourg, Xavier Bettel, emphasised three topics: i) democracy and the rule of law, ii) strategic autonomy, and iii) migration. He called for greater protection of minorities and respect for the rule of law and fundamental values. Openness was also an important point for him, both regarding internal borders within the European Union and on cooperation and trade with the world. Given the challenges – financial, climate, security, industrial and social – that lie ahead in the coming years, he called for more solidarity and greater means on which to build the EU’s political action.

The fundamental rights of citizens must remain the backbone of this European Union. We cannot procrastinate on this point.

Xavier Bettel

Background Figure 1 – Time devoted by Xavier Bettel to various topics in his speech

Roberta Metsola launched the ‘This is Europe’ initiative soon after her election as president of the European Parliament in January 2022. Xavier Bettel is the eighth EU leader to have addressed the Parliament since its Conference of Presidents endorsed the initiative on 28 April 2022. These debates will continue during subsequent sessions. The next leader to have confirmed his participation is the Chancellor of Germany, Olaf Scholz, who will speak during the May 2023 plenary session.

A similar Parliament initiative, ahead of the 2019 European elections, saw a number of EU leaders speak in Parliament’s plenary sessions about their views on the future of Europe. Xavier Bettel, who is currently the third longest serving member of the European Council, also took part in that series. A 2019 EPRS analysis of the future of Europe debates pinpointed the similarities and differences in EU leaders’ views.

The ‘This is Europe’ initiative is particularly relevant in the context of the Conference on the Future of Europe (CoFoE), a bottom-up exercise that allowed EU citizens to express their opinions on the EU’s future policies and functioning. On 30 April 2022, the CoFoE plenary adopted 49 proposals (see EPRS overview), including more than 300 measures by which they might be achieved. As a follow-up, Parliament adopted a resolution, by a large majority, calling for a convention in accordance with Article 48 of the Treaty on European Union. This call was backed by the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen in her State of the Union speech on 14 September 2022.

At the June 2022 European Council meeting, the Heads of State or Government ‘took note’ of the CoFoE proposals. While calling for ‘an effective follow-up’, they did not provide specific guidelines in this respect. Instead, they merely stated that each EU institution should follow up on the proposals ‘within their own sphere of competences’, rather than acting jointly. EPRS research has shown that there is significant convergence between the results of the CoFoE and the priorities of the European Council, as expressed in the latter’s 2019‑2024 strategic agenda and its conclusions over the past 3 years.

Main focus of Xavier Bettel’s speech

Bettel addressed a wide range of topics in his speech to Parliament (see Figure 1). In terms of words, he devoted most attention to i) democracy and the rule of law, ii) strategic autonomy, and iii) migration.

Democracy and the rule of law

Respect for minorities was a central focus of Bettel’s address. He gave a personal insight based on his own experience, underlining that homosexual people wanted first and foremost ‘respect’. He welcomed the fact that 15 Member States had supported the European Commission’s referral of Hungary’s ‘anti-LGBT propaganda’ law to the Court of Justice of the European Union. He called for Members to continue the fight for democratic rights, for the rule of law and for human rights.

Strategic autonomy

Bettel expressed his support for the concept of ‘strategic autonomy’, stressing that it meant ‘neither protectionism nor renunciation of friends and close partners, nor equidistance between allies and the rest of the world’. He argued that none of his colleagues in the European Council understood it in such a narrow way. In his view, openness was an essential part of strategic autonomy.

Migration

Bettel called for improved surveillance at the EU’s external borders and for greater engagement with international partners on issues such as returns, the management of migratory flows, ways of addressing the root causes of irregular migration and of setting up possibilities for regular migration. He expressed hope that the Parliament and Council would reach agreement before the end of this legislative term.

Specific proposals and positions

The Luxembourgish Prime Minister used the opportunity to present his views on how the European Union should advance in specific policy areas. He also made some new proposals, summarised below.

Policy issuePriority action and proposals (quotes)Democracy‘We need to complete our toolkit on human rights and minority rights’.Russia’s war on Ukraine‘Sanction the aggressor, continue to financially support Ukraine, and deliver weapons to them’.Internal market‘It brings us prosperity, but is also at the origin of our common rules and standards in social, environmental, consumer protection and food safety’.Migration‘A common European migration policy needs to be fair, resilient, rules-based and characterised by the right balance between solidarity and responsibility’.Energy and climate‘In the face of the dual climate and energy crisis – too often we tend to forget – we have also succeeded in significantly reducing our consumption while accelerating the transition to an energy system based mainly on renewable energy’.Table – Specific proposals made by Xavier Bettel, by policy area Contrast with Bettel’s speech during Parliament’s 2019 Future of Europe debates

The magnitude of the change in the political context since Xavier Bettel spoke before the Parliament 4 years ago, on 30 May 2018 as part of the Future of Europe debates, is apparent when comparing the two speeches. Back then he talked a lot about i) tax harmonisation, and called for ii)  further deepening of economic and monetary union, and iii) efforts to move towards a European social model. Then, he was also the EU leader who addressed the highest number of policy areas.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘‘This is Europe’ debate in the European Parliament: Speech by Xavier Bettel, Prime Minister of Luxembourg, 19 April 2023‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Nera Kuljanic with Clemens Weichert.

The interested shopper can find a multitude of product labels and claims on their food, clothes and household items. They provide the buyer with information on a range of topics, such as animal welfare, CO2 emissions, organic, and fair trade aspects, and more. But this variety can be daunting and confusing. What if there were a European climate label to help consumers make better choices – those that cause the least amount of global warming?

This was the premise of a workshop organised by the European Parliament’s Panel for the Future of Science and Technology (STOA) on 20 March 2023. Initiated by STOA Panel member Pernille Weiss (EPP, Denmark), the workshop’s aim was to discuss the potential and challenges of introducing an EU climate labelling framework. Two core themes emerged from the speakers’ contributions: the advantages of having a harmonised system of climate labelling for products on the EU market, and the crucial role of data in the process of designing such a system.

On the potential advantages of such a framework, Bo Weidema from the Danish Centre for Environmental Assessment started by pointing out some of the issues with the interpretation of the current labelling standards (notably at the ISO level), such as giving irrelevant, non-comparable, and non-transparent results. On the other hand, he noted the EU Product Environmental Footprint (PEF) method includes some unnecessary, complicated or unclear requirements. It therefore fails in several borderline cases, such as a producer declaring that a certain by-product has no climate impact whatsoever. According to Mr Weidema, a clear and simple PEF standard is possible by improving the methodology, rethinking the role of product categories, removing unnecessary and complicated requirements, and adding rules on dealing with uncertainty in the data. In this way, the standard could become more comprehensive, easier to apply for producers, and easier to understand for consumers.

Moving to the practical implementation of a single climate labelling framework, Emilia Moreno Ruiz, chief technical officer at ecoinvent Association, a Swiss non-profit organisation that manages a life cycle inventory database supporting environmental assessments of products and processes worldwide, explained what the supporting data infrastructure should look like. Ms Moreno Ruiz highlighted three key points that make databases fit-for-purpose. These were: (1) the enormous amount of data needed to evaluate the products has to be centrally managed according to a transparent and uniformly enforced methodology; (2) the databases have to be properly maintained and regularly updated; and (3) a modular design makes the data accessible, interoperable and reusable, for example to easily connect to other databases.

Moving from the technical ‘back end’ to the consumer-facing ‘front end’, John Thøgersen of Aarhus University, Denmark shared the latest insights from his field of economic psychology. To help consumers make better choices, he explained, labelling has to be actively used by consumers who regard it as trustworthy, must relate to a topic they care about, and should be easily understandable. In this respect, research shows that some designs are more effective than others. For example, simply declaring the amount of CO2 emitted to produce a given product is less effective than relative labelling, such as the traffic light system. Some of the issues highlighted by Mr Thøgersen are related to product categories: deciding on a reference product, establishing categories that are meaningful to the average consumer (since comparisons between very different products – such as carrots and beef – are unlikely to provide new, useful information for consumers), and labelling a large share of products in a category. Finally, Blanca Morales addressed potential advantages from the civil society perspective, speaking on behalf of the European Environmental Bureau (EEB) and the consumer organisation BEUC, where she serves as the EU Ecolabel coordinator. She pointed out that there are no carbon neutral products – despite the carbon offsetting efforts undertaken by some companies. Moreover, she explained, the information a label provides to consumers and the background data is just as important to producers in identifying hotspots where they can make climate-friendly improvements. Lastly, besides climate change, the EU climate label should consider other concerns, such as biodiversity loss and pesticide use. On this last point, Mr Weidema pointed out that including different types of impacts to be expressed in a single number with one label would require weighting them against each other.

Towards a European climate label?

The workshop will inform a forthcoming STOA study on the topic, carried out by Bo Weidema. As the workshop demonstrated, more research is needed about the best design and methodology for a climate labelling framework.

A webstream of the event is available on our website.

Your opinion counts for us! To let us know what you think, get in touch via and follow us on Twitter at @EP_ScienceTech.

Written by Katarzyna Sochacka and Clare Ferguson with Rebecca Fredrick.

Highlights of the April plenary session included debates on the need for an EU strategy on relations with China and on children forcibly deported from Ukraine. Other debates addressed: energy storage; labour mobility and the social rights of striking non-EU lorry drivers; adoption of the cyber-package proposals; a digital euro; and Dieselgate (use of defeat devices in cars to disarm pollution control systems). Members also held debates on: a possible EU global health strategy; universal decriminalisation of homosexuality, in light of recent developments in Uganda; the IPCC report on climate change; and the EU action plan against trafficking in cultural goods. 

Following a statement by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the European Commission, Josep Borrell, Members discussed the situation in Peru. Commissioner Johannes Hahn made statements on the need for European solidarity in saving lives in the Mediterranean, particularly in Italy, as well as on EU relations with Iraq. 

The President of the European Parliament, Roberta Metsola, made a statement on the 80th anniversary of the Uprising in the Warsaw Ghetto. Xavier Bettel, Prime Minister of Luxembourg, was also present, participating in the latest ‘This is Europe’ debate.

Fit for 55 package

In a joint debate on the EU’s ‘Fit for 55’ package, Members considered and adopted provisional agreements reached in trilogue with the Council on a set of linked proposals.

Revising the emissions trading system (ETS)

Covering 40 % of EU greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, the EU has not revised its emissions trading system (ETS) since 2018. An update is needed to align the ETS with the European Climate Law target of a 55 % reduction in EU net GHG emissions by 2030, compared with 1990 levels. The agreement on the proposed revision of the ETS will increase overall emissions reductions and include municipal waste incineration from 2028. It covers a wider range of fuels, and phases out free allowances from 2026 to 2034. From 2024, the ETS will also cover maritime transport emissions.

ETS for aviation

The agreement on aviation emissions reflects Parliament’s demands for transparency measures and to encourage uptake of sustainable aviation fuels. Locations such as small islands and outermost regions will be able to cover the price difference between sustainable fuels and kerosene, while monitoring of non-CO2 aviation emissions will begin in 2025.

Carbon border adjustment mechanism

The EU aims to phase out the free allocation of carbon emission allowances to European industry. To prevent non-EU manufacturers from taking unfair advantage, a carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM) should provide a level playing field for EU and non-EU producers. The agreed text greatly amends the proposal, extending the CBAM to a wider range of products and emissions, and scheduling the transitional period to phase in the CBAM to 31 December 2025.

Social climate fund

A further, separate, ETS for road transport and buildings (ETS II) should begin in 2025 (although if energy prices remain exceptionally high, this could be delayed). The proposed €72 billion social climate fund aims at supporting the most vulnerable citizens and companies to counter the costs of this extension. The agreement will see the fund in place from 2026. Funding will largely come from ETS credits, but national governments should co-finance 25 % of the total estimated cost of their plans under the social climate fund.

Deforestation-free products

The EU is keen to contribute to the global fight against deforestation by halting EU consumption of commodities and products contributing to deforestation and forest degradation. Members debated and adopted a provisional agreement on a proposal to ensure only deforestation-free products reach the EU market. The new law would impose due diligence obligations on importers, and set penalties for non-compliance. During negotiations, Parliament succeeded in extending the scope to include additional products; a wider definition of ‘forest degradation’; and ensured consultation with indigenous peoples.

Markets in crypto-assets (MiCa)

Digital or virtual ‘crypto’ assets are a relatively new phenomenon. Mindful of both the opportunities they present and the potential risks, the EU seeks to legislate to protect investors and maintain financial stability, whilst also encouraging industry innovation. Members debated and adopted a provisional agreement on markets in crypto-assets negotiated by the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON), which would cover crypto‑assets not regulated under existing legislation. Key amongst these are ‘stablecoins’, digital assets whose value is stabilised against major currencies, and whose popularity has surged in recent years. The regulation will reinforce safety measures for crypto‑assets, requiring issuers to have plans in place to tackle turbulence and ensure reserves.

Information accompanying transfers of funds and certain crypto-assets

Members also debated and adopted a provisional agreement based on a joint report by ECON and the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) on revising existing law on fund transfers, to include transfers of crypto-assets. Due to their low traceability, speed and global reach, there is a risk of criminals using crypto-assets, including to finance terrorist activity. The EU therefore proposes to extend the ‘travel rule’ (payment service providers must include payer and payee information with each transfer), to cover crypto-assets. During interinstitutional negotiations on the proposal, Parliament succeeded in imposing additional rules for transactions between crypto‑asset service providers and self‑hosted addresses (‘wallets’, for crypto‑assets that are otherwise almost impossible to monitor for money-laundering activity).

2024 EU budget

Parliament did not adopt guidelines for the 2024 EU budget, as the plenary rejected the report tabled by the Committee on Budgets. This rejection followed disagreement between the political groups over amendments tabled in plenary. The Commission’s presentation of the draft 2024 EU budget will be the next milestone in the 2024 budgetary procedure, and is scheduled for the end of May/beginning of June.

Question time – Legacy of the European Year of Youth

Members posed questions to Commissioner Mariya Gabriel on the legacy of the European Year of Youth, (EYY22), which encompassed a series of events and initiatives in 2022. The Commission is expected to provide Parliament with a report evaluating EYY22 by the end of 2023. In the meantime, the Committee on Culture and Education (CULT) has suggested that the EYY22 legacy and that of the 2023 European Year of Skills could be linked in 2024, with funding for follow-up activities in subsequent years.

Opening of trilogue negotiations

By vote, Members confirmed five mandates for negotiation from the LIBE committee on proposals on: the screening regulation; a centralised system for the identification of Member States holding conviction information on third-country nationals and stateless persons (ECRIS-TCN); on asylum and migration management; the crisis and force majeure regulation; and on the long-term residents’ directive. Members also confirmed, without a vote, several further mandates to enter into interinstitutional negotiations: from the LIBE committee on reports on the single permit directive; and from the Committee on Transport and Tourism (TRAN) on the directive on a trans-European transport network; from the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO) on financial services contracts concluded at a distance; as well as three mandates from the ECON and LIBE committees on: prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing; on measures in this context to be put in place by Member States; and on the Anti-Money-Laundering Authority (AMLA).

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Plenary round-up – April 2023‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Andrés García with Clemens Weichert.

To explore the future of Europe’s open strategic autonomy, the European Parliament’s Panel for the Future of Science and Technology (STOA) organised a workshop on 7 March 2023. Four panellists working on the topic and a full room of policy-makers, analysts, students and others made for a lively discussion. Most agreed on the need for more European autonomy, while nuanced opinions on where to focus provided some contrast.

STOA Panel Member Lina Gálvez Muñoz (S&D, Spain) opened the discussion by introducing the concept of open strategic autonomy. While strategic autonomy refers to the reduction of dependencies in raw materials and other critical parts for the industrial value chains, the qualifier ‘open’ implies a continued engagement with third parties.

Keynote speaker Diego Rubio, director of the Spanish Prime Minister’s Office for Foresight and Strategy then took the floor. He explained that the last two years have taught us three lessons: first, that history has not ended; second, that the European Union is particularly threatened by geopolitical change, because Europeans benefited greatly from the previous world order; and third, that the EU is very much able to handle the different crises it faces. However, he argued that we need new visions for the future. Fighting crises purely reactively is not enough in the long-term. Instead, it is essential to formulate a vision for how our energy systems or primary sector industries are supposed to work 30 years from now. EU countries and institutions are currently establishing foresight units to strengthen this preparedness capacity. Global competitors such as China and the USA are already far ahead in their foresight capabilities today.

Diego Rubio went on to formulate three theses, which led to an animated discussion. His first thesis is that Europe has to react swiftly, as long as it is still a major powerhouse in many areas. Marek Havrda (Czech Deputy Minister for European Affairs) subsequently underlined this urgency by noting that the centre of gravity in several research fields, such as artificial intelligence (AI), is moving from Europe to the Indo-Pacific. Alice Pannier, who heads the Geopolitics of Technology programme at the French Institute of International Relations (Ifri), and EPRS Policy Analyst Mario Damen, then took the floor to stress the roles of both the private sector and EU institutions in AI research.

The keynote speech’s second thesis was the importance of not over-reacting: a second Cold War has not yet occurred, and interdependence with other regions should not be a problem in itself. Returning to this subject, Mario Damen added that, to the contrary, in terms of military and economic autonomy, some degree of interdependence is necessary. Mikel Landabaso, panellist and Director of the Joint Research Centre (JRC) in Seville, pointed out that all foresight analysis needs to be firmly anchored in science. Consequently, the JRC operationalises what strategic autonomy means and expresses it in numbers. The JRC did this most recently in a report on the future of EU-China relations.

Diego Rubio’s third and most discussed thesis was that the EU should change the way it operates. This means searching for ways to decrease overall dependencies, instead of changing which countries it relies upon. While, during subsequent discussion, the general idea found agreement in the room, a wide range of opinions was expressed on what changes should be made. Mikel Landabaso and Alice Pannier underlined the importance of the dual transitions to green and digital technologies. Marcin Batory, of the Polish Office for the Registration of Medical Products (URPL) remarked on the role of technical expertise and education. The availability of experts is a major bottleneck in some sectors, for example in the production of advanced medical devices, where the EU has few competencies today. The stance towards third countries became a major point of debate. Marek Havrda noted many countries in the Global South have taken neutral or Russia-friendly positions regarding the war in Ukraine, which poses a difficulty for Europe. Alice Pannier responded that, while those concerns are justified, European values of multilateralism and human rights remain very attractive. In this sense, Europe’s values are an asset in diplomacy, just as US military power and Chinese manufacturing capabilities are for their respective circles of influence.

Diego Rubio made clear that the priority for the forthcoming Spanish Council Presidency would be to work with other EU governments in preparation of a European Council meeting on open strategic autonomy in October 2023. He took an optimistic tone, noting that Europe had mastered many crisis before and would do so again.

To conclude, Lina Gálvez Muñoz summarised the need for strategic foresight and open strategic autonomy in her key message: ‘We cannot make the same mistakes as in the past, we cannot go from one dependency to another’.

If you missed the conference, the full recording is available here.

Your opinion counts for us. To let us know what you think, get in touch via stoa@europarl.europa.eu.

Written by Mario Damen.

That the EU imports almost 60 % of its energy shows that real EU strategic autonomy in energy is far from achieved. The current energy crisis poses a risk to all four EU energy policy objectives. Crisis in the energy market is causing public and private debt and inflation, which risks destabilising the European energy market. While diversifying gas imports away from Russia reduces dependency on one big supplier, reliance on several other third countries implies new supply risks. Although high fossil fuel prices may accelerate the transition towards renewable energy, short-term investment in alternative fossil fuels and energy price caps risk diluting incentives for the green transition. Finally, improved cross-border energy network connectivity is susceptible to the yet untested risk of a lack of solidarity between Member States in the event of a structural supply crisis. Now that energy policy is increasingly determined by geopolitics, mitigating these risks is essential.

So far, the EU has managed these four challenges quite well, although concerns remain. Diversification of supply, filling gas storage and a relatively mild winter have limited the impact of the energy crisis. Initially, most responses to the crisis came from national governments, safeguarding their national strategic autonomy in energy matters. Member States took the lead with short-term measures to diversify supply and mitigate the effect of rising prices, mostly according to national energy priorities. The EU has also reacted swiftly, with a range of strategies and practical measures designed to increase coherence and EU strategic autonomy. The measures focus both on the internal autonomy of a functioning and well connected internal market and on the external autonomy of supply security in a global market. One of the biggest challenges will be to enhance strategic autonomy for renewable energy, for instance by producing renewables in the EU, while managing dependence on imports of the necessary raw materials.

Read the complete briefing on ‘EU strategic autonomy: Four energy crisis challenges‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marcin Grajewski.

The Ukraine Defence Contact Group (Ramstein group) of 54 countries supporting Kyiv in its struggle against Russia’s military aggression meets on 21 April to discuss sending more military equipment to Ukraine.

As President Vladimir Putin visited his commanders in regions of Ukraine under Moscow’s military occupation, Russian forces stepped up heavy artillery bombardments and air strikes on the devastated, symbolically important Ukrainian city of Bakhmut.

Poland, Ukraine’s neighbour and staunch ally, has banned imports of Ukrainian grain in defiance of EU trade policies, saying local prices of wheat had plummeted, causing protests from Polish farmers. Transport shipments would be restored after a deal to ensure that Poland would be only a transit country for the commodity. Meanwhile, Russia has cast doubt over whether it will agree to extend the agreement not to block Ukrainian shipments of grain via the Black Sea.

This note gathers links to the recent publications and commentaries from many international think tanks on Russia’s war on Ukraine. Earlier analyses of the war can be found in a previous edition of the ‘What Think Tanks are Thinking’ series.

Poland and Ukraine: The emerging alliance that could reshape Europe
Atlantic Council, April 2023

Arming Ukraine without crossing Russia’s red lines
Brookings Institution, April 2023

How Russia’s invasion of Ukraine tested the international legal order
Brookings Institution, April 2023

No gains for Europe from latest pilgrimage to Beijing
Bruegel, April 2023

Ukraine’s total democratic resilience in the shadow of Russia’s war
Carnegie Europe, April 2023

Russian army in search of human reserves: Day 414 of the war
Centre for Eastern Studies, April 2023

The EU’s strategic energy partnership with the US after a year of war
Centre for Eastern Studies, April 2023

Expert insights: Russia and Ukraine
Clingendael, April 2023

EU-Ukraine strategy should include the Eurasian spine
Egmont, April 2023

Steppe change: How Russia’s war on Ukraine is reshaping Kazakhstan
European Council on Foreign Relations, April

The Zelensky-Lukashenka-Tsikhanouskaya triangle: Understanding Ukraine’s relationship with the Belarusian opposition
European Council on Foreign Relations, April 2023

The art of vassalisation: How Russia’s war on Ukraine has transformed transatlantic relations
European Council on Foreign Relations, April 2023

Advancing military mobility in Europe: An uphill battle
European Policy Centre, April 2023

Buying weapons together (or not)
European Union Institute for Security Studies, April 2022

Ukraine’s Integration with the EU in the context of the war
EUROPEUM, April 2023

Russian blackmail and the Black Sea Grain Initiative: The (limited) impact of the war in Ukraine on global food security
Finnish Institute of International Affairs, April 2023

Judging Putin
Fondation Robert Schuman, April 2023

Humanitarian responses to the war in Ukraine: Stories from the grassroots
Foreign Policy Centre, April 2023

Sanctions against Russia: Are they working?
Friends of Europe, April 2023

TB2 Bayraktar : Grande stratégie d’un petit drone
Institut français des relations internationales, April 2023

Tackling the constraints on EU foreign policy towards Ukraine: From strategic denial to geopolitical awakening
Istituto Affari Internazionali, April 2023

Reframing Russian colonialism: Ukraine refuses to be the subaltern
Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, April 2023

War in Ukraine, where quantity as well as quality matters
International Institute for Strategic Studies, April 2023

Ukraine’s strategy of attrition
International Institute for Strategic Studies, April 2023

Ukraine: The shock of recognition
International Institute for Strategic Studies, April 2023

Economic sanctions against Russia: How effective? How durable?
Peterson Institute for International Economics, April 2023

Stick with Europe
Rand Corporation, April 2023

Stalled in Ukraine, Kremlin increasingly turns to political theater
Rand Corporation, April 2023

Why blockading rather than retaking Crimea might be Kyiv’s best option
Rand Corporation, April 2023

Cyber operations in Russia’s war against Ukraine
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, April 2023

Ukraine’s reconstruction: Questions and common grounds
Vox Ukraine, April 2023

Ukraine, the defeat of Putin
Barcelona Centre for International Affairs, March 2023

War, peace, and the international system after Ukraine
Brookings Institution, March 2023

What to do about the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant
Brookings Institution, March 2023

Reforming the Ukrainian economy and state: The unfinished business
Bruegel, March 2023

Much of the Global South is on Ukraine’s side
Bruegel, March 2023

Is the EU doing enough for Eastern Europe?
Carnegie Europe, March 2023

The EU accession prospects of Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia
Centre for European Policy Studies, March 2023

One year of war in Ukraine
Centre for European Policy Studies, March 2023

After a year of arms deliveries to Ukraine, the EU needs to step up and speed up
Centre for European Policy Studies, March 2023

Eurovision, war and the geopolitics of pop
Chatham House, March 2023

Russian nuclear intimidation
Chatham House, March 2023

Chinese supply chains could tip the balance in Ukraine
Chatham House, March 2023

How the Ukraine grain deal went from boon to burden for the Kremlin
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, March 2023

Population-centric: Lessons from Russia’s hybrid war in Moldova
European Council on Foreign Relations, March 2023

Ukraine’s accession talks need bold action in Kyiv and Brussels
European Policy Centre, March 2023

Where to now? Ukraine’s war is eclipsing the EU’s internal woes
Friends of Europe, March 2023

Global politics in the shadow of Ukraine
International Crisis Group, March 2023

The EU after one year of war: Widening, deepening, rebalancing
Istituto Affari Internazionali, March 2023

Russia’s war on Ukraine: A sanctions timeline
Peterson Institution for International Economics, March 2023

Ukraine’s reconstruction already on the agenda
Polish Institute of International Affairs, March 2023

One year after the invasion: Most Russians still back war in Ukraine
Polish Institute of International Affairs, March 2023

EU plans for increased ammunition production
Polish Institute of International Affairs, March 2023

Reviewing the Russian economy a year after the invasion of Ukraine
Polish Institute of International Affairs, March 2023

Refugees from Ukraine adapting to the European labour market
Polish Institute of International Affairs, March 2023

America’s dangerous short war fixation
Rand Corporation, March 2023

Framing sanctions: The role of governmental narrative-building
RUSI Europe, March 2023

Read this briefing on ‘Russia’s war on Ukraine‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.