European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Sebastian Clapp.

One of the flagship proposals of the Strategic Compass adopted in March 2022 is the creation of a new rapid reaction force for responses to crises outside the EU. This rapid deployment capacity (RDC) will be a modular force of 5 000 personnel that should be fully operational by 2025. To establish the RDC, important issues, particularly on cost-sharing, decision-making, size, readiness and enablers need to be resolved.

Rapid deployment capacity

In May 2021, 14 EU Ministers of Defence called on the HR/VP to develop a proposal for a new EU rapid reaction force to respond to international crises outside the EU. This call to action took shape in the March 2022 Strategic Compass, with its commitment to establish an RDC by 2025. The RDC will be a modular force of up to 5 000 personnel, consisting of modified EU battlegroups and additional forces combining Member States’ forces and capabilities. Rather than a single force, the RDC will combine different components (air, land, maritime) and should include strategic enablers – such as air transport capabilities – depending on the operational scenario. The RDC’s purpose will be to respond rapidly to imminent crises, and to be able to be used in different operational scenarios, including ‘initial entry, reinforcement, or as a reserve force to secure an exit’. The first live exercises will be held in autumn 2023 in the south of Spain (Gulf of Cadiz). The RDC should reach full operational force by 2025.In a first sign of progress, EU ministers of defence endorsed two possible scenarios for the RDC on 15 November 2022: (1) initial phase of stabilisation and (2) rescue and evacuation. According to the first annual progress report on the implementation of the Compass, the RDC’s conceptual development has progressed and ‘work continues on the substantially modified EU Battlegroups … pre-identifying Member States’ military forces and capabilities… [and] on the remaining operational scenarios’.

Decision-making and cost sharing

The battlegroups have never been deployed, mostly owing to the lack of political will and the necessity for a unanimous Council decision for their activation. As a potential way to overcome these hindrances, EU leaders have committed to developing modalities for more flexible decision-making, in particular by exploring the potential of Article 44 TEU, which allows ‘coalitions of the willing’ to conduct missions and operations on behalf of the EU. Although Article 44 still requires a unanimous Council decision and political oversight by the Council, according to an October 2022 study requested by the European Parliament Sub-committee on Security and Defence (SEDE), it does ‘potentially create an avenue for more flexibility and speed in decision making’. The authors of the study suggest increasing the incentives by allowing greater funding from the common budget and giving more freedom to coalitions of the willing, e.g. by letting them establish the plan for the operation (OPLAN), especially where speed is of the essence. They also call for the simulation of different scenarios to clarify the modalities for the invocation of Article 44.

The principle that ‘costs lie where they fall’ means troop-contributing nations have to date found reasons to veto battlegroup deployment to avoid being stuck with the costs. The European External Action Service (EEAS) and European Council recognised this as the ‘most significant obstacle’. The Strategic Compass specifically states that the RDC will profit from common funding and enhanced solidarity. However, owing to lack of agreement, the precise modalities have not yet been defined, with experts suggesting using the European Peace Facility should compensate troop contributors based on a common cost calculation, taking the gross national product key into account and covering extra costs associated with deployment. The authors of the SEDE study note that, at the very least, incremental costs (additional costs for deployment, transport, use of ammunition and fuel, etc.) should be covered by the European Peace Facility.

EU battlegroups vs rapid deployment capacity

EU battlegroups are multinational, military units of up to 1 500 personnel each, meant to respond rapidly to emerging crises around the world. While they have been operational since 2007, they have never been deployed, mostly because of a lack of political will and financial solidarity. The former is especially problematic because deployment requires a unanimous Council decision. A number of questions have been raised regarding the differences between EU battlegroups and the RDC. The precise parameters for the EU rapid deployment capacity have yet to be defined; however, according to Clingendael, several differences between the RDC and battlegroups can already be highlighted:

• Size: while the RDC is meant to consist of 5 000 personnel, battlegroups comprise up to 1 500 troops (3 000 if two are always supposed to be on stand-by at the same time).
• Composition: the RDC is modular and comprises different components (land, air, maritime) according to operational needs, while battlegroups include land-based capabilities alone, based on fixed national contributions.
• Strategic enablers: the RDC incorporates strategic enablers, while this is not the case for battlegroups.
• Scenarios: two concrete operational scenarios have already been adopted for the RDC, while this has never been the case for the battlegroups.
• Standby-period: while battlegroups are on stand-by for 6 months, the RDC will be on standby for 12 months.

Clingendael consider these differences will make it challenging to incorporate ‘substantially modified’ EU battlegroups in the EU RDC (as suggested by the Compass). It also remains unclear what ‘substantially modified’ means. One expert notes that a bottom-up approach should be used: the EU should start by expanding the membership of each battlegroup and prolong their standby duration. The same report argues that an incentive-based ‘spillover’ could help an actual deployment of rapid reaction forces: gradually integrating capability projects into the European defence union through permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) and the European Defence Fund (EDF) could encourage EU Member States to then deploy such capabilities within the framework of the RDC in crises, when the time comes.

Size and enablers

The Strategic Compass suggests a modular force of 5 000 troops. However, for the five scenarios already mentioned in the Strategic Compass, it is thought this number will not be enough. The authors of the SEDE study suggest that, to cover all currently envisaged scenarios, the RDC would need different force packages for different scenarios and regions, and a very varied number of required land, air, special forces and maritime enablers. They therefore suggest 7 000-10 000 troops as a rough indication of the required forces, including enablers. For the RDC to materialise, one analyst suggests the EU will need a pool of at least five or six brigades (5 000 troops). In terms of readiness, the SEDE study suggests a system similar to the French Guépard system, which would mean that the majority of RDC modules would stay at a relatively low readiness, except those for ‘high urgency tasks’ (e.g. rescue and evacuation operations). Clingendael suggests a model of ‘dual hatted readiness forces’, where forces at various levels of readiness would be available for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the RDC. An objective that will be particularly difficult to fulfil by 2025 will be the necessary enablers, such as intelligence and strategic reconnaissance (ISR), strategic transport and air-to-air refuelling. Experts doubt that these shortfalls will be made up by 2025, especially for ISR and precision weapons. Experts note that, while PESCO and the European Defence Fund are already dealing with some shortfalls, those remaining should be remedied as a matter of priority. This will require sustained high defence investments and political will, which experts agree is the most crucial component of the RDC.

European Parliament position

In its CSDP implementation report of 18 January 2023, Parliament calls for the RDC to be ‘implemented as soon as possible and by 2025 at the latest’ and underlines the need to close the gaps on strategic enablers by 2025. A Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) draft report on the EU rapid deployment capacity, adopted on 9 March 2023, underlines that the RDC’s tasks should include rescue and evacuation, initial entry and initial phase of stabilisation operations. Temporary reinforcement of other missions should be used as a reserve force to secure an exit. The committee notes that the RDC target number should be at least 5 000 troops, plus the strategic enablers required to conduct its operation.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Network cost contribution debate‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Bruno Bilquin.

The European Peace Facility (EPF), a financial instrument outside the EU budget that has been operational since July 2021, finances activities with military implications. It funds equipment and training for EU partner countries’ armies, as well as the common costs of EU military missions and operations abroad. It also funds the military component of EU civilian missions or exercises abroad, or of EU support to missions led by other international organisations. One year after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, its initial ceiling has been increased to allow the EU to continue its military support to Ukraine at a critical stage of the conflict, while simultaneously maintaining and even increasing its military engagement in other regions of its neighbourhood, in the Western Balkans and in Africa.  

Since the start of Russia’s war of aggression on 28 February 2022, the EU has mobilised seven successive tranches, of €500 million each, from the EPF. In February 2023, EU military assistance to the Ukrainian Armed Forces reached a total of €3.6 billion. This assistance, for the first time in EU history, has a strong lethal component (weapons and equipment, including, most recently, tanks) alongside a smaller, although significant, non-lethal component (including protective equipment, other non-lethal supplies, and training). The delivery of military assistance is carried out by the EU Member States; through the EPF, the EU can reimburse Member States for a part of their military deliveries.

The EPF-funded military assistance to Ukraine has absorbed, in the first 12 months of the war, 60 % of the initially planned financial ceiling of the EPF of €5 billion for 2021-2027. Therefore, the Council decided on 13 March to increase that ceiling by €2 billion (in 2018 prices) for 2023, and possibly by an additional €3.5 billion (in 2018 prices) up to 2027, an increase that would more than double the total initial ceiling. On 20 March, in response to Ukraine’s urgent needs and requests, the Council decided to earmark €1 billion from the EPF to partially reimburse Member States for deliveries of ammunition (and missiles if requested) to Ukraine from their stocks, and another €1 billion for the joint procurement of ammunition (and missiles if requested) from the EU and Norwegian defence industries.

The European Parliament consistently and firmly supports the use of the EPF in Ukraine and beyond, and the increase of its ceiling.

Read the complete briefing on ‘European Peace Facility: State of play as of 31 March 2023‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

EPF-funded military assistance to Ukraine, March 2022 to March 2023

Written by Vivienne Halleux (1st edition).

Air pollution is the single largest environmental health risk in the EU and causes significant damage to ecosystems. As part of the European Green Deal’s zero pollution ambition, on 26 October 2022 the Commission tabled a proposal for a revision of the Ambient Air Quality Directives. The proposed directive would set air quality standards for 2030 that are more closely aligned with the Word Health Organization’s recommendations, as updated in 2021. It would also include a mechanism for the standards’ regular review based on the latest scientific information. To achieve them on time, the Member States would have to establish air quality plans ahead of 2030. Provisions on air quality monitoring and assessment would be updated, including through new requirements for monitoring pollutants of emerging concern, such as ultrafine particles.

Stakeholders have had mixed reactions to the proposal. NGOs call for full alignment with the WHO guidelines by 2030 at the latest, and for penalties in case the 2030 deadline is missed. Industry representatives insist on the need to meet current standards first, before aiming for higher ones.

In Parliament, the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI), responsible for the file, aims to adopt its legislative report before the end of June 2023.

Versions

• April 2023: Revision of EU air quality legislation: Setting a zero pollution objective for air (1st edition)

Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on ambient air quality and cleaner air for Europe (recast) Committee responsible:Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI)COM(2022) 542
26.10.2022Rapporteur:Javi López (S&D, Spain)2022/0347(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Norbert Lins (EPP, Germany)
Karin Karlsbro (Renew, Sweden)
Michael Bloss (Greens/EFA, Germany)
Gianna Gancia (ID, Italy)
Anna Zalewska (ECR, Poland)
Petros Kokkalis (The Left, Greece)Ordinary legislative procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council on equal footing
– formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Vote in committee on draft report

Written by Gregor Erbach with Sarah Svensson.

Renewable hydrogen has the potential to play a significant role in the energy system as a versatile energy carrier and feedstock that can help decarbonise a variety of applications in areas such as heavy industry, chemicals manufacturing, transportation, and electricity generation and storage. Hydrogen can be produced through the electrolysis of water with renewable electricity, using different setups that vary in terms of cost, impact on the electricity system and carbon emissions.

Today, renewable hydrogen makes up a small fraction of total hydrogen production. Most hydrogen is produced from fossil fuels and, although cheaper, it causes carbon emissions. Demand for renewable hydrogen is expected to grow quickly as the need for climate-friendly solutions increases. While the falling cost of renewable electricity certainly plays a role in boosting this demand, sustaining it still requires support measures aimed at growing the market and bringing down the cost of electrolysers. To avoid a situation where renewable electricity used for hydrogen production is diverted away from other uses, it is important to ensure additionality, i.e. additional renewable electricity capacity for renewable hydrogen production.

On 10 February 2023, in line with the requirements of the Renewable Energy Directive, the Commission adopted two delegated regulations: one defining rules on renewable hydrogen production and clarifying the additionality criteria for renewable electricity, and another setting out a methodology to calculate lifecycle GHG emissions. The European Parliament and the Council of the EU have four months to approve or reject the rules, but they cannot amend them. On 28 March 2023, the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE) decided not to raise an objection to the delegated regulation on additionality. Having in place definitive criteria for renewable hydrogen is key to making investment decisions and to launching EU and Member State initiatives that can support the growth of the European hydrogen industry.

Read the complete briefing on ‘EU rules for renewable hydrogen: Delegated regulations on a methodology for renewable fuels of non-biological origin‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Gabija Leclerc and Rosamund Shreeves.

Since the Taliban regime overtook the country in mid-August 2021, Afghanistan’s record on women’s rights has been manifestly one of, if not the worst, worldwide. Despite promises to ‘uphold women’s rights in line with Sharia law’, from the very first weeks of its rule, the Taliban started suppressing the rights of their citizens, with women the main target of restrictions. As well as prohibiting women and girls from traveling without a male relative, the Taliban have also denied them post-primary education, banned them from numerous public places and restricted their employment to health care and primary education. In December 2022, women were also banned from working for non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in most sectors.

This crackdown on women’s rights has attracted considerable international condemnation, including from Muslim states. In response to the regressive policies, many international donors have reduced or threatened to halt their humanitarian assistance, upon which the country is strongly reliant. It is feared that women could, unintentionally, be those most impacted by this reduction or suspension of humanitarian aid. The Taliban nevertheless appears inflexible, leaving international actors with a dilemma as to how to proceed.

The European Union (EU) has been engaged in Afghanistan since the mid-1980s and has prioritised advancing Afghan women’s rights. While changing its terms of engagement, it has continued to provide humanitarian aid and to support civil society. The European Parliament has followed the situation closely and recommended further action to support Afghan women and girls.

This briefing analyses the current situation of women’s rights in Afghanistan, taking a long view. Women’s rights have been an intense battleground between different actors for over a century, with periods of promising reforms followed by resistance and often reversals of progress. This helps to explain how a country, where women won voting rights in 1919 – earlier than in most of the Western world – has ended up by treating its female population in a manner possibly amounting to a crime against humanity.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Women’s rights in Afghanistan: An ongoing battle‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Timeline of main restrictions on women’s rights under the Taliban (2021-2022)

Citizens often send messages to the President of the European Parliament (or to the institution’s public portal) expressing their views on current issues and/or requesting action from the Parliament. The Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (AskEP) within the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) looks into these issues and replies to the messages, which may sometimes be identical as part of wider public campaigns.

The President of the European Parliament has recently received a large number of messages calling on the Parliament to vote against the European Commission’s new legislative proposal to prevent and combat child sexual abuse. Citizens expressed their concerns that this new legislation would breach data protection and privacy rights. Citizens first began to write to the President on this subject in February 2023. In its proposal, the Commission wants to make it mandatory for online service providers to detect, report and remove child sexual abuse material on their services. According to the Commission, investigation of suspicious content will follow strict rules and conditions; it will not entail general monitoring of individuals’ communications. The European Parliament has recently started working on the legislative proposal.  

Please find below the main points of the reply sent to citizens who took the time to write to the President of the European Parliament on this matter (in English and German).

Main points made in the reply in English

Protecting EU values in the digital field

While the European Parliament has long advocated for a safer internet for children, it also defends privacy and data protection on the internet.

In a joint declaration, the three EU institutions agreed to promote a digital transformation based on EU values and principles. This includes, for example, the principle of privacy and individual control over data. On this occasion, President Metsola stressed: “We want to make Europe fit for the digital age. This declaration […] makes sure that our values also apply in the digital sphere.”

New legislative proposal by the European Commission

As part of a new EU strategy to combat child sexual abuse online more effectively, the Commission announced a legislative proposal in May 2022. This law would oblige online service providers to identify, report and remove child sexual abuse content. They would have to assess the risk of misuse of their services and take measures to minimise them. The proposal also suggests creating a decentralised EU agency to combat child sexual abuse.

According to the EU Commissioner for Home Affairs Ylva Johansson, who is responsible for the proposal, it does not allow for generalised or indiscriminate scanning of content of all kinds of electronic communication. The scope for investigating suspicious content is very limited and the procedure is subject to strict conditions and guarantees. The proposal also requires providers to deploy technologies that are the least privacy-intrusive possible.

Further information on how the European Commission intends to protect privacy is available on its website.

Next steps in the legislative process

As a next step, the European Parliament and the Council have to vote on the proposal. In Parliament, the file was assigned to the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE), which recently started working on the draft report.

It should be noted that, in accordance with Article 2 of the Statute for Members of the European Parliament, Members of the European Parliament are free and independent. Neither Parliament nor its President are authorised to impose instructions on Members on how to vote or how to carry out their political activities.

Main points made in the reply in German

Schutz der gemeinsamen europäischen Werte im digitalen Bereich

Während sich das Europäische Parlament seit langem für ein sichereres Internet für Kinder einsetzt, verteidigt es ebenfalls die Privatsphäre und den Datenschutz im Internet.

In einer gemeinsamen Erklärung vereinbarten die drei EU-Institutionen, dass sie einen digitalen Wandel auf Grundlage der europäischen Werte und Grundsätze fördern möchten. Dazu gehört beispielsweise der Grundsatz des Schutzes der Privatsphäre und der individuellen Kontrolle über Daten. Zu diesem Anlass hob Präsidentin Metsola hervor: „Wir wollen Europa fit für das digitale Zeitalter machen. Diese Erklärung […] stellt sicher, dass unsere Werte auch im digitalen Bereich gelten.“ (Übersetzung aus dem Englischen)

Neuer Gesetzesvorschlag der Europäischen Kommission

Im Rahmen einer neuen EU-Strategie zu einer wirksameren Bekämpfung des sexuellen Missbrauchs von Kindern im Internet veröffentlichte die Kommission im Mai 2022 einen Gesetzesvorschlag. Dieses Gesetz würde Onlinedienstanbieter verpflichten, Inhalte über sexuellen Missbrauch von Kindern zu identifizieren, zu melden und zu entfernen. Sie müssten das Risiko des Missbrauchs ihrer Dienste einschätzen und Maßnahmen ergreifen, um es zu minimieren. Der Vorschlag sieht auch die Einrichtung einer dezentralen EU-Agentur zur Bekämpfung des sexuellen Missbrauchs von Kindern vor.

Laut der zuständigen EU-Kommissarin für Inneres Ylva Johansson erlaubt der Gesetzesvorschlag kein allgemeines und wahlloses Scannen von Inhalten aller Arten elektronischer Kommunikation. Der Freiraum bei Ermittlungen zu verdächtigen Inhalten sei sehr begrenzt, und das Verfahren unterliege strengen Bedingungen und Garantien. Der Vorschlag sieht außerdem vor, dass die Anbieter Technologien einsetzen, die am wenigsten in die Privatsphäre eingreifen.

Weitere Informationen darüber, wie die Europäische Kommission beabsichtigt, die Privatsphäre zu schützen, sind auf der Webseite verfügbar.

Nächste Schritte im Gesetzgebungsverfahren

Im nächsten Schritt müssen das Europäische Parlament und der Rat über den Vorschlag abstimmen. Im Parlament wurde das Dossier dem Ausschuss für bürgerliche Freiheiten, Justiz und Inneres (LIBE) zugewiesen, der erst kürzlich mit der Arbeit des Berichtsentwurfs begonnen hat.

Hierbei möchten wir anmerken, dass gemäß Artikel 2 des Abgeordnetenstatuts des Europäischen Parlaments Europaabgeordnete ihr Mandat frei und unabhängig ausüben. Weder das Parlament noch seine Präsidentin sind befugt den Abgeordneten vorzuschreiben, wie sie abstimmen noch wie sie ihre politischen Tätigkeiten ausüben sollen.

Written by Maria Niestadt (1st edition).

In November 2022, the European Commission published a proposal for a regulation laying down measures for a high level of public sector interoperability across the Union (the interoperable Europe act). The initiative seeks to ensure a consistent, human-centric EU approach to interoperability, create an interoperability governance structure that helps public administrations and the private sector to work together, and establish an ecosystem of interoperability solutions for the EU’s public sector. The proposal should also cut red tape for citizens and businesses.

The European Parliament and the Council have started working on the file. In Parliament, the file has been assigned to the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy, and in the Council to the working party on telecommunications and information society. Parliament’s rapporteur, Ivars Ijabs (Renew Europe, Latvia) published his draft report in March 2023. The next step is for the European Parliament and Council to adopt their negotiating positions ahead of trilogue negotiations

Versions

• April 2023: Interoperable Europe act (1st edition)

Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down measures for a high level of public sector interoperability across the Union (interoperable Europe act) Committee responsible:Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE)COM(2022) 720
18.11.2022Rapporteur:Ivars Ijabs (Renew Europe, Latvia)2022/0379(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Gheorghe Falcă (EPP, Romania)
Josianne Cutajar (S&D, Malta)Ordinary legislative procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council on equal footing
– formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Committee vote on draft report

Written by Stefano De Luca.

With the current pace of technological innovation, it is clear that the volume of data being exchanged is larger than ever and will only continue growing. The EU’s ambitious connectivity targets are pushing policymakers to take a more forward-thinking approach to the telecoms sector. One question EU decision-makers must answer is whether the main digital players, who generate huge volumes of traffic and revenue using the EU’s telecoms infrastructure, should contribute to the cost of network roll-out and, if so, whether that would be ‘fair’.

Background

The revival of the debate on the European network cost contribution – or ‘fair contribution‘ – stems from the idea recently re-introduced by the large European telecom operators (fixed and mobile) that market actors fuelling large volumes of data traffic (large online traffic generators such as Google and Netflix) should contribute to telecom operators’ network costs.

Large telecoms operators (telcos) suggest that a few large traffic generators are taking advantage of the network investment needed to support such data volumes without bearing the roll-out costs; in other words, they are ‘free-riding’.

Large traffic generators, meanwhile, argue that they contribute to the internet ecosystem too by investing heavily in infrastructure, such as data centres, undersea cables and satellites, and by creating attractive internet content, which is one of the reasons customers pay telecoms operators to carry data or decide to upgrade their subscriptions.

Finally, there is a fierce debate over whether or not a mechanism to extract a fair contribution from large traffic generators could undermine the net neutrality principle embedded both in the Open Internet Regulation and the declaration on digital rights and principles for the digital decade. The Commission has stated that any process of exploring a mechanism to secure a fair contribution to the costs of network infrastructure would take care to uphold the EU’s net neutrality rules.

Interconnection market: ‘Bill and keep’ versus ‘sending party network pays’ charging systems
The fair contribution debate is not entirely new. The European Telecommunications Network Operators’ Association (ETNO) proposed to introduce a kind of sending party network pays (SPNP) charging system back in 2012. The idea of this system is that large traffic generators should pay a fee to telcos for ‘delivering’ their data traffic (e.g. video streaming) to the end user’s network. At present, internet interconnection is largely unregulated and done on the basis of transit and peering agreements. The SPNP approach collides with the dominant bill and keep approach of interconnection, where data transport for internet services over telecoms networks is included in the end user price at retail level and each network agrees to terminate connections from the other network without any charge.
The Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications (BEREC) published reports on the internet interconnection market in 2012 and 2017, concluding that there were no competition issues requiring regulatory intervention. In its 2022 preliminary assessment of the fair contribution mechanism, BEREC rejected many arguments raised by ETNO. For instance, BEREC reports that there is no evidence that large traffic generators are free-riding on telecoms networks, that such providers also invest in network infrastructure, and that the SPNP charging system could cause significant harm to the internet ecosystem.
Rebutting this preliminary assessment, ETNO notes that the EU fair contribution debate has now moved beyond the telco industry proposal, beyond analysis of the internet interconnection market and beyond Europe, (referring to the fair contribution act debate in the United States). European Commission public consultation

The European declaration on digital rights and principles for the digital decade fuelled the debate on whether large traffic generators should contribute financially to telcos’ deployment of very high capacity networks (VHCNs) such as optical fibre and 5G. The declaration commits to develop ‘adequate frameworks so that all market actors benefiting from the digital transformation assume their social responsibilities and make a fair and proportionate contribution to the costs of … infrastructures, for the benefit of all Europeans’. Although not legally binding, it provides a framework for meeting the EU’s digital decade targets, including the connectivity ones of having all EU households covered by a fixed gigabit network (1Gbps) and all populated areas covered by 5G by 2030. An upcoming Commission study costs the infrastructure investment needed to achieve these targets at around €174 billion.

Along with its gigabit infrastructure act proposal and the draft gigabit recommendation, the Commission has launched a consultation on ‘the future of the connectivity sector and its infrastructure’, including a section on the fair contribution; this is running from 23 February to 19 May 2023. Focusing on the fair contribution concept, the Commission asks respondents to quantify their planned investment in network infrastructure capable of optimising internet data traffic. It also asks telcos to explain any obstacles to charging digital players for increased data traffic and whether such players should contribute fairly to finance network deployment. On this last point, the Commission also asks for views on the potential contribution mechanism structure (for instance mandatory direct payments to finance networks deployments or an EU or national digital fund).

Stakeholders’ and experts’ point of views

There are different positions on whether and how large traffic generators should contribute to the roll-out of the future-proof European telecoms network. Among the most controversial points:

Investment for upgrades in capacity and future network roll out: studies conducted for telecoms operators have estimated that data traffic driven by large traffic generators could generate costs relating to managing and deploying the networks conveying the traffic of €36 to 40 billion a year for EU telcos. BEREC points out that it has not seen such costs reflected in telcos’ financial statements or loss warnings. Other studies and reports stress that large traffic generators also invest in the internet ecosystem and that content and application providers invested €183 billion in Europe’s internet infrastructure between 2011 and 2021.

Double payment for data transport services: associations and experts demanding a careful impact assessment or against the fair contribution argue that telcos are already remunerated by their own customers through an internet subscription. In addition, there are concerns that a potential fee on large traffic generators would be passed on to consumers through higher prices for content or more advertising. Telcos argue that large traffic generators are not like individual internet users and should contribute to the costs of the traffic conveyance they benefit from and help achieve the digital decade goals.

Fair contribution mechanism: a report funded by the Computer & Communications Industry Association questions the compatibility of a fair contribution with global tax reforms on big tech, considering the lack of evidence on internet market failure or inefficiency. An expert commentator underlines the importance of clarifying who will be the final beneficiary of a potential ‘fair contribution’ fee on large traffic generators. A fee of this kind, if introduced, should be earmarked to finance investments in new very high capacity networks and not for other purposes (for instance to increase telcos’ dividends). This article also suggests that ‘the fee should be collected by public authorities and then distributed as public funds’.

South Korea: First experiment with a fair contribution to network financing
South Korea is the only country to have initiated a form of ‘fair contribution’ for large traffic generators, deviating from the ‘bill and keep’ principle and introducing the SPNP charging mechanism by law. Content providers with an average daily number of users of over 1 million or generating data accounting for over 1 % of total internet traffic are obliged to pay fees to telcos for terminating traffic on their networks. Reports and expert views, with some exceptions, tend to agree that the South Korean experiment is failing and leading to: reduced diversity of online content, slower digital transformation, higher prices for end users buying internet content, a decline in internet service quality and a decrease of investment in network infrastructure. A number of civil society organisations and academics have called on the government of South Korea to repeal the legal framework.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Network cost contribution debate‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Guillaune Ragonnaud (1st edition).

Most goods require packaging at several stages of their product life. Today, the diversity of packaging items and materials is considerable. Between 2009 and 2020, the total mass of packaging waste generated in the EU rose by 20 %. The Packaging and Packaging Waste Directive (PPWD – Directive 94/62/EC) lays down measures to prevent the production of packaging waste, and to promote reuse of packaging and recycling and other forms of recovering packaging waste. It also sets out the requirements that all packaging placed on the EU market must meet. These provisions are designed to reduce the disposal of packaging waste and to promote a more circular economy.

As part of the European Green Deal and the new circular economy action plan, the Commission put forward a revision of the PPWD in November 2022. The initiative’s objective is to ensure that all packaging is reusable or recyclable in an economically feasible way by 2030. The aim is to reinforce the essential requirements for packaging to ensure its reuse and recycling, boost the uptake of recycled content, and improve the requirements’ enforceability. Measures are also envisaged to tackle over-packaging and reduce packaging waste.

The proposal is now in the hands of the co-legislators. In the European Parliament, the Committee on Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI) is responsible for the file.

Versions

• March 2023: Revision of the Packaging and Packaging Waste Directive (1st edition)

Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on packaging and packaging waste, amending Regulation (EU) 2019/1020 and Directive (EU) 2019/904, and repealing Directive 94/62/EC Committee responsible:Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI)COM(2022) 677
30.11.2022Rapporteurs:Frédérique Ries (Renew, Belgium)
Massimiliano Salini (EPP, Italy)2022/0396(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Delara Burkhardt (S&D, Germany)
Grace O’Sullivan (Greens/EFA, Ireland)
Silvia Sardone (ID, Italy)
Pietro Fiocchi (ECR, Italy)
João Pimenta Lopes (The Left, Portugal)Ordinary legislative procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council on equal footing
– formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Publication of draft report Recycling and recovery rates of packaging waste in the EU (%)

Written by Katarzyna Sochacka with Rebecca Fredrick.

The highlight of the March II plenary session was the debate on the conclusions of the European Council meeting of 23-24 March 2023. In a formal ceremony held to celebrate the 25th anniversary of the Good Friday/Belfast Agreement, the Presidents of the European Parliament, Roberta Metsola, the European Council, Charles Michel, and the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, each underlined the significance of the 1998 Agreement and the importance of ensuring reconciliation between the two communities in Northern Ireland. Members debated several legislative files, including on fluorinated gases and ozone-depleting substances, safety of products and equal pay for men and women. In a further debate, Members considered the 2022 rule of law report from the European Commission.

Fluorinated gases and ozone depleting substances

In a joint debate, Members considered two reports from the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI) Committee on fluorinated gases and ozone-depleting substances, and subsequently adopted positions for trilogue negotiations on the two proposals. The proposed revision of the Ozone Regulation will update current rules on ozone-depleting substances (ODS) to reduce administrative burden, facilitate monitoring, and further reduce ODS emissions. The second proposed regulation concerns fluorinated greenhouse gases (F-gases), a particularly strong – although non-ozone-depleting – category of greenhouse gases (GHG). EU rules on F‑gases have been in place since 2006 and have led to significant reductions in GHG emissions. Among the ENVI committee’s proposed changes to the Commission’s proposal are a prohibition on the use of F-gases in sectors where alternatives are technologically and economically feasible, steeper product phase-down trajectories, firmer deadlines after which certain F‑gases will not be allowed to be placed on the market, and the introduction of minimum fines for non-compliance.

General product safety regulation

Members debated and adopted a provisional agreement, endorsed by the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO), on the proposed regulation on general product safety, which would replace existing legislation that has lost effectiveness as a result of digitalisation, supply chain evolution and changes in consumer behaviour. The text agreed in trilogue takes into account Parliament’s call that product safety assessments must consider the consumers targeted (for example, children and older people), as well as its stance on consumers’ right to remedy in the event of a product recall.

Equal pay for equal work between men and women

Parliament also debated and adopted the provisional agreement on equal pay for equal work between men and women, reached after five trilogue meetings. Despite the right to equal pay being enshrined in the EU Treaties since 1992, the gender pay gap currently sits at 12.7 %. The European Parliament has for years been calling for stronger measures on equal pay. The proposal will increase transparency around pay and access to justice for victims of pay discrimination. Notably, the legislation requires all companies – regardless of size – to make available to employees their criteria for determining remuneration as well as a breakdown of remuneration in the company.

Rule of law

Members debated a European Commission statement on its third annual rule of law report. Members voted on a motion for a resolution on the report, tabled by the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE). In its 2022 report, the Commission took into account Parliament’s call for the inclusion of specific recommendations directed at each Member State. While the resolution acknowledges this addition, it expresses concern that many of the recommendations lack specificity. (Members also debated separate Commission statements on the rule of law in Greece, Spain and Malta, resolutions on which are expected to be voted during the April plenary session.)

Opening of trilogue negotiations

Two committees’ decisions to enter into interinstitutional negotiations were approved without a vote: from the Legal Affairs (JURI) Committee on the proposal for a directive on the protection of the environment through criminal law, and from the Agriculture and Rural Development (AGRI) Committee on the proposal for a regulation on the conversion of the Farm Accountancy Data Network into a Farm Sustainability Data Network.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Plenary round-up – March II 2023‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Tambiama Madiega.

General-purpose artificial intelligence (AI) technologies, such as ChatGPT, are quickly transforming the way AI systems are built and deployed. While these technologies are expected to bring huge benefits in the coming years, spurring innovation in many sectors, their disruptive nature raises policy questions around privacy and intellectual property rights, liability and accountability, and concerns about their potential to spread disinformation and misinformation. EU lawmakers need to strike a delicate balance between fostering the deployment of these technologies while making sure adequate safeguards are in place.

Notion of general-purpose AI (foundation models)

While there is no globally agreed definition of artificial intelligence, scientists largely share the view that technically speaking there are two broad categories of AI technologies: ‘artificial narrow intelligence’ (ANI) and ‘artificial general intelligence’ (AGI). ANI technologies, such as image and speech recognition systems, also called weak AI, are trained on well-labelled datasets to perform specific tasks and operate within a predefined environment. By contrast, AGI technologies, also referred to as strong AI, are machines designed to perform a wide range of intelligent tasks, think abstractly and adapt to new situations. While only a few years ago AGI development seemed moderate, quick-paced technological breakthroughs, including the use of large language model (LLM) techniques have since radically changed the potential of these technologies. A new wave of AGI technologies with generative capabilities – referred to as ‘general purpose AI’ or ‘foundation models‘ – are being trained on a broad set of unlabelled data that can be used for different tasks with minimal fine-tuning. These underlying models are made accessible to downstream developers through application programming interface (API) and open-source access, and are used today as infrastructure by many companies to provide end users with downstream services.

Applications: Chat GPT and other general-purpose AI tools

In 2020, research laboratory OpenAI – which has since entered into a commercial partnership with Microsoft – released GPT-3, a language model trained on large internet datasets that is able to perform a wide range of natural language processing tasks (including language translation, summarisation and question answering). In 2021, OpenAI released DALL-E, a deep-learning model that can generate digital images from natural language descriptions. In December 2022, it launched its chatbot ChatGPT, based on GPT-3 and trained on machine learning models using internet data to generate any type of text. Launched in March 2023, GPT-4, the newest general-purpose AI tool, is expected to have even more applications in areas such as creative writing, art generation and computer coding.

General-purpose AI tools are now reaching the general public. In March 2023, Microsoft launched a new AI‑powered Bing search engine and Edge browser incorporating a chat function that brings more context to search results. It also released a GPT-4 platform allowing businesses to build their own applications (for instance for summarising long-form content and helping write software). Google and its subsidiary DeepMind are also developing general-purpose AI tools; examples include the conversational AI service, Bard. Google unveiled a range of generative AI tools in March 2023, giving businesses and governments the ability to generate text, images, code, videos, audio, and to build their own applications. Developers are using these ‘foundation models‘ to roll out and offer a flurry of new AI services to end users.

General-purpose AI tools have the potential to transform many areas, for example by creating new search engine architectures or personalised therapy bots, or assisting developers in their programming tasks. According to a Gartner study, investments in generative AI solutions are now worth over US$1.7 billion. The study predicts that in the coming years generative AI will have a strong impact on the health, manufacturing, automotive, aerospace and defence sectors, among others. Generative AI can be used in medical education and potentially in clinical decision-making or in the design of new drugs and materials. It could even become a key source of information in developing countries to address shortages of expertise.

Concerns and calls for regulation

The key characteristics identified in general-purpose AI models – their large size, opacity and potential to develop unexpected capabilities beyond those intended by their producers – raise a host of questions. Studies have documented that large language models (LLMs), such as ChatGPT, present ethical and social risks. They can discriminate unfairly and perpetuate stereotypes and social biases, use toxic language (for instance inciting hate or violence), present a risk for personal and sensitive information, provide false or misleading information, increase the efficacy of disinformation campaigns, and cause a range of human-computer interaction harms (such as leading users to overestimate the capabilities of AI and use it in unsafe ways). Despite engineers’ attempts to mitigate those risks, LLMs, such as GPT-4, still pose challenges to users’ safety and fundamental rights (for instance by producing convincing text that is subtly false, or showing increased adeptness at providing illicit advice), and can generate harmful and criminal content.

Since general-purpose AI models are trained by scraping, analysing and processing publicly available data from the internet, privacy experts stress that privacy issues arise around plagiarism, transparency, consent and lawful grounds for data processing. These models represent a challenge for education systems and for common-pool resources such as public repositories. Furthermore, the emergence of LLMs raises many questions, including as regards intellectual property rights infringement and distribution of copyrighted materials without permission. Some experts warn that AI-generated creativity could significantly disrupt the creative industries (in areas such as graphic design or music composition for instance). They are calling for incentives to bolster innovation and the commercialisation of AI-generated creativity on the one hand, and for measures to protect the value of human creativity on the other. The question of what liability regime should be used when general-purpose AI systems cause damage has also been raised. These models are also expected to have a significant impact on the labour market, including in terms of work tasks.

Against this backdrop, experts argue that there is a strong need to govern the diffusion of general-purpose AI tools, given their impact on society and the economy. They are also calling for oversight and monitoring of LLMs through evaluation and testing mechanisms, stressing the danger of allowing these tools to stay in the hands of just a few companies and governments, and highlighting the need to assess the complex dependencies between companies developing and companies deploying general-purpose AI tools. AI experts are also calling for a 6-month pause, at least, in the training of AI systems more powerful than GPT‑4.

General-purpose AI (foundation models) in the proposed EU AI act

EU lawmakers are currently engaged in protracted negotiations to define an EU regulatory framework for AI that would subject ‘high-risk’ AI systems to a set of requirements and obligations in the EU. The exact scope of a proposed artificial intelligence act (AI act) is a bone of contention. While the European Commission’s original proposal did not contain any specific provisions on general-purpose AI technologies, the Council has proposed that they should be considered. Scientists have meanwhile warned that any approach classifying AI systems as high-risk or not depending on their intended purpose would create a loophole for general purpose systems, since the future AI act would regulate the specific uses of an AI application but not its underlying foundation models.

In this context, a number of stakeholders, such as the Future of Life Institute, have called for general-purpose AI to be included in the scope of the AI act. Some academics favouring this approach have suggested modifying the proposal accordingly. Helberger and Diakopoulos propose to consider creating a separate risk category for general-purpose AI systems. These would be subject to legal obligations and requirements that fit their characteristics, and to a systemic risk monitoring system similar to the one under the Digital Services Act (DSA). Hacker, Engel and Mauer argue that the AI act should focus on specific high-risk applications of general-purpose AI and include obligations regarding transparency, risk management and non-discrimination; the DSA’s content moderation rules (for instance notice and action mechanisms, and trusted flaggers) should be expanded to cover such general-purpose AI. Küspert, Moës and Dunlop call for the general-purpose AI regulation to be made future-proof, inter alia, by addressing the complexity of the value chain, taking into account open-source strategies and adapting compliance and policy enforcement to different business models. For Engler and Renda, the act should discourage API access for general-purpose AI use in high-risk AI systems, introduce soft commitments for general-purpose AI system providers (such as a voluntary code of conduct) and clarify players’ responsibilities along value chains.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘General-purpose artificial intelligence‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Agnieszka Widuto and Stephanie Pradier.

The ongoing energy crisis and its related challenges of energy security concerns and high energy prices have put the spotlight on the EU’s domestic production and use of energy in general and renewables in particular. The 2018 Renewable Energy Directive (RED) requires the EU to achieve a 32 % share of renewable energy sources (RES) in gross final energy consumption by 2030. The Commission has since proposed a revision of the renewables target to 40 % as part of the ‘fit for 55’ package, in the context of the new EU climate goals under the European Green Deal, and a further increase to 45 % under the REPowerEU plan to phase out Russian energy imports.The EU exceeded its 2020 target of 20 %, achieving a 22.1 % renewables share of energy consumed. However, possibly because of the economic rebound after the COVID-19 lockdowns, the percentage of renewables consumed has since dropped to 21.8 %.

Read this infographic on ‘Renewable energy in the EU‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Sources of renewable energy in EU electricity consumption, 2021 Share of energy sources in EU production of primary energy, 2021 Share of renewable energy in three key sectors, 2021 Share of energy from renewable sources in final energy consumption, EU and Member States, 2021

Written by Enrico D’Ambrogio.

EU integration represents an inspiring example of conflict resolution. Some 30 years of violent sectarian conflict in Northern Ireland was brought to an end in 1998, with the signature of the Good Friday/Belfast Agreement. At the time, both the United Kingdom (UK) and Ireland were Member States of the European Union, having both joined the European Communities on 1 January 1973.

The EU’s engagement in the Northern Ireland peace process materialised first through support for the International Fund for Ireland. As part of its cohesion policy, the EU then directed significant investment to Northern Ireland through building specific cohesion programmes into the framework of the UK’s allocations. From 1995, EU funding was channelled through successive PEACE programmes, supporting peace and reconciliation and promoting economic and social stability in Northern Ireland and the six border counties of Ireland. The European territorial cooperation programme (Interreg) was a further EU cohesion policy tool playing a role in Northern Ireland.

Since the UK’s withdrawal from the EU on 1 February 2020, the PEACE PLUS programme, the largest ever cross-border cooperation programme on the island of Ireland, has been agreed, and it will continue to support the process towards peace and reconciliation in Northern Ireland.

The European Parliament’s support for the EU’s financial contribution to the peace process has been constant, and Parliament expressed concern for the continuity and stability of this support after the UK’s withdrawal from the EU. MEPs have also called for efforts to increase general awareness, and to raise the profile of the impact and necessity of EU funding in Northern Ireland.

Read the complete briefing on ‘EU cohesion policy support to 25 years of peace in Northern Ireland‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Luisa Antunes.

Antimicrobial resistance (AMR) is a global, multidimensional phenomenon occurring in humans, animals, and environmental ecosystems. It is the ability of microbes, e.g. bacteria, viruses, fungi and protozoa, to survive in the presence of medicines designed to kill or inactivate them (antimicrobials: antibiotics, antivirals, antifungals and antiprotozoals). At patient level, AMR hampers the effective treatment of microbial infections, leading to prolonged, severe disease and, in some cases, death. At community level, it amplifies the risk of infection outbreaks, epidemics and pandemics.

AMR is a growing problem, predicted to cause millions of deaths worldwide in the coming decades. The research and development pipeline for new antimicrobials has dried up, partly because of an oligopolistic market structure in a research area considered to give a low return on investment. Concerted EU and Member State action has led to an overall decrease in antimicrobial consumption; however, the relative use of both broad-spectrum and last-resort antimicrobials continues to grow. The lack of investment in prevention, diagnostics and adequate healthcare infrastructure is further driving the preventive prescription of antimicrobials.

Under-investment in good-quality healthcare is one of the main drivers of AMR. Tackling the socioeconomic determinants of health – such as reducing overall poverty and economic inequality, ensuring basic standards of living, education, and health – is imperative to reduce the burden of infection and the spread of AMR. Addressing the causes of AMR requires a multidisciplinary and multisectoral approach, involving not only the health sector but also other sectors, such as agriculture, environment and trade. The forthcoming revision of the pharmaceuticals package will be a chance for the EU to drive forward policies to ensure equitable access to safe, effective and affordable pharmaceuticals for unmet medical needs, and to define strategies for incentives to promote research into innovative antimicrobials.

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Penicillin, first discovered in 1928, contributed to the success of Allied troops in the Second World War and ushered in a new era for medicine. The period between the 1940s and 1960s witnessed a ‘golden age‘ of antimicrobial development, where the impact of serious conditions such as tuberculosis, pneumonia and diarrhoea could finally be mitigated, thus contributing to an increase in quality of health and global life expectancy.

However, the abuse and misuse in consumption of wide-spectrum antimicrobials has led to a progressive increase in antimicrobial-resistant infections, with 35 000 deaths in the EU each year (more than HIV/AIDS and malaria deaths combined), and €1.1 billion worth of losses to healthcare systems. The past 20 years have seen the emergence of microbes resistant to all available antimicrobial classes.[i] By 2050, AMR could cause 10 million deaths worldwide, surpassing cancer as the second largest killer; it could also cause up to 3.8 % of global gross domestic product (GDP) to be lost.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Tackling antimicrobial resistance: From science to pharmaceuticals policy‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

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Written by Clément Evroux.

The magnitude of current global challenges, such as the climate crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic, stresses the relevance of joining forces worldwide and pooling human and financial resources to facilitate the creation and dissemination of knowledge and innovative solutions for EU research.

In 2021, the European Commission adopted a communication on a global approach to research and innovation – the new European strategy for international cooperation. In 2022, the European Parliament and the EU Member States responded to the communication with respectively a resolution and a declaration tabled by the Council presidency. Acknowledging the effects of the current geopolitical tensions, including the Russian invasion of Ukraine, they outlined how to ensure that Europe’s openness to the world will safeguard EU strategic autonomy, interests and values.

Following the launch of Horizon Europe in 2021, the EU is expected to intensify international cooperation, including by extending association to the programme to new partners such as Australia, Canada, Japan, Singapore and New Zealand.

The participation of stakeholders in international cooperation activities is key to Europe’s capacity to expand its scientific and technological leadership – thus far established in the domain of joint exploratory scientific activities, including transdisciplinary initiatives – to also cover technological development and standardisation. European research and innovation players are unambiguously supporting international cooperation for global goods, such as knowledge, the environment and global health. They also express hopes that the United Kingdom will swiftly join Horizon Europe as an associated country.

The first data available on non-EU-based legal entities’ participation in Horizon Europe confirm a significant improvement: as of 21 February 2023, they take part in 42.17 % of the 5 200 grant agreements that have been signed since the programme was launched in 2021.

This updates a briefing published in June 2022.

Read the complete briefing on ‘The EU’s global approach to research and innovation‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Aidan Christie with Rebecca Fredrick.

This week, Members hold their second March plenary session, this time in Brussels. The agenda is full, with debates scheduled on the rule of law in EU countries and on two environmental files – but the planned vote on measures to help ensure equal pay for equal work is likely to attract the most attention.

Before moving to the legislative work, on Wednesday, Parliament will hold a ceremony to commemorate the 25th anniversary of the Good Friday/Belfast Agreement, which brought an end to three decades of violent conflict in Northern Ireland. The EU has done much to support the peace process, even before the Agreement was reached in 1998, in particular through targeting funding on measures to foster cross-community reconciliation and economic development. In the same spirit, the recently agreed Windsor Framework to facilitate the movement of goods between Great Britain and Northern Ireland under the UK’s EU withdrawal Agreement seeks to prevent the need for a hard border between Northern Ireland and Ireland, safeguarding both the all-island economy and the EU single market.

Parliament is also due to hear statements on Wednesday from the European Council and Commission on the conclusions of the 23-24 March European Council meeting.

A key moment of the second March plenary session will be Thursday’s vote on adoption of the provisional agreement on equal pay for equal work between men and women, reached after five long trilogue meetings. Despite the right to equal pay being enshrined in the EU Treaties since 1992, the gender pay gap currently sits at 12.7 %. The European Parliament has for years been calling for stronger measures on equal pay. If adopted, the present proposal would increase transparency around pay and access to justice for victims of pay discrimination. Notably, the legislation requires all companies – regardless of size – to make available to employees their criteria for determining remuneration as well as a breakdown of remuneration in the company. The burden of proof on pay-related issues will shift from worker to employer, and companies with over 100 employees will be obliged to publish their gender pay gap, and to conduct a joint assessment with their employees if it exceeds 5 %.

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Accept YouTube Content EPRS Policy Podcast on equal pay for equal work

Following the equal pay debate, Members are set to debate a European Commission statement on its third annual rule of law report on Thursday morning, and subsequently vote on a motion for a resolution on the report, tabled by the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE). This year, the Commission took into account Parliament’s call for the inclusion in the report of specific recommendations directed at each Member State. While the LIBE motion acknowledges this addition, it expresses concern that many of the recommendations lack specificity. Additionally, it calls on the Commission to address in their entirety other requests which Parliament has previously made, namely, establishing an advisory panel of independent experts, including fundamental rights in the scope of the report, and providing implementation deadlines for country-specific recommendations.

Turning to the environment, in a joint debate scheduled for Wednesday afternoon Members are due to discuss two reports tabled by the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI), with the aim of fixing Parliament’s position for trilogue negotiations with the Council. The reports concern proposals that aim to bring existing legislation into alignment with EU climate goals and with the Montreal Protocol.

The proposed revision of the Ozone Regulation would update current rules on ozone-depleting substances (ODS) to reduce administrative burden, facilitate monitoring, and further reduce ODS emissions. Parliament seeks to establish a rolling review mechanism by which the Commission would be required to assess every 2.5 years (beginning in January 2025) the availability of alternatives to ODS prohibited by the Montreal Protocol but whose use is permitted in the EU in certain applications. The ultimate aim is to phase out such exemptions. The second proposed regulation concerns fluorinated greenhouse gases (F-gases), a particularly strong – although non-ozone-depleting – category of greenhouse gases (GHG). EU rules on F-gases have been in place since 2006 and have led to significant reductions in GHG emissions. However, in light of the EU’s goals of 55 % GHG reductions by 2030 and climate neutrality by 2050, Parliament is pushing further. Among the ENVI committee’s proposed changes to the Commission’s proposal are a prohibition on the use of F-gases in sectors where alternatives are technologically and economically feasible, steeper product phase-down trajectories, firmer deadlines after which certain F-gases will not be allowed to be placed on the market, and the introduction of minimum fines for non-compliance.

Before the end of the Wednesday evening sitting, Members are expected to debate a provisional agreement, endorsed by the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO), on the proposed regulation on general product safety. If adopted, the regulation would replace existing legislation which has become less effective as a result of digitalisation, supply chain evolution and changes in consumer behaviour. The text agreed in trilogue has taken into account Parliament’s demand that product safety assessments must consider the consumers targeted (for example, children and older people), as well as its stance on consumers’ right to remedy in the event of a product recall.

• Plenary session agenda
• Review of the F-gas Regulation
• Revision of the Ozone Regulation
• EU general product safety regulation
• Equal pay for equal work between men and women
• European Commission’s third rule of law report
• The Windsor Framework
• EU cohesion policy support to 25 years of peace in Northern Ireland
• Outcome of the meetings of EU leaders of 23-24 March 2023

Written by Andrés García with Clemens Weichert.

Investigative journalists recently brought to light extensive spying operations in Europe, using the powerful Pegasus spyware. European Union governments and the European institutions set up their own investigations have been seeking ways to improve data protection in the EU. On 2 March 2023 the European Parliament’s Panel for the Future of Science and Technology (STOA) brought together experts on cybersecurity and data protection during a workshop entitled ‘Pegasus affair: the end of privacy and cybersecurity?’.

STOA Vice-Chair Ivo Hristov (S&D; Bulgaria) set the scene by describing the new technologies that make it possible for private and state actors to monitor private communications. These technologies endanger individual rights and challenge democracy by infringing on citizens’ privacy in a way they cannot defend themselves against as individuals. The EU has therefore undertaken to regulate and restrict the use of spyware.

Moderating the workshop, Fanny Hidvegi (Europe Policy and Advocacy Director at Accessnow), highlighted that members of marginalised communities fall disproportionately victim to spyware attacks, meaning that those affected often belong to the most vulnerable groups in society. Although Pegasus is not unique, it constitutes an egregious example of commercially available spyware that can be used both against institutions and private individuals, even granting retroactive access to data stored on a phone. It poses an unprecedented threat to the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). She then introduced the workshop discussion panels: the first on threats and challenges posed by software like Pegasus, and the second on the future of spyware legislation.

On the first panel, Professor Bart Preneel presented the technological aspects of the case and its effects on international politics. To protect citizens’ digital privacy, the EU will need strong supervision of its digital sector, as well as considerable investment to keep pace with developments in the United States and China. Civil rights activist Chloé Berthélémy (European Digital Rights, EDRi) then took the floor to advocate EU use of its market power to ban this ‘market of vulnerability’. This would set an important precedent on the international stage.

Fanny Hidvegi introduced the second panel with a reminder that reform of the E-Privacy Directive is long blocked by disagreements between EU governments about the extent of national security exemptions. This, she argued, is a political rather than legal issue. European Data Protection Supervisor, Wojciech Wiewiórowski took the floor to push for a European solution, within the framework of the Treaties. He pointed out that the exceptions currently in place allow EU Member States to justify extensive spying operations by invoking national security. In the future, these exceptions should be revised, if European legislation is to have an impact on EU countries’ operations in the digital field. The rule of law is key in this debate, the Supervisor argued, since European legislation is worthless if Member States’ secret services do not follow their own laws.

Olivier Micol, Head of Unit for Data Protection at the European Commission, pointed out that, even though spyware can be bought and sold privately, using it for illegal purposes is already punishable. Not only private companies, but also ‘if you work for law enforcement, for criminal purposes, the EU law applies; and with EU law you have all the checks and balances, the oversight up to the European Court of Justice’. In a similar vein, Member States cannot simply claim to act in the interest of national security in their spying operations; they have to prove it to profit from legal exceptions.

Opinions differed on the topic of a general ban on spyware. On the one hand, it poses a severe interference in people’s rights and freedoms; on the other hand, if banned in Europe, spyware may be bought and sold on the black market and to foreign governments. Some speakers advocated tighter regulation of both the scope and capabilities of spyware, as well as its use, with Mr Wiewiórowski highlighting the need for certain spying operations to counter Russian cyberattacks

The open discussion touched on topics such as the outsized influence that a few large corporations play in the sector, and the dangers and possibilities of cloud storage services. Mr Wiewiórowski took the opportunity to launch a plea for European citizens not to normalise spying and not to get used to being spied upon, but rather to see it as the infringement on individual rights it is.

With the work of the European Parliament’s Committee of Inquiry to investigate the use of Pegasus and equivalent surveillance spyware (PEGA) coming to an end, these conclusions will inform future European Parliament debate. This STOA workshop, and the work of the PEGA committee, aim at taking further steps to protecting EU citizens’ privacy.

A webstream of the event is available on our website. Your opinion counts for us. To let us know what you think, get in touch via and follow us on Twitter at @EP_ScienceTech.

Written by Annastiina Papunen and Rebecca Torpey.

Discussions at the European Council meeting of 23 March concentrated on Europe’s long-term strategy for economic competitiveness, Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, and energy. Other topics mentioned in the European Council conclusions include migration, the donors’ conference in support of the victims of the recent earthquake in Türkiye and Syria, the agreement on the path to normalisation of relations between Kosovo[1] and Serbia, the sentencing of Belarusian democratic opposition leaders, and the Windsor Framework aimed at resetting EU-UK relations.

With recent turbulence in the banking sector as the backdrop, EU leaders discussed the situation in the euro area during a Euro Summit meeting in inclusive format on 24 March, issuing a short statement underling their commitment to close coordination of economic policies.

In addition, the new President of Cyprus, Nikos Christodoulides, outlined his proposal aimed at relaunching negotiations on the Cyprus issue. While not formally on the agenda nor discussed in the meeting itself, according to the Commission President, EU leaders also raised and commented – on the margins of the meeting – on the last-minute opposition by a group of Member States, led by Germany, to the politically agreed phasing out of vehicles with combustion engines by 2035.

1. General aspects

The European Council meeting, which lasted just one day, started with the customary address from the President of the European Parliament, Roberta Metsola. Her remarks focused on the need to strengthen EU solidarity with Ukraine and on measures aimed at boosting investment and EU economic competitiveness. She stressed that the EU ‘must continue to act in unison and deliver on more Europe where it matters’. As indicated in the President, Charles Michel’s, invitation letter, the UN Secretary-General, António Guterres, joined the European Council as guest for a joint discussion on key geopolitical issues and global challenges, in particular food security.

Ahead of the meeting, on 22 March. Charles Michel and Commission President Ursula von der Leyen met with the European social partners (i.e. European employers’ and trade union organisations) for the tripartite social summit, discussing the challenges to the EU’s competitiveness.

The 23 March European Council meeting was the third in a row to finish within one calendar day. While the December 2022 meeting was planned as a one day event from the start, the February and March meetings were both initially planned to stretch over two calendar days. Also worth mentioning, a new indicative Leaders’ agenda for the coming months in 2023 was published ahead of this latest meeting. Whilst originally aimed at providing a concrete work programme to guide EU action in the medium term, and offer an overview of EU leaders’ meetings for a period of at least a year, this document has become shorter and shorter since its inception in 2017.

2. European Council meeting Competitiveness, single market and the economy

The European Council outlined a number of challenges facing the EU economy, and discussed ways of ensuring long-term economic prosperity and competiveness in the context of shifting geopolitical dynamics. EU leaders underlined the need for a comprehensive approach covering the single market, industrial, agricultural and trade policies, which would aim at increasing the productivity and competitiveness of the EU’s economic base. To be able to assess the progress achieved in the medium term, the Council has been tasked, with the input of the Commission, with providing an annual report to the European Council. At the same time, EU leaders invited the Council and Commission to provide a report in advance of the June European Council meeting to take stock of work carried out to facilitate financing, make energy affordable, reduce strategic dependencies, develop skills, and prepare the EU economic, industrial and technological base for the twin transitions.

The single market, arguably one of the EU’s biggest success stories, is celebrating its 30th anniversary. Based on the Commission’s ‘the Single Market at 30’ communication, EU leaders took stock of the achievements and remaining challenges. The recent years of polycrisis have exposed Europe’s vulnerabilities, which EU leaders are keen on fixing. They thus reiterated their long-term goal of completing the single market, in particular the digital and services markets, as well as their call for the full enforcement of single market rules and the removal of existing barriers. Accounting for 99 % of EU companies and more than half of EU gross domestic product (GDP), SMEs are to receive ‘special focus’ in the efforts to further strengthen the single market.

The long- and short-term performance and competitiveness of the EU economy has been a regular item on EU leaders’ agenda lately, as a result of a series of crises requiring strong economic answers at EU level. At its December 2022 meeting, the European Council asked the Commission to deliver ‘in early 2023, a strategy at EU level to boost competitiveness and productivity’. This is noteworthy insofar as the EU had developed similar growth strategies in the past, namely the Lisbon strategy and the Europe 2020 strategy, both of which were the subject of thorough preparation processes and stakeholder involvement. However, this approach was not taken forward after 2020.

Following the Commission’s communication ‘Long-term competitiveness of the EU looking beyond 2030′, EU leaders are calling for measures in six areas: i) regulatory environment, ii) investment, iii) research and innovation, iv) digitalisation, v) skills, and vi) circularity. They reiterated their call for a simpler regulatory environment and reduced administrative burdens for EU businesses. EU leaders also highlighted possible tools to support simplification efforts, in particular the use of digital solutions, the easing of reporting requirements, the introduction of competitiveness checks for legislative proposals, regulatory convergence, and the removal of barriers for cross-border business.

Providing support to EU companies in their investment needs was addressed at previous meetings. But this time around, EU leaders set a deadline for the co-legislators: to finalise work on the legislative proposals aimed at completing the capital markets union before the 2024 European elections. Flexibility in the use of current EU funding and the need to mobilise all available EU funds to support strategic sectors was underlined. In that context, EU leaders took note of the Commission’s plan to make a proposal for a European sovereignty fund before summer 2023. Furthermore, ‘secure, stable and sustainable supply chains’ were discussed in response to heavy disruption during the COVID crisis and current geopolitical tensions. Improving connectivity and infrastructure for both transport and energy was also mentioned under the investment heading.

EU leaders also took a strong stance in support of innovation, and stated that public and private research and development investment, which in 2021 stood at 2.27 % of GDP, should be increased to meet the 3 % target. They also want to get innovative products and services, especially those with high growth potential, onto the market quicker, and indicated that regulatory sandboxes could be used for that purpose. EU leaders also underlined the opportunities offered by data, and the necessity of the EU staying in the forefront of key digital technologies, such as artificial intelligence, quantum computing, microelectronics and web 4.0. Cybersecurity was also mentioned; that reference is partly linked to the current geopolitical situation and also partly to the rapid development of new technologies, which make organising attacks on key actors and infrastructure easier than before.

EU leaders reiterated their February 2023 call for the development of skills to address a number of challenges facing the EU economy, including demography, labour shortages and specific challenges linked to the twin digital and green transitions. Von der Leyen described skills as the ‘make it or break it of the single market and our economic success’. EU leaders also asked for work to be taken forward on the Commission’s net zero industry act proposal, which aims at helping EU industries move towards clean-tech and clean-energy, as well as on the critical raw materials act, designed to secure the provision of the much needed raw materials for digital and green transitions. The circular economy could also contribute to making EU industry more sustainable and to reducing dependencies and materials costs.

As anticipated, the European Council held a strategic discussion on trade, with some EU leaders stressing the importance of trade in achieving strategic goals, spreading EU values and boosting the economy. While EU leaders took note of the temporary crisis and transition framework for State aid, the challenge will however be to get all 27 on the same page in terms of negotiating, agreeing and ratifying trade agreements with strategic partners, notably for agreements aimed at ensuring access to critical raw materials. 

Finally, EU leaders discussed the European Semester. In the process of developing national reform programmes and stability or convergence programmes, Member States are required to take into account the priorities of the 2023 annual sustainable growth survey. EU leaders also endorsed the draft Council recommendation on euro-area economic policy as well as the 14 March Council conclusions on the economic governance review.

Main message of the President of the European Parliament: On competitiveness, Roberta Metsola highlighted that ‘the European Union’s twin transition can happen, with the commitment of our people, but only if we create favourable conditions for that transition to occur. We need to explain that going green will pay-off for people, businesses and their families.’

Ukraine

EU leaders took stock of the situation in Ukraine, adopting lengthy conclusions, largely reiterating previous messages, including the Union’s ‘resolute condemnation of Russia’s war of aggression’, support for Ukraine’s independence and territorial integrity, and support for President Zelenskyy’s peace plan. Volodymyr Zelenskyy addressed EU leaders by video-link once again, stressing that the supply of military aid was a fight against the clock, recalling the importance of each hour on the battlefield, and saluting the Polish and Slovak decisions on supplying MiG fighter jets to Ukraine. 

EU leaders focussed on accountability, military assistance, sanctions and food security, among a wider range of Ukraine-related topics flagged up in the EPRS outlook. They condemned child deportation and took note of the arrest warrants issued by the International Criminal Court against Vladimir Putin and Maria Lvova-Belova in connection with this war crime. President von der Leyen called the Ukrainian child abductions a ‘horrible reminder of the darkest times of our history’. She stressed that 16 200 children have been deported, of whom only 300 had returned, and announced that the Commission would, together with Poland, organise a conference to launch an international cooperation process to establish the ‘whereabouts’ of these children.

Artillery ammunition was central to the military assistance debate. EU leaders welcomed the Council’s agreement to provide 1 million rounds of artillery ammunition to Ukraine through the European Peace Facility over the next 12 months. Von der Leyen stressed that European ammunition-production capacities need ramping up, and that the Commission would put forward a specific legal proposal, exploring the possible use of the EU budget for that purpose. As regards sanctions, the focus was on ensuring implementation and countering their circumvention. Whilst further sanctions could be envisaged, EU leaders stressed their commitment ‘to continue working on the oil price cap together with partners’. On food security, EU leaders noted the extension of the UN Black Sea Grain Initiative and stressed the importance of the EU Solidarity Lanes in allowing Ukraine to export its grain. Von der Leyen noted that €56 million to date had been allocated to help EU farmers in frontline countries cope with internal market distortions resulting from the war.

Main message of the President of the European Parliament: President Metsola stressed that the joint procurement of ammunition agreement ‘represents a landmark moment’. She praised Moldova’s resilience, and called for support to democratic forces in Georgia.

Energy

Energy was less prominent in the debate than at previous meetings. EU leaders took stock of actions taken to achieve the energy-related objectives set out in earlier conclusions, in particular reducing prices, decreasing demand, enhancing security of supply, and phasing out Russian fossil fuels. They also considered restocking efforts in view of the upcoming winter, urged the co-legislators to agree quickly on proposals that would speed up the green transition, and called for work on the proposal on the internal electricity market design revision to be finalised by the end of 2023.  

Migration

The Swedish Council Presidency and the Commission briefed EU leaders on progress in the implementation of the 9 February 2023 European Council conclusions on migration. EU leaders called for speedy progress and reiterated their previous commitment to ‘revert to the matter on a regular basis’. As Michel noted, the next progress report is due for the June 2023 meeting.

Main message of the President of the European Parliament: President Metsola indicated that the European Parliament would play its part, but asked EU leaders to deliver on the proposed regulations on asylum and migration management, and on crisis and force majeure.

3. Euro Summit

The Euro Summit convened in inclusive format, for only the second time since December 2021. Both European Central Bank President Christine Lagarde and Eurogroup President Paschal Donohoe were in attendance, to discuss the current issues impacting the euro area and ways of increasing euro stability and EMU resilience. EU leaders stated: ‘our economies entered 2023 on a healthier footing than previously expected, despite high inflation and energy prices’, and asked the Eurogroup to monitor developments. Ongoing work on economic governance was discussed, as was the need for strong EU economic architecture, which requires the completion of the capital markets union and banking union. Work on the latter is especially pertinent in the context of recent turbulence in the banking sector following the collapse of the Silicon Valley Bank and the Credit Suisse takeover.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Outcome of the meetings of EU leaders of 23-24 March 2023‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Citizens regularly comment to the European Parliament on the changing of the clocks. The clocks have gone forward recently, but how long will this periodic change continue?

The European Parliament voted to abolish seasonal time changes in 2019. However, the governments of EU countries have not yet been able to reach an agreement. 

Current situation

Under EU rules adopted in 2000, clocks in all EU countries are put forward by one hour on the last Sunday in March, and put back by one hour on the last Sunday in October.

However, a growing number of citizens have expressed a desire to stop these seasonal clock changes. In a resolution adopted in February 2018, the European Parliament called on the Commission to conduct a thorough assessment of the summer-time arrangements and, if necessary, to come up with a proposal for their revision.

Proposal to scrap changing the clock

In September 2018, following a public consultation, the European Commission put forward a legislative proposal to stop applying seasonal changes in EU countries.

This proposal was put forward for adoption under the ordinary legislative procedure, in which the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, which represents EU countries, take decisions on an equal footing. 

European Parliament in favour of scrapping clock changes

In a legislative resolution of March 2019, the European Parliament supported the Commission proposal to discontinue seasonal changes of time. More information and links can be found in a press release. The video recording of the plenary debate can be watched here (start 19.42, end 20.49). 

Blocked since no agreement among EU countries

Under the initial proposal, the new rules were due to apply as from 1 April 2021. However, since EU countries have not been able to reach a position, the rules have yet to be updated. As a result, seasonal clocks changes continue twice a year.

You can find more information about this legislative procedure in the procedure file published by the European Parliament’s Legislative Observatory.

Question from Members of the European Parliament

Several Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) have written parliamentary questions on this topic, for example a question to the European Commission in June 2022, entitled ‘Status of the seasonal time changes proposal and the outlook for its adoption’. In its reply from September 2022, the Commission underlines that any change is still blocked by EU countries.

Further information

• Discontinuing seasonal changes of time, European Parliamentary Research Service, Briefing, March 2019
• Directive discontinuing seasonal change of time, European Parliamentary Research Service, Legislative Train Schedule
• EU summer-time arrangements under Directive 2000/84/EC, Ex-post impact assessment study, European Parliamentary Research Service, October 2017
• Seasonal changes of time, European Parliament’s Legislative Observatory
• State of the Union 2018: Q&A on the Commission’s proposal to put an end to seasonal clock changes, European Commission
• Seasonal clock change in the EU, Mobility and Transport – European Commission

Keep sending your questions to the Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (Ask EP)! We reply in the EU language that you use to write to us.

Written by Etienne Bassot.

To say that the geo-political climate has been stormy since the beginning of this European Commission’s mandate would be an under-statement. COVID-19 emerged just as Ursula von der Leyen was starting her tenure as president, and the epidemic was declared a pandemic within her first 100 days. The year 2020 was marked by the outbreak of the pandemic, and 2021 by its continuing impact. The year 2022 will be remembered as the year Russia launched its war on Ukraine. These two major challenges – the pandemic and war on the European continent – combined with further major challenges such as climate change and many others, transformed the conditions in which the Commission had expected to navigate when it began its mandate and set its course in autumn 2019. The pandemic and the war are common threads throughout the different sections of this publication: they have affected all policies, sometimes forcing progress, at other times slowing it down, and at yet others imposing a change of course and the implementation of previously unanticipated measures. The overwhelming importance of the latest challenge, Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, is reflected in the choice of photograph on the front cover: the Commission President speaking in the European Parliament’s plenary session in a key debate on the first anniversary of Russia’s invasion.

Against this backdrop, when assessing how the European Commission has delivered over the past 6 months against its commitments and announcements, it is striking how much the institutional throughput has remained steady. Previous editions of this EPRS analysis have already highlighted that neither the coronavirus pandemic nor the war on Ukraine had hindered progress on the main priorities. As the pandemic enters its fourth year and the war its second, the Commission’s pace and volume of delivery remains very close to the level of 6 months ago, when assessed on the eve of the 2022 State of the Union address.

The European Commission is sailing a steady course in terms of the number of new initiatives it is producing for each priority, balanced with the number of announced initiatives still to come. The co-legislators’ work on the legislative initiatives also continues to progress at a steady rate.

That the rate of progress has remained largely unchanged is to the credit of the European institutions: the Commission in tabling the initiatives, and the European Parliament and Council for their work on the legislative proposals, through to adoption. At a time when building compromise and reaching majorities is a challenge, as seen in the Member States of the European Union (EU) as well as in other democracies across the globe, this is an achievement worth noting, especially with just over a year to go before the next European elections.

This is an important achievement for the European institutions and all parties involved in EU policy-making, and it is also important for observers reading this EPRS assessment of the Commission’s delivery against the latter’s own announcements. Ultimately, it is important for citizens, who want to know what the EU is doing and how much of the programme they favoured when they elected their representatives in 2019 has been translated into legislation and action. It is also important for institutions in other countries in the world that look to the EU as an example. Among them is the Ukrainian Parliament, for whom this edition of our analysis, along with a selection of other EPRS publications, is exceptionally being translated into Ukrainian.

So the European Commission has delivered on its initial programme and successive updates. The question now is whether that is enough.

Surely but slowly? With just over a year to go before the European Parliament is dissolved for the elections, is it enough that two thirds of the initiatives announced have been submitted to the co‑legislators – in other words that one third are still to be tabled? Is it enough that only half of the initiatives submitted have been adopted – in other words, that most of the other half still require substantial work from the co-legislators to find agreement enabling their adoption?

This analysis monitors all six of the Commission’s priorities. It combines a two-page presentation of each priority and a single-page infographic (page 3) illustrating the degree of progress – both overall and under each of the six priorities.

According to this EPRS analysis, of the nearly 600 initiatives announced (597), two thirds (66 %, 379) have now been submitted and, in the case of the legislative proposals, the co-legislators have started work. It is worth noting that almost one in five of the Commission’s initiatives are non-legislative, for instance strategies, action plans and other communications. Of the 379 initiatives that have been submitted, half (50 %) have already been adopted (188) – by the legislators in the case of the legislative proposals, or simply by the Commission in the case of the non-legislative initiatives – while the vast majority of the other half are either proceeding normally through the legislative process (129, or 67 %) or are close to adoption (28, or 15 %). Conversely, a certain number are proceeding very slowly or are currently blocked (34, or 18 %).

With a focus on each of the six policy priorities, this assessment shows how the European Commission is performing in tabling the proposals and initiatives it has announced, and how the three institutions are progressing in negotiating and adopting legislation. The European Green Deal ranks highest in terms of the number of initiatives planned (148), but the executive has tabled only just over half of them (or 56 %), with fewer than a quarter being adopted by the co-legislators so far (24 %). The third priority, ‘An economy that works for people’, comes next (126), but more initiatives have been tabled (65 %) and a third of them adopted (30 %). The digital priority totals 103 initiatives planned, 55 % of which have already been submitted (57), and 28 adopted (27 %). For ‘A stronger Europe in the world’, an area with relatively few legislative initiatives by definition, and in contrast to the majority of the Commission’s priorities, almost nine out of ten (88 %) initiatives have already been tabled (see Section 4) and three in five adopted. A fair amount of work remains to be done for the other priorities: 40 % of the proposals have still to be submitted for ‘A Europe fit for the digital age’, 28 % for ‘Promoting our European way of life’ and 45 % for ‘A new push for democracy’ (see Sections 2, 5 and 6). This latter priority comes lowest in terms of number of initiatives announced (60).

This publication and the next will continue to monitor this Commission’s delivery in the final year of this legislative term, before the 2024 European elections. For more information on how the von der Leyen Commission’s agenda is proceeding, a proposal-by-proposal assessment is available on the European Parliament’s ‘Legislative Train Schedule‘ website, developed by EPRS.

A European Green Deal A Europe fit for the digital age An economy that works for people A stronger Europe in the world Promoting the European way of life A new push for European democracy

Read the complete in-depth analysis on ‘The six policy priorities of the von der Leyen Commission: State of play in spring 2023‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.