European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Györgyi Mácsai, Members’ Research Service (EPRS) with Raffaele Ventura, GlobalStat, EUI.

This infographic provides an insight into the economic performance of Kazakhstan compared with the European Union (EU) and looks at the trade dynamics between them. Kazakhstan’s unemployment rate recorded a slight but steady decrease, stabilizing at 4-5% in the decade 2010-2020. Inflation rates, on the other hand, show less stability throughout the time series, and in 2022 reached their second-highest value since 2007. Foreign direct investment (FDI) fluctuated, with a notable spike in 2016, when Kazakhstan attracted record levels of FDI in12.5 % of gross domestic product (GDP). This was followed by a steep decrease in the inflows that in subsequent years have never exceeded 5% of the gross domestic product. Despite a significant yearly fluctuation, the EU’s trade with Kazakhstan shows a general upward trend, with a sharp increase after the 2020 global economic slowdown.

Read this infographic on ‘Kazakhstan: Economic indicators and trade with EU‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

EU imports of goods from Kazakhstan (2022) EU exports of goods to Kazakhstan (2022) Kazakhstan’s share in EU total trade (exports plus imports) Top EU partners (2022) Trade in goods Main trade partners (2022) Trade in goods, exports plus imports EU trade with Kazakhstan Kazakhstan’s business environment and socio-economic indicators FDI and remittances Public finances, monetary and financial data Female labour force participation rate (% of female population aged 15+) GDP growth (Annual change, %) Total unemployment rate (% of total labour force) Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita

Written by Ralf Drachenberg with José René Ernault.

EU leaders met on 5 and 6 October 2023 in Granada for an informal meeting of the European Council, preceded by a meeting of the European Political Community (EPC). On 5 October, leaders at the EPC issued messages of unity in support of Ukraine in the wake of Russia’s war against it. On other topics, such as facilitating peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan, the EPC made little headway.

At their informal meeting on 6 October, EU leaders adopted the Granada Declaration, taking stock of progress made in achieving the objectives set at Versailles in March 2022. This follow-up exercise was crucial, as EU leaders are starting a discussion process on two critical and intertwined topics: i) the future political priorities to underpin the 2024-2029 strategic agenda, and ii) the process of EU enlargement and its consequences for EU institutions and policies. Furthermore, EU leaders discussed migration, reference to which was excluded from the Granada Declaration on account of opposition from Poland and Hungary. The European Council President thus issued a declaration on migration in his own name for the second time in a row, with the support of the other 25 Member States.

1.  The European Political Community meeting

On 5 October, the Spanish Presidency hosted the third meeting of the EPC – the constitutive meeting of which was held in Prague in October 2022, followed by a highly symbolic meeting in Moldova in June 2023. Originating in a proposal made by French President Emmanuel Macron, the EPC was designed as a forum to promote political dialogue and cooperation between EU and non-EU countries, while contributing to peace and security on the European continent. It brings together the heads of state or government of 47 countries, excluding Belarus and Russia, and the leaders of the EU institutions. The EPC has so far remained a largely informal platform, with no budget or secretariat to ensure continuity between meetings. The organisation of the summits has relied on the host countries, with little involvement on the part of the EU institutions.

EPC meeting format

The summit began with a plenary session opened by Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez. The session was dominated by messages of unity in support of Ukraine – tragically intensified by news of a Russian missile attack on civilian areas in the north of the country. Ukraine’s President, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, stressed the need to defeat Russia on the battlefield to avoid a new frozen conflict, and reiterated the need to offer security guarantees to countries vulnerable to Russia.

In his address, Sánchez stressed the shared aspiration of EPC members to tackle common challenges, such as energy sovereignty, artificial intelligence, digitalisation and how to maintain the international rules-based order. These challenges were then discussed in three thematic clusters: i) digitalisation; ii) energy, environment and the green transition; and iii) multilateralism and geostrategy. Unlike in Moldova, the theme of enlargement did not feature in the plenary session.

Outcome of the EPC meeting

The EPC meeting took place amid growing criticism of its loose format and unclear purpose. The final press conference, which was to outline results and hand over the preparation of the next EPC meeting to the United Kingdom (UK), was cancelled. Concrete outcomes indeed appear limited. Although stronger cooperation between EPC countries in the field of cybersecurity was one point agreed upon, as stressed by Macron, the meeting failed to make any significant progress in resolving conflicts between participating countries. Hopes for mediation between Kosovo and Serbia were dashed, with Kosovo President Vjosa Osmani refusing to meet Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić unless sanctions were taken against Serbia after the recent spike in violence in northern Kosovo.

Likewise, the prospect of facilitating peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and addressing the humanitarian crisis in Nagorno-Karabakh, was undermined by the non-attendance of Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev and Türkiye’s President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. The issue was however raised in a meeting between European Council President Charles Michel, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, Macron and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan. They expressed unwavering support for the territorial integrity of Armenia, condemned Azerbaijan’s military operation in Nagorno-Karabakh and called for the resumption of dialogue. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced that the EU’s humanitarian aid to Armenia would be doubled from €5 million to €10 million. European Parliament President Roberta Metsola met with Pashinyan and invited him to address the European Parliament’s next plenary session.

Migration

Although the Spanish Presidency had not put the issue of migration on the agenda – an issue that had featured on the Moldova meeting agenda – the topic was mentioned in Michel’s speech as a challenge the EPC should address together, alongside its conflict resolution mission. Migration was discussed on the sidelines, notably at a meeting convened by UK Prime Minister Rishi Sunak, including Italy, the Netherlands, France, Albania and the European Commission. The participants committed to help one another tackle the challenges of irregular migration, fight smuggling, and develop comprehensive partnerships. The possibility of UK cooperation with the EU border agency Frontex was also discussed.

2. The informal meeting of the European Council

The informal European Council meeting began with an exchange with Metsola, who underlined that as a result of a series of crises, the EU’s budget was now stretched to its limit. In the context of the on-going revision of the EU’s multiannual financial framework, she stressed that to be able to address migration, support Ukraine, help Member States struck by natural disasters, and generate sustainable growth, the EU needed a budget that was ‘fit for purpose’. This was the first EU leaders’ meeting attended by Evika Silina as Prime Minister of Latvia.

The future of the European Union: The 2024-2029 Strategic Agenda

As proposed by Michel, EU leaders started a reflection process on the EU’s future priorities, the results of which would feed into the 2024-2029 strategic agenda to be adopted in June 2024. The discussion was based on general questions: ‘what do we want to do together? How can we assure we will be able to act together? How should our common ambitions be financed?

The topics that were identified for the discussion in Granada and the reflection process were: i) security, defence and cyber-resilience; ii) long-term competitiveness and the EU single market; iii) crisis-preparedness; iv) the green and digital transitions; v) multilateralism and global partnerships; vi) migration; and vii) enlargement and absorption capacity. The European Council President’s idea is to have specific topics dealt with in smaller groups, with discussions then scheduled for the various regular European Council meetings. First drafts are expected to be put forward in spring 2024. However, not all Member States were enthusiastic about the small groups’ approach, as some fear being excluded from parts of the debate.

Some EU institutions and Member States have begun offering input for the future strategic priorities and potential Treaty reform in the context of EU enlargement. The Spanish Presidency put forward its own paper, Resilient EU2030. The Commission contributed to the future priority policy objectives by outlining ways to increase EU resilience, competitiveness and sustainability. A much-discussed Franco-German reflection paper on the future of the EU, suggesting an EU made up of four distinct tiers: i) the inner circle, ii) the EU, iii) associated members, and iv) the EPC, each with different competences and obligations, also contributed to the debate. The proposals resulting from the Conference on the Future of Europe, at which Member States, EU institutions and citizens together indicated political priorities for the future, provided another contribution.

Granada Declaration

The objective of the Granada Declaration was to take stock of the progress made since the Versailles Declaration, adopted in March 2022 under the French Presidency of the Council, and which focused on the areas of defence, energy, and supply chain resilience. In the words of Michel, ‘Granada is the time to look back and critically assess progress in strengthening our European sovereignty, identifying our achievements as well as areas that still require our political action’.

The Granada Declaration calls on the EU to take action in the following areas:

• the EU’s defence readiness and capabilities;
• the EU’s resilience and global long-term competitiveness;
• reduction in vulnerabilities and improved crisis-preparedness;
• a more cohesive, innovation-driven, and interconnected single market;
• affordable energy, EU energy sovereignty and lower external dependencies;
• engagement with partners and protection of the rules-based international order;
• preparation for enlargement, both in future Member States and in the EU itself.

Until the last moment, it was unclear whether the Granada Declaration would obtain the support of all 27 Member State leaders needed for its adoption. In the end, Hungary and Poland only agreed on the declaration if all references to migration were deleted. While this position must be seen in the context of the upcoming Polish elections on 15 October 2023 and the national referendum on migration the same day, the difficulties in agreeing on the Granada Declaration indicate a crisis of unity in the European Council. For the second time in a row EU leaders could not agree on a common text owing to disagreements on migration (see EPRS Post-European Council Briefing, June 2023).

Since the European Council is responsible for ‘defin[ing] the EU general political directions and priorities’ (Article 15 of the Treaty on European Union), the difficulties encountered when drafting the Granada Declaration do not bode well for the discussion process on the next strategic agenda. The European Council is also responsible for defining ‘the strategic guidelines for legislative and operational planning within the area of freedom, security and justice’ (Article 68 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union), something EU leaders have not been able to agree on since 2019, mainly on account of differences over EU migration policy.

Migration

This informal leaders’ meeting also discussed European migration policy, notably its external dimension. Reporting on the discussions, both Michel and von der Leyen welcomed the Council’s recent agreement on a negotiating mandate for the regulation on crisis situations, a big step towards completing the European migration and asylum reform package. The agreement in the Council reached by qualified majority was however criticised by Poland and Hungary, which expressed their disagreement by again opposing the adoption of text on migration by EU leaders. Prior to the meeting, the Polish government stated that it would ‘present a tough veto against illegal immigration at the European Council’, while Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán stated that there would be ‘no compromise on migration. Not today, and not in the upcoming years’.

In the end, Michel issued a separate declaration on migration in his capacity as European Council President. The declaration summarises the EU’s comprehensive approach to migration, which combines: i) external action, notably mutually beneficial comprehensive partnerships with countries of origin and transit; ii) measures to address the root causes of migration; iii) opportunities for legal migration; iv) more effective protection of EU external borders; v) a resolute fight against organised crime, human trafficking and smuggling, and instrumentalisation of migration as a hybrid threat; vi) a higher rate of returns; and vii) internal aspects, in compliance with international law, EU principles and values, and the protection of fundamental rights. Michel stressed that migration would be on the agenda of the next formal European Council meeting on 26-27 October 2023.

Main message of the President of the European Parliament: Metsola reported on a detailed exchange with EU leaders on migration and stressed that for the first time in decades there was a realistic possibility of agreeing on a common European asylum and migration system. She criticised the lack of political will in the past to adopt ambitious legislation. Rather than making decisions supported by a majority of Member States, consensus had been sought, leading to a de facto veto in a policy area where the veto cannot be used. She stressed the public is very concerned about migration, having recently stated that ‘migration is the challenge of our generation’.

Enlargement

Michel indicated that discussions on enlargement had focused on ‘the consequences this expansion may entail’. Member States’ views are quite diverse on the matter, both on the question of internal reforms and regarding a possible date. While some, such as Lithuania, would prefer a quick enlargement ahead of any potential institutional reforms, many others, including Germany, acknowledge the need to carry out internal reforms first, this potentially even leading to Treaty reform, in order for an enlarged EU to be able to function.

Michel’s proposal of setting 2030 as the possible date for enlargement has been met by reservations on the part of many Member States, including the Netherlands, but also from the European Commission. The Irish Taoiseach, Leo Varadkar, stressed the need to be ‘honest with people. From becoming a candidate to actually joining the EU takes many years’. Others, such as Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas believe that 2030 is ‘too far away’ for enlargement. The Prime Minister of Hungary, Viktor Orbán, even shed doubt on the added value for the EU of Ukrainian membership.

One idea suggested by various actors – Member States and think-thanks – is that of ‘gradual integration’, by which candidate countries would be offered visible and tangible benefits early on to motivate their reform process and reduce the waiting time for full membership. Consequently, they could potentially already participate in some policies and/or EU institutions (without voting rights) before formally acceding to the EU. Ursula von der Leyen has indicated that the Commission will publish its progress reports in early November. A decision on opening negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova could potentially be taken at the 14-15 December 2024 European Council meeting.

Main message of the President of the European Parliament: Metsola described enlargement as the Union’s strongest geopolitical tool. The EU now needed to discuss its absorption capacity and internal reform, because ‘what works for 27 will not work for 32, 33 or 35’ EU Member States.

Read this briefing on ‘Outcome of the meetings of EU leaders, 5-6 October 2023‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Laurence Amand-Eeckhout.

The purpose of World Mental Health Day is to improve knowledge, raise awareness and mobilise efforts in support of mental health around the world. This year’s theme, ‘Mental health is a universal human right’, underlines that a mental health condition should never be a reason to deprive a person of their human rights.

Background

The World Health Organization (WHO) defines ‘mental health’ as a state of mental well-being in which people cope well with the many stresses of life, can realise their potential, can function productively and fruitfully, and are able to contribute to their communities. Multiple individual, social and structural factors may combine to protect or undermine mental health. Individual psychological and biological factors such as emotional skills, substance use and genetics can make people more vulnerable. Exposure to unfavourable social, economic, geopolitical and environmental circumstances (such as the pandemic, rising living costs, conflicts and war) also increases people’s risk of experiencing poor mental health.

World Mental Health Day was first celebrated on 10 October in 1992 on the initiative of the World Federation for Mental Health. The theme of World Mental Health Day 2023 – ‘Mental health is a universal human right‘ – is geared towards improving knowledge, raising awareness and driving actions that promote and protect everyone’s mental health as a universal human right. This includes the right to be protected from mental health risks, the right to available, accessible, acceptable, and good-quality care, and the right to liberty, independence and inclusion in the community.

Facts and figures

According to the WHO, in 2019 one in every eight people, or 970 million people around the world, were living with a mental disorder, with anxiety and depression the most common. In the EU, in that same year before the COVID-19 pandemic, mental health problems affected around 84 million people (1 in 6), and those figures have only worsened since. The pandemic put additional pressure on mental health, particularly among young people and categories at risk, such as the elderly and people in vulnerable situations.

EU action on mental health

Policies and services addressing mental health are the individual EU Member States’ responsibility. However, according to Article 168 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the EU complements national policies while also fostering cooperation between Member States. The EU’s work on mental health, part of its activities on non-communicable diseases, is geared towards supporting action on the ground and promoting the exchange of best practice and knowledge. On 7 June 2023, responding to calls from the European Parliament and from citizens in the context of the Conference on the Future of Europe, the European Commission adopted a communication on a new comprehensive approach to mental health, adding another pillar to the European health union. According to that approach, EU action on mental health will focus on three guiding principles. Every EU citizen should have access to adequate and effective prevention, access to high-quality and affordable mental healthcare and treatment, and be able to reintegrate into society after recovery.

The European Parliament has consistently supported the promotion of good mental health and putting mental health at the heart of EU policymaking, through numerous opinions, studies, debates, written questions and own-initiative resolutions. Its Subcommittee on Public Health (SANT) held a hearing on young people’s mental health on 29 June 2023 and is currently preparing an own-initiative report on mental health (rapporteur: Sara Cerdas, S&D, Portugal). A debate on the draft report took place on 19 September 2023, and focused notably on prevention, accessibility of mental health services, early diagnosis, treatment, and the social integration of people with mental health conditions in the community.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘World Mental Health Day 2023: 10 October‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clare Ferguson and Katarzyna Sochacka.

During the October I plenary session Members held a number of debates, including on the need for speedy adoption of the EU asylum and migration package. Other debates focused on: precarity in Europe and the need to aid the deprived; large-scale corrupt sales of Schengen visas; medicine shortages and EU strategic healthcare autonomy; the European Central Bank’s 10th consecutive increase in reference interest rates; proposals to extend glyphosate use; and on the Energy Charter Treaty. In the external relations field, topics debated concerned: EU–China trade relations, the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh after the Azerbaijan attack and threats against Armenia; Moldova’s EU path; and recent developments in the Serbia–Kosovo dialogue.

Parliament approved the appointment of Wopke Hoekstra as member of the European Commission responsible for climate action, and the allocation of an additional role, as Executive Vice-President for the European Green Deal, for Maroš Šefčovič. Members heard a statement by Parliament’s President marking 10‑years since the tragedy off the coast of Lampedusa. Petr Pavel, the Czech President, addressed Members in a formal sitting.

Revision of the EU’s 2021-2027 multiannual financial framework

In view of the need to address the urgent budgetary shortfall and to provide additional financial support to Ukraine, Members debated the Committee on Budgets (BUDG) interim report on the proposal for a mid-term revision of the 2021-2027 EU multiannual financial framework (MFF). The BUDG committee would like to see the amount proposed (€65.8 billion) increased by a further €10 billion. Of this increase, €2 billion should go to reinforcing the single market, an additional €1 billion to migration management, and an increase of €1 billion each to the budget allocations for security and defence and for EU action in the rest of the world. With the remaining extra €5 billion, the committee proposes to strengthen the EU Flexibility Instrument, and the Solidarity and Emergency Aid Reserve. To prevent another payments backlog towards the end of the MFF period, the committee also wants to abandon the annual appropriation payment cap.

European media freedom act

Members debated a Committee on Culture and Education (CULT) report on a proposal to establish a common framework for media services in the internal market (known as the ‘European media freedom act’). The CULT committee proposes to include, among other things, greater transparency on state and non-EU financial support for media outlets, better protection for journalists who are pressured to reveal their sources, and stronger rules on the use of spyware against journalists suspected of criminal behaviour. The report sets Parliament’s position for negotiations with the Council.

European green bonds

Members adopted the compromise text negotiated by the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) on the proposal to regulate European green bonds (debt securities for climate and environmental projects). While the EU is a global leader on the green bond market, the risk of market disruption through ‘greenwashing’ necessitates a uniform definition and a regulated standard. In the world’s first voluntary standard for using a ‘Green Bond’ label, Parliament’s negotiators succeeded in ensuring that all green bond proceeds go towards sustainable activities included in the EU taxonomy (with some flexibility). Companies will have to disclose how such investments feed into their transition plans, and respect greater scrutiny of the environmental claims made of green bonds in general.

Economic coercion by third countries

Non-EU countries are attempting economic coercion (restricting trade or investment to influence the EU or its Member States’ sovereign choices), and the phenomenon is on the rise. As the EU currently has no legal framework in place to fight such coercion, a new proposal seeks to deter countries from this type of action. Members adopted the political agreement reached by the International Trade Committee (INTA) in trilogue negotiations. The text sets a clear definition of economic coercion, and of EU action to counter it. Parliament’s negotiators succeeded in adding a timeframe and a broad list of possible responses. While retaliation should be proportionate, Parliament has insisted on stronger democratic control of the substance and process, and ensured that non-EU countries should pay for damages caused by economically coercive practices.

Intelligent road transport systems

Intelligent transport systems (ITS) use real-time traffic information to make transport safer and more efficient and reduce emissions and energy consumption. As current EU rules governing ITS date from 2010, the Commission proposes to bring them into line with the latest technological developments, to accelerate the availability of data to feed into ITS tools, and enhance its interoperability. Parliament’s negotiators ensured crucial data on road restrictions are included in this shared data. Members adopted the provisional agreement reached by the Transport and Tourism (TRAN) Committee in trilogue negotiations.

Urban wastewater treatment

With consequences for human and environmental health, micro-organisms, solvents, detergents, fats and oils, metals and other substances from households and industry all end up in urban wastewater. Members debated a Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI) report supporting a proposal to update EU urban wastewater legislation. As the new law would introduce a system where pharmaceutical and cosmetics companies pay for any water pollution they cause, the ENVI committee would like to see EU countries also contribute a maximum of 20 % of the financing to upgrade their wastewater treatment plants, to avoid a knock-on effect on medicine prices. The committee seeks stronger monitoring and better reuse of treated wastewater. It also calls for new washing machines to include microfiber filters. The adopted report sets Parliament’s position for future negotiations with the Council.

Classification, labelling and packaging of substances and mixtures

Members debated an ENVI committee report on the classification, labelling and packaging of hazardous substances and mixtures, seeking to fine-tune the proposal, clarify rules on mixed substances, exempt renewable botanicals, and reinforce the scientific basis for classification. The ENVI committee would also like to see new hazard criteria for immunotoxicity and neurotoxicity by the end of 2025, and to assess progress in the development of alternative methods to animal testing. The adopted report sets Parliament’s position for negotiations with the Council.

Protection of workers from asbestos

Despite the ban on asbestos in the EU, exposure to this carcinogen kills more than 70 000 people a year in Europe. Members adopted the agreement reached by the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs (EMPL) in negotiations with the Council, on proposals to amend EU law on asbestos in the workplace, by lowering the limits to which workers may legally be exposed. According to the agreed text, new exposure limits would be 10 times lower than current limits, and demolition companies across Europe would need a permit. The new rules also aim to help workers avoid exposure to asbestos by setting protective equipment standards and decontamination procedures.

Question Time with the Commissions – EU–China trade relations

Valdis Dombrovskis (Executive Vice-President) answered questions on EU–China trade relations, where the EU’s trade deficit has risen substantially and there have been a number of confrontations between the two partners in recent years.

Opening of trilogue negotiations

Three decisions to enter into interinstitutional negotiations were approved without a vote: on reports on measures to reduce the cost of deploying gigabit electronic communications network (ITRE); on data collection and sharing relating to short-term accommodation rental services (IMCO); and on the amendment of Protocol No 3 to the Statute of the Court of Justice (JURI). Members also voted to approve a LIBE committee decision to enter into negotiations on a report on the Schengen Borders Code.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Plenary round-up – October I 2023‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Guillaume Ragonnaud (1st edition).

Consumers are faced with a wealth of claims on the ‘green’ nature of products. In the absence of specific EU rules, how can they be sure that these claims are reliable, comparable and verifiable throughout the EU? On 22 March 2023, the European Commission put forward a proposal for a directive on green claims. The proposed directive would require companies to substantiate the voluntary green claims they make in business-to-consumer commercial practices, by complying with a number of requirements regarding their assessment (e.g. taking a life-cycle perspective). No single method for the assessment would be stipulated. The proposal would also set requirements on how to communicate the claims and introduce rules on environmental labelling schemes. Compliance with these requirements would have to be verified and certified by a third party (‘verifier’). The proposal is now in the hands of the co-legislators. In Parliament, the file was allocated jointly to the Committees on Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO) and on Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI).

Versions

• October 2023: ‘Green claims’ directive: Protecting consumers from greenwashing (1st edition)

Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on substantiation and communication of explicit environmental claims (green claims directive)Committees responsible:
(Joint committee)Committee on Internal Market and Consumer
Protection (IMCO) and Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI)COM(2023)166
22.3.2023Co-rapporteurs:Andrus Ansip (Renew, Estonia)
Cyrus Engerer (S&D, Malta)2023/0085(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Arba Kokalari (EPP, Sweden)
Pernille Weiss (EPP, Denmark)
Laura Ballarín Cereza (S&D, Spain)
Emma Wiesner (Renew, Sweden)
Kim Van Sparrentak (Greens/EFA, Netherlands)
Carlo Fidanza (ECR, Italy)
Annalisa Tardino (ID, Italy)
Petros Kokkalis (The Left, Greece)
Anne-Sophie Pelletier (The Left, France)Ordinary legislative
procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council
on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’)Next steps expected: Vote in committee on the draft report

Written by Ralf Drachenberg, Annastiina Papunen and Rebecca Torpey with José Ernault.

Established as an informal summit meeting in 1975, the European Council became a formal European Union institution, with a full-time President, in 2009, on the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon. It consists of the Heads of State or Government of the 27 EU Member States, the President of the European Council and the President of the European Commission (Article 15(2) of the Treaty on European Union, TEU). The latter two individuals have no voting rights. Meetings of the European Council are normally also attended by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. The President of the European Parliament is ‘invited to speak’ as the first item on the European Council’s agenda, followed by an exchange of views (Article 235(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU, TFEU). At its formal meetings, normally four per year, the European Council adopts ‘conclusions’ that are aimed at identifying policy priorities and action to be taken by the Union as a whole.

Agenda-setting and crisis management

The European Council’s role is to ‘provide the Union with the necessary impetus for its development and define the general political directions and priorities’ (Article 15(1) TEU). It cannot exercise legislative functions. At the beginning of the 2014-2019 and the 2019-2024 institutional cycles, the European Council adopted an agenda of strategic priorities, designed to guide the work of the European Union over the five-year period.

Reflecting the direction taken by the 2017 Rome Agenda set out on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the Rome Treaties, the 2019-2024 strategic agenda, adopted by the Heads of State or Government at their meeting in June 2019, defines migration and the protection of citizens as the top priorities for action in the upcoming five years. Then, comes the development of a stronger economic base, including the fight against unemployment, followed by climate change and social issues. Finally, it looks to increase the EU’s influence and defend its interest in the world. The four core priorities set out in the 2019-2024 strategic agenda broadly correspond to the concerns of EU citizens at the time, as reflected by the 2019 standard Eurobarometer.[1]

The outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic in early 2020 and the prospect of a protracted economic recession of unknown length and severity has, however, prompted EU Heads of State or Government to review the above priorities in order to provide for a coordinated approach and joint action to tackle the crisis. They met virtually on a number of occasions, with their attention shifting from the initial pandemic-related crisis management to the more medium-term recovery process.

At their first video-conference dedicated to the management of the health crisis, on 10 March 2020, the 27 EU Heads of State or Government, alongside the Presidents of the European Commission and the European Central Bank and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, agreed to work together along four main axes, with a view to: i) limiting the spread of the virus; ii) providing medical equipment; iii) promoting research, for instance on development of a vaccine; and iv) tackling the socio-economic consequences of the crisis. The EU leaders underscored the need for a joint European approach and close coordination with the European Commission in combating the pandemic.

Given the serious human, economic and social consequences of the health crisis, criticism has been directed towards the lack of overall preparedness in combatting the pandemic across the EU, and the lack of coordination among Member States at the start of the outbreak. Indeed, EU leaders have acknowledged that the EU needed to become better at ‘developing its executive capacity and at managing crises in a coordinated fashion’.

Following the immediate crisis-management phase, the European Council therefore shifted its focus more towards the medium-term recovery process, with the aim of relaunching and transforming the EU’s economies. In a ‘Joint Statement of the Members of the European Council’ adopted on 26 March 2020, EU leaders mandated the Presidents of the European Council, Charles Michel, and the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, to put forward a roadmap for recovery.

Submitted on 21 April, the recovery plan places particular emphasis on the opportunities offered by the green transition and digital transformation, which are expected to foster new forms of growth and contribute to a more innovative and resilient EU. This dual transformation has been given a central role in the EU’s medium- to long-term action, and forms part of a broader ambition aimed at achieving ‘European strategic autonomy‘. Charles Michel mentioned the concept of strategic autonomy several times over the year 2020; most prominently, on 28 September, when he stated that ‘European strategic autonomy – these are not just words. The strategic independence of Europe is our new common project for this century. It’s in all our common interest’. This concept was then formally endorsed by the European Council, which presented it as ‘a key objective of the Union’ in its 1-2 October 2020 conclusions. Recent developments in Afghanistan are likely to give new impetus to the debate on the EU’s strategic autonomy, as events in August 2021 have highlighted once again the need for the EU to strengthen its defence cooperation.

As regards the funding for the EU recovery process, this will come from the Next Generation EU (NGEU) recovery fund, set up as a temporary mechanism and linked to the 2021-2027 multiannual financial framework (MFF). Yet, it was only after months of remote meetings that the European Council was able to convene again in person to discuss the financial package, and an intensive four-day meeting was needed on 17-21 July, to reach political agreement on the 2021-2027 MFF and NGEU. Together, the two instruments amount to €1 824.3 billion, with €360 in loans and €390 billion in grants making up the latter. After several negotiation meetings between European Parliament and Council representatives, a political agreement on the package was reached on 10 November 2020. However, following the refusal by Hungary and Poland to endorse the outcome, citing concerns with the rule of law mechanism, it took the European Council another two meetings, a video-conference on 19 November and a meeting in person on 11-12 December 2020, to finally agree on clarifications to the rule-of-law conditionality mechanism, thus paving the way for the adoption of the MFF and the NGEU.

One and a half years after the outbreak of the crisis, boosting the EU economy and ensuring its future resilience remain the key priority of the EU. An improving health situation – coupled with increasing vaccination levels – allowed for the gradual restart of EU economies, which in turn led to a brighter economic outlook, with GDP forecast to grow by 4.8 % in 2021 in the EU. However, the speed of recovery varies by Member State and by sector.

Thus, immediately after the Commission’s first-ever bond issuance to feed the Recovery and Resilience Facility, the June 2021 European Council pushed for swift adoption by the Council and rapid implementation of the National Recovery and Resilience Plans, with the aim of ensuring balanced recovery throughout the continent.

Hence, despite an evolution in the ranking of European citizens’ priorities for EU action as identified in the most recent standard Eurobarometer, the horizontal policy orientations set by the European Council in its 2019-2024 strategic agenda appear to remain fully relevant and in line with the expectations of citizens, who now consider the economic situation as their top concern at EU level.

Specific Treaty-based role

In addition to its horizontal priority-setting role as defined in Article 15(1) TEU, the European Council is also tasked with identifying the Union’s strategic interests, determining the objectives of, and defining general guidelines for common foreign and security policy (Article 26 TEU). Following a request by EU leaders, the then High Representative, Federica Mogherini, presented an EU global strategy, which the European Council welcomed in June 2016. The strategy sets five broad priorities for the EU external action in coming years: the security of the Union, state and societal resilience to the east and south, an integrated approach to conflict and crisis, cooperative regional orders, and global governance for the 21st century.

Furthermore, the European Council defines the strategic guidelines for legislative and operational planning in the area of freedom, security and justice (Article 68 TFEU). For the period until 2019, the priorities for the European Union in the area of freedom, security and justice, were to ‘better manage migration in all aspects; prevent and combat crime and terrorism; [and] improve judicial cooperation among EU countries’. Following the outbreak of the migration crisis, and a series of terrorist attacks on European soil, key strategic documents, notably the European agenda on security and the European agenda on migration, were adopted in 2015, either at the request of or with the endorsement of the European Council. A new set of ‘strategic guidelines for legislative and operational planning’ were expected to be adopted by the European Council at its meeting of 26‑27 March 2020. Since the ordinary spring European Council meeting had to be postponed because of the coronavirus crisis. However, more than a year and a half later, and despite the 15 European Council meetings held in the meantime, EU leaders have still not complied with this Treaty obligation, nor is the topic mentioned in the indicative Leaders’ Agenda 2021-2022.

The European Council has also to ‘consider each year the employment situation in the Union and adopt conclusions thereon, on the basis of a joint annual report by the Council and the Commission’ (Article 148 TFEU).

Decision-making procedures and working methods

The European Council’s decisions are taken mainly by consensus, but in certain cases, the European Council can also decide by qualified majority. For example, the President of the European Council is elected by qualified majority vote for a once-renewable term of two and a half years. The President’s role is ‘to ensure the preparation and continuity of the work of the European Council in cooperation with the President of the Commission’, chair its meetings, ‘facilitate cohesion and consensus within the European Council’, and to ensure ‘the external representation of the Union on issues concerning its common foreign and security policy, without prejudice to the powers of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy’ (Article 15(5) TEU). The first two full-time Presidents of the European Council, Herman Van Rompuy and Donald Tusk, served five years each between 2009 and 2019. The third permanent President of the European Council, Charles Michel, began his mandate at the beginning of December 2019.

While not directly accountable to the European Parliament, the President of the European Council presents a report to the Parliament after each (formal) meeting of the Heads of State or Government (Article 15(6)(d) TEU). Usually this takes the form of a declaration in person, followed by a plenary debate.

One of the most striking development in recent years has been the substantial evolution in the working methods and formations of the European Council. As a result of the series of crisis of the last decade, we have witnessed an exponential increase in the number and types of meetings. All meetings are indeed meetings of Heads of State or Government, but not all meetings are formal European Council meetings.

Over recent years, members of the European Council have met in seven different formats:

Next to 1) regular meetings of the European Council on a quarterly basis (Article 15(3) TEU), mentioned earlier, the President can convene 2) special meetings of the European Council ‘when the situation so requires’ (Article 15(3) TEU). In principle, conclusions are also adopted at these special meetings. But, there can be exceptions, e.g. the special meeting of February 2020 on the MFF.

In addition, 3) informal meetings of Heads of State or Government take place traditionally twice per year in the country holding the rotating presidency of the Council, such as for instance the Porto meeting on 8 May 2021, in connexion with the social summit.

As a result of, inter alia, the financial crisis, the UK’s decision to leave the Union, the Leaders’ Agenda proposed by the previous President of the European Council, Donald Tusk, in 2017, and the coronavirus pandemic, meeting formations have evolved substantially.

The financial crisis has led to the increase in the number of special European Council meetings as well as to the establishment of the 4) Euro Summit, created as an informal gathering in 2008 and formalised in 2012 with the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the EMU. In principle, Euro Summits include the EU Member States which have adopted the common currency, currently 19 countries. However, more and more meetings take place in an inclusive format, i.e. with the participation of all 27 Member States. This was the case for instance of the June 2021 Euro Summit. This broad involvement could be linked to the fact that the Euro Summits are not crisis meetings anymore; they now aim at bringing forward the reform of EMU, which is of concern for all the Member States.

From June 2016, following the UK referendum, EU leaders felt the need to discuss a number of things among the 27. Thus, a number of informal meetings of Heads of State or Government at 27 took place without the UK to discuss the future of Europe, notably in Bratislava in 2016, Rome in 2017 and Sibiu in 2019. On those occasions a series of landmark declarations were adopted, which were not formal conclusions. Once the UK had triggered Article 50 and notified its intention to leave, then a new formal format was set up, the 5) European Council (Article 50), which adopted formal conclusions.

As for 6) Leaders’ meetings, they were set up under President Tusk in 2017 and aimed at discussing sensitive issues in an informal way. Such discussions were based, not on draft conclusions, but on short notes prepared by the President. The idea is to have an open, relatively unstructured debate on controversial but highly consequential issues, with a view to facilitating agreement at a follow-up European Council meeting.

The 2019-2024 strategic agenda was prepared in very much the same way, by using the working method developed under the Leaders’ Agenda. Just ahead of the 2019 European elections, the EU‑27 met on 9 May 2019 in the Romanian city of Sibiu to assess the implementation of previous policy objectives and to reflect informally on future EU action over the coming five years. The EU leaders’ discussion was informed by President Tusk’s Leaders’ Agenda note, ‘Strategic agenda 2019-2024 – Outline’, which provided a first overview of the topics for future action. The 2019-2024 strategic agenda was then adopted at the June 2019 formal European Council meeting.

The process consisting of first holding an informal or inconclusive discussion on a topic and then seeking to adopt conclusions at a subsequent meeting has been kept in the Leaders’ Agenda 2020-2021, put forward by President Charles Michel at the special European Council meeting of 1‑2 October 2020 and then in the new indicative Leaders’ Agenda 2021-22, presented in June 2021. The idea is that, ‘where no immediate conclusions are drawn, the outcome of the debates will be reflected in later conclusions’. Designed to provide an important structuring framework for the European Council’s activities, both the 2020-21 and 2021-22 Leaders’ Agendas outline the planned meetings and main policy topics that EU Heads of State or Government are called to address in the months ahead. The third edition of the Leaders’ Agenda however, the indicative nature of which is specified in the title, appears to be less detailed and less comprehensive when compared to the first and second editions. Moreover, whilst maintaining the Leaders’ Agenda framework, Mr Michel seems more recently to have dropped the practice of preparing special notes and of organising an informal meeting to discuss sensitive issues.

Moreover, a number of EU priority topics appear to be missing in the listing of issues for discussion outlined in the latest Leaders’ Agenda. This is the case of migration for instance. Owing to the sensitivity of the issue and because EU leaders have not thus far been able to agree on the distribution of migrants beyond the Member State of arrival, migration has been absent from the European Council’s meeting agendas in 2019 and 2020. However, EU discussions on migration have resurfaced recently: the issue was debated at length at the October 2021 European Council meeting and is likely to feature among the highly sensitive topics of the coming months.

The newest feature of meetings of Heads of State or Government are video-conference meetings. In a context of lockdown, this new form of meeting has enabled EU leaders to take joint action to tackle the crisis. Video-conference meetings are clearly linked to the ongoing coronavirus crisis. However, it can be assumed that they be a lasting feature. Indeed, next to the coronavirus pandemic, other topics were often touched upon at video-conference meetings, thus using the opportunity of a virtual meeting to move forward on other pressing or even less pressing issues.

Obviously video technology enables urgent meetings to take place, and for the EU to take action if needed between physical meetings. Thus, given there is the necessary political will, the use of video-conferences could provide a new dynamic to the European Council, increasing its adaptability and reaction capacity.

Nevertheless, even if video-conferences are a good vehicle for rapid consultation, this type of meeting has its limits: Video-conferences are inappropriate to discuss sensitive issues, such as foreign affairs or budgetary matters. In such a format, EU leaders tend to be more cautious and to keep to their written statements, because the confidentiality of discussions is not ensured and participation is (de facto) broader than in formal physical meetings. Moreover, considering the particular nature of the European Council, small bilateral or side-meetings are crucial for achieving agreements on sensitive issues. We have witnessed it in the context of the negotiations on MFF in July 2020, when a physical meeting was necessary to enable political agreement to be reached on the MFF, and with the postponement of the discussion on Russia at the March European Council, which had to be held online due to the public health situation.

Altogether, the European Council has been active during the coronavirus crisis, and the institution has taken a digital leap. But video-meetings are unlikely to replace physical meetings fully when crucial decisions are on the agenda.

Read the complete study on ‘Key issues in the European Council: State of play in September 2023‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marketa Pape.

Under EU rules, EU citizens are free to reside and work in any Member State, and can be posted to any other EU country to provide a service job. By contrast, labour migration by third-country nationals (TCNs) is controlled by a different regulatory framework. However, Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) case law provides that TCNs with work and residence permits in one Member State may be posted across the EU to perform temporary work. The posting of TCN workers is increasingly being used as a labour mobility channel.

Posting of workers

Key pillars of the EU acquis, the principles of free movement of workers, freedom of establishment and freedom to provide services are rooted in the EU Treaties. The freedom to provide services serves as the basis for the practice of ‘posting’ workers. A ‘posted worker‘ is a worker sent by their employer to provide a temporary service in another EU Member State. While performing work in the receiving/host country, they do not shift their residence there. They remain connected to their sending/home country, where the employment agreement was concluded and where they remain subject to social security rules (under certain conditions). At the same time, while executing a service contract in a host country for their employer or a temping agency, posted workers are subject to the labour law of that country.

The posting of workers is becoming increasingly common and developing in new forms, including posting of TCN workers. While TCNs are legally ‘fixed’ by a work and residence permit in the country that granted the permits, the CJEU decided in 1994 that TCNs who have a valid work and residence permit in one Member State can be posted in any other Member State across the EU without needing another work permit (the Vander Elst case). The CJEU has confirmed this rule in subsequent case law.

Posting offers new migration opportunities to TCNs, especially low-and medium-skilled workers, who might otherwise have difficulty obtaining work and residence permits in Member States that privilege highly skilled labour migrants. Posted TCN workers mainly work in construction, transport and agriculture. The main receiving countries of posted TCN workers are Austria, Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands, while Poland, Slovenia and Spain are among the main sending countries. The nationalities most represented among posted TCN workers are Ukrainian and Bosnian, followed by Serbian and Belarusian.

The combined statuses of ‘posted worker’ and ‘labour migrant’ make posted TCN workers doubly vulnerable, however, as they depend on their employers not only for employment but also for the renewal of their work and residence permits in the sending country. Often used as a business model for profit maximisation, posting of TCN workers has the potential to grow into a mobility channel on an equal footing with ‘traditional’ TCN labour migration.

EU legal framework

The 1996 Posting of Workers Directive (PWD) established a core set of rights in relation to the terms and conditions of employment of posted workers, addressing remuneration, rest periods, annual leave, and occupational health and safety requirements. The directive aimed both to protect these rights within the EU and to facilitate a level playing-field in the Member State of posting.

The 2018 revised PWD strengthened the principle of ‘equal pay for the same work in the same place’ (the original PWD had ensured only ‘minimum rates of pay’); extended to posted workers the rules on workers’ accommodation and on allowances or reimbursement of expenditure to cover travel, board and lodging; and confirmed the equal treatment of posted temporary agency workers.

The PWD applies to both EU and TCN workers. It does not define a minimum duration of posting or any visa or permit requirements. However, after 12 months of posting (18 months, if notified by the employer), all terms and conditions of employment of the host country will apply to the posted worker (except rules on contract termination, supplementary working pensions and social security, which apply after 24 months).

The Enforcement Directive 2014/67/EU sought to increase compliance with the PWD. It addressed issues relating to access to information and circumvention of rules, inspections and monitoring, joint liability in subcontracting chains and exchange of information between Member States.

EU rules on social security coordination (Regulation 883/2004/EC, implementing Regulation 987/2009/EC and Regulation 1231/2010/EU) guarantee posted TCNs the same social security protection received by EU citizens moving within the EU (under certain conditions). It has been observed, however, that despite harmonising efforts at EU level, short-term TCN workers’ access to social security is organised in a fragmented way both within and across national jurisdictions.

The right of residence of the TCN worker in the sending Member State falls under the EU common immigration policy, which is a shared competence between the EU and the Member States. The EU has adopted rules relating to admission criteria, procedures for the application for residence and work authorisations, and the rights of specific categories of legal migrants to the EU (including seasonal workers, workers on intra-corporate transfer, persons under temporary protection – first activated for persons residing in Ukraine fleeing Russia’s war – and highly skilled workers and their families).  

National rules applicable to posted TCN workers

While a TCN worker needs a work permit only in the sending Member State, the same does not apply for residence permits. Member States apply various administrative requirements regarding the right of posted TCN workers to stay on their territory. While some do not impose any requirements, most require prospective posted workers to apply for a temporary residence permit or a ‘Vander Elst visa’. For a posting shorter than 90 days – a ‘Schengen visa’ posting – most Member States waive this requirement.

Member States can regulate additional areas, such as the conditions for renewal or withdrawal of work and residence permits. In addition, several Member States have specific bilateral agreements that exempt certain TCNs from the requirement to have a work permit. Slovenia, for instance, allows citizens from Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia to obtain a special work permit to work in Slovenia, while TCNs of other nationalities must obtain both a work and a residence permit. This allows Slovenian companies to recruit TCN workers from these Balkan countries swiftly and post them in other EU countries. Similarly, Poland offers some simplified procedures to citizens of Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Armenia and Georgia.

Further national legal requirements are complex, fragmented and vary considerably. Compliance is difficult to verify and involves inspections. This requires cooperation from labour, social security and immigration authorities from other EU countries, whose differences in approach, competences, personnel and language capacities may complicate the process.

Transport sector: Directive 2020/1057/EU sets specific rules for posting drivers in the road transport sector, and clarifies the forms of international road freight transport to which the PWD applies. Drivers performing ‘cabotage’ (national transport undertaken by hauliers from another Member State) or ‘cross-trade’ (transport between two countries performed by a vehicle registered in a third country) are considered posted workers. However, bilateral transport (between the Member State of establishment and another country) and transit transport (crossing a Member State without loading or unloading) are not considered posted work. When a driver is posted, remuneration of the host Member State applies; when not, that of the Member State of establishment applies. While the directive also applies to TCN posted drivers, it does not deal with visas. European Parliament initiatives

Since 2014, Parliament has called repeatedly for improvements to the PWD. In 2016, the Commission put forward a proposal for a regulation on better coordination of social security systems, seeking to clarify conflicts between social security coordination rules and the PWD. The file is currently on hold.

In the negotiations on the revision of the PWD, Parliament pushed for ‘equal pay for equal work’ and for Member States to be able to apply regional, sectoral or industry agreements to posted workers. It also sought to enable Member States to place foreign undertakings under the same national obligations in cases of sub-contracting. In 2021, Parliament called on the Commission to research trends affecting working conditions of posted TCNs, with a view to updating policy at EU or national level as appropriate.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Posting of third-country nationals in the EU‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Velina Lilyanova.

The Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) is the main element of Next Generation EU (NGEU), the EU’s recovery plan, designed to help EU Member States navigate their way out of the COVID-19 crisis and towards a more resilient future. To receive financing from NGEU, each Member State had to prepare a national recovery and resilience plan (NRRP) and include in it reforms and investment addressing six policy areas, or the six pillars of the RRF. The fifth pillar, ‘Health, and economic, social and institutional resilience’, has a broad scope, but around half of the measures included in it are health-related.

The outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic put an unprecedented strain on the EU’s health systems and revealed a number of vulnerabilities, even in the best-performing Member States. Consequently, in 2020, in the framework of the European Semester, all Member States received country-specific recommendations (CSRs) in the area of health policy (up from around half of Member States in 2019). To address these recommendations, and their health systems’ weaknesses, all the Member States have envisaged investment and reform measures adapted to their national contexts, and included them in their NRRPs. The most recent annual report from the European Commission on the RRF estimated the total healthcare-related expenditure at €43 billion for the 27 NRRPs. Despite differences, the NRRPs reveal a number of common themes. These include the need to expand healthcare infrastructure, modernise primary care, address staff shortages, and – not least – digitalise health services. Taken together, these measures are expected to make national healthcare sectors more robust and efficient. With all national plans in place and the implementation of the RRF well under way, this briefing gives an overview of the main health-related measures in the plans, with a spotlight on digital (e-health) measures.

While Member States define and deliver their national health services and medical care, the EU is contributing greatly to the joint efforts to strengthen public health policy and build a European health union. The European Parliament has consistently promoted the establishment of a coherent public health policy, including the creation of a new stand-alone European health programme.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Health-related measures in the national recovery and resilience plans‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Breakdown of health pillar expenditure by policy area: ‘Healthcare’

Written by Pieter Baert (1st edition).

A massive increase in trade volumes – in particular thanks to the rise of e-commerce – combined with the fast growing number of EU standards that need to be checked at the border and continuously evolving trade strategies have put EU customs authorities under a lot of pressure in recent times. Concerns have been raised that the EU’s customs union is burdened by fragmented digitalisation, suboptimal coordination between national authorities and overall complexity, leaving traders with high administrative compliance costs and criminals with opportunities to commit fraud. To tackle these issues, the European Commission tabled a customs reform package on 17 May 2023. Along with a number of other provisions, key to the reform would be the establishment of an EU customs authority, which would oversee a new customs data hub. This would entail a more centralised and digitalised approach to customs that should lower compliance costs for traders, free up resources for national authorities and ensure a more efficient, strengthened and fraud-proof customs union.

The proposal is subject to the ordinary legislative procedure, requiring the support of both the Council of the EU and the European Parliament, following consultation of the European Economic and Social Committee. Within the Parliament, the Committee on Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO) is working on the file.

Versions

• September 2023: Establishing a EU Customs Authority and Customs Data Hub (1st edition)

Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council establishing the Union Customs Code and the European Union Customs Authority, and repealing Regulation (EU) No 952/2013Committee responsible:Internal Market and Consumer ProtectionCOM(2023) 258
17.5.2023Rapporteur:Deirdre Clune (EPP, Ireland)2023/0156(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Maria Grapini (S&D, Romania)
Catharina Rinzema (Renew, the Netherlands)
Anna Cavazzini (Greens/EFA, Germany)
Anne-Sophie Pelletier (The Left, France)Ordinary legislative procedure
(COD) (Parliament and Council
on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’)Next steps expected: Draft report

Percentage of individuals in the EU-27 who purchased goods online from a non-EU seller in 2022 Customs duties paid into the EU budget as an own resource*, 2022, (€ million)

Written by Tim Peters, Head of the Budgetary Policies Unit.

The European Union’s budget is currently under significant pressure: the EU has sent massive financial aid to Ukraine. Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has led to high inflation and high interest rates, which mean that the space available within the EU budget has become even tighter.

Against that background, three influential members of Parliament’s Committee on Budgets and one renowned academic expert discussed the future of the EU budget in Parliament’s library: the two co-rapporteurs for the revision of the MFF, Margarida Marques (S&D, Portugal) and Jan Olbrycht (EPP, Poland); one of the two co-rapporteurs for the reform of the own resources, Valérie Hayer (Renew, France); and Iain Begg, Professor at the London School of Economics and Political Science. All panellists agreed that the current multiannual financial framework was not fit for purpose and urgently needed a pressing and meaningful revision. Albeit not perfect, the European Commission’s proposal was judged a significant step forward in the right direction. In their opinion, the European Parliament would, therefore, broadly support the Commission proposal and be likely to ask for top-ups for certain headings and an enhanced flexibility to cope with unforeseen events.

Please accept YouTube cookies to play this video. By accepting you will be accessing content from YouTube, a service provided by an external third party.

YouTube privacy policy

If you accept this notice, your choice will be saved and the page will refresh.

Accept YouTube Content

The panellists concurred that the EU needed to reform its institutional and budgetary setup to be ready for the forthcoming enlargement to include Ukraine, Moldova and several Western Balkan countries. Due to the significantly lower level of prosperity and the high relevance of the agricultural sector in those candidate countries, the budgetary consequences of their accession would be massive.

The Members underlined that the EU has to commit the budgetary means necessary to meet its political priorities. It is not sustainable, in their view, for Member States to allocate more and more tasks to the EU while simultaneously refusing to provide appropriate financial and human resources allowing the EU to deal with those tasks. The Members pointed out the need to replace GNI-based own resources with genuine own resources, based on EU legislation such as the Emissions Trading Scheme or corporate taxation of large multinational companies.

© European Union 2023 – Source : EP© European Union 2023 – Source : EP© European Union 2023 – Source : EP© European Union 2023 – Source : EP© European Union 2023 – Source : EP© European Union 2023 – Source : EP© European Union 2023 – Source : EP Further reading

• Topical digest: EU long-term budget: Does the EU have enough resources to finance its priorities?
• Revision of the EU’s long-term budget for 2021 to 2027: Securing sufficient resources for the EU
• System of own resources of the European Union
• Financing Ukraine’s recovery: Consequences for the EU budget and budgetary control, and principles for success
• Prof Begg’s presentation 

Written by Karin Jacobs (1st edition).

On 1 June 2023, the European Commission presented the maritime safety package, focused on introducing modernised maritime safety and security rules on port state and flag state control, maritime accident investigation and ship source pollution. The package also includes a proposal to revise the Regulation on the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA).

The revised regulation would give EMSA new and more numerous tasks since the last major revision of its mandate in 2013 and aim to make it ‘future proof’. Furthermore, it seeks to take better account of EMSA’s current tasks and objectives, which means that the agency would be legally mandated to fulfil these and provide EU Member States and the European Commission with technical, operational and scientific assistance, to ensure maritime safety, security and the green and digital transition of the maritime sector. At the same time, the agency would be provided with adequate human and financial resources to fulfil its role.

In the European Parliament, the Committee on Transport and Tourism (TRAN) is leading the work on this legislative file. The Fisheries (PECH), Environment (ENVI) and Budget (BUDG) Committees have been invited to submit an opinion.

Versions

• September 2023: Revised rules on the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) (1st edition)

Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the European Maritime Safety Agency and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1406/2002Committee responsible:Transport and Tourism Committee (TRAN)COM(2023)269
1.6.2023Rapporteur:Cláudia Monteiro de Aguiar (EPP, Portugal)2023/0163(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Sara Cerdas (S&D, Portugal)
Caroline Nagtegaal (Renew, the Netherlands)
Jutta Paulus (Greens/EFA, Germany)
João Pimenta Lopes (The Left, Portugal)Ordinary legislative procedure
(COD) (Parliament and Council
on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’)Next steps expected: Publication of draft report

Written by Karin Jacobs (1st edition).

On 1 June 2023, the European Commission presented a legislative package to modernise and reinforce maritime rules on safety and pollution prevention. This package contains proposals for the revision of five legislative acts, among them the revision of the Directive on Ship-source Pollution. The aim is to combat pollution from maritime ships thereby preventing all ship-owners and operators, regardless of the ship’s flag, from releasing any type of illegal discharge, in line with International Maritime Organization (IMO) rules, into European seas. The proposal contains a robust framework for penalties for infringements, and their application. In addition, there would be an extended range of substances classified as polluting, and enforcement would be strengthened.

Within the European Parliament, the Committee on Transport and Tourism (TRAN) is leading the work on this legislative file and Marian-Jean Marinescu (EPP, Romania) has been appointed rapporteur. The Committees on Legal Affairs (JURI), Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI), and Fisheries (PECH) have been invited to provide opinions.

Versions

• September 2023: Revision of the Directive on Ship-source Pollution (1st edition)

Proposal for a directive amending Directive 2005/35/EC on ship-source pollution and on the introduction of penalties, including criminal penalties, for pollution offencesCommittee responsible:Transport and Tourism Committee (TRAN)COM(2023) 0273
1.6.2023Rapporteur:Marian-Jean Marinescu (EPP, Romania)2023/0171(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Sara Cerdas (S&D, Portugal)
Bergur Lokke Rasmussen (Renew, Denmark)
Carlo Fidanza (ECR, Italy)
Leila Chaibi (The Left, France)Ordinary legislative procedure
(COD) (Parliament and Council
on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’)Next steps expected: Publication of draft report

Written by Anne Altmayer (1st edition).

On 30 March 2023, the European Commission presented a proposal for a directive on common rules promoting the repair of goods. The proposed directive aims to mitigate the current business and consumption pattern, marked by frequent and premature replacement and discarding of goods. According to the Commission, this model generates additional costs for consumers, is a waste of natural resources and does harm to the environment. The proposal seeks to save costs for consumers and facilitate the development of a resource-efficient circular economy. The proposed directive would apply to the repair of goods within and outside the legal guarantee.

In Parliament, the file has been referred to the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO). René Repasi (S&D, Germany) has been appointed as rapporteur.

Versions

• September 2023: Right to repair: New consumer rights (1st edition)

Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on common rules promoting the repair of goods and amending Regulation (EU) 2017/2394, Directives (EU) 2019/771 and (EU) 2020/1828Committee responsible:Committee on Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO)COM(2023) 155
30.3.2023Rapporteur:René Repasi (S&D, Germany)2023/0083(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Arba Kokalari (EPP, Sweden)
Catharina Rinzema (Renew, the Netherlands)
Anna Cavazzini (Greens/EFA, Germany)
Beata Mazurek (ECR, Poland)
Anne-Sophie Pelletier (The Left, France)Ordinary legislative procedure
(COD) (Parliament and Council
on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’)Next steps expected: Vote in committee on draft report

Written by Guillaume Ragonnaud (1st edition).

This year marks the 30th anniversary of the single market. Although it has generally been a success story, a number of challenges remain. For instance, there is still no EU-wide harmonisation of the technical requirements for the road circulation of non-road mobile machinery. This has a negative effect on the functioning of the single market. This sector covers a broad range of machinery fitted with the means for self-propulsion – such as combine harvesters, excavators, ride-on mowers and forklifts – and that may need to circulate on the road to go from one workplace to another.

On 23 March 2023, the Commission presented a proposal for a regulation that would set out the requirements for the EU type approval and placing on the market of non-road mobile machinery intended to circulate on public roads. It would also lay down rules and procedures on market surveillance of non-road mobile machinery. Stakeholders have broadly welcomed the proposal.

The proposed regulation is now in the hands of the co-legislators. In Parliament, the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO) is responsible for the file. The committee vote on the draft report is expected on 27-28 November 2023.

Versions

• September 2023: Non-road mobile machinery circulating on public roads (1st edition)

Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the approval and market surveillance of non-road mobile machinery circulating on public roads and amending Regulation (EU) 2019/1020Committee responsible:Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO)COM(2023)178
30.3.2023Rapporteur:Tom Vandenkendelaere (EPP, Belgium)2023/0090(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Maria-Manuel Leitão-Marques (S&D, Portugal)
Ivars Ijabs (Renew, Latvia)
Malte Gallée (Greens/EFA, Germany)
Beata Mazurek (ECR, Poland)  
ID: to be appointed
Kateřina Konečná (The Left, Czechia)Ordinary legislative procedure
(COD) (Parliament and Council
on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’)Next steps expected: Awaiting committee decision

Written by Mario Damen.

The Strategic Foresight Conversation (SFC) on the future of the EU and Ukraine was a multi-stage stakeholder consultation in which more than 50 experts from various backgrounds participated between June 2022 and June 2023. The Russian invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 and the ensuing war has not only changed all aspects of life in Ukraine, but is also affecting the EU in many significant ways and has shifted geopolitical and geo-economic paradigms. The SFC investigated future relations between the EU and Ukraine across a range of cross-cutting domains. Against the backdrop of the European Council decision of 24 June 2022 to give candidate status to Ukraine and Moldova, a rather long time horizon of 2035 was chosen, to allow to look beyond the war and include views on reconstruction, EU enlargement and EU external relations.

The process consisted of three phases. Phase one explored the EU-Ukraine relationship and considered the impact of possible developments. Phase two identified drivers of change and developed four scenarios:

1. Fair Stability assumes that Ukraine would regain all of its territory and join the EU and NATO, while a new cooperative Russian regime signs a peace agreement.
2. Cold War II assumes that the front would get stuck without agreement between the parties, leading to a bipolar world and partial Ukrainian integration into the EU and NATO.
3. Frozen Conflict assumes that the parties would negotiate trade-offs after the front got stuck, leading to Ukrainian neutrality and a stagnant EU accession process.
4. Devastated Europe assumes that Russia would escalate the war, leading to NATO involvement in the war and a stronger and enlarged NATO, but a disunited, weak EU.

Scenarios are not predictions but a tool to imagine possible futures – both desirable and undesirable ones. They served as stepping stones to formulate policy considerations in phase three of the SFC; these policy considerations were put in the political context of European Parliament resolutions. The actionable conclusions of these considerations were clustered into four areas for EU action:

1. From military support towards a new European security architecture: the EU could transition from the coordination of and public support for short-term military and economic aid to Ukraine towards developing a future security architecture for wider Europe, which may involve diplomatic efforts.
2. Towards EU enlargement, reconstruction and recovery: Ukraine should address reforms needed for EU accession, in particular those regarding the rule of law. The EU could prepare for shifts in distribution of political power and financial means and develop a coordinated position on enlargement for several accession candidates, balancing the principle of individual merit and a group approach. Parallelism between Ukraine’s EU accession and its reconstruction is important. Reconstruction requires coordination, financing and the contribution of returning refugees.
3. Building an effective, green and sovereign European Union: the EU could prepare its institutions for enlargement, while addressing the double challenge of achieving strategic autonomy in its energy, raw material and agricultural needs and delivering on the European Green Deal. It could draw lessons from earlier enlargements.
4. Reviewing the EU’s external relations: the EU could prepare for different possible future relationships with Russia and Belarus, facing more antagonistic or cooperative governments. It could carefully calibrate its relations with Türkiye and China, taking into account US-China relations and the need for de-risking economic relations.

Although certain elements of the scenarios and policy considerations have already materialised, there are still many open questions that are relevant for future policymaking.

Read the complete study on ‘EU-Ukraine 2035: Strategic foresight analysis on the future of the EU and Ukraine‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Summary of EU-Ukraine 2035 scenarios

Written by Antonio Albaladejo Román.

What happened?

On 15 September 2023, three EU Member States bordering Ukraine – Poland, Hungary and Slovakia – unilaterally restricted the import of certain Ukrainian agricultural products. This move comes in the wake of the European ‘Commission’s decision not to extend a previous ban on the import (although allowing transit) of Ukrainian grain into these countries.

Why were there restrictions in the first place?

Ukraine is one of the world’s top agricultural producers, especially of grain and vegetable oils. It is also an important food supplier to many countries in Africa and the Middle East.

Russia’s war against Ukraine has deliberately targeted Ukrainian food production and Black Sea exporting facilities, seeking to undermine the country’s economy and threaten global food security.

The EU responded to Moscow’s ‘food weaponisation’ strategy through temporary trade liberalisation with Ukraine, and by setting up the EU-Ukraine Solidarity Lanes in May 2022. These measures have allowed Ukraine to export over 44 million tonnes of blocked agricultural product through EU territory, and had an immediate effect on global food prices, averting a wider crisis.

However, lower prices and competition from Ukrainian producers affected farmers in the EU Member States bordering Ukraine, who called for protectionist measures. Pressure from these groups led to five Member States (Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria) to restrict the import or transit of Ukrainian agricultural products in April 2023, in violation of the EU’s exclusive competence on trade policy.

The European Commission reached a deal with these Member States, agreeing to temporarily restrict import of four Ukrainian products (wheat, corn, rapeseed, and sunflower seeds) into these countries, but allowing their transit to non-EU countries. A coordination platform consisting of the Commission, Ukraine and the affected Member States was also set up. These temporary restrictive measures were extended for three additional months on 5 June 2023.

In addition to the temporary import restrictions, the EU has channelled substantial financial resources to support farmers affected by Ukrainian grain imports. In March 2023, the European Commission mobilised €56.3 million from the agricultural reserve for Bulgarian, Polish and Romanian farmers (€16.75 million for Bulgaria, €29.5 million for Poland and €10.05 million for Romania). Later in May, the Commission put forward an additional €100 million package, extended to Hungary and Slovakia (which provides €9.77 million to Bulgaria, €15.93 million to Hungary, €39.33 million to Poland, €29.73 million to Romania and €5.24 million to Slovakia).

What triggered the latest dispute?

When import restrictions expired on 15 September 2023, the Commission announced that it would not renew the import ban, as the initial market disruption had subsided. Ukraine had also committed to prevent future grain supply surges, and the Russian termination of the Black Sea Grain Initiative in July 2023 increased the importance of the EU Solidarity Lanes for global food security.

Three Member States (Poland, Hungary and Slovakia) opposed the termination of the import ban, and announced the reintroduction of unilateral restrictive measures on several Ukrainian agricultural products.

In response, Ukraine announced its intention to file a lawsuit against these Member States before the World Trade Organization (WTO).

What is the position of the European Parliament?

On 24 March 2022, the European Parliament plenary called for the establishment of safe transport and food corridors to and from Ukraine, as well as support for EU farmers affected by the war in Ukraine. On 12 September 2023, the Parliament debated the impact of Ukrainian grain exports on EU farmers after Russia’s withdrawal from the Black Sea Grain Initiative with the European Commission.

Is the EU’s solidarity with Ukraine weakening?

No, the EU remains steadfast in supporting Ukrainians against Russia’s unprovoked war of aggression. Since the Russian illegal invasion of 24 February 2022, the EU, its Member States and financial institutions have mobilised nearly €40 billion to support Ukraine’s State and economy, and a further €20 billion in military assistance. Poland and Slovakia in particular are among the top international supporters of Ukraine. EU citizens too continue to stand strongly alongside Ukraine, with two-thirds in favour of supporting Kyiv’s path toward European integration.

Food Security in 2023

If you wish to learn more about how Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and climate change are impacting global food security in 2023, watch this video.

Please accept YouTube cookies to play this video. By accepting you will be accessing content from YouTube, a service provided by an external third party.

YouTube privacy policy

If you accept this notice, your choice will be saved and the page will refresh.

Accept YouTube Content

Written by Karoline Kowald and Marianna Pari.

The EU’s long-term budget for 2021 to 2027 was set at €1.1 trillion, together with a specific instrument to support the EU’s recovery from the pandemic, Next Generation EU (NGEU), providing €750 billion (2018 prices). Since 2021, the EU budget has already mobilised significant additional resources to cope with the pandemic and its impact, providing direct support totalling €70 billion to help EU citizens and enterprises, and countries outside the EU, cope with the COVID‑19 crisis. In 2022, Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine generated more unexpected financing needs. The EU budget alone has contributed €50 billion to support Ukraine and its people, and help Member States cope with the multiple effects. As a result, the EU’s funds and instruments for addressing unexpected situations are severely depleted. The EU budget needs meaningful reinforcement to be able to respond to the challenges that still lie ahead.

On 20 June 2023, the Commission presented a revision of the EU’s long-term budget, including a package of budgetary and legislative proposals. It proposed an overall reinforcement of the EU budget by €65.8 billion, covering an increase in the budget headings, the special instruments and €17 billion in grants for Ukraine. For the Ukraine Facility, a further €33 billion in loans is proposed, bringing overall support to Ukraine to €50 billion. The Commission is also proposing a ‘Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform’ (STEP), to be financed through redeployments and with €10 billion of additional funds. Additional budgetary means are set aside for responses to migration challenges, and a specific instrument to cover the increasing borrowing cost of NGEU.

According to the European Parliament’s Committee on Budgets, the proposed revision is a positive step towards equipping the EU budget with the necessary financing means. However, the rapporteurs’ draft report argues that an additional €10 billion is required to address future challenges effectively.

This is a follow up to an earlier briefing on the EU’s long-term budget, published in June 2023.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Revision of the EU’s long-term budget for 2021 to 2027: Securing sufficient resources for the EU‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Revision of the 2024-2027 MFF: Budgetary overview of Commission proposal

Written by Alina Dobreva (1st edition).

On 22 December 2021, the European Commission announced its proposal for the introduction of new own resources. The underlying objective is to decrease the share of own resources based on gross national income (GNI) in the revenue mix while preserving existing long-term EU policy commitments. The initiative also seeks to secure the necessary resources to cover new budgetary expenditures, such as the repayments of the debt arising from the Next Generation EU recovery fund and the recently adopted Social Climate Fund. Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has generated further needs for additional funds to finance support for Ukraine, for Ukrainian refugees in the EU, and for sectors of the EU economy severely affected by the war. The 2021 Commission proposal on own resources included the extended emissions trading scheme and a carbon border adjustment mechanism, and reallocated profits of very large multinational companies (on the basis of Pillar 1 of the OECD/G20 agreement). Parliament adopted a legislative resolution approving that proposal.

On 20 June 2023, the Commission put forward an adjusted package for the next generation of own resources, amending its previous proposal and completing its proposal by increasing the ETS call rate and introducing a temporary statistical own resource based on company profits. The proposal is subject to a formal re-consultation of Parliament.

Versions

• September 2023: System of own resources of the European Union (1st edition)

Proposal for a Council decision amending Decision (EU, Euratom) 2020/2053 on the system of own resources of the European UnionCommittee responsible:Budgets (BUDG)COM(2021)0570, 22.12.2021
COM(2023)0331 (amended
legislative proposal for reconsultation), 20.6.23Rapporteur:José Manuel Fernandes (EPP, Portugal);2021/0430(CNS)Shadow rapporteurs:Eider Gardiazabal Rubial (S&D, Spain)
David Cormand (Greens/EFA, France)
Roberts Zīle (ECR, Latvia)
Joachim Kuhs (ID, Germany)
Younous Omarjee (The Left, France)
Dimmitrios Papadimoulis (The Left, Greece)CNS – Consultation
procedure (Parliament
adopts a non-binding
opinion only)Next steps expected: Awaiting committee decision

Own resources of the EU budget, 2007-2024

Written by Michael Adam with Clotilde Hocquard.

Artificial intelligence (AI) has become a powerful tool thanks to technological advances, access to large amounts of data, machine learning and increased computing power. The release of ChatGPT at the end of 2022 was a new breakthrough in AI. It demonstrated the vast range of possibilities involved in adapting general-purpose AI to a wide array of tasks and in getting generative AI to generate synthetic content based on prompts entered by the user. By 2026, 90 % of online content may be synthetically generated.

AI is an opportunity to improve the democratic process in our societies. For example, it can help citizens to gain a better understanding of politics and engage more easily in democratic debate. Likewise, politicians can get closer to citizens and eventually represent them more effectively. Such an alignment between citizens and politicians could change the face of electoral campaigns and considerably improve the policymaking process, making it more accurate and efficient.

Although concerns over the use of AI in politics have been present since the late 2010s, those related to democracies and the election process in particular have grown with the recent evolution of AI. This emerging technology poses multiple risks to democracies, as it is also a powerful tool for disinformation and misinformation, both of which can trigger tensions resulting in electoral-related conflict and even violence. AI can, for example, generate false information, or spread a bias or opinions that do not represent the public sentiment. Altogether, despite its benefits AI has the potential to affect the democratic process in a negative way.

Despite the above risks, AI can prove useful to democracies if proper safeguards are applied. For example, specific tools can be employed to detect the use of AI-generated content and techniques such as watermarking can be used to clearly indicate that content has been generated by AI. The EU is currently adapting its legal framework to address the dangers that come with AI and to promote the use of trustworthy, transparent and accountable AI systems.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Artificial intelligence, democracy and elections‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Martin Höflmayr (1st edition).

A digital euro can be understood as central bank money offered in digital form for citizens and businesses to be used for their retail payments. It would be a central bank digital currency (CBDC) –an electronic equivalent to cash, complementing banknotes and coins – and the central motivation to develop a CBDC can be explained by the increasing digitalisation of financial services. Banknotes and coins, currently the only public money, are considered the ultimate anchor of the financial system. However, in recent years the number of cash payment transactions has declined substantially while digital payments have soared. At the same time, private currencies, such as Bitcoin, are challenging the role of sovereign currencies. Another argument for pursuing a digital euro relates to Europe’s ‘strategic autonomy’ and the external dependency on foreign payment-related service providers.

In October 2021, the ECB launched the investigation phase for the digital euro project. It is the ECB’s prerogative to decide whether or not to issue a digital euro, but the decision requires the approval of a regulation establishing a legal framework for a digital euro. The European Commission has therefore put forward a digital euro package. While the proposal would grant legal tender status to the digital euro, the legal tender status of the physical form of central bank money would also be ensured for the first time in secondary legislation.

Versions

• September 2023: Digital euro package (1st edition)

Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the establishment of the digital euro; Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the provision of digital euro services by payment services providers incorporated in Member States whose currency is not the euro and amending Regulation (EU) 2021/1230 of the European Parliament and the Council; Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the legal tender of euro banknotes and coinsCommittee responsible:Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON)COM(2023)369; COM(2023)368;
COM(2023)364
28.6.2023Rapporteur:Stefan Berger (EPP, Germany)2023/0212(COD)
2023/0211(COD)
2023/0208(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Paul Tang (S&D, Netherlands); Gilles Boyer (Renew, France); Gunnar Beck (ID, Germany); Michiel Hoogeveen (ECR, Netherlands)Ordinary legislative procedure
(COD) (Parliament and Council
on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’)Next steps expected: Committee draft report