European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Clare Ferguson.

As the world continues attempting to achieve the tricky balancing act needed to tackle international aggression, deteriorating climate conditions and looming economic downturn, Parliament meets in plenary determined to ensure the best outcomes for European citizens. The latest ‘This is Europe’ debate is due to take place on Tuesday morning, with the President of Lithuania, Gitanas Nausėda. The President of the European Council, Charles Michel, is expected to attend the session on Wednesday morning, when Members are scheduled to hear European Council and Commission statements on the preparation of the European Council meeting of 23-24 March 2023. This will be the first time he appears in advance of a European Council meeting, rather than reporting to plenary after each meeting.

One of the biggest questions facing lawmakers since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is how we can ensure energy security in the European Union in 2023. Members of the European Parliament are expected to take the opportunity to scrutinise the European Commission’s action on this topic at ‘question time’ on Tuesday afternoon. Whereas concerted EU mitigation has avoided energy shortages to date, the bloc faces multiple challenges to continue to cut consumption, improve energy efficiency and diversify energy supplies (by using more renewables, domestic sources and LNG), whilst simultaneously working towards climate neutrality. All EU countries are currently net energy importers. With no signs of Russia ending its war, and climate change still a threat, the EU needs to redouble efforts to move from a short-term crisis response to true energy security.

In a joint debate scheduled for Monday evening, Members are set to discuss the outcome of the negotiations on the ‘Fit for 55’ proposals aimed at reducing EU greenhouse gas emissions by 55 % by 2030. Members are expected to vote on a provisional agreement, endorsed by the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI), on revising the Effort-sharing Regulation. The legislation sets binding targets for each EU country to reduce emissions not covered under the emissions trading system (ETS), which now need updated to reflect the EU’s greater climate ambition. The revision requires a just and socially fair transition, with Parliament insisting on reinforced corrective action, transparency, and the importance of scientific advice. Parliament is also expected to formally adopt a provisional agreement on revising the market stability reserve for the EU ETS, which adjusts the number of allowances in the reserve, the auctioning of which provides significant revenue for EU countries. Similarly, Members are set to formally adopt a text agreed with the co-legislators on revising the Land Use, Land-use Change and Forestry Regulation (LULUCF), which manages carbon removals through sustainable forestry and land management. While some of Parliament’s demands for a stronger framework, and environmental and economic monitoring, were not addressed, a review is scheduled for 2025.

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To further reduce the energy wasted through badly insulated and energy-inefficient buildings, Parliament is also expected to set its position for negotiations with the Council on accelerating action under the Energy Performance of Buildings Directive, following a debate on Monday evening. Parliament’s discussion follows a Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE) report, seeking to set an earlier zero-emissions deadline for all new buildings. Fossil fuel heating systems should disappear altogether by 2035, with residential buildings set to reach EPC class E by 2030. Where renovations would lead to rent rises not compensated by energy savings, however, the report seeks an exemption for public social housing.

During the ‘question time’ scheduled for Tuesday afternoon with the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the European Commission, Josep Borrell, Members are expected to seek answers regarding efforts to strengthen trans-Atlantic ties to face global multilateral challenges. While President Joe Biden’s administration has a more cooperative approach to the EU than that of his predecessor, long-running trade disputes have proven hard to reconcile, and the Inflation Reduction Act has recently fuelled significant concerns in Europe. Nevertheless, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has strengthened transatlantic ties.

In a joint debate on relations with the United Kingdom, scheduled for Tuesday evening, Members are set to discuss a Committee on Constitutional Affairs (AFCO) implementation report on the Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the EU. They are also expected to hear a Commission statement on the recently agreed Windsor framework. The framework seeks to improve the movement of goods under the Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland (the part of the Withdrawal Agreement seeking to avoid a hard border on the island of Ireland, and safeguard the all-island economy, the Good Friday (Belfast) Agreement and the integrity of the EU single market). The chairs of the European Parliament UK Contact Group and Parliament’s delegation to the EU-UK Parliamentary Partnership Assembly have welcomed the Windsor framework, but also promised detailed parliamentary scrutiny and thorough monitoring of its implementation.

Elsewhere, the EU is an active mediator in the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. While the EU is a particularly important trade and assistance partner for Armenia, Azerbaijan (considered an authoritarian regime) is an important EU energy supplier. Parliament seeks to advance discussion on a future Armenia-Azerbaijan peace treaty to address the root causes of the conflict. Members are consequently set to discuss Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) own-initiative reports on EU-Armenian relations and EU-Azerbaijan relations on Tuesday evening.

On Tuesday morning, Parliament is expected to consider a Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE) report, in view of setting a position for trilogue negotiations on the proposed data act, aimed at governing fair access to and use of data in the EU. The report seeks to clarify the data covered by the legislation, strengthen protection of trade secrets, ensure fairer contracts for customers and provide them with more power to switch provider. It also demands fair remuneration for access to data, and sets the terms for ‘public emergency’ access to privately held data.

The European Parliament is a staunch defender of those who act to protect human rights. On Wednesday afternoon, Members are set to debate a Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) own-initiative report assessing the framework for protecting human rights activists working in non-EU countries. The report calls for consistent application of the EU guidelines, to a wider range of rights defenders, and for specific support for those defending women’s sexual and reproductive rights. As well as debating the implementation of the EU guidelines on human rights defenders, Members are expected to hear statements from the Council and European Commission on human rights defenders protecting women’s sexual and reproductive health and rights.

Finally, Parliament is expected to debate a European Citizens’ Initiative on Thursday morning, backed by over 1 million citizens and calling for bee-friendly agriculture for a healthy environment. Reacting to declining bee populations, the initiative seeks an EU response to redressing the balance between priorities on food security, the environment and agricultural practices.

• Plenary session agenda
• Interaction between the European Parliament and the European Council: Parliament’s plenary debates on European Council conclusions
• Question Time: How to ensure energy security in the EU in 2023
• Revision of the Effort-sharing Regulation
• Revision of the market stability reserve for the EU emissions trading system
• Revision of the Land Use, Land-use Change and Forestry Regulation
• Energy Performance of Buildings Directive
• EU-Armenia relations
• EU-Azerbaijan relations
• Parliament’s position on the data act
• EU Guidelines on Human Rights Defenders
• ‘Save bees and farmers’: A European Citizens’ Initiative on bee-friendly agriculture for a healthy environment

Written by Guillaume Ragonnaud.

Over the past centuries, humanity has used an increasing share of the known elements to foster technological innovation, in particular metals. Today, a wide range of key technologies across all industries, from chips to batteries, medical imaging to tanks, rely on the unique physical properties of some specific critical raw materials (CRMs). Demand for CRMs is projected to skyrocket in the coming years. However, as the transition to ‘net-zero’ and the digital age is particularly materials-intensive, it remains uncertain whether supply will keep up with the expected needs. Moreover, recent pledges for higher defence spending will also require more CRMs.

The EU’s ambition to become a climate-neutral economy by 2050, and its ability to sustain the green and digital transitions and achieve strategic autonomy, all rely heavily on reliable, secure and resilient access to CRMs. CRM supply chains are global, complex, and fragile, which makes them vulnerable to a wide range of risks, including those linked to geopolitical tensions. The supply of CRMs is often more concentrated than that of fossil fuels. Furthermore, the EU’s reliance on imports of CRMs is extremely high, sometimes reaching 100 % (e.g. for rare earth elements – REEs). The EU’s strategic dependency in the supply of REEs is a notable example of the challenges linked to the EU’s over-dependence on supply chains dominated by third countries.

Over the past few years, to avoid replacing its dependency over fossil fuels by another, on CRMs, the EU has reviewed all relevant policies to foster its security of supply, mixing industrial, research and trade policies with international partnerships. It is expected to go further with the announced proposal for a CRM act. Possible measures that could help the EU tackle these challenges include diversifying CRM primary sourcing; promoting a fully circular approach to CRM use; and implementing contingency planning, mitigating and emergency measures, including stockpiling.

The European Parliament has promoted an integrated approach throughout the CRM value chain under a European strategy for CRMs, to increase the EU’s supply. It has recently emphasised that a new European Sovereignty Fund should increase European investment in the raw materials sector.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Securing Europe’s supply of critical raw materials: The material nature of the EU’s strategic goals‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marcin Grajewski.

The European Union faces a dilemma in how to respond to the US Inflation Reduction Act, which pours billions of dollars of federal funds into the American economy by favouring US-made clean energy and technology. The debate is reshaping the EU’s efforts to become a global leader in clean technologies to help combat climate change. It has also heated up the discussion on future EU industrial policy, pitting advocates of proactive State aid against defenders of the traditional EU competition policy which underpins the single market.

This note offers links to recent reports and commentaries from some major international think tanks and research institutes on the debates relating to EU clean tech and industrial policies, notably in the area of State aid.

The fiscal side of Europe’s energy crisis: The facts, problems and prospects
Bruegel, March 2023

How Europe should answer the US Inflation Reduction Act
Bruegel, February 2023

Building a North American electric vehicle supply chain
Brookings Institution, February 2023

How to reform federal permitting to accelerate clean energy infrastructure: A nonpartisan way forward
Brookings Institution, February 2023

National fiscal policy responses to the energy crisis
Bruegel, February 2023

Climate versus trade? Reconciling international subsidy rules with industrial decarbonisation
Bruegel, February 2023

The EU response to the United States Inflation Reduction Act
Bruegel, February 2023

For a green European industrial policy
German Council on Foreign Relations, February 2023

The EU’s hasty response to US subsidies is a major mistake in the making
German Council on Foreign Relations via Internationale Politik, February 2023

Just decarbonisation: An opportunity for EU-US cooperation
German Marshall Fund, February 2023

A Single Market 2.0 for the future: More social, more environmental and with a place for open strategic autonomy
Heinrich Böll Stiftung, February 2023

State aid, unequal distribution of subsidies and fragmentation of the single market
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, February 2023

Inflation Reduction Act versus Pacte vert : Les divergences transatlantiques sur la transition énergétique
Institut français des relations internationales, February 2023

Industrial Policy: An EU response to the challenge of competitiveness
Irish Institute of International and European Affairs, February 2023

The future of industrial policy and the European Single Market
Irish Institute of International and European Affairs, February 2023

Comment l’Europe répond à la rivalité sino-américaine
Jacques Delors Institut, February 2023

The US-EU race for green subsidies can help fight climate change
Peterson Institute for International Economics, February 2023

The US-China technology war and its effects on Europe
Real Instituto Elcano, February 2023

Lessons learned from state-level climate policies to accelerate U.S. climate action
Wilson Centre, February 2023

The European Single Market turns 30: Time for Europe to celebrate but not rest on its laurels 
Bertelsmann Stiftung, January 2023

The EC conditionally approves state aid to Uniper and SEFE
Centre for Eastern Studies, January 2023

Europe needs to dial down its anxiety over the Inflation Reduction Act
Centre for European Reform, January 2023

Turning down the heat on transatlantic tech
Centre for European Reform, January 2023

Caught in the crossfire: Why EU states should discuss strategic export controls
European Council on Foreign Relations, January 2023

Made in Europe: An EU Green Industrial Plan to respond to the challenge of US and Chinese protectionism
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, January 2023

Bringing economics back into EU and US chips policy
Brookings Institution, December 2023

Biden’s ‘America First’ economic policy threatens rift With Europe
Council on Foreign Relations, December 2023

Le plan de soutien du gouvernement allemand aux ménages et entreprises: Comment compenser le double choc énergétique et économique?
Institut français des relations internationales, December 2022

Walking out of the woods: EU industrial policy between the energy crisis and decarbonisation
Istituto Affari Internazionali, December 2022

Why US allies are upset over electric vehicle subsidies in the Inflation Reduction Act
Peterson Institute for International Economics, December 2022

Deglobalisation and protectionism
Bruegel, November 2022

In a green subsidy race, the EU should not imitate the US
Centre for European Policy Studies, November 2022

A compass to guide EU policy in support of business competitiveness
European Council for International Political Economy, November 2022

The impacts of EU strategy autonomy policies: A primer for member states
European Council for International Political Economy, November 2022

Applying an intergenerational mindset to European technology investments
European Policy Centre, November 2022

Technology and industrial policy in an age of systemic competition
German Council on Foreign Relations, February 2023

Read this briefing on ‘Industrial policy, State aid and clean tech‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Sebastian Clapp and Eric Pichon.

On 8 March 2023, the European Commission is set to adopt an update of its first EU maritime security strategy from 2014. The EU is a one-of-a-kind maritime actor, a fact that brings both opportunities and responsibilities. It has been argued that, if the EU-27 were to combine the capacities and capabilities of their navies, they would form one of the world’s largest maritime powers. There is therefore space for better integration of capabilities and greater coherence among the EU’s tools to promote its multi-dimensional strategic maritime interests. As around 90 % of global goods are traded via maritime routes, freedom of navigation, security, sustainability and respect for international law are crucial for the EU. These routes are, however, becoming increasingly contested and restricted, reflecting new patterns of global power distribution.

The EU’s common security and defence policy instruments, particularly its missions and operations abroad, are the most visible manifestation of its maritime actorness. The EU currently has two naval military operations: EUNAVFOR Atalanta in the western part of the Indian Ocean, and EUNAVFOR MED Irini in the central part of the Mediterranean Sea. In following the orientations provided by its maritime security strategy and the Strategic Compass, the EU is aiming to increase its capacity and reliability as a maritime security actor. One example is its coordinated maritime presences (CMPs), launched in January 2021 with a pilot case in the Gulf of Guinea, and another CMP launched in February 2022 in the north-western Indian Ocean, to boost the EU’s maritime capacity and global outreach. Another is the EU’s action to boost its maritime defence capabilities through the various post-2016 initiatives that aim to incentivise collaborative projects. Finally, the EU has also enhanced its cooperation with partners, in particular with NATO, in ensuring maritime security in the transatlantic space, although political obstacles remain.

This updates a February 2021 briefing by Tania Lațici, Eric Pichon and Branislav Stanicek.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Charting a course through stormy waters: The EU as a maritime security actort‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

European maritime security landscape

Written by Rosamund Shreeves (1st edition).

Violence directed against a woman because she is a woman, or that affects women disproportionately (‘gender-based violence against women’) is a violation of fundamental rights, and a major obstacle to gender equality in all EU Member States. Despite increased attention, national legislation does not offer equal protection for women against all forms of gender-based violence across the EU, and there are significant gaps in the measures adopted at EU level.

On 8 March 2022, the European Commission adopted a legislative proposal on combating violence against women and domestic violence, to enshrine minimum standards in EU law for criminalising certain forms of gender-based violence, improve access to justice, protection and support for victims, ensure coordination between relevant services and prevent these types of crime. On 12 January 2023, Parliament’s joint rapporteurs from the Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality (FEMM) and the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) presented their draft report to a joint meeting of the two committees. On 28 February 2023, a further joint committee meeting took note of 1 481 amendments tabled on the draft report.

Versions

• March 2023: Combating violence against women and domestic violence (1st edition)

Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on combating violence against women and domestic violence Committees responsible:Women’s Rights and Gender Equality (FEMM) and Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE), jointly under Rule 58COM(2022) 245 final
25.5.2022Rapporteur:Frances Fitzgerald Frances (EPP, Ireland)
Evin Incir (S&D, Sweden)2022/0167(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Ordinary legislative procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council on equal footing
– formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Committee vote on draft report

Written by Györgyi Mácsai, Members’ Research Service (EPRS) with Mira Manini Tiwari, GlobalStat, EUI.

Our infographic provides an insight into the economic performance of Nigeria compared to the EU, and looks at the trade dynamics between the two. While GDP growth in Nigeria recovered quickly after a slight recession in 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic, a growing unemployment rate combined with rising inflation represent an economic challenge to the African country. Nigeria is an oil exporter, and the absence of local oil refinery capacities provides an opportunity for some EU Member States – mainly Belgium and the Netherlands – to import crude oil and re-export it to Nigeria after refining. The trade in petroleum oils represents 93 % of total EU imports and 53 % of total EU exports of goods to Nigeria.

Read this infographic on ‘Nigeria: Economic indicators and trade with EU‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Ionel Zamfir.

Progress on gender equality at risk

International Women’s Day is a good opportunity to take stock of progress achieved on gender equality and women rights. This year however, global indicators do not provide much reason to celebrate. Where not completely stalled by the COVID‑19 pandemic, progress has been slim, and the new economic challenges caused by the conflict in Europe present another formidable obstacle.

Only in the area where disparity between men and women is the greatest – power – has some progress been seen. The 2022 Gender Equality Index, published by the European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE), found that, due to the impact of the COVID‑19 pandemic, gender equality in the European Union would have regressed without the gains made in the power domain, and particularly in economic decision-making. Nevertheless, there were also exceptions: the power equality index fell compared to pre-pandemic levels in Estonia and Romania. On the other hand, gender equality at work and in knowledge stagnated or regressed in most EU countries.

Note: the gender equality index in the area of political power looks at the representation of women and men as members of parliament (both houses), members of government (senior and junior ministers), and members of regional/local assemblies.

The situation is by no means better at global level. The 2022 Global Gender Gap report published by the World Economic Forum (a global think tank) warns that progress on gender equality globally has stalled because of ‘the economic and social consequences of the pandemic and geopolitical conflict’, and could even go into reverse.

Greater participation of women in economic and political life has multiple benefits. For example, in the digital sector and economy – the focus of this year’s session of the United Nations Commission on the Status of Women – data show that the women’s participation in scientific and technological sectors in Europe remains low. Only one in five information and communication technology (ICT) specialists and one in three science, technology, engineering and/or mathematics (STEM) graduates are women. The drop-out rate from digital careers among 30‑44 year old women working in the digital sector is higher than that among men. This is likely related to motherhood and caregiving responsibilities. In addition, a significant gender salary gap in the ICT sector persists. Recruiting more women in the technology sector could be pivotal in closing the talent gap (where the ICT sector faces an unprecedented shortage of ICT professionals). The European Institute for Gender Equality stresses that closing the gender gap in STEM careers would help increase EU per capita GDP by 2.2‑3.0 % by 2050.

In the political area, several Member States still lag behind on women’s participation despite its multiple benefits: lending legitimacy to governing institutions and better representing women’s experience, interests and needs. This is all the more important as the current cost of living crisis affects women more severely. On the other hand, new obstacles have emerged. The political backlash against women rights has continued and intensified. Women’s sexual and reproductive health and rights have come under renewed attack, across the world as well as in the EU. In Poland, which has adopted a draconian anti-abortion law, defenders of women’s reproductive rights such as Justyna Wydrzyńska have faced judicial harassment.

Women in the shadow of war

In Europe, war has reminded the public of the horrific effects it can have on women in conflict areas, as well as of the need for international justice to hold those responsible for such crimes accountable. Women are among the most badly affected by the conflict in Ukraine, whether as victims of war crimes and crimes against humanity, or because of the consequences of war, exposing them to food and energy deprivation, health risks, job losses, and an increased burden of care in the absence of men sent to the frontline. However, Ukrainian women have shown their courage and resilience in the face of adversity: many have been active in the army or have provided relief to those affected by the war. They have led civil society initiatives to reform their country and prepare it for EU membership, although their representation of women in Ukrainian politics remains low.

Elsewhere in Europe, the current generation of women leaders (such as Heads of State or Government in Estonia, Finland, Italy or Moldova, the President of the European Parliament, the President of the European Commission, or the Foreign Minister in Germany, for instance), has reacted to the Russian aggression in Ukraine with strong determination and commitment to the respect of international principles.

The war in Ukraine has had a devastating impact on women all over the world. According to a report by United Nations Women, Global Gendered Impacts of the Ukraine Crisis, it has aggravated food insecurity in developing countries (already more severe for women than men), and has exposed women to increased health risks due to the energy crisis.

The cost of living crisis in Europe: impact on women

In the European Union, the ongoing cost of living crisis has added another layer to the negative effects of the pandemic on gender inequality. Energy and food prices have spiked, driven by the serious risk of shortages on the EU and world markets. While shortages have not yet materialised, inflation looks set to persist and, as a result, ever more people are coming under increased financial pressure and at greater risk of energy poverty – particularly women.

Existing statistical data provides an albeit incomplete picture of the distinct ways in which rising energy prices affect men and women. The graph below, based on Eurostat data, shows that households with children headed by a single adult have been hardest hit by rising energy prices. Their share under all three dimensions (arrears on utility bills, capacity to keep the home warm, and living in buildings with leaks or rotten window frames) analysed in the graph is higher in almost all cases than for the average household category. Based on Eurostat statistics from 2021, women make up 83 % of single-parent households and are therefore the most likely to be affected by the energy crisis. A Eurofound survey from the spring of 2022 confirmed these trends. It found that the share of women who were late in paying their energy bills surged in the spring of 2022, and that single women and single mothers were more likely than other groups to struggle to pay their energy bills.

Existing inequalities among men and women compound vulnerability to energy poverty, particularly those related to income, such as the gender pay gap, the gender pension gap, and women’s more limited possibilities to work compared to men because of their disproportionate burden of care for children and other close relatives. Women are over-represented in relatively low-paying sectors, such as care, health and education, and in part-time work, and therefore more vulnerable to the energy crisis, which has had a severe impact on those with a low income.

Eurostat indicators related to energy poverty in the EU (2020-2021)

Sources:

• Living in homes with a leaking roof, damp walls, floors or foundation, or rot in window frames or floor (2020)
• Unable to keep home warm (2021)
• With arrears in utility bills (2021)

Age too plays a role in women’s vulnerability to energy poverty. With women in the EU living longer than men (an age gap that in some EU Member States reaches up to 10 years), and often receiving lower pensions, they are at an increased risk of energy poverty. Age also makes people particularly sensitive to cold and exposes them to increased health risks.

While the energy crisis has put a strain on ordinary citizens, particularly those most vulnerable, energy companies have made record profits. Against this background, data from the International Energy Agency demonstrates that the energy sector has historically been and continues to be male-dominated. As of 2018, there were 76 % fewer women than men working in the energy sector (in 29, mostly EU, countries investigated) and the average gender wage gap conditional on skills was -15 %.

In line with the obligation imposed by EU legislation to protect vulnerable energy consumers, EU countries have tried to mitigate the impact of rising energy prices on the general population, and in certain cases specifically on the most vulnerable persons, mainly through reduced tariffs and cash benefits. A more comprehensive approach – one that goes beyond the measures taken to alleviate the direct impact of rising energy prices on women – necessarily entails tackling structural inequalities, particularly in income, between women and men. EU action has historically made a difference in this important area. Equal pay for equal work, or work of equal value between men and women, has been a right in the EU since 1957. Yet, implementation and enforcement of the equal pay for equal work principle remain a challenge The painful truth is … women in the European Union are paid on average 13 % less than men (Eurostat, 2020), which equals more than one month’s salary. One concern is that, because of a lack of pay transparency, pay discrimination often goes undetected, and victims face difficulties in obtaining redress. The adoption of the proposed EU pay transparency directive (which is presently going through the legislative procedure, with the Parliament and the Council having reached agreement in December 2022), could be an important step in closing the gender pay gap.

European Parliament position

In its resolution of 5 July 2022 on women’s poverty in Europe, the European Parliament underlined that women’s poverty increases the risk of energy poverty, among other risks, and that policy measures tailored specifically to single parents are needed. It further stressed ‘that access to affordable utilities must be guaranteed to low-income households, and in particular older women and single mothers’. In its 2021 opinion on the proposed directive on energy efficiency, Parliament’s Women’s Rights and Gender Equality Committee (FEMM) called on Member States to adopt specific measures to support women, combat the feminisation of energy poverty and include all citizens in the green transition.

With regard to women directly affect by the war in Ukraine, in a 5 May 2022 resolution on the impact of the war on women, the Parliament strongly condemned the use of sexual and gender-based violence as a weapon of war, stressing that it is a war crime.

Related EPRS publications for International Women’s Day

• Gender aspects of energy poverty, EPRS At a Glance, I. Zamfir, 15 February 2023
• Women in politics in the EU: State of play, , R. Shreeves, I. Zamfir, EPRS Briefing, March 2023 update
• Equal pay for equal work between men and women: Pay transparency and enforcement mechanisms, M. Lecerf, EPRS Briefing, 8 February 2023
• Women in the digital sector, S. di Luca, EPRS At a Glance, 2 March 2023
• For more EPRS publications related to women rights and gender equality, see Topical Digest Gender equality across policy areas, March 2023

Related EPRS multimedia Video on Gender aspects of energy poverty: Chronicles on Care work in the EU:

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Written by Marcin Grajewski.

The President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, and the British Prime Minister, Rishi Sunak, have hailed the new political agreement between the European Union and the United Kingdom as the opening of a new chapter in relations between the two. Ties have been uneasy ever since the UK left the EU, more than three years ago, hindering the development of much-needed cooperation in areas such as defence and scientific research.

The new agreement in principle, called the Windsor Framework, modifies trade rules for Northern Ireland, which have been a source of heated debate in the post-Brexit UK. The deal seeks to resolve tensions caused by the Ireland/Northern Ireland protocol, a complex agreement which sets trading rules for Northern Ireland – allowing it to access the EU single market and thus avoid a ‘hard border’ on the island of Ireland – that London agreed before the UK left the EU, but has since maintained are unworkable.

This note offers links to recent reports and commentaries from some major international think tanks and research institutes on the implications of Brexit and on EU-UK relations.

Northern Ireland Protocol: The Windsor Framework
House of Commons Library, February 2023

The protocol deal is a win for Sunak, and the EU
Centre for European Reform, February 2023

A new momentum grows for UK-France defence cooperation
Chatham House, February 2023

L’Europe puissance: Maintenant ou jamais
Fondation Robert Schuman, February 2023

Can facts change views on migration?
LSE blog, February 2023

The Northern Ireland Protocol
Policy Exchange, February 2023

How will a UK-EU deal land in Northern Ireland
UK in a Changing Europe, February 2023

Anger, Brexit and losers consent
UK in a Changing Europe, February 2023

Will we see a closer UK-EU relationship in the long term?
UK in a Changing Europe, February 2023

What has Brexit meant for the NHS
UK in a Changing Europe, February 2023

Who will repair broken Britain?
Carnegie Europe, January 2023

Early impacts of the post-Brexit immigration system on the UK labour market
Centre for European Reform, January 2023

UK-Europe relations finally head in the right direction
Chatham House, January 2023

Public support is on the rise but the road to re-joining the EU would not be smooth
LSE blog, January 2023

Will the UK break apart?
National Institute of Economic and Social Research, January 2023

Has Brexit become less divisive?
UK in a Changing Europe, January 2023

The impact of the post-Brexit migration system on the UK labour market
UK in a Changing Europe, January 2023

The cost of Brexit to June 2022
Centre for European Reform, December 2022

Why the UK must deliver on Nordic-Baltic security
Chatham House, December 2022

Culture notes: The EU and Britain can still be friends
Chatham House, December 2022

Beyond Brexit: Promoting workers’ rights, decent jobs, and standards through UK-EU domestic advisory groups
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, December 2022

Environmental regulation in the UK after Brexit
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, December 2022

Britain is a political and economic mess but comfortable in its skin
Barcelona Centre for International Affairs, November 2022

EU-UK relations are low on Rishi Sunak‘s pre-budget agenda: Though change would benefit both sides
Bertelsmann Stiftung, November 2022

UK science and technology after Brexit: How to fix it
Centre for European Reform, November 2022

Stop banging on about Brexit: Fat chance of that happening in the UK
Friends of Europe, November 2023

The reappearance of the Brexit debate in the UK: Keeping an eye on the geopolitical ball
Friends of Europe, November 2023

Accountability after Brexit: Parliament and the UK–EU relationship
Institute for Government, November 2022

Rishi Sunak’s three Brexit headaches
Institute for Government, November 2022

The next era of UK-EU security relations
Policy Exchange, November 2022

Responses to Brexit: Elite perceptions in Germany, France, Poland and Ireland
UK in a Changing Europe, November 2022

How has Brexit changed EU-UK trade flows?
Economic and Social Research Institute, October 2022

The end of Brexit fever
European Council on Foreign Relations, October 2022

Trade, migration and Brexit
UK in a Changing Europe, October 2022

Read this briefing on ‘A new chapter in EU-UK ties?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Citizens often turn to the European Parliament to ask how the European Union (EU) financially support EU countries and candidate countries struck by natural disasters.

The European Union Solidarity Fund (EUSF) enables the EU to provide effective support to an EU country, or to a candidate country to the EU, when dealing with the effects of a major natural disaster.

The Solidarity Fund was set up in 2002 to respond to major natural disasters following the severe floods in Central Europe in the summer of that year. It is one of the main EU instruments for post-disaster recovery and a tangible expression of EU solidarity.

Twenty years of achievements

Between 2002 and the end of 2022, the Solidarity Fund mobilised over €8.2 billion for interventions in 127 disasters (107 natural disasters, including floods, forest fires, earthquakes, storms and drought and 20 health emergencies) in 24 EU countries (plus the United Kingdom) and 3 candidate countries (Albania, Montenegro and Serbia).

Since April 2020, in the framework of the EU effort to fight the coronavirus pandemic, the scope of the Solidarity Fund was extended to cover major public health emergencies. This includes assistance to the population in the event of health crises and measures to limit the spread of an infectious disease.

Application process for aid

The Solidarity Fund is not a rapid response instrument for dealing with the immediate effects of a natural disaster. The EU can only grant financial aid to a country that requests it after an application and budgetary process which can take several months to complete.

The affected EU country or candidate country must send an application for aid within 12 weeks of the disaster, or the first action taken against it, depending on the type of event. The European Commission receives and assesses the application and – if the application is accepted – proposes an amount of aid to the European Parliament and the Council of the EU (EU countries’ governments), who have to approve the sum before it can be paid out.

The country or region is then responsible for distribution of the aid and auditing the way it is spent. The aid can generally be used to rebuild infrastructure and shelter displaced populations, or in the event of a health emergency, to provide medical treatment and protect the general population from the spread of a disease.

Review of the Solidarity Fund

In a 2019 evaluation of the Solidarity Fund, the European Commission found it was effective and well-received by beneficiary countries, as well as complementary to related policies. However, European Commission reports draw attention to the long time countries and regions have to wait to receive funding, while industry experts warn that the Fund could run out of money should several disasters take place within a short period of time.

In an October 2021 resolution, the European Parliament explicitly called on the European Commission to propose a revision of the Solidarity Fund, to establish a more targeted, effective and timely rapid response mechanism for areas and regions prone to specific or recurrent natural disasters.

In an earlier resolution of May 2021, on the review of the EU Solidarity Fund, Parliament invited the European Commission to:

• continue simplifying and speeding up the application procedure for EU countries, to ensure a faster response to disasters and emergencies;
• better take into account disasters on a regional scale;
• assess the specific impacts of drought and to address them in the future regulation;
• focus, as far as possible, on the regions that are most at risk of major or regional natural disasters or major public health emergencies (for instance, isolated regions and regions that are prone to intense seismic or volcanic activity);
• oblige beneficiary states to inform citizens about EU financial support.

Parliament also believes that a reassessment of the EU Solidarity Fund’s budget might be necessary in the future, to ensure that the budget is large enough to deal effectively with major and regional natural disasters and major public health emergencies.

Further information

• European Union Solidarity Fund, European Parliamentary Research Service, Briefing, September 2021
• The Solidarity Fund, European Parliament, Factsheet
• EU Solidarity Fund, European Commission
• COVID-19 – EU Solidarity Fund, European Commission
• European Union Solidarity Fund – Performance, European Commission

Keep sending your questions to the Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (Ask EP)! We reply in the EU language that you use to write to us.

Written by Carmen-Cristina Cîrlig (1st edition).

The confiscation of criminals’ illicit profits is considered an effective tool in the fight against organised crime, identified as a major threat to EU security. However, despite the comprehensive set of EU rules on asset freezing and confiscation, there are still obstacles on the path to recovering criminal assets, as shown by the European Commission’s June 2020 evaluation of the 2014 directive on freezing and confiscation of instrumentalities and proceeds of crime and the 2007 Council decision on asset recovery offices (AROs).

To address this situation, in May 2022 the European Commission adopted a proposal to amend the 2014 directive with a view to strengthening the EU’s asset recovery and confiscation rules and reinforcing the powers of AROs.

The European Economic and Social Committee adopted its opinion on the proposal on 14 December 2022. In the European Parliament, the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs is in charge of the file and published its draft report on 14 February 2023.

Versions

• March 2023: Revision of the EU rules on asset recovery and confiscation (1st edition)

Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on asset recovery and confiscation Committee responsible:Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE)COM(2022) 245 final
25.5.2022Rapporteur:Loránt Vincze (EPP, Romania)2022/0167(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Caterina Chinnici (S&D, Italy)
Malik Azmani (Renew, Netherlands)
Sergey Lagodinsky (Greens/EFA, Germany)
Nicolaus Fest (Identity and Democracy Group, Germany)
Assita Kanko (ECR, Belgium)
José Gusmão (GUE/NGL, Portugal)Ordinary legislative procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council on equal footing
– formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Committee vote

Written by Agnieszka Widuto.

The energy crisis of 2022 has brought new challenges for the EU electricity market. Concerns over very high prices (driven in part by their coupling with gas prices), security of energy supply, and the need to increase decarbonisation have sparked discussions on the need to redesign the EU’s electricity market.

The EU has already taken a number of short-term measures to contain the energy crisis. The REPowerEU plan of May 2022 was introduced to phase out Russian fossil fuel imports, diversify supplies, boost energy savings and accelerate the clean energy transition. Other measures, focusing more specifically on electricity, included a Council regulation of October 2022 on an emergency intervention to address high energy prices, which introduced electricity demand reduction targets and set a revenue cap on inframarginal electricity producers, i.e. those producing electricity below the cost of the most expensive ‘marginal’ fuel source.

More long-term structural electricity market reform aims to make the market more resilient, contain excessive price volatility and ensure secure energy supplies, especially from clean sources. The reform is expected to focus on the following areas: making electricity bills less dependent on short-term fossil fuel prices, e.g. by reducing the role of gas in short-term markets; pricing inframarginal technologies on the basis of their true production costs; boosting the role of renewables; better protecting consumers against price volatility and empowering them to produce and share electricity; and improving market transparency, surveillance and integrity. There is also an ongoing discussion as to whether the current merit order system based on marginal pricing, effectively responsible for coupling electricity prices with gas prices, should be reformed.

The Commission is expected to present its legislative proposal on the electricity market reform in mid-March 2023.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Reforming the EU electricity market‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Antonio Albaladejo Román.

Food insecurity remains one of the most pressing global challenges. The COVID-19 pandemic and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine have made the food crisis significantly worse in recent years, threatening millions of people worldwide. Despite some promising trends, food inflation remains consistently high, and it depends on a volatile environmental and geopolitical context. The EU has devoted substantial resources to tackling the immediate effects of the crisis. However, in the long run, the key to food security will be sustainable agri-food systems.

2021: Hunger on the rise

Global food security was already under strain before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The disruptions caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and the subsequent economic rebound led to severe bottlenecks in global agri-food chains and skyrocketing energy prices in the second half of 2021. In addition to fuelling inflationary pressures on consumers and food producers, the rising cost of energy also affected the price and availability of fertilisers, a critical input for agriculture whose manufacture is heavily dependent on natural gas. As global food prices surged, the number of people facing hunger worldwide rose to 828 million in 2021 – 150 million more than pre-pandemic levels. Nearly 2.3 billion people (30 % of the world’s population) were facing moderate or severe food insecurity. Acknowledging the gravity of the situation, United Nations (UN) Secretary-General António Guterres warned during the UN Food Systems Summit in September 2021 that hunger was ‘on the rise again’. The disruptions felt across the world also hit the EU. In January 2022, annual inflation in the euro area reached 5.1 % (3.5 % for food, alcohol and tobacco), up from 0.9 % in January 2021 (1.5 % for food, alcohol and tobacco), and basic products such as bread became more expensive for EU consumers (7.3 % year-on-year increase in January 2022, up from 1.7 % in January 2021).

2022: Russia invades Ukraine

Russia’s unprovoked attack on Ukraine in February 2022 exacerbated existing challenges to global food security, pushing energy and food prices to historic heights. Before the war, Russia and Ukraine accounted for 34 % of global exports of wheat, 27 % of barley, 17 % of maize and 55 % of sunflower oil. Russian and Ukrainian agricultural exports are particularly important for many African and Middle Eastern countries, where food security was already unstable. Moscow’s exports of natural gas and mineral fertilisers influenced global agricultural markets, and Russia was the world’s largest exporter of nitrogen-based fertilisers, second largest of potassium and third largest of phosphorus (the three most important mineral substances for fertiliser production). To prevent the food crisis from worsening, the EU, the United States and other like-minded countries avoided imposing sanctions on agricultural and food products; Moscow meanwhile weaponised its energy, grain and fertiliser exports. Russia deliberately targeted agricultural production facilities, blockading Ukrainian Black Sea ports for months to prevent Kyiv’s agricultural exports (of which 80 % were seaborne) – until the UN–Türkiye-brokered Black Sea Grain initiative and EU solidarity lanes allowed exports to resume.

The repercussions of Russia’s war for international agricultural markets were swift and severe. In March 2022, the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) reported an all-time peak in global food prices, which would remain high despite subsequent easing. Fertiliser prices rose sharply as well; this was due to export restrictions in several countries and production cutbacks owing to high energy costs. Humanitarian and non-governmental organisations reported increased difficulties in assisting food-stressed regions on account of rising costs and higher numbers of people in need. Although food availability was never at risk in the EU, European farmers faced higher costs for their main inputs (such as energy, fertilisers and animal feed), which aggravated food inflation. EU fertiliser prices jumped by 149 % in September 2022, following a 70 % fall in European ammonia production owing to high energy prices. The EU also imports large quantities of Ukrainian maize (an average of 11 million tonnes annually) and oilseeds, which are critical for animal nutrition. Finally, extreme weather events in Europe caused significant reductions in key crop yields. As a result, euro area inflation rose to 7.4 % in March 2022, and continued climbing to a 10.6 % peak in November, with food, alcohol and tobacco seeing the highest inflationary increase over 2022 after energy, reaching 13.8 % in December.

2023: What outlook for food security?

Although global food prices fell for the 10th consecutive month in January 2023, food inflation remains consistently high in many countries, reaching 14.1 % in January in the euro area. This mismatch is the result of both a reduced price pass-through from global to consumer prices, and ongoing geopolitical uncertainty fuelling price instability despite some positive trends. Energy prices, which affect farmers and fertiliser producers, already started to decline in the second half of 2022. In addition to containing inflationary pressure on agri-food chains, lower energy prices might influence the use of fertilisers by farmers in 2023, with direct effects on future crop yields. The EU solidarity lanes and the Black Sea Grain initiative have continued to facilitate the safe export of Ukrainian foodstuffs to international markets. The initiative had allowed over 18 million tonnes of grain and foodstuffs to be exported as of January 2023 (of which over 50 % to developing countries) and the agreement is due for renewal in March, after the latest extension. Should Russia refuse to renew the deal, Ukrainian seaborne exports could again be at risk, with dire implications for international markets and food-stressed countries. Even if Ukrainian grain exports were to continue, the country’s agricultural output is likely to be significantly smaller compared with the 2021-2022 season. Indeed, many of the positive trends are highly dependent on geopolitical and environmental factors, and could change abruptly. Weather shocks during 2023 also warrant special attention. Persistent drought, which has severely affected food security in east Africa, is forecast to continue. In Europe, a repetition of the water and heat stress experienced in 2022 could lead to diminished crops yields again this year, affecting EU consumers and global food security, given the bloc’s role as an agricultural exporter.

EU action to strengthen food security

EU concerns over food security are not new, but Russia’s war on Ukraine has made them top political priorities. The current food crisis is the result of several drivers, some of which are circumstantial and already addressed by the EU and the international community. Following the EU leaders’ March 2022 Versailles Declaration, the European Commission put forward a series of measures to ensure global food security and food affordability. Internationally, EU solidarity lanes have allowed Ukraine to export over 23 million tonnes of agricultural products to global markets. The EU has earmarked €8 billion between 2020 and 2024 for global food security, and will further support the food systems of around 70 countries under the 2021‑2027 multiannual financial framework. Acting multilaterally, the Commission is a key partner in eight global coalitions to strengthen food security, and has actively advocated lifting agricultural export restrictions.

Domestically, the Commission has pursued the double objective of mitigating the war’s immediate impact on EU farmers and consumers while boosting agricultural production to meet global demand. This support for farmers affected by higher input costs included advances of direct payments, a €500 million package, and temporary State aid measures. The Commission also permitted the temporary use of fallow land to increase food and animal feed production, and an easing of import requirements for animal feed. Member States were also encouraged to reduce value added tax rates for staple foods, and use the Fund for European Aid to the Most Deprived to cushion the effect of food inflation on lower-income households.

To increase the EU’s agricultural resilience to external shocks, the Commission aims to reduce Europe’s dependency on imports of critical inputs, in particular fertilisers and plant-based proteins for animal feed. Over the long term, the decisive challenge for food security in Europe and the world will be the transition to sustainable and resilient food systems capable of feeding a growing population. This objective is at the core of the farm to fork strategy, which aims to make EU food production more resilient and environmentally neutral while remaining competitive and able to provide EU consumers with affordable and nutritious food. To that end, in a March 2022 resolution, the European Parliament called for a reinforced European strategic autonomy in food, feed and fertilisers. In a July 2022 resolution, Parliament encouraged the EU to make the global transformation to sustainable food systems a central objective of its international financial instruments.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Food security in 2023: EU response to an evolving crisis‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Issam Hallak (1st edition).

In the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, which showed the need for more sophisticated and demanding capital requirements for banks, new regulations were agreed at international level – known as the Basel III Agreements. In the EU, they were implemented essentially by amending the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD) and adopting the Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR).

On 27 October 2021, the Commission tabled two interconnected proposals to amend the CRR and the CRD, respectively. The objective is two-fold: (i) implementing the final arrangements of the Basel Agreement; and (ii) enhancing the harmonisation of banking supervision in the EU.

The main amendments concern the introduction of an ‘output floor’, i.e. a lower bound for minimum capital requirements calculated using banks’ own methods, consideration of environmental, social and governance (ESG) components in risk assessment, and harmonisation of the selection of board members and directors of credit institutions.

The Council issued its common approach in November 2022. The decision by Parliament’s ECON Committee to enter negotiations was confirmed in plenary on 15 February 2023.

Versions

• February 2023: Urban wastewater treatment: Updating EU rule (1st edition)

Proposal for amending Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 as regards requirements for credit risk, credit valuation adjustment risk, operational risk, market risk and the output floor; Proposal for amending Directive 2014/59/EU; amending Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 as regards requirements for credit risk, credit valuation adjustment risk, operational risk, market risk and the output floor Committee responsible:Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON)COM(2021) 663, 27.10.2021;
COM(2021) 664, 27.10.2021Rapporteur:Jonás Fernández (S&D, Spain)2021/0341(COD);
2021/0342(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Othmar Karas (EPP, Austria), Eric Poulsen (Renew, Denmark) 2021/0341(COD) / Gilles Boyer (Renew, France) 2021/0342(COD), Ville Niinistö (Greens/EFA, Finland), Marco Zanni (ID, Italy), Johan Van Overtveldt (ECR, Belgium), Dimitrios Papadimoulis (The Left, Greece)Ordinary legislative procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council on equal footing
– formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Trilogue

Written by Irmgard Anglmayer and Susanna Tenhunen.

COVID-19 was not the first epidemic, and it will not be the last of its kind. It is one of the most recent in a set of epidemics the World Health Organization (WHO) has designated Public Health Emergencies of International Concern (PHEIC) since 2009. Although experts had warned of the prospect of a pandemic, the sheer scale, suddenness, and serious social and economic consequences of COVID‑19 took the world by surprise. The outbreak provided a timely reminder of health as a public good. It also emphasised the need to prioritise preparedness and long-term prevention at all levels of governance, from local to global, and to ensure an effective response capacity.

From its outbreak, the COVID-19 pandemic cast unprecedented strain on European health systems and European solidarity. Looking back from today’s perspective, the common European response was a success story. Member States’ initial national containment measures and lock downs were limited and insufficient to stop the spread of the coronavirus. The early lessons from the pandemic show that cross-border challenges to health systems and economies, including supply chain problems, vaccine development and procurement and measures to sustain the economy, could no longer be overcome by Member States acting alone. Public health measures needed to be consistent, coherent, transparent and coordinated, to ensure maximal effectiveness.

This EPRS study on the EU’s Public health response to the COVID‑19 pandemic assesses the lessons learned from the pandemic, the current state of play, challenges, and opportunities for improvement to public health governance in the EU, and includes a series of recommendations to strengthen the EU’s resilience and preparedness for future cross-border health threats. It was drawn up at the request of the European Parliament’s Special Committee on the COVID‑19 pandemic: lessons learned and recommendations for the future (COVI).

The study covers five main areas (or ‘pillars’):

Integrated pillars 1 and 2 analyse the EU vaccines strategy and study its impact. In particular, they examine the role played by the European Medicines Agency (EMA) in activating the fast-track procedure to issue conditional marketing authorisation for COVID‑19 vaccines, which allowed timely and equitable access. In this context, the study also touches upon transparency issues at the different stages of vaccine research, development and manufacturing, authorisation and procurement.

The study gives an overview of national vaccination strategies in the 27 EU Member States and discusses some factors behind the differences in countries’ vaccination progress and coverage. The analysis on vaccine uptake builds on Vaccine Tracker data collected by the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC). A substantial variation is found between EU countries in terms of vaccine uptake, with a higher vaccine coverage rate in the older age groups. The study reveals that vaccine hesitancy, infodemic, and trust in public authorities are some of the pivotal elements underpinning the effectiveness of national vaccination programmes. In some Member States, initial reluctance turned into vaccination acceptance, while it remains relatively high in others.

Finally, pillars 1 and 2 discuss the scientific evidence regarding vaccine effectiveness, based on clinical trials and epidemiological studies. A correlation analysis shows a general negative relationship between COVID‑19 mortality rates/excess mortality rates and national vaccination progress. However, the fact that excess mortality rates were still high in 2022, suggests that vaccines need to be supplemented by other policies and tools to restore EU public health.

Pillar 3 discusses effectiveness, coherence, and the European added value of the EU’s public health response to COVID‑19. In this regard, it presents an early ex-post assessment of EU action. The study finds that after a slow start, the EU was very effective in mobilising a variety of resources in terms of public health, financial support and civil protection, to provide emergency support and long-term structural support within the EU. The European Health Union, the EU vaccines strategy, the joint procurement and deployment of vaccines and medical countermeasures, the ‘Green Lane’ approach, and the EU Digital COVID certificate to maintain the integrity of the single market are examples of successful common European action. In the global context, the COVID‑19 pandemic triggered a significant reversal in progress towards the United Nation’s Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Despite EU and other actors’ major contributions to global health, the COVID‑19 pandemic widened global inequities, one of the major issues being access to COVID‑19 vaccines worldwide.

Pillar 4 changes the focus from a backward-looking assessment of lessons learned to a forward-looking approach on how to further strengthen the EU’s prevention and preparedness for future cross-border health threats. The study looks at the extended mandates of the EU agencies ECDC and EMA, the state of health preparedness under the newly created Health Emergency Preparedness and Response Authority (HERA), the EU global health strategy, the future WHO pandemic treaty, and the rising challenges of antimicrobial resistance (AMR). Based on its findings, it reiterates that prevention and preparedness will need to be anchored in robust forms of international cooperation. This requires a ‘one health’ approach, together with a focus on the social and environmental determinants of ill health, and greater global cooperation.

Pillar 5 reviews the state of play of the EU’s competences in the public health domain, followed by key discussions on the citizen-driven proposals on public health presented at the Conference on the Future of Europe (CoFoE). It reviews Europe’s transition from a period of immediate emergency response to the COVID‑19 pandemic, to managing recovery and strengthening prevention. It concludes with reflections on the EU’s upgraded framework for serious cross-border health threats and summarises positions expressed in favour – as well as those with a more sceptical tone towards a potential Treaty change.

From a methodological point of view, the study builds on various complementary methods for data collection, including systematic desk research; a literature review of peer-reviewed scientific publications on vaccine effectiveness; a quantitative data collection of COVID‑19 vaccine roll-out in the 27 EU Member States; and interviews with key stakeholders involved in or affected by EU’s COVID‑19 response and crisis management.

Finally, drawing on the lessons from COVID-19, the study makes 12 recommendations to improve the EU’s prevention, preparedness and response to future cross-border health threats. The study was presented to the European Parliament’s COVI special committee on 28 February 2023. The web streaming of that event is available on the European Parliament website.

Timeline on the EU public health response Vaccination coverage by the end of September 2022 COVID-19 certificate required to access certain public spaces Timeline of COVID-19 vaccines authorisations in the EU Timeline of vaccine development Vaccination progress by country (vaccine doses administered per 100 persons) Vaccination coverage by the end of September 2022 (aged 60 and above)

Written by Pieter Baert (1st edition).

Value added tax (VAT) is one of the key revenue raisers in national budgets, representing on average almost one-fifth of all tax revenue collected in the European Union (EU). To help strengthen the fight against VAT fraud and reduce the administrative burden for businesses, the European Commission tabled a three-part initiative – VAT in the Digital Age – on 8 December 2022.

As a first objective, the Commission proposes to introduce an EU-wide reporting system on intra-EU business-to-business (B2B) transactions, whereby companies would share, in real-time, data drawn from electronic invoices with the authorities. This would allow Member States to keep a close eye on the trail of VAT collected and to intervene when there is suspicion of fraudulent practices. Second, the European Commission proposes to introduce a harmonised framework for charging VAT in passenger transport and short-term accommodation platforms. Lastly, the initiative proposes measures to lower VAT compliance costs for companies operating across borders.

For the proposal to become a directive, the Council needs to vote on it with unanimity, after having consulted the European Parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee.

Versions

• February 2023: VAT in the digital age (1st edition)

Proposal for a Council directive amending Directive 2006/112/EC as regards VAT rules for the digital age Committee responsible:Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON)COM(2022) 701
08.12.2022Rapporteur:Olivier Chastel (Renew, Belgium)2022/0407(CNS)Shadow rapporteurs:Lidia Pereira (EPP, Portugal)
Aurore Lalucq (S&D, France)
Mikuláš Peksa (Greens/EFA, Czechia)
Andżelika Anna Możdżanowska)Consultation procedure
(CNS) – Parliament
adopts a non-binding
opinion Next steps expected: National parliaments’ opinions

Written by Vivienne Halleux (1st edition).

Under the European Green Deal, the European Commission tabled a proposal for a recast of the Urban Wastewater Treatment Directive in October 2022. Dating back to 1991, and instrumental to the achievement of European Union water policy objectives, the directive needs to be updated and adapted to new challenges and realities.

The recast proposal would introduce new obligations to better control pollution due to rainwater, impose stricter standards for nutrient removal and require advanced treatment for the removal of micro-pollutants. To cover treatment costs, a system of extended producer responsibility (EPR) targeting pharmaceuticals and cosmetics would be set up. To align the directive with the Green Deal’s ambitions, an energy neutrality obligation would be introduced for wastewater treatment plants. Requirements on water reuse and sludge management would be clarified to enhance circularity. Health parameters would be monitored in wastewater to support public health action. While the deadline for submitting feedback on the proposal still lies ahead, initial stakeholder reactions already reveal diverging views on the proposed EPR scheme.

The co-legislators have started work on the proposal. Parliament’s Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety, responsible for the file, plans to consider its rapporteur’s draft report at the end of April 2023. The Council intends to hold a policy debate on 16 March 2023.

Versions

• February 2023: Urban wastewater treatment: Updating EU rule (1st edition)

Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning urban wastewater treatment (recast) Committee responsible:Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI)COM(2022) 541 final
26.10.2022Rapporteur:Nils Torvalds (Renew, Finland)2022/0345(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Deirdre Clune (EPP, Ireland)
Marek Paweł Balt (S&D, Poland)
Margrete Auken (Greens/EFA, Denmark)
Nicola Procaccini (ECR, Italy)
Nikolaj Villumsen (The Left, Denmark)Ordinary legislative procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council on equal footing
– formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Publication of draft report

Written by Karin Smit Jacobs.

China is increasingly investing in key European infrastructure, including ports. This is something that has drawn attention at both EU and Member State level, in particular regarding strategic dependency on China and how it affects the EU’s economic interests. This short briefing provides an initial overview of existing, publicly known Chinese interests in EU ports.

Chinese investments in EU ports

In 2021, the EU exported €223 billion of goods to China and imported goods worth €472 billion. China is thereby Europe’s foremost trading partner when it comes to imports of goods, of which a substantial part passes through EU ports, in particular maritime ports. To stimulate economic growth, China has opened new global trade routes, enhancing its international presence by contracting and investing in a network of transport infrastructure, in the framework of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), launched in 2013. In line with this strategy, Chinese firms have since been developing economic interests in ports in European counties, including Greece, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Spain and Italy.

The main players are two Chinese state companies – COSCO Shipping, the world’s largest shipping company, the third largest in the container transport sector, and the fifth largest port terminal operator, and China Merchants Port Holdings (the sixth largest port terminal operator globally) – as well as Hutchison Port Holdings (a subsidiary of CK Hutchison Holdings, a private company headquartered in Hong Kong and listed on the Hong Kong stock exchange), the second largest port terminal operator in the world.

The following developments have taken place in relation to COSCO and other Chinese companies when it comes to European ports.

In Germany in 2022, COSCO, which initially planned to take a larger stake in the company operating the Hamburg container terminal Tollerort, finally purchased a 24.9 % holding, following reported protests in the coalition government. In addition, Hutchison Port Holdings operates an inland multi modal terminal at Duisburg. According to a 2019 study, in Greece COSCO owns a majority stake in terminals in the port of Piraeus, operating two terminals via a subsidiary, and has operational control via a majority stake in the Piraeus port authority. Furthermore, China Merchants Port Holdings has a minority stake in Thessaloniki. In Belgium,COSCO owns a controlling stake in a container terminal in Zeebrugge and a minority stake in a container terminal in Antwerp. China Merchants Port Holdings has a minority stake in Antwerp and Hutchison Port Holdings operates an inland terminal in Willebroek. In the Netherlands, both COSCO Shipping and Hutchison Ports have stakes in container terminals in the port of Rotterdam. Hutchison Port Holdings operates two terminals, Euromax and Delta, which makes it the largest container terminal operator in Rotterdam. It also operates inland terminals in Venlo, Amsterdam and Moerdijk. In Spain,COSCO has controlling stakes in the largest terminals in the ports of Valencia and Bilbao. Hutchison Port Holdings also has a stake in Barcelona. In France, China Merchants Port Holdings has minority stakes in terminals in Montoir, Dunkirk, Le Havre and Fos. In Malta, China Merchants Port Holdings has a minority stake in Marsaloxlokk. In Sweden and Poland, Hutchison Port Holdings has stakes in Stockholm and Gdynia, respectively. In Italy in 2016, COSCO bought 40 % of the port of Vado Ligure. This operation also involved Hong Kong’s Qingdao Port International Development, which bought a further 9.9 % of the new container terminal. Until 2016, COSCO had a 50 % stake in the Conateco (Consorzio Napoletano Terminal Containers) terminal in Naples; it then sold its entire stake to MSC (Mediterranean Shipping Company). There has also been somemedia speculation over possible Chinese interest in the Italian ports of Taranto (which hosts an important Italian naval base) and Palermo.

EU action

In 2019, in its Strategic Outlook, the European Commission declared China ‘an economic competitor in the pursuit of technological leadership, and a systemic rival promoting alternative models of governance’. The same year, the EU adopted new rules for better screening of foreign direct investment into the EU, according to which countries have to consider the implications of foreign direct investment (FDI) in critical infrastructure, including ports. In December 2022, the EU adopted new rules for ensuring resilience of critical entities, including ports, in which the potential threat posed by FDI in critical infrastructure in the EU is acknowledged. The rules underline that services, the economy and the free movement and safety of EU citizens depend on the proper functioning of critical infrastructure.

The EU has also recognised the need to step up investment in infrastructure development around the world. In December 2021 it launched the Global Gateway, which aims inter alia to develop trade networks and transport hubs. It promotes smart, clean and secure links in digital, energy and transport and strengthens health, education and research systems across the world.

In addition to adopting legislation with the Council, such as the FDI screening rules, and rules on critical infrastructure, the European Parliament has recently adopted several resolutions on relations with China. On 16 September 2021, the Parliament voted a resolution calling for a new EU-China strategy, in which it stated that a future EU strategy on China should provide the necessary tools and data to address threats stemming from China, including via its BRI. It also called for greater coordination between the EU’s Connectivity Strategy and the Blue Dot Network in order to provide a sustainable alternative to the BRI. It stressed that BRI projects must be closely monitored, ‘including with regard to their negative political effects in the EU’.

Outlook

Analysts have pointed to significant uncertainties for the logistics sector in Europe, arising from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the impact of the pandemic and changing China-Russia and China-US relations. A 2022 study on the impact for the Netherlands’ maritime logistics sector developed a number of scenarios resulting from changing Chinese influence in the world. In one scenario, China plays a strong role in European logistics or becomes influential to the point of strategic dependence on China. In others, China’s role in European logistics is weakening either as a result of the roll-out of alternative infrastructure projects, such as the Global Gateway, or increasingly negative views of China’s investments in Europe, which build on negative views of globalisation and China’s role in it, as well as greater cooperation between Russia and China since the start of the war in Ukraine. For scenarios involving the increasing influence of China, the study suggests the need for cooperation to sustain long-term competitiveness and maintain a high level of prosperity, but points to the potential for a detrimental impact on the Netherlands’ ‘strategic room for manoeuvre’ and the competitiveness of Dutch companies.

Concerns have been voiced in recent years by both think tanks and governments in relation to the possible use of state-owned companies for political influence. Risks highlighted in relation to Chinese ownership of European ports include altering the flow of goods from one European port to another and having access to the inner workings of European container terminals. Whereas some have pointed to the apparent pro-China course of Greece since COSCO’s investment in the Port of Piraeus as an example, others say that gaining political leverage over Greece as an objective of COSCO or the Chinese Communist Party cannot be confirmed based on publicly-available information. While the political leadership could, if needed, gain political leverage by using state-owned port operators, they suggest doing this would be costly for the companies, so the Chinese government would most likely not use the companies as an ‘overt political tool’. Nonetheless, they suggest that port investments could be an indirect source of political leverage – the more a country’s economy benefits from the presence of Chinese port operators, the more it depends on good relations with China. Some have also raised concerns regarding large-scale investments by Chinese companies in European ports, some of which are logistical hubs for NATO equipment.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Chinese strategic interests in European ports?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Katrien Luyten.

Russia’s unprovoked and unjustified invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 has forced millions of people to flee Ukraine and seek refuge in the EU and neighbouring countries. Reacting swiftly, the European Union (EU) decided to grant these refugees EU-wide temporary protection; by the end of December 2022, 3.8 million third-country nationals were benefiting from this possibility. This first-ever activation of the Temporary Protection Directive has generally met with a very positive response, as it has avoided extreme pressure on national asylum systems and offered security to the people affected.

Temporary Protection Directive

According to United Nations data, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has caused more than 8 million refugees to seek refuge elsewhere in Europe. The EU strongly condemned the aggression and moved quickly to grant protection to people fleeing Ukraine. Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/382 of 4 March 2022 – which entered into force the same day – took account of the mass arrival of displaced people from Ukraine and activated Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001 (the Temporary Protection Directive (TPD) for the first time ever. The TPD enables EU Member States to move rapidly to offer protection and rights to people in need of immediate protection to prevent national asylum systems from being overwhelmed. Although the directive had been invoked several times before, for instance in response to the migratory flows from North Africa in 2011 and the migration crisis in 2015, it had never actually been activated.

Temporary protection waives the need to examine individual applications and allows Ukrainian nationals – as well as other third-country nationals or stateless persons benefiting from international protection in Ukraine and their family members – to enjoy harmonised rights across the EU. These rights include access to a residence permit, education, medical care, housing, the labour market and social welfare assistance.
Once admitted to EU territory, these people can move freely within the EU, choose the Member State in which they wish to enjoy the rights attached to temporary protection, and join family and friends in the numerous diaspora networks across the EU. Temporary protection does not prevent these people from applying for international protection. When the temporary protection period ends, the general laws on protection and on aliens in the Member States will apply, including on return. A new European Commission website informs people fleeing the war in Ukraine about their rights, including their eligibility for temporary protection and their rights of travel within the EU.

By the end of December 2022, 3 826 620 displaced people from Ukraine were benefiting from temporary protection in the EU, with Germany (967 715), Poland (961 340) and Czechia (432 415) being the main host countries, according to Eurostat. These numbers may differ from the operational data collected by EU agencies, such as the European Union Asylum Agency (EUAA), or by international ones such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The Member States hosting the highest numbers per 1 000 inhabitants were Czechia (41.1), Estonia (28.8), Poland (25.5) and Lithuania (23.3). Over 98 % of the people fleeing the war were Ukrainian citizens, the vast majority of them female (65 %); 14 % of the male refugees were boys aged 0 to 14. This substantial difference in numbers is owing to the fact that most men aged 18 to 60 are banned from leaving the country. Eurostat data nonetheless show an increase in the share of adult men since the start of the war (from 7 % in March 2022 to 26 % in December 2022). Moreover, men aged 18 to 64 represent 15 % of all beneficiaries of temporary protection in the EU. Temporary protection was initially granted for one year but was later prolonged until March 2024. Another extension of one year is possible, depending on how the situation evolves.

Implementation of the Temporary Protection Directive

The Commission, which coordinates cooperation and the exchange of information among the Member States through a ‘solidarity platform’, has produced operational and other guidelines to help them apply the directive. As this is the first time the directive has been activated and given the speed with which it had to be implemented and applied, from day one it has come under a lot of scrutiny. EU agencies, such as the EUAA and the Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), the intergovernmental Organisation for Economic Co‑operation and Development (OECD) and the European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE) – a network of non-governmental organisations – are among those who have analysed the measures taken by the Member States to address the arrival of displaced people from Ukraine. Despite the emergence of divergent practices and policies because of different interpretations of the TPD – such as its scope and eligibility; reception support; access to rights; freedom of movement in the EU; and how to deal with circular movements to and from Ukraine –overall, assessment of the implementation has so far been positive.

During a November 2022 public hearing in the European Parliament on the TPD’s implementation, promising practices highlighted included enhanced and quicker registration and information provision, a more flexible approach to assessing documents and an integrated system covering various service providers. Things that could be done to improve the TPD’s implementation include applying the TPD more consistently; eliminating the practical, administrative and legal barriers to accessing rights; ensuring early and systematic identification of people with specific needs; and applying the lessons learned and good practices more broadly for the benefit of asylum management in the EU.

The FRA is monitoring the broader fundamental rights impact on the EU of the Russian war, paying specific attention to aspects such as the situation at the borders, the situation of children and of non-Ukrainian nationals fleeing the war to the EU, as well as the challenges of human trafficking, sexual and gender-based violence and xenophobic disinformation and hate speech.

Some claim that the EU is offering people displaced from Ukraine preferential treatment compared with the way asylum seekers, refugees and subsidiary protection holders from other countries, are treated under the EU’s asylum rules. In response, the Commission has pointed out the temporary nature of this protection, clarifying that as soon as it expires, the general laws on protection and on non-EU citizens in the Member States will apply. Given the current deadlock in the war in Ukraine, it remains to be seen if that will be the best way to handle the Ukrainian refugee situation in the longer term.

Lessons for the future Proposed crisis and force majeure regulation

As part of the proposal for an EU pact on migration and asylum, the Commission proposed a regulation addressing situations of crisis and force majeure in migration and asylum policy. The proposal – which would repeal the TPD – would address situations of migration and asylum crisis and force majeure more broadly, and grant those affected immediate protection status. The Commission insists that the crisis and force majeure proposal will give a solid response to needs on the ground while also catering to different situations. Despite this, it has received criticism, not least because of the narrow personal scope of immediate protection as compared to temporary protection, and because immediate protection, unlike temporary protection, would have a one-year duration, without the possibility of extension.

Potential impact on the EU asylum system

The 2015 migration crisis exposed a number of deficiencies and gaps in the EU’s policies on asylum. To address the situation, the Commission proposed a reform of the common European asylum system. Experts have already started analysing the possible impact of the EU’s response to the Ukrainian refugee arrivals on the future of the EU’s asylum system. The Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies argues that flexible models of responsibility-sharing between the Member States might be a more realistic option than static ones. This requires political will and unity among leaders. Furthermore, ‘political realities, particularly in the Council’ – as the European Policy Centre warns – seem to be ‘pointing in a different direction’ and ‘indicat[ing] the re-emergence and continued attachment to the earlier political dividing lines around solidarity’. The Hertie School agrees that the current willingness across the EU to welcome refugees from Ukraine illustrates a growing ‘geopolitisation’ of protection.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘One year of temporary protection for people displaced from Ukraine?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Luisa Antunes with Michael Sicaud-Clyet.

The European Union is committed to achieving climate neutrality by 2050, which requires a drastic increase in the share of energy from renewable sources in the electricity mix. However, the availability of some renewable energy sources is variable and intermittent, creating concerns about system reliability. Devising new energy storage capacities could solve this issue and contribute to the EU’s climate neutrality goal.

Historically, energy systems have been dominated by large power plants able to produce great quantities of energy in a short time. This centralised mode of production has the advantage of easily balancing supply and demand at any time. However, such primarily fossil fuel-powered plants, are not known for being nature-positive. As part of the European Green Deal, the Fit for 55 package aims at adjusting the EU climate laws to achieve climate neutrality, by reducing EU greenhouse gas emissions to at least 55 % by 2030 compared to 1990. With fossil fuels still constituting a large part of the energy mix, the EU will need to considerably increase its share of renewable energy to pursue this objective.

Renewable energy is a sustainable resource that naturally renews or replenishes itself. Common sources include wind, solar, geothermal energy, hydropower, biomass, and biogas. It is estimated that between 2018 and 2050, the worldwide renewable energy share in power generation will increase from 25 % to 86 %, with most of the increase coming from wind and solar. In the EU, over 60 % of the EU-28 electricity mix still had to become renewable, and further electrification is expected. However, a major obstacle hinders renewable energy penetration in the power grid: wind turbines and solar panels have variable, or intermittent, nature (e.g. they are dependent on weather and climate conditions), and thus cannot be programmed ‘on demand’ at the request of power grid operators to fulfil market needs, unlike most of the fossil fuel power plants they will replace. Power grids necessitate a permanent balance between production and demand. Therefore, it is an ongoing challenge to increase the share of renewable energy in the electricity grid.

One of the ways to achieve this is through energy storage. The main types of energy-storing systems are: electrochemical (batteries), mechanical (pumped hydro storage), and chemical (hydrogen). These technologies can help provide flexibility, encompassing different timescales: from a discharge time of hours for batteries, to several months for pumped hydro storage. Hydrogen has an average power range (1 kW‑1 GW) as well as an average life duration (<30 years), but very poor efficiency (20‑40 %; hydrogen will also likely be used to decarbonise hard-to-abate industrial processes, so capacity may be built up despite the poor efficiency). Both the power range (1 kW‑50 MW) and life duration (<20 years) of batteries are lower, but they are more efficient (90‑98 %). A third possibility is pumped hydro storage, which has the highest power range (10 MW‑3 GW) and life duration (>80 years). However, it has intermediate efficiency (70‑85 %) and is less environmentally sustainable, as it contributes to biodiversity loss in aquatic life.

Energy storage system limitations include their limited storage capacity, high cost, and extensive requirements in terms of physical space and transportation infrastructure. Thus, the process of storing energy still needs to be optimised to reach the EU’s commitment to decarbonise the energy sector by 2050.

Potential impacts and developments

Optimising energy storage would allow an increase in wind and solar energy use. Since 2016, the increase in annual battery installations in the EU has been accompanied by a rising share of renewables in the energy mix and a decrease in the share of fossil energy, laying the groundwork for the virtuous cycle that will be required in the future to drive adoption of renewables. Innovation is key to improving the elasticity of substitution between renewable and fossil-fuel energy production, as it enables the full potential of these natural resources to be exploited by dispatching their energy to the grid whenever it is needed.

Another beneficial impact would be on the stability of the power grid, where deferring large quantities of excess energy over different periods could help stabilise fluctuation in supply and demand. At a time of geopolitical and economic uncertainty, energy storage could enhance the EU’s energy security, reducing dependence on third-country fossil fuels, strengthening strategic autonomy and potentially increasing its geopolitical leverage. Developing climate-neutral energy storage systems and technologies would ensure larger distribution and prevent extreme price fluctuations, contributing to affordable energy, a priority in tackling energy poverty in the EU.

However, several barriers persist in developing and deploying storage systems. First, how to increase the capacity and efficiency of existing technologies, whilst ensuring an ideal economic and regulatory context, for their development. Moreover, in the short term, the impact of energy storage on greenhouse gas emissions is more uncertain and would depend on the competitiveness of renewable energy sources compared to fossil fuels. There is also a wide application gap at national level: most Member States require storage facility operators to pay double network or energy taxes (as both producers and consumers), a burden that discourages its development. Unlike for gas, a common regulatory approach for electricity storage is still missing. In addition, energy storage can have a harmful impact on the environment and human health: the mining, use, disposal and recyclability of raw materials – especially for batteries – are yet unresolved issues that further touch upon issues of human rights and labour standards.

Anticipatory policy-making

Energy storage is part of the principles stipulated in EU law, that Member States, regulatory authorities, and system operators must follow to deliver appropriate investment incentives for generation and efficient electricity dispatch. In its 2020 resolution, the European Parliament called on the European Commission to develop a comprehensive strategy on energy storage to enable the EU’s transformation to a climate-neutral economy. The Commission’s REPowerEU plan further highlights energy storage as a significant asset to ensure the flexibility and security of the EU’s energy supply. Currently, only 5 % of the EU’s installed capacity is used for storage. The European Commission estimates that the EU will need to store six times more energy to achieve net-zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050.

The EU supports energy storage in three main areas: a strategic framework for the development of energy storage technologies, EU research and innovation funding instruments, and a legislative framework for its development. Legislative and non-legislative policy action on market regulation and economic incentives could help boost demand by lowering market prices and resolving double taxation issues.

Several Horizon Europe research and development projects are currently in place to find ways to increase the capacity and efficiency of existing technologies and make power grids more flexible. New technologies will need to be developed to increase the share of renewable energy in the EU and the consumer contribution to decentralised energy storage.

Pumped hydro storage can be harmful for biodiversity, and batteries’ raw materials need to be more recyclable. To ensure energy storage is more nature positive, as well as technological and economically viable, standards to assess the environmental impacts of energy-storage systems should be developed and extended to other forms of energy storage.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘What if increased energy storage could help fix climate change?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marcin Grajewski.

Russia’s war on Ukraine has been redefining the European Union’s security, defence and foreign policies, changing its priorities on the continent and globally. The biggest military conflict on European soil since World War II has shone a spotlight on territorial defence and the shifting international order. Before the brutal conflict erupted a year ago, security and defence policy had focused mainly on conflict prevention and the strengthening of international security in general.The main foreign policy objectives had included the preservation of peace, strengthening international security and promoting international cooperation.

The war has highlighted the importance of NATO and transatlantic relations for European security, despite efforts to bolster the EU’s ‘strategic autonomy‘. The conflict has solidified EU solidarity in foreign and security policy, but also brought to light certain divisions among Member States.

This note gathers links to recent publications and commentaries from many international think tanks on European defence, security and foreign policies. It includes only the most recent papers related to Ukraine. Earlier reports on Russia’s war on Ukraine can be found in the previous item in the ‘What think tanks are thinking’ series.

The EU must reconcile geopolitics and democracy
Carnegie Europe, February 2023

Can Europe influence U.S.-China rivalry?
Carnegie Europe, February 2023

The unfulfilled promise of EU foreign and security policy towards Iran
Centre for European Policy Studies, February 2023

The South China Sea and Indo-Pacific in an era of ”multipolar” competition
Centre for European Policy Studies, February 2023

The impact of the war in Ukraine: Annual report 2022
Centre for European Reform, February 2023

Europe and the Iran nuclear threat
Centre for European Reform, February 2023

A new momentum grows for UK-France defence cooperation
Chatham House, February 2023

Seven ways Russia’s war on Ukraine has changed the world
Chatham House, February 2023

Culture notes: Will the EU find its voice at last?
Chatham House, February 2023

Europe: Crossing the East-West divide
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, February 2023

The European Union and Latin America: Renewing the partnership after drifting apart
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, February 2023

Repair, replace, reimburse: Sustaining a European tank coalition for Ukraine
European Council on Foreign Relations, February 2023

Russia’s defeat in Ukraine must be the top transatlantic priority
European Policy Centre, February 2023

One year of war in Ukraine: Why Western policy towards Russia has not changed enough
Finnish Institute of International Affairs, February 2023

Leopard 2 tanks and Ukraine’s war: Keeping an eye on the geopolitical ball
Friends of Europe, February 2023

Pushing back against the authoritarians: Everyone can play a part, not just the military
Friends of Europe, February 2023

Watching China in Europe: February 2023
German Marshall Fund, February 2023

Turkey’s disengagement from the European Union
German Marshall Fund, February 2023

Comment la guerre a déjà changé l’Union européenne?
Institut Jacques Delors, February 2023

Guerre en Ukraine et nouvel ordre du monde
Institut Montaigne, February 2023

Back to the roots: Nato returns to territorial defence in Europe
Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, February 2023

European missile defence: Right questions, unclear answers?
International Institute for Strategic Studies, February 2023

La guerre en Ukraine et l’action de l’Union européenne : expertise technique et politique
Robert Schuman Foundation, February 2023

Germany’s fragile leadership role in European air defence
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, February 2023

Is European strategic autonomy over?
Carnegie Europe, January 2023

Is European defence missing its moment?
Centre for European Reform, January 2023

Europe’s strategic technology autonomy from China
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, January 2023

How Europe can shape changes in the world economy
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, January 2023

Strategy, capabilities, technology: A manifesto for new European defence
European Council on Foreign Relations, January 2023

Will 2023 mark a shift towards a more realist EU foreign policy?
Friends of Europe, January 2023

What to watch in 2023
German Marshall Fund, January 2023

Souveraineté numérique: Politiques européennes, dilemmes américains
Institut français des relations internationales, January 2023

Naval combat systems: Developments and challenges
Istituto Affari Internazionali, January 2023

Europe-Africa relations in a multi-crises world: Turning the page after COVID-19, the EU-AU Summit and the war against Ukraine
Istituto Affari Internazionali, January 2023

Geopolitics and energy security in Europe
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, January 2023

Time to re-engage with Kosovo and Serbia: Strengthening EU foreign and security policy amidst internal contestation
Barcelona Centre for International Affairs, December 2022

Centre of gravity: Security and defence in the Indo-Pacific – What role for the European Union
Brussels School of Governance, December 2022

A tactical pause in relations with the West: China plays on hopes for peace
Centre for Eastern Studies, December 2022

Can we ever build a common European home? The perils and promise of an old idea
Centre for European Policy Studies, December 2022

The rise of mega-regions: Eurasia, the Indo-Pacific, and the transatlantic alliance in a reshaped world order
Centre for European Policy Studies, December 2022

Strengthening US-EU cooperation on trade and technology
Chatham House, December 2022

Open strategic autonomy in European defence: what countries must do
Clingendael, December 2022

Realising the EU hybrid toolbox: opportunities and pitfalls 

Clingendael, December 2022

Nach der Ostpolitik Lehren aus der Vergangenheit als Grundlage für eine neue Russland- und Osteuropapolitik
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, December 2022

Fragmentation nation: How Europeans can help end the conflict in Yemen
European Council on Foreign Relations, December 2022

The growing EU engagement in Central Asia: Challenging the Russian predominance in its traditional backyard
European Institute for Asian Studies, December 2022

The EU-ASEAN commemorative summit: Advancing bilateral cooperation in challenging times 

European Institute for Asian Studies, December 2022

Seize the geopolitical moment: The Western Balkans and European security
Friends of Europe, December 2022

Watching China in Europe: December 2022
German Marshall Fund, December 2022

Analysing political acceptability of reforms among national policymakers
GLOBSEC, December 2022

Not one without the other: realigning deterrence and arms control in a European quest for strategic stability 

Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, December 2022

Stocks militaires: une assurance-vie en haute intensité?
Institut français des relations internationales, December 2022

EU foreign policy integration at times of war: From short-term responses to long-term solutions
Istituto Affari Internazionali, December 2022

Naval defence cooperation in the EU: Potential and hurdles 

Istituto Affari Internazionali, December 2022

Military expenditure: Transparency, defence inflation and purchasing power parity
International Institute for Strategic Studies, December 2022

How to save the WTO with more flexible trading rules
Peterson Institute for International Economics, December 2022

EU responses to the potential of an armed conflict in the Taiwan Strait
Polish Institute of International Affairs, December 2022

A strategic feasibility test: Is the old European dream of peaceful multilateralism dead?
Brussels School of Governance, November 2022

The US-EU trade and technology council: Assessments and recommendations
Centre for Strategic and International Studies, November 2022

Promoting the rule of law in EU external relations: A conceptual framework
College of Europe, November 2022

The war against Ukraine and European defence: When will we square the circle?
Egmont, November 2022

A like-minded partner? India’s evolving domestic politics and implications for the EU
European Institute for Security Studies, November 2022

After the storm: The EU in uncharted waters
European Policy Centre, November 2022

Diversity and power in the European Union
European Policy Centre, November 2022

Securing our future: 100 African and European voices on climate change, conflict and security
Friends of Europe, November 2022

Euro-Mediterranean economic cooperation in the age of deglobalisation
Istituto Affari Internazionali, November 2022

Read this briefing on ‘EU security, defence and foreign policies‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.