European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Laurence Amand-Eeckhout.

Mental health has become a major issue of public health, and economic and social concern across the whole of the EU. Collecting data is crucial for monitoring mental health, developing effective policies and addressing the growing mental health challenges. It is estimated that more than 84 million people in the EU are struggling with mental health problems.

The COVID-19 pandemic and the subsequent economic crisis have placed a huge strain on everyone’s mental health. The restrictive measures taken by governments during the pandemic had a severe impact on people, with inequalities in mental health, both within the population and between social groups. Young people, the elderly and people in vulnerable situations suffered more than others.

Mental health is also an issue at work. Poor working environments, including excessive workloads, job insecurity, harassment and discrimination, pose a risk to the mental health of workers.

Policies and services addressing mental health are the individual EU Member States’ responsibility. The EU work on mental health, part of its activities on non-communicable diseases, aims to complement Member States’ policies, supporting real action on the ground and the exchange of best practice and knowledge. On 7 June 2023, addressing calls from the European Parliament and from citizens in the context of the Conference on the Future of Europe, the European Commission adopted a communication on a new comprehensive approach to mental health, adding another pillar to the architecture of the European Health Union. EU action on mental health will focus on three guiding principles: access to adequate and effective prevention; access to high quality and affordable mental healthcare and treatment; and reintegration into society after recovery.

The European Parliament has always been a supporter of the promotion of good mental health and putting mental health at the heart of EU policymaking. Its Subcommittee on Public Health (SANT) is currently preparing an own-initiative report on mental health.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Mental health in the EU‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Ionel Zamfir (1st edition).

Several EU directives dealing with equality require EU Member States to establish equality bodies with a focus on assisting victims of discrimination and preventing and fighting discrimination on the grounds listed under the directives. However, their rules are too general and have no precise definition of these bodies’ duties and manner of operation, thus leading to disparities among the Member States’ bodies. Additionally, the work of some Member States’ bodies has been hampered by lack of resources, insufficient independence or a narrow remit.

In 2018, the European Commission adopted a recommendation on standards for equality bodies. Later, after assessing its implementation, it decided to shift to binding legislation. In a package of legislative measures on equality, in December 2022 it published a proposal setting standards for equality bodies fighting discrimination on several grounds. A second proposal, under the ordinary legislative procedure, focuses specifically on equality between men and women in the employment field. The proposal reinforces the equality bodies’ independence, resources and mandate. While generally welcoming the proposal, stakeholders have suggested specific changes to its provisions

Versions

• July 2023: Standards for equality bodies: Discrimination under Article 19 TFEU grounds (1st edition)

Proposal for a Council directive on standards for equality bodies in the field of equal treatment between persons irrespective of their racial or ethnic origin, equal treatment in the field of employment and occupation between persons irrespective of their religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation, equal treatment between women and men in matters of social security and in the access to and supply of goods and services, and deleting Article 13 of Directive 2000/43/EC and Article 12 of Directive 2004/113/ECCommittee responsible:Women’s Rights and Gender Equality (FEMM)COM(2022) 689
7.12.2022Rapporteur:Sirpa Pietikäinen (EPP, Finland)2022/0401(APP)Shadow rapporteurs:Carina Ohlsson (S&D, Sweden)
Irène Tolleret (Renew, France)
Kira Marie Peter-Hansen (Greens/EFA, Denmark)
Eugenia Rodríguez Palop (The Left, Spain)Consent procedure (APP)
(Unanimity in the Council,
consent in Parliament)Next steps expected: Drafting of committee report

Written by Ivana Katsarova (1st edition).

The European Union (EU) has established over 40 regimes of sanctions against third countries, entities, and legal and natural persons. These restrictive measures include arms embargoes, import and export bans, freezing of funds and economic resources, and travel bans. Whereas the adoption of EU sanctions is centralised at EU level, their implementation and enforcement lies with the Member States. The significant differences between national systems, particularly in terms of offences and penalties for breaches of EU sanctions, are thought to weaken their efficacy and the EU’s credibility.

Following the Council’s decision to add the violation of EU sanctions to the areas of ‘particularly serious crime with a cross-border dimension’, the European Commission issued, in December 2022, a proposal for a directive to harmonise criminal offences and penalties for such violations.

On 9 June, the Council adopted its general approach. In the European Parliament, the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs adopted its report on the proposal on 6 July 2023, along with a decision to enter into trilogue negotiations.

Versions

• July 2023: Revision of EU marketing standards for certain ‘breakfast’ directives (1st edition)

Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and the Council amending Council Directives 2001/110/EC relating to honey, 2001/112/EC relating to fruit juices and certain similar products intended for human consumption, 2001/113/EC relating to fruit jams, jellies and marmalades and sweetened chestnut purée intended for human consumption, and 2001/114/EC relating to certain partly or wholly dehydrated preserved milk for human consumptionCommittee responsible:Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI)COM(2023) 0201
21.04.2023Rapporteur:Alexander BERNHUBER (EPP-AU)2023/0105(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Ordinary legislative procedure
(COD) (Parliament and Council
on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’)Next steps expected: Draft report Honey, beehives and beekeepers in the EU

Written by Rafał Mańko.

Sovereign states, as the primary subjects of public international law, voluntarily enter into treaties (international agreements) creating international organisations, as the secondary subjects of public international law. According to a long-standing and well-established principle of public international law, known by the Latin maxim of pacta sunt servanda, states are obliged to abide by the agreements to which they commit. This principle is enshrined in Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (‘Vienna Convention’). It also applies, as a matter of course, to the multilateral treaties establishing international organisations. Such treaties may specify duties incumbent upon state parties, such as periodic payment of membership fees or agreement to abide by the decisions of organs of the organisation, as well as a set of values or principles to which state parties to the founding treaties have voluntarily committed, as in Article 3 of the Statute of the Council of Europe.

If a state violates a provision of a multilateral treaty that is essential to the accomplishment of its object or purpose, under Article 60 of the Vienna Convention, such breach is considered material. In such case, the other parties may, by unanimous agreement, suspend the operation of the treaty in whole or in part, or terminate it either in the relations between themselves and the defaulting state, or between all the parties to the treaty. Some experts claim that Article 60 of the Vienna Convention could be invoked to terminate a treaty establishing an international organisation, and thereby serve as a means for suspension or expulsion of a recalcitrant member.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Suspension and expulsion of states from international organisations: Analysis of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and of the practice at the United Nations and the Council of Europe‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Monika Dulian with Oleksandra Klochko.

In response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the EU took immediate action to stem rising energy prices and secure energy supply to its Member States. In its communication on the REPowerEU plan from March 2022, the European Commission proposed that the Member States use joint purchasing, collecting of orders and matching of supply and demand to support gas storage refilling operations. The Commission also proposed a ‘joint European platform’ to lead bilateral negotiations with major gas producers. Accordingly, the EU Energy Platform was established on 7 April 2022, initially on the basis of a European Council mandate. The legal basis for the platform is Council Regulation (EU) 2022/2576 of December 2022, which lays down the rules for the joint purchasing mechanism. The latter is to remain in operation for 1 year as of the moment the document enters into force and the service provider in charge of the joint purchasing mechanism is selected.

The EU Energy Platform aims to ensure security of supply by purchasing natural gas, LNG and hydrogen for the Member States jointly and at affordable prices, after aggregating their demand (at least 15 % of the Member States’ storage filling obligations are subject to demand aggregation). Once a Member State submits a demand, it is under no obligation to actually purchase gas; from that moment on it is for energy companies – from within the EU and the EU Energy Community – to negotiate and make business decisions. Natural gas and LNG demand from these companies is aggregated and then matched with reliable EU or non-EU sellers. This happens through AggregateEU – a demand aggregation and joint purchasing service operated by a service provider chosen by the Commission based on predefined criteria. The EU Energy Platform is also in charge of the outreach to international suppliers with a view to diversifying gas supplies.

The evolution of the platform will depend on the political will and readiness of the Member States to pool a larger part of EU gas demand. Major gas-consuming countries in particular would have to be convinced to give away their privileged market access in order to build a common and effective mechanism. In the long run, the platform could shift its focus towards hydrogen procurement and distribution to accelerate the energy transition towards renewable sources.

Read the complete briefing on ‘EU Energy Platform: Facilitating joint purchases of gas‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Carmen-Cristina Cîrlig (1st edition).

The European Union (EU) has established over 40 regimes of sanctions against third countries, entities, and legal and natural persons. These restrictive measures include arms embargoes, import and export bans, freezing of funds and economic resources, and travel bans. Whereas the adoption of EU sanctions is centralised at EU level, their implementation and enforcement lies with the Member States. The significant differences between national systems, particularly in terms of offences and penalties for breaches of EU sanctions, are thought to weaken their efficacy and the EU’s credibility.

Following the Council’s decision to add the violation of EU sanctions to the areas of ‘particularly serious crime with a cross-border dimension’, the European Commission issued, in December 2022, a proposal for a directive to harmonise criminal offences and penalties for such violations.

On 9 June, the Council adopted its general approach. In the European Parliament, the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs adopted its report on the proposal on 6 July 2023, along with a decision to enter into trilogue negotiations.

Versions

• July 2023: Proposal for a directive on the violation of Union restrictive measures (1st edition)

Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the definition of criminal offences and penalties for the violation of Union restrictive measuresCommittee responsible:Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE)COM(2022) 684
2.12.2022Rapporteur:Sophia In’t Veld (Renew, the Netherlands)2022/0398(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Leopoldo López Gil (EPP, Spain)
Thijs Reuten (S&D, the Netherlands)
Saskia Bricmont (Greens/EFA, Belgium)
Patryk Jaki (ECR, Poland)
Anders Vistisen (ID, Denmark)
Clare Daly (The Left, Ireland)Ordinary legislative procedure
(COD) (Parliament and Council
on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’)Next steps expected: Trilogue negotiations

Written by Maria Niestadt.

The EU has started reflecting on its vision for emerging virtual worlds (metaverses) and providing funding opportunities to develop these worlds. The aim is to ensure that people are protected in virtual worlds and that EU businesses, in particular SMEs, are not driven out of competition.

Introduction

Boosted by technological advances, virtual worlds (also referred to as metaverses) are becoming more prominent globally as well as in the EU. These worlds (which are in different stages of maturity) offer real-time, immersive and persistent environments that blend physical and virtual elements in various areas like manufacturing, medicine, education, entertainment, commerce, and the public and military sectors. Virtual worlds have the potential to change the way we work, shop, learn, engage and entertain on the internet. There is no uniform definition of ‘virtual worlds’ or ‘metaverse(s)’. Both terms are still in use (in the singular and the plural), often interchangeably, although the European Commission seems to use the term ‘virtual worlds’ more often. In an earlier briefing, the European Parliamentary Research Service described a metaverse as ‘an immersive and constant virtual 3D world where people interact by means of an avatar to carry out a wide range of activities’. In July 2023, the Centre on Regulation in Europe (CERRE) provided an overview of existing definitions and suggested their own definition of a virtual world: ‘an immersive, synchronous, persistent and unified 3D user experience that might enable mass content creation’. A 2023 study published by the European Commission’s Joint Research Centre considered that ‘next generation virtual worlds’ are ‘experiences that incorporate varying degrees of virtual and real information, which users can access with different levels of immersiveness and interaction’.

Supporting technologies

Virtual worlds are supported by various extended reality (XR) technologies, such as virtual reality (VR), augmented reality (AR), mixed reality (MR) and augmented virtuality (AV). XR is an umbrella term that covers all kinds of technologies that alter reality by adding digital elements to the real world. While in the VR environment the person is fully immersed (with a dedicated headset) in the 3D virtual environment, in the AR environment the person still sees the outside world (AR simply adds virtual content to a real world). MR also augments the real world for users, but the virtual world becomes so realistic that users cannot distinguish virtual content from physical objects, while AV adds items of the real world to the virtual world. Sometimes the boundaries between these technologies are not clear, and the same headset can use multiple technologies. Virtual worlds are also supported by other technologies such as the Internet of Things (IoT), 5G, blockchain and artificial intelligence (AI). These technologies facilitate various actions in virtual worlds. For example, blockchain technology allows users to buy and sell virtual assets without going through a centralised platform. IoT helps to transfer information between the real and virtual world through objects, and AI helps to analyse user interactions and data, and create personalised experiences. The EU is currently working on a first-ever attempt to enact a horizontal regulation for AI and recently adopted a regulation on markets in crypto-assets. Other horizontal regulations such as the General Data Protection Regulation, Digital Services Act and Digital Markets Act (which will also apply to virtual worlds) aim to protect users and ensure that EU SMEs are not driven out of the market.

Applications

Virtual worlds can change the way we connect, perceive and experience the world, opening up numerous opportunities but also bringing a number of challenges. They can be used in almost all areas, such as:

• education: virtual worlds enable users to visit places and times (such as Ancient Greece, or other planets) that are otherwise impossible to visit;
• manufacturing: companies can test prototypes of production lines or entire factories using a digital twin to detect potential errors and minimise costs;
• healthcare: virtual worlds can help doctors to diagnose more accurately and more quickly and to improve performance during and when preparing for surgery. Patients can benefit from immersive experiences to alleviate pain and anxiety, or to consult doctors on the other side of the world;
• public sector: virtual worlds can be used, for example, for consultations with citizens, city planning, visualisation of future development projects or training of employees;
• art and design: when visiting virtual worlds of museums, galleries and archives, users can almost experience how it is to be in an actual museum. Virtual 3D buildings enable architects to gain a realistic impression of their structure, furniture and decorations;
• entertainment: users of virtual worlds can attend various virtual events (such as concerts, movies, parties, and sports events);
• online shopping: customers can explore virtual stores and try on virtual clothes, while brands can host virtual events and advertise their products in virtual worlds;
• tourism: virtual worlds enable travellers to plan their trip by exploring virtual representations of destinations and hotels.

What is the EU doing? European Commission

The European Commission has started to reflect on its vision of virtual worlds and how the EU could support the EU VR/AR sector. As announced in its 2020 communication on ‘Europe’s Media in the Digital Decade: An Action Plan to Support Recovery and Transformation’, the Commission has launched a European Virtual and Augmented Reality (VR/AR) Industrial Coalition. This coalition brings together the VR/AR industry and policymakers to inform policymaking, encourage investment, facilitate dialogue and identify key challenges and opportunities. It has organised a series of workshops and drafted a strategic paper as well as a roadmap outlining the next steps for the VR/AR sector. The Commission is also offering funding opportunities under programmes such as Horizon Europe and Digital Europe. For example, in April 2023 the Commission published a call for proposals for EU action grants, which covered topics such as developing the CitiVerse (a virtual world for citizens); in May 2023, the Commission organised an info day on ‘Developing CitiVerse’. Furthermore, the Commission has launched the VR Media Lab through Horizon Europe, which supports immersive VR/AR media products. In July 2023, the Commission is expected to publish an initiative on virtual worlds, which would describe the Commission’s vision for virtual worlds, address opportunities and societal challenges, and announce upcoming implementation measures. It will be based on various consultations that the Commission has carried out recently.

European Parliament

The Parliament has also begun considering the implications of virtual worlds. The Committee on Legal Affairs (JURI) and the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO) are preparing own-initiative reports on virtual worlds. The JURI report (rapporteurs Axel Voss, EPP, Germany, and Iban García del Blanco, S&D, Spain) will focus more on civil, company, commercial and intellectual property law issues, and the IMCO report (rapporteur: Pablo Arias Echeverría, EPP, Spain) on internal market issues. On 24 April 2023, JURI held a hearing on regulatory challenges of the metaverse. As mentioned in a recent study requested by the JURI committee, the Parliament has also been exploring how to apply various XR technologies to its own work.

Advisory committees

On 26 April 2023, the European Economic and Social Committee adopted an opinion regarding an initiative on virtual worlds, such as the metaverse. This opinion highlights the importance of continually analysing ‘whether the legislation currently in force is sufficient to regulate virtual worlds’ and collaborating with various stakeholders to ensure that society benefits from these worlds.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Virtual worlds (metaverses)‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Sebastian Clapp.

NATO’s next summit, to take place from 11 to 12 July 2023, is being hosted by Lithuania, in Vilnius. Among the items topping the agenda will be support for Ukraine – including its eventual accession to the Alliance and security guarantees, NATO’s defence plans and budgets, and Sweden’s accession. The summit comes amid Russia’s ongoing war on Ukraine and a fundamental overhaul of NATO’s defence and deterrence framework.

Ukraine and NATO EU-NATO cooperation:
NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept states that the EU is a ‘unique and essential partner for NATO’. The two organisations share 22 Member States in common. EU-NATO cooperation focuses on issues of common interest such as crisis management and military mobility. Since the war in Ukraine began, the two organisations have sought to ensure that their responses to the invasion are aligned and have, for instance, coordinated weapons deliveries. Benedetta Berti of the European Policy Centre argues that stronger EU-NATO cooperation should stay at the top of the agenda for NATO leaders, and both organisations ‘would benefit from jointly defining a roadmap for enhancing cooperation with practical steps and milestones’.

Ukraine’s defence minister has noted that he ‘expects a guarantee that his country will be invited to join the military alliance at the conclusion of the war with Russia’. Allies have repeated the commitments they made at the Bucharest Summit in 2008 that Ukraine would become a NATO member at an unspecified time in the future, and reiterated their support for NATO’s open door policy. Since Ukraine’s bid for fast-track membership, made in September 2022, NATO Allies have been unable to agree on whether that membership ‘should be full or partial; immediate; gradual, or once again postponed; unconditional or linked to the outcome of the war’. While, NATO may not be ready to offer Ukraine a concrete timeline for membership, Allies may offer security guarantees to Ukraine outside the formal NATO structures. What form they will take is unclear however, as the ‘Western alliance is still divided over nearly every element of how to respond to the request’. According to former NATO Assistant Secretary-General Camille Grand, security guarantees can range from full-NATO membership to ‘paper guarantees’ such as the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, while in between there are ‘many variants – from bilateral treaties to de facto political commitments – and the challenge is to find the right spot’. One proposal is the Kyiv security compact, which would commit the West to provide political, financial, military and diplomatic support over decades, to increase Ukraine’s ability to defend itself.

NATO Allies have been supporting Ukraine with military equipment and aid since before the start of the Russian invasion. These deliveries have been coordinated, inter alia, by the EU and the Ukraine Contact Group, which includes 54 countries. The summit is likely to result in a NATO plan to enhance interoperability with Ukraine, and further commitments to provide Ukraine with weapons and ammunition, and training. NATO also plans to invite Ukraine to a NATO-Ukraine defence council as an equal member. More details of this are to be announced at the summit. This will be an upgrade from the current NATO-Ukraine Commission, opening the door to a wide range of new areas of cooperation, such as joint exercises.

NATO’s defence plans and budgets

At the Madrid Summit in 2022, the Allies agreed on a ‘fundamental shift’ in NATO’s deterrence and defence posture, a new NATO force model (NFM), and a boost to NATO’s enhanced forward presence (eFP) on the eastern flank. Concrete progress on these measures will be an essential determinant of success at this summit. The NFM is a significant expansion of NATO’s readiness posture, calling for several hundred thousand troops at different readiness levels. There is doubt, however, about the Allies’ ability to fulfil this vision. Important for this purpose will be to endorse updated defence plans – the centrepiece of which are three regional plans – but also to endorse the agreed expansion of the eight existing battlegroups to brigades. In a positive sign, Germany recently committed to permanently stationing a brigade in Lithuania within the eFP framework. The nuclear dimension of defence is also becoming increasingly important, given Russia’s constant nuclear-sabre rattling, the suspension of its participation in the New Start Treaty, the expansion of its nuclear arsenal and the recent announcement that Russia has deployed nuclear warheads to Belarus. Some analysts argue that NATO must commit to enhancing its nuclear deterrence faced with these new threats, and increase its overall nuclear credibility.

Sweden’s accession to NATO

Hungary and Turkey have yet to ratify the accession to NATO of Sweden, which together with Finland (which became a member in April 2023) applied for membership following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Sweden is one of NATO’s closest partners, with the status of an ‘enhanced opportunity partner‘. Ankara accuses Stockholm of harbouring Kurdish groups that Turkey considers terrorists and is demanding their extradition. It also wants an arms embargo on the country lifted. The newly elected government in Sweden lifted the arms embargo in September 2022 and toughened its anti-terrorism laws. The Swedish prime minister even wrote a letter to the Turkish president noting that Sweden is ready to meet Turkey’s demands. However, Sweden has an independent judiciary and the extraditions Turkey is requesting are not for the government to decide. Turkey also hopes to gain US Congressional approval of a major defence package to modernise Turkey’s air force, which the US president has linked to Swedish NATO accession. Hungary is holding up ‘NATO expansion…[as a] trump card’, as it seeks to unlock billions of euros of EU funding that have been frozen due to concerns about judicial independence. Hungary is also expecting Sweden to cease its criticism of Hungary’s rule of law and lack of adherence to LGBTQI rights. Hungary has hinted repeatedly, however, that it will not block Sweden’s NATO accession on its own. Many experts believe that the Turkish president, having recently won his re-election bid, will give the green light prior to or shortly after the Vilnius Summit, but this is far from certain. Erdogan dealt a blow to Sweden’s hopes in the run up to the summit when he said that Turkey would not change its attitude unless Sweden prevented anti-Turkey protests by ‘terrorists’.

Defence budgets
Boosting defence spending will also be top of the agenda at the summit, as Allies will discuss a possible new defence investment pledge. At the 2014 Wales Summit, NATO allies committed to a 2 % of GDP defence spending guideline within a decade. However, in 2022, only 7 (Estonia, Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the UK and the US) out of 30 NATO members met the 2 % of GDP spending guideline. The NATO Secretary-General has called for 2 % to be seen as the absolute minimum rather than a ceiling, and noted that he will ‘advocate for a more ambitious pledge than the one made in 2014’ at the Vilnius Summit. Multiple NATO members have already announced significant increases in defence spending. However it remains to be seen whether these will ever be implemented, with a looming possible recession. Allies may be reluctant to commit publicly to higher defence budget targets. Atlantic Council pundits note however, ‘that success at Vilnius will require a commitment to increase defence spending’. NATO Secretary-General

In recent months ‘Europe has been locked in an endless parlour game over who might replace Jens Stoltenberg’, who has led the alliance since October 2014. The NATO secretary-general, who is ‘responsible for steering the process of consultation and decision-making in the Alliance and ensuring that decisions are implemented’ is selected for renewable 4-year terms – or shorter – based on a unanimous vote by member states. The secretary-general is traditionally a senior European political figure. Many capitals called for the first female secretary-general or a nominee from eastern Europe, while others advocated continuity through extension of Stoltenberg’s term. On 4 July, the North Atlantic Council extended Stoltenberg’s mandate for a year, until 1 October 2024, to be endorsed by NATO leaders at the summit.

European Parliament position

In several resolutions, Parliament has recognised NATO’s role as the cornerstone of collective security for those Member States that are also NATO members. It has stressed the importance of enhancing and deepening the EU’s strategic partnership with NATO. Parliament has a delegation for relations with the NATO Parliamentary Assembly (DNAT) for cooperation on common challenges. In a June 2023 resolution, Parliament called on NATO to invite Ukraine into NATO after the war is over and, in the meantime, to develop a temporary security guarantee framework, to be implemented immediately after the war.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Towards NATO’s 2023 Vilnius Summit‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Antonio Vale with Clemens Weichert.

If it is to achieve the Paris Agreement objective of keeping the rise in global temperature well below 2° C, the EU must consider every possible technology to decarbonise energy production. Nuclear fusion is the process that powers the sun and it can be reproduced on Earth. However, even once the considerable engineering challenges of designing a fusion power plant are overcome, there are major constraints inherent in upscaling fusion power.

The basic function of a nuclear fusion reactor is to combine two hydrogen nuclei into a single helium nucleus with slightly less mass then the sum of the two original nuclei. The lost mass is converted into energy. This process is the power source behind both the sun and the hydrogen bomb.

The physics are known and the fuel is readily available. When harnessed in a controlled reaction, fusion power can provide low‑carbon electricity. Research into such civilian use cases has been ongoing since the 1950s. In facilities like the Joint European Torus (JET) near Oxford, scientists are able to heat up plasma to the necessary temperatures, 10 times as hot as the core of the sun. However, heating the plasma and keeping it confined in the reactor requires energy-intensive magnets, or lasers, that use a great deal more energy than the fusion reaction generated. This is a major engineering challenge.

While most approaches use magnetic confinement and a mixture of two fuels – deuterium and tritium – there are numerous variations in fuels and confinement methods. US researchers at the National Ignition Facility (NIF) use inertial confinement, and in 2022, for the first time, they achieved ignition: a net energy gain from a fusion reaction, though not nearly enough to account for the electricity demand of operating their equipment.

Nuclear fusion research has so far relied on purpose-built, state-funded research facilities such as JET and NIF. A next generation facility – the result of an international cooperation project called ITER – is being built in southern France. The EU is funding 45 % of the project, which is set to produce its first plasma in 2025 and start full operation in 2035. Once results are in, ITER is to be followed by a prototype plant with a capacity of 1 GW – powerful enough to cover half of Berlin’s electricity consumption in 2022 – to demonstrate operational viability. However, according to the generally accepted timetable for this pathway, fusion energy will not be on the grid until long after 2050, too late for the green transition.

Nevertheless, some private companies, such as Commonwealth Fusion Systems, are promising a working power plant before 2040. Although the probability of these companies meeting their ambitious goals should not be overstated, they are using the insights generated by JET to improve on the formula in a number of ways, such as using high-end magnets. Should one of them achieve a breakthrough – that is, a self-sustaining fusion reaction with a significant net energy gain – a fusion power plant might be able to feed electricity into the electricity grid much sooner than currently predicted.

Potential impacts and developments

Once the scientific and engineering challenges are overcome, the construction of the first fusion power plants can start. In this scenario, the availability of raw materials, fuels, and qualified workers would represent hard constraints on scaling up the technology. Capital costs and regulations pose soft constraints. Building a fusion reactor requires rare earth elements such as neodymium for the magnets. These are already at a very high supply risk because of their use in wind turbines and electric vehicles, as well as the dominant role China plays in their extraction and processing. For fuel, ITER-style reactors require tritium, which is only commercially produced by nuclear power plants of the CANDU type, all of which will retire in the coming decades. In theory, fusion power plants should be able to ‘breed’ their own fuel supply, but this has not yet been achieved. Securing the initial amount to start the reaction will prove to be a ‘make or break’ criterion for the industry. While some approaches circumvent this problem by using a different fuel mix, most public and private funding goes to start-ups using deuterium and tritium, as the most efficient mix.

Building and operating a fusion power plant would require a large workforce of nuclear engineers, metal‑workers, and electricians. While these are well-paid jobs, the difficulty currently being experienced in France with staffing new conventional nuclear plants gives an idea of some of the problems a fusion power project would run into. Just like nuclear fission plants, which gain energy from splitting atoms, nuclear fusion plants will take a long time to plan and build. For a fission plant, construction normally takes 5 to 10 years; similar timeframes would apply to fusion plants. Depending on the tritium breeding rate of a future power plant, scaling up could take decades. On top of these hard constraints, soft constraints come into play. More specifically, the upfront capital costs of construction will presumably be very high. By way of comparison, recent fission plants have cost over €10 billion to build.

However, the rewards of achieving fusion power would be considerable. Proponents highlight the low carbon emissions, the availability of deuterium fuel extracted from sea water, and the small land-use footprint as advantages of fusion power. Though some radioactive waste is produced, it poses little danger given the small quantities and short half-life. The main promise is that fusion power will produce a constant supply of cheap electricity for the decarbonisation of industry, transport and heating. Furthermore, falling electricity prices might also enable other future technologies such as vertical agriculture, desalination – an energy intensive technology to provide water for agriculture and utilities – or even direct carbon capture and storage from the atmosphere. Although fusion power plants could provide a constant baseload of electricity, they would not be able to adjust quickly to fluctuating supply and demand.

Anticipatory policy-making

The EU has two major programmes in place in the field of fusion energy. One is its contribution to ITER, the other is the Euratom research and training programme. ITER, meaning ‘the way’ in Latin, will be the largest fusion reactor of its kind upon completion. The EU contribution to ITER is managed by Fusion for Energy, which is responsible to Euratom and its Member States. Over the 2014-2027 period, the EU will spend €8 billion on the project. The 2016 roadmap schedules the beginning of operations for 2025. In the same timeframe, €1.5 billion – close to half of Euratom’s research and training budget – will go to fusion research. These funds go to organisations such as Eurofusion, a consortium that works within the official fusion roadmap towards the success of fusion energy, for example by funding young researchers in fusion training and education. In this way, the EU is already addressing the workforce challenges that a commercial fusion project will bring. The Union is therefore taking a leading role in fusion research worldwide.

Implementing the proposed EU regulation on critical raw materials would significantly improve the security of supply of some elements that are crucial for any fusion reactor, such as rare earths and lithium. Appropriate safety regulations should take into account the far lower risks compared with fission plants. With regard to the high capital costs of a fusion power plant, some degree of state funding might be considered, since even scientists who are convinced of the feasibility of building a fusion power plant have been voicing concern about their profitability since the 1970s.

Even under the most optimistic scenario for developments in fusion energy research and development and in a favourable political environment, the hard constraints of tritium supply, construction times, and workforce availability make fusion energy a long-term prospect. Entering a future electricity market dominated by renewables, fusion plants will not be able to provide flexible electricity at times of peak demand. Their production costs will therefore be the decisive factor in market entry, determining whether they can provide baseline power to the grid at a price that can compete with renewables-charged energy storage options. Nevertheless, with a variety of actors pursuing a wide range of approaches to fusion, one of them might just find a solution to these problems.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘What if we could make nuclear fusion work?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Listen to podcast ‘What if we could make nuclear fusion work?’ on YouTube.

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Written by Aidan Christie.

Members head to Strasbourg for the last plenary session before the summer break, with a packed agenda. With just nine months left before the Parliament goes into electoral recess, ahead of the elections on 6-9 June next year, the urgency of business is stepping up, given the limited time left to find agreement on – often complex – legislative files.

On Monday afternoon, Members will launch the week’s deliberations with a joint debate covering a number of proposals from the ‘fit for 55’ package, along with two linked proposals on industrial emissions. The ‘fit for 55’ package is all about adapting EU law and policies in order to meet the legally binding target, set in the European Climate Law, of reducing greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55 % (from 1990 levels) by 2030. The Parliament and Council have been making steady progress in negotiating the various proposals since the package was launched in July 2021.

Three of the proposals to be debated have been agreed between Parliament and Council negotiators, and now need to be formally adopted. The proposed regulation on deployment of alternative fuels aims to speed up the installation of infrastructure and take-up of vehicles running on alternative fuels, such as electric and hydrogen-power, with targets for equipment to be installed at minimum intervals along main roads. The FuelEU Maritime proposal seeks to push the uptake of cleaner fuels for ships and reduce carbon emissions from seaborne transport – reducing gradually in coming to years to reach an 80 % cut by 2050. In addition, to using cleaner fuels en route, ships in port would have to connect to on-shore electrical power. The proposed revision of the Energy Efficiency Directive aims to speed up implementation of energy savings and promote renewable energy sources. The agreement would set a binding target of an 11.7 % reduction in final energy consumption by 2030. The public sector will have a specific target for reducing energy consumption, as well as the target of renovating 3 % of public buildings per year.

The linked proposals on the revision of the Industrial Emissions Directive seek to expand existing rules applying to large agro-industrial installations, to cover a broader range of installations, as well as promoting faster adoption of new less-polluting techniques to reduce emissions. Members will vote on the reports from the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI) with a view to setting the Parliament’s position for trilogue negotiations with the Council.

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Staying on the environmental theme, on Tuesday morning, Members are due to debate the proposed nature restoration regulation, which would establish a legal obligation on Member States to restore degraded ecosystems. During two voting sessions in the ENVI committee, Members took positions on hundreds of proposed amendments, but a tied vote meant that there was ultimately no majority in favour of the proposal as amended. Formally therefore, the committee is recommending that plenary reject the Commission’s proposal, but it is anticipated that large numbers of amendments will be tabled in plenary and the voting may again be very close.

Less controversially, on Tuesday, Members are due to vote on two other reports in the environmental field, with a view to setting Parliament’s position for trilogue talks. Again from ENVI, the report on the proposed regulation on ecodesign requirements for sustainable products aims at making products on the internal market more durable, reusable, reparable, upgradable, recyclable, and generally less harmful to the environment. From the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO), the report on the proposed revision of the Construction Products Regulation seeks to boost circular business models and make sustainable products the norm in the building sector.

Integrated circuits or ‘chips’ are fundamental to virtually every aspect of modern life, but Europe has become reliant on chips made elsewhere in the world. The EU chips act would strengthen the semiconductor ecosystem in Europe, bolstering Europe’s capacity to design and produce chips, and giving the Commission powers to implement emergency measures on the chips market if needed in crisis situations. On Tuesday morning, Members are due to consider final adoption of the text agreed in trilogue with the Council.

In the external relations field, on Tuesday afternoon, Members are scheduled to debate reports from the Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) on the Commission’s latest annual enlargement reports on progress in candidate countries, with Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina on the agenda this month. In both cases, the committee underlines the importance of continuing progress towards accession, and emphasises areas where the country concerned needs to step up its efforts. In the latter case, AFET denounces the recent increased inflammatory actions of the Republika Srpska leadership. Also on Tuesday afternoon, Parliament is due to debate recommendations drafted by the AFET committee on EU relations with the Palestinian Authority. The committee expresses concern at the mounting violence in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in recent months, and calls for an immediate end to all violence. Members also urge the Palestinian leadership to organise free and fair elections.

Media freedom and pluralism have come under growing threat in recent years, through increasing harassment of journalists, as well as human rights defenders and activists, with groundless or abusive lawsuits. Such lawsuits seek to silence those speaking out on legitimate matters of public interest, landing them with high costs for defending their freedom of expression. On Monday evening, Parliament is set to debate the report from the Committee on Legal Affairs (JURI) on the proposed directive on protection of journalists and human rights defenders from unfounded court cases with a view to setting its position for trilogue negotiations.

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Threats to freedom of speech come in various forms, and recent events have highlighted potential vulnerabilities to foreign interference and undue influence of Members of the European Parliament. The Special Committee on Foreign Interference and Disinformation (ING2) had its mandate extended to investigate shortcomings in Parliament’s rules on transparency, integrity, accountability and anti-corruption measures. Its recommendations on reforming the rules to protect Parliament’s integrity are set for debate on Wednesday afternoon.

The threats to European society from the coronavirus pandemic have now largely passed, but the Special Committee set up to evaluate the experiences of the crisis has aimed to ensure the EU is better prepared for any future major health threat. Parliament is due to debate the lessons learned from COVID-19 and recommendations for the future on Tuesday afternoon, with the COVI committee calling for action in four areas: a health union, democracy and fundamental rights, addressing social and economic impact, and global action.

A European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI) enables citizens to call for the Union to act in a given area, and once 1 million people, from at least 7 EU countries, sign up, the European Commission must respond. The ‘Save Cruelty Free Cosmetics – Commit to a Europe without animal testing‘ ECI has gained the required signatures, and its organisers presented their case in a hearing before the ENVI committee in May. The ECI is scheduled for debate in plenary on Monday evening, before the Commission presents its formal response.

Every year, after closing the financial year, the EU budget generally has a surplus, due to higher than expected revenue and underspending. Amending budget No 2/2023 will enter the surplus from 2022, amounting to €2.5 billion, as revenue in the 2023 budget, and Parliament is expected to vote on Tuesday to confirm this move.

The regular question time session with the Commission will focus this month on EU-Africa strategy, with Members having the opportunity to pose questions to the Commission on Tuesday afternoon on its plans for developing relations with African countries.

Finally, on Wednesday morning, Parliament is scheduled to debate the outcome of the European Council meeting of 29‑30 June 2023, where recent developments in the war against Ukraine and in Russia were discussed.

Agenda

• Ecodesign for sustainable products
• Revision of the Construction Products Regulation
• Revision of the Energy Efficiency Directive
• Alternative fuels infrastructure
• FuelEU Maritime – Sustainable maritime fuels
• Nature restoration regulation
• Revision of the industrial emissions directive
• Protection of journalists and human rights defenders from manifestly unfounded or abusive court proceedings (SLAPPs)
• Reforming rules to protect Parliament’s integrity
• 2022 report on Albania
• 2022 report on Bosnia and Herzegovina
• EU relations with the Palestinian Authority
• Amending budget No 2/2023: 2022 surplus
• Lessons learned from COVID-19 and recommendations for the future
• EU chips act
• Citizens’ initiative on animal testing

Written by Clément Evroux.

Antimicrobial resistance (the ability of a microorganism to survive in the presence of a medicine designed to inhibit or kill it) is threatening the capacity to prevent and cure infectious diseases. In the European Union, it causes an estimated 35 000 deaths per year, and places an annual financial burden of €1.1 billion on healthcare systems. In 2019, the World Health Organization declared antimicrobial resistance (AMR) to be one of the top 10 global public health threats facing humanity.

On 26 April 2023, the European Commission published a proposal for a Council recommendation on stepping up EU action to combat AMR. This proposal complements two other legislative proposals, together making up the EU pharmaceutical package. It provides for a holistic preparedness and response framework to curb AMR, through a One Health approach, ensuring the inclusion of human, animal and plant health, as well as their interactions with the environment. Three main priorities underpin the proposal: infection prevention, prudent use of antimicrobials (including the objective of reducing human consumption of antibiotics in the Union by 20 % by 2030), and research and development to ensure access to appropriate medical countermeasures.

The European Parliament adopted a resolution welcoming the proposal on 1 June. The Council of the EU adopted the recommendation on 13 June 2023.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Stepping up EU action to combat antimicrobial resistance: The ‘One Health’ approach‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

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Written by Andrés García and Clemens Weichert.

A recently published Panel for the Future of Science and Technology (STOA) study offers a bird’s eye perspective of the drivers for more strategic autonomy, the barriers that stand in the way, and how the European Union can work to overcome these barriers.

In the last few years, several events have threatened our way of life in Europe. The COVID‑19 pandemic and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine have shown how fragile our supply of energy, technical components, and basic commodities really is. This is why the European Parliament’s Panel for the Future of Science and Technology (STOA) commissioned a study on ‘A preparedness plan for Europe: Addressing food, energy and technological security‘.

The authors of the study, a group of researchers from Białystok University of Technology in Poland, brought 153 international experts together to answer these difficult questions on their respective fields. They covered not only the crucial matters of food and energy security, but also the supply of semiconductors used in computer chips and the security of European satellite communication. These four fields are obviously very important to European citizens. So what did the experts say?

Following a foresight approach, the researchers formulated several theses. Each took the form of a future scenario, such as, ‘The supply of semiconductors to strategic sectors of the EU countries will be ensured’. The respondents then assigned a significance score to each scenario, indicating how likely it is in their opinion, as well as the significance of the associated effects. They also gave a timescale for when the scenario may happen, from ‘by the end of 2025’ to ‘after 2050’, or maybe ‘never’. Lastly, they gave their opinions of what major barriers could arise, how Europe can overcome them, and which actors lawmakers must bring on board to ensure benefits while avoiding undesirable side effects.

The example above received the highest of all the significance scores, and the experts who participated in the exercise expect the supply of semiconductors to be secured no earlier than 2031, and not later than 2050. According to the respondents, Europe needs a circular economy with shorter and more secure international supply chains to secure the supply of semiconductors, although this is unlikely to happen within the next decade.

In the food and energy sectors, the respondents expect developments to happen much faster. The theses on food focused on increased European production of wheat, sunflower oil, and special fertilisers. Experts expect most of these developments to happen sometime before 2030, or at least in the first half of the 21st century. The EU should promote the use of advanced agricultural technology to achieve these goals they say, but an increase in droughts and floods might make this more difficult.

On energy, the timeline is even shorter. For the two most significant theses, more than 80 % of respondents agree that they will be implemented in the 2020s. Specifically, they postulate a more dynamic growth in the renewable energy sector and the building of energy interconnectors, such as power lines and hydrogen pipelines between EU Member States. The other energy theses touch on the topics of energy independence from Russia, an increased use of hydrogen gas, and more distributed energy production. However, especially for hydrogen, we still need to make a lot of technological progress before this becomes a realistic option.

While the experts rated the development of Europe’s satellite communications programme ‘Copernicus’ to be somewhat less significant, they still expect many new private and public applications to be found within the next few years.

The authors of the study received feedback on 21 theses. The responses came from a diverse set of experts from all over Europe, who work on a range of topics. In their conclusion, the authors emphasised the role of new technologies and continuing research in all fields. While climate change is the greatest threat to food security, energy autonomy depends mostly on strengthening connections within Europe – both politically as well as physically – in the form of power lines.

Read the full report and STOA options brief to find out more. The results of this analysis were presented by its authors to the STOA Panel at its meeting of 16 March 2023. The complete version of the study incorporates the ideas provided at the time by the STOA Panel Members through their suggestions and comments.

Your opinion counts for us. To let us know what you think, get in touch via stoa@europarl.europa.eu.

Written by Vitalba Crivello.

Expectations were high when the 2023 edition of the annual ESMH summer school for young media makers kicked off on 6 June at the European Parliament in Strasbourg. Some sixty young journalists, science communicators and students from EU countries filled the room with excitement about the nine thematic sessions of the five-day school programme, focusing on ‘Storytelling in science’ and culminating in two sessions at EYE2023.

The event offered young journalists an opportunity to reflect upon the complex task of reporting on scientific topics, meeting and networking with experts in science communication and journalism.

DAY 1: science stories in the current media landscape

Crafting science stories is indeed a challenging task, especially at times of crises and uncertainty.

As Christian Ehler (EPP, Germany), STOA Chair noted during his opening speech, the current media landscape presents big challenges for science journalism. To overcome them, the ESMH and STOA are encouraging young media-makers to research, look for and shape science stories capable of gaining and maintaining public trust at a time when misinformation is a prominent risk.

A discussion panel on the status of the current media landscape and the future challenges for science journalism followed. Thanks to a very active audience, the lively debate set the scene for the whole event.

DAY 2: trust How do we persuade the public to trust sound science news?

Thiswas the key question around which the three sessions on 7 June revolved.

The day started with a hands-on training run by Kai Kupferschmidt (Science reporter at Science magazine, Berlin), who engaged participants in an interactive discussion about how to define news and what makes something ‘newsworthy’.

The morning continued with a roundtable on how journalists can better understand their audience and gain their trust, with particular attention paid to the dynamics of the digital world.

The afternoon session carried the discussion on the role of trust in science news even further, by looking at the rationale behind science denialism and exploring solutions to help the public avoid falling into the misinformation trap.

DAY 3: storytelling and best practices for science journalism

Moving on, the 8 June session started with a masterclass on storytelling. Here, participants did a practical exercise and analysed two science stories, discussing how to engage with and retain the audience by using a narrative that would grip their emotions until a story’s conclusion. 

Then it was time for another discussion panel, where fact-checkers, journalists and researchers exchanged views on how a science journalist can ensure scientific accuracy while applying the storytelling technique.

Day 3 ended with a session on new tools for science journalism, notably with an eye on the possibilities and risks of generative AI and Chat GPT.

DAY 4: climate stories (at EYE2023)

On 9 June, the 60 young participants in the ESMH summer school mingled with the young people attending EYE2023, for two sessions on climate stories.

In the first panel, expert speakers from traditional and digital media discussed the effectiveness of storytelling in inspiring climate action, paying particular attention to approaching and understanding their audience.

Immediately after the panel, Youtuber Simon Clark and seasoned science journalist Alok Jha ran a masterclass on how to build a science story, observing the similarities and differences of creating a captivating story on social and traditional media.

DAY 5: EYE2023 and the future of science journalism

On 10 June, while the summer school’s participants were free to attend additional sessions at EYE2023, the ESMH team began to receive feedback on the 2023 ESMH summer school. As this was generally enthusiastic, the team will continue their work to offer young journalist further opportunities to learn and share.

As Kai Kupferschmidt said ‘Young journalists can count on proficiency with new tools, and social media provides them fresh perspectives that I think can contribute to improving the system that we have now. I think there is a huge opportunity there and I think there will be people who grasp it.’

Written by Ralf Drachenberg with José René Ernault.

EU leaders had a very full agenda for their June meeting. The war in Ukraine was again one of the focal points of the European Council, with EU leaders for the first time expressing readiness to contribute to a future ‘security guarantee’ to Ukraine. They also took stock of the Union’s efforts to bolster joint defence procurement, and acknowledged that ‘defence preparedness’ was key in the current security context. With the adoption of conclusions on China, the European Council chose to display unity and stress its political will to forge a common approach based on the concept of ‘de‑risking – not de-coupling from China’. As anticipated, migration became a very divisive point, with two countries, Hungary and Poland refusing to endorse joint conclusions, which were replaced by conclusions of the European Council President. In addition, EU leaders addressed a range of external relations topics, including the Western Balkans accession process, the situation in Kosovo, the Cyprus settlement and relations with Turkey following the re-election of President Erdogan, with the High Representative/VP and the Commission invited to report on the state of play. EU leaders also discussed relations with the Southern Neighbourhood, welcoming the partnership package with Tunisia, and prepared for the July 2023 EU-CELAC Summit aimed at renewing the EU partnership with Latin America, a priority for the incoming Spanish Council Presidency.

1.     General remarks

The meetings of EU Heads of State or Government started with an exchange of views with the NATO Secretary-General, Jens Stoltenberg, on EU-NATO cooperation and Euro-Atlantic security. That was followed by the address of the European Parliament’s President, Roberta Metsola, and a discussion with EU leaders focused on Ukraine, the MFF revision and migration. President Metsola also stressed that the EU needed to prepare for the next enlargement, which required reform. She also asked EU leaders to reflect on their position on the proposed changes for Parliamentary elections.

Worth noting is the breakfast meeting of a cross political party group of EU leaders (De Croo, Costa, Iohannis, Kristersson, Rutte, Sanchez, Scholz, Macron, Meloni, Morawiecki) that took place on the margins of the European Council, and discussed the ‘absorption capacity of the EU for new Member States and the EU’s necessary internal reforms in this regard.

2.     European Council meeting Ukraine

Once again, EU leaders underlined their unity and determination in support of Ukraine, with a particular focus on military support. The stark contrast between the unity at EU-level and the ‘cracks in the Putin system’ was underlined strongly in the discussions. While no conclusions were adopted on the recent Wagner mutiny, EU leaders discussed the situation in Russia, with some describing the country as weakened, but treated the episode as an internal Russian matter. That notwithstanding the Baltic leaders called for increased surveillance on the EU’s eastern borders with Belarus, where Wagner fighters are supposed to be relocated. Highlighting his distinct views, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban described the situation as being of ‘no major importance’.

Overall, four topics dominated the discussions. Ahead of NATO’s Vilnius summit, the question of security guarantees for Ukraine was a central issue in the discussion on Ukraine. EU leaders indicated their readiness ‘to contribute, together with partners, to future security commitments to Ukraine’. The views of the different EU leaders were however quite divergent in this respect, with some pushing for swift accession of Ukraine to NATO once the war is over, while others argued that Ukraine’s accession is something unrealistic or that other measures should be prioritised. As EU Member States have different security arrangements – most being NATO members but some being neutral, the respect for specific national security considerations was reiterated in the conclusions.

Financing the reconstruction, and the use of Russian frozen assets to that end, was the second element of the discussion. Some EU leaders urged speeding up work on identifying possible solutions for using these assets, stressing that the funds needed for the reconstruction of Ukraine should not be the burden of European taxpayers. The ECB and EU countries such as Germany have shown more reluctance towards that approach, fearing that such a decision could lower the trust of foreign states wishing to store assets in Europe. Belgium Prime Minister Alexander De Croo also stated that the method used should not undermine financial security in the EU.

Russia’s accountability was the third issue discussed, with EU leaders welcoming the start of the support operations of the International Centre for the Prosecution of the Crime of Aggression. The fourth aspect was the condemnation of the military support provided by Belarus to Russia, notably allowing Russian armed forces to use its territory (as well as the support from Iran).

In addition, EU leaders condemned the destruction of the Kakhova dam, welcomed the 11th sanctions package, underlined their active diplomatic efforts in support of Ukraine’s Peace Formula and for the organisation of the Copenhagen peace conference in July, and discussed the EU path of Ukraine and Moldova. As expected, Volodymyr Zelenskyy addressed EU leaders by video-link, updating them on the situation on the battlefield and stressing Ukraine’s readiness to start accession negotiations.

Finally, in a context of strong criticism of the deal reached between the Commission and five Member States affected by the import of Ukrainian agriculture products , the European Council did address food security, expressing concern at the slowdown of the Black Sea Grain Initiative.

Main message of the President of the European Parliament: President Metsola expressed the European Parliament’s desire that the accession negotiations with Ukraine should be opened by the end of the year. Georgia’s European path was also mentioned in the conclusions.

Security and defence

President Michel stressed that ‘strong allies make strong Alliances’. He underlined that the efforts undertaken in the EU to develop EU defence capabilities and bolster joint defence procurement also contributed to strengthening NATO, putting emphasis on the complementarity between the two institutions. As for Jens Stoltenberg, he stressed the importance of the EU-NATO strategic partnership in the current context of war in Europe, recalling the work undertaken on resilience and critical infrastructure. The Estonian Prime Minister, Kaja Kallas, insisted that Europeans needed to further bolster defence investments, and warned that lack of political will could prove dangerous, recalling that, between 1999 and 2021, European defence investments had increased by 19.7 %, whilst the increase had reached 65.7 % in the US, 292 % in Russia and 595 % in China in the same period. The Swedish Prime Minister, Ulf Kristersson, whose country is still waiting to join the Alliance, stressed that the ‘Vilnius Summit is a very good occasion for decision-making’.

The European Peace Facility envelope was increased by €3.5 billion to meet ‘the global geographical scope’ of the instrument, reaching a total of €12 billion. Besides welcoming this development, EU leaders took stock of the implementation of the Strategic Compass. They also welcomed the new Civilian CSDP Compact and praised efforts to strengthen cyber-defence.

Main message of the President of the European Parliament: President Metsola stressed that a new security architecture was required, underlining that the EU and NATO needed to ‘complement each other’, and avoid duplication and competition. She underlined the importance of continuing to boost joint defence procurement, urging the adoption of EDIRPA and ASAP.

Migration

Discussions on migration were difficult and lengthy. As expected, Poland and Hungary expressed their disagreement with both the content and the procedure for the adoption of the Council common position on two key pieces of legislation regulating the internal dimension of migration. Although the use of use of qualified majority voting (QMV) fully complied with the Treaty, the two countries consider that consensus should apply to migration issues. They even attempted to have a joint statement adopted providing for decision-making by consensus on migration issues in future. Dutch Prime Minister, Mark Rutte, indicated that, due to their ‘anger’ on the matter, Poland and Hungary had opposed the adoption of European Council conclusions on migration – even on the external dimension aspect on which they actually agree with the EU position. The views of the other EU leaders were summed up by Xavier Bettel, Luxembourg’s Prime Minister, who stated that ‘I prefer to have no conclusions than bad conclusions. If it is to have a breach of Treaties, it is not acceptable’. In the end, there were only conclusions by the President of the European Council on the external dimension of migration, which largely reflect the draft conclusions with the addition of a reference to the position of Poland and Hungary.

Another highly debated aspect was the use of ‘innovative measures‘, referring notably to the use of disembarkation centres (i.e. centres outside the EU where a first screening of asylum applications would be carried out), a proposal supported by Denmark and Austria, but strongly rejected by other Member States such as Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands.

Charles Michel underlined the significant progress achieved on migration measures since the European Council’s February 2023 meeting, pointing in particular to closer EU-Tunisia cooperation. Migration has clearly returned to being a ‘rolling agenda’ topic at European Council meetings, and Michel confirmed that the topic would be on the agenda of the next and subsequent meetings.

Main message of the President of the European Parliament: Roberta Metsola underlined that ‘migration cannot be instrumentalised’ and that the co-legislators needed to find agreement on the migration package before the European elections in June 2024. For her, the starting position in any debate on migration must always be that no human being should die trying to reach Europe.

China

For the first time since 2020, the European Council adopted conclusions on China, indicating political will to overcome divisions and forge a common approach to the relationship, adapted to the current strategic environment. As underlined by President von der Leyen, there was ‘broad consensus on the concept of “de-risking – not de-coupling from China” ‘, a country which is ‘simultaneously a partner, a competitor and a systemic rival’. The EU would ‘continue to engage with China … but following a European approach based on our interests and on our values’. Thus, the approach implies that the EU would carry out both ‘economic de-risking’ and ‘diplomatic de-risking’, which in terms of EU policy towards China will translate at three levels. Economically, first, the relationship with China needs to be re-balanced and based on reciprocity. Following the principle set in Versailles in 2022, the EU will seek to reduce its ‘critical dependencies’ and economic vulnerabilities whilst respecting its interests. President von der Leyen mentioned in particular the trade deficit, which had tripled over the past ten years or the unfair practices faced by EU companies in accessing the Chinese market. However, analysts warned that, in practice, ‘de-risking’ and ‘not decoupling’ were far from complementary. The Prime Minister of Latvia, Krišjānis Karinš, summed up the EU’s dilemma by stressing the need to reduce dependencies rapidly to avoid later problems.

Defending human rights, democratic values and fundamental principles constitute the second level, with EU leaders expressing support for efforts to address these issues. They welcomed the renewal of the Human Rights dialogue with China, whilst expressing concern about the situation in Tibet and Xinjiang, as well as the (lack of) respect of engagements towards Hong Kong.

Third, the European Council underlined China’s special responsibility in upholding the international order as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, and stressed the need to engage with China on global issues such as health, climate change and security. In that context, it called on China ‘to press Russia’ to end its war and to ‘unconditionally withdraw’ from Ukraine. So far, China has refrained from condemning Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine, abstaining or voting against in the various resolutions the UN has adopted on Ukraine and/or Russia since the outbreak of the war. EU leaders also recalled the global strategic importance of the East and South China Seas, expressing concern over ‘growing tensions in the Taiwan Strait’; they also stressed that the EU opposed revisionism, and confirmed its ‘One China policy’.

Economy

EU leaders only briefly discussed economic issues, underlining the need to build European competitiveness on the fundamental asset of the European internal market. For that purpose, they decided to put in place a high-level committee to identify additional steps to strengthen the EU internal market, and tasked the Commission with the preparation of two reports for their meeting in March 2024 – an independent report on the future of the single market and the first progress report on the EU’s competitiveness, productivity and growth. In that context, EU leaders called for demographic challenges – Europe is an ageing continent with a median age of 44.4 years and low fertility rates – to be addressed, with a toolbox aimed at lessening the impact on competitiveness.

EU leaders also had a first exchange of views on the economic security concept, following the publication of the strategy. The wording of the conclusions is cautious, calling for ‘proportionate, precise and targeted answers to security challenges on the basis of a risk assessment’.

Multiannual Financial Framework

EU leaders did not open discussions on the sensitive and divisive subject of the revision of the Multiannual Financial Framework – just ‘taking note’ of the Commission proposal.

Main message of the President of the European Parliament: Focusing a lot on this topic, President Metsola stressed that ‘we need to put our money where our mouth is’ and adapt the EU’s long term budget, if Europe wants to address adequately all the challenges it faces.

EU-priorities 2024-2029

In a letter sent ahead of the meeting, President Michel proposed a process for the shaping of the EU’s next strategic priorities, and suggested four (plus one ) priority areas i) the EU’s economic and social base; ii) the energy challenge; iii) security and defence capabilities; and iv) engagement worldwide. Migration would also be a core topic. Discussion would kick off under the Spanish Presidency with the aim of finalising during the Belgian one in the first half of 2024.

Read this briefing on ‘Outcome of the European Council meeting of 29-30 June 2023‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Laurence Amand-Eeckhout (1st edition).

On 28 September 2022, the European Commission proposed a revision of the 2009 Directive on the protection of workers from the risk of exposure to asbestos. The aim of the proposal is to lower the occupational exposure limit (OEL) value, which is mandatory in all Member States. According to the proposal, the OEL would be reduced from 0.1 fibres/cm³ to 0.01 fibres/cm³, and not to a lower limit as wished by the European Parliament and some European trade unions. Despite the total ban on the use of asbestos in the EU, exposure to this carcinogenic fibre, which is still present in millions of buildings, kills more than 70 000 people a year in Europe.

The Committee on Employment and Social Affairs adopted its report on the proposal on 26 April 2023. The mandate to enter trilogues was endorsed by the plenary the following month. On 27 June 2023, the Council and the European Parliament reached a provisional agreement, which now needs to be confirmed, and formally adopted by the two co-legislators

Versions

• June 2023: Protection of workers from asbestos at work (1st edition)

Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2009/148/EC on the protection of workers from the risks related to exposure to asbestos at workCommittee responsible:Employment and Social Affairs (EMPL)COM(2022) 489
28.9.2022Rapporteur:Véronique Trillet-Lenoir (Renew, France)2022/0298(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Cindy Franssen (EPP, Belgium)
Marianne Vind (S&D, Denmark)
Sara Matthieu (Greens/EFA, Belgium)
Joanna Kopcinska (ECR, Poland)
Elena Lizzi (ID, Italy)
Nikolaj Villumsen (The Left, DenmarkOrdinary legislative procedure
(COD) (Parliament and Council
on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’)Next steps expected: Final first-reading vote in plenary

Written by Sebastian Clapp.

Russia’s war on Ukraine has laid bare the challenges that the European defence industry faces as it tries to meet increased demand and ramp up production in the wake of a fundamentally changed security environment in Europe. The European defence industry comprises a number of large multinational companies, mid-caps and over 2 000 small and medium-sized enterprises. It faces a multitude of challenges, such as decades of under-investment, fragmentation, lack of supply of critical raw materials and semiconductors, and a lack of manufacturing capability.

The EU and its Member States have taken several steps to reinforce the European defence industry, especially since the start of Russia’s war on Ukraine: Member States have significantly boosted their defence budgets, the combined total of which is set to reach €290 billion a year in 2025; the European Defence Fund is investing in research and capability development projects and has achieved very positive results so far; and Permanent Structured Cooperation is providing the legal framework and binding commitments for important progress in collaborative defence. The EU has also broken taboos by proposing a joint defence procurement instrument (European Defence Industry Reinforcement through Common Procurement Act) and an initiative to ramp up ammunition production (Act in Support of Ammunition Production), as part of a three-track proposal to support Ukraine’s needs for ammunition (deliver ammunition from existing stocks, jointly procure from industry, and support the ramping up of production).

Additionally, the European Peace Facility, most known for being used to supply Ukraine with lethal weapons, can be used to procure defence materiel from the European defence industry, further boosting its capacity. The European Chips Act and Critical Raw Materials Act will also be leveraged to benefit the European defence industry to ensure that it has all the necessary supplies to tackle the substantially increased demand for its products. These signals have led the industry to take the first steps to ramp up its production capacity.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Reinforcing the European defence industry‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Tim Peters.

Ukraine’s recovery and EU accession will be a defining project of the European Union in the 2020s. The costs will be massive. A regularly quoted number for the cost of recovery is €383 billion, based on a damage assessment carried out by the World Bank. However, until Ukraine has liberated all territories temporarily occupied by Russia, that number will rise further.

The EU and its Member States, together as ‘Team Europe’, have committed approximately €72 billion in financial, military and humanitarian support for Ukraine and its people, including for Ukrainian refugees in the EU, as of June 2023. On top of that comes an additional €50 billion for the EU’s Ukraine Facility proposed by the European Commission on 20 June 2023 ahead of the Ukraine Recovery Conference in London the following day. Considering the large amounts of EU money involved, full democratic scrutiny of the spending by the European Parliament and effective budgetary control measures are crucial.

Not all of the recovery can and will be financed by the public sector. Ukraine – with the help of the EU and other partners – has to create the right environment for private investment as fast as possible. An overall security guarantee for Ukraine and financial guarantees for early private investments are as essential as strengthening of the rule of law through more transparency, judicial reform and anti-corruption measures.

A democratic Ukraine based on the rule of law and with a vibrant market economy would serve as a beacon of freedom and prosperity, and could thus act as a successful catalyst for democratic change in the whole region.

Read the complete in-depth analysis on ‘Financing Ukraine’s recovery: Consequences for the EU budget and budgetary control, and principles for success‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Development of margins for the 2024 budget year (commitments, € million) Overall margins 2021-2027, (commitments, € million) Financial and humanitarian aid for Ukraine (figures pre-2023 Ukraine Recovery Conference in London and excluding military aid) Team Europe financial, humanitarian and military support for Ukraine totals €72 billion before the mid-term revision of the multiannual financial framework and the 2023 Ukraine Recovery Conference in London

Written by Marcin Grajewski.

Leaders of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) will meet in Vilnius on 11-12 July against the backdrop of a complex and volatile security environment. Russia’s war on Ukraine, and the latter country’s future membership of the military alliance will dominate the annual summit, according to many public statements. The meeting will aim to send a strong signal of support for Ukraine, reiterating NATO’s open door policy towards the country’s membership, increasing military aid, pledging to make the Ukrainian military more interoperable with NATO forces and, possibly, outlining future security guarantees for Kyiv.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy is seeking a commitment that his country will join NATO as soon as the war is over, but only some Allies support that request, while others are more cautious. NATO leaders will discuss creating a new NATO-Ukraine Council, which would boost relations between the two, compared with the current NATO-Ukraine commission. NATO will also address strengthening its eastern flank, updating the Alliance’s current plans to defend the region from possible Russian aggression.

NATO will also re-examine its Strategic Concept adopted last year in Madrid, discuss security challenges posed by China, and the required increases in the member states’ defence spending. Allies are expected to press Türkiye to drop its opposition to Sweden’s membership of NATO. NATO countries hope to find a replacement for, or prolong the term of, Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg, who is formally due to step down in September.

This note gathers links to the recent publications and commentaries from many international think tanks on the NATO summit and related issues. Earlier analyses of Russia’s war on Ukraine can be found in a previous edition of the ‘What Think Tanks are Thinking’ series.

European public opinion remains supportive of Ukraine
Bruegel, June 2023

Ukraine needs a trio of security guarantees, EU accession, and reconstruction
Carnegie Europe, June 2023

Giving Ukraine NATO membership is the best way to prevent world war III in Europe
Centre for European Reform, June 2023

Ukraine’s progress towards NATO membership: Going from Bucharest to Vilnius without moving?
Centre for European Reform, June 2023

Here are five difficult issues for the NATO summit
Chatham House, June 2023

Ukraine’s recovery depends on security guarantees
Chatham House, June 2023

NATO stands ready to prevent escalation of the war in Ukraine
Egmont, June 2023

Compromise at Vilnius: Ukraine’s path to NATO membership
European Council on Foreign Relations, June 2023

Countdown until the NATO Vilnius Summit: Priorities and expectations in 2023
European Policy Centre, June 2023

Memo to NATO’s future Secretary General
European Policy Centre, June 2023

What security guarantees for Ukraine?
Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, June 2023

Ukraine’s reconstruction will depend on security guarantees
International Institute for Security Studies, June 2023

The war in Ukraine and Europe’s geopolitical awakening
Institut des relations internationales et stratégiques, June 2023

Not allowing Ukraine into NATO and the EU is risky
Wilson Center, June 2023

Backstopping Ukraine’s long-term security: Toward an Atlantic-Asian security community
Brookings Institution, May 2023

High time for Sweden’s NATO membership
Egmont, May 2023

Forging the future of NATO
Heritage Foundation, May 2023

Indo-Pacific cooperation with European NATO countries: Security partnership initiatives and perspectives
Eastern European Studies Centre, May 2023

Cooperation in an era of strategic competition: EU-NATO relations in the context of war and rivalry
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, May 2023

Defining success for NATO’s Vilnius summit: A primer
Atlantic Council, April 2023

Arming Ukraine without crossing Russia’s red lines
Brookings Institution, April 2023

Why Ukraine needs security guarantees
Carnegie Europe, April 2023

Finland becomes NATO’s thirty-first member state
Centre for Eastern Studies, April 2023

What is NATO?
Council on Foreign Relations, April 2023

Franco-German cooperation will be crucial for the future of European security
Centre for European Policy Studies, April 2023

Finland brings great value to NATO’s future deterrence
Chatham House, April 2023

Advancing military mobility in Europe: An uphill battle
European Policy Centre, April 2023

Could NATO membership be a game-changer for the Western Balkans engagement with China?
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, April 2023

A treaty change for the European Defence Union
Istituto Affari Internazionali, April 2023

Strengthening deterrence a priority for NATO at the Vilnius Summit
Polish Institute for International Affairs, April 2023

Finland Joins NATO, Sweden’s accession remains uncertain
Rand Corporation, April 2023

War, peace, and the international system after Ukraine
Brookings institution, March 2023

One step back, two steps forward: The EU, NATO and emerging and disruptive technologies
Brussels School of Governance, March 2023

Is Hungary a reliable EU and NATO member?
Carnegie Europe, March 2023

NATO can learn from Ukraine’s military innovation
Chatham House, March 2023

No longer off the radar: NATO‘s enlargement to the north and its implications for the Baltic states
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, March 2023

NATO enlargement: The future of the open-door policy
GLOBSEC, March 2023

The U.S. and its allies must understand and respond to Russia’s nuclear threats
Heritage Foundation, March 2023

United States and NATO versus BRICS and SCO
Institut Européen des Relations Internationales, March 2023

The war against Ukraine and Russia’s position in Europe’s security order
Istituto Affari Internazionali, March 2023

Space: Exploring NATO’s final frontier
Istituto Affari Internazionali, March 2023

Evaluating NATO Enlargement: From Cold War Victory to the Russia-Ukraine War
Brookings Institution, February 2023

NATO and the invasion, one year on
Centre for International and Strategic Studies, February 2023

Baltic defence: Why NATO should persuade Turkey to admit Sweden
European Council on Foreign Relations, February 2023

How to beat Russia: What armed forces in NATO should learn from Ukraine’s homeland defense
GLOBSEC, February 2023

Liberté, Union européenne, OTAN: La société ukrainienne a fait son choix
Institut français des relations internationales, February 2023

Défense européenne, OTAN, Ukraine : quelques points sur quelques «i»
Institut Jacques Delors, February 2023

Next level partnership: Bolstering EU_NATO cooperation to counter hybrid threats in the western Balkans
European Union Institute for Strategic Studies, February 2023

The War against Ukraine and its lessons for NATO militaries: Food for thought
Istituto Affari Internazionali, February 2023

Back to the roots: Nato returns to territorial defence in Europe Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, February 2023

Read this briefing on ‘NATO’s July summit in Vilnius‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clemens Weichert with António Vale.

In a fragmented and shifting geopolitical landscape, it is important to have partners you can trust, in research as well as in politics. At the sixth joint conference of the European Parliament’s Panel for the Future of Science and Technology (STOA) and the Kyoto-based Science and Technology in Society forum (STS forum) in Brussels, policy leaders and researchers from Europe and Japan underlined that they intend not only to continue, but to deepen cooperation in the research field. The discussion between senior officials and scientists focused on international research cooperation, with a special emphasis on the planned Horizon Europe association agreement with Japan, which would make the East Asian country one of the first associates outside Europe’s immediate neighbourhood.

In their introductions, STOA Chair Christian Ehler (EPP, Germany) and Chairman of the STS forum Komiyama Hiroshi praised the continued cooperation between their respective organisations, manifested in reciprocal visits, including this event and the planned STOA mission to the STS forum‘s 20th Annual Meeting later in 2023. Mr Ehler underlined that Europe and Japan share common values: their cooperation is founded on being open, democratic societies in an increasingly authoritarian world. Mr Komiyama reflected on the pitfalls and opportunities of international cooperation and the use of artificial intelligence (AI) in research. While AI might help bridge language and cultural gaps between researchers, he said, it must be carefully employed due to the factual errors and inaccuracies that sometimes appear in the output of large language models.

The politics of research cooperation

The first panel of the event dealt with the policy dimension of international research cooperation, chaired by STOA Vice Chair Ivars Ijabs (Renew, Latvia), who noted that researchers cooperate on their own all the time. He explained that politics can act as a constraint, for example for geopolitical reasons, or it can act as an enabling and helping force. In the case of Europe and Japan, initiatives such as association through Horizon Europe make it easier to bring people together.

Signe Ratso, the official responsible for international Horizon Europe cooperation at the European Commission, underlined this point. As likeminded partners, Japan and the EU can tackle today’s big challenges together, from the green transition to digitalisation and new ways to produce hydrogen. Ms Ratso also expressed her hope that together, they could ensure the research sector takes an active role in rebuilding Ukraine once the war is over. Her counterpart in the Japanese government Kiyoura Takashi, Deputy Director General of Science and Technology, drew parallels to a recent meeting of the G7 science ministers in Sendai, Japan, where they listed closer international cooperation as one of their top three priorities. As part of a larger science policy portfolio, Japan has recently opened a €360 million fund for research cooperation and talent mobility.

Emphasising the common challenges facing Japan and Europe, STOA Panel member Lina Gálvez Muñoz (S&D, Spain) noted these include not only climate change but also the less frequently mentioned demographic challenge of an ageing population. Shared values, such as gender equality, underpin the cooperation with Japan, and she hailed the recent signing of the Japan-EU digital partnership.

Salvatore Arico, CEO of the International Science Council, spoke about the relationship between science and policy, which ought to be based on the principles of freedom and responsibility. Science, he explained, needs a strong and enabling political framework. Providing in turn options to policy-makers, by identifying what we can and cannot do.

How does international science work?

After a Q&A session and a short break, STOA panel member Pernille Weiss (EPP, Denmark) introduced the second panel of the afternoon. This took an in-depth look at the experiences and the know-how among researchers who engage in international cooperation. First to speak was Thomas Pichler, a physicist from the University of Vienna who coordinates an European Research Council (ERC) synergy project with partners in Italy, Germany, and Japan. Research cooperation, he said, builds trust and might grow into deeper collaboration if the timeframe allows for continuous feedback and the full exploration of possible synergies. The ERC grant allows for this, and including Japanese partners will become even easier once the association agreement has been signed.

RIKEN’s Executive Director Naka Makiko went on to specify four conditions for successful research cooperation: excellence in research on both sides; funding; young, eager researchers who are willing to move to a different country for several years; and the time to develop a project.

Enrico Di Pietro is a nuclear fusion expert with experience in ITER and JT-60SA, two large-scale research cooperation projects in which Japan and Europe participate. He shared his unique insights into the challenges posed by such a multi-billion-euro, decades-long project. The lessons he drew about integrated leadership, in-kind payments and intercultural teambuilding may be applied to future projects. Continuing the theme of project management, NEDO’s representative in Europe Imazato Kazuyuki made three points. It is important, he said, to align the interests of the political, scientific, and the business side of any research project to get it off the ground. It is then crucial not to lose momentum, by defining milestones and providing incentives to reach them in time; and above all, building trust between partners is fundamental for cooperation. The final speaker, Marie‑Beatrice Madec from SOLVAY, agreed: the time and energy project management requires should never be underestimated. Part of the task is to enable researchers to share time and knowledge to allow them to bridge cultural and professional gaps.

Where do we go from here?

The event closed with a summary of the event. Yamazaki Takuya from JETRO Brussels highlighted the role of fundamental research in advancing science, which requires thinking outside of the box. Bringing researchers together fosters an atmosphere of cooperation, not competition, from which both public and private institutions can profit.

European Parliament Vice-President for STOA Marc Angel (S&D, Luxembourg) pointed out that a quarter of all science papers today are the product of international cooperation. Small countries and very big projects, such as ITER, stand to profit most from such cooperation, as long as the countries involved continue to be on good terms. He highlighted Horizon Europe as a great success in boosting cooperation that will continue to improve by adding new associated countries such as Japan. Today’s event, he added, was itself an example of the growing scientific partnership between Europe and Japan.

The final speaker Kaji Misako, from the Japanese Foreign Ministry, confirmed the Japanese government’s commitment to this partnership, adding that science and technology play an increasingly important role in today’s diplomacy. Together, Japan and Europe could work towards the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals by intensifying their research efforts, as was agreed during the Japanese G7 presidency this year.

The conference underlined the close, values-based relationship between Japan and Europe, as well as the will on both sides to continue fostering research cooperation. With Japan set to become a Horizon Europe associate country, existing ties will become stronger, both in terms of increased mobility of scientists as well as cooperation on larger projects.

A webstream of the event is available on our website.

Your opinion counts for us! To let us know what you think, get in touch via and follow us on Twitter at @EP_ScienceTech.

• © European Union 2023 – Source: EP
• © European Union 2023 – Source: EP
• © European Union 2023 – Source: EP
• © European Union 2023 – Source: EP
• © European Union 2023 – Source: EP
• © European Union 2023 – Source: EP
• © European Union 2023 – Source: EP
• © European Union 2023 – Source: EP

Written by Ralf Drachenberg and Annastiina Papunen with José René Ernault.

The last regular European Council meeting before the summer break will address a wide range of topics, from Russia’s war in Ukraine, the economic situation and a strategic debate on China, to security, defence and migration. In the context of Ukraine, EU leaders will reconfirm the EU’s multidimensional support for the country, with a specific focus on military assistance, and welcome the agreement on the 11th package of sanctions on Russia. On the economic situation, EU leaders are expected to discuss industrial policy, the EU’s long-term competitiveness – including the potential of and challenges linked with artificial intelligence – and EU resilience and economic security. The proposed targeted revision of the 2021-2027 multiannual financial framework may also come up. EU leaders will attempt to bring positions closer on the divisive topic of EU relations with China. Finally, as a result of recent developments (notably the dramatic sinking of a migrant ship and growing opposition to the asylum agreement), migration may move higher up the agenda.

1.     General aspects

While the Indicative Leaders’ Agenda 2023 had announced discussions on Ukraine, the EU economy, security and defence and preparations for the EU-CELAC summit, the meeting agenda adds a strategic discussion on China, migration and the process towards the 2024‑2029 Strategic Agenda.

The membership of the European Council will be slightly changed at the29-30 June meeting, as the new prime ministers of Finland, Petteri Orpo, Slovakia, Ľudovít Ódor, and Bulgaria, Nikolai Denkov, will be participating for the first time.

2.     European Council meeting Ukraine

EU leaders are likely to reaffirm their unity in support of Ukraine, and their backing of the Ukrainian Peace Formula, towards a just and lasting peace respecting Ukraine’s sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity within the internationally recognised borders. Volodymyr Zelenskyy will most probably address the European Council once again, enabling EU leaders to exchange on progress made on the Ukrainian President’s 10-point peace plan, while expressing support for a peace summit that Denmark is willing to host in July 2023.

The EU’s political, humanitarian and military aid for Ukraine will again be at the centre of the debate. Through the EU civil protection mechanism, the Union has already delivered 89 000 tonnes of humanitarian assistance since the outbreak of the war. Ukraine launched its counter-offensive in early June 2023 and, given the heavy fighting on the ground and the military equipment needs of the Ukrainian armed forces, military assistance is likely to be at the centre of the debate once again.

In light of the recent destruction of the Nova Kakhova dam, European Council President Charles Michel has stressed that the issue will be raised, and more assistance provided for the flooded areas. Most EU leaders have already condemned the attack and expressed their support for Ukraine in this context.

As regards Russia’s accountability for its unjustified aggression towards Ukraine, EU leaders are expected to welcome the establishment of the Register of damage caused by the aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine. The EU and more than 40 countries worldwide, including all EU countries except Hungary and Bulgaria, have signed the register. EU leaders are also expected to take stock of progress made by the Council’s Ad Hoc Working Party on developing legal options allowing for the use of Russia’s frozen assets to support Ukraine’s reconstruction.

EU leaders are expected to welcome the agreement on the 11th sanctions package. It had been temporarily stalled owing to concerns on the part of Greece and Hungary regarding the inclusion of a number of Greek shipping firms and the Hungarian OTP bank among ‘international sponsors of war’ on a list drawn up by Kyiv authorities. At the same time, some countries, notably Poland and the Baltic States, had been trying to push for the deepening of the sanctions, notably by targeting Russian diamond and natural gas imports, and curbing nuclear energy cooperation. The 11th sanctions package seeks to combat the circumvention of sanctions, notably by banning goods exports to third countries suspected of circumventing sanctions. However, Polish authorities have stressed that the biggest loophole in the sanctions regime currently is linked to the lack of sanctions on Belarus.

Following the recent plea by Zelenskyy and Maia Sandu, President of Moldova, in favour of opening EU accession negotiations by the end of 2023, EU leaders may also consider the EU accession path of the two countries. In addition, they will most likely welcome the Civilian EU Partnership Mission and the support package for Moldova adopted by the Commission on 31 May 2023, following up on a request formulated by the European Council in March 2023.

Economic

The economic situation has been a recurring agenda point at recent European Council meetings owing to the high economic impact of Russia’s war on Ukraine. In that context, ensuring Europe’s long-term competitiveness, completing the single market, especially in digital and services, and ensuring a modern industrial policy, are high on the priority list. In June, EU leaders are expected to call for an independent high-level report on the future of the single market and for a first regular progress report on competitiveness, both to be presented in March 2024. They may also call for the adoption of key pieces of legislation (e.g. the net zero industry act, the critical raw materials act and the artificial intelligence (AI) act) before the 2024 European elections. As usual in June, the European Council will be called upon to endorse the country-specific recommendations and conclude this year’s European Semester cycle.

Following the publication by the European Commission of a European economic strategy on 20 June, the concept of economic security is likely to attract EU leaders’ attention. Linked with EU efforts to enhance strategic autonomy, the strategy seeks to strengthen the EU’s economic base, hedging against risks and security challenges caused by today’s complex geopolitical situation, and working with the ‘broadest possible range of countries’. Among the risks mentioned are risks to supply chains, critical infrastructure and technology security and the risk of economic coercion. Not all Member States seem, however, to agree on the risks presented, or on the need for new measures to counter them. According to some reports, the EU Member States most worried are those championing free trade.

The potential contribution of AI to EU competitiveness as well as the challenges associated with it, notably illustrated by the rapid development of tools such as ChatGPT, will be at the centre of EU leaders’ attention. Tech experts as well as Members of the European Parliament preparing the AI act have been raising concerns, pointing out that AI-based new tools could greatly impact our future – possibly in adverse ways – if left unchecked. In May, the G7 meeting initiated the ‘Hiroshima AI process‘ to ‘immediately take stock of the opportunities and challenges of generative AI, which is increasingly prominent across countries and sectors’. EU leaders are therefore expected to urge rapid progress on the AI act, while ensuring that European values are featured in global AI standards. Although the AI Act file has now entered the interinstitutional negotiation phase, there are still a number of unresolved issues. These include the question of whether to fully ban facial recognition or rather allow some exceptions, for instance in the case of the search for a missing child. These sensitive topics divide both political groups in the European Parliament and Member States.

Finally, EU leaders may call for work on the economic governance review to be accelerated so as to conclude the file by the end of the year. The Commission proposals were met with general satisfaction in many Member States; Germany is however asking for stricter debt reduction targets.

Multiannual financial framework

As a result of unforeseen additional financial needs arising from multiple crises (e.g. the COVID‑19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine), on 20 June 2023, the Commission proposed a targeted revision of the 2021-2027 multiannual financial framework (MFF) – see EPRS briefing. EU leaders are not likely to discuss the proposed spending increase at their June meeting but may invite the Council to take work forward without delay. However, the discussion among Member States is expected to be particularly difficult, as a number of them, notably the budget hardliners such as Germany and the Netherlands are already indicating their opposition to an increase in the MFF ceiling. The European Parliament, meanwhile, already called for the revision and upscaling of the MFF in December 2022.

Security and defence

EU leaders will take stock of the implementation of their earlier conclusions on security and defence and, in particular, of the Versailles Declaration, in which they had called for the joint procurement of defence capabilities and for the European defence industry to be bolstered. Two short-term and complementary instruments to boost joint defence procurement are currently being examined by the co-legislators: the European defence industry reinforcement through common procurement act (EDIRPA) and the act in support of ammunition production (ASAP).The latter would allow Member States to procure ammunition together in support of Ukraine. On 1 June 2023, Parliament voted on the ASAP, opening the way for interinstitutional negotiations. These will probably focus on funding as Members of the European Parliament questioned the Commission’s choice of using funds dedicated to other defence instruments rather than identifying new funding options. EU leaders will probably call (again) on the co-legislators to adopt these instruments rapidly. They may also reiterate their call on the Commission to submit a proposal for a European defence investment programme (EDIP) to support the European defence industrial sector in the longer term.

EU leaders could also discuss EU-NATO cooperation ahead of the NATO Summit to be held in Vilnius on 11 July 2023. The focus there is very likely to be on security guarantees for Ukraine and on its accession to the Alliance. Zelenksyy has requested NATO give a strong signal.

External relations China

The European Council will discuss EU relations with China, which remains a divisive topic among Member States. Some EU leaders, such as Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte advocate an EU-specific approach. He stated in October 2022 that the EU needed ‘a policy on China that is independent from other international actors, notably the US’. Similarly, French President Emmanuel Macron has called ‘for a reduction of the EU’s dependence on the US to avoid being involved in a confrontation between China and the US over Taiwan’. Conversely, other Member States favour a closer alliance with the US in confronting China, notably Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki, who has called for a ‘strategic partnership with the US’ as opposed to ‘strategic autonomy from the US’.

The October 2022 strategic discussion on China also highlighted distinct views between the European Council’s President, Charles Michel, who stressed the need to engage with China, and the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, who advocated reducing European dependencies on China and taking a more assertive stance on Taiwan. The recent joint communication on a European economic security strategy confirms the Commission’s approach of de-risking economic relations with China.

As underlined during a debate in Parliament, clarity and unity in EU policy on China is needed: without being confrontational, EU policy should be based on reciprocity, mutual respect and respect for international law. Members also felt that changing the status quo on Taiwan was unacceptable for the EU.

As was the case after the October 2022 strategic discussion, the adoption of European Council conclusions on China seems rather unlikely.

EU-CELAC summit

EU leaders will discuss relations with Latin America and the Caribbean in preparation for the EU-CELAC Summit in Brussels on 17 and 18 July. The summit coincides with the start of Spain’s terms as President of the Council of the EU, with stronger relations with Latin America among its priorities.

Other items Strategic agenda for 2024 to 2029

The European Council sets the long-term priorities for the EU at the start of each institutional cycle by adopting a five-year strategic agenda for the EU. The 2019-2024 edition is organised around four headings: i) protecting citizens and freedoms; ii) developing a strong and vibrant economic base; iii) building a climate-neutral, green, fair and social Europe; and iv) promoting European interests and values on the global stage. (See the EPRS publication Origins of the 2019-24 EU Strategic Agenda).

Charles Michel will inform EU leaders of the steps towards adopting the 2024-2029 strategic agenda, due to be completed in June 2024. The political groups in the European Parliament are already outlining their various priorities for the elections and the next institutional cycle. The Spring 2023 Eurobarometer identifies EU citizens’ priorities as follows: i) the fight against poverty; ii) public health; iii) action against climate change; and iv) support for the economy and job creation.

Migration

The Swedish Council Presidency and the Commission will inform the European Council on progress in the implementation of conclusions on migration from February and March 2023. Following an agreement in the Justice and Home Affairs Council of 8-9 June 2023 on two crucial migration files, asylum and migration management regulation (AMMR) and the asylum procedure regulation (APR), Poland and Hungary, who voted against the agreement, might attempt to re-open the discussion ahead of up-coming trilogue negotiations between the co-legislators.

Read this briefing on ‘Outlook for the European Council meeting of 29-30 June 2023‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.