European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Antonio Albaladejo Román.

What happened?

On 15 April 2023, the Polish government announced a ban on the import and transit of Ukrainian agricultural products until June 2023. The governments of Hungary, Slovakia and Bulgaria mirrored Poland’s decision, although Slovakia and Bulgaria’s ban  do not prohibit the transit of agricultural products. Czechia has publicly ruled out similar measures. After reaching a deal with Ukrainian authorities on 18 April 2023, Poland agreed to lift the transit ban, but the import restriction remains. At the time of writing, no other EU Member States bordering Ukraine have adopted or announced a ban on Ukrainian agricultural products.

Why was Ukraine exporting grain through its neighbours?

Since the start of the full-scale invasion in 2022, Russia has deliberately targeted Ukraine’s agricultural production, and occupied or blockaded its Black Sea ports, through which most of its agricultural commodities were exported. Moscow’s objectives are twofold. By destroying Ukraine’s agricultural industry – an important share of its GDP – Russia aims to cripple the Ukrainian economy, and thus Kyiv’s will and ability to resist the Russian aggression. Additionally, by depriving international markets of Ukraine’s substantial agricultural exports, Russia seeks to provoke a global food crisis, putting pressure on the international community to concede to Moscow’s demands. 

The EU and its international partners are responding to Russia’s strategy by helping Ukraine’s farmers maintain production levels, and by facilitating the export of Ukrainian grain and other agricultural commodities critical to global food security.

On 12 May 2022, the European Commission and EU Member States bordering Ukraine launched the EU-Ukraine Solidarity Lanes, allowing for the export of blockaded Ukrainian goods through EU road, railway and river networks. Additionally, the EU agreed on temporary trade liberalisation to facilitate exports to the EU single market and support Ukraine’s battered economy.

What was the effect of these measures?

EU solidarity lanes allow safe transport of much-needed Ukrainian grain and other agricultural commodities to international markets. Some 56 million tonnes of goods, including 29 million tonnes of agricultural products have been exported from Ukraine, thanks to the EU solidarity lanes. In combination with the United Nations-Türkiye sponsored Black Sea Grain Initiative, the EU solidarity lanes contributed to the stabilisation of international markets, and the steady decline in world food prices, following the initial disruptions caused by Russia’s invasion and averting a greater humanitarian crisis.  

However, the influx of Ukrainian agricultural products into the EU also impacts regional markets in neighbouring Member States. In its recent agriculture short-term outlook report, the European Commission acknowledges that ‘the sharply increasing imports from Ukraine created oversupply, downward pressure on prices and saturated logistical chains in some EU regions’ (Bulgaria, Poland, Romania). Competition from Ukrainian producers, and the downward pressures on agricultural prices led farmers in these countries to call for the reintroduction of import restrictions.

How did the EU respond to these concerns?

The EU has devoted substantial support to European producers affected by rising energy, feed and fertiliser prices, including a €500 million package adopted in March 2022, and by approving national State aid measures which, in the case of Poland, reached €836 million.

Additionally, after the Member States affected raised concern regarding the consequences of the solidarity lanes for their markets, the European Commission mobilised €29.5 million in funding to support Polish farmers (€16.7 million for Bulgaria and €10 million for Romania), which could be complemented using national funds to reach 100 %.

What could be the consequences of the ban?    

Trade policy is an exclusive competence attributed to the EU by Member States. Any restriction on agricultural imports from Ukraine therefore requires adoption at EU level.

The most recent Eurostat data shows persistently high food inflation in Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Bulgaria – well above the EU average. As the European Commission points out, Ukraine grain imports brought agricultural prices down and compensated for production shortages in the EU after a hot and dry summer. Should the bans remain – particularly for transit – and given the uncertainty regarding Russia’s commitment to the Black Sea Grain Initiative, global food prices could rise sharply once more, affecting European consumers everywhere, especially if extreme weather continues during 2023.

What is the position of the European Parliament?

During the March II 2022 plenary session in Brussels, the European Parliament called for the establishment of safe transport and food corridors to and from Ukraine, as well as support for EU farmers affected by the war in Ukraine. On 24 April 2023, the European Parliament’s Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development (AGRI) is expected to hold an exchange of views with Markian Dmytrasevych, Ukrainian Deputy Minister of Agrarian Policy and Food.

Written by Clare Ferguson with Rebecca Frederick.

Members of the European Parliament meet in Strasbourg from 17 April, with a number of high-profile issues to discuss, not least the current geopolitical situation and the continuing fight against climate change. A key debate following Council and European Commission statements on the need for a coherent strategy for EU-China relations is scheduled for Tuesday morning. In a second key debate on Wednesday morning, Members will hear Council and Commission statements on the situation of children forcibly deported from Ukraine and the International Criminal Court arrest warrant for Vladimir Putin. The Prime Minister of Luxembourg, Xavier Bettel, is due to attend the plenary to take part in the latest ‘This is Europe’ debate, on Wednesday. In the foreign affairs field, a statement is expected on the deep political crisis in Peru. The Question Time session scheduled for Tuesday afternoon provides an opportunity for the Commission to respond to Members’ questions on the legacy of the European Year of Youth, which encompassed a series of events and initiatives in 2022.

Launched in 2005 and covering 40 % of EU greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, the EU has not revised its emissions trading system (ETS) since 2018. An update is therefore necessary to align the ETS with the European Climate Law target of a 55 % reduction in EU net GHG emissions by 2030, compared with 1990 levels. In a joint debate on the EU’s ‘Fit for 55’ ambitions on Monday evening, Members are due to consider provisional agreements on a number of proposals. The first is the agreement reached on the proposed revision of the ETS. The agreed text increases overall emissions reductions and envisages the inclusion of municipal waste incineration from 2028. It covers a wider range of fuels and phases out free allowances from 2026 to 2034. From 2024, the ETS will also cover maritime transport emissions under a linked proposal.

A separate proposal covers trading in aviation emissions, which are set to rise. Here, Members are due to consider a provisional agreement that reflects Parliament’s demands for transparency measures and to set aside allowances to encourage uptake of sustainable aviation fuels. Locations such as small islands and outermost regions will be able to cover the price difference between sustainable fuels and kerosene, while monitoring of non-CO2 aviation emissions will begin in 2025.

As part of the transition to a cleaner economy, the EU aims to phase out the free allocation of carbon emission allowances to European industry. To prevent non-EU manufacturers from taking unfair advantage of the new rules, however, a carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM) should provide a level playing field between EU and non-EU producers. Members are set to consider a provisional agreement that greatly amends the original proposal, extending the CBAM to a wider range of products and emissions and scheduling the transitional period to phase-in the CBAM to 31 December 2025.

A further, separate, ETS for road transport and buildings (ETS II) should begin in 2025 (although if energy prices remain exceptionally high, this could be delayed). This part of the necessary transition to a greener economy will have a direct impact on the whole of society. The proposed €72 billion social climate fund therefore aims at supporting the most vulnerable citizens and companies to counter the costs of extending the ETS to these sectors. Members are expected to consider the provisional agreement reached between the co-legislators on creating the fund from 2026. While funding is largely expected to come from ETS credits, national governments should co-finance 25 % of the total estimated cost of their plans under the social climate fund.

Deforestation contributes to global warming, so the EU is keen to contribute to the global fight against deforestation by halting EU consumption of commodities and products that contribute to deforestation and forest degradation. On Monday evening, Members are due to debate the provisional agreement on a proposal to ensure only deforestation-free products reach the EU market. If adopted, the new law would impose due diligence obligations on importers and set penalties for non-compliance. During negotiations on the file, Parliament succeeded in extending the scope to include additional products; a wider definition of ‘forest degradation’; and to ensure consultation with indigenous peoples.

Digital or virtual ‘crypto’ assets are a relatively new phenomenon. Mindful of both the opportunities they present and the potential risks, the EU seeks to legislate to protect investors and maintain financial stability, whilst also encouraging industry innovation. A joint debate on two provisional agreements concerning crypto‑assets is therefore set to take place on Wednesday afternoon. The first is the subject of a Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) report on markets in crypto-assets, which would cover crypto‑assets not covered by existing legislation. Key amongst these are ‘stablecoins’, digital assets whose value is stabilised against major currencies, and whose popularity has surged in recent years. The provisional agreement reinforces safety measures for crypto‑assets, requiring issuers to have plans in place to tackle turbulence and ensure reserves to back up their currency.

Due to their low traceability, speed and global reach, there is a risk of criminals using crypto-assets, including to finance terrorist activity. The EU therefore proposes to extend the ‘travel rule’ (payment service providers must include payer and payee information with each transfer), to cover crypto-assets. During interinstitutional negotiations on the proposal, Parliament succeeded in imposing additional rules for transactions between crypto‑asset service providers and self‑hosted addresses (‘wallets’, for crypto‑assets that are otherwise almost impossible to monitor for money-laundering activity). Members are therefore also due to debate a joint report by ECON and the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) on revising existing law on fund transfers to include such transfers of crypto-assets.

On Tuesday afternoon, Parliament is expected to debate a motion for a resolution, tabled by the Committee on Budgets (BUDG), on Parliament’s ‘guidelines’ for the 2024 EU budget. The guidelines set Parliament’s goals for the Union’s budget before negotiations begin with the other EU institutions, and ahead of the Commission formally presenting the draft budget. The BUDG committee urges the Commission to revise the 2021-2027 multiannual financial framework in light of the significant challenges (Russia’s war of aggression, high levels of inflation) that have arisen since its adoption and which hamper achievement of the EU’s political goals. The committee calls upon the Commission to present a second basket of new own resources, highlighting the importance of repaying debt incurred under the EU recovery instrument. It reiterates the importance of the 2024 EU budget in delivering across a variety of policy areas, including the green and digital transitions, and ensuring energy security and independence. The committee stresses that EU funding should not be used for the construction of walls or fences at the EU’s external borders.

Further reading

• Agenda – European Parliament Plenary Session April 2023
• EU-China relations
• Russia’s war on Ukraine : Forcibly displaced Ukrainian children
• Political turmoil in Peru
• Legacy of the European Year of Youth 2022
• Revision of the EU emissions trading system: Fit for 55
• Regulation on deforestation-free products
• Revision of the EU emissions trading system: Aviation
• EU carbon border adjustment mechanism
• Social climate fund
• Markets in crypto-assets (MiCA)
• Recasting the Transfer of Funds Regulation
• Parliament’s guidelines for the 2024 EU budget: Section III – European Commission

Written by Luisa Antunes.

Antimicrobial resistance (AMR) causes 33 000 deaths in Europe annually. The European Parliament’s Panel for the Future of Science and Technology (STOA) held a workshop to discuss scientific and policy breakthroughs to counter AMR on 29 March 2023. The lessons learned will serve Members of the European Parliament in the forthcoming discussions on the revised pharmaceuticals package.

The Chair, STOA panel member, Lina Galvez Munoz (S&D, Spain), appealed to the Commission and Member States to take action on this public health issue, which and may increase 10‑fold by 2050, surpassing cancer as the second biggest cause of death worldwide.

The first session of the event focused on new insights from science, in particular from monitoring, new antimicrobial strategies and prevention, including vaccines.

"Surveillance is the basis of everything and without it we are flying blind. Data sharing is essential"- @FrankAarestrup at #STOAevent on #AntimicrobialResistance pic.twitter.com/RN49xZfuPe

— STOA Panel (@EP_ScienceTech) March 29, 2023

Frank Aarestrup, Professor of Microbiology at Technical University of Denmark, introduced novel technologies such as metagenomics and wastewater sequencing for monitoring and surveillance of antimicrobial resistance genes. These technologies are applicable to any living being and habitat, making them an essential tool in modern global AMR surveillance. Data sharing and open science are important to accomplish this.

Francesco Imperi, Professor of Microbiology at University Roma Tre in Italy, presented possible alternatives to antibiotics. These include resistance breakers, antibiotic adjuvants, antivirulence drugs and phage therapy. Professor Imperi stressed the need to preserve existing antibiotics (stewardship) and to develop rapid diagnostic tools. It is still possible to identify novel antibiotics, by investigating yet-unexplored microbial bacterial diversity, which accounts for 99 % of existing microbes.

Pedro Madureira, co-founder and CSO at Immunethep in Portugal, presented a new immunotherapeutic strategy that can be used to help our immune system fight infections. This vaccine strategy neutralises a common bacterial molecule, GAPHD, that is present in the five bacterial groups that cause more than 80 % of global infections (Escherichia coli, Klebsiella pneumoniae, methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA), Streptococcus pneumoniae and Streptococcus agalactiae).

Session two focused on a discussion of policy strategies. Malin Grape, Swedish ambassador on AMR, presented the different EU and global level policy measures in place to counteract AMR. AMR will be a focal point of the upcoming revision of the pharmaceutical package, as well as of the Council’s recommendations on the implementation of the EU One Health action plan. It is essential to translate scientific evidence into implementable policy. The solution will be to ensure equitable access to a diversified pool of both new and old antimicrobials, which requires a discussion on models of financing.

Ellen 'T Hoen @ellenthoen
: "Companies are making huge profits from infectious diseases….Antibiotics are a particular category of pharmaceuticals that do not fit the standard business model of the pharmaceutical industry " #STOAevent on tackling #AntimicrobialResistance

— STOA Panel (@EP_ScienceTech) March 29, 2023

Clare Chandler, medical anthropologist at the London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine in the United Kingdom, stressed that the development of new antibiotics is but a partial, temporary fix to a public health problem. A more sustainable solution is to reduce society’s infrastructural reliance on antibiotics and address systemic problems at the basis of AMR, such as healthcare, hygiene, productivity and inequality, by reinvesting in physical and economic structures, including good quality public healthcare, good working conditions, good nutrition, patient follow-up, and vaccination. More emphasis should go on policy research, which only accounts for 1 % of the total AMR funding.

A question and answer session followed, where speakers discussed topics including new approaches in artificial intelligence as opportunities for vaccine development, the importance of data sharing, the link between AMR and the environment, and the nature of incentives for the development of new antimicrobials.

The Chair concluded with a reflexion on how we do not need to socialise the cost and privatise the profits, but rather discuss money and benefit allocation, using a global approach focused on international collaboration and interdisciplinary science, for equitable, reliable access. The solution to AMR cannot be incentives for private industry alone – we should move towards a public ownership of research and development.

In conclusion, the workshop discussed the urgent need for a new EU pharmaceutical strategy to address AMR. The workshop provided insights into new scientific and policy breakthroughs, including alternatives to antibiotics, monitoring, surveillance, and policy strategies for equitable access to old and new antimicrobials.

Your opinion counts for us. To let us know what you think, get in touch via stoa@europarl.europa.eu.

Written by Agnieszka Widuto (1st edition).

On 14 March 2023, the European Commission proposed a reform of the EU electricity market, with the aim of reducing price volatility for consumers and creating favourable conditions for investors in low-carbon energy. The reform includes two legislative proposals – one on electricity market design (EMD) and the other on protection against wholesale energy market manipulation. These two proposals revise five pieces of EU legislation.

The electricity market reform seeks to make the energy bills of consumers and businesses less dependent on short-term price fluctuations, which are often driven by fossil fuel prices. It also improves consumer protection by offering more fixed-priced contracts and enhancing supplier obligations, and incentivises solutions such as energy communities, self-consumption and renewable energy sharing.

The reform supports the use of more long-term instruments such as power purchase agreements and contracts for difference, and improves integration and liquidity in forward markets. It also enhances flexibility solutions such as demand response and storage. Furthermore, it aims to improve market monitoring and transparency, and protection against manipulation.

Both legislative proposals will now be negotiated by the European Parliament and the Council.

Versions

• April 2023: Improving the design of the EU electricity market (1st edition)

Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and the Council amending Regulations (EU) 2019/943 and (EU) 2019/942 as well as Directives (EU) 2018/2001 and (EU) 2019/944 to improve the Union’s electricity market design Committee responsible:Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE)COM(2023) 148
14.3.2023Rapporteur:Nicolàs Gonzales Casares (S&D, Spain)2023/0077(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Maria da Graça Carvalho (EPP, Portugal); Morten Petersen (Renew, Denmark); Michael Bloss (Greens/EFA, Germany); Paolo Borchia (ID, Italy); Zdzisław Krasnodębski (ECR, Poland); Marina Mesure (GUE/NGL, France)Ordinary legislative procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council on equal footing
– formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Publication of draft report

Written by Mar Negreiro.

Protecting children online is becoming increasingly vital. For over two decades, there has been a limited range of online age verification methods available to protect children from accessing online content unsuitable for their age. A number of countries are introducing legislation and/or codes of practice to address this situation. At EU level too, there are increasing efforts in this regard, with a code of practice in the pipeline. Challenges abound, however, in the areas of privacy, monitoring and the need to improve parents’ and children’s digital skills.

State of play

Children are very avid internet users; the coronavirus pandemic only amplified this trend, as children became used to spending more time online during the lockdowns. Global estimates reveal that one in three children is an internet user, and that one in three internet users is under 18. In the EU, most children use their smartphones daily, and almost twice as much as compared to 10 years ago. They also use them from a much younger age. More often than not, though, the online environments they access were not originally designed for them. Moreover, younger children have no problem bypassing the EU age requirements put in place by services such as social media, which require a minimum age of 13 for their users. One study found that digital services do not use adequate age verification or parental consent methods. This failing recently resulted in a record fine.

Main types of online age verification method

Online age verification methods are increasingly diverse. Below is a list of the most common ones.

• Self-declaration: this most common of all methods has been shown to be easily bypassed by children. Examples include self-declaring one’s date of birth.
• Credit card: here, users are required to verify the validity of their cards, for instance, by making a bank or card payment of €0.01. This method is mostly used by e-commerce sites and apps selling adult products such as alcohol or adult content. Beyond the inherent risk of phishing, it is not possible to ascertain that the person using the card is the legitimate owner; moreover, the age for owning a credit card varies across countries.
• Biometrics: this method relies on artificial intelligence (AI), which powers the use of biometric technologies, including facial recognition applications. These may be used to analyse facial features with a selfie to ascertain that the individual requesting access is over 18. Establishing a person’s age with accuracy is prone to errors; furthermore, underage individuals may use the face of someone older to gain unjustified access. What is more, authentication methods that use biometrics raise privacy issues because they may use special categories of personal data. Using applications to estimate a child’s age can also lead to excessive data processing and to profiling.
• Analysing online usage patterns: this involves using age verification systems by inference, such as importing the individual’s internet browsing history or analysing their ‘maturity’ by means of a questionnaire or their online user-generated content or purchases.
• Offline verification: this is done using scratch cards or offline in-situ age checks by means of documents.
• Parental consent: some apps and services require parental consent to register a child for a digital service. Yet, parental authority is rarely fully verified. Proving parental authority/guardianship might involve checking traditional identity (ID) documents and family registers.
• Vouching: this involves asking users other than the parents to vouch online as confirmation that a child seeking online access is of the right age.
• Digital ID: this method relies on tools offered by the state to verify individuals’ identity and age before granting them access to digital services. For instance, China, Canada and Australia have introduced a digital ID for citizens. Some EU countries have also adopted this solution, and there is a proposal to create a European digital identity wallet.
• Age verification by a specific app: such apps are applied for a specific purpose. In France, for instance, users will soon have to install a government-licensed digital certification app to access online pornography content.

Only recently have social platforms started applying measures to verify age.

• In 2022, Instagram started testing a vouching tool to ensure users are as old as they say they are; it has also started using biometric technology for facial analysis in some cases.
• YouTube has launched a dedicated children’s app and introduced new data practices.
• Meta has created Messenger Kids in Facebook that allows children to connect with parent-approved contacts only.
• Tiktok does not have an age-verification method but might ban accounts after sign-up.
• Twitter verifies parental consent requiring documentation (ID/birth certificate, etc.). Twitter says that the documents are treated confidentially and deleted after verification.
• e-Commerce sites selling adult products and services such as gambling, alcohol or pornography have a wide range of age verification methods such as credit and scratch cards and biometrics.

Main challenges and opportunities

A number of key challenges remain, of which the following three are particularly serious.

• Privacy/cybersecurity concerns: despite the widespread use of age verification methods in some sectors, there are still fears that they pose privacy and cybersecurity risks. Given the sensitivity of the data collected by some age verification systems, some suggest creating a specific trusted certification for third-party players. To date, there is no common EU guidance on methods for determining age verification; children easily bypass most solutions.
• Content not attractive enough for children: since children’s apps and digital services tend to provide a limited set of functionalities, many children prefer to lie about their age to use the ones designed for adults. This makes children more vulnerable not only to privacy risks but also to safety threats, such as online grooming, or to exposure to content that is inappropriate for their age. There is a need to consider usability for young users during the software design phase.
• Improved digital skills: parents, children and guardians need better digital skills and a greater awareness of the risks involved. Some have also suggested that age verification should be an ongoing process that continues after sign-up.

What the EU is doing

Prior to the adoption of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which came into effect in 2018, there were no specific restrictions on the online processing of children’s data in Europe. The GDPR requires the use of verification with regard to age and parental consent. Likewise, the Audiovisual Media Services Directive (AVMSD) requires the adoption of appropriate measures to protect children from online harmful content, including through age verification. In addition, the new European strategy for a better internet for children envisages a comprehensive EU code of conduct on age-appropriate design for 2024, building on the new rules in the Digital Services Act (DSA) and in line with the AVMSD and the GDPR. Such a code already exists in other parts of the world, such as the United Kingdom and California.

Moreover, in the context of the EU eID proposal, the Commission intends to strengthen age verification methods by means of a robust framework of certification and interoperability. In addition, the proposal for a regulation to combat child sexual abuse online envisages improved online age verification. There is also the EU co-funded euCONSENT project, which is building a browser-based interoperable age verification method. The European Parliament has called for better age verification methods to protect children online on several occasions, including in its own-initiative report on consumer protection in online video games adopted in January 2023 and its March 2021 resolution on children’s rights in the light of the EU strategy on the rights of the child. Likewise, better age verification methods to protect children online are part of the European Commission’s proposed European declaration on digital rights and principles for the digital decade and the OECD’s Declaration on a Trusted, Sustainable and Inclusive Digital Future.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Online age verification methods for children‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Sebastian Clapp.

One of the flagship proposals of the Strategic Compass adopted in March 2022 is the creation of a new rapid reaction force for responses to crises outside the EU. This rapid deployment capacity (RDC) will be a modular force of 5 000 personnel that should be fully operational by 2025. To establish the RDC, important issues, particularly on cost-sharing, decision-making, size, readiness and enablers need to be resolved.

Rapid deployment capacity

In May 2021, 14 EU Ministers of Defence called on the HR/VP to develop a proposal for a new EU rapid reaction force to respond to international crises outside the EU. This call to action took shape in the March 2022 Strategic Compass, with its commitment to establish an RDC by 2025. The RDC will be a modular force of up to 5 000 personnel, consisting of modified EU battlegroups and additional forces combining Member States’ forces and capabilities. Rather than a single force, the RDC will combine different components (air, land, maritime) and should include strategic enablers – such as air transport capabilities – depending on the operational scenario. The RDC’s purpose will be to respond rapidly to imminent crises, and to be able to be used in different operational scenarios, including ‘initial entry, reinforcement, or as a reserve force to secure an exit’. The first live exercises will be held in autumn 2023 in the south of Spain (Gulf of Cadiz). The RDC should reach full operational force by 2025.In a first sign of progress, EU ministers of defence endorsed two possible scenarios for the RDC on 15 November 2022: (1) initial phase of stabilisation and (2) rescue and evacuation. According to the first annual progress report on the implementation of the Compass, the RDC’s conceptual development has progressed and ‘work continues on the substantially modified EU Battlegroups … pre-identifying Member States’ military forces and capabilities… [and] on the remaining operational scenarios’.

Decision-making and cost sharing

The battlegroups have never been deployed, mostly owing to the lack of political will and the necessity for a unanimous Council decision for their activation. As a potential way to overcome these hindrances, EU leaders have committed to developing modalities for more flexible decision-making, in particular by exploring the potential of Article 44 TEU, which allows ‘coalitions of the willing’ to conduct missions and operations on behalf of the EU. Although Article 44 still requires a unanimous Council decision and political oversight by the Council, according to an October 2022 study requested by the European Parliament Sub-committee on Security and Defence (SEDE), it does ‘potentially create an avenue for more flexibility and speed in decision making’. The authors of the study suggest increasing the incentives by allowing greater funding from the common budget and giving more freedom to coalitions of the willing, e.g. by letting them establish the plan for the operation (OPLAN), especially where speed is of the essence. They also call for the simulation of different scenarios to clarify the modalities for the invocation of Article 44.

The principle that ‘costs lie where they fall’ means troop-contributing nations have to date found reasons to veto battlegroup deployment to avoid being stuck with the costs. The European External Action Service (EEAS) and European Council recognised this as the ‘most significant obstacle’. The Strategic Compass specifically states that the RDC will profit from common funding and enhanced solidarity. However, owing to lack of agreement, the precise modalities have not yet been defined, with experts suggesting using the European Peace Facility should compensate troop contributors based on a common cost calculation, taking the gross national product key into account and covering extra costs associated with deployment. The authors of the SEDE study note that, at the very least, incremental costs (additional costs for deployment, transport, use of ammunition and fuel, etc.) should be covered by the European Peace Facility.

EU battlegroups vs rapid deployment capacity

EU battlegroups are multinational, military units of up to 1 500 personnel each, meant to respond rapidly to emerging crises around the world. While they have been operational since 2007, they have never been deployed, mostly because of a lack of political will and financial solidarity. The former is especially problematic because deployment requires a unanimous Council decision. A number of questions have been raised regarding the differences between EU battlegroups and the RDC. The precise parameters for the EU rapid deployment capacity have yet to be defined; however, according to Clingendael, several differences between the RDC and battlegroups can already be highlighted:

• Size: while the RDC is meant to consist of 5 000 personnel, battlegroups comprise up to 1 500 troops (3 000 if two are always supposed to be on stand-by at the same time).
• Composition: the RDC is modular and comprises different components (land, air, maritime) according to operational needs, while battlegroups include land-based capabilities alone, based on fixed national contributions.
• Strategic enablers: the RDC incorporates strategic enablers, while this is not the case for battlegroups.
• Scenarios: two concrete operational scenarios have already been adopted for the RDC, while this has never been the case for the battlegroups.
• Standby-period: while battlegroups are on stand-by for 6 months, the RDC will be on standby for 12 months.

Clingendael consider these differences will make it challenging to incorporate ‘substantially modified’ EU battlegroups in the EU RDC (as suggested by the Compass). It also remains unclear what ‘substantially modified’ means. One expert notes that a bottom-up approach should be used: the EU should start by expanding the membership of each battlegroup and prolong their standby duration. The same report argues that an incentive-based ‘spillover’ could help an actual deployment of rapid reaction forces: gradually integrating capability projects into the European defence union through permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) and the European Defence Fund (EDF) could encourage EU Member States to then deploy such capabilities within the framework of the RDC in crises, when the time comes.

Size and enablers

The Strategic Compass suggests a modular force of 5 000 troops. However, for the five scenarios already mentioned in the Strategic Compass, it is thought this number will not be enough. The authors of the SEDE study suggest that, to cover all currently envisaged scenarios, the RDC would need different force packages for different scenarios and regions, and a very varied number of required land, air, special forces and maritime enablers. They therefore suggest 7 000-10 000 troops as a rough indication of the required forces, including enablers. For the RDC to materialise, one analyst suggests the EU will need a pool of at least five or six brigades (5 000 troops). In terms of readiness, the SEDE study suggests a system similar to the French Guépard system, which would mean that the majority of RDC modules would stay at a relatively low readiness, except those for ‘high urgency tasks’ (e.g. rescue and evacuation operations). Clingendael suggests a model of ‘dual hatted readiness forces’, where forces at various levels of readiness would be available for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the RDC. An objective that will be particularly difficult to fulfil by 2025 will be the necessary enablers, such as intelligence and strategic reconnaissance (ISR), strategic transport and air-to-air refuelling. Experts doubt that these shortfalls will be made up by 2025, especially for ISR and precision weapons. Experts note that, while PESCO and the European Defence Fund are already dealing with some shortfalls, those remaining should be remedied as a matter of priority. This will require sustained high defence investments and political will, which experts agree is the most crucial component of the RDC.

European Parliament position

In its CSDP implementation report of 18 January 2023, Parliament calls for the RDC to be ‘implemented as soon as possible and by 2025 at the latest’ and underlines the need to close the gaps on strategic enablers by 2025. A Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) draft report on the EU rapid deployment capacity, adopted on 9 March 2023, underlines that the RDC’s tasks should include rescue and evacuation, initial entry and initial phase of stabilisation operations. Temporary reinforcement of other missions should be used as a reserve force to secure an exit. The committee notes that the RDC target number should be at least 5 000 troops, plus the strategic enablers required to conduct its operation.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Network cost contribution debate‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Bruno Bilquin.

The European Peace Facility (EPF), a financial instrument outside the EU budget that has been operational since July 2021, finances activities with military implications. It funds equipment and training for EU partner countries’ armies, as well as the common costs of EU military missions and operations abroad. It also funds the military component of EU civilian missions or exercises abroad, or of EU support to missions led by other international organisations. One year after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, its initial ceiling has been increased to allow the EU to continue its military support to Ukraine at a critical stage of the conflict, while simultaneously maintaining and even increasing its military engagement in other regions of its neighbourhood, in the Western Balkans and in Africa.  

Since the start of Russia’s war of aggression on 28 February 2022, the EU has mobilised seven successive tranches, of €500 million each, from the EPF. In February 2023, EU military assistance to the Ukrainian Armed Forces reached a total of €3.6 billion. This assistance, for the first time in EU history, has a strong lethal component (weapons and equipment, including, most recently, tanks) alongside a smaller, although significant, non-lethal component (including protective equipment, other non-lethal supplies, and training). The delivery of military assistance is carried out by the EU Member States; through the EPF, the EU can reimburse Member States for a part of their military deliveries.

The EPF-funded military assistance to Ukraine has absorbed, in the first 12 months of the war, 60 % of the initially planned financial ceiling of the EPF of €5 billion for 2021-2027. Therefore, the Council decided on 13 March to increase that ceiling by €2 billion (in 2018 prices) for 2023, and possibly by an additional €3.5 billion (in 2018 prices) up to 2027, an increase that would more than double the total initial ceiling. On 20 March, in response to Ukraine’s urgent needs and requests, the Council decided to earmark €1 billion from the EPF to partially reimburse Member States for deliveries of ammunition (and missiles if requested) to Ukraine from their stocks, and another €1 billion for the joint procurement of ammunition (and missiles if requested) from the EU and Norwegian defence industries.

The European Parliament consistently and firmly supports the use of the EPF in Ukraine and beyond, and the increase of its ceiling.

Read the complete briefing on ‘European Peace Facility: State of play as of 31 March 2023‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

EPF-funded military assistance to Ukraine, March 2022 to March 2023

Written by Vivienne Halleux (1st edition).

Air pollution is the single largest environmental health risk in the EU and causes significant damage to ecosystems. As part of the European Green Deal’s zero pollution ambition, on 26 October 2022 the Commission tabled a proposal for a revision of the Ambient Air Quality Directives. The proposed directive would set air quality standards for 2030 that are more closely aligned with the Word Health Organization’s recommendations, as updated in 2021. It would also include a mechanism for the standards’ regular review based on the latest scientific information. To achieve them on time, the Member States would have to establish air quality plans ahead of 2030. Provisions on air quality monitoring and assessment would be updated, including through new requirements for monitoring pollutants of emerging concern, such as ultrafine particles.

Stakeholders have had mixed reactions to the proposal. NGOs call for full alignment with the WHO guidelines by 2030 at the latest, and for penalties in case the 2030 deadline is missed. Industry representatives insist on the need to meet current standards first, before aiming for higher ones.

In Parliament, the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI), responsible for the file, aims to adopt its legislative report before the end of June 2023.

Versions

• April 2023: Revision of EU air quality legislation: Setting a zero pollution objective for air (1st edition)

Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on ambient air quality and cleaner air for Europe (recast) Committee responsible:Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI)COM(2022) 542
26.10.2022Rapporteur:Javi López (S&D, Spain)2022/0347(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Norbert Lins (EPP, Germany)
Karin Karlsbro (Renew, Sweden)
Michael Bloss (Greens/EFA, Germany)
Gianna Gancia (ID, Italy)
Anna Zalewska (ECR, Poland)
Petros Kokkalis (The Left, Greece)Ordinary legislative procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council on equal footing
– formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Vote in committee on draft report

Written by Gregor Erbach with Sarah Svensson.

Renewable hydrogen has the potential to play a significant role in the energy system as a versatile energy carrier and feedstock that can help decarbonise a variety of applications in areas such as heavy industry, chemicals manufacturing, transportation, and electricity generation and storage. Hydrogen can be produced through the electrolysis of water with renewable electricity, using different setups that vary in terms of cost, impact on the electricity system and carbon emissions.

Today, renewable hydrogen makes up a small fraction of total hydrogen production. Most hydrogen is produced from fossil fuels and, although cheaper, it causes carbon emissions. Demand for renewable hydrogen is expected to grow quickly as the need for climate-friendly solutions increases. While the falling cost of renewable electricity certainly plays a role in boosting this demand, sustaining it still requires support measures aimed at growing the market and bringing down the cost of electrolysers. To avoid a situation where renewable electricity used for hydrogen production is diverted away from other uses, it is important to ensure additionality, i.e. additional renewable electricity capacity for renewable hydrogen production.

On 10 February 2023, in line with the requirements of the Renewable Energy Directive, the Commission adopted two delegated regulations: one defining rules on renewable hydrogen production and clarifying the additionality criteria for renewable electricity, and another setting out a methodology to calculate lifecycle GHG emissions. The European Parliament and the Council of the EU have four months to approve or reject the rules, but they cannot amend them. On 28 March 2023, the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE) decided not to raise an objection to the delegated regulation on additionality. Having in place definitive criteria for renewable hydrogen is key to making investment decisions and to launching EU and Member State initiatives that can support the growth of the European hydrogen industry.

Read the complete briefing on ‘EU rules for renewable hydrogen: Delegated regulations on a methodology for renewable fuels of non-biological origin‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Gabija Leclerc and Rosamund Shreeves.

Since the Taliban regime overtook the country in mid-August 2021, Afghanistan’s record on women’s rights has been manifestly one of, if not the worst, worldwide. Despite promises to ‘uphold women’s rights in line with Sharia law’, from the very first weeks of its rule, the Taliban started suppressing the rights of their citizens, with women the main target of restrictions. As well as prohibiting women and girls from traveling without a male relative, the Taliban have also denied them post-primary education, banned them from numerous public places and restricted their employment to health care and primary education. In December 2022, women were also banned from working for non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in most sectors.

This crackdown on women’s rights has attracted considerable international condemnation, including from Muslim states. In response to the regressive policies, many international donors have reduced or threatened to halt their humanitarian assistance, upon which the country is strongly reliant. It is feared that women could, unintentionally, be those most impacted by this reduction or suspension of humanitarian aid. The Taliban nevertheless appears inflexible, leaving international actors with a dilemma as to how to proceed.

The European Union (EU) has been engaged in Afghanistan since the mid-1980s and has prioritised advancing Afghan women’s rights. While changing its terms of engagement, it has continued to provide humanitarian aid and to support civil society. The European Parliament has followed the situation closely and recommended further action to support Afghan women and girls.

This briefing analyses the current situation of women’s rights in Afghanistan, taking a long view. Women’s rights have been an intense battleground between different actors for over a century, with periods of promising reforms followed by resistance and often reversals of progress. This helps to explain how a country, where women won voting rights in 1919 – earlier than in most of the Western world – has ended up by treating its female population in a manner possibly amounting to a crime against humanity.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Women’s rights in Afghanistan: An ongoing battle‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Timeline of main restrictions on women’s rights under the Taliban (2021-2022)

Citizens often send messages to the President of the European Parliament (or to the institution’s public portal) expressing their views on current issues and/or requesting action from the Parliament. The Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (AskEP) within the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) looks into these issues and replies to the messages, which may sometimes be identical as part of wider public campaigns.

The President of the European Parliament has recently received a large number of messages calling on the Parliament to vote against the European Commission’s new legislative proposal to prevent and combat child sexual abuse. Citizens expressed their concerns that this new legislation would breach data protection and privacy rights. Citizens first began to write to the President on this subject in February 2023. In its proposal, the Commission wants to make it mandatory for online service providers to detect, report and remove child sexual abuse material on their services. According to the Commission, investigation of suspicious content will follow strict rules and conditions; it will not entail general monitoring of individuals’ communications. The European Parliament has recently started working on the legislative proposal.  

Please find below the main points of the reply sent to citizens who took the time to write to the President of the European Parliament on this matter (in English and German).

Main points made in the reply in English

Protecting EU values in the digital field

While the European Parliament has long advocated for a safer internet for children, it also defends privacy and data protection on the internet.

In a joint declaration, the three EU institutions agreed to promote a digital transformation based on EU values and principles. This includes, for example, the principle of privacy and individual control over data. On this occasion, President Metsola stressed: “We want to make Europe fit for the digital age. This declaration […] makes sure that our values also apply in the digital sphere.”

New legislative proposal by the European Commission

As part of a new EU strategy to combat child sexual abuse online more effectively, the Commission announced a legislative proposal in May 2022. This law would oblige online service providers to identify, report and remove child sexual abuse content. They would have to assess the risk of misuse of their services and take measures to minimise them. The proposal also suggests creating a decentralised EU agency to combat child sexual abuse.

According to the EU Commissioner for Home Affairs Ylva Johansson, who is responsible for the proposal, it does not allow for generalised or indiscriminate scanning of content of all kinds of electronic communication. The scope for investigating suspicious content is very limited and the procedure is subject to strict conditions and guarantees. The proposal also requires providers to deploy technologies that are the least privacy-intrusive possible.

Further information on how the European Commission intends to protect privacy is available on its website.

Next steps in the legislative process

As a next step, the European Parliament and the Council have to vote on the proposal. In Parliament, the file was assigned to the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE), which recently started working on the draft report.

It should be noted that, in accordance with Article 2 of the Statute for Members of the European Parliament, Members of the European Parliament are free and independent. Neither Parliament nor its President are authorised to impose instructions on Members on how to vote or how to carry out their political activities.

Main points made in the reply in German

Schutz der gemeinsamen europäischen Werte im digitalen Bereich

Während sich das Europäische Parlament seit langem für ein sichereres Internet für Kinder einsetzt, verteidigt es ebenfalls die Privatsphäre und den Datenschutz im Internet.

In einer gemeinsamen Erklärung vereinbarten die drei EU-Institutionen, dass sie einen digitalen Wandel auf Grundlage der europäischen Werte und Grundsätze fördern möchten. Dazu gehört beispielsweise der Grundsatz des Schutzes der Privatsphäre und der individuellen Kontrolle über Daten. Zu diesem Anlass hob Präsidentin Metsola hervor: „Wir wollen Europa fit für das digitale Zeitalter machen. Diese Erklärung […] stellt sicher, dass unsere Werte auch im digitalen Bereich gelten.“ (Übersetzung aus dem Englischen)

Neuer Gesetzesvorschlag der Europäischen Kommission

Im Rahmen einer neuen EU-Strategie zu einer wirksameren Bekämpfung des sexuellen Missbrauchs von Kindern im Internet veröffentlichte die Kommission im Mai 2022 einen Gesetzesvorschlag. Dieses Gesetz würde Onlinedienstanbieter verpflichten, Inhalte über sexuellen Missbrauch von Kindern zu identifizieren, zu melden und zu entfernen. Sie müssten das Risiko des Missbrauchs ihrer Dienste einschätzen und Maßnahmen ergreifen, um es zu minimieren. Der Vorschlag sieht auch die Einrichtung einer dezentralen EU-Agentur zur Bekämpfung des sexuellen Missbrauchs von Kindern vor.

Laut der zuständigen EU-Kommissarin für Inneres Ylva Johansson erlaubt der Gesetzesvorschlag kein allgemeines und wahlloses Scannen von Inhalten aller Arten elektronischer Kommunikation. Der Freiraum bei Ermittlungen zu verdächtigen Inhalten sei sehr begrenzt, und das Verfahren unterliege strengen Bedingungen und Garantien. Der Vorschlag sieht außerdem vor, dass die Anbieter Technologien einsetzen, die am wenigsten in die Privatsphäre eingreifen.

Weitere Informationen darüber, wie die Europäische Kommission beabsichtigt, die Privatsphäre zu schützen, sind auf der Webseite verfügbar.

Nächste Schritte im Gesetzgebungsverfahren

Im nächsten Schritt müssen das Europäische Parlament und der Rat über den Vorschlag abstimmen. Im Parlament wurde das Dossier dem Ausschuss für bürgerliche Freiheiten, Justiz und Inneres (LIBE) zugewiesen, der erst kürzlich mit der Arbeit des Berichtsentwurfs begonnen hat.

Hierbei möchten wir anmerken, dass gemäß Artikel 2 des Abgeordnetenstatuts des Europäischen Parlaments Europaabgeordnete ihr Mandat frei und unabhängig ausüben. Weder das Parlament noch seine Präsidentin sind befugt den Abgeordneten vorzuschreiben, wie sie abstimmen noch wie sie ihre politischen Tätigkeiten ausüben sollen.

Written by Maria Niestadt (1st edition).

In November 2022, the European Commission published a proposal for a regulation laying down measures for a high level of public sector interoperability across the Union (the interoperable Europe act). The initiative seeks to ensure a consistent, human-centric EU approach to interoperability, create an interoperability governance structure that helps public administrations and the private sector to work together, and establish an ecosystem of interoperability solutions for the EU’s public sector. The proposal should also cut red tape for citizens and businesses.

The European Parliament and the Council have started working on the file. In Parliament, the file has been assigned to the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy, and in the Council to the working party on telecommunications and information society. Parliament’s rapporteur, Ivars Ijabs (Renew Europe, Latvia) published his draft report in March 2023. The next step is for the European Parliament and Council to adopt their negotiating positions ahead of trilogue negotiations

Versions

• April 2023: Interoperable Europe act (1st edition)

Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down measures for a high level of public sector interoperability across the Union (interoperable Europe act) Committee responsible:Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE)COM(2022) 720
18.11.2022Rapporteur:Ivars Ijabs (Renew Europe, Latvia)2022/0379(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Gheorghe Falcă (EPP, Romania)
Josianne Cutajar (S&D, Malta)Ordinary legislative procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council on equal footing
– formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Committee vote on draft report

Written by Stefano De Luca.

With the current pace of technological innovation, it is clear that the volume of data being exchanged is larger than ever and will only continue growing. The EU’s ambitious connectivity targets are pushing policymakers to take a more forward-thinking approach to the telecoms sector. One question EU decision-makers must answer is whether the main digital players, who generate huge volumes of traffic and revenue using the EU’s telecoms infrastructure, should contribute to the cost of network roll-out and, if so, whether that would be ‘fair’.

Background

The revival of the debate on the European network cost contribution – or ‘fair contribution‘ – stems from the idea recently re-introduced by the large European telecom operators (fixed and mobile) that market actors fuelling large volumes of data traffic (large online traffic generators such as Google and Netflix) should contribute to telecom operators’ network costs.

Large telecoms operators (telcos) suggest that a few large traffic generators are taking advantage of the network investment needed to support such data volumes without bearing the roll-out costs; in other words, they are ‘free-riding’.

Large traffic generators, meanwhile, argue that they contribute to the internet ecosystem too by investing heavily in infrastructure, such as data centres, undersea cables and satellites, and by creating attractive internet content, which is one of the reasons customers pay telecoms operators to carry data or decide to upgrade their subscriptions.

Finally, there is a fierce debate over whether or not a mechanism to extract a fair contribution from large traffic generators could undermine the net neutrality principle embedded both in the Open Internet Regulation and the declaration on digital rights and principles for the digital decade. The Commission has stated that any process of exploring a mechanism to secure a fair contribution to the costs of network infrastructure would take care to uphold the EU’s net neutrality rules.

Interconnection market: ‘Bill and keep’ versus ‘sending party network pays’ charging systems
The fair contribution debate is not entirely new. The European Telecommunications Network Operators’ Association (ETNO) proposed to introduce a kind of sending party network pays (SPNP) charging system back in 2012. The idea of this system is that large traffic generators should pay a fee to telcos for ‘delivering’ their data traffic (e.g. video streaming) to the end user’s network. At present, internet interconnection is largely unregulated and done on the basis of transit and peering agreements. The SPNP approach collides with the dominant bill and keep approach of interconnection, where data transport for internet services over telecoms networks is included in the end user price at retail level and each network agrees to terminate connections from the other network without any charge.
The Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications (BEREC) published reports on the internet interconnection market in 2012 and 2017, concluding that there were no competition issues requiring regulatory intervention. In its 2022 preliminary assessment of the fair contribution mechanism, BEREC rejected many arguments raised by ETNO. For instance, BEREC reports that there is no evidence that large traffic generators are free-riding on telecoms networks, that such providers also invest in network infrastructure, and that the SPNP charging system could cause significant harm to the internet ecosystem.
Rebutting this preliminary assessment, ETNO notes that the EU fair contribution debate has now moved beyond the telco industry proposal, beyond analysis of the internet interconnection market and beyond Europe, (referring to the fair contribution act debate in the United States). European Commission public consultation

The European declaration on digital rights and principles for the digital decade fuelled the debate on whether large traffic generators should contribute financially to telcos’ deployment of very high capacity networks (VHCNs) such as optical fibre and 5G. The declaration commits to develop ‘adequate frameworks so that all market actors benefiting from the digital transformation assume their social responsibilities and make a fair and proportionate contribution to the costs of … infrastructures, for the benefit of all Europeans’. Although not legally binding, it provides a framework for meeting the EU’s digital decade targets, including the connectivity ones of having all EU households covered by a fixed gigabit network (1Gbps) and all populated areas covered by 5G by 2030. An upcoming Commission study costs the infrastructure investment needed to achieve these targets at around €174 billion.

Along with its gigabit infrastructure act proposal and the draft gigabit recommendation, the Commission has launched a consultation on ‘the future of the connectivity sector and its infrastructure’, including a section on the fair contribution; this is running from 23 February to 19 May 2023. Focusing on the fair contribution concept, the Commission asks respondents to quantify their planned investment in network infrastructure capable of optimising internet data traffic. It also asks telcos to explain any obstacles to charging digital players for increased data traffic and whether such players should contribute fairly to finance network deployment. On this last point, the Commission also asks for views on the potential contribution mechanism structure (for instance mandatory direct payments to finance networks deployments or an EU or national digital fund).

Stakeholders’ and experts’ point of views

There are different positions on whether and how large traffic generators should contribute to the roll-out of the future-proof European telecoms network. Among the most controversial points:

Investment for upgrades in capacity and future network roll out: studies conducted for telecoms operators have estimated that data traffic driven by large traffic generators could generate costs relating to managing and deploying the networks conveying the traffic of €36 to 40 billion a year for EU telcos. BEREC points out that it has not seen such costs reflected in telcos’ financial statements or loss warnings. Other studies and reports stress that large traffic generators also invest in the internet ecosystem and that content and application providers invested €183 billion in Europe’s internet infrastructure between 2011 and 2021.

Double payment for data transport services: associations and experts demanding a careful impact assessment or against the fair contribution argue that telcos are already remunerated by their own customers through an internet subscription. In addition, there are concerns that a potential fee on large traffic generators would be passed on to consumers through higher prices for content or more advertising. Telcos argue that large traffic generators are not like individual internet users and should contribute to the costs of the traffic conveyance they benefit from and help achieve the digital decade goals.

Fair contribution mechanism: a report funded by the Computer & Communications Industry Association questions the compatibility of a fair contribution with global tax reforms on big tech, considering the lack of evidence on internet market failure or inefficiency. An expert commentator underlines the importance of clarifying who will be the final beneficiary of a potential ‘fair contribution’ fee on large traffic generators. A fee of this kind, if introduced, should be earmarked to finance investments in new very high capacity networks and not for other purposes (for instance to increase telcos’ dividends). This article also suggests that ‘the fee should be collected by public authorities and then distributed as public funds’.

South Korea: First experiment with a fair contribution to network financing
South Korea is the only country to have initiated a form of ‘fair contribution’ for large traffic generators, deviating from the ‘bill and keep’ principle and introducing the SPNP charging mechanism by law. Content providers with an average daily number of users of over 1 million or generating data accounting for over 1 % of total internet traffic are obliged to pay fees to telcos for terminating traffic on their networks. Reports and expert views, with some exceptions, tend to agree that the South Korean experiment is failing and leading to: reduced diversity of online content, slower digital transformation, higher prices for end users buying internet content, a decline in internet service quality and a decrease of investment in network infrastructure. A number of civil society organisations and academics have called on the government of South Korea to repeal the legal framework.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Network cost contribution debate‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Guillaune Ragonnaud (1st edition).

Most goods require packaging at several stages of their product life. Today, the diversity of packaging items and materials is considerable. Between 2009 and 2020, the total mass of packaging waste generated in the EU rose by 20 %. The Packaging and Packaging Waste Directive (PPWD – Directive 94/62/EC) lays down measures to prevent the production of packaging waste, and to promote reuse of packaging and recycling and other forms of recovering packaging waste. It also sets out the requirements that all packaging placed on the EU market must meet. These provisions are designed to reduce the disposal of packaging waste and to promote a more circular economy.

As part of the European Green Deal and the new circular economy action plan, the Commission put forward a revision of the PPWD in November 2022. The initiative’s objective is to ensure that all packaging is reusable or recyclable in an economically feasible way by 2030. The aim is to reinforce the essential requirements for packaging to ensure its reuse and recycling, boost the uptake of recycled content, and improve the requirements’ enforceability. Measures are also envisaged to tackle over-packaging and reduce packaging waste.

The proposal is now in the hands of the co-legislators. In the European Parliament, the Committee on Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI) is responsible for the file.

Versions

• March 2023: Revision of the Packaging and Packaging Waste Directive (1st edition)

Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on packaging and packaging waste, amending Regulation (EU) 2019/1020 and Directive (EU) 2019/904, and repealing Directive 94/62/EC Committee responsible:Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI)COM(2022) 677
30.11.2022Rapporteurs:Frédérique Ries (Renew, Belgium)
Massimiliano Salini (EPP, Italy)2022/0396(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Delara Burkhardt (S&D, Germany)
Grace O’Sullivan (Greens/EFA, Ireland)
Silvia Sardone (ID, Italy)
Pietro Fiocchi (ECR, Italy)
João Pimenta Lopes (The Left, Portugal)Ordinary legislative procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council on equal footing
– formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Publication of draft report Recycling and recovery rates of packaging waste in the EU (%)

Written by Katarzyna Sochacka with Rebecca Fredrick.

The highlight of the March II plenary session was the debate on the conclusions of the European Council meeting of 23-24 March 2023. In a formal ceremony held to celebrate the 25th anniversary of the Good Friday/Belfast Agreement, the Presidents of the European Parliament, Roberta Metsola, the European Council, Charles Michel, and the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, each underlined the significance of the 1998 Agreement and the importance of ensuring reconciliation between the two communities in Northern Ireland. Members debated several legislative files, including on fluorinated gases and ozone-depleting substances, safety of products and equal pay for men and women. In a further debate, Members considered the 2022 rule of law report from the European Commission.

Fluorinated gases and ozone depleting substances

In a joint debate, Members considered two reports from the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI) Committee on fluorinated gases and ozone-depleting substances, and subsequently adopted positions for trilogue negotiations on the two proposals. The proposed revision of the Ozone Regulation will update current rules on ozone-depleting substances (ODS) to reduce administrative burden, facilitate monitoring, and further reduce ODS emissions. The second proposed regulation concerns fluorinated greenhouse gases (F-gases), a particularly strong – although non-ozone-depleting – category of greenhouse gases (GHG). EU rules on F‑gases have been in place since 2006 and have led to significant reductions in GHG emissions. Among the ENVI committee’s proposed changes to the Commission’s proposal are a prohibition on the use of F-gases in sectors where alternatives are technologically and economically feasible, steeper product phase-down trajectories, firmer deadlines after which certain F‑gases will not be allowed to be placed on the market, and the introduction of minimum fines for non-compliance.

General product safety regulation

Members debated and adopted a provisional agreement, endorsed by the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO), on the proposed regulation on general product safety, which would replace existing legislation that has lost effectiveness as a result of digitalisation, supply chain evolution and changes in consumer behaviour. The text agreed in trilogue takes into account Parliament’s call that product safety assessments must consider the consumers targeted (for example, children and older people), as well as its stance on consumers’ right to remedy in the event of a product recall.

Equal pay for equal work between men and women

Parliament also debated and adopted the provisional agreement on equal pay for equal work between men and women, reached after five trilogue meetings. Despite the right to equal pay being enshrined in the EU Treaties since 1992, the gender pay gap currently sits at 12.7 %. The European Parliament has for years been calling for stronger measures on equal pay. The proposal will increase transparency around pay and access to justice for victims of pay discrimination. Notably, the legislation requires all companies – regardless of size – to make available to employees their criteria for determining remuneration as well as a breakdown of remuneration in the company.

Rule of law

Members debated a European Commission statement on its third annual rule of law report. Members voted on a motion for a resolution on the report, tabled by the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE). In its 2022 report, the Commission took into account Parliament’s call for the inclusion of specific recommendations directed at each Member State. While the resolution acknowledges this addition, it expresses concern that many of the recommendations lack specificity. (Members also debated separate Commission statements on the rule of law in Greece, Spain and Malta, resolutions on which are expected to be voted during the April plenary session.)

Opening of trilogue negotiations

Two committees’ decisions to enter into interinstitutional negotiations were approved without a vote: from the Legal Affairs (JURI) Committee on the proposal for a directive on the protection of the environment through criminal law, and from the Agriculture and Rural Development (AGRI) Committee on the proposal for a regulation on the conversion of the Farm Accountancy Data Network into a Farm Sustainability Data Network.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Plenary round-up – March II 2023‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Tambiama Madiega.

General-purpose artificial intelligence (AI) technologies, such as ChatGPT, are quickly transforming the way AI systems are built and deployed. While these technologies are expected to bring huge benefits in the coming years, spurring innovation in many sectors, their disruptive nature raises policy questions around privacy and intellectual property rights, liability and accountability, and concerns about their potential to spread disinformation and misinformation. EU lawmakers need to strike a delicate balance between fostering the deployment of these technologies while making sure adequate safeguards are in place.

Notion of general-purpose AI (foundation models)

While there is no globally agreed definition of artificial intelligence, scientists largely share the view that technically speaking there are two broad categories of AI technologies: ‘artificial narrow intelligence’ (ANI) and ‘artificial general intelligence’ (AGI). ANI technologies, such as image and speech recognition systems, also called weak AI, are trained on well-labelled datasets to perform specific tasks and operate within a predefined environment. By contrast, AGI technologies, also referred to as strong AI, are machines designed to perform a wide range of intelligent tasks, think abstractly and adapt to new situations. While only a few years ago AGI development seemed moderate, quick-paced technological breakthroughs, including the use of large language model (LLM) techniques have since radically changed the potential of these technologies. A new wave of AGI technologies with generative capabilities – referred to as ‘general purpose AI’ or ‘foundation models‘ – are being trained on a broad set of unlabelled data that can be used for different tasks with minimal fine-tuning. These underlying models are made accessible to downstream developers through application programming interface (API) and open-source access, and are used today as infrastructure by many companies to provide end users with downstream services.

Applications: Chat GPT and other general-purpose AI tools

In 2020, research laboratory OpenAI – which has since entered into a commercial partnership with Microsoft – released GPT-3, a language model trained on large internet datasets that is able to perform a wide range of natural language processing tasks (including language translation, summarisation and question answering). In 2021, OpenAI released DALL-E, a deep-learning model that can generate digital images from natural language descriptions. In December 2022, it launched its chatbot ChatGPT, based on GPT-3 and trained on machine learning models using internet data to generate any type of text. Launched in March 2023, GPT-4, the newest general-purpose AI tool, is expected to have even more applications in areas such as creative writing, art generation and computer coding.

General-purpose AI tools are now reaching the general public. In March 2023, Microsoft launched a new AI‑powered Bing search engine and Edge browser incorporating a chat function that brings more context to search results. It also released a GPT-4 platform allowing businesses to build their own applications (for instance for summarising long-form content and helping write software). Google and its subsidiary DeepMind are also developing general-purpose AI tools; examples include the conversational AI service, Bard. Google unveiled a range of generative AI tools in March 2023, giving businesses and governments the ability to generate text, images, code, videos, audio, and to build their own applications. Developers are using these ‘foundation models‘ to roll out and offer a flurry of new AI services to end users.

General-purpose AI tools have the potential to transform many areas, for example by creating new search engine architectures or personalised therapy bots, or assisting developers in their programming tasks. According to a Gartner study, investments in generative AI solutions are now worth over US$1.7 billion. The study predicts that in the coming years generative AI will have a strong impact on the health, manufacturing, automotive, aerospace and defence sectors, among others. Generative AI can be used in medical education and potentially in clinical decision-making or in the design of new drugs and materials. It could even become a key source of information in developing countries to address shortages of expertise.

Concerns and calls for regulation

The key characteristics identified in general-purpose AI models – their large size, opacity and potential to develop unexpected capabilities beyond those intended by their producers – raise a host of questions. Studies have documented that large language models (LLMs), such as ChatGPT, present ethical and social risks. They can discriminate unfairly and perpetuate stereotypes and social biases, use toxic language (for instance inciting hate or violence), present a risk for personal and sensitive information, provide false or misleading information, increase the efficacy of disinformation campaigns, and cause a range of human-computer interaction harms (such as leading users to overestimate the capabilities of AI and use it in unsafe ways). Despite engineers’ attempts to mitigate those risks, LLMs, such as GPT-4, still pose challenges to users’ safety and fundamental rights (for instance by producing convincing text that is subtly false, or showing increased adeptness at providing illicit advice), and can generate harmful and criminal content.

Since general-purpose AI models are trained by scraping, analysing and processing publicly available data from the internet, privacy experts stress that privacy issues arise around plagiarism, transparency, consent and lawful grounds for data processing. These models represent a challenge for education systems and for common-pool resources such as public repositories. Furthermore, the emergence of LLMs raises many questions, including as regards intellectual property rights infringement and distribution of copyrighted materials without permission. Some experts warn that AI-generated creativity could significantly disrupt the creative industries (in areas such as graphic design or music composition for instance). They are calling for incentives to bolster innovation and the commercialisation of AI-generated creativity on the one hand, and for measures to protect the value of human creativity on the other. The question of what liability regime should be used when general-purpose AI systems cause damage has also been raised. These models are also expected to have a significant impact on the labour market, including in terms of work tasks.

Against this backdrop, experts argue that there is a strong need to govern the diffusion of general-purpose AI tools, given their impact on society and the economy. They are also calling for oversight and monitoring of LLMs through evaluation and testing mechanisms, stressing the danger of allowing these tools to stay in the hands of just a few companies and governments, and highlighting the need to assess the complex dependencies between companies developing and companies deploying general-purpose AI tools. AI experts are also calling for a 6-month pause, at least, in the training of AI systems more powerful than GPT‑4.

General-purpose AI (foundation models) in the proposed EU AI act

EU lawmakers are currently engaged in protracted negotiations to define an EU regulatory framework for AI that would subject ‘high-risk’ AI systems to a set of requirements and obligations in the EU. The exact scope of a proposed artificial intelligence act (AI act) is a bone of contention. While the European Commission’s original proposal did not contain any specific provisions on general-purpose AI technologies, the Council has proposed that they should be considered. Scientists have meanwhile warned that any approach classifying AI systems as high-risk or not depending on their intended purpose would create a loophole for general purpose systems, since the future AI act would regulate the specific uses of an AI application but not its underlying foundation models.

In this context, a number of stakeholders, such as the Future of Life Institute, have called for general-purpose AI to be included in the scope of the AI act. Some academics favouring this approach have suggested modifying the proposal accordingly. Helberger and Diakopoulos propose to consider creating a separate risk category for general-purpose AI systems. These would be subject to legal obligations and requirements that fit their characteristics, and to a systemic risk monitoring system similar to the one under the Digital Services Act (DSA). Hacker, Engel and Mauer argue that the AI act should focus on specific high-risk applications of general-purpose AI and include obligations regarding transparency, risk management and non-discrimination; the DSA’s content moderation rules (for instance notice and action mechanisms, and trusted flaggers) should be expanded to cover such general-purpose AI. Küspert, Moës and Dunlop call for the general-purpose AI regulation to be made future-proof, inter alia, by addressing the complexity of the value chain, taking into account open-source strategies and adapting compliance and policy enforcement to different business models. For Engler and Renda, the act should discourage API access for general-purpose AI use in high-risk AI systems, introduce soft commitments for general-purpose AI system providers (such as a voluntary code of conduct) and clarify players’ responsibilities along value chains.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘General-purpose artificial intelligence‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Agnieszka Widuto and Stephanie Pradier.

The ongoing energy crisis and its related challenges of energy security concerns and high energy prices have put the spotlight on the EU’s domestic production and use of energy in general and renewables in particular. The 2018 Renewable Energy Directive (RED) requires the EU to achieve a 32 % share of renewable energy sources (RES) in gross final energy consumption by 2030. The Commission has since proposed a revision of the renewables target to 40 % as part of the ‘fit for 55’ package, in the context of the new EU climate goals under the European Green Deal, and a further increase to 45 % under the REPowerEU plan to phase out Russian energy imports.The EU exceeded its 2020 target of 20 %, achieving a 22.1 % renewables share of energy consumed. However, possibly because of the economic rebound after the COVID-19 lockdowns, the percentage of renewables consumed has since dropped to 21.8 %.

Read this infographic on ‘Renewable energy in the EU‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Sources of renewable energy in EU electricity consumption, 2021 Share of energy sources in EU production of primary energy, 2021 Share of renewable energy in three key sectors, 2021 Share of energy from renewable sources in final energy consumption, EU and Member States, 2021

Written by Enrico D’Ambrogio.

EU integration represents an inspiring example of conflict resolution. Some 30 years of violent sectarian conflict in Northern Ireland was brought to an end in 1998, with the signature of the Good Friday/Belfast Agreement. At the time, both the United Kingdom (UK) and Ireland were Member States of the European Union, having both joined the European Communities on 1 January 1973.

The EU’s engagement in the Northern Ireland peace process materialised first through support for the International Fund for Ireland. As part of its cohesion policy, the EU then directed significant investment to Northern Ireland through building specific cohesion programmes into the framework of the UK’s allocations. From 1995, EU funding was channelled through successive PEACE programmes, supporting peace and reconciliation and promoting economic and social stability in Northern Ireland and the six border counties of Ireland. The European territorial cooperation programme (Interreg) was a further EU cohesion policy tool playing a role in Northern Ireland.

Since the UK’s withdrawal from the EU on 1 February 2020, the PEACE PLUS programme, the largest ever cross-border cooperation programme on the island of Ireland, has been agreed, and it will continue to support the process towards peace and reconciliation in Northern Ireland.

The European Parliament’s support for the EU’s financial contribution to the peace process has been constant, and Parliament expressed concern for the continuity and stability of this support after the UK’s withdrawal from the EU. MEPs have also called for efforts to increase general awareness, and to raise the profile of the impact and necessity of EU funding in Northern Ireland.

Read the complete briefing on ‘EU cohesion policy support to 25 years of peace in Northern Ireland‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Luisa Antunes.

Antimicrobial resistance (AMR) is a global, multidimensional phenomenon occurring in humans, animals, and environmental ecosystems. It is the ability of microbes, e.g. bacteria, viruses, fungi and protozoa, to survive in the presence of medicines designed to kill or inactivate them (antimicrobials: antibiotics, antivirals, antifungals and antiprotozoals). At patient level, AMR hampers the effective treatment of microbial infections, leading to prolonged, severe disease and, in some cases, death. At community level, it amplifies the risk of infection outbreaks, epidemics and pandemics.

AMR is a growing problem, predicted to cause millions of deaths worldwide in the coming decades. The research and development pipeline for new antimicrobials has dried up, partly because of an oligopolistic market structure in a research area considered to give a low return on investment. Concerted EU and Member State action has led to an overall decrease in antimicrobial consumption; however, the relative use of both broad-spectrum and last-resort antimicrobials continues to grow. The lack of investment in prevention, diagnostics and adequate healthcare infrastructure is further driving the preventive prescription of antimicrobials.

Under-investment in good-quality healthcare is one of the main drivers of AMR. Tackling the socioeconomic determinants of health – such as reducing overall poverty and economic inequality, ensuring basic standards of living, education, and health – is imperative to reduce the burden of infection and the spread of AMR. Addressing the causes of AMR requires a multidisciplinary and multisectoral approach, involving not only the health sector but also other sectors, such as agriculture, environment and trade. The forthcoming revision of the pharmaceuticals package will be a chance for the EU to drive forward policies to ensure equitable access to safe, effective and affordable pharmaceuticals for unmet medical needs, and to define strategies for incentives to promote research into innovative antimicrobials.

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Penicillin, first discovered in 1928, contributed to the success of Allied troops in the Second World War and ushered in a new era for medicine. The period between the 1940s and 1960s witnessed a ‘golden age‘ of antimicrobial development, where the impact of serious conditions such as tuberculosis, pneumonia and diarrhoea could finally be mitigated, thus contributing to an increase in quality of health and global life expectancy.

However, the abuse and misuse in consumption of wide-spectrum antimicrobials has led to a progressive increase in antimicrobial-resistant infections, with 35 000 deaths in the EU each year (more than HIV/AIDS and malaria deaths combined), and €1.1 billion worth of losses to healthcare systems. The past 20 years have seen the emergence of microbes resistant to all available antimicrobial classes.[i] By 2050, AMR could cause 10 million deaths worldwide, surpassing cancer as the second largest killer; it could also cause up to 3.8 % of global gross domestic product (GDP) to be lost.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Tackling antimicrobial resistance: From science to pharmaceuticals policy‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

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Written by Clément Evroux.

The magnitude of current global challenges, such as the climate crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic, stresses the relevance of joining forces worldwide and pooling human and financial resources to facilitate the creation and dissemination of knowledge and innovative solutions for EU research.

In 2021, the European Commission adopted a communication on a global approach to research and innovation – the new European strategy for international cooperation. In 2022, the European Parliament and the EU Member States responded to the communication with respectively a resolution and a declaration tabled by the Council presidency. Acknowledging the effects of the current geopolitical tensions, including the Russian invasion of Ukraine, they outlined how to ensure that Europe’s openness to the world will safeguard EU strategic autonomy, interests and values.

Following the launch of Horizon Europe in 2021, the EU is expected to intensify international cooperation, including by extending association to the programme to new partners such as Australia, Canada, Japan, Singapore and New Zealand.

The participation of stakeholders in international cooperation activities is key to Europe’s capacity to expand its scientific and technological leadership – thus far established in the domain of joint exploratory scientific activities, including transdisciplinary initiatives – to also cover technological development and standardisation. European research and innovation players are unambiguously supporting international cooperation for global goods, such as knowledge, the environment and global health. They also express hopes that the United Kingdom will swiftly join Horizon Europe as an associated country.

The first data available on non-EU-based legal entities’ participation in Horizon Europe confirm a significant improvement: as of 21 February 2023, they take part in 42.17 % of the 5 200 grant agreements that have been signed since the programme was launched in 2021.

This updates a briefing published in June 2022.

Read the complete briefing on ‘The EU’s global approach to research and innovation‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.