European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Alessandro D’Alfonso.

Next Generation EU (NGEU) is the unprecedented instrument created by the European Union (EU) to help Member States recover from the socio-economic impact of the COVID‑19 crisis, while also addressing structural challenges such as the green and digital transition. Its main spending tool is the €723.8 billion Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) that finances ambitious packages of reform and investment measures agreed in the Member States’ national recovery and resilience plans (NRRPs). Given the RRF’s strong links with the European Semester, the EU’s economic governance coordination framework regularly takes stock of progress in RRF implementation.

Combined with additional data on payments received so far by Member States (30.6 % of the approved allocation on average) and the milestones and targets linked to those payments (11 % of the overall objectives under the plans), the documents in the 2023 European Semester spring package provide an overview of the state of play in the implementation of the RRF in individual Member States. According to the European Commission, the deployment of the RRF is broadly on track. Variations appear to be emerging across the EU, however, since on the basis of the country-specific recommendations and reports, Member States can be classified into four broad groups as regards implementation of their NRRPs: 1) well under way (in 9 Member States); 2) under way (14); 3) under way with significant delays (2); and 4) significantly delayed (2).

With 89 % of the milestones and targets still to be achieved, the years to 2026, the final year for the RRF, will be crucial for successful completion of the plans. Their ongoing revision, not least for the inclusion of new REPowerEU chapters on reinforced energy measures, may trigger delays in 2023, but it is also an opportunity to address current challenges, such as unexpectedly high inflation. As of 12 June 2023, only a quarter of Member States had submitted their REPowerEU chapters, which must be agreed and operational by the end of 2023 at the latest.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Recovery and resilience plans in the 2023 European Semester: Progress and country-specific recommendations‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

National recovery and resilience plans (NRRPs) as of 12 June 2023: European Semester assessment, payments received and milestones and targets achieved

Written by Martina Prpic (1st edition).

On 19 December 2022, the European Commission put forward a proposal for the targeted revision of Directive 2011/36/EU, which is the main EU instrument to combat trafficking in human beings and protect its victims. Despite progress achieved in fighting this crime, the Commission reports that, on average, 7 000 people per year are victims of human trafficking in the EU and that this figure is most likely only the tip of the iceberg. Moreover, forms of exploitation have evolved over time and have adapted to the new environment. For instance, criminal networks are now taking advantage of the possibilities offered by new technologies to recruit victims. Most recently, the Russian invasion of Ukraine has generated a massive displacement of women and children and created new opportunities for criminal organisations. While a large majority of victims of trafficking for sexual exploitation are women and girls, men are more victims of trafficking for labour exploitation, the share of which is increasing, or are forced to commit criminal activities. Against this background, the Commission is proposing a set of amendments to strengthen the current rules, further harmonise provisions across Member States in order to reduce demand, and collect robust data and statistics.

Versions

• June 2023: Preventing and combating trafficking in human beings (1st edition)

Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2011/36/EU on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings and protecting its victims. Committees responsible:Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) and Women’s Rights and Gender Equality (FEMM)COM(2022) 732
19.12.2022Rapporteurs:Malin Björk (The Left, Sweden)
Eugenia Rodríguez Palop (The Left, Spain)2022/0426(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Lena Düpont (EPP, Germany)
Maria Walsh (EPP, Ireland)
Maria-Manuel Leitão-Marques (S&D, Portugal)
Juan Fernando López Aguilar (S&D, Spain)
Abir Al-Sahlani (Renew, Sweden)
Yana Toom (Renew, Estonia)
Alice Kuhnke (Greens/EFA, Sweden)
Vincenzo Sofo (ECR, Italy)
Christine Anderson (ID, Germany)
Patricia Chagnon (ID, France)Ordinary legislative procedure
(COD) (Parliament and Council
on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’)Appointment of rapporteur

Next steps expected: Committee vote on draft report

Written by Costica Dumbrava (1st edition).

In December 2022, the Commission presented two proposals to revise the rules on the collection and transfer of advance passenger information (API) data – data collected by air carriers at check-in and sent to competent authorities in the country of destination prior to the flight’s take-off. One of the proposals is for a new regulation on the collection and transfer of API data for the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of terrorist offences and serious crime.

The proposal seeks to align the rules on the collection and transfer of API data with the rules on the processing of passenger name records (PNR) – data from air travellers’ ticket reservations – in order to increase the effectiveness of the fight against serious crimes and terrorism in the EU. The proposal provides uniform criteria for the collection and transfer of API data on extra-EU flights and selected intra-EU flights. It builds on the provisions of another proposal for a regulation on the collection and transfer of API data for enhancing and facilitating external border controls. Both proposals rely on the establishment of a centralised router to enable the transmission of API data between air carriers and the competent national authorities dealing with API data.

The proposal falls under the ordinary legislative procedure. In the European Parliament, the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) has appointed a rapporteur, Assita Kanko (ECR, Belgium), who has begun preparing a draft report.

Versions

• June 2023: Advance passenger information (API) to tackle terrorism and serious crime (1st edition)

Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the collection and transfer of advance passenger information for the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of terrorist offences and serious crime, and amending Regulation (EU) 2019/818 Committee responsible:Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE)COM(2022) 731
13.12.2022Rapporteur:Assita Kanko (ECR, Belgium)2022/0425(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Jeroen Lenaers (EPP, the Netherlands)
Paul Tang (S&D, the Netherlands)
Jan-Christoph Oetjen (Renew, Germany)
Tinek Strik (Greens/EFA, the Netherlands)
Clare Daly (The Left, Ireland)Ordinary legislative procedure
(COD) (Parliament and Council
on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’)

Next steps expected: Publication of draft report

Written by Eric Pichon.

What is at stake?

The Cotonou Agreement is the widest and most comprehensive binding partnership agreement between the EU and third countries: it connects one-fifth of the world’s population and covers trade, development and political cooperation between the EU and 78 countries in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP). Signed in 2000, it was set to expire after twenty years. However, it has been extended several times (currently until 30 June 2023) to offer the possibility of setting up a new agreement. After a long and challenging negotiation process, which was also affected by the COVID‑19 pandemic, the chief negotiators have proposed a new and improved agreement. It reflects the changes and challenges that have emerged since 2000 and is expected to shape the future of EU-ACP relations.

What is new in the future agreement?

The ACP Group of States became an international organisation in April 2020: the Organisation of ACP States (OACPS). The new legal framework for EU relations with the current 79 OACPS members will therefore be the ‘OACPS-EU Partnership Agreement’. However, it is likely that the final name will be something more catchy, perhaps based on the location of the official signature – maybe ‘Samoa’.

There will also be a new structure for the agreement, with a ‘foundation’ that defines the ACP and EU common values and interests, such as democracy, human rights, sustainable development and climate action. On top of that, three separate regional pillars for Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific will focus on their specific needs and priorities. For example, the African pillar will deal with issues such as peace and stability, democracy and good governance, economic and human development, migration and mobility, and climate change. The Caribbean pillar will emphasise regional integration and disaster resilience. The Pacific pillar will highlight the maritime dimension of the partnership. The new agreement will also be more flexible, allowing for different levels of action (continental, regional, national) and different types of cooperation (political dialogue, development assistance, trade arrangements), depending on each context.

How does the European Parliament fit in?

The partnership is more than just a formal agreement. It is a living collaboration between the two sides. To make this happen, the partnership has a solid institutional framework that involves representatives from both sides at different levels: ministers, ambassadors, and parliamentarians.

The Joint Parliamentary Assembly (JPA) is a key part of this framework. It brings together 78 Members of the European Parliament and 78 members of ACP countries’ parliaments.[1] They meet twice a year, once in the ACP and once in the EU, to discuss fair and sustainable development, security, climate, youth employment, gender equality, human rights, or any topic of common concern. They adopt resolutions that provide jointly agreed positions on these important issues.

What is on the agenda in June?

The next plenary session will take place in Brussels (26‑28 June 2023), where JPA members will debate on timely topics such as hybrid threats, the reform of the United Nations Security Council, the humanitarian situation in countries affected by terrorism, and the situation in Haiti.

The plenary session will also feature debates with Jutta Urpilainen, the European Commissioner for international partnerships, with Johan Forssell, Development Minister of Sweden, Alan Ganoo, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Mauritius – the two countries respectively preside the EU and OACPS Councils – and with the European Economic and Social Committee.

The Joint Parliamentary Assembly organises additional events during its plenary weeks. In June 2023 a Youth Forum and a Women’s Forum will take place, where participants from both sides will exchange views and ideas, as well as a seminar on the best practices to fight disinformation.

In addition, the Development Committee of the European Parliament has invited the JPA members to join a public hearing on helping developing countries deal with their debt issues.

What is next?

The European Parliament fought hard to keep the Joint Parliamentary Assembly in the future partnership, and it succeeded. The future agreement not only preserves the Joint Parliamentary Assembly but also creates three joint assemblies for EU relations with respectively, Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific. These assemblies will allow for more focused and tailored cooperation at the regional level. The European Parliament’s ACP unit has worked with JPA Bureau Members from both sides on drafting the rules of procedures for the four future assemblies. These draft rules will be presented and be put to a vote during the JPA plenary session in June 2023.

Parliament and the JPA are eagerly waiting for the future partnership to come into force. They hope that the remaining obstacles will be overcome soon, for the Council to give its green light, and that there will be no delay in this crucial step.

Want to know more?

After Cotonou: Towards a new agreement with the African, Caribbean and Pacific states, International Agreements in Progress Briefing, EPRS, April 2023

Check the Legislative train Schedule for updates on the state of play of the proposed future agreement.

Visit the Joint Parliamentary Assembly website.

[1] The OACPs has 79 members but Cuba is not party to the Cotonou Agreement. South Africa decided to leave the OACPS as of 2 September 2022 and will not participate in the future agreement. The Maldives became a full member of the OACPS on 10 December 2022.

Written by Costica Dumbrava (1st edition).

In December 2022, the Commission presented two proposals to revise the rules on the collection and transfer of advance passenger information (API) data – data collected by air carriers at check-in and sent to border control authorities in the country of destination prior to a flight’s take-off. The current directive on the collection and transfer of API data will be replaced by two regulations: one on the collection and transfer of API data for border management purposes, and another on the collection and transfer of API data for law enforcement purposes.

The proposal on the collection and transfer of API data for border management seeks to enhance and facilitate the effectiveness and efficiency of border checks at external borders and to combat irregular immigration. It provides a revised and extended list of API data and makes mandatory the collection of API data on all scheduled and non-scheduled flights into the EU. It also establishes a new technical solution (a router) to enable air carriers to transfer API data to the competent national authorities though a single, centralised system, under strict data protection and security rules.

The proposal falls under the ordinary legislative proposal where the European Parliament and the Council act as co-legislators. In the European Parliament, the rapporteur appointed in the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) has started preparing a draft report.

Versions

• June 2023: Advance passenger information (API) to enhance border checks (1st edition)

Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the collection and transfer of advance passenger information (API) for enhancing and facilitating external border controls, amending Regulation (EU) 2019/817 and Regulation (EU) 2018/1726, and repealing Council Directive 2004/82/EC. Committee responsible:Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE)COM(2022) 729
13.12.2022Rapporteur:Jan-Christoph Oetjen (Renew, Germany)2022/0424(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Jeroen Lenaers (EPP, Netherlands)
Marina Kaljurand (S&D, Estonia)
Tineke Strik (Greens/EFA, the Netherlands)
Assita Kanko (ECR, Belgium)
Nikolaus Fest (ID, Germany)
José Gusmão (The Left, Portugal)Ordinary legislative procedure
(COD) (Parliament and Council
on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’)Appointment of rapporteur

Next steps expected: Publication of draft report

Written by Pieter Baert (1st edition).

The rise of e-commerce has required the system of value-added tax (VAT) to adapt and ensure that the rules allow for a smooth and fraud-proof transaction between customer and seller. The major overhaul of the VAT rules for e-commerce in 2021 introduced a series of important simplifications for businesses, such as the creation of an import one-stop shop (IOSS). The IOSS allows businesses to declare and remit VAT on all their business-to-consumer (B2C) distance sales of imported goods across the EU (i.e. goods bought online by a customer established in the EU with the goods dispatched from a third country) through one single VAT return, rather than in each country where they make a sale. However, at the moment, the IOSS operates with a threshold, whereby the distance selling of goods with a value above €150 cannot be declared in the IOSS.

Having assessed that the €150 threshold constitutes a burden to businesses, the Commission proposed on 17 May 2023 to further expand the IOSS by removing the threshold entirely. This change would open the use of the IOSS to a wider range of businesses, which would benefit from lower compliance costs. The proposal is subject to a special legislative procedure, requiring unanimous support in the Council, following consultation of the European Parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee.

Versions

• June 2023: Proposal for a simplification of VAT rules for e-commerce (imports) (1st edition)

Proposal amending Directive 2006/112/EC as regards VAT rules relating to taxable persons who
facilitate distance sales of imported goods and the application of the special scheme for
distance sales of goods imported from third territories or third countries and special
arrangements for declaration and payment of import VAT Committee responsible:Economic and monetary affairs (ECON)COM(2022) 262
17.5.2023Rapporteur:To be appointed2023/0158(CNS)Shadow rapporteurs:Consultation procedure
(CNS) – Parliament
adopts a non-binding opinion.Appointment of rapporteur

Origin of seller: Non-EU (% of individuals who purchased online in 2022*)

Written by Marcin Grajewski.

The European Union has found new impetus for enlargement in the wake of Russia’s war on Ukraine, making progress in what was once called the EU’s most successful policy. A year ago, the EU granted Ukraine and Moldova official EU candidate status and also opened the same possibility for Georgia. Politicians and analysts more and more often say that the EU should become more involved in the Western Balkan countries, which saw their membership prospects open 20 years ago. If it does not, those countries could drift away politically from the Union and exacerbate conflicts in the post-Yugoslav area. For Turkey, EU membership is no longer a priority, while popular support for EU accession is declining in Serbia, partly due to the influence of Russia.   

‘There is a new awareness inside the EU. We finally realise that it is not enough to just wait for our friends outside the Union to move closer to us. It is not enough to say that the door is open. We must also take responsibility to bring the aspiring members of our Union much closer to us,’ European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said at the GLOBSEC conference in Bratislava in May.

This note gathers links to the recent publications and commentaries from many international think tanks on enlargement and issues with EU accession countries.

The future of the European Political Community
European Council on Foreign Relations, June 2023

Who is afraid of Georgian democracy?
Carnegie Europe, May 2023

Time to get serious about Moldova
Carnegie Europe, May 2023

Is the EU ready for further enlargement?
Carnegie Europe, May 2023

The European Political Community: From Prague to Chisinau and beyond
European Policy Centre, May 2023

Applying for EU membership in time of war: ‘Accession through war’ of Ukraine
Istituto Affari Internazionali, May 2023

Keeping friends closer: Why the EU should address new geoeconomic realities and deepen partnerships with its neighbours
Bertelsmann Stiftung, April 2023

How Russia’s invasion of Ukraine tested the international legal order
Brookings Institution, April 2023

Why Ukraine needs security guarantees
Carnegie Europe, April 2023

Bosnia and Herzegovina: Gas disputes along ethnic lines
Centre for Eastern Studies, April 2023

Croatia’s prime minister: There should be fewer roadblocks for EU enlargement to the Balkans, and Ukraine
Atlantic Council, March 2023

Is the EU doing enough for Eastern Europe?
Carnegie Europe, March 2023

The politics of dialogue: How the EU can change the conversation in Kosovo and Serbia
European Council on Foreign Relations, March 2023

Georgia must get its act together to become an EU candidate country 
European Policy Centre, March 2023

Ukraine’s accession talks need bold action in Kyiv and Brussels
European Policy Centre, March 2023

Europe and Russia on the Balkan front: Geopolitics and diplomacy in the EU’s backyard
Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, March 2023

Making the EU and member states policy towards the Western Balkans socio-economically more sustainable
Österreichische Gesellschaft für Europapolitik, March 2023

Consequences of the war in Ukraine: Two areas of contention -Turkey and the Balkans
Rand Corporation, March 2023

The normalisation of relations between Kosovo and Serbia
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, March 2023

Can enlargement be the EU’s most successful foreign policy, again?
Carnegie Europe via Aspenia, February 2023

The EU must reconcile geopolitics and democracy
Carnegie Europe, February 2023

Closer to the West? Serbia’s foreign policy after the Russian invasion of Ukraine
Centre for Eastern Studies, February 2023

Dutch parliament demands geopolitical alignment in EU enlargement
Clingendael, February 2023

Ukraine: Conflict at the crossroads of Europe and Russia
Council on Foreign Relations, February 2023

Resolving the Kosovo-Serbia dispute: The key to limiting Russia’s influence in the Balkans
European Policy Centre, February 2023

Can the EU still wrest the Balkans from their blighted history?
Fondation Robert Schuman, February 2023

Role of regional organizations and initiatives towards acceleration of the Western Balkans’ European integration
Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, February 2023

How enlargement accomplishes European unity while changing its nature
Jacques Delors Institute, February 2023

The EU should fast-track negotiations for Ukraine’s membership
Peterson Institute for International Economics, February 2023

The impressive EU-Ukraine summits: Alongside the inadequate enlargement methodology
Stockholm Centre for Eastern European Studies, February 2023

Western Balkan foreign and security ties with external actors
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, February 2023

Hedging its bets: Serbia between Russia and the EU
Carnegie Europe, January 2023

Czech Presidency of the Council of the European Union: Enlargement as a strategic decision
EUROPEUM, January 2023          

Russia’s war in Ukraine: Rethinking the EU’s eastern enlargement and neighbourhood policy
German Council on Foreign Relations, January 2023

Read this briefing on ‘EU enlargement‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Silvia Kotanidis.

The investiture of the President of the European Commission is a process that has evolved since the beginning of European integration. From the Treaty of Rome to the beginning of the 1980s, the role of the European Parliament was almost inexistent. With the 1983 Stuttgart Declaration, Parliament acquired an embryonic consultative role whereby the non-binding opinion of the Enlarged Bureau (Parliament’s Bureau plus leaders of the political groups) was sought prior to the appointment of the President. In 1992, the Treaty of Maastricht formalised the consultation of the European Parliament, but its role remained non-binding. The 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam introduced Parliament’s approval to the investiture procedure when it entered into force in 1999, and this was retained with the Treaty of Nice in 2001. Finally, in 2009 the Treaty of Lisbon introduced the procedure applicable today, establishing a political link between the vote on the President of the European Commission. According to Article 17(7) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), the Commission President is today elected by Parliament by a majority of the component Members in a process in which the European Council, acting by qualified majority and taking into account the elections to the European Parliament, proposes a candidate to the European Parliament.

The lead candidate process is a political process, based on the European political parties nominating the (lead) candidate they would support as President of the Commission, ahead of the European elections. The lead candidate then fronts the electoral campaign across the EU and presents the political programme of the party of reference. The lead candidate, or Spitzenkandidaten process, was run for the first time in 2014, and a second time in 2019, with contrasting results. However, the idea had been floated in European circles and academia since the 1990s. Supporters consider that the lead candidate process could make the process of selection of the leader of the ‘EU executive’ more transparent and shelter the choice from intergovernmental influence and the ‘horse trading’ dynamics often present in the European Council. A further purpose was to provide greater democratic legitimacy to the office of head of the European Union’s executive by giving voters the chance to influence the choice of the Commission President. This would have brought EU political processes closer to their national versions, making the EU method of appointing EU leaders more comprehensible to the public. A further purpose was to inject some dynamism into EU elections by personalising the electoral campaign and associating a specific candidate with a political programme, which should motivate citizens to turn out to vote. Finally, the lead candidate process was thought to be a step towards the creation of a European demos, i.e. a place where candidates campaigning across the EU discuss EU-wide issues, addressing EU voters.

The lead candidate process was run for the first time in 2014 with Jean‑Claude Juncker, the European People’s Party (EPP) lead candidate, elected President of the Commission. However, in 2019, the process was not as successful, as Ursula von der Leyen was appointed by the European Council as President of the Commission without having been a Spitzenkandidat. Research on the impact of the lead candidate process has highlighted that the 2014 Spitzenkandidaten process gained a certain visibility in media debates, giving prominence to EU-related topics. This increased visibility was also linked to the contingent financial and sovereign debt crises and to the polarisation introduced to the debate between pro-European and Eurosceptic movements. Turnout however remained stagnant in 2014 (with a slight fall of 0.36 percentage points compared to 2009) and the visibility of the lead candidates remained low (19 % of the respondents to a 2014 post-election survey recognised Jean-Claude Juncker, while 17 % recognised Martin Schulz, lead candidate of the Party of European Socialists, PES), with higher peaks in the lead candidates’ home countries. However, a higher percentage of respondents (41 %) recognised that a vote for a lead candidate and for a specific European party was a vote for the future President of the European Commission. The link between the lead candidates and the national political parties, a connection that boosts lead candidates’ visibility during electoral campaigns, was not strong. This is also recognised in a European Commission report on the 2014 European elections and by some commentators (e.g. Peñalver and Priestley). Notwithstanding these flaws, the 2014 lead candidate process can be considered a positive experience, as it helped end the decline in voter turnout, added transparency to the selection of candidates for the President of the Commission and instilled self-confidence in the Commission, which could now claim to be more political thanks to enhanced popular legitimacy.

In 2019, the repetition of the experiment had to take account of European Council President Donald Tusk’s declaration, ahead of the elections, that renewed adoption of the lead candidate process was not automatic and that the European Council claimed full ownership of the right to propose a candidate to Parliament. With more preparation by the European political parties, the lead candidate process was run by almost all European political parties, including some that had not participated in the process in the 2014 elections. Among the main reasons for the failure of the lead candidate process in 2019, commentators highlight the lack of a candidate with the requisite experience required by the European Council (e.g. Jim Cloos). De Wilde also mentions the unsuccessful 2018 electoral reform, which would have introduced a Union-wide constituency, as a factor in the lack of support for the lead candidate process; the lack of a truly European electoral debate; and the fragmented opinion of European political parties regarding some lead candidates. Notwithstanding these weaknesses, turnout increased in 2019 (+8.05 percentage points), the highest turnout in European elections since 1994.

After the 2019 set-back, the question is whether the lead candidate process has a future, considering that – in addition to the commendable aim to improve transparency, legitimacy and personalisation – it, in principle, brings the EU closer to citizens by emulating national processes of selection of the premier. This study explores several avenues that could keep the lead candidate process alive.

A first avenue consists of improving the status quo by working on the interinstitutional dimension, intra-parliamentary cohesion, and improving practical arrangements to facilitate the process. This option presupposes that a certain degree of maturity is reached in relations between the two participating institutions and that the European Parliament and European Council work in synergy. European political parties should therefore carefully select their lead candidates with a view to incorporating the requirements that the European Council considers indispensable, at an early stage. For the European Council, this would mean going beyond the wording of the Treaty provision and recognising the development of European societies that demand greater transparency in politics and more involvement for citizens in political life. If the right equilibrium is reached, the repetition of the lead candidate process over time could lead to the establishment of a constitutional convention or practice.

A second avenue could be the recognition of the lead candidate process in an interinstitutional agreement, a legal instrument provided for under Article 295 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which however does not include the European Council as one of the possible contracting institutions, casting some doubt on the legal feasibility of this option. This was proposed in the pending reform of the European Electoral Act (legislative resolution of 3 May 2022 on the proposal for a Council Regulation on the election of the Members of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage (2020/2220(INL) – 2022/0902(APP)).

A third option would be to incorporate the lead candidate process in a reform of the European Electoral Act. The 2015 Hübner-Leinen report made an attempt in this direction, to which the introduction of a Union-wide constituency was later added. However, this reform was not adopted by the Council.

A fourth option would be to refer to the lead candidate in the Treaties. This option would require an ordinary Treaty revision, which is a legally burdensome procedure, due to the ‘double unanimity’ required, as well as presenting political difficulties. Treaty provisions incorporating the lead candidate process could provide, for example, that in the framework of the necessary consultations the European Council hears the lead candidates before formalising the proposal for a Commission President candidate; that the European Council must vote on the first- or second-ranking lead candidate before resorting to a different candidate; that the European Council considers as a candidate for the Commission President, the lead candidate able to garner a parliamentary majority; that the European Council is required to consider the lead candidate with the most votes (or second-most), or finally to invert the role of the institutions by making Parliament the institution that proposes the candidate for President of the Commission to the European Council, which must then vote on that proposal.

The Spitzenkandidaten process is one of the measures proposed by the Conference on the Future of Europe. Proposal 38(4) states that ‘European citizens should have a greater say on who is elected as President of the Commission. This could be achieved either by the direct election of the Commission President or a lead candidate system’. This desire of citizens to be able to influence EU decisions and the choice of EU leadership should not be overlooked in following up on the Conference’s results. In this respect, the lead candidate process can play a considerable role.

Read the complete study on ‘Spitzenkandidaten or the lead candidate process: Ways to Europeanise elections to the European Parliament‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament

Written by Andrés García Higuera with Clemens Weichert.

Open strategic autonomy is about ensuring that the EU has the capacity to cope alone if necessary but without ruling out cooperation whenever possible. It goes some steps beyond smart supply chain management by taking into account geopolitics as well as economic factors. It relies on foresight to identify threats and ensures resilience by anticipating the required responses. Could the resulting preparedness also prevent crises by normalising situations that would otherwise become emergencies?

In recent years, the world has gone through repeated crises –the economic crisis, migration, Russia’s invasion of Crimea, Brexit, the COVID-19 pandemic, the shortage of semiconductors, Russia’s further invasion of Ukraine, the energy crisis, rogue cyberattacks, political tensions with Asia, etc. As the European Union (EU) is close both geopolitically and economically to Ukraine, the impact of the war on its economy is particularly acute. The OECD recently published a simulation of the likely effects of the war and the commodity price changes, showing drops in growth almost twice as large in the eurozone as in the United States. While the consequences of Russia’s actions and the subsequent disruptions to European supply chains are only now beginning to be fully appreciated, the EU needs to respond to these crises as supply chains for food, energy, raw materials, satellite communications and semiconductors, among others, are currently at risk. Also, very recently, the COVID-19 crisis put enormous pressure on health supply chains for face masks, respirators, hydroalcoholic gel, tests and vaccines.

According to the dictionary definition, a ‘crisis’ is ‘a time of great disagreement, confusion, or suffering’. In some of the recent instances of crisis, it was the material shortages of strategic products that really made the situation dire and brought about disagreement, confusion and a considerable part of the suffering. The strategic impact of logistics has long been been acknowledged . Napoleon, for example, was aware of the need to take it into account to increase the mobility of his artillery and supply his troops. He offered a prize for new methods to improve food preservation, which led to inventions such as canned food. Napoleon sought to make war situations less disruptive for his side, while the enemy would be hard put to cope. However, he failed to grasp the overarching scale of the problem; can openers were only invented 50 years after canned food.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘What if open strategic autonomy could break the cycle of recurring crises?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Listen to podcast ‘What if open strategic autonomy could break the cycle of recurring crises?’ on YouTube.

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Written by Magdalena Pasikowska-Schnass.

As digital technologies have been increasingly permeating our lives, artificial intelligence (AI) has gradually made it onto the scene too, but without much fanfare. This once daunting prospect has become a part of our lives even in domains that do not seem to belong to a futurist world, such as cultural heritage and museums. The results are both promising and surprising: reconstructing a piece of art, completing an unfinished composition of a great musician, identifying the author of an ancient text, or providing architectural details for a potential reconstruction of the Notre-Dame de Paris cathedral would have seemed like science fiction just a few years ago.

Applying AI in the public cultural domain requires investment in many areas, the most obvious being infrastructure, equipment and highly qualified human resources. Human resources are essential, as AI needs to be fed with high-quality data to be trained to perform its tasks. Data needs to be interoperable and properly described with metadata. Moreover, copyright issues must be resolved before such data is used, and cultural heritage professionals need to learn how to navigate this complex terrain skilfully.

The EU has a rich cultural heritage, and its numerous top museums and works of art are a precious resource for its cultural and creative industry. Yet, it depends on the United States for its online cultural platforms and on Asia for its equipment. Presently, it is making efforts to change all this and to preserve its cultural and creative resources in digital form in order to amass the data needed to put AI at the service of its cultural heritage and museums. AI can also be beneficial for archaeological and historic research, helping deepen knowledge and localise sites. To foster these developments, the EU has issued recommendations setting targets for the 3D digitisation of the Member States’ cultural heritage sites and monuments, but also for relevant capacity building and training.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Artificial intelligence in the context of cultural heritage and museums: Complex challenges and new opportunities‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Listen to policy podcast ‘Artificial intelligence in the context of cultural heritage and museums’ on YouTube.

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Written by Clare Ferguson with Rebecca Frederick.

With only a year to go before the 2024 European elections, Members of the European Parliament meet in Strasbourg from 12 to 15 June 2023 with a very full agenda, and a focus on security. The key political debates scheduled for Wednesday morning, are expected to be on the preparation of the European Council meeting of 29‑30 June 2023 and the rule of law in Poland in the context of recent changes to the electoral law and the new investigative committee on Russian interference in Poland’s internal security. The session will open with a statement marking the World Day against Child Labour.

The President of the Republic of Kosovo, Vjosa Osmani, is expected to address a formal sitting on Wednesday morning. A ‘This is Europe’ debate with the President of Cyprus, Nikos Christodoulides, is scheduled for Tuesday morning. Following the recent deterioration on the ground, Members are due to hold a debate on Ukraine on Tuesday morning, on the humanitarian and environmental consequences of the destruction of the Nova Kakhovka dam, and the sustainable reconstruction and integration of Ukraine into the Euro-Atlantic community.

Russia’s war on Ukraine, the pandemic and the effects of climate change pose enormous challenges to food security. Although there is no shortage of food in Europe today, it is clear that food security and a resilient agricultural sector are strategic matters both for developing countries and for the EU. Parliament has long pushed for stronger strategic autonomy in food and agricultural supplies such as fertiliser. Parliament also supports measures to shield consumers from food inflation. On Tuesday afternoon, Members are due to debate a Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development (AGRI) report on ensuring food security and the long-term resilience of EU agriculture. The report recommends taking measures to ensure food safety both at home and globally, including reducing dependence on imports and supporting farmers in the search for innovative means to produce food. The AGRI report nevertheless opposes a blanket ban on the use of pesticides and fertilisers, which it states could threaten farmers’ livelihoods.

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Following the discovery that government bodies from both EU and non-EU states have used Pegasus spyware and equivalents against journalists, politicians, diplomats, civil society actors and others, the European Parliament established a Committee of Inquiry to investigate the use of Pegasus and equivalent surveillance spyware (PEGA) in March 2022. In a joint debate scheduled for Wednesday afternoon, Members are due to debate the committee’s findings, with a view to making a recommendation to the Commission and the Council. The draft recommendation condemns governments’ illegitimate use of spyware. It underlines failures to implement EU law, not just by those Member States that have used spyware, but also criticises European Commission and European External Action Service support for non-EU countries to develop surveillance capacities. Parliament calls for common EU standards to regulate Member State use of spyware, better enforcement of related EU law (including data protection law and the Dual-use Regulation) and for new legislation placing due diligence requirements on producers and exporters of surveillance technologies.

The EU is keen to ensure a ‘human-centric’ approach to regulating artificial intelligence (AI), to ensure an optimum balance between the benefits and risks of these new technologies. To set Parliament’s position for trilogue negotiations with the Council, Parliament is expected to debate a joint Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO) and Civil Liberties (LIBE) Committee report on Tuesday afternoon, which proposes to greatly amend the proposed artificial intelligence act. The changes proposed touch upon the definition, set a larger number of prohibited practices, and stricter categorisation of high-risk systems, such as those that risk harming people’s health, safety, fundamental rights or the environment – and social media platforms and systems used to influence political processes. The report also proposes boosting protection of fundamental rights, health, safety, the environment, democracy and the rule of law in general-purpose AI systems like ChatGPT and increasing their transparency. National governance and enforcement should be stronger, and Parliament proposes to establish a new EU AI body to ensure the rules are applied.

New technology offers the opportunity to revolutionise the exchange of evidence in criminal investigations, including across borders. Members are expected to vote on a compromise reached with the co-legislators in a joint debate on Monday afternoon. To make evidence easier for law enforcement authorities to access, two pieces of legislation would introduce a European production order and a European preservation order. The compromise text on the proposals includes a mandatory 10-day response deadline for production orders (8 hours in emergencies) and a notification system for some categories of data, among other things. Should Members adopt the agreed texts on cross-border access to electronic evidence, they then go to the Council for its adoption.

A Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) report sought to shift the focus away from law enforcement and control-related issues and towards harm reduction and health during interinstitutional negotiations on a proposal to strengthen the EU Drugs Agency’s mandate. The illicit drugs landscape in Europe has changed greatly since the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA) was set up to provide scientific analysis in 2006, with drugs such as amphetamines and ecstasy increasingly produced in the EU. Members also demand greater transparency in the EMCDDA, and more focus on the human rights, age and gender dimensions of drug use and addiction. Members will vote on the adoption of the provisional text agreed in trilogue negotiations.

Batteries are found in countless everyday devices and are an important means of storing intermittent renewable energy. In its push for climate neutrality, the EU is modernising its legislative framework on batteries. A proposal on batteries and waste batteries seeks to address all steps of a battery’s life cycle, setting rules for sustainability (minimum recycled content, performance criteria, etc.), safety, labelling, and disposal. It also introduces due diligence obligations for businesses sourcing raw materials. With the goal of zero-emission mobility in mind, the European Parliament’s Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI) seeks to widen the proposed scope to include batteries used in light transport (e.g. e-scooters). This addition, as well as tougher due diligence requirements recommended by ENVI, was included in the provisional agreement on the proposal for a new regulatory framework for batteries, concluded in interinstitutional negotiations in December 2022, on which Members are due to vote on final adoption on Wednesday.

Remoteness, insularity or small in size, with a challenging geography or climate, and a lack of economic opportunity often disadvantages those living in the EU’s outermost regions. On Monday, Parliament is expected to consider an own-initiative report from the Committee on Regional Development (REGI) on the assessment of the European Commission’s 2022 strategy to improve living conditions in the EU’s outermost regions. The REGI committee would like to see greater ambition for these regions, particularly to provide more opportunities for young people. One demand is to reproduce the compensation scheme mitigating higher prices in agriculture in the fisheries, transport, energy and other sectors. The committee underlines the importance of sustainable tourism in these regions, and highlights the need for better digital infrastructure and connectivity.

Fisheries agreements between the EU and non-EU countries generally focus on the fight against illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing. The EU/Mauritius Fisheries Partnership Agreement is part of a set of EU tuna agreements aimed at sustainable fishing in the western Indian Ocean. Signed on 21 December 2022, a new four-year protocol implementing the agreement currently applies provisionally. During the votes scheduled for Wednesday lunchtime, Members are set to decide on giving Parliament’s consent to concluding the protocol, allowing fishing opportunities for up to 40 EU vessels.

Members have an opportunity to question the High Representative/Vice-President, Josep Borrell on Tuesday afternoon on relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan and the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh and in the Lachin Corridor. He will also make statements on the situations in Lebanon and in Nicaragua, as well as on the state of the Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement with Cuba.

On Thursday, Members are set to vote on the composition of the European Parliament for the coming term. They are expected to propose slight adjustments in the number of Members to be elected in each Member State, to take account of population changes since the 2019 elections. The final decision will then be taken by the European Council, which must first obtain formal consent from the Parliament. The Council and Commission will earlier in the week make statements on the negotiations on the European electoral law, with little progress shown since the Parliament formally submitted its proposal to revamp the 1976 Electoral Act in May 2022.

Further reading:

• European Parliament Plenary Session – June 2023 – Agenda
• Ensuring food security and the long-term resilience of EU agriculture
• Parliament’s negotiating position on the artificial intelligence act
• Investigation of the use of Pegasus and equivalent surveillance spyware
• Cross-border access to electronic evidence
• Strengthening the EU Drugs Agency’s mandate
• New regulatory framework for batteries
• Assessment of the European Commission’s 2022 strategy to improve living conditions in the EU’s outermost regions
• EU/Mauritius Fisheries Partnership Agreement: New protocol
• Relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan and the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh and in the Lachin Corridor
• Parliament’s proposal to revamp the 1976 Electoral Act
• World Day against Child Labour (forthcoming)

Written by Vivienne Halleux (1st edition).

As required by EU water legislation, and in line with the European Green Deal’s zero pollution ambition, on 26 October 2022 the European Commission tabled a proposal to revise the lists of surface water and groundwater pollutants that need to be monitored and controlled for the purpose of protection of EU freshwater bodies, and the associated environmental quality standards. The proposal also seeks to remedy shortcomings identified in the current framework as regards chemical pollution in waters, and notably to enable swifter adaptation to scientific knowledge.

Stakeholders’ views on the proposed text are mixed. Non-governmental organisations are pushing for more ambition, for instance on chemical mixtures, pesticides, deadlines, and producers’ responsibility for covering monitoring costs. Industry representatives have meanwhile expressed some concerns, notably about the achievability and scientific grounding of certain new standards.

In Parliament, the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI), responsible for the file, is scheduled to vote on its legislative report before summer 2023.

Versions

• June 2023: Pollutants in EU waters: Update of chemical substances listed for control (1st edition)

Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and the Council amending Directive 2000/60/EC establishing a framework for Community action in the field of water policy, Directive 2006/118/EC on the protection of groundwater against pollution and deterioration and Directive 2008/105/EC on environmental quality standards in the field of water policy Committee responsible:Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI)COM(2022) 540
26.10.2022Rapporteur:Milan Brglez (S&D, Slovenia)2022/0344(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Dace Melbārde (EPP, Latvia)
Róża Thun und Hohenstein (Renew, Poland)
Ville Niinistö (Greens/EFA, Finland)
Karol Karski (ECR, Poland)
Rosanna Conte (ID, Italy)
Marina Mesure (The Left, France)Ordinary legislative
procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council
on equal footing – formerly
‘co-decision’)Next steps expected: Vote in committee on draft report

Written by Guillaume Ragonnaud.

The EU has the world’s largest single market. Home to 345 million people when it was launched in 1993, it now numbers 447 million consumers and 23 million companies, and covers a considerable range of policy areas. This year, the single market is celebrating its 30th anniversary.

While the single market generates many jobs and considerable economic benefits, many hurdles remain. In March 2020, the Commission identified the top 13 barriers to cross-border activity (such as red tape), and the five main root causes of these barriers (such as inadequate enforcement of legislation).

Furthermore, recent shocks – including the pandemic and Russia’s war on Ukraine – resulting in restrictions to free movement, shortages of goods and services, and rising energy prices, have shown not only how vulnerable the single market can be to crises, but also the extent to which the EU economy relies on a well-functioning single market.

In May 2022, the plenary of the Conference on the Future of Europe proposed to deepen the single market further. On 18 January 2023, Parliament adopted a resolution on the 30th anniversary of the single market. Reaffirming its readiness to play its role in the process, Parliament called for renewed commitment from the Member States and the other EU institutions, and a specific agenda for action towards 2030 and beyond, to strengthen and develop the single market further, not least in areas such as services, energy, telecommunications and the digital single market.

On 16 March 2023, the Commission put forward a communication on the single market at 30, in which it discusses a possible way towards further single market integration.

This is an update of an ‘at a glance’ note published for the ceremony marking the anniversary during the January plenary session. An EPRS infographic provides additional information on the single market.

Read the complete briefing on ‘The single market at 30 (1993-2023)‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament

Written by Micaela Del Monte, Maria Díaz Crego and Silvia Kotanidis.

An electoral threshold for the allocation of seats is the minimum percentage of votes that a political party or a coalition is required to collect in order to gain a seat in the legislative assembly. Thresholds are said to enable a better balance between governability and representativeness, by favouring the formation of stable majorities and avoiding excessive fragmentation of the legislative assembly. Thresholds are sometimes imposed by law, but in the absence of an explicit legal requirement, they can be the de facto result of the size of the constituency and the relevant electoral law determining the apportionment of seats between constituencies. Provisions for electoral thresholds are common in proportional electoral systems, which tend to favour multipartyism. Thresholds can, however, be problematic when they limit or impede the representation of regional parties and ethnic and linguistic minorities, for instance.

The current European Electoral Act contains a set of common principles to be upheld by the different domestic laws applicable to the election of the European Parliament. The original act of 1976 did not contain any provisions on minimum thresholds. Following modifications introduced in 2002, Article 3 allows Member States to set a minimum threshold for the allocation of seats; this must not exceed 5 % of the votes cast. More recently, a draft legislative act, adopted by the European Parliament in May 2022 and seeking to repeal the 1976 Act, proposes to modify Article 3. Member States would remain free to establish an electoral threshold of no more than 5 % of the valid votes cast, but they would be obliged to establish a threshold – of no less than 3.5 % and no more than 5 % – for national constituencies comprising more than 60 seats.

The electoral thresholds applied in the 2019 European elections ranged between 5 % of the valid votes cast, required in nine Member States (Czechia, France, Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia) and 1.8 %, required in Cyprus, while 14 Member States set no threshold. Italy, Austria and Sweden applied a 4 % threshold; and Greece 3 %. At the time of writing, it appears that these thresholds will still be applicable for the 2024 European elections.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Electoral thresholds in European Parliament elections‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Electoral thresholds for the 2024 European elections

Citizens often turn to the European Parliament to ask about the rules on submitting a European citizens’ initiative.

The European citizens’ initiative gives citizens an opportunity to take an active part in establishing European Union (EU) policy. If citizens want the European Union to take action on a particular issue, they can launch a citizens’ initiative calling on the European Commission to propose new laws.

Organisers need one million citizens from across the EU to sign in support of an initiative before the European Commission can consider it.

How does it work in practice?

Before launching an initiative, a group of organisers needs to be set up. This group should be made up of at least seven EU citizens, living in at least seven different EU countries. This represents a quarter of the EU population. They do not have to be nationals of those countries, but must be old enough to vote in the European Parliament elections in their own EU country.

The organisers must register their initiative with the European Commission and set a date to start collecting signatures of support. Signatures must be collected within 12 months.

To ensure initiatives are representative, an initiative must meet certain conditions. It must receive at least one million valid signatures, and these must come from no less than seven EU countries (including a minimum number of signatures from each country).

If the initiative meets all the conditions, the European Commission will consider it:

Within one month:

• EU officials will meet with the initiative organisers;

Within three months:

• the initiative organisers will have a chance to explain their initiative at a public hearing held at the European Parliament.

The Parliamentary committee responsible for the policy organises the hearing and may subsequently draft a report. Members of the European Parliament may then hold a debate in a full (plenary) session, which could lead Parliament to adopt a resolution related to the initiative. In such a case, Parliament effectively lends its support to the initiative, and calls on the European Commission to propose legislation. 

Within six months:

• the European Commission issues a formal reply – and explains why it will (or will not) propose a new law based on the initiative.

If the European Commission decides to adopt a legislative proposal in response to a citizens’ initiative, this proposal has to follow the appropriate legislative procedure, and must be examined and adopted by the legislator (the European Parliament and the Council) for it to become law.

You can find out more about citizens’ initiatives, sign an ongoing initiative, or start your own on the citizens’ initiative website.

Successful citizens’ initiatives

To date, seven initiatives have reached the signature threshold and have been answered by the European Commission.

The ‘Right2Water’ initiative, entitled ‘Water and sanitation are a human right! Water is a public good, not a commodity!’ was the first successful example of this democratic mechanism.

It was followed by:

• One of us
• Stop Vivisection
• Ban glyphosate and protect people and the environment from toxic pesticides
• Minority SafePack – one million signatures for diversity in Europe, and
• End the Cage Age
• Save bees and farmers! Towards a bee-friendly agriculture for a healthy environment

Parliament supports the European Citizens’ Initiative

The European Parliament strongly supports wider participation in democracy and has previously called for the European citizens’ initiative to be made more citizen-friendly and for the procedure to be simplified and streamlined. As a result, the rules on the citizens’ initiative were updated in 2020, making it more accessible, less bureaucratic and easier for organisers and supporters to use.

Legal basis

Within Parliament, Rule 222 and Rule 230 of the Rules of Procedure apply to citizens’ initiatives.

The right to invite the European Commission to propose new laws, in areas that are within its powers or areas of competence, is enshrined in Article 11.4 of the Treaty on European Union.

Further information

• European Citizens’ Initiative Fact Sheet, European Parliament, 2022
• European citizen’s initiatives, At your service, European Parliament

Keep sending your questions to the Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (Ask EP)! We reply in the EU language that you use to write to us.

Written by Rafał Mańko.

The European Electoral Act of 1976 allows the EU Member States to set the minimum age for standing as a candidate in European elections. While in May 2022 Parliament proposed a uniform minimum age of 18, the next round of elections – in 2024 – will be governed by the existing rules. The minimum age therefore varies among the Member States, ranging from 18 (in the majority of countries) to 25 (Italy and Greece).

Variation across the Member States

The existing rules on European elections are based on a combination of the common principles established in the European Electoral Act of 1976, as amended by Council Decision 2002/772, and the different national rules implementing those principles. The minimum age for standing as a candidate for the European Parliament is determined by the individual Member States, in line with Article 8 of the European Electoral Act. Across the EU, this age currently varies as follows: the rules in 15 Member States provide for 18 years of age, nine for 21 (Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czechia, Estonia, Ireland, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland and Slovakia), one (Romania) for 23, and two (Italy and Greece) for 25. Through a law adopted in 2021, Belgium lowered the minimum age from 21 to 18, and those new rules will apply for the 2024 elections.

Figure 1 – Age to stand as a candidate for the EP Parliament proposes a harmonised age of 18 for candidates

In May 2022, Parliament tabled a proposal for a Council regulation on the election of MEPs by direct universal suffrage, which would replace the existing European Electoral Act (2022/0902(APP)). The proposal harmonises a number of rules applicable to European elections, including the minimum age for eligibility to stand as a candidate for an MEP. According to its recital 17, a ‘single harmonised age … for standing as a candidate should be introduced across the Union in order to ensure equality and to avoid discrimination in access to those most fundamental civic and political rights’. Article 5(1) of the proposal sets the age at 18 and, in contrast to the voting right, provides for no exceptions. To enter into force, the regulation needs the unanimous approval of the Council and the approval of all Member States in line with their constitutional requirements.

Member StateMinimum ageLegal basis in national law

Belgium

18

Article 41 of the European Parliament Elections Act 1989 as modified by Act of 12.12.2021

Bulgaria

21

Article 351 of the Electoral Code

Czechia

21

Article 6 of the European Parliament Elections Act

Denmark

18

§ 6 of the Act Concerning the Election of the Danish MEPs

Germany

18

§ 6b of the European Elections Act

Estonia

21

§ 4(5) of the European Parliament Election Act

Ireland

21

Section 11 of the European Parliament Elections Act 1997

Greece

25

Article 2(1) of Law 4255/2014 on European elections in conjunction with Article 55 of the Constitution

Spain

18

Article 6 of the Organic Law 5/1985 of 19 June 1985

France

18

Article 5 of the EP Elections Act in conjunction with Article L.127 and L.2 of the Electoral Code

Croatia

18

Article5 of the European Parliament Elections Act in conjunction with Article 45 of the Constitution

Italy

25

Article 4 of the Law on the Election of Italian MEPs 1979

Cyprus

21

Article 13 of the European Parliament Elections Act

Latvia

21

§ 4 of the Act on Election to the European Parliament

Lithuania

21

Article 10(6) of the Electoral Code

Luxembourg

18

Article 285(1)(3) of the Electoral Act 2003

Hungary

18

Article XXIII of the Fundamental Law in conjunction with § 2:10 of the Civil Code (age of majority)

Malta

18

Article 19(1) of the European Parliament Elections Act 2004

Netherlands

18

Article Y4(a) of the Electoral Act

Austria

18

§ 29 of the European Elections Ordinance

Poland

21

Article 11 § 1(4) of the Electoral Code

Portugal

18

Article 4 of the Electoral Law for the European Parliament in conjunction with Articles 1 and 4 of the Law Governing Elections to the Assembly of the Republic

Romania

23

Article 5(7) of the European Parliament Elections Law

Slovenia

18

Article 10 of the Election of MEPs from the Republic of Slovenia Act

Slovakia

21

§ 73(1)(a)(b) of Act No 180/2014 Coll., on the conditions for the exercise of the right to vote

Finland

18

§ 164 of the Elections Act in conjunction with § 14(II) of the Constitution

Sweden

18

Avdeling V, 4 § of the Elections Act

Table 1 – Legal bases setting the age for candidates in European elections in the EU-27

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Minimum age to stand as a candidate in European elections‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clare Ferguson.

Every five years, Europeans go to the polls to elect their representatives in the European Parliament. The next chance for citizens to choose who will defend their interests takes place from 6 to 9 June 2024. This will be the 10th time Europeans vote in the world’s largest transnational elections, mandating over 700 Members to represent their views in the only directly elected European institution. With 12 months to go before voting begins, the European Parliament is keen to ensure that Europeans have all the information they need to make their choice. The European Parliamentary Research Service has therefore prepared analysis of various organisational aspects of the 2024 elections.

Although turnout in the European elections increased to 51 % in 2019 (+8.05 percentage points – the highest turnout in two decades), EU institutions and governments are keen to ensure greater representativeness by boosting voter numbers. The election results are also likely to affect young people directly, both in the years to come and later on. Several countries have therefore lowered the voting age (you can vote aged 17 years in Greece, and aged 16 years in Germany, Malta, Austria, and – because voting is obligatory once registered – upon request in Belgium). This should allow young people to have their say on candidates that reflect their values. Furthermore, the European Parliament proposes to allow young people (aged at least 18) to stand as candidates throughout the EU, although that new rule is unlikely to be in place in time for the 2024 elections. At present, the minimum age for candidates is set by each EU country and varies from 18 to 25 years.

The EU guarantees all citizens the right to vote and stand as a candidate in elections to the European Parliament, under the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. The European Parliament is an active supporter of the right to equal participation for people with disabilities. Parliament demands that the EU and its Member States ensure equal opportunities for persons with disabilities to vote, campaign, and stand as candidates. Parliament has also highlighted the urgent need to ensure equal access to polling stations and better representation of people with disabilities on electoral rolls.

Depending on the outcome of the elections, the formation of a stable majority is the most likely outcome to provide a good balance between representativeness and getting Parliament’s work done. Setting an electoral threshold (minimum percentage of votes needed for the allocation of seats) is one way to ensure that Parliament can operate without multiple very small parties pulling in too many different directions. Although it is unlikely to be agreed with the Member States in time for the 2024 elections, Parliament adopted a draft law in May 2022, seeking to modify the rules on electoral thresholds in the European elections. Under the proposal, EU countries could set a threshold of no more than 5 % of the valid votes cast, but they would be obliged to establish a threshold of no less than 3.5 % and no more than 5 % for national constituencies comprising more than 60 seats (only the largest Member States). The electoral thresholds expected still to apply in 2024, however, remain at 5 % of valid votes (France, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Czechia, Romania, Croatia, Latvia and Hungary), 3 % (Greece), 4 % (Austria, Italy, Sweden), and 1.8 % (Cyprus), while 14 Member States set no threshold.

Once the new Parliament is in place, Members vote to elect the new head of the European Union’s executive body, the President of the European Commission, and hold public hearings to examine the proposed team of Commissioners. To strengthen the political link between the new Parliament’s composition and the choice of a new Commission President, a ‘lead-candidates’ process, known as the Spitzenkandidaten process was used in 2014. European political parties designated their candidate for the post of President of the Commission, meaning that voters would influence the choice of the President of the EU’s executive when choosing to vote for a particular party. While this led to the successful election of European People’s Party lead candidate Jean‑Claude Juncker in 2014 – this was not the case in 2019, with the nomination of Ursula von der Leyen, who had not been a candidate in the election. Was this a temporary switch from a process aimed at making the appointment of EU leaders more comprehensible to the public? Or is the EU abandoning this particular attempt to give European citizens a greater say on who becomes the next President of the Commission? With only 12 months to go, it remains to be seen whether the lead-candidates process will be employed in 2024.

As we have seen above, a European Parliament with a robust mandate from a large voter base is best able to represent citizens’ wishes. Mobilising people to vote has been a major goal for the EU since before the first direct elections in 1979. The organisation of the elections is itself a reflection of this fundamental democratic need, with a crucial role played by political parties. While today’s European political parties are a familiar aspect of the campaign, there was less agreement in the past as to whether European parties were needed for ‘European’ elections. The debate surrounding self-standing European parties and their role in voter mobilisation has run for decades, and continues today. A revision of EU law governing the statute and funding of European political parties and European political foundations, part of the ‘new push for European democracy’, is currently under discussion between the European Parliament and the Council of the EU.

While some consider European elections are ‘second-order’ elections, the increased turnout in 2019 shows this may not be the case forever. With the geopolitical situation underlining the benefits of EU membership, Parliament is working on several proposals to make European elections more consistent and robust across the EU.

Further reading:

• Age to vote in European elections
• Age to stand as a candidate in European elections
• Political participation of people with disabilities in the EU
• Electoral thresholds in European elections
• Spitzenkandidaten or the lead-candidates process: Ways to Europeanise elections to the European Parliament (forthcoming)
• Political parties, voter mobilisation and the 1979 European elections
• Proposing new rules for European elections
• Amending the rules governing the statute and funding of European political parties (recast)
• Heading towards the 2024 European elections [Ten issues to watch in 2023]

Written by Rafał Mańko.

Under current EU law, EU Member States are free to set their minimum national voting age for European elections. This age is set at 16 in Austria, Germany and Malta, 17 in Greece, and 18 in the remaining Member States. In Belgium, EU citizens can, following a recent change, request to vote in European elections from the age of 16.

Current law

The rules applicable to European elections are based on a combination of the common principles established in the European Electoral Act of 1976, as amended by Council Decision 2002/772, and the different national rules implementing those principles. In line with Article 8 of the European Elections Act, Member States can set the minimum voting age in their national legislation.

Proposal

In May 2022, Parliament tabled a proposal for a Council regulation on the election of the Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) by direct universal suffrage, which would replace the existing European Electoral Act of 1976 (2022/0902(APP)). The aim of the proposal is to harmonise a number of rules applicable to European elections, including the voting age. According to recital 17 of the proposal, a ‘single harmonised age for voting … should be introduced across the Union in order to ensure equality and to avoid discrimination‘. Article 4(1) of the proposal sets the age at 16 but allows for exceptions for ‘existing constitutional orders establishing a minimum voting age of 18 or 17 years of age’. To enter into force, the regulation needs the unanimous approval of the Council and the approval of all Member States in accordance with their constitutional requirements.

Figure 1 – Voting age in the Member States Voting by persons under 18 year of age

The 2024 European elections will be governed by the European Electoral Act of 1976. In Belgium, a law adopted in 2022 allows Belgians and other EU nationals resident in Belgium, aged 16-18, to vote in European elections after submitting a request to their municipality of residence. In Germany, a law adopted in early 2023 lowered the voting age for European elections from 18 to 16. In 2018, Malta‘s Constitution sets the standard voting age, including for European elections, at 16. In Greece, the voting age is set at 17. In 2007, Austria fixed its standard voting age at 16. In all other Member States, the voting age is 18.

Member StateVoting ageLegal basisBelgium18, 16 on requestArticle 1 § 2 of the EP Elections Act 1989 as modified by Act of 1 June 2022Bulgaria18Article 350 of the Electoral CodeCzechia18Article 5 of the European Parliament Elections ActDenmark18§ 6 of the Act Concerning the Election of the Danish MEPs in conjunction with § 1(1) of the Parliamentary Elections ActGermany16§ 6 of the European Elections Act as modified by Act of 11.1.2023Estonia18§ 4 (1) of the European Parliament Election ActIreland18Rule 72, Schedule 2 of the European Parliament Elections Act 1997Greece17Article 1 of the European Elections Act 2014 in conjunction with Article 4(1) of the Parliamentary Elections ActSpain18Article 2 of the Organic Law 5/1985 of 19 June 1985France18Article 5 of the European Parliament Elections Act in conjunction with Article L.2 of the Electoral CodeCroatia18Article 45 of the ConstitutionItaly18Article 3 of the Law on Election of Italian MEPs 1979Cyprus18Article 4 of the European Parliament Elections ActLatvia18§ 2 of the Act on Election to European ParliamentLithuania18Article 8(4) of the Electoral CodeLuxembourg18Article 3 of the Electoral Act 2003Hungary18Article XXIII of the Fundamental Law in conjunction with § 2:10 of the Civil Code (age of majority)Malta16Article 11(c) of the European Parliament Elections Act 2004 in conjunction with Article 57(b) of the Constitution of MaltaNetherlands18Article Y3(a) and (b)(2) of the Electoral ActAustria16§ 10 of the European Elections OrdinancePoland18Article 10 § 1 of the Electoral CodePortugal18Article 1 of the Electoral Law for the European Parliament in conjunction with Article 1 of the Law governing Elections to the Assembly of the RepublicRomania18Article 5(5) of the European Parliament Elections LawSlovenia18Article 10 of the Election of MEPs from the Republic of Slovenia ActSlovakia18§ 3 of the Act no. 180/2014 Coll., on the conditions for the exercise of the right to voteFinland18§ 14(II) of the ConstitutionSweden18Avdeling 5, 4 § of the Elections Act (2005:837) in conjunction with Proclamation (1974:152) on the adoption of a new form of government, kap., 4 §.Table 1 –Legal bases setting the voting age for European elections in the EU-27

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Voting age for European elections‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Györgyi Mácsai, Members’ Research Service (EPRS) with Mira Manini Tiwari, GlobalStat, EUI.

This infographic provides an insight into the economic performance of Mexico compared to the EU, and looks at the trade dynamics between them. Mexico’s GDP per capita, unemployment rate, female labour force participation, and FDI have remained relatively stable since 2006, with slight increases, whereas remittances have increased more markedly. EU trade with Mexico has increased significantly since 2006, most notably trade in goods. This is dominated by trade in mechanical appliances and electrical equipment, both in terms of imports and exports. ‘Various business services’ constitute the largest proportion of EU service imports and exports from and to Mexico (32.5% and 23.8% respectively in 2021).

Read this infographic on ‘Mexico: Economic indicators and trade with EU‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Suzana Anghel with José Ernault.

On 1 June 2023, Moldova hosted the second meeting of the European Political Community (EPC) in Bulboaca, just a few kilometres from the Ukrainian border. The focus of this informal forum of 48 leaders from across the European continent was clearly more on peace and security – with all participants reiterating their unity in support of Ukraine – and less on energy and interconnectivity, the other topic on the agenda. Discussions took place in plenary and roundtable format, showing continuity in method with the inaugural EPC meeting held in Prague in 2022.

Enlargement, although not officially a topic for discussion, was placed at the centre of the debates by the President of Moldova, Maia Sandu, and the President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, who this time attended the summit in person. The two leaders pleaded for the opening of EU accession negotiations by the end of this year. In addition, Zelenskyy advocated powerfully for a strong signal from NATO at the upcoming summit of the Alliance in Vilnius on 11 July 2023, both regarding Ukraine’s accession and concerning security guarantees on the way to membership. This to some extent transformed the meeting into an informal preparatory meeting for the NATO and European Council meetings later this year, touching on and possibly easing potential sensitivities. No summit declaration was adopted, confirming the EPC’s informal platform format.

A series of side meetings allowed leaders to discuss issues of direct interest to their own countries. Side meetings were also used for mediation purposes in the case of the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict, and to attempt to put the Pristina-Belgrade dialogue back on track, after the recent spike in violence.

1.     Background

The European Political Community’s second summit meeting took place on 1 June 2023 in Moldova, at Mimi Castle in Bulboaca, 20 kilometres from the Ukrainian border. The leaders of 45 European countries, including all 27 EU-Member States, attended the summit, while the President of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, declined the invitation at the last minute. The presidents of three EU institutions – the European Council, the European Commission and the European Parliament – also attended. The event followed on from the inaugural EPC meeting, held in Prague on 6 October 2022, at which 44 leaders from across the European continent came together for the first time to express their unity and support for Ukraine.

EPC summits are held on a bi-annual basis, being hosted alternately by an EU and a non-EU country. The meeting in Bulboaca was the first EPC summit to be hosted by a non-EU country, Moldova. Spain, the country holding the rotating Presidency of the Council of the EU in the second half of the year, will host the third EPC meeting in October 2023, when an informal European Council meeting is also expected to take place. The United Kingdom is expected to host the fourth EPC summit in a year’s time, during the first half of 2024.

2.     European Political Community: Origins and initial developments

The EPC originated from a proposal made by the President of France, Emmanuel Macron, at the closing event of the Conference on the Future of Europe on 9 May 2022. It is a ‘partnership of equals’, which allows EU and non-EU European countries to share an informal platform for political dialogue and cooperation on peace and security at a time of war on the European continent.

Prior to, during and after the Prague summit, there were discussions about the possibility of transforming the EPC initiative, giving it more structure and possibly providing it with a permanent secretariat and a dedicated budget. This path has not been taken thus far, confirming the leaders’ preference for flexibility, something Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez has praised. Academics argue that a dedicated institutional framework could bring more clarity on who is in charge of developing the agenda and ensuring business continuity between summits. For now, however, tasks are being undertaken by the host countries with informal help from the EU. There is a fear that the EU’s involvement in the preparatory stages, if continued, could estrange some participants, who might see the Union’s involvement as an attempt to use the EPC as a vehicle to promote its policies rather than as a platform of equals.

3.     The summit’s host: Moldova

The choice of Moldova as host for the second EPC meeting sends a strong signal of support and commitment from the EU to a country that has expressed its European aspirations vibrantly and was granted candidate country status a year ago, along with Ukraine.

Moldova has been on the front line from the moment Russia’s war on Ukraine broke out. The country has had to cope with high numbers of refugees (691 154 arrivals, with 103 281 remaining in Moldova). It has also been constantly challenged by Russia’s multifaceted hybrid war, being continually confronted with disinformation, weaponisation of energy supplies and destabilisation attempts, against which Volodymyr Zelenskyy warned when addressing the European Council back in February 2023. Moldova’s security is intertwined with that of Ukraine, with the latter acting as a de facto security provider, a reality recognised by Sandu.

Since Russia’s full-blown invasion of Ukraine, the EU has provided Moldova with multifaceted – political, financial, humanitarian and military – support. In May 2023, the EU doubled its macro-financial assistance for Moldova, bringing it to a total of €295 million. The Union has also granted temporary trade liberalisation for seven key Moldovan agricultural products. It has meanwhile provided €48 million in humanitarian aid to help Moldova cope with the challenge posed by the high number of war refugees. Moldova’s electricity grid has been synchronised with the continental European grid, and the country has progressively phased out its dependency on Russian gas (with the exception of Transnistria). A €200 million energy support package was presented in November 2022 to help Moldova meet its gas supply needs, and Moldova is now participating in the common gas purchasing mechanism. As regards military support, a day before the EPC summit, the EU High Representative/Vice President of the European Commission (HR/VP), Josep Borrell, inaugurated the European Union Partnership Mission Moldova in Chisinau. The mission’s objective is to help strengthen Moldova’s resilience and ability to counter hybrid threats. The EU has so far pledged up to €80 million through the European Peace Facility to support modernisation of Moldova’s armed forces. A new set of sanctions, adopted on Romania’s initiative, target ‘actions aimed at destabilising’ Moldova.

4.     European Political Community meeting in Bulboaca Meeting format

The meeting alternated between plenary and roundtable sessions. A plenary session allowed the host, Maia Sandu, to open the summit. She expressed Moldova’s gratitude to Ukraine for standing up for its security, and to the EU and its Member States for their support and assistance. She also mentioned Moldova’s aspirations for EU integration, and commitment to meet the required conditions. Zelenskyy, who was next to take the floor, called for unity and warned the leaders that ‘every doubt we show here in Europe is a trench that Russia will definitely try to occupy’. Three other leaders – the Prime Minister of Italy, Giorgia Meloni, the President of Romania, Klaus Iohannis, and the Prime Minister of the Netherlands, Mark Rutte – addressed the plenary. They assured Moldova and Ukraine of their countries’ support, called for unity and, in the case of Rutte, stressed the urgent need to train Ukrainian pilots to fly F-16 aircraft.

Two roundtables were scheduled, one on security and one on energy and interconnectivity, to allow European leaders to discuss the two subjects in depth, in smaller groups. This model had already been successfully used at the inaugural EPC meeting but also earlier at the EU-African Union Summit in 2022. In contrast with the previous summit, the leaders came back together for a working lunch, which took the place of a closing plenary session and was followed by side meetings.

Main results of the meeting

The EPC summit was an opportunity to bring the continent together to discuss security, energy and interconnectivity. In practice, the debates were dominated by two topics: security and enlargement. The Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Rishi Sunak, put migration on the agenda, a topic that could return to the fore in a year’s time, when the EPC summit is to be hosted by the UK.

European unity

The European leaders once again sent a strong signal of unity, isolating Russia and Belarus, and demonstrating support for Moldova and Ukraine. At the joint press conference closing the summit, Sandu, Sanchez, and the Czech Prime Minister, Peter Fiala, stressed that the European family was in Moldova standing united in support of peace. Attending the summit, the European Parliament President, Roberta Metsola, stressed that the objective was to show support ‘to Moldova, to Ukraine and to the wider European community’, and underlined that Europe is facing a resilience test which it needs to meet united.

Security

The European continent’s security and its protection from war in all its forms, including hybrid attacks, was the overarching theme of the summit. Ukraine’s security was at the centre of the debates. Zelenskyy pleaded for Ukraine’s accession to NATO and for security guarantees on the way to membership. These two questions remain sensitive for members of the Alliance, who will need to consider them at the July summit in Vilnius. Some have taken a clear stance in support of Ukraine’s accession, with over 10 countries, including recently Romania, signing a ‘declaration of support for Ukraine’s accession to NATO’. Macron stressed that ‘Vilnius must send a clear message to Ukraine and Ukrainians. I favour stronger, concrete very clear security guarantees’, without clarifying their form. Estonian Prime Minister, Kaja Kallas, stressed that her own country’s history and experience tells that ‘the only security guarantee is NATO’.

EU enlargement

Enlargement was the surprise topic prompted by Sandu and Zelenskyy, and echoed by several EU leaders. Sandu used the summit to express her country’s European aspirations and to reiterate Moldova’s self-set objective to join the EU by 2030. European Council President Charles Michel said he would put enlargement on the agenda of EU leaders at the end of the year, after the submission by the Commission of its progress reports. Metsola pointed to the ‘adamant firmness‘ of Moldovan citizens in favour of European integration that she had experienced when visiting Chisinau, and the impressive speed shown by Moldova in its response to the Commission’s conditionality, which had led Parliament to vote a resolution in support of opening accession negotiations with Moldova by the end of 2023. She also addressed a strong message to the Western Balkans, pleading for their ‘faster, more urgent and more deep European integration’.

Side meetings in a variable geometry format Armenia-Azerbaijan

A meeting was convened by Charles Michel on the sidelines of the EPC summit to facilitate the normalisation of relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan, in a context of resurging tensions in the region, with each side accusing the other of ceasefire violations. The meeting was attended by the President of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev, the Prime Minister of Armenia, Nikol Pashinyan, the French President, Emmanuel Macron, and the German Chancellor, Olaf Scholz. This meeting followed a similar one held during the Prague EPC summit in October 2022. Michel, who has been actively involved in the peace talks, has met Aliyev and Pashinyan five times in trilateral format since September 2020, and has been engaging in various communication formats (bilateral meetings or phone calls) with both leaders pushing for the conclusion of an agreement on border delimitation and a peace treaty (see Figure 1). Michel announced a new meeting in Brussels on 21 July 2023 and invited participants to reconvene during the EPC summit in Granada in October 2023.

Figure 1 – Timeline of EU-led mediation efforts between Armenia and Azerbaijan Kosovo–Serbia

Another meeting held on the margins sought to address tensions in north Kosovo following local elections, which were boycotted by the Serb community. The meeting involved Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić, Kosovan President Vjosa Osmani, Macron, Scholz, and Borrell. Macron stated that Osmani and Vučić had agreed to consider a French-German plan to ease tensions.

Read this briefing on ‘Outcome of the European Political Community meeting in Bulboaca, Moldova, on 1 June 2023‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.