European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Liselotte Jensen with Sara Catharina Svensson.

The European Youth Event will bring together thousands of young people in the European Parliament in Strasbourg, on 9 and 10 June 2023, to share ideas about the future of Europe. This introduction to one of the major topics to be discussed during the EYE event is one of 11 prepared by the Parliament’s Research Service (EPRS). It offers an overview of the main lines of EU action and policy in the area concerned, and aims to act as a starting point for discussions during the event. You can find them all on this link.

The effects of climate change are increasingly apparent, with rising temperatures, more frequent and intense natural disasters, and shifting weather patterns. These changes are primarily caused by human activities, such as burning fossil fuels and deforestation. This notes sets out briefly some of the causes and consequences of climate change and the action the European Union is taking to address it.

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Accept YouTube Content New rules for better air quality Facing the reality of climate change

Climate change – long-term shifts in temperatures and weather patterns – has been occurring for decades. The primary cause of climate change is the release of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere. These gases, which include carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), and nitrous oxide (N2O), trap heat from the sun and act as a blanket over the planet, leading to global warming and climate change.

The majority of CO2 emissions come from burning fossil fuels such as oil, gas, and coal. We use these fossil fuels in industry, in transport, to generate electricity and to keep warm. Another potent greenhouse gas, methane, mainly comes from cattle farming and rice cultivation, as well as from coal, oil and gas production. Forests can help absorb CO2, but deforestation and other changes in the way we use the land can also increase greenhouse gases in the atmosphere.

A growing concern is the possibility of reaching climate tipping points. These are critical points beyond which a significant change or effect takes place in a system, with irreversible and often cascading impacts. Every six years, more than 200 scientists from around the world come together to produce a comprehensive report – based on research undertaken by thousands of scientists since the previous report was published – that gives an up-to-date picture of our understanding of climate change. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), warned in its latest report that, unless we take drastic measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, global warming will likely exceed 1.5 degree Celsius (°C) within 20 years and 2°C before 2100. The IPCC working groups identify 15 potential tipping points around the world, including changes in permafrost, which releases significant amounts of greenhouse gases when melting; ice sheets destabilising, triggering sea-level rise; and changing global monsoon patterns, causing floods or droughts.

Other researchers have determined that seven such tipping points are likely to occur at 1.5°C of global warming – and we may already have reached five of them. The collapse of the West-Antarctic and Greenland ice sheets, and subsequent sea level rise, is of particular concern for Europe, where more than a third of the European population lives in coastal regions. Such impending collapses are two of the tipping points that researchers believe may already be in motion. Others increasingly at risk of happening are the dieback of the most southern of the northern hemisphere forests and the thawing of permafrost. To avoid reaching these tipping points and having to pay the costs of the damage they will wreak, it is crucial that we reinforce efforts to limit global warming.

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Accept YouTube Content Fitfor55: a new energy system How will climate change affect us?

Even if we manage to slash emissions, the world is still likely to reach 1.5°C of warming within the next 20 years. This means that the impacts of climate change will become increasingly severe, with more frequent and intense extreme weather events. Heatwaves are particularly dangerous and deadly, especially for vulnerable populations such as children, older people and those with chronic health conditions. Droughts and crops lost to bad weather can lead to food shortages and economic instability. Extreme weather such as storms, floods, droughts and heatwaves can damage buildings and infrastructure, as well as disrupt transport and supply chains. Wildfires and a lack of fresh water are particularly damaging to ecosystems and wildlife. Rising sea levels are another major concern, as they can cause coastal flooding, erosion, and destroy homes and natural habitats.

Climate change will cost billions of euros and damage all our economic sectors. Adapting to the new conditions and making them less damaging by upgrading buildings, roads, railways and pipelines, developing new technologies, and changing our lifestyles will also cost (a lot of) money. The overall impact on the global economy is expected to be negative, with some regions and industries hit harder than others.

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Accept YouTube Content EU Climate Action: Responding to the global emergency What is the European Union doing about climate change?

The European Green Deal is the EU’s strategy for our society to reach climate neutrality by 2050 (i.e. emissions of greenhouse gases must not exceed removals). The programme sets out actions to be taken related to the climate, environment and the economy, such as improving our food systems, protecting biodiversity and boosting the circular economy. One important part of the Green Deal was the adoption of the European Climate Law in June 2021. Under this law, the EU is legally obliged to become climate neutral by 2050 and to reduce its net greenhouse gas emissions by 55 % by 2030, compared to what its emissions were in 1990.

To make sure that we meet our 2030 target, the European Commission proposed the ‘fit for 55‘ package. This package revises and updates existing laws so they meet climate targets and introduces new laws and strategies. These include ambitious changes to the three main elements of EU climate action: the EU Emissions Trading System Directive (EU ETS), the Effort-sharing Regulation, and the Land Use, Land-use Change and Forestry (LULUCF) Regulation.

The Emissions Trading System is the world’s first (and biggest) carbon market. In the EU, permitted emissions ceilings are set for some industries, such as power plants and energy-intensive industrial installations (which are responsible for about 40 % of the EU’s total domestic greenhouse gas emissions). Based on the ‘polluter pays’ principle, businesses covered by the EU ETS have to buy allowances on the ETS market through auctions. Each emissions allowance entitles the holder to emit one tonne of CO2. Since 2012, the EU ETS also covers aviation emissions generated by flights within and between EU countries and also some partner countries outside the EU.

The Effort-sharing Regulation sets specific national emissions reduction targets for sectors not included in the EU ETS: transport, buildings, agriculture, small industrial installations, waste treatment, energy supply and product use. These emissions currently account for almost 60 % of the EU’s total domestic emissions.

The EU’s natural carbon sinks absorb CO2, helping to reduce its concentration in the atmosphere. The LULUCF Regulation aims at increasing this absorption, for example by restoring wetlands and bogs, planting new forests and halting deforestation. After a downward trend over the past decade, in terms of the amount of carbon removed by forest and agricultural land (and land where use has changed to, or from, one of these uses), specific targets per Member State will ensure an increase in carbon removals by 2030.

The ‘fit for 55’ package also includes other initiatives to reduce emissions from transport and buildings and increase our use of renewable energy. It sets up a new carbon border adjustment mechanism to ensure that producers of imported goods also pay for the pollution they cause.

The primary EU funds to support the transition to a greener economy will be the EU budget, with 30 % of its funding earmarked for climate action, and the Next Generation EU fund – created to assist the recovery from the effects of the COVID‑19 pandemic. The Just Transition Fund aims at helping regions most affected by the transition away from fossil fuels. Finally, the Social Climate Fund (part of the ‘fit for 55’ package) should go some way towards helping the most vulnerable households, micro-businesses and transport users meet the costs of moving to cleaner buildings and vehicles.

In February 2021, the European Commission adopted the new EU climate change adaptation strategy. The strategy aims to boost capacity to minimise and adapt to the impacts of climate change. It focuses on increasing knowledge and anticipating the effects of climate change, and developing policy to equip the EU to respond to a changing world. Adaptation actions include more green spaces and trees in urban areas, which can absorb intense rainfall and provide a cooling effect during heatwaves. For agriculture, changing crops to more heat and drought-resistant types can help reduce crop losses. Sharing knowledge on successful ways to adapt makes it easier to implement such measures in time.

Interactive infographic: Climate action

Written by Marketa Pape.

The European Youth Event will bring together thousands of young people in the European Parliament in Strasbourg, on 9 and 10 June 2023, to share ideas about the future of Europe. This introduction to one of the major topics to be discussed during the EYE event is one of 11 prepared by the Parliament’s Research Service (EPRS). It offers an overview of the main lines of EU action and policy in the area concerned, and aims to act as a starting point for discussions during the event. You can find them all on this link.

Inequality, broadly understood as a difference in social status, wealth, or opportunity between people or groups, has always been present in our societies to some extent. However, over the past 30 years, income and wealth inequalities have increased dramatically worldwide. Tackling inequality and redistributing wealth is mainly the responsibility of national governments. The European Union is helping them to narrow the gap.

A widening gap

The benefits of economic growth have not been shared fairly, and the gap between rich and poor has widened. The causes of this growing inequality are multiple, including globalisation, technological change, taxation policy and economic crises. Inequality can take many forms: between people with different social and cultural backgrounds, or gender and generations, as well as between regions and countries. Inequalities affect our access to life opportunities, such as education, employment, a career and financial resources. When such inequalities accumulate, they can lead to social exclusion (meaning people cannot afford to take part in society). As one of the principles underpinning the EU is to provide opportunities for all without discrimination, EU policy covering education, employment and financial resources seeks to reduce inequalities by ensuring equal access to high-quality education, public goods and services, finance and entrepreneurship.

Wealth, in particular, is very unequally distributed. Even before the COVID‑19 pandemic, income inequalities were at their highest levels in 30 years in many countries – with the top 10 % of the population earning ten times more than the bottom 10 %. In the EU, every fifth person was at risk of poverty or social exclusion in 2021. The risk was higher for women, young people under 18, people with dependent children and those with disabilities. As the pandemic further increased this gap, particularly affecting young people, the need to tackle inequalities is evident.

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Accept YouTube Content Bridging Europe’s digital divide Principles to build on

The EU has a duty to combat social exclusion and discrimination; to promote social justice, equality between women and men, and solidarity between generations; and to protect children’s rights. Based on EU-wide objectives, the EU supports and complements national policies on social inclusion and protection, to ensure everyone has decent living and working conditions. However, national governments decide social policies, education and taxation. The EU can only define minimum standards and provide guidance, coordination and funding.

The United Nations’ sustainable development goals for 2030 (especially those related to ending poverty and reducing inequalities) and the EU’s 2000 Charter of Fundamental Rights (given a status equivalent to the EU Treaties in 2009), oblige EU governments and institutions to uphold a number of social and welfare rights when implementing EU law.

The European Pillar of Social Rights has guided EU policies aiming at enhancing social justice since 2017. It sets 20 principles that include education, training and learning throughout life. They also set standards on providing equal opportunities, active support when seeking employment, social protection, wages and the right to adequate minimum income. Importantly, they set out guidance for national governments to ensure the rights of the 87 million people in the EU with a disability. All EU countries agreed to implement the guidance, with the responsibility to ensure compliance shared between EU institutions, national, regional and local authorities, social partners and civil society. An action plan sets targets to achieve by 2030. Some 78 % of 20‑64 year‑olds should be in employment, and 60% of adults participating in training. A third aim is to lift 15 million people – including 5 million children – out of poverty or social exclusion.

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Accept YouTube Content Évolution de la pauvreté dans l’Union européenne Changing the game

The EU helps prevent or reduce inequalities in many ways. To ensure equal opportunities from the start, it promotes access to high quality and inclusive education, including early childhood education and care, as well as to training and lifelong learning. In parallel, it seeks to return the teaching professions to their place at the heart of our education systems.

EU rules make it easier for us to work in another EU country and protect your social security rights when you move within Europe. For instance, you can work in another EU country without needing a permit and be treated the same as a national in terms of access to employment, working conditions, taxes and social advantages. EU rules coordinate national social security systems. If you fall ill or are injured anywhere in Europe and carry the European health insurance card, you are entitled to the necessary treatment.

All EU countries also have to follow agreed minimum EU standards covering health and safety at work. These ensure protection against discrimination and set rules for employing young people, part-time work and working hours. Men and women have the right to equal treatment at work, which includes maternity, paternity and parental leave. Recent rules seek to ensure that, where EU countries have established minimum wages, regular reviews reflect the rising cost of living, and that women are fairly represented on company boards. New rules are being discussed to ensure that men and women receive equal pay for equal work and that those working for digital platforms, for instance in food delivery, are treated correctly.

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Accept YouTube Content Chronicles: Care work in the EU Recent EU developments

With the European Green Deal strategy, the EU wants to decarbonise the economy and make it more digital and inclusive. While this is expected to improve our health and wellbeing and create jobs, the transition to a greener economy also poses risks. Among these, jobs will be lost in carbon-intensive industries such as coal-burning power plants, energy will cost more and living standards could be affected. New EU funding seeks to address these concerns, but greater effort is necessary for a just transition to a less polluting economy, such as adapting school curricula to new skills and helping workers train for environmentally and economically sustainable jobs.

During the COVID-19 pandemic, many people expected the EU to act, while in fact it had little power to do so. As the crisis unfolded, EU countries agreed to EU-wide measures led by the European Commission. While not explicitly targeting inequality, the steps taken – such as the joint procurement of vaccines and the adoption of the SURE programme to protect jobs and incomes affected by the pandemic – helped lessen or prevent further inequalities between EU citizens and countries. Thanks to measures like SURE, unemployment grew less than during the 2008 economic and financial crisis, despite a much larger fall in gross domestic product (GDP). However, the pandemic increased inequalities in terms of access to quality health services and due to whether or not people could work from home.

To help national economies recover from the pandemic, the EU set up a vast recovery programme – Next Generation EU. Governments had each to prepare their national recovery and resilience plans based on a set of criteria and get EU approval. Among other things, the European Commission advised them to prioritise support for young people who wanted to study science and technology, or pursue further education and apprenticeships, as well as to offer loans and grants to young entrepreneurs. Recommended measures included offering employment to those with disabilities, or living in rural, remote or disadvantaged areas, as well as ensuring all children have access to education. To receive the funding, governments have to carry out the reforms promised and the investment outlined in their national plan.

In an EU-wide 2022 survey on fairness, inequality and inter-generational mobility, more EU citizens agreed rather than disagreed that, overall, most of the things that happen in their lives are fair and that they have equal opportunities like everyone else in their country.

Nevertheless, while much EU policy seeks to tackle income inequality, it does not address wealth inequality and wealth concentrated among a small group of people. However, the EU has made efforts to ensure greater tax transparency regarding multinational companies and to prevent tax avoidance.

Simple solutions cannot resolve inequality overnight. There is potential for the EU to do more in several areas. As we look beyond growth as the lead measure of our economies, a more equal distribution of wealth is key.

Written by Krisztina Binder.

The European Youth Event will bring together thousands of young people in the European Parliament in Strasbourg, on 9 and 10 June 2023, to share ideas about the future of Europe. This introduction to one of the major topics to be discussed during the EYE event is one of 11 prepared by the Parliament’s Research Service (EPRS). It offers an overview of the main lines of EU action and policy in the area concerned, and aims to act as a starting point for discussions during the event. You can find them all on this link.

Education and training help us acquire the knowledge and skills we need to get the job we want. To ensure everyone has access to quality and inclusive education, the European Union aims to create a European education area by 2025. The EU also helps EU countries to promote key skills and competences, for instance on digital education.

Why action is needed

According to the European Commission, even before the pandemic, 77 % of companies struggled to find employees with the required skills. A quarter of the EU’s small and medium-sized enterprises saw the lack of skilled and experienced staff as their greatest concern. It is estimated that about 46 % of European adults could benefit from learning new skills or refreshing ones they once had but have forgotten. While this high percentage is partially due to people leaving education at a young age, the risks of skill loss and skill obsolescence also extend to those with higher levels of education. In the future, 90 % of jobs in all sectors will need some form of digital skills, yet 35 % of today’s workers do not possess them. There is also a significant shortage of women in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) studies and careers. Women accounted for only 19.1 % of information and communications technology (ICT) specialists employed in 2021, and only 31.3 % of students enrolled in STEM studies in 2020.  

European Year of Skills 2023

The objective of the Year of Skills is to promote investment in training and converting existing skills to adapt them to new needs across the EU. It involves actors across society, from local authorities to trade unions and companies. The focus is on matching people’s aspirations and skill-sets with labour market opportunities, thus enabling more people, particularly women and young people, to get a job. The 2023 European Year of Skills is expected to support the achievement of the EU targets to have at least 60 % of adults participating in training each year, and an employment rate of at least 78 % by 2030. It also aims to contribute to the EU’s 2030 digital targets – whereby 80 % of adults would have at least basic digital skills and there would be 20 million information and communications technology specialists working.

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Accept YouTube Content Lifelong Learning Skills development through education and training?

All EU citizens have the right to quality and inclusive education, training and lifelong learning opportunities. These enable us to maintain and acquire new skills, participate fully in society and successfully navigate a fast-changing labour market.

Responsibility for organising education systems and the content of teaching lies with the national governments of EU countries. However, the EU supplements and supports these national efforts and encourages exchange and cooperation between countries. As cooperation continues to evolve, the European Commission’s vision of establishing a European education area by 2025 aims at improving access to quality education, with opportunities to learn throughout our lives, and ensuring we can study anywhere in the EU.

Several initiatives under the European education area umbrella are already under way. A recommendation on blended learning in schools helps EU countries address the consequences of the pandemic on learners, teachers, trainers and schools and to develop a long-term effective, inclusive and engaging approach to blended learning in primary and secondary education. The aim is to help schools to be more flexible and inclusive of a broad range of pedagogical methods, technological tools, learner needs and changing circumstances. An initiative on learning for environmental sustainability encourages EU countries to support education specific to sustainable development and to the green transition towards a more sustainable society – skills currently in high demand. Another initiative, the 2022 European strategy for universities, states that higher education providers should better adapt to rapidly evolving demand for skills on the job market – including to help equip students and adult learners with digital and sustainability skills. An initiative to develop a scheme to certify the learning outcomes of short-term learning experiences, for instance a short course or training session, aims to offer flexible learning opportunities for a wider range of people to develop or update their knowledge. Taking a new approach to lifelong learning, the individual learning accounts initiative recommends that EU countries put people of working age in charge of a budget, to spend on training of their choice, to improve their skills and employability. Other initiatives are being set up, for instance, on graduate tracking, to improve the link between graduates’ skills and competences and the job market.

Promoting learning for digital and language skills

Boosting digital skills is a particular focus of the EU’s digital education action plan. Among the actions lined up, the plan includes the creation of a European digital skills certificate recognised across the EU. It also sets up digital opportunity traineeships, which would provide, for instance, university and vocational education and training (VET) students and recent graduates to boost their digital skills. And the plan encourages women’s participation in STEM studies and careers through, for example, training in digital and sustainable entrepreneurship skills for young women.

Improving language skills also helps us widen our experience and qualifications, perhaps by moving to study in another country and learning throughout our lives. Projects aimed at helping young people to study or carry out a traineeship in another country are just an example of the wide range of projects supported by the Erasmus+ programme, which, since its creation in 1987, has involved nearly 13 million people. The European Solidarity Corps programme helps young people take part in projects that benefit communities, and develop their skills and competences at the same time.

Written by Branislav Stanicek.

The European Youth Event will bring together thousands of young people in the European Parliament in Strasbourg, on 9 and 10 June 2023, to share ideas about the future of Europe. This introduction to one of the major topics to be discussed during the EYE event is one of 11 prepared by the Parliament’s Research Service (EPRS). It offers an overview of the main lines of EU action and policy in the area concerned, and aims to act as a starting point for discussions during the event. You can find them all on this link.

The European Union is a peace project – aimed at safeguarding peace, upholding the principles of international law and promoting European values through its common foreign and security policy (CFSP). The recent geopolitical shifts, including Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the COVID‑19 pandemic, and climate and technology challenges, all allow the EU to demonstrate its capacity to act swiftly and in unison. While CFSP decisions are currently made by unanimity among EU member countries represented in the Council, there is a debate on moving to qualified majority in some areas.

Background

Robert Schuman declared in May 1950 that ‘world peace cannot be safeguarded without the making of creative efforts proportionate to the dangers which threaten it’. With international relations and peace endangered in many places today, these creative efforts are needed more than ever. The EU’s common foreign and security policy was established with the Treaty on European Union in 1993.

In 1997, the Treaty of Amsterdam improved the decision-making process, including by allowing for constructive abstention (allowing an EU country to choose to abstain without blocking an initiative) and qualified majority voting (today, a vote passes if 55 % of EU countries representing at least 65 % of the total EU population vote in favour). In 1999, the European Council established the role of the High Representative for the CFSP to represent the EU in its foreign relations. Since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, the High Representative is also a Vice-President of the European Commission (HR/VP).

The current President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen declared the ambition to head a ‘geopolitical commission’ that ‘stabilises its neighbourhood, accelerates enlargement and champions multilateralism’. Consequently, the CFSP budget has been boosted under the 2021–2027 financial framework: external action has been allocated €98.4 billion, and security and defence €13.2 billion.

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Accept YouTube Content A Strategic Compass for the EU Stabilising the neighbourhood

In 2020, the HR/VP Josep Borrell noted that EU foreign policy should prioritise a response to the urgent call to stabilise its own neighbourhood, and that ‘Europe must learn quickly to speak the language of power’. Indeed the EU’s neighbourhood is marked by instability: in the south, long-term conflicts affect an ‘arc of crisis’, ranging from Libya through Syria and Türkiye, and from the threat of jihadist networks, to the challenges posed by Iran. Besides the war in Ukraine, which has signalled an unprecedented disruption of peace in Europe, the EU faces several conflicts on its eastern borders, in the Caucasus, and with autocratic regimes in Belarus and Russia. The EU’s answer to these crises includes new proposals, such as setting up a European political community.

Accelerating enlargement

The EU is not a static entity, and EU enlargement policy sets out the conditions for new countries to join the Union. In her State of the Union address in September 2022, Ursula von der Leyen confirmed EU enlargement is among her key political priorities. Proposals on reforming EU enlargement policy were presented in February 2020, aimed at boosting the process of welcoming new countries. European Council conclusions from June 2022 support the ‘gradual integration’ of new Member States.

In 2022, Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova requested to join the EU, and Member States endorsed their ‘European perspective’ on 23 June. Among the six Western Balkan countries, accession negotiations are under way with Albania, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia. Granted ‘candidate country’ status, Bosnia and Herzegovina has not yet opened accession negotiations. Kosovo is the least advanced in the process, with remaining sensitive issues, in particular, normalisation of relations with Serbia within the EU facilitated Belgrade-Pristina dialogue, the application of the 2013 Brussels Agreement with Serbia, and the establishment of an association/community of Serb-majority municipalities in Kosovo. Foreign interference particularly by Russia and China, also remain evident in the region.

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Accept YouTube Content EU response to the US Inflation Reduction Act Championing multilateralism

The EU has exclusive competence in trade policy, meaning that only the EU, rather than individual member countries, can conclude trade deals between the EU and global partners. In recent years, the EU has concluded bilateral trade agreements with Australia, Canada, Chile, Japan, New Zealand and the United Kingdom, as well as with the Mercosur South American trade bloc. Trade and technology engagement with key partners has taken new forms, such as the EU-US Trade and Technology Council created in 2021, and the agreement in June 2022 to launch the EU-India Trade and Technology Council. Engagement with Asia and the Indo-Pacific region features high on the EU agenda, with a plan of action agreed on a 2023‑2027 strategic partnership with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

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Accept YouTube Content Corporate sustainability due diligence Challenges ahead

The EU faces a key challenge in developing its common European foreign policy and ensuring that EU action in the world is strategic and coherent. Today, the Council must vote unanimously on foreign policy (with the exception of certain clearly defined cases that require only a qualified majority, e.g. the appointment of special representatives). The European Council’s Sibiu meeting in May 2019 supported the need to broaden the scope of qualified majority voting (under Article 31(3) TEU, the ‘passerelle clause’ – according to which the European Council may authorise the Council to act by qualified majority in certain cases in common foreign and security policy).

Even though international relations are increasingly fragmented, the balance of power between major actors such as the United States of America and the EU, Russia and China remains an important influence. The alliance between the EU and the US reflects our shared historical experience, common values and interests. However, the Trump administration’s ‘America First’ stance precipitated a move towards the development of EU strategic autonomy and strategic culture – ‘a common way of looking at the world, of defining threats and challenges’. Initiatives such as the new European Diplomatic Academy should help to foster a common EU diplomatic culture.

Putting EU enlargement policy into action also remains challenging. Since Croatia’s accession in 2013, no further new country has joined the EU. This decline in the enlargement project could be partly due to ‘enlargement fatigue’, both in hopeful accession countries as well as in EU countries, resulting in faltering public support. This could be particularly the case in Türkiye, as accession negotiations came to a standstill in June 2018, due to serious deficiencies in the country’s democratic institutions and the human rights situation, highlighted by the European Parliament.

Despite its relatively limited formal role in EU foreign policy, Parliament nevertheless influences the conduct of CFSP indirectly, through its budgetary powers, including holding the right to amend the draft CFSP budget. In addition, international agreements concluded by the EU in the CFSP field require Parliament to be consulted and Parliament to consent (Article 218 TEU). Through its parliamentary diplomacy, Parliament plays an important role in international relations worldwide. Following the conclusions of the Conference on the Future of Europe in 2022, the President of the European Parliament, Roberta Metsola, stressed the need for reform, including in foreign and security policy: ‘The last major reform took place a generation ago … It is time’. The proposals outlined by the conference will feed into discussions on the future of the EU’s external action in an increasingly challenging geopolitical environment.

Interactive infographic: Normandy index

Written by Sebastian Clapp.

The European Youth Event will bring together thousands of young people in the European Parliament in Strasbourg, on 9 and 10 June 2023, to share ideas about the future of Europe. This introduction to one of the major topics to be discussed during the EYE event is one of 11 prepared by the Parliament’s Research Service (EPRS). It offers an overview of the main lines of EU action and policy in the area concerned, and aims to act as a starting point for discussions during the event. You can find them all on this link.

When it comes to the international stage, European Union countries agree to work together for greater impact, especially on security and defence matters. A key component of the Union’s common foreign and security policy (CFSP) – the common security and defence policy (CSDP) – sets the framework for EU defence and crisis management. Faced with growing geopolitical uncertainty, the EU has made unprecedented progress on defence cooperation in recent years. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine provided renewed impetus to deepen this cooperation further, leading to a number of taboo-breaking proposals, such as the joint delivery of lethal weapons to Ukraine and a joint defence procurement fund.

Common security and defence policy

The EU first set out a common security and defence policy (CSDP) at the European Council meeting in Cologne in 1999. The CSDP is the EU’s main policy framework in the field of defence and crisis management and a key component of the Union’s common foreign and security policy (CFSP).

The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the European Commission (HR/VP – currently Josep Borrell) coordinates the CSDP. The HR/VP chairs the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) – made up of foreign ministers from each EU country – which takes CSDP decisions by unanimity. The HR/VP also heads the EU’s ‘diplomatic service’ – the European External Action Service (EEAS) – and the European Defence Agency (EDA), which supports all EU member countries, except Denmark, in enhancing their defence capabilities through European cooperation. Finally, the European Council – made up of Heads of State or Government of all EU countries – sets the overall political direction and priorities of the CSDP. As with the FAC, all European Council decisions on CFSP must be taken unanimously. The Treaty on European Union (TEU) ‘enables Parliament to play a full role in the development of the CSDP’. The European Parliament scrutinises the CSDP and its budget, among other things. According to the TEU, the HR/VP must consult Parliament ‘regularly’ on the main aspects of the CSDP and inform it on developments in this area, ensuring that Parliament’s views are ‘duly taken into consideration’. The TEU also states that Parliament must hold debates on progress on CSDP implementation twice a year. Parliament has generally been very supportive of stronger EU defence integration and cooperation. Parliament’s Subcommittee on Security and Defence (SEDE) prepares an annual report on CSDP implementation, which covers a wide range of security and defence issues.

There has been unprecedented progress on EU defence cooperation since the adoption of the EU Global Strategy in 2016. Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) provides a framework to deepen defence cooperation between EU countries (except Malta and Denmark). The European Defence Fund (EDF) promotes cooperation between EU companies on defence research and capability development. The coordinated annual review on defence (CARD) identifies opportunities for increased cooperation. The European Commission now has a Directorate-General for Defence Industry and Space (DG DEFIS). In 2019, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced the advent of a ‘geopolitical Commission’, signalling the EU executive branch’s willingness to step up its role on defence. And in late 2021, European Council President Charles Michel dubbed 2022 the ‘year of European defence’.

All of these initiatives are ground-breaking moves towards a more sovereign EU able to defend itself, with the ultimate intention to create a fully fledged European defence union – a term now used openly by EU institutions. The European defence union concept is based on provisions in Article 42(2) of the Treaty on European Union, which states: ‘The common security and defence policy shall include the progressive framing of a common Union defence policy. This will lead to a common defence, when the European Council, acting unanimously, so decides. It shall in that case recommend to the Member States the adoption of such a decision in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements.’

Gender equality is a priority in all of the EU’s external policies, so the women, peace and security agenda is central to defence and security policy. Climate change exacerbates threats and is therefore another priority, addressed through initiatives such as the climate change and defence roadmap.

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Accept YouTube Content Working together to tackle common threats: The EU-NATO relationship A new era in defence policy – Versailles Declaration and the Strategic Compass

Russia’s decision to invade Ukraine in 2022 shattered long-held views that war was a thing of the past in Europe. Russia’s war on Ukraine has ‘unleashed the strongest push to strengthen Europe’s defence since the end of the Cold War’. In their March 2022 Versailles Declaration, EU leaders reiterated the EU’s commitment to ‘take more responsibility for its own security’, including by ‘investing more and better’ in defence capabilities. They stated that the EU will strengthen its defence industry and increase the EU’s ‘capacity to act autonomously’, although close cooperation between the EU and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) will remain key to European security. Most significantly, the EU formally approved its Strategic Compass in March 2022. This ambitious plan to strengthen security and defence policy includes over 80 concrete actions, set to increase the EU’s ability to act, enhance its resilience, strengthen its defence capabilities and improve its partnerships and deadlines for concluding them.

One of the most significant elements of the Strategic Compass is the call for the development of an EU Rapid Deployment Capacity by 2025. This would consist of a modular force of up to 5 000 personnel, made up of modified EU battlegroups combining forces and capabilities from EU countries. EU battlegroups are multinational military units of up to 1 500 personnel, intended to respond rapidly to emerging crises outside the EU. While they have been operational since 2007, they have not yet been deployed in the field, due to a lack of political will and financial solidarity.

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Accept YouTube Content A Strategic Compass for the EU Promoting peace and security in the world

A key part of EU action under the CSDP are its external missions and operations in peacekeeping, conflict prevention, and strengthening international security. The EU deployed its first CSDP mission in 2003, and has since undertaken over 37 missions and operations, ranging from peacekeeping and conflict prevention to strengthening international security. Almost 4 000 men and women participate in such missions today. As of February 2023, there were 21 ongoing CSDP missions (12 civilian and 9 military, located in Europe, Africa and Asia). The EU Military Assistance Mission Ukraine (EUMAM Ukraine) launched in November 2022, for example, aims at strengthening the capacity of the Ukrainian armed forces. It will train some 30 000 Ukrainian military personnel on EU territory.

European Peace Facility

For the first time in European Union history – and not without controversy – on 28 February 2022, EU countries agreed to finance the provision of lethal weapons to a country at war: Ukraine. The funding for the weapons will come from the European Peace Facility. The fund was set up to fund the common costs of military CSDP missions and operations, support peace-support operations led by international and regional organisations and to help partner countries and organisations build their capacity to survive in the modern world – including through the provision of lethal weapons. The equipment delivered to Ukraine so far ranges from Soviet-era tanks to protective equipment. In January 2023, EU countries, Norway, the United Kingdom and the United States together promised Ukraine over 100 Western-made main battle tanks. Poland has already delivered the first of them. Training for Ukrainian tank crews has also already begun.

Buying defence equipment together

The Russian invasion of Ukraine triggered another taboo-breaking proposal – to buy defence equipment using the EU budget. To reinforce Europe’s defence industry by buying equipment collectively, a new short-term funding instrument, the European Defence Industry Reinforcement through Common Procurement Act (EDIRPA), is under discussion. It should address the ‘most urgent and critical defence product needs, especially those revealed or exacerbated by the response to the Russian aggression against Ukraine’. Based on the EDIRPA proposal, the European Commission expects to put forward a further proposal for a law on a longer-term European defence investment programme (EDIP) in June 2023.

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Accept YouTube Content European defence industry reinforcement through common procurement act (EDIRPA) [Policy podcast]

Written by Silvia Kotanidis.

The European Youth Event will bring together thousands of young people in the European Parliament in Strasbourg, on 9 and 10 June 2023, to share ideas about the future of Europe. This introduction to one of the major topics to be discussed during the EYE event is one of 11 prepared by the Parliament’s Research Service (EPRS). It offers an overview of the main lines of EU action and policy in the area concerned, and aims to act as a starting point for discussions during the event. You can find them all on this link.

European elections are a crucial moment in our democracy, giving citizens a say in the political direction of the European Union. However, as they are sometimes considered ‘second order elections’, where national rather than European issues are the focus, the European Parliament is proactively seeking ways to make EU elections more visible. After declining ever since the first European elections in 1979, electoral turnout increased in the 2019 elections. At least three elements may affect the next elections to the European Parliament, due to take place in late spring of 2024, with consequences for the balance between EU institutions.  

Background

Elections to the European Parliament are governed, for the most part, by national laws. The 1976 Electoral Act (amended in 2002) sets only certain common basic principles. These include proportional representation, voting taking place in all countries during the same ‘electoral period’, a voluntary electoral threshold for candidates of not more than 5 % at national level, and rules precluding Members of the European Parliament from taking up other public offices or national functions. The legal basis for reforming EU electoral law is enshrined in Article 223 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which makes it Parliament’s responsibility to propose the rules on EU elections, which are thereafter adopted unanimously by the Council (after Parliament has given consent).

The lead candidate, or Spitzenkandidaten, process

The first element to watch in the 2024 elections is how the results may affect the choice of the President of the European Commission. To give European citizens more of a say, the EU has tried out a new process – the lead candidate, or Spitzenkandidaten, process. However, it is not certain that this innovation will be repeated, after one successful, and one unsuccessful iteration, in 2014 and 2019 respectively. This process is intended to build a more democratic link between the European Parliament (the only EU institution directly elected by citizens) and the EU executive.

Commission Presidents are chosen by the European Council, acting by a qualified majority, and ‘taking into account the elections to the European Parliament’. The European Council proposes its candidate for President of the Commission to the European Parliament. Parliament then elects the Commission President by a majority of its component Members (Article 17(7) TEU). Under the, so far experimental, lead candidate process, European political parties agreed to propose their own candidates for the position of President of the Commission. The power to propose the final candidate for the Commission presidency would then go to the party winning the most votes in the European elections (or able to marshal a parliamentary majority around their own candidate).

Although criticised as a ‘power grab’ (because it seems to deprive the European Council of its role in proposing the candidate that Parliament then votes into the Commission presidency), ahead of the 2014 elections, the Parliament offered a more nuanced interpretation of the Spitzenkandidaten process in a 2013 resolution. The lead candidate process first took place in the 2014 European election campaign, under the motto ‘this time it’s different‘. The outcome was rather successful. The European People’s Party (EPP) gained the most votes, and the Parliament and Council accepted their lead candidate, Jean‑Claude Juncker (although not without resistance), who was voted into office in July 2014.

However, the lead candidate experience in the 2019 elections was less successful. Although almost all European political parties proposed a lead candidate, the European Council put forward a different candidate. As a result, a tiny majority of Parliament’s Members (383 votes in favour, 327 against, and 22 abstentions) elected Ursula von der Leyen as European Commission President in July 2019.

The role of European political parties in the Spitzenkandidaten process is vital. Each political party runs a selection process for its lead candidate, according to its own internal rules or political strategy. The process therefore enhances Parliament’s role in the choice of the person to fill the most important EU executive position. It will consequently be crucial for European parties to decide whether to agree to repeat this experiment a third time. With the 2024 elections approaching (although the exact dates have yet to be fixed), European parties should have taken their decision by summer 2023, i.e. in good time to select lead candidates in autumn 2023.

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Accept YouTube Content How can the EU counter radicalisation? Pending electoral reforms

Very much linked to the Spitzenkandidaten process, a second element to watch in the 2024 European elections is the pending electoral reform (contained in the draft legislative act adopted by Parliament on 3 May 2022). This reform, one of the many attempted over recent decades to ‘Europeanise’ the European elections (so that they are seen as a Europe-wide election, rather than a secondary chance to vote on national issues), would innovate in two respects. First, by addressing the current fragmentation into 27 different electoral systems, it would make electoral rules more uniform across the EU (for example, uniform minimum voting age, right to vote in third countries, 9 May as fixed election day). Next, by seeking to emancipate European elections from national debate and to bring European affairs closer to citizens, it would introduce a Union-wide constituency in which 28 Members of Parliament would be elected – not for a single country, but through transnational lists. Here, alternating candidates between small, medium-sized and large countries would ensure geographical balance. This Union-wide constituency would facilitate the lead candidate process, through a proposed political agreement between European political entities and an interinstitutional agreement between Parliament and European Council.

The EPP, Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D) and the Renew Europe groups endorsed the proposals for European transnational lists combined with a lead candidate process in the January 2022 Our priorities for Europeans political agreement. The highly innovative character of these proposals and the constitutional procedures they would require mean they are unlikely to be in place before the 2024 European elections. Discussions on the proposal will surely continue during 2023, giving an indication of EU countries’ political appetite to take the long-awaited leap to making the European elections ‘more European’.

Conference on the Future of Europe

A third element to watch is the effect of the recent Conference on the Future of Europe, especially citizens’ involvement in what was considered a true exercise of participatory democracy. Held from April 2021 to May 2022, this citizen-led debate helped increase interest in European affairs (and it is hoped will increase electoral turnout), as well as producing concrete results on the role of European elections. Citizens’ panel Recommendation 16 suggests harmonised electoral conditions. Conference Proposal 38(4) proposes giving citizens a greater say on who is elected President of the Commission, either via a direct election or through the lead candidate process. While the European Parliament, European Commission and European Council must consider these forward looking and innovative suggestions before they can be implemented, they represent a clear indication of the desire to make European elections key to European democracy.

Written by Laurence Amand-Eeckhout and Tarja Laaninen.

The European Youth Event will bring together thousands of young people in the European Parliament in Strasbourg, on 9 and 10 June 2023, to share ideas about the future of Europe. This introduction to one of the major topics to be discussed during the EYE event is one of 11 prepared by the Parliament’s Research Service (EPRS). It offers an overview of the main lines of EU action and policy in the area concerned, and aims to act as a starting point for discussions during the event. You can find them all on this link.

Despite the wide range of health benefits gained from participating in physical activity, nearly half of Europeans do not exercise. A recent Eurobarometer survey, published in September 2022, found that 45 % of European adults never exercise. A healthy lifestyle is vital to personal and public health, and public health policy has taken centre stage in European Union policymaking since the COVID‑19 pandemic. In the wake of the crisis, the EU has renewed its focus on addressing cross-border health emergencies and is working towards building a European Health Union.

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Accept YouTube Content European health union: Safeguarding EU citizens’ health Health Background

National governments are responsible for organising and delivering healthcare services to citizens, whereas the European Union’s role is mainly one of coordination and support. EU-level public health policy aims at protecting and improving peoples’ health, ensuring equal access to modern and efficient healthcare, and equipping EU countries to better prevent and address serious cross-border health threats, such as the COVID‑19 pandemic. The EU also funds research projects on prevention, diagnosis, new treatments and care.

The EU adopts legislation and makes recommendations to countries on public health topics, ranging from medicines, medical devices and clinical trials, to tobacco, promotion of good health and patients’ rights.

Two EU agencies support national governments on health issues: the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC), which assesses and monitors emerging disease threats, and the European Medicines Agency (EMA), which evaluates the quality, safety and efficiency of medicines.

What is the EU doing – and why?

Drawing lessons from the COVID‑19 crisis, the EU has begun building a European Health Union, to improve EU capacity in prevention, preparedness, surveillance, risk assessment, early warning, and response in the face of medical emergencies. To do this, the EU has reinforced the ECDC and the EMA. It has created new rules on serious cross-border threats to health. There is new legislation regulating the supply of medical countermeasures (products used to face serious health threats such as antibiotics, tests and equipment, personal protective equipment, and vaccines) in the event of a public health emergency. The EU also created the European Health Emergency Preparedness and Response Authority (HERA). Additionally, a new law enabling stronger cooperation between EU countries on assessment of new health technology should ensure patients have better access to innovative medicines and medical devices.

The EU also focuses on long-term health priorities: cancer, non-communicable diseases, antimicrobial-resistant infections, health and safety at work, mental health disorders, and digital health. Health promotion and disease prevention are also essential – particularly regarding the serious impact of drugs, alcohol and tobacco use on our health. As part of building a stronger European Health Union, the EU is also reviewing its pharmaceutical legislation. Shortages of certain medicines are a growing threat to public health in Europe, and making medicines available and affordable for everyone is a real challenge.

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Accept YouTube Content Fighting antibiotic resistance Sport Background

A Eurobarometer survey from September 2022 showed that up to 45 % of Europeans never exercise or play sports. Respondents aged 15‑24 years are the most likely to exercise or play sport with some regularity (54 %). This proportion decreases with age, from 42 % among 25‑39 year-olds, to 32 % in the group aged 40‑54 and 21 % among those aged 55 and over.

While responsibility for sports policy lies primarily with national governments and sports organisations, the EU does play a role. Since 2009, the EU has been responsible for fostering cooperation and managing initiatives in support of physical activity and sport across Europe. The EU allocates funding for sports under a dedicated budget in the Erasmus+ programme, and finances numerous sports projects and networks.

Decisions taken by the EU institutions can have a major impact on professional athletes’ careers. The best-known case is the European Court of Justice Bosman ruling (1995), which eliminated transfer fees for footballers whose contracts had ended, and banned restrictions on how many players from other Member States could sign to play for clubs in EU countries.

What is the EU doing – and why?

Given the positive health effects of physical activity, getting more people to participate in sport is an EU priority. The European Week of Sport, held every September across Europe, seeks to engage more Europeans – from children to pensioners – in sports and physical exercise. The EU supports the idea that taking part in sports can improve general wellbeing, as well as providing significant economic benefits across the Union, and can help overcome wider societal issues such as racism, social exclusion and gender inequality.

Examples of EU action include initiatives to enhance young athletes’ wellbeing and help athletes combine their sporting careers with work or education. The EU promotes quality coaching, works to raise youth awareness of the dangers of doping, and to improve the governance of sports organisations.

The 2021-2024 EU work plan for sport guides those working towards cooperation between EU institutions, national authorities and sports stakeholders. One of its priorities is investment in sport and health-enhancing physical activity, including the creation of sports opportunities for all ages. The plan also aims at helping the sports sector recover from the COVID-19 pandemic. The EU plans to increase the proportion of women in leadership positions and coaching. The plan promotes equal conditions for all athletes, and seeks to enhance media coverage of women in sport.

At the annual EU Sport Forum in June 2022, a Youth Ideas Lab was launched under the umbrella of the HealthyLifestyle4All initiative (a European Year of Youth 2022 initiative). The goal of the Youth Labs was to give young people a voice in developing innovative proposals related to increasing young people’s participation in and access to physical activity, and ensuring a healthy lifestyle through sport for all generations.

Written by David de Groot.

The European Youth Event will bring together thousands of young people in the European Parliament in Strasbourg, on 9 and 10 June 2023, to share ideas about the future of Europe. This introduction to one of the major topics to be discussed during the EYE event is one of 11 prepared by the Parliament’s Research Service (EPRS). It offers an overview of the main lines of EU action and policy in the area concerned, and aims to act as a starting point for discussions during the event. You can find them all on this link.

The Treaty of Maastricht, which entered into force 30 years ago, officially established European Union citizenship. Since then, everyone who holds the nationality of an EU country is also an EU citizen. Union citizenship means EU citizens enjoy the same treatment in law irrespective of their nationality throughout all EU countries. This includes rights to move and live and vote anywhere in EU territory.

EU citizenship

Article 20 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) states ‘Citizenship of the Union is hereby established. Every person holding the nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union. Citizenship of the Union shall be additional to and not replace national citizenship’. As nationals of EU countries, therefore, our EU citizenship is the fundamental status granting us rights in all EU countries. These rights are granted under the EU Treaties and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.

Freedom to move and live anywhere in the EU

As an EU citizen, you have the right to move and live with your family in another EU country – whether they are EU citizens themselves or third-country (non-EU) nationals – for holidays, shopping trips, work, study or to retire. EU citizenship also allows you to live in one EU country and work across the border in another. The EU has adopted legislation to make all of this easier.

EU citizenship law mostly concerns EU citizens and their family members living in an EU country of which they do not have the nationality. However, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) also considers that EU citizenship protects us, under certain circumstances, against measures countries take that could deprive EU citizens of their rights in their own country. For example, national authorities may not refuse to grant a residence or work permit to a third-country national parent of an EU citizen child, if this means that the child would have to leave the EU – as that would be considered a violation of the child’s right of residence as an EU citizen.

Electoral rights

As an EU citizen residing in an EU country, you are entitled to vote and to stand as a candidate in that country in the European Parliament elections. These take place every five years, with the next elections expected in May 2024. Many EU countries allow their nationals to vote in European elections from abroad. Because you are only allowed to vote in the European elections in one place, however, individuals living in another EU state must then decide in which country they want to participate in the election. Furthermore, as an EU citizen you have the right to vote and stand as a candidate in municipal elections in the EU country in which you live.

The legislation on electoral rights dates from the 1990s. Updated proposals concerning voting in European elections in the Member State of residence and municipal elections are currently being considered.

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Accept YouTube Content Heading towards 2024 European elections (Ten issues to watch in 2023) Protection overseas

When visiting a non-EU country, things do not always go as planned, and you might need the help of an embassy or consulate. However, what happens if the EU country of which you are a national does not have an embassy or consulate in that country? Will you remain ‘unrepresented‘? In such cases, we have the right, as EU citizens, to ask for help from an embassy or consulate of any other EU Member State located in that non-EU country. They must assist you under the same conditions as they assist their own nationals.

Right to petition the European Parliament

As an EU citizen, you have the right to submit a petition to the European Parliament, individually or with others, on any matter within the European Union’s fields of activity that directly affects you.

The European Parliament’s Committee on Petitions acts as a bridge between EU citizens and the EU institutions, and is responsible for considering and following up on your petition.

Right to good administration and access to documents

EU citizens have the right to have their affairs handled impartially, fairly and within a reasonable time by EU institutions and bodies. Known as the right to good administration, it also sets out that you may write to the EU institutions in any of the official EU languages and must receive an answer in the same language.

Additionally, as an EU citizen, you have a right to access to documents held by the EU institutions.

Right to refer to the European Ombudsman

If you think that an EU institution or an EU agency has treated you unfairly, as an EU citizen you are entitled to refer your case to the European Ombudsman. The European Ombudsman is an independent and impartial body that holds the EU’s institutions and agencies to account, and promotes good administration. The Ombudsman helps people, businesses, and organisations facing problems with the EU’s administration by investigating complaints about maladministration by EU institutions and bodies.

Protection against losing EU citizenship

Considering that many of our essential rights come from our EU citizenship, losing EU citizenship can have devastating consequences on personal and professional life. However, whether there is an implicit right to retain EU citizenship once you have it, is still an open-ended question.

The Court of Justice of the EU has held on multiple occasions that it is for each EU country, having due regard to EU law, to lay down the conditions for the acquisition and loss of nationality. According to the Court, in situations where a person stands to lose their nationality, EU Member State authorities and courts must make an individual assessment of the consequences the resultant loss of EU citizenship would have on that person. There might also be a duty for EU countries to help people recover their nationality and thus EU citizenship.

A notable exception to this is, when a country decides to leave the European Union. In such cases, nationals of that country lose EU citizenship and all associated rights, unless they have the nationality of another Member State.

Written by Suzana Anghel and Ralf Drachenberg.

Europe’s long-term strategy for the competitiveness of its economy, notably regarding investment, innovation and trade, will be at the centre of the European Council meeting on 23 and 24 March 2023. EU leaders will of course address Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, and consider the multidimensional (political, financial, economic, humanitarian and military) assistance the EU and its Member States have been providing to Ukraine, particularly joint ammunition procurement. Regarding energy policy, EU leaders will continue their work on reducing energy demand, ensuring security of energy supply and lowering energy prices. Following up on the special European Council meeting in February, EU leaders will examine implementation of their conclusions on migration, in particular regarding external border management and returns. The European Council may also welcome the recent agreement in principle on the Windsor Framework, which will outline how the Ireland/Northern Ireland Protocol will function, notably as regards customs procedures. The European Council meeting will be followed by a Euro Summit meeting on 24 March.

1. General aspects

During the first-ever appearance of a European Council president at a pre-European Council debate in plenary, on 15 March 2023, Charles Michel outlined the main agenda points of the forthcoming European Council meeting planned for 23 and 24 March. As noted in an EPRS analysis of the interaction between the European Council and the European Parliament, until now, the president of the former had only appeared before Parliament to report on the conclusions of a meeting of the institution. As for the agenda of the March European Council meeting, Charles Michel indicated that the EU’s economic future would be a central topic. When speaking of Europe’s competitiveness, Michel devoted some attention to the EU’s relations with China, without however indicating if EU leaders were to consider the subject again in March 2023 or later in the year.

The Indicative Leaders’ Agenda 2022, which offered an overview of EU leaders’ meetings and topics for the year, expired in December 2022, and has still not been updated. It remains to be seen whether the European Council President, Charles Michel, will use this European Council meeting as the occasion to present a new document covering 2023.

2. European Council meeting Ukraine

On 24 February, EU leaders will discuss the situation in Ukraine for the 10th time since the start of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. They will most probably condemn once again the unjustified and illegal war waged by Russia, reaffirm the EU’s support for Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and recall Ukraine’s European path. EU leaders could also reiterate their support for the Ukraine peace formula put forward by the President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, who could, as is now the tradition, again address the European Council. President Michel underlined that the peace plan was based on the United Nations (UN) Charter principles, while recalling that the UN General Assembly had adopted (with 141 votes in favour, 7 votes against, and 32 abstentions) a resolution calling for an end to the war in Ukraine.

EU leaders will most probably consider the multidimensional (political, financial, economic, humanitarian and military) assistance the EU and its Member States have been providing to Ukraine. Regarding political support, as stressed by President Michel, unity is key. EU leaders could take stock of progress on the implementation of the €18 billion worth of financial assistance granted to Ukraine for 2023. They will most probably consider the growing need for humanitarian aid as well. Through its civil protection mechanism, the EU has so far provided 82 000 tonnes of material assistance, including power generators, medical equipment and temporary shelter units, to Ukraine.

The debate will very likely focus on military assistance. As highlighted by President Michel, Ukraine urgently needs ammunition, as it is facing up to 50 000 Russian artillery shells per day. This requires a rapid ramping up of military support, in particular through joint ammunition procurement, and also strengthening the EU’s security and defence, an aspect EU leaders might also consider. The High Representative/Vice President of the European Commission, Josep Borrell, stressed that the coming weeks would be ‘critical’, and proposed increasing the European Peace Facility by €2 billion. This proposal was first considered by ministers of defence at their informal meeting in Stockholm on 7 and 8 March 2023; the European Council could welcome an agreement that was reached during the Foreign Affairs Council meeting of 20 February. The Council has also discussed the first year of implementation of the Strategic Compass; as required by the Compass, the results will most probably be presented to EU leaders.

At their special meeting of 9 February 2023, EU leaders expressed support for the establishment in The Hague of an international centre for the prosecution of the crime of aggression in Ukraine. In the meantime, an agreement has been signed – a development the European Council is likely to welcome. EU leaders have repeatedly expressed their support for the work of the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court. The Court could open war crime cases in which several crimes, including the abduction of Ukrainian children, could be examined. EU leaders have several times called on Russia to return abducted Ukrainian children. According to estimates, nearly 14 000 Ukrainian children have been abducted and deported to Russia to date. EU leaders are again expected to take stock of efforts made to identify legal options allowing for the use of Russia’s frozen assets to support Ukraine’s reconstruction. 

Although no new sanctions are expected, EU leaders could take stock of the implementation of existing sanctions and call for closer coordination with partners, in particular the United States (US). Back in May 2022, EU leaders had welcomed the European Commission’s proposal to criminalise, on the basis of Article 83 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU, the violation of EU sanctions. In the meantime, the European Commission has presented a proposal for a directive, which is currently being examined by the co-legislators, while the European Economic and Social Committee has presented its opinion.

EU leaders might once again condemn the support Iran and Belarus are providing to Russia in its aggression against Ukraine. They could also consider the destabilisation attempts targeting Moldova and express EU support to help strengthen the country’s resilience. Food security remains an issue of concern, and EU leaders could welcome the Black Sea Grain initiative’s extension for an additional 60 days.

Competitiveness, single market and the economy

The EU single market turned 30 this year, and EU leaders are expected to take stock of its degree of completion based on the ‘The Single Market at 30’ communication. Deepening and strengthening the single market was a core priority for EU leaders even before the COVID-19 pandemic and the Ukraine crisis; given the current situation, it is more essential than ever.

Increased use of state subsidies by global competitors, in particular the US with its Inflation Reduction Act, has ignited the discussion on the topic in recent months, which is relevant in relation to both EU global competitiveness and competiveness within the single market. The last European Council meeting agreed to work on relaxing the State aid regime in a targeted and temporary manner. However, a group of countries remain concerned that the relaxation of State aid controls may result in an uneven playing field, and weaken the single market. In that context, the European Council is likely to discuss the temporary crisis and transition framework adopted by the Commission on 9 March 2023.

According to President Michel, the EU’s long-term strategy to ensure the EU economy’s competitiveness will be at the centre of discussions at the March meeting. In this context, Michel has highlighted three areas on which the EU needs to work: i) investment, ii) innovation, and iii) trade. The Versailles Declaration signalled the importance of a robust EU trade policy to respond effectively to ‘growing instability, strategic competition and security threats’. Indeed, recent European Council conclusions have highlighted the crucial importance of trade policy as a means of allowing the EU to access new strategic markets and ensure access to critical materials to secure value chains. At the March European Council meeting, EU leaders are thus likely to hold a discussion on EU trade policy, as well as on ways to contribute to the EU’s strategic goals.

Talks will continue on ways to make EU industry more competitive and future-proof in the current global situation. EU leaders will most probably discuss the EU Green Deal industrial plan, which was put forward shortly before the special meeting of 9 February 2023 as a European response to the US Inflation Reduction Act. Based on the guidance EU leaders gave at that meeting, the Commission has published two key pillars of the industrial plan: the net-zero industry act and the European critical raw materials act. To facilitate business access to funding and in turn boost investment, EU leaders are expected to take stock of progress made in completing the capital markets union. Greater ambition and effort to establish a genuine capital markets union – as a means of ‘channelling Europe’s savings into growth’ – was also the subject of a recent joint op-ed signed by the presidents of the European Council, European Commission, Eurogroup, European Central Bank and European Investment Bank.

The reform of the EU economic governance framework, last discussed on 9 February 2023, is likely to feature on the agenda again. EU leaders are expected to endorse the Ecofin Council conclusions of 14 March and ask the Commission to put forward the related legislative proposals.

As part of the regular annual European Semester process, EU leaders will look at the 2023 annual sustainable growth survey, the priority areas of which should feature in the national recovery and resilience plans. EU leaders are also expected to endorse the draft Council recommendation on euro-area economic policy.

Energy

In line with their previous conclusions on energy, EU leaders are expected to consider: i) the reduction of energy demand; ii) security of supply; and iii) lower prices. They will most probably stress again the importance of phasing out dependency on Russian fossil fuels and accelerating the decarbonisation of energy systems in the EU.

In view of replenishing stocks for winter 2023/2024, EU leaders could insist on stronger coordination of gas purchases and full use of the EU energy platform mechanism for joint gas purchases, AggregateEU. Through this mechanism, Member States can engage voluntarily in joint purchases, with a mandatory minimum aggregation of demand equivalent to 15 % of storage facilities’ filling needs in each Member State. EU leaders could call on the Commission to continue assessing the consequences of implementing the emergency energy measures put in place in 2022, and discuss their possible extension.

On 16 March 2023, the Commission presented its proposal for electricity market reform, which EU leaders are likely to debate in a context of persisting national sensitivities. In a joint letter of 13 February, a group of seven Member States expressed concern about a sweeping reform of the current system, and called for a ‘prudent’ approach promoting the green transition and keeping energy affordable. Other countries, such as France and Spain, have repeatedly called for an in-depth reform that should be implemented rapidly.

Migration

In the context of a 64 % increase in irregular border crossings in 2022 compared with the previous year, and the resulting pressure at the EU’s external borders, EU leaders held an in-depth debate on migration during their meeting of 9 February 2023. The conclusions put emphasis on three areas: i) external action; ii) returns and readmissions; and iii) protection of external borders. The European Council will now take stock of how these conclusions have been implemented.

Justice and home affairs (JHA) ministers discussed the internal and external aspects of migration on 10 March 2023. On that occasion, the Swedish Presidency of the Council presented an overview of the state of play of all current legislative files on JHA issues, including migration-related files such as the Eurodac recast, the proposed regulation on asylum and migration management, and the Asylum Procedures Directive reform.

EU leaders are expected to examine the Commission’s new initiatives on effective European integrated border management and returns, in particular a communication on the strategic framework for European integrated border management (EIBM) and a recommendation to Member States on the mutual recognition of return decisions and expedite returns.

The President of the European Parliament, Roberta Metsola, is expected to reiterate to EU leaders her plenary message on migration, in which, in particular, she urged the EU to take a ‘more ambitious stance on migration’.

Other items

EU leaders could follow up on their commitment to provide further assistance to Türkiye and Syria following the deadly earthquake of 6 February 2023, and welcome the results of the Donors’ Conference of 20 March 2023. They could also consider the situation in Georgia in light of recent street protests, and recall the importance of maintaining the country’s EU path, in line with most Georgians’ aspirations.

3. Euro Summit

The European Council meeting will be followed by a Euro Summit, following nine months without any meeting of the euro-area countries’ leaders, even though such meetings are supposed to take place at least twice a year. This summit will be only the second since December 2021. Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and other urgent issues have dominated EU leaders’ agenda and taken precedence. At this meeting, EU leaders are expected to consider the results of the Eurogroup meeting of 13 March 2023 and focus, in particular, on fiscal guidance for 2024; inflation, which lately has been significantly higher than the European Central Bank’s 2% target; as well as on plans to develop a digital euro. The collapse of the Silicon Valley Bank in the US and the possible effects on the EU economy may also be discussed.

Read this briefing on ‘Outlook for the meetings of EU leaders on 23-24 March 2023‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Citizens often send messages to the President of the European Parliament (or to the institution’s public portal) expressing their views on current issues and/or requesting action from the Parliament. The Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (AskEP) within the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) looks into these issues and replies to the messages, which may sometimes be identical as part of wider public campaigns.

The President of the European Parliament has recently received a large number of messages calling on the European Union to adopt measures for legal protection of animal rights. Citizens first began to write to the President on this subject in March 2023, in the context of the risk that a 2014 Portuguese law criminalising the mistreatment or abandonment of pets is declared unconstitutional. Citizens are calling on the EU to act to protect pets.

Please find below the main points of the reply sent to citizens who took the time to write to the President of the European Parliament on this matter (in English and Portuguese).

Main points made in the reply in English

Under European Union law, the European Commission is the only institution that can submit proposals for legislation. The EU takes full account of animal welfare requirements when defining its policies on agriculture, fisheries, transport, the internal market, research and technological development and space. This protection is enshrined in the EU Treaties.

However, the welfare of pet animals remains the sole responsibility of each individual EU country and is not subject to EU-wide rules.

The Council of Europe’s European Convention for the Protection of Pet Animals is not part of EU law, although it has been ratified by several EU countries, including Portugal. The European Union and the Council of Europe work independently.

Finally, we would like to draw your attention to the Intergroup on the Welfare and Conservation of Animals, and especially its Companion Animals Working Group. This is an informal inter-party platform, where Members of the European Parliament can exchange views on animal welfare and promote contact between Members and civil society. They do not, however, represent the official position of the European Parliament.

Main points made in the reply in Portuguese

Nos termos do direito da União Europeia, a Comissão Europeia é a única instituição que pode apresentar propostas de legislação. Na definição das políticas da União nos domínios da agricultura, da pesca, dos transportes, do mercado interno, da investigação e desenvolvimento tecnológico e do espaço, a União plenamente tem em conta as exigências em matéria de bem-estar dos animais. Esta proteção está consagrada nos Tratados da UE.

No entanto o bem-estar dos animais de companhia continua a ser da exclusiva responsabilidade de cada país da UE e não está sujeito a regras a nível da União Europeia.

No que diz respeito à Convenção Europeia para a Proteção dos Animais de Companhia do Conselho da Europa, esta convenção não faz parte do direito da União, embora tenha sido ratificada por vários países da UE, incluindo Portugal. Além disso, a União Europeia e o Conselho da Europa trabalham independentemente.

Finalmente, gostaríamos de chamar sua atenção para o Intergrupo para o Bem-Estar e Conservação dos Animais, e especialmente o seu grupo de trabalho sobre animais de companhia, que é uma plataforma informal interpartidária onde os deputados ao Parlamento Europeu podem trocar opiniões sobre questões de bem-estar animal e promover o intercâmbio entre os deputados e a sociedade civil. Todavia, não representam a posição oficial do Parlamento Europeu.

Written by Krisztina Binder.

In a rapidly changing and increasingly digital world, the COVID-19 pandemic has further increased the need to develop the use of technology in education and training. Appropriate skills and competences, as well as digital infrastructure and equipment, are key in this regard. When adapting education to the digital age, ensuring equity and inclusion is crucial, too.

The 2021-2027 digital education action plan (DEAP), the European Commission’s flagship initiative adopted in September 2020, calls for high-quality, inclusive and accessible digital education supported by reinforced cooperation and exchange at EU level. The two strategic priorities set out in the plan are the development of a high-performing digital education ecosystem and the strengthening of citizens’ digital skills and competences. Several actions were put forward to support these priorities.

Implementation of each of these actions is already on track or completed. For instance, the Council adopted its recommendation on blended learning approaches in November 2021, and the Commission published ethical guidelines on the use of artificial intelligence and data in teaching and learning for educators in October 2022. In the second quarter of 2023, the Commission is expected to present proposals for two Council recommendations, namely on the enabling factors for digital education and on improving the provision of digital skills in education and training. In 2024, the Commission is due to carry out a comprehensive review to evaluate the DEAP’s outreach and impact and, if necessary, propose additional measures or modifications.

In its March 2021 resolution on shaping digital education policy, the European Parliament acknowledged the DEAP’s extended scope and ambition. At the same time, it urged that digital transition funds be used to increase education systems’ digital capacity, and stressed the need to close the digital divide and ensure quality digital education based on a lifelong learning approach. According to Parliament, financial support for teachers’ professional development is also crucial.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Progress on the European Commission’s 2021-2027 digital education action plan‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Women in Digital (WID) score, 2022 At least basic digital content creation skills (% of all individuals), 2021 People with at least basic overall digital skills (% of people aged 16 to 74), 2021

Written by Katarzyna Sochacka and Clare Ferguson.

Among the highlights of the March I plenary session was a debate on the conclusions of the special European Council meeting of 9 February and the preparation of the European Council meeting of 23-24 March 2023, with Charles Michel, the President of the European Council. Members also debated the failure of the Silicon Valley Bank and its implications for European financial stability, a common EU response to save lives at sea, the need to ensure transparency and accountability in the light of alleged conflicts of interest, combatting organised crime in the EU, human rights defenders working in the field of sexual and reproductive health rights, cross-border adoption from third countries, the Bridgetown Agenda on development finance, long-term commitment to animal welfare, and strengthening EU defence in the context of the war in Ukraine.

Members also debated statements by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the European Commission, Josep Borrell, on the deterioration of democracy in Israel and the consequences on the occupied territories, on the situation in Georgia, and on the challenges facing Moldova.

During a ceremony celebrating International Women’s Day, in addition to statements by the Presidents of the Parliament, Roberta Metsola, and of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, Samantha Cristoforetti, an astronaut from the European Space Agency and former commander of the International Space Station, and Shirin Ebadi, Iranian activist and 2003 Nobel Peace Prize winner, gave speeches.

Finally, Members heard and debated a ‘This is Europe’ address by Gitanas Nausèda, President of Lithuania.

Data act

Parliament considered and adopted a position for trilogue negotiations on the proposed data act, aimed at governing fair access to and use of data in the EU, on the basis of a Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE) report. The report seeks to clarify which data are covered by the legislation, strengthen protection of trade secrets, ensure fairer contracts for customers, and provide them with more power to switch provider. It also demands fair remuneration for access to data, and sets the terms for ‘public emergency’ access to privately held data.

Outcome of negotiations on ‘Fit for 55’ proposals

In a joint debate, Members assessed the outcome of negotiations on several ‘Fit for 55’ proposals aimed at reducing EU greenhouse gas emissions by 55 % by 2030. Members adopted a provisional agreement, endorsed by the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI), on revising the Effort-sharing Regulation. The legislation sets binding targets for each EU country to reduce emissions not covered under the emissions trading system (ETS), which now need updated to reflect the EU’s increased climate ambition. The revision requires a just and socially fair transition, with Parliament insisting on reinforced corrective action, transparency, and the importance of scientific advice. Parliament also formally adopted a provisional agreement on revising the market stability reserve for the EU ETS, which adjusts the number of allowances in the reserve, the auctioning of which provides significant revenue for EU countries. In addition, Members adopted a text agreed between the co-legislators on revising the Land Use, Land-use Change and Forestry Regulation (LULUCF), which manages carbon removals through sustainable forestry and land management. While some of Parliament’s demands for a stronger framework, and environmental and economic monitoring were not addressed, a review is scheduled for 2025.

Energy performance of buildings

To further reduce the energy wasted through badly insulated and energy-inefficient buildings, Parliament adopted its position for negotiations with the Council on accelerating action under the Energy Performance of Buildings Directive. Parliament’s discussion follows an ITRE committee report on the proposed revision of the directive, seeking to set an earlier zero-emissions deadline for all new buildings. Fossil fuel heating systems should disappear altogether by 2035, with residential buildings set to reach EPC class E by 2030. Where renovations would lead to rent rises not compensated by energy savings, however, the report seeks an exemption for public social housing.

European Citizens’ Initiative: ‘Save bees and farmers!’

Parliament debated a European Citizens’ Initiative, backed by over 1 million citizens, calling for bee-friendly agriculture for a healthy environment. Reacting to declining bee populations, the initiative seeks an EU response to redress the balance between priorities on food security, the environment and agricultural practices.

EU relations with Armenia and Azerbaijan

Members debated and adopted Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) own-initiative reports on EU-Armenia relations and EU-Azerbaijan relations seeking to advance discussion on a future Armenia–Azerbaijan peace treaty to address the root causes of the conflict.

Guidelines on human rights defenders

Members debated and adopted an AFET own-initiative report on EU guidelines on human rights defenders assessing the framework for protecting human rights activists working in non-EU countries. The report calls for consistent application of the EU guidelines, to a wider range of rights defenders, and for specific support for those defending women’s sexual and reproductive rights.

Windsor framework

In a joint debate on relations with the United Kingdom, Members debated a Committee on Constitutional Affairs (AFCO) implementation report on the Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the EU. They also heard a Commission statement on the recently agreed Windsor framework. The framework seeks to facilitate the movement of goods under the Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland (the part of the Withdrawal Agreement seeking to avoid a hard border on the island of Ireland, and safeguard the all-island economy, the Good Friday (Belfast) Agreement and the integrity of the EU single market). The chairs of the European Parliament’s UK Contact Group and Parliament’s delegation to the EU-UK Parliamentary Partnership Assembly have welcomed the Windsor framework, but also promised detailed parliamentary scrutiny and thorough monitoring of its implementation.

Question time

Commissioner Kadri Simson answered Members’ questions on how to ensure energy security in the EU in 2023. Subsequently, the EU High Representative, Josep Borrell, answered questions on how to strengthen trans-Atlantic ties to face global multilateral challenges.

Opening of trilogue negotiations

Members confirmed, with a vote, the mandate for negotiations from the ITRE committee on a proposal for a regulation on European Digital Identity framework.

Members also confirmed, without voting, ten mandates to enter into interinstitutional negotiations, three from the ITRE committee, on reports on the internal markets for renewable and natural gases, and on a report on a high common level of cybersecurity in EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies; three from the Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) committee, on reports on amendments to the markets in financial instruments rules, MiFID 2 and MiFIR, and on the regulation on central securities depositories; one from the Legal Affairs (JURI) committee on geographical indication protection for craft and industrial products; one from the Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) committee on alignment with EU rules on the protection of personal data, and two from the joint LIBE/JURI committee on proposals for a directive and regulation on digitalisation of cross-border judicial cooperation.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Plenary round-up – March I 2023‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Ralf Drachenberg.

‘This is Europe’ – an initiative proposed by the President of the European Parliament, Roberta Metsola – consists of a series of debates with EU leaders to discuss their visions for the future of the European Union. In his address to the European Parliament on 14 March 2023, the President of Lithuania, Gitanas Nausėda, emphasised three topics: i) support for Ukraine and that country’s place in Europe (i.e. enlargement); ii) the importance of historical memory; and iii) the challenges facing Europe today. Among the greatest challenges is maintaining an independent posture in EU relations with authoritarian regimes.

We have seen time and again serious crises give impetus to European renewal. There is something remarkable about the ability of all of us Europeans to adjust and move forward with unfaltering optimism whatever happens.

Gitanas Nausėda Background

Roberta Metsola launched the ‘This is Europe’ initiative soon after her election as president of the European Parliament in January 2022. Gitanas Nausėda is the seventh EU leader to have addressed the Parliament since its Conference of Presidents endorsed the initiative on 28 April 2022. These debates will continue during subsequent sessions. The next leader to have confirmed their participation is the prime minister of Luxembourg, Xavier Bettel, who will speak during the April 2023 plenary session; he is due to be followed by the chancellor of Germany, Olaf Scholz, during the May session. A similar initiative by the Parliament, ahead of the 2019 European elections, saw a number of EU leaders speak in the Parliament’s plenary sessions about their views on the future of Europe. An EPRS analysis of the future of Europe debates pinpointed the similarities and differences in EU leaders’ views.

Figure 1 – Time devoted by Gitanas Nausėda to various topics in his speech

The ‘This is Europe’ initiative is particularly relevant in the context of the Conference on the Future of Europe (CoFoE), a bottom-up exercise that allowed EU citizens to express their opinions on the EU’s future policies and functioning. On 30 April 2022, the CoFoE plenary adopted 49 proposals (see an EPRS overview), including more than 300 measures by which they might be achieved. As a follow-up, Parliament adopted a resolution, by a large majority, calling for a convention in accordance with Article 48 of the Treaty on European Union. This call was backed by the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, in her State of the Union speech on 14 September 2022. At the June 2022 European Council meeting, the Heads of State or Government ‘took note’ of the CoFoE proposals. While calling for ‘an effective follow-up’, they did not provide specific guidelines in this respect. Instead, they merely stated that each EU institution should do so ‘within their own sphere of competences’, rather than jointly among the EU institutions. EPRS research has shown that there is significant convergence between the results of the CoFoE and the priorities of the European Council as expressed in its 2019‑2024 strategic agenda and its conclusions over the past 3 years. The current Swedish Presidency of the Council indicated that it will follow up on the CoFoE’s work, and push to achieve broad consensus on how to proceed with its proposals.

Main focus of Gitanas Nausėda’s speech

Gitanas Nausėda addressed a wide range of topics in his speech to Parliament (see Figure 1). In terms of words, he devoted most attention to three issues: i) Russia’s war on Ukraine; ii) history; and iii) enlargement.

Russia’s war on Ukraine

The main topic of Nausėda’s address was Russia’s war on Ukraine. He notably praised the EU’s response to Russia’s aggression, as it stood ‘united and extended a helping hand to Ukrainians when they needed it the most’. He stressed the importance of European civil society’s and European citizens’ strong support and determination in enabling this united European response. The Lithuanian President called for continued support for Ukraine and strengthened sanctions against Russia, ‘until it stops the brutal war against Ukraine and ensures that those responsible for the crimes of aggression are held accountable’.

History

Nausėda underlined that Lithuania had been an integral part of Europe for centuries. He warned that some purposely distorted historical memories to meet their political aims, and stressed that it was necessary to remember the crimes committed to avoid repeating old mistakes. In his view, ‘ignor[ing] the past is never an option’, and by ‘commemorating the crimes of the two totalitarian regimes, we can respond more decisively and more accurately to today’s challenges’. He called for a stronger EU focus on European historical memory, notably through educational programmes for schoolchildren, and by providing EU funding to investigate and evaluate the crimes of Communist regimes at the international level.

Enlargement

Nausėda reiterated his support for the enlargement process of both Ukraine and Moldova, and for giving such a perspective to Georgia. He argued that ‘historical experience shows that the most effective way to expand the space of peace, stability and prosperity in Europe has been and will continue to be EU enlargement’. With the aim of launching negotiations with Ukraine before the end of the year, he said it was crucial to ensure continued EU financial and technical support for Ukraine’s European reforms.

Specific proposals and positions

The Lithuanian President used the opportunity to present his views on how the European Union should advance in specific policy areas. He also made some new proposals, summarised below.

Policy issuePriority action and proposals (quotes)Energy and climate‘Invest increasingly more in green energy to become truly independent and, which is no less important, to safeguard our planet’s climate.’Competitiveness, economy and trade‘A long-term strategy for European competitiveness should include strengthening the single market and the technological and industrial base, removing the existing excessive barriers to the movement of goods, services and private capital, promoting international partnerships and rules-based trade.’Migration‘The issue of irregular migration certainly deserves our joint focus. We therefore support the targeted use of EU funds, the smooth return of irregular migrants, stronger focus on countering disinformation in third countries, combatting human smuggling and eliminating the root causes of illegitimate migration in countries of origin.’Democracy‘If we are serious about maintaining the rules-based international order, we must not only take on responsibility but also continue to deepen and expand the transatlantic bond. We must cooperate to the fullest extent with like-minded countries in strengthening democracy, developing rules-based global economic relations, promoting fair competition, and countering economic coercion.’Table – Specific proposals made by Gitanas Nausėda, by policy area

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘‘This is Europe’ debate in the European Parliament: Speech by Gitanas Nausėda, President of Lithuania, 14 March 2023‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marcin Grajewski.

Ukraine and its Western allies say Moscow is waging an unprovoked war of conquest that has destroyed Ukrainian cities, killed thousands of people and forced millions more to flee their homes. As Russian troops push forward in waves with a new offensive in the eastern Donbas region of Ukraine, Russia and Ukraine are locked in the bloodiest infantry battle in Europe since World War II.

Ukraine has been urging its allies in the EU and the US to increase the delivery of weapons as it is running out of artillery shells. However, the West’s weapon production capacities are limited. Tanks and aircraft in particular will be crucial to ward off Russian attacks and, possibly, retake Ukrainian territory occupied by Moscow, says Ukrainian President, Volodymyr Zelenskyy. Think-tank analysts also ponder wider issues, such as the impact of the war on efforts to combat climate change, fiscal and other policies, as well as the post-war global order and Ukraine’s reconstruction.

This note gathers links to the recent publications and commentaries from many international think tanks on Russia’s war on Ukraine. Earlier analyses of the war can be found in a previous edition of the ‘What Think Tanks are Thinking’ series.

Premature peace with Putin would be disastrous for international security
Atlantic Council, March 2023

One year in ten numbers
Bruegel, March 2023

Is Russia’s war on Ukraine a global war?
Carnegie Europe, March 2023

After a year of arms deliveries to Ukraine, the EU needs to step up and speed up
Centre for European Policy Studies, March 2023

Europe needs both fiscal and energy solidarity
Centre for European Reform, March 2023

How Russia’s war on Ukraine is threatening climate security
Chatham House, March 2023

Ukraine needs to pursue victory without sacrificing its democratic future
Council on Foreign Relations, March 2023

The astonishing endurance of unity on Ukraine
Council on Foreign Relations, March 2023

Putin ist mächtig wie nie – doch der Krieg beschleunigt den Zerfall seines Imperiums
German Council on Foreign Relations, March 2023

Is realism policy relevant? Evidence from Ukraine and Taiwan
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, March 2023

What has the war on Ukraine revealed about Russia’s non-strategic missiles?
Institute for International Strategic Studies, March 2023

Quelles garanties de sécurité européennes possibles pour l’Ukraine?
Institut Jacques Delors, March 2023

The war against Ukraine and Russia’s Position in Europe’s security order
Istituto Affari Internazionali, March 2023

Military situation in Ukraine as of 10 March 2023
Polish Institute of International Affairs, March 2023

Wagner Group transforms in the wake of the war in Ukraine
Polish Institute of International Affairs, March 2023

Much of the Global South is on Ukraine’s side
Peterson Institute for International Relations, March 2023

The next reform of Russia’s armed forces: Is it a new threat or just for appearances?
Polish Institute of International Affairs, March 2023

What will Putin do next?
Rand Corporation, March 2023

One year since Russia invaded Ukraine
Barcelona Centre for International Affairs, February 2023

Arms control is in limbo until Russia’s war in Ukraine ends
Brooking Institution, February 2023

One year into the Ukraine war: What does the public think about American involvement in the world
Brooking Institution, February 2023

Are sanctions against Russia working?
Bruegel, February 2023

After Russia’s war against Ukraine: What kind of world order?
Carnegie Europe, February 2023

The West’s race against time in supporting Ukraine
Carnegie Europe, February 2023

One year of war: Russia’s imperial maximalism versus Ukraine’s resistance
Centre for Eastern Studies, February 2023

New Ukraine: A breakthrough at great cost
Centre for Eastern Studies, February 2023

A multi-speed mobilisation: NATO’s eastern flank one year after the Russian invasion of Ukraine
Centre for Eastern Studies, February 2023

A year of war in Europe: The balance sheet
Centre for European Reform, February 2023

Envisioning a multilayered security blanket for Ukraine
Centre for Strategic and International Studies, February 2023

Nuclear stability for all put at risk by Putin’s speech
Chatham House, February 2023

One year on, how can the war on Ukraine end?
Chatham House, February 2023

Un an après l’agression russe, les enjeux de la reconstruction de l’Ukraine
Confrontations Europe, February 2023

How much aid has the U.S. sent Ukraine?
Council on Foreign Relations, February 2023

Why the war will continue
Council on Foreign Relations via Project Syndicate, February 2023

Captivated by war: The Russian people in the face of the Ukraine war, mobilization, and tactical defeat
Egmont, February 2023

From buffer to frontier: Ukraine and the EU
Egmont, February 2023

United West, divided from the rest: Global public opinion one year into Russia’s war on Ukraine
European Council on Foreign Relations, February 2023

Repair, replace, reimburse: Sustaining a European tank coalition for Ukraine
European Council on Foreign Relations, February 2023

The second year of Russia’s war: Scenarios for the Ukraine conflict in 2023
European Council on Foreign Relations, February 2023

Russia’s defeat in Ukraine must be the top transatlantic priority
European Policy Centre, February 2023

What now for the future of Ukraine’s healthcare system?
European Policy Centre, February 2023

Russia’s regime transformation and the invasion of Ukraine: From a failed blitzkrieg to war as the new normal
Finnish Institute of International Affairs, February 2023

A brutal war has robbed Ukraine’s children of an entire year of their lives
Friends of Europe, February 2023

What have we learned from the Russian invasion of Ukraine?
Friends of Europe, February 2023

A turning point for EU trade policy after the Russian aggression?
German Council on Foreign Relations, February 2023

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine continues to have global policy repercussions: The one-year mark
German Marshall Fund, February 2023

Hard work for 2023: Supporting Ukraine to win the war against Russia
GLOBSEC, February 2023

Un Tribunal spécial pour l’Ukraine: Défis, dangers et opportunités pour la justice pénale internationale
Groupe de Recherche et d’Information sur la Paix et la Sécurité, February 2023

Russia’s war on Ukraine: One year on
Institute for International Strategic Studies, February 2023

Guerre en Ukraine: Révélatrice de ruptures dans le secteur spatial?
Institut français des relations internationales, February 2023

The war against Ukraine and its lessons for NATO militaries: Food for thought
Istituto Affari Internazionali, February 2023

A year in: Turning the tide in Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine
Open Societies Foundation, February 2023

The EU should fast-track negotiations for Ukraine’s membership
Peterson Institute for International Economics, February 2023

Why the war in Ukraine goes on, despite expert forecasts
Razumkov Centre, February 2023

Cross-border movements compared: Migration from and to Ukraine in historical comparison with other conflict-induced situations
Wilfried Martens Centre, February 2023

Read this briefing on ‘The latest on Russia’s war on Ukraine‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Sigfrido M. Ramírez Pérez.

José María Gil-Robles Gil-Delgado is so far the only Spaniard from the European People’s Party (EPP) to serve as President of the European Parliament. He embodied a particular tradition within Spanish political life: Christian democracy. Son of the historical leader of the Spanish Right during the Second Spanish Republic, Gil-Robles lived with his family in exile in Portugal during the Spanish Civil War. He came back to Spain along with his monarchist father to oppose the dictatorship, and became very active in the European Movement and European Christian democracy organisations, helping to pave the way for national reconciliation and a democratic transition.

After the dismal failure of the Christian Democratic Party in Spain’s first free elections in 1977, and following the transformation of the Alianza Popular into the Partido Popular and its accession to the EPP, Gil-Robles was elected to the European Parliament in 1989. Re-elected in 1994, he became a vice‑president and then, from 1997 until 1999, President. During his years in office, he represented the European Parliament in the negotiations leading to the Treaty of Amsterdam.

Gil-Robles played a crucial role in consolidating Parliament’s scrutiny of the European Commission during the historic process that led to the resignation of the Santer Commission in 1999, putting his role as President above his personal and political connections and interests. Re-elected to Parliament for a third term, he chaired several parliamentary intergroups that reflected his Christian conviction that solidarity and human dignity were at the core of the European project.

In favour of the Constitutional Treaty and later of the Lisbon Treaty, Gil-Robles supported deeper European integration, a movement that he compared to that of a tortoise. Once he had retired from Parliament, Gil-Robles remained active as Jean Monnet Chair in Madrid, and President of the Jean Monnet Foundation and of the Association of Former Members of the European Parliament.

Read the complete briefing on ‘José María Gil-Robles Gil-Delgado (1935-2023): President of the European Parliament, 1997-1999‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Issam Hallak (1st edition).

On 7 December 2022, the European Commission made two proposals to amend EU legislation on derivative markets to reduce the excessive and concentrated exposure of EU financial institutions to third-country central counterparties (CCPs). CCPs are clearing platforms that mitigate counterparty risks on derivative instruments by providing collateral.

Among other things, the proposals would require EU financial institutions to retain a portion of mandatory CCP derivative trading, to be handled through EU CCPs, and aim to reduce the regulatory costs for innovation for the latter. The regulations would also grant other non-banking institutions further access to EU CCPs. The strategy behind the proposals is to establish additional controls over clearing in third-country CCPs posing systemic risks, while making EU CCPs more attractive.

In Parliament, the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) is responsible for the files. The rapporteur for the files is Danuta Hübner (Poland, EPP).

Versions

• March 2023: Excessive and concentrated exposures to third-country central counterparties (1st edition)

Proposal for a regulation amending Regulations (EU) No 648/2012, (EU) No 575/2013 and (EU) 2017/1131 as regards measures to mitigate excessive exposures to third-country central counterparties and improve the efficiency of Union clearing markets
Proposal for a directive amending Directives 2009/65/EU, 2013/36/EU and (EU) 2019/2034 as regards the treatment of concentration risk towards central counterparties and the counterparty risk on centrally cleared derivative transactions Committee responsible:Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON)COM(2022) 697
5.12.2022
COM(2022) 698
7.12.2022Rapporteur:Danuta Maria Hübner (EPP, Poland)2022/0403(COD)
2022/0404(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Aurore Lalucq (S&D, France)
Erik Poulsen (Renew, Denmark)
Claude Gruffat (Greens/EFA, France)
Dorien Rookmaker (ECR, Netherlands)Ordinary legislative procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council on equal footing
– formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: National parliaments’ opinions

Written by Issam Hallak (1st edition).

On 7 December 2022, the Commission tabled a proposal for a directive aimed at enhancing and harmonising insolvency law in the EU. The proposal seeks to make it easier to recover assets from the liquidated insolvency estate; render insolvency proceedings more efficient; and ensure a predictable and fair distribution of recovered value among creditors. The directive would complement two recently adopted pieces of legislation, namely, the directive on pre-insolvency proceedings and debt discharge following insolvency proceedings, and the regulation on the determination of jurisdiction and applicable law for cross-border insolvency.

In the European Parliament, the referral was announced in plenary on 26 January 2023, and the file was assigned to the Committee on Legal Affairs (JURI). Parliament has expressed concern at the lack of harmonisation of insolvency law across the EU on several occasions in the framework of previous legislative procedures.

Versions

• March 2023: Harmonising certain aspects of insolvency law in the EU (1st edition)

Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on import, export and transit measures for firearms, their essential components and ammunition, implementing Article 10 of the United Nations Protocol against the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, their parts and components and ammunition, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (UN Firearms Protocol) (recast) Committee responsible:Committee on Legal Affairs (JURI)COM(2022) 702
7.12.2022Rapporteur:Pascal Arimont (EPP, Belgium)2022/0408(COD)Shadow rapporteur:René Repasi (S&D, Germany)Ordinary legislative procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council on equal footing
– formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Awaiting committee decision Average recovery rate for loans in insolvency proceedings, EU-27 (%), 2018

Written by Clément Evroux (1st edition).

According to the European Commission, the manufacturing and trade in firearms, their essential components and ammunition employs around 150 000 people in the EU. Following the terrorist attacks in the EU of the last decade, the EU decided to update its legislation on civilian firearms. In 2020, the Commission adopted the 2020-2025 action plan on firearms trafficking to help curb illegal flows of firearms, and ammunition, while also strengthening the legal market. The publication of Directive (EU) 2021/555 on control of the acquisition and possession of weapons on 6 April 2021 was the first legislative outcome of the plan.

In October 2022, the Commission presented a proposal for a regulation on import, export and transit measures for firearms, their essential components and ammunition, another legislative commitment in its action plan. The proposed regulation would pursue three main objectives: a) neutralising the risks of trafficking at import and export; b) ensuring traceability in the firearms trade, based on systematic written information; and c) promoting efficient implementation of controls. Compared with Regulation (EU) 258/2012, currently in force and which it supersedes, the proposal extends the material scope to exports, provides for consistent interpretation of rules across Member States, and allows for the flow of data at EU level.

Versions

• March 2023: Import, export and transit measures for firearms (1st edition)

Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on import, export and transit measures for firearms, their essential components and ammunition, implementing Article 10 of the United Nations Protocol against the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, their parts and components and ammunition, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (UN Firearms Protocol) (recast) Committees responsible:International Trade (INTA)COM(2022) 0480
27.10.2022Rapporteur:Bernd Lange (S&D, Germany)2022/0288(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Anna-Michelle Asimakopoulou (EPP, Greece)
Urmas Paet (Renew, Estonia)
To be appointed (Greens/EFA)
Danilo Oscar Lancini (ID, Italy),
To be appointed (ECR)
Emmanuel Maurel (The Left, France)Ordinary legislative procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council on equal footing
– formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Publication of the draft report

Written by Anna Caprile and Angelos Delivorias.

Outraged by Russia’s illegal and unprovoked full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, European Union countries swiftly adopted unprecedentedly tough sanctions, in close cooperation with partners including the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and Japan. The rapid succession of ten packages of EU sanctions adopted since then, in what has already been labelled a ‘sanctions revolution’, have resulted in an unparalleled set of measures targeting the key sectors of the Russian economy and the political elites. New sanctions have also been adopted against Belarus and Iran, in response to their involvement in Russia’s war of aggression.

The unprecedented nature of the sanctions imposed against Russia, in scale and scope, has created new implementation challenges, in particular for the EU. Member States and EU institutions have renewed efforts to make alignment truly global, and to close loopholes to prevent circumvention. In November 2022, the violation of ‘restrictive measures’ (sanctions) was added to the list of ‘EU crimes’ included in the Treaties.

Despite the challenges, analysts consider that sanctions have already met three important objectives: they have sent the Kremlin a strong signal of Western resolve and unity, they have permanently degraded Russia’s military capabilities, and they are asphyxiating its economy and energy sector, with long-term consequences. However, most experts warn that the impact of sanctions will not be severe enough to limit Russia’s ability to wage war against Ukraine in 2023. The non-alignment of a significant number of countries has also evidenced divergent global perceptions of the stakes and priorities ahead.

Since Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol in 2014, the European Parliament has been a vocal advocate of severe sanctions. Parliament has unequivocally condemned Russia’s unjustified aggression against Ukraine, and has since demanded broader and better-enforced sanctions, including a secondary sanctions mechanism, as well as the confiscation of Russian assets frozen by the EU to pay for Ukraine’s reconstruction. On 23 November 2022, Parliament adopted a resolution recognising Russia as a state sponsor of terrorism.

Read the complete briefing on ‘EU sanctions on Russia: Overview, impact, challenges‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Piotr Bąkowski.

Faced with a persistent terrorist threat, the European Union (EU) is playing an increasingly ambitious role in counter-terrorism. Primary responsibility for combating crime and ensuring security lies with the Member States, but the EU provides cooperation, coordination and (to some extent) harmonisation tools, as well as financial support, to address this borderless phenomenon. Moreover, awareness of the connection between development and stability, as well as between internal and external security, has come to shape EU action beyond Union borders. EU spending on counter-terrorism has increased over the years, to allow for better cooperation between national law enforcement authorities and enhanced support by the EU bodies in charge of security and justice, such as Europol, eu-LISA and Eurojust.

The many new rules and instruments that have been adopted in recent years focus, among things, on harmonising definitions of terrorist offences and sanctions, sharing information and data, protecting borders, countering terrorist financing and regulating firearms. However, implementing and evaluating the various measures is a challenging task. The European Parliament has played an active role, not only in shaping legislation, but also in evaluating existing tools and gaps through the work accomplished by its Special Committee on Terrorism (TERR) in 2018.

In line with the Parliament’s recommendations, as well as the priorities set by the European Commission and its counter-terrorism agenda presented in December 2020, EU counter-terrorism action has recently focused on doing more to anticipate threats, counter radicalisation, and reduce vulnerabilities by making critical infrastructures more resilient and improving the protection of public spaces. The EU will also continue to address the online dimension of various forms of extremism, in line with the laws on dissemination of terrorist content online and on the provision of digital services in the EU that have recently entered into force.

This briefing updates an earlier one, entitled Understanding EU counter-terrorism policy, published in 2021.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Understanding EU counter-terrorism policy‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Terrorist attacks in the EU, 2020-2021