European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Gilles Pittoors (1st edition).

In December 2023, the Commission proposed to amend Directive (EU) 2015/637 on the coordination and cooperation measures to facilitate consular protection for unrepresented citizens of the Union in third countries, and Directive (EU) 2019/997 establishing an EU emergency travel document. The aim is to make improvements in the areas covered by the two directives, in response to crises such as COVID-19, the conflicts in Afghanistan and Ukraine, and repatriations from Israel and Gaza. The intended outcomes include enhanced legal clarity, streamlined cooperation, greater consular service effectiveness, and heightened standards of consular support and crisis response.

The proposal is subject to the consultation procedure. Within Parliament, the file was assigned to the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE), with Loránt Vincze (EPP, Romania) as rapporteur. The Committees on Legal Affairs (JURI), Foreign Affairs (AFET) and Development (DEVE) were invited to submit opinions, with the latter deciding not to do so. The DEVE committee report was published in March 2024 and adopted in plenary on 24 April 2024. The proposal is now awaiting the Council’s final decision.

Complete version

• July 2024: Consular protection and the EU emergency travel document (1st edition)

Proposal for a Council Directive amending Directive (EU) 2015/637 on the coordination and cooperation measures to facilitate consular protection for unrepresented citizens of the Union in third countries and Directive (EU) 2019/997 establishing an EU emergency travel documentCommittee responsible:Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE)COM(2023) 930 final
6.12.2023Rapporteur:Loránt Vincze (EPP, Romania)2023/0441(CNS)Shadow rapporteurs:Gilles Lebreton (ID, France)
Nacho Sánchez Amor (S&D, Spain)
Marina Kaljurand (S&D, Estonia)
Jana Toom (Renew, Estonia)
Tinneke Strik (Greens/EFA, Netherlands)
Assita Kanko (ECR, Belgium)
Miguel Urbán Crespo (The Left, Spain)Special legislative
procedure – consultationNext steps expected: Adoption by the Council

Written by Kristina Grošek.

The ninth parliamentary term formally ended on 15 July 2024, ahead of the constitutive part-session of the European Parliament elected on 6-9 June 2024. Despite their best efforts, the co‑legislators had not reached agreement on a number of legislative proposals before the end of the ninth term. These will form a major part of the business that needs to be picked up again in the tenth term. To ensure continuity in its work, Parliament has adopted rules on how to deal with unfinished files.

Unfinished business in the European Parliament

‘Unfinished business’ refers to any procedure on which parliamentary work was ongoing at the end of the parliamentary term, i.e. where the plenary had not taken a final decision. According to Rule 250 of Parliament’s Rules of Procedure, at the end of the last part-session before elections, all Parliament’s unfinished business is deemed to have lapsed, unless the Conference of Presidents – at the beginning of the new term – decides, on the basis of reasoned requests from parliamentary committees and other institutions, to resume or continue consideration of the unfinished business. Furthermore, Parliament can ask the European Commission to refer a proposal to it again, in order for work to resume (Rules 62 and 86).

Unfinished files at the end of the ninth parliamentary term

As of 1 July 2024, at the end of the ninth term, some 174 ordinary legislative procedure files were ongoing at different stages of the legislative process. Of these, around 60 remained at an early stage. There are also several other unfinished files (e.g. special legislative procedures, budgetary procedures, and non-legislative procedures). In line with Rule 250, once the committees have been constituted, the new Chair of the Conference of Committee Chairs (CCC) will invite each committee to provide information on the state of play of unfinished files, and on how they intend to handle them (resume work, or ask the Commission to modify or withdraw the proposal). The Conference of Presidents will then decide on which files work will resume and in what manner. On the basis of that decision, the President will then inform the Commission and the Council of Parliament’s plans.

Unfinished files at the end of the eighth parliamentary term

On 24 July 2019, the Chair of the CCC wrote to the chairs of all committees, requesting that they examine the unfinished files and inform him on how they proposed to proceed. Following this, at its meeting of 16 October 2019, the Conference of Presidents decided to resume work on 37 files under the ordinary legislative procedure where a first-reading position had not yet been adopted. The decision listed a further 83 files on which a first-reading position had already been adopted in plenary. Work was to resume on another 71 files (under various procedures), while the Commission was asked to withdraw 12 legislative proposals.

Commission and Council

The Treaties do not set out a specific procedure for handling unfinished legislative files at the end of a parliamentary term, but they do allow the Commission to change a proposal, as long as the Council has not acted (Article 293(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union). For those files where the first reading has been concluded in Parliament, once the Council has transmitted its first-reading position, Treaty deadlines for the second reading must be respected. The 2007 joint declaration on practical arrangements for the co-decision procedure stipulates that the institutions coordinate their work, to enable proceedings to be conducted in a coherent and convergent fashion (point 6), with maximum efficiency (point 20).

Read this ‘at a glance note ‘on ‘Unfinished business from the ninth term‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Tim Peters.

The Ukraine Facility is the EU’s flagship programme to support Ukraine’s recovery, reconstruction and modernisation following Russia’s full-scale war of aggression. The facility as defined by Regulation (EU) 2024/792 consists of three pillars and will mobilise up to €50 billion to ensure stable and predictable financial support for Ukraine between 2024 and 2027 and assist the country on its path towards EU membership. The Ukraine plan guides implementation of the facility’s Pillar I: it sets the conditions and serves as framework for disbursing funds, and outlines the reform pathway for Ukraine’s reconstruction and EU accession. Two tranches of exceptional bridge financing totalling €6 billion and pre-financing worth €1.9 billion have so far been transferred to Ukraine. Regular transfers of quarterly instalments from the Ukraine Facility are planned until 2027. Disbursal is conditional on Ukraine implementing the Ukraine plan quantitative and qualitative reform steps, and adhering to EU values.

Ukraine plan

The Ukraine plan sets out a coherent approach and clear priorities for reform in Ukraine. Its structure is defined by Article 17 of Regulation (EU) 2024/792. The plan ensures Ukraine’s ownership of implementation of the Ukraine Facility, as it was the responsibility of Ukraine’s government to draft it. Ukraine’s parliament, the Verkhovna Rada, and Ukrainian civil society were consulted by the government during the plan’s drafting and it was then assessed by the European Commission. The plan constitutes the basis for support provided under Pillar I of the facility – covering direct financial support. However, all measures financed under Pillar II (investments) and Pillar III (accession assistance) should equally support the objectives and implementation of the Ukraine plan.

The Commission endorsed the plan on 15 April 2024 on the basis of the criteria set out in Article 18 of Regulation (EU) 2024/792. On 14 May 2024, the Council adopted an implementing decision approving the plan. Payments to Ukraine will be disbursed by the EU subject to the implementation of the 69 reforms and 10 investments agreed, on the basis of 130 reform indicators and 16 investment indicators set out in the annex to the Council implementing decision.

The plan’s first part defines basic reforms that lay the foundations for accelerating economic recovery and strengthening institutional capacity in the areas of public administration reform, public financial management, the judicial system and the fight against corruption and money laundering. The second part outlines the reforms needed to develop the economy and improve citizens’ welfare in areas such as financial markets, human capital and decentralisation and regional policy. The third part focuses on priority sectors whose rapid development will stimulate broad economic growth, such as the energy sector, the agri-food sector, the green transition and environmental protection.

Ukraine Facility payments

Pillar I of the facility consists of €33 billion in loans and €5.27 billion in grants. Grants are paid out through the EU budget, through a new thematic special instrument, the Ukraine Reserve, set up over and above the EU’s budget expenditure ceilings. The loans will be guaranteed by the EU budget ‘headroom’. Funds from Pillar I are dedicated to providing Ukraine with direct financial assistance. At least 20 % of investments under the Ukraine plan must support climate change mitigation, adaption, environmental protection or the green transition. Furthermore, at least 20 % of Pillar I grants must go to sub-national authorities and local self-government.

Two tranches of exceptional bridge financing – consisting of €6 billion in loans – were disbursed in March and April 2024. On 28 June 2024, the Commission disbursed almost €1.9 billion in pre-financing to Ukraine, bringing total EU support transferred to Ukraine under the Facility to €7.9 billion in loans.

On 22 May 2024, the EU and Ukraine signed a framework agreement in accordance with Article 9 of Regulation (EU) 2024/792. The agreement stipulates the terms for management, control, reporting, auditing and information sharing in relation to the Ukraine Facility funds. The EU and Ukraine also signed a loan agreement setting out the provisions for the management and implementation of funding borrowed by the Commission. Grant payments will be based on financing agreements. Each quarter, the Commission will pay funds to Ukraine subject to the qualitative and quantitative reform steps being fulfilled and a positive Council implementing decision. Table 1 outlines the heavily frontloaded preliminary annual payment schedule for Pillar I grants and loans.

Table 1 – Ukraine Facility Pillar 1 preliminary annual financing schedule (2024–2028)

20242025202620272028State budget support€16 billion€12.5 billion€7.2 billion€1.2 billion€1.32 billion**The transfer in 2028 is expected to be completed in January and provides financing for the indicators met in Q4 2027. Data source: Ministry of Economy of Ukraine. Scrutiny mechanisms

Transfers of the quarterly tranches are conditional on implementation of the Ukraine plan quantitative and qualitative reform steps during the previous quarter. The Commission assesses their fulfilment before proposing a Council implementing decision. Following Council approval – or amendment – the Commission adopts the financing decision authorising disbursement of the non-repayable support. The Commission also monitors the facility’s implementation against the indicators defined in the Ukraine plan, and will track progress on a publicly available Ukraine plan scoreboard, at the latest from 1 January 2025 (Article 21, Regulation (EU) 2024/792). The Commission will inform Parliament on progress, reforms and payment scheduling, including through the Ukraine Facility dialogue (Article 37 of Regulation (EU) 2024/792).

Ukraine investment framework

Pillar II is the Ukraine investment framework, which provides grants and guarantees to de-risk private and public investment. That pillar is equipped with €6.97 billion in grants and is expected to incentivise investments of up to €40 billion. Micro-, small and medium-sized business will receive a minimum of 15 % of those guarantees. A first round of guarantee and grant agreements were signed during the 2024 Ukraine Recovery Conference in Berlin and comprised €1.4 billion in blended finance grants and loan guarantees, seeking to unlock €6 billion in investments.

Use of immobilised Russian assets

Parliament has insisted repeatedly that Russia must pay for the massive damage caused by the war and that immobilised Russian assets should be confiscated. On 21 May 2024, the Council adopted a set of legal acts ensuring that the net profits generated from extraordinary revenues accruing to central securities depositories (CSDs) in the EU, as a result of the implementation of the EU restrictive measures, will be used for further support for Ukraine. These profits will be used to support Ukraine’s defence industry capacities and the country’s reconstruction, according to the following key: 90 % to the European Peace Facility, an off-budget instrument, and 10 % to programmes financed from the EU budget. This would give Ukraine revenue of approximately €3 billion per year. On 14 June 2024, G7 leaders agreed to launch ‘extraordinary revenue acceleration (ERA) loans’ for Ukraine, in order to make available approximately US$50 billion in additional funding for Ukraine by the end of 2024. Those loans would be serviced and repaid by future flows of extraordinary revenues stemming from immobilised Russian sovereign assets held in G7 jurisdictions. The implementation of that agreement would require the EU to draw up new and amended rules.

A set of draft legal acts from the European Commission and the European External Action Service is expected in the coming months, to implement the most recent G7 leaders’ agreement on the use of extraordinary revenues from immobilised Russian assets.

Read this ‘at a glance note ‘on ‘Ukraine Facility: State of play‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Rafał Mańko.

Sixty years ago, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) ruled on the conflict between a rule of Community law, part of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (EEC) (‘EEC Treaty’), and a subsequent rule of national law, part of a legislative act adopted by a Member State parliament. The ECJ ruled that such a conflict should be resolved in line with the primacy of EU law principle that national courts must apply. The Costa v Enel case concerned an Italian nationalisation law, which created a national electricity enterprise – ‘Enel’ –transferring all existing electricity enterprises operating in Italy to it, upon compensation (‘Enel Law’). Nicolino Flaminio Costa, a Milan advocate, was a customer of one of the electricity companies affected by the nationalisation. Urged by Professor Gian Galeazzo Stendardi, his colleague from the Milan Bar Council and an astute supporter of the primacy and direct effect of Community law, Costa did not allow Enel employees to check his energy meter, and refused to pay his first bill from Enel. Two lawsuits before a local small claims court followed, where Stendardi represented Costa. In the first, judge Antonio Carones made a preliminary reference only to the Italian Constitutional Court (ICC), asking it to evaluate the Enel Law’s conformity with the Italian Constitution and the EEC Treaty. The ICC not only confirmed the Enel Law’s constitutionality but also declared that a later Italian law must prevail over earlier Community law. When a second bill arrived, Costa sued again. This time, the case came before judge Vittorio Emanuele Fabbri, who filed two preliminary references, to the ICC and the ECJ.

Before the ECJ, the Italian government argued that judge Fabbri’s reference was ‘absolutely inadmissible’ because a later Italian law must prevail over the EEC Treaty. However, the ECJ declared the reference admissible, stating that a rule of Community law having direct effect must prevail over any national law that contravenes it. The ECJ argued that, if an opposite view were accepted, the uniformity of Community law across the Member States would be adversely affected, as any state could simply derogate from a selected Treaty rule by passing a domestic law. On the substance, the ECJ found that most Treaty rules invoked by the Italian judge did not have direct effect, so could not affect the case, save for two: the freedom of establishment and the prohibition on monopolies. It was left to the national judge to decide whether the latter of them was possibly breached.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Costa v Enel judgment: 60 years on The making of the doctrine of primacy of EU law‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Silvia Kotanidis.

With the 2024 elections now over, during its first part-session, from 16 to 19 July 2024, the new Parliament is due to vote in a secret ballot on whether to approve the European Council’s chosen candidate for President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen. She was the lead candidate for the European People’s Party. In Parliament, the candidate needs to secure 361 votes, i.e. an absolute majority of all Members (currently 720).

The President of the European Commission has taken on an ever more prominent leading role within the College of Commissioners, with the increasingly presidential system rather eclipsing the principle of collegiate decision-making.

The Commission President also plays a crucial role in relations between the European Parliament and the Commission. When presenting their priorities to Parliament prior to being elected, the candidate for Commission President sets the course for the whole term, during which they will be called to account by Parliament. Building on this, Parliament plays an increasingly prominent role in political agenda-setting, shaping the EU’s legislative programming together with the Commission and the Council.

Although more in-depth assessments of the 2019-2024 Commission presided over by Ursula von der Leyen will be made in the coming months, her presidency has been characterised by several severe crises, with the pandemic and international conflict presenting a stress test for her agenda. However, these issues did not prevent delivery on the majority of the Commission’s priority initiatives.

This updates a 2019 briefing by the same author, itself an update of a 2014 briefing by Eva-Maria Poptcheva.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Role and election of the President of the European Commission‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Silvia Kotanidis.

At the January 2022 plenary sitting, the European Parliament (EP) is due to elect its 31st President, to hold office for the second half of the current term, up to the next European elections, following which the new Parliament will elect its President in July 2024. The President has an important and increasingly visible function in the EU institutional and international setting, mirroring the influential role of the Parliament as shaper of EU policies and as co-legislator. This is a further update of an ‘at a glance’ note, the most recent edition of which was published in June 2019.

Read this ‘at a glance note ‘on ‘How is the European Parliament’s President elected?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Listen to podcast ‘Rules on ‘revolving doors’ in the EU‘ on YouTube.

Please accept YouTube cookies to play this video. By accepting you will be accessing content from YouTube, a service provided by an external third party.

YouTube privacy policy

If you accept this notice, your choice will be saved and the page will refresh.

Accept YouTube Content

Written by Clare Ferguson.

After the excitement of the European elections, the 720 newly elected Members of the European Parliament take office on 16 July. Their first tasks will be crucial in the organisation of the tenth Parliament (sitting from 2024 to 2029). The agenda for the parliamentary session in Strasbourg from 16‑19 July 2024 is at first, therefore, dedicated to electing certain of their peers to Parliament’s most important offices.

This first, constitutive session will open on Tuesday morning (under revised Rules of Procedure, which enter into force that day). Members cannot take part in debates or votes until the President has been elected. Therefore, electing a new President is Members’ first task. Voting should begin on Tuesday morning. The political groups (or individual Members amounting to 1/20th of the whole Parliament), propose the presidential candidates. To form a political group, a minimum of 23 MEPs, elected in at least one quarter (currently seven) of the EU Member States, is required (Rule 33). With political group formation taking place right up to the wire this time, political alliances are difficult to predict, but having already announced her candidacy, it is widely expected that outgoing President Roberta Metsola will gain a second two-and-a-half year mandate. Members elect their President by absolute majority, in a secret ballot (with up to four rounds, under Rule 16).

Once the new President takes the chair, the elections to Parliament’s Bureau follow. Traditionally, the holders of these key posts reflect the numerical strength of the political groups, and also respect geographical and gender balance, and negotiations among the political groups ensure this balance. The 14 Vice-Presidents are elected in a single ballot by an absolute majority of votes cast (two further rounds of voting are possible, under Rule 17, to fill any remaining seats). Each responsible for specific aspects of parliamentary business, Vice-Presidents chair debates when the President cannot. Parliament then elects five Quaestors, by absolute majority, in up to three ballots (under Rule 18). They are responsible for administrative and financial matters directly concerning Members and their working conditions. The President and Vice-Presidents make up the new Bureau of the Parliament, with the Quaestors participating in an advisory capacity.

Before Parliament’s committees can hold their constitutive meetings, the Conference of Presidents (of the political groups) proposes the number of Members to sit on each committee. Members are due to vote on these numbers on Wednesday (under Rule 212), following which the political groups can appoint the Members of each committee. The committees should then elect their chairs and vice-chairs during meetings planned for 23 July. These appointments are generally the subject of an informal agreement among the political groups, based on using the d’Hondt method, and are expected to reflect the plurality of Member States and a fair representation of political views.

The strength of the political groups in Parliament is therefore at its most evident at this point in the legislature, as their preferred candidates for the Bureau and committee offices find out how much support they have. Negotiations to form these political groups (Members sit with others of similar political persuasion, rather than by nationality) began immediately after the June 2024 elections, and reflect the changes in the political landscape foreshadowed by the results. Political groups must comply with certain rules before informing Parliament’s Secretary-General of their composition. Some are closely aligned with a European political party, whereas others draw their membership from a wider range of national parties. Their presidents meet in the Conference of Presidents, chaired by the President of Parliament.

Once Parliament’s President is in place, it will be time to turn to the appointment of the next European Commission. While the majority of EU leaders endorsed a second mandate for Ursula von der Leyen during the 27 June European Council meeting, she still needs the support of an absolute majority of Members of Parliament – at least 361). Members are set to vote on the candidate for Commission President during this session, by secret ballot on Thursday. If von der Leyen does not obtain the required majority, the European Council would need to propose a new candidate within a month, and Parliament would then vote on the new candidate at the session scheduled for September. Von der Leyen is scheduled to present her priorities to Parliament on Thursday morning, before the vote. These will set the course for the whole term, against which Members scrutinise the Commission’s progress. Together, the new Commission President and EU leaders then propose their candidates for Commissioner posts. Parliament organises hearings of the Commissioners-designate, so that Members from the relevant parliamentary committees can assess their suitability. Members will then decide whether to approve the Commission as a whole at a plenary session later in the year.

Members are also due to hear statements on Wednesday morning from the European Council and the Commission on the conclusions of the European Council meeting of 27 June. However, as the process of appointing Parliament’s office-holders takes up considerable time, the customary statement on the priorities of the incoming Council Presidency, held by Hungary, which began on 1 July, is likely to take place during the September session.

• European Parliament Plenary Session July 2024
• Electing the European Parliament’s President
• Results of the May 2024 European elections
• European Parliament Rules of Procedure 2024‑2029
• Understanding the d’Hondt method: Allocation of parliamentary seats and leadership positions
• Rules on political groups in the European Parliament
• Role and election of the President of the European Commission
• Timeline to new EU institutional leadership
• Outcome of the European Council meeting of 27 June 2024
• How plenary works

Written by Silvia Kotanidis.

The ‘revolving doors’ phenomenon has frequently caught media and public attention in recent years. This publication offers an overview of how the post term activities of members of the EU institutions –Commissioners and Members of the European Parliament, as opposed to staff members – are regulated by the EU institutions. The European Ombudsman has looked into the issue of revolving doors in the context of several individual cases; on a few occasions this has ended in an unsatisfactory outcome for the institution or body under investigation and prompted the European Ombudsman to make specific recommendations to avoid a repeat of maladministration in future cases. At EU level, almost all institutions place some restrictions on post-term activities, while a comparative overview of EU Member States shows that just a small number of them legislate for this aspect of the post-term activity of parliamentarians.

Read the in-depth analysis on ‘Rules on ‘revolving doors’ in the EU: Post-mandate restrictions on members of EU institutions and parliamentarians in Member States‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Listen to podcast ‘Rules on ‘revolving doors’ in the EU‘ on YouTube.

Please accept YouTube cookies to play this video. By accepting you will be accessing content from YouTube, a service provided by an external third party.

YouTube privacy policy

If you accept this notice, your choice will be saved and the page will refresh.

Accept YouTube Content

Written by Naja Bentzen.

Misleading information can throw any of us off course. Both misinformation – mistakes without ill intent – and disinformation – created and spread with the aim of fooling people – can make it hard to take informed decisions. Fast evolving technologies – including deepfake video and audio – make it too easy to produce and spread deceptive content very rapidly. Many of us worry about the effect: some 85 % of people worldwide are concerned about the impact of disinformation on their fellow citizens; 87 % think disinformation has already affected political life in their country; and 38 % of EU citizens list false and/or misleading information as a threat to democracy. These tips will help you steer around falsehoods.

Fact-checking compass

Read this infographic on ‘Fact-checking compass: How to spot information manipulation‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Please accept YouTube cookies to play this video. By accepting you will be accessing content from YouTube, a service provided by an external third party.

YouTube privacy policy

If you accept this notice, your choice will be saved and the page will refresh.

Accept YouTube Content

The European Union strongly condemned Russia’s unprovoked attack on Ukraine on 24 February 2022. Now, more than two years later, the war has already claimed over 10 000 civilian lives, and generated at least 3.5 million internal refugees and 6.3 million Ukrainians have fled the country. The ongoing attack has reverberated beyond Ukraine’s borders, affecting food security, energy prices and inflation both in the EU and beyond. The European Parliament labelled Russia’s war ‘the most outrageous act of aggression conducted by the political leadership of a given country in Europe since 1945’. The EU’s response has been structured along three axes: political, economic and military support for Ukraine; isolation and containment of Russia; and enhancement of EU and EU neighbourhood resilience.

Parliament’s extraordinary meeting of 1 March 2022, where it adopted a resolution unequivocally condemning Russia’s aggression and setting the direction for the EU response, was one of the first international gatherings Ukraine’s President, Volodymyr Zelenskyy attended. Parliament’s President, Roberta Metsola, was the first EU leader to visit Kyiv, on 1 April 2022.

Since then, Parliament has dealt with more than 40 legislative files of paramount importance for Ukraine and adopted over 30 non-legislative resolutions on aspects of EU support for Ukraine, including: several rounds of macro-financial assistance; the Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP); and the Ukraine Facility, earmarking €50 billion for Ukraine’s reconstruction.

Parliament has also unwaveringly supported Ukraine’s EU membership aspirations, advocating successfully in June 2022 for Ukraine to be granted candidate country status, and in December 2023 for Member States to start accession negotiations. During EU-Ukraine Parliamentary Association Committee meetings, Members have discussed parliamentary follow-up to Ukraine’s official accession request with their Ukrainian counterparts, as well as EU military and humanitarian support, sanctions, accountability for violations of international humanitarian law and war crimes, and preparations for Ukraine’s reconstruction.

Moreover, Parliament has used its powers to advocate a tougher policy of containment towards Russia. It supports economic sanctions (including a November 2023 resolution making specific recommendations on sanctions enforcement, monitoring and circumvention), and urges the EU to explore ways to confiscate frozen Russian assets and use them for Ukraine’s reconstruction. In May 2024, the Council approved a plan to use €3 billion of the profits from these frozen assets to support Ukraine. The EU recently adopted a 14th comprehensive package of sanctions, cracking down on circumvention and adopting energy measures, as well as listing additional individuals and entities for sanction.

Other initiatives Parliament champions include the ‘Generators of Hope’ campaign to supply Ukraine with energy equipment for the winter. In December 2022, the European Parliament awarded the 2022 Sakharov Prize to the brave people of Ukraine. 

Parliament is therefore employing its budgetary, agenda-setting, external action and law-making powers to mobilise solid EU support for Ukraine’s defence against Russia’s aggression, and to ensure that the EU honours its pledges. Parliament’s powers fall broadly into six, often overlapping, domains: law-making, the budget, scrutiny of the executive, external relations, and, to a lesser extent, constitutional affairs and agenda-setting. This graphic shows more examples of areas where Parliament used one or more of its different powers to influence legislation:

Mapping the European Parliament’s powers in different areas

For a fuller picture of the European Parliament’s activity over the past five years, take a look at our publication Examples of Parliament’s impact: 2019 to 2024: Illustrating the powers of the European Parliament, from which this case is drawn.

Written by Alessandro D’Alfonso, Martin Höflmayr and Giulio Sabbati, with David Kläffling.

The European Union’s economic outlook for 2024 reflects cautious optimism, with gross domestic product (GDP) growth estimated at 1.0 % for the EU and 0.8 % for the euro area. As inflation is projected to continue declining towards the European Central Bank’s 2 % target by 2025, a soft landing is within reach. Near-term growth is mainly driven by real wages and private consumption, while high interest rates keep private investment sluggish. This marks a slight improvement from the previous forecast for the EU, while the euro area forecast remains unchanged. Economic expansion in southern EU countries continues to outpace that of those in the north and west, promoting convergence. Unemployment rates continued to fall in the Member States with the highest rates, leading to a further reduction in disparities across the EU. Overall, the EU unemployment rate at the beginning of 2024 stood at a record low of 6.0 %. This positive momentum coincides with the 20th anniversary of the EU’s enlargement to 10 additional Member States, highlighting the single market’s beneficial integration effects.

Launched as a response to the socioeconomic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, Next Generation EU (NGEU) and its Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) have also supported recovery and economic convergence in the EU. Against the backdrop of new EU fiscal rules, in place as of this year, NGEU and the RRF are expected to continue playing a significant role in financing strategic investment and reform up to 2026. In that context, this publication aims to track the state of the EU economy. It builds on a well-established EPRS series, ‘Monitoring the EU’s economic outlook’, becoming quarterly.

Read this infographic on ‘Economic Outlook Quarterly: A soft landing within reach‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

RRF payments so far, % committed resources Composition of NGEU and RRF resources Next Generation EU (NGEU) EU inflation
Harmonised index of consumer prices (HICP) monthly data, % HICP in the EU
EU inflation, share of HICP items by change in annual inflation rate, % Unemployment rate by gender in the EU Member States
Q1-2024, % of the labour force Total unemployment rate in the EU General government balance, European Commission spring forecast, % of GDP Government consolidated gross debt, change Q4-2019 vs Q4-2023, percentage points of GDP Quarterly GDP growth in the EU Member States
% change, Q4-2019 and Q1-2024 GDP growth in the EU
Quarterly, % change compared to same period in previous year

Written by Silvia Kotanidis.

To allocate seats in collegiate bodies, such as parliaments, a method is needed to translate votes proportionally into whole seats. The d’Hondt method is a mathematical formula that is used widely in proportional representation systems, although it leads to less proportional results than other seat allocation systems, such as the Hare-Niemeyer or Sainte-Laguë/Schepers methods. Moreover, the d’Hondt method tends to favour the electoral lists that win the most votes, to the detriment of those with fewer votes. However, it is effective in facilitating majority formation and therefore in securing parliamentary operability.

The d’Hondt method is used by 15 EU Member States for elections to the European Parliament. It is also used within Parliament as the formula for distributing the chairs of the parliamentary committees and delegations among the political groups, and among the national delegations within some political groups. This proportional distribution of leadership positions within Parliament prevents the dominance of political life by just one or two large political groups, ensuring that smaller political groups also have a say in setting the political agenda. Some argue, however, that this approach limits the impact of election results on the political direction of decision-making within Parliament; they would call instead for a ‘winner-takes-all’ strategy.

Many national parliaments in the EU also distribute committee chairs and other posts proportionally among political groups, either using the d’Hondt method or through more informal means. Others apply a ‘winner-takes-more’ approach, reserving only certain committee chair posts with particular relevance to government scrutiny for opposition groups. In the US House of Representatives, all committee chairs are selected from the majority party.

This updates a 2019 briefing, which itself updated a 2016 briefing by Eva-Maria Poptcheva.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Understanding the d’Hondt method: Allocation of parliamentary seats and leadership positions‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Costica Dumbrava with Hugo Carmona Bas (1st edition).

In March 2023, the European Commission presented a proposal for a directive to expand the use of digital tools and processes in EU company law. The directive would seek to facilitate companies’ cross-border activities by reducing bureaucracy and administrative burdens (such as when setting up subsidiaries and branches in another Member State), increase transparency and boost trust in the business environment across the EU. The proposal is expected to contribute to the creation of a more integrated and digitalised single market, reducing administrative costs for companies by up to €437 million per year.

The proposal falls under the ordinary procedure, where Parliament and the Council act as co‑legislators. In April 2024, Parliament adopted its position on first reading. The directive is subject to the corrigendum procedure and Parliament must approve the final text before formal adoption by the Council and publication in the Official Journal.

Complete version

• July 2024: Enhanced digital tools and processes in company law (1st edition)

Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directives 2009/102/EC and (EU)
2017/1132 as regards further expanding and upgrading the use of digital tools and processes in company lawCommittee responsible:Legal Affairs (JURI)COM(2023) 0177
20.3.2023Rapporteur:Emil Radev (EPP, Bulgaria)2023/0089(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Maria-Manuel Leitão-Marques (S&D, Portugal)
Angel Dzhambazki (ECR, Bulgaria)Ordinary legislative
procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council
on equal footing –
formerly ‘co-decision’)Committee for opinion:Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO)Next steps expected: Final adoption

Written by Yann-Sven Rittelmeyer.

Introduction to Hungary’s parliamentary system

Hungary is a parliamentary democracy with a unicameral parliament, the Országgyűlés (National Assembly). The structure and functioning of Hungary’s political system are determined by the Fundamental Law of 25 April 2011, which has been amended 12 times since its entry into force in 2012.

The National Assembly elects the President of the Republic (head of state), whose role is primarily representative but entails some complementary and controlling competences vis-à-vis the legislative, executive and judicial powers. The executive power is exercised by the Prime Minister, proposed by the President and elected by the National Assembly. The Prime Minister chooses the ministers, who together with him/her, compose the government. The Prime Minister also defines the government’s general policy. Ministers are accountable for their actions to both the National Assembly and the Prime Minister. Only the Prime Minister can dismiss them, and the government’s mandate is linked to that of the Prime Minister.

This briefing is part of an EPRS series on national parliaments and EU affairs. It offers an overview of the way the EU Member States’ national parliaments are structured and how they process, scrutinise and engage with EU legislation. It also refers to relevant publications by national parliaments.

The National Assembly is Hungary’s supreme organ of popular representation. It is in charge of adopting and amending the Fundamental Law, adopting legislative acts, and scrutinising the government’s activities. The members of the National Assembly are elected every 4 years by universal, equal, direct and secret vote. The Act CCIII of 2011 on the election of members of the National Assembly reformed the electoral system by establishing a single-round election with 106 members elected in individual voting districts and 93 members elected through national-level lists. The reform allowed Hungarian citizens living abroad to participate in the ballot (although they can only vote for national party lists), and national minorities to elect national minorities members.

The European Parliament and the European Commission have repeatedly raised concerns about the current functioning of Hungary’s constitutional and electoral system. According to the most recent resolution adopted by the European Parliament, the Hungarian government is responsible for the ‘persistent systemic and deliberate breach of democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights in Hungary’.

Read the complete briefing on ‘The Hungarian Parliament and EU affairs‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Whatever kind of paid work you do, you want a fair wage. In recent years, wage inequality has grown in many European Union countries, and more employed people have become at risk of poverty. In 2017, the EU institutions announced non‑binding guidelines for policy action – the European Pillar of Social Rights. This affirmed workers’ rights to fair pay that provides a decent standard of living in the EU. Minimum wages set in the EU therefore seek to protect those who work, while minimum income schemes target people who do not get sufficient income from work. Both policy measures are the responsibility of national governments, but the EU supports and complements their action.

The European Parliament has long advocated EU guidelines on minimum wages to prevent poverty. In 2019, it called on the European Commission to put forward a legal instrument to ensure fair minimum wages for workers across the EU. In response, in her 2020 State of the Union speech, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen spoke out against ‘social dumping’ and announced a first EU legislative initiative. A month later, the Commission proposed a directive on adequate minimum wages. These rules sought to ensure workers have access to minimum wage protection set at adequate levels, and, to strengthen collective bargaining as the main instrument for ensuring fair pay.

After much negotiation, the Council and Parliament reached an agreement on the new rules in June 2022. They agreed on a framework to promote collective bargaining on wage setting, as well as adequate statutory minimum wage levels, while also improving effective access to minimum wage protection for all workers. Parliament wanted to oblige EU countries to develop action plans, and to ensure full respect for workers’ rights to join a union and to bargain collectively, but the Council opposed this. EU countries have until 15 November 2024 to implement the new rules.

The Commission then proposed to recommend that EU countries update their minimum income schemes, as existing schemes play varying roles in national social protection systems, with a wide range of design, generosity and accessibility. While the Council adopted the slightly modified recommendation in January 2023, two months later Parliament called on the Commission to consider a stronger legal instrument (a directive) to address the cost of living crisis. However, the Commission responded that no legal basis allowed it to propose a directive.

By ensuring wage inequality stays on the agenda, and by helping shape EU law, Parliament is keeping the pressure up in the debate around minimum wage and minimum income. Parliament’s powers fall broadly into six, often overlapping, domains: law-making, the budget, scrutiny of the executive, external relations, and, to a lesser extent, constitutional affairs and agenda-setting. This graphic shows more examples of areas where Parliament used one or more of its different powers to influence legislation:

Mapping the European Parliament’s powers in different areas

For a fuller picture of the European Parliament’s activity over the past five years, take a look at our publication Examples of Parliament’s impact: 2019 to 2024: Illustrating the powers of the European Parliament, from which this case is drawn.

Written by Marc Jütten (Members’ Research Service) with Kadri Paris (Transatlantic Relations and Global Governance Unit, DG for External Policies).

G7 leaders gathered under the Italian presidency from 13 to 15 June 2024 in Apulia, Italy, for the 50th G7 Summit. The summit was a demonstration of the G7’s unity and determination in the face of intense challenges to the rules-based multilateral order and international peace and security: Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and the war in Gaza. In the presence of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, the leaders agreed to provide US$50 billion in additional funding to Ukraine from frozen Russian sovereign assets. The leaders also backed the comprehensive deal on Gaza outlined by United States (US) President Joe Biden. The Italian presidency put special focus on energy cooperation with Africa as a priority for the G7.

Background

On 1 January 2024, Italy took over the G7 presidency from Japan (Canada will follow in 2025). While the Italian presidency did not present a ‘roadmap’, its guiding priorities were: artificial intelligence (AI), Ukraine, Gaza, migration and Africa. Whereas the Japanese presidency had focused primarily on the economic security agenda and related policies, Italy identified Africa as a new priority topic for its presidency. This initiative is in line with the Mattei plan for Africa, which seeks to position Italy as an energy hub between Africa and Europe, investing in gas and hydrogen pipelines between the two continents.

In addition, the Italian presidency placed the focus on AI, carrying forward the Hiroshima AI process launched by the G7 last year. As was the case with the two previous G7 summits, Russia’s war of aggression on Ukraine overshadowed the gathering and put the focus on G7 support for Ukraine. This year, another conflict in the EU’s neighbourhood, in Gaza, was added to the agenda.

The Group of Seven (G7)
The G7 Speakers’ Meeting provides an opportunity for the presidents of the parliaments of the G7 countries and of the European Parliament to meet annually to discuss parliamentary responses to international issues. The next meeting will take place in from 5 to 7 September 2024, in Verona, Italy.
The group meets annually to discuss issues such as global economic governance, international security, and, most recently, artificial intelligence (AI).
The aggregate gross domestic product (GDP) of G7 member states represents about 30 per cent of the global economy.
The G7 is home to over 776 million people.
The G7 Speakers’ Meeting provides an opportunity for the presidents of the parliaments of the G7 countries and of the European Parliament to meet annually to discuss parliamentary responses to international issues. The next meeting will take place in from 5 to 7 September 2024, in Verona, Italy.

The EU was represented at the summit by Charles Michel, President of the European Council, and Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission. Ahead of the summit, Michel published an article entitled ‘Forging a new era of cooperation‘ in which he outlined three key areas on which the G7 should focus: (i) partnering more closely with Africa; (ii) tackling food insecurity and strengthening global food systems; and (iii) strengthening health systems across Africa.

In line with previous G7 presidencies, the Italian presidency had invited representatives of other states and international organisations to take part in some working sessions, illustrating the G7 ambition to foster alliances with countries from the ‘Global South’. Overall, the leaders of eleven countries and five international organisations participated, including: Luis Inácio Lula da Silva, President of Brazil – holder of this year’s G20 presidency; Narendra Modi, Prime Minister of India; Javier Milei, President of Argentina; Mohamed Ould Ghazouani, President of Mauritania, in his capacity as Chair of the African Union (AU); and Pope Francis, who addressed the leaders in a session on AI.

Outcome of the summit

During the summit, G7 leaders held six working sessions:

• Africa, climate change and development
• The ongoing situation in the Middle East
• Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine
• Migration
• Indo-Pacific / Economic security
• Artificial intelligence and energy / Africa and the Mediterranean region

On 14 June, the G7 leaders adopted a 36-page communiqué. The document starts with a preamble in which the G7 stresses various commitments ‘to meet global challenges at a crucial moment in history’. It states that the G7 stands ready to support Ukraine’s fight for freedom and its reconstruction, for as long as it takes, and commits to taking concrete steps to address the triple crisis of climate change, pollution, and biodiversity loss. The communiqué then addresses a wide range of topics, including: the conflict in Gaza; freedom of navigation in the Red Sea; Iran; fostering partnerships with African countries; sustainable development and food security; the Indo-Pacific region; and AI. China is a recurring theme, with the summit’s final communiqué referencing the country 29 times. It expresses concern about China’s trading practices – including its harmful overcapacity and market distortions – and calls on China to cease the transfer of dual-use materials to Russia.

However, media attention was drawn first and foremost to the G7 leaders’ commitment to provide US$50 billion in additional funding to Ukraine from Russia’s frozen state assets (despite complex legal challenges). The details of the financing arrangement will be spelt out in the coming months, and the loan will be issued by the end of the year. On the margins of the summit, Ukraine signed bilateral security agreements with the US and Japan.

The second key message from Apulia concerned the war in Gaza. G7 leaders stood united behind the comprehensive deal outlined by the US government, involving a three-step approach that could lead to an immediate ceasefire in Gaza, the release of all hostages, and a credible pathway towards peace under a two-state solution. Leaders also called for a significant and sustained increase in humanitarian assistance.

On the Italian presidency’s key priority, the G7 leaders (including the EU) and African partners adopted a joint statement on energy for growth in Africa. The initiative is about helping to develop clean energy projects, attract private capital and concessional finance, and overcome barriers to investment in clean energy across Africa. The G7 also introduced the Apulia food systems initiative, designed to strengthen global food security.

Marking a reversal compared with the Hiroshima communiqué, this year’s outcome document made no reference to ‘access to safe and legal abortion’, but it kept the call to guarantee comprehensive sexual and reproductive health services and rights for all.

In addition to the summit declarations, the G7 leaders and ministerial actors adopted a number of statements and documents prior to the summit, such as the G7 leaders’ statement on synthetic drugs threats and the G7 leaders’ statement on Iran’s attack against Israel.

Observers’ views

According to experts, the Apulia Summit gave a strong performance on its key issues, producing at least 469 commitments. Oxfam welcomed the fact that for the first time in their 50-year history, G7 leaders had all agreed to increase taxes on the richest people. On a more general note, some observers repeated their call to institutionalise the G7 with permanent staff and a secretariat, and to expand membership to include Australia and the Republic of Korea.

Looking ahead, the Apulia Summit took place in a climate of uncertainty for the future unity of the group, not least with the possibility of a second Trump term and the rise of alternative institutions, such as the G20 and BRICS+.

Read this briefing on ‘Outcome of the 50th G7 Summit, held in Apulia, Italy‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by David de Groot with Titouan Faucheux (1st edition).

Employers in the EU face labour shortages in many sectors of the economy, a situation that could further deteriorate in the coming decades. In the context of a global race for talent, facilitating international recruitment is a priority for the EU.

Announced on 27 April 2022, the European Commission launched an EU talent pool pilot initiative specifically addressed towards workers fleeing the war in Ukraine to facilitate their access to the EU labour market.

On 15 November 2023, as part of the talent mobility package, the Commission subsequently published a legislative proposal for a regulation to establish an EU talent pool available to third-country nationals residing in third countries.

In the European Parliament (ninth legislative term), the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) was responsible for the file. On 6 February 2024, the LIBE committee’s rapporteur presented her draft report. The Employment and Social Affairs (EMPL), Culture and Education (CULT) and Development (DEVE) committees published their opinions on 19 February and 8 and 11 April 2024 respectively. Work will continue during the 10th legislative term.

The Council agreed its general approach on 13 June 2024.

Complete version

• July 2024: Proposal establishing an EU talent pool (1st edition)

Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing an EU Talent Pool Committee responsible:Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE)COM(2023) 716
15.11.2023Rapporteur:Abir Al-Sahlani (Renew, Sweden)2023/0404(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:To be appointedOrdinary legislative
procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council
on equal footing –
formerly ‘co-decision’)Next steps expected: Committee vote on draft report

Written by Ralf Drachenberg and Rebecca Torpey.

The European Council took two important decisions on 27 June for the new institutional cycle: one on the EU’s institutional leadership, the other on the EU’s political priorities for the next five years. EU leaders elected António Costa as the next European Council President, proposed Ursula von der Leyen as the candidate for Commission President, and nominated Kaja Kallas as High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. They also adopted conclusions on Ukraine, the Middle East, security and defence, and competitiveness. Other topics addressed were migration, the Black Sea, Moldova, Georgia, hybrid threats, and the fight against antisemitism, racism and xenophobia. The European Council also agreed on a roadmap for future work on internal reforms.

General

As has become the practice, the European Council held an exchange of views with the President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, on Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, and the European Union’s support for Ukraine and its people; this time, Zelenskyy attended the meeting in person.

Addressing EU leaders at the start of the meeting, the President of the European Parliament, Roberta Metsola, discussed how to turn the messages deriving from the recent European elections into a political programme for Parliament. Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez was not able to attend and was represented by German Chancellor Olaf Scholz.

European Council meeting Next institutional cycle

The European Council took two crucial decisions for the new institutional cycle, one on the EU’s institutional leadership, the other on the EU’s political priorities for the next five years.

High-level appointments

EU leaders agreed on the EU’s next institutional leadership. As widely anticipated ahead of the meeting, the package the European Council agreed upon includes: Ursula von der Leyen (Germany) for European Commission President; António Costa (Portugal) for European Council President; and Kaja Kallas (Estonia) for High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR/VP). In contrast to 2019, the agreement on the package was taken very swiftly.

As was the case for past European Council decisions on top jobs (e.g. in 2014 for the nomination of the Commission President, and in 2017 for the re-election of the European Council President), the candidates were not supported by all EU leaders. As announced, and as in 2014, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán did not support the package, nor did Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, who abstained due to the selection process excluding her political family.

Following the practice to date, the new European Council President was also elected by the Heads of State or Government of the euro-area Member States as President of the Euro Summit for the same term. Thus, António Costa will be President of the Euro Summit from 1 December 2024 to 31 May 2027. He indicated that his main priority as European Council President would be to build unity between the Member States in order to put the new Strategic Agenda on track.

Source: EPRS.

The newly composed European Parliament will complete the appointment process of the EU’s institutional leadership by electing its own President during its first session on 16-19 July. It is also expected to vote on the Commission President during that session, and then vote on the entire College of Commissioners in the autumn.

Main messages of the President of the European Parliament: President Metsola recalled that the Parliament remained firmly behind the lead candidate process. She informed the European Council that the leaders of the Parliament’s political groups would invite the nominee for President of the European Commission to discuss, on 2 July, a political programme reflecting the voters’ messages, and also ways of building the necessary majority in Parliament.

Strategic Agenda 2024-2029

In line with its Treaty-based role, which is to set the EU’s political priorities, the European Council adopted the Strategic Agenda 2024-2029. As flagged up by EPRS and outlined by the European Council President, Charles Michel, the Strategic Agenda 2024-2029 is built on three pillars: 1) ‘A free and democratic Europe’; 2) ‘A strong and secure Europe’; and 3) ‘A prosperous and competitive Europe’.

The Strategic Agenda 2024-2029 constitutes, on the one hand, an important shift in the European Union’s political priorities, but on the other shows a high degree of continuity in the topics included. The most obvious changes are the increased significance of security and defence, the addition of new elements on EU competitiveness and the salience of democracy, which is, for the first time, a headline priority. At the same time, many policy issues have been kept from the Strategic Agenda 2019-2024 (a detailed EPRS comparison of the old and new Strategic Agendas is forthcoming).

President von der Leyen stressed that the Strategic Agenda 2024-2029 provided an important input for the development of the next Commission’s political guidelines, which she will present to the European Parliament ahead of its vote on her candidacy for European Commission President.

Roadmap for future work on internal reforms

EU leaders set a roadmap for work on the reforms required to achieve the Union’s long-term objectives. They stressed that ‘this work should advance in parallel with the enlargement process, as both the Union and future Member States must be ready at the time of accession’. It envisages:

• an in-depth policy review by the Commission on i) values, ii) policies, iii) budget, and iv) governance, to be presented by spring 2025;
• the next Council presidencies taking the work of recent presidencies on the matter forward and presenting a follow-up report by June 2025;
• the European Council reviewing progress and giving further guidance in June 2025.

When discussing future internal reforms, the European Council did not refer to the results of the Conference on the Future of Europe, nor did it address the European Parliament’s formal request of 22 November 2023 calling for a Convention on the revision of the Treaties.

Ukraine

EU leaders’ discussions on Ukraine covered four main aspects. Following the significant increase in attacks on civilians and critical infrastructure, support for Ukrainian society was the first focal point. EU leaders urged increased support for Ukraine’s energy system, tasking the HR/VP and the Council to accelerate preparations for the winter. The European Council also welcomed the outcome of the recovery conference and – after the Council’s positive assessment of the Ukraine Plan – the distribution of €1.89 billion in pre-financing for Ukraine’s recovery and reconstruction. EU leaders also welcomed initiatives towards the return of unlawfully deported Ukrainian children and civilians.

The second point was military support for Ukraine. EU leaders welcomed recent positive steps, notably the signing of joint security commitments between Ukraine and the EU as well as bilateral agreements with Member States and partners. As discussed at the G7 summit, Ukraine’s reconstruction as well as military support is to be financed in the form of loans paid by the revenue obtained from frozen Russia assets, and disbursed through the Ukraine Assistance Fund (UAF). The first tranche of €1.4 billion is to be released in the summer, followed by another billion euro by the end of the year. The European Council invited the Council, the Commission and the HR/VP to take work forward on this. Hungary has reportedly been blocking the funds, but the Council legal service argued that Hungary could not do so as it had abstained in the vote on the creation of the UAF.

Third, the European Council welcomed recent steps along Ukraine’s EU path, with the first intergovernmental conference (IGC) on its accession held on 25 June. This followed a European Council decision of December 2023 to open accession negotiations with Ukraine, and the approval of the negotiating framework by the Council on 21 June 2024. EU leaders also welcomed the outcome of the peace summit, and committed to increasing the EU’s push for broader international support for peace in Ukraine based on the UN Charter, international law and Ukraine’s peace formula. Lastly, the European Council welcomed the 14th package of sanctions against Russia, as well as progress on efforts to see Russia and its leadership held accountable for their war of aggression.

Middle East

The European Council reiterated its condemnation of the Hamas attack and restated Israel’s right to defend itself, while stressing the need to do so in compliance with international law. It also reminded Israel of the legally binding nature of the order of the International Court of Justice of 24 May 2024, urging it to halt military operations in Rafah and expressing deep concern about the consequences on civilians of the ground operation in Rafah. Given the dire humanitarian situation in Gaza, the European Council reiterated calls for aid to reach Palestinians rapidly and unhindered. It condemned strikes on the International Committee of the Red Cross in Gaza, and attempts to label the UN Relief and Works Agency as a terrorist organisation. EU leaders reiterated their condemnation of extremist settler violence in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, inviting the Council to take forward work against perpetrators. Furthermore, they condemned Israeli government decisions to further expand illegal settlements across the occupied West Bank, and urged Israel to reverse these decisions.

The European Council welcomed the adoption of the UN Security Council resolution proposing a three-phase ceasefire deal, and called for its full and swift implementation. EU leaders also reiterated their commitment to sustainable peace based on a two-state solution; in that context, they called on Israel to stop actions that weaken the Palestinian Authority and to release withheld clearance funds. Meanwhile, following the escalating attacks on both sides of the Israeli-Lebanese border (due to the Israel-Hezbollah conflict), the European Council invited the Commission, the Council and the HR/VP to strengthen EU support to Lebanon, its armed forces and the UN force in Lebanon.

Security and defence

The European Council discussed urgent and medium-term European defence needs and defence initiatives, inviting the Council, Member States, the Commission and the HR/VP to take work forward on mobilising funds for defence initiatives. Several areas were highlighted: i) addressing critical capability gaps based on the capability development plan; ii) the European defence industry strategy; and iii) the European defence industry programme proposal (aiming for adoption by mid-2025). The Commission President reportedly presented three options to raise defence funding: i) increasing national contributions; ii) raising taxes; iii) EU borrowing/’eurobonds’. Chancellor Scholz (and The Netherlands) opposed the use of eurobonds and the refinancing of national defence budgets from the EU budget. In contrast, EU leaders welcomed the European Investment Bank’s security and defence action plan, calling for its swift adoption.

Competitiveness

Following its April conclusions calling for a new European competitiveness deal, the European Council stressed that ‘swift and decisive progress on all strands’ of the new deal was expected by the end of the year. Since April, the Council has adopted conclusions on the future of industrial policy and the future of the EU single market. However, the eagerly awaited report on EU competitiveness by former European Central Bank President Mario Draghi has not been released (it will probably now be published in July).

Other items

As anticipated, the European Council invited the Commission and the HR/VP to prepare a joint communication on building an EU strategic approach to the Black Sea. In light of the challenges posed by Russia’s war against Ukraine and destabilising activities in the region, EU leaders reiterated their support for Moldova, and welcomed the first IGC, on 25 June, on the country’s accession to the EU. In parallel, the European Council discussed recent developments in Georgia, notably the transparency of the foreign influence law and the increasingly difficult situation for civil society representatives, political leaders, civil activists and journalists in Georgia. It urged Georgia to reverse its current course of action, and to ensure that the elections in the autumn are free and fair.

Read this briefing on ‘Outcome of the European Council meeting of 27 June 2024‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Leading the European Union’s institutions, agencies and bodies is a high-profile position of great responsibility, with nominees called upon to represent all EU citizens. A broader renewal of the leadership of all the European Union’s main institutions follows the June 2024 European elections, in which both Parliament and the Council play a major role. The European Parliament has the power to nominate, vet and appoint people to these senior positions, although its exact role varies from case to case. Even where Parliament’s opinions are not legally binding, Parliament can closely scrutinise candidates to ensure they are qualified for the job. The publicity that often surrounds hearings and the questionnaires candidates answer provides Parliament with a further opportunity to exercise political leverage.

During the ninth legislative term, Parliament used its powers to nominate and appoint holders of senior positions in EU institutions and other EU bodies. Examples include the hearing process that led to the appointment of the von der Leyen Commission, the replacement of Commissioners mid-mandate, and the appointment of the first ever European Chief Prosecutor.

The appointment process for the college of Commissioners has evolved over the years and influenced the relationships and exercise of power between the institutions concerned. Parliament’s committees have expressed doubt as to candidates’ specific expertise and probed more deeply where needed. In 2019, Parliament’s Committee on Legal Affairs examined all candidate commissioners’ declarations of financial interests, to assess possible conflicts of interest prior to their hearings. Two candidates withdrew from the process after the committee hearings, and Parliament addressed additional written questions to four other candidates. The committee decided one candidate was unqualified to be a member of the college and her candidacy was withdrawn.

Parliament has also been actively involved in replacing individual commissioners during their mandates. For example, after he responded to written follow-up questions, Parliament voted in favour of Wopke Hoekstra as Frans Timmermans’ successor.

Parliament and the Council appoint the European Chief Prosecutor by common accord. In 2019, the selection process saw a long power struggle between the two institutions. The deadlock was finally broken following a public hearing organised by Parliament’s Committees on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs and on Budgetary Control. The successful candidate, Laura Codruţa Kövesi, had the Parliament’s backing.

Parliament thus ensures EU leaders are qualified for their position, by exercising its influence on constitutional issues and closely scrutinising candidates. Parliament’s powers fall broadly into six, often overlapping, domains: law-making, the budget, scrutiny of the executive, external relations, and, to a lesser extent, constitutional affairs and agenda-setting. This graphic shows more examples of areas where Parliament used one or more of its different powers to influence legislation:

Mapping the European Parliament’s powers in different areas

For a fuller picture of the European Parliament’s activity over the past five years, take a look at our publication Examples of Parliament’s impact: 2019 to 2024: Illustrating the powers of the European Parliament, from which this case is drawn.

The European Parliament regularly receives enquiries from citizens about how the EU regulates social media and protects its users.

The European Union (EU) has adopted a series of rules to protect the rights of social media users. These intend to provide a safer online environment for users and set clear standards on how the tech companies operate whilst promoting digitalisation.

Protection of personal data and privacy

Your right to protection of your personal data is enshrined in the EU charter of fundamental rights. In 2016, the EU adopted the General Data Protection Regulation – often referred to as ‘GDPR rules’. The regulation applies to all companies that process their users’ data within the EU. Under the GDPR, social media companies must obtain explicit consent from their users to access and process their data. It establishes a series of rights for citizens including the rights to:

• access, correct and erase personal data held by companies (‘right to be forgotten’)
• receive your personal data collected by a company and to have it transmitted to another company (‘data portability’)
• receive notification of a personal data breach.

Individual data protection authorities in the 27 EU countries enforce the GDPR. They have the power to investigate complaints and impose fines for breaches. They are independent from government and work together to ensure consistent application of the rules across the EU through the European Data Protection Board. In 2023, the Irish Data Protection Commission imposed the largest fine so far – €1.2 billion – on Facebook’s parent company in Ireland, Meta Platforms. Meta’s export to and storage in the United States of EU Facebook users’ personal data (based on standard contractual clauses) was deemed to have breached GDPR rules. Meta has announced plans to appeal.

Under the 2002 EU e-privacy rules, social media platforms and messaging services like WhatsApp are banned from enabling the surveillance of their users, unless the user has consented, or if the surveillance is carried out by a legally authorised person, such as the police. In 2017, the European Commission proposed new rules to enhance the security and confidentiality of communications and set clearer rules on tracking technologies such as cookies. Parliament has adopted its position, but the procedure is awaiting agreement among the governments of EU countries.

The new EU digital rulebook

One of the priorities of the von der Leyen Commission was to make Europe ‘fit for the digital age’. In 2022, Parliament and EU governments brought in two major new laws to create a fairer and safer online world: the Digital Markets Act and the Digital Services Act. Broadly, the idea is that ‘what is illegal offline should be illegal online’.

The Digital Markets Act – limiting the power of big digital companies

The Digital Markets Act creates a level-playing field for all digital companies, enabling smaller firms and start-ups to compete more easily with the industry giants.

The act sets clear rules for large platforms (‘gatekeepers’) to stop them imposing unfair conditions on businesses and consumers. The European Commission has so far designated six gatekeepers: Alphabet (Google, YouTube), Amazon, Apple, ByteDance (TikTok), Meta (Facebook, Instagram) and Microsoft.

These platforms will no longer be able to favour their own services and products over those offered by third parties on their platform. They will be required to give users the option to remove any pre-installed software or applications, making it easier for users to switch between platforms and apps.

The act will also enhance compatibility between different messaging platforms. This means that whether they are on a small or large platform, users will be able to send messages, share files, and make video calls across different messaging applications.

Non-compliance risks significant fines: up to 10 % of the company’s total worldwide annual turnover, or up to 20 % in the event of repeated infringements. In March 2024, the Commission opened investigations into certain uncompetitive practices that might breach the act. This includes Alphabet (for giving preference to its own services on Google Search); Apple (for preventing users from being able to choose services on iPhones); and Meta (for obliging customers to consent to their data being used for targeted advertising if they do not agree to pay a monthly fee – the ‘pay or OK model’).

The Digital Services Act – ensuring a safe online environment

The Digital Services Act is a ground-breaking new law. From 17 February 2024, it applies to any digital platform, including social media, that acts as an intermediary to connect users with goods, services, and content. It applies to all digital organisations providing services in the EU, including those established outside the EU. It applies to both large and small operators, but very large online platforms or search engines are subject to additional rules. The European Commission has designated 19 platforms as such, including social media and networking channels such as Facebook, Instagram, TikTok or X (previously Twitter), and the Google and Bing search engines.

The act will hold these platforms legally liable for their users’ unlawful behaviour if they are aware of illegal content. Such ‘content’ includes child sexual abuse material, terrorist content, illegal hate speech or illegal goods and services.
The new rules focus on:

• Countering illegal content and dangerous and counterfeit goods, by making it easier for users to report them and for authorities to enforce action against them;
• Tackling online harassment and cyber bullying, by making sure any non-consensual private images and other abusive content can be quickly flagged by users and removed;
• Protecting children, by requiring platforms to ensure a high level of privacy, safety and security of minors on their services;
• Banning targeted advertising online based on profiling children or on sensitive data like sexuality, religion or race;
• Banning ‘dark patterns’ or ‘nudging’ techniques that might manipulate users into making choices they do not intend to make.

National authorities and the European Commission can enforce the act through a set of investigative and sanctioning measures. Companies who do not comply face hefty fines (up to hundreds of millions of euro) and an EU-wide ban. On 19 February 2024, the Commission announced formal proceedings to assess whether TikTok has breached the Digital Services Act in relation to the protection of minors, advertising transparency, data access for researchers, and the risk management of addictive design and harmful content.

Media Freedom Act

The European Media Freedom Act, adopted in April 2024, protects EU journalists and media from political or economic interference. It introduces a mechanism to prevent very big online platforms, such as X (formerly Twitter), Facebook or Instagram, from arbitrarily restricting or deleting independent media content.

Parliament calls for more protection for social media users

In December 2023, Parliament urged the Commission to propose new legislation against addictive design features such as automatic play and infinite scrolling, which affect children and young people in particular, and can lead to behavioural patterns and internet use that mirror addiction. It also asked the Commission to put forward a digital ‘right not to be disturbed’ allowing consumers to turn off attention-seeking features.

Following a petition regarding the impossibility of accessing basic banking services without a mobile phone, Parliament acknowledged that a divide exists between people who are able to use a digital means of payment, or to access public services, and others who cannot or are reluctant to use them. Parliament stressed that companies providing everyday services should offer a non-digital solution. It called on the Commission to consider the risks of discrimination against older people and other vulnerable groups when assessing payment services, and to ensure that digitisation is ‘human-centric’.

Further information

• Digital Markets Act, overview, European Commission
• Digital Services Act overview, European Commission
• Q & A on Digital Services Act, European Commission
• Implications of the Digital Transformation on Different Social Groups, Study, European Parliament

Keep sending your questions to the Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (Ask EP)! We reply in the EU language that you use to write to us.