Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

These are difficult times for multilateral action. Many are looking full of hope to Germany, whose Alliance for Multilateralism provides a key counterpoint to the “My country first” maxim. As such, it is all the more important for the German Government to set out a clear and substantive position in its new white paper on multilateralism. It must communicate clearly to the German people and other states why working with other nations, while often difficult and requiring constant compromise, is just as much in Germany’s own interest as strong, independent international organisations and global, universally applicable norms and rules. The Federal Government also needs to outline the specific changes for which it intends to advocate.

Die Abteilung Klimapolitik sucht zur Mitarbeit in einem Forschungsprojekt ab Mitte Oktober

zwei studentische Hilfskräfte (w/m/div)

für 10 bis 19 Wochenstunden

 

Die Europäische Zentralbank (EZB) hält an ihrem ultralockeren Kurs fest. DIW-Präsident Marcel Fratzscher kommentiert die heutige Sitzung des EZB-Rates wie folgt:

Die EZB hält an ihrem Kurs fest und signalisiert, dass sie in den kommenden Monaten ihre Geldpolitik weiter lockern wird. Mit ihrer neuen Prognose gesteht die EZB ein, dass sie mit den gegenwärtigen Maßnahmen ihr Ziel der Preisstabilität in der mittleren Frist wahrscheinlich nicht erreichen wird. Die niedrige Inflation und die unzureichende Verankerung der Inflationserwartungen sind die größte Herausforderung, die die EZB lösen muss. Die EZB hat nun die Hürde des Bundesverfassungsgerichts aus dem Weg geräumt, so dass eine Verlängerung des PEPP-Anleihenkaufprogramms wahrscheinlich ist. Der stärkere Euro erschwert die Arbeit der EZB nur temporär und spiegelt vor allem die besser als erwartete wirtschaftliche Erholung der Eurozone wider.

Community engagement has been recognized as a critical tool to strengthen people-centered approaches to peacekeeping and protection of civilians. Liaising with local populations enables peacekeepers to better identify protection needs, improve early warning, and design tailored and effective protection plans. It is also key to defuse tensions through mediation and dialogue. However, community engagement, when not carefully devised and implemented, may also put civilian populations at risk of exposure and retaliation, or inadvertently fuel political, economic, and social drivers of conflict.

On September 9, IPI, along with co-hosts Nonviolent Peaceforce and the Permanent Mission of the Netherlands to the UN, held a closed-door roundtable with representatives of the UN, member states, and civil society organizations to reflect on these risks and identify lessons as well as good practices from different peacekeeping operations. The session offered various perspectives coming from the UN, NGOs, and other humanitarian organizations on different approaches to community engagement, and particularly on the “do-no-harm” approach to community engagement.

The two-hour discussion was conducted under the Chatham House rule of non-attribution, and moderated by Dr. Namie Di Razza, IPI Senior Fellow and head of IPI’s Protection of Civilians program.  Opening remarks were made by Mark Zellenrath, Deputy Permanent Representative of the Netherlands to the United Nations.

Participants explored a wide range of potential risks associated with community engagement. They first discussed risks of reprisals from armed groups or state actors who may target civilians for their perceived “collaboration” with the UN, or seek to deter them from reporting abuses and human rights violations. They also examined the distinction between community engagement and peacekeeping-intelligence, and specific methodologies to avoid doing harm, protect sources and support the capacities and the voice of local communities. Discussants also considered risks and challenges induced by COVID-19, including the need to reduce contact with local populations to prevent the spread of the virus, and shared innovative perspectives to adapt community engagement approaches.

Key takeaways were:

• Protection of civilians is an all-of-mission mandate, and community engagement should accordingly be undertaken by all sections of the mission in an integrated manner, including by civilian, police and military personnel.
• Training is critical to ensure the ability of all missions’ components to engage with communities in a safe and professional way.
• Despite the UN peacekeepers’ efforts to abide by “do-no-harm” standards, creating a protective environment where multiple diplomatic, NGO and state actors engage with communities through their own channels can be an important challenge. Communities can be put at risk of retaliation by a wide range of actors engaging with them.
• It is important to distinguish peacekeeping intelligence and community engagement for protection of civilians (PoC) purposes. Community engagement has multiple objectives, from gathering information to facilitating political dialogue, mediation and peacebuilding. Peacekeeping intelligence, which aims at enhancing the situational awareness of the missions, stems from the analysis of information coming from a wide range of sources, which can include human sources, but are mostly open source data.
• Community engagement is not a one-way street and should not be reduced to extractive methods of information collection. Communities should be regarded as active participants who should be given ownership over the design of effective protection strategies.
• As missions need to reduce their interaction with communities to mitigate the risks of spreading COVID-19, new ways of working have provided an opportunity to test the robustness of community engagement tools established in the past and to strengthen the use of digital platforms to facilitate dialogue and engagement.  However, there are also inherent risks in the use of technologies, which can be weaponized for digital surveillance, or inadvertently end up empowering elite groups with easier access to technologies.

The discussion aimed at informing IPI’s upcoming research paper on community engagement and the protection of civilians in peacekeeping contexts, which will be published this fall.

Die Bundesregierung sollte sich in ihrem Weißbuch Multilateralismus vornehmen, die multilaterale Ordnung in ihren Grundzügen zu erhalten, aber auch – mit anderen gemeinsam – so umzugestalten, dass sie gerechter und gestärkt wird. Sie sollte dafür die Agenda 2030 zum Leitmotiv erklären, das Handeln verschiedener Ministerien kohärenter gestalten und den Weg für Reformen bereiten.

Die Bundesregierung sollte sich in ihrem Weißbuch Multilateralismus vornehmen, die multilaterale Ordnung in ihren Grundzügen zu erhalten, aber auch – mit anderen gemeinsam – so umzugestalten, dass sie gerechter und gestärkt wird. Sie sollte dafür die Agenda 2030 zum Leitmotiv erklären, das Handeln verschiedener Ministerien kohärenter gestalten und den Weg für Reformen bereiten.

Die Bundesregierung sollte sich in ihrem Weißbuch Multilateralismus vornehmen, die multilaterale Ordnung in ihren Grundzügen zu erhalten, aber auch – mit anderen gemeinsam – so umzugestalten, dass sie gerechter und gestärkt wird. Sie sollte dafür die Agenda 2030 zum Leitmotiv erklären, das Handeln verschiedener Ministerien kohärenter gestalten und den Weg für Reformen bereiten.

Die im DIW Berlin angesiedelte forschungsbasierte Infrastruktureinrichtung
Sozio-oekonomisches Panel (SOEP) sucht zur Unterstützung im Survey Management im Bereich der SOEP-Core-Befragung ab dem 1. August 2020

eine studentische Hilfskraft (w/m/div)

für  8 Wochenstunden

Das Deutsche Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin) sucht zum nächstmöglichen Zeitpunkt eine/n

 VorstandsreferentIn (w/m/div)

Die Europäische Union kündigte bei der Weltklimakonferenz in Madrid 2019 ihren Europäischen „Green Deal” an, in dem sie das klare Ziel ausdrückt, Europa bis 2050 zum weltweit ersten klimaneutralen Kontinent zu machen. Bereits in der Vergangenheit hat sich die EU bei Klima- und Nachhaltigkeitsaspekten als global führend angesehen und sich kontinuierlich nach innen wie auch bei internationalen Verhandlungen für Fortschritte eingesetzt. Mit dem „Green Deal” erkennt die EU somit auch an, dass ihr Handeln im Binnenmarkt allein nicht reichen wird, um die Welt für den dringend notwendigen Übergang zu gelebter Nachhaltigkeit auf Kurs zu bringen.

Als global führender Akteur verpflichtet sich die EU, mit gutem Beispiel voranzugehen, und unter anderem Diplomatie, Handels- und Entwicklungskooperation für den Klima- und Umweltschutz zu nutzen sowie Nachhaltigkeitsstandards entlang der Wertschöpfungsketten zu setzen. Diese Absichten sind gut gemeint, und sie bieten Partnerländern sicher vielfache Möglichkeiten, bei der eigenen „grünen Transition” voranzukommen. Aber insbesondere für Entwicklungsländer dürfen potenzielle Herausforderungen und Zielkonflikte nicht übersehen werden.

Die Europäische Union kündigte bei der Weltklimakonferenz in Madrid 2019 ihren Europäischen „Green Deal” an, in dem sie das klare Ziel ausdrückt, Europa bis 2050 zum weltweit ersten klimaneutralen Kontinent zu machen. Bereits in der Vergangenheit hat sich die EU bei Klima- und Nachhaltigkeitsaspekten als global führend angesehen und sich kontinuierlich nach innen wie auch bei internationalen Verhandlungen für Fortschritte eingesetzt. Mit dem „Green Deal” erkennt die EU somit auch an, dass ihr Handeln im Binnenmarkt allein nicht reichen wird, um die Welt für den dringend notwendigen Übergang zu gelebter Nachhaltigkeit auf Kurs zu bringen.

Als global führender Akteur verpflichtet sich die EU, mit gutem Beispiel voranzugehen, und unter anderem Diplomatie, Handels- und Entwicklungskooperation für den Klima- und Umweltschutz zu nutzen sowie Nachhaltigkeitsstandards entlang der Wertschöpfungsketten zu setzen. Diese Absichten sind gut gemeint, und sie bieten Partnerländern sicher vielfache Möglichkeiten, bei der eigenen „grünen Transition” voranzukommen. Aber insbesondere für Entwicklungsländer dürfen potenzielle Herausforderungen und Zielkonflikte nicht übersehen werden.

Die Europäische Union kündigte bei der Weltklimakonferenz in Madrid 2019 ihren Europäischen „Green Deal” an, in dem sie das klare Ziel ausdrückt, Europa bis 2050 zum weltweit ersten klimaneutralen Kontinent zu machen. Bereits in der Vergangenheit hat sich die EU bei Klima- und Nachhaltigkeitsaspekten als global führend angesehen und sich kontinuierlich nach innen wie auch bei internationalen Verhandlungen für Fortschritte eingesetzt. Mit dem „Green Deal” erkennt die EU somit auch an, dass ihr Handeln im Binnenmarkt allein nicht reichen wird, um die Welt für den dringend notwendigen Übergang zu gelebter Nachhaltigkeit auf Kurs zu bringen.

Als global führender Akteur verpflichtet sich die EU, mit gutem Beispiel voranzugehen, und unter anderem Diplomatie, Handels- und Entwicklungskooperation für den Klima- und Umweltschutz zu nutzen sowie Nachhaltigkeitsstandards entlang der Wertschöpfungsketten zu setzen. Diese Absichten sind gut gemeint, und sie bieten Partnerländern sicher vielfache Möglichkeiten, bei der eigenen „grünen Transition” voranzukommen. Aber insbesondere für Entwicklungsländer dürfen potenzielle Herausforderungen und Zielkonflikte nicht übersehen werden.

During the first decade of the 2000s,  Brazil was trending for its economic boom, participatory  innovations  and social  achievements  through public  policies. Brazil  was, back then, a notable example of how advancements on democratic institutions, practices and programs connected to socio-economic progresses of its  population, especiallythe most vulnerable. The book Democracy at Work:  Pathways to  Well-Being in Brazil analyses and  explains the links between more robust democracies and  human  development.

During the first decade of the 2000s,  Brazil was trending for its economic boom, participatory  innovations  and social  achievements  through public  policies. Brazil  was, back then, a notable example of how advancements on democratic institutions, practices and programs connected to socio-economic progresses of its  population, especiallythe most vulnerable. The book Democracy at Work:  Pathways to  Well-Being in Brazil analyses and  explains the links between more robust democracies and  human  development.

During the first decade of the 2000s,  Brazil was trending for its economic boom, participatory  innovations  and social  achievements  through public  policies. Brazil  was, back then, a notable example of how advancements on democratic institutions, practices and programs connected to socio-economic progresses of its  population, especiallythe most vulnerable. The book Democracy at Work:  Pathways to  Well-Being in Brazil analyses and  explains the links between more robust democracies and  human  development.

Since 2016, Germany has been the second largest contributor to the United Nations development system (UNDS) for development-related and humanitarian activities, after the United States of America. The biggest increase in Germany’s funding has been in the form of earmarked contributions, that is, funding with specified geographic and thematic purposes. While humanitarian funding to agencies such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the World Food Programme (WFP) and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) accounts for the bulk of Germany’s contributions to the United Nations (UN), development-related funding for the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) and UN Women also experienced a sharp rise. More recently, core contributions, which can be used by multilateral organisations with greater discretion, have also increased, most notably as part of the coronavirus (COVID-19) emergency response.
The significant increase signals that Germany places trust in the UN, including in times of crisis, and deems it to be of real importance. It is now time for Germany to more explicitly recognise its strategic interest in a strong and effective UNDS that can reinforce its foreign policies regarding stabilisation, reconstruction, refugees and the climate. Through multilateral organisations states can achieve more than they can alone. Although earmarked funding has helped the UNDS to expand its scope and scale, in the most prominent forms it has many negative repercussions in terms of efficiency, effectiveness and legitimacy.
Earmarking also comes with direct costs to German actors, who face challenges stemming from the multitude of earmarked funding arrangements and their administrative burden. In addition, the German government presents itself in a fragmented manner with regard to the UNDS, with differences across and within ministries and implementing agencies.
For Germany, being in the prominent position of second largest contributor to the UNDS, at a time when the largest contributor is withdrawing funding, comes with responsibilities and opportunities. To be an effective supporter of multilateralism, the German government needs to get its own house in order.
• It should view its allocation decisions as a means towards strengthening multilateralism and supporting UN reforms, and to that end it should work towards a better balanced funding mix with greater shares of flexible funds.
• It should more clearly communicate and justify its increased engagement in the UNDS to the German public and increase the coherence of its multilateral efforts.
• It should assess the hidden costs that arise through the use of implementing agencies and improve guidance on earmarked funding in line with commitments made in the context of the Grand Bargain (2016) and UN Funding Compact (2019).
• It should stabilise the recently raised levels of core contributions to UN development agencies, recognise the strategic importance of core contributions and also make greater use of softly earmarked forms of funding.

Since 2016, Germany has been the second largest contributor to the United Nations development system (UNDS) for development-related and humanitarian activities, after the United States of America. The biggest increase in Germany’s funding has been in the form of earmarked contributions, that is, funding with specified geographic and thematic purposes. While humanitarian funding to agencies such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the World Food Programme (WFP) and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) accounts for the bulk of Germany’s contributions to the United Nations (UN), development-related funding for the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) and UN Women also experienced a sharp rise. More recently, core contributions, which can be used by multilateral organisations with greater discretion, have also increased, most notably as part of the coronavirus (COVID-19) emergency response.
The significant increase signals that Germany places trust in the UN, including in times of crisis, and deems it to be of real importance. It is now time for Germany to more explicitly recognise its strategic interest in a strong and effective UNDS that can reinforce its foreign policies regarding stabilisation, reconstruction, refugees and the climate. Through multilateral organisations states can achieve more than they can alone. Although earmarked funding has helped the UNDS to expand its scope and scale, in the most prominent forms it has many negative repercussions in terms of efficiency, effectiveness and legitimacy.
Earmarking also comes with direct costs to German actors, who face challenges stemming from the multitude of earmarked funding arrangements and their administrative burden. In addition, the German government presents itself in a fragmented manner with regard to the UNDS, with differences across and within ministries and implementing agencies.
For Germany, being in the prominent position of second largest contributor to the UNDS, at a time when the largest contributor is withdrawing funding, comes with responsibilities and opportunities. To be an effective supporter of multilateralism, the German government needs to get its own house in order.
• It should view its allocation decisions as a means towards strengthening multilateralism and supporting UN reforms, and to that end it should work towards a better balanced funding mix with greater shares of flexible funds.
• It should more clearly communicate and justify its increased engagement in the UNDS to the German public and increase the coherence of its multilateral efforts.
• It should assess the hidden costs that arise through the use of implementing agencies and improve guidance on earmarked funding in line with commitments made in the context of the Grand Bargain (2016) and UN Funding Compact (2019).
• It should stabilise the recently raised levels of core contributions to UN development agencies, recognise the strategic importance of core contributions and also make greater use of softly earmarked forms of funding.

Since 2016, Germany has been the second largest contributor to the United Nations development system (UNDS) for development-related and humanitarian activities, after the United States of America. The biggest increase in Germany’s funding has been in the form of earmarked contributions, that is, funding with specified geographic and thematic purposes. While humanitarian funding to agencies such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the World Food Programme (WFP) and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) accounts for the bulk of Germany’s contributions to the United Nations (UN), development-related funding for the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) and UN Women also experienced a sharp rise. More recently, core contributions, which can be used by multilateral organisations with greater discretion, have also increased, most notably as part of the coronavirus (COVID-19) emergency response.
The significant increase signals that Germany places trust in the UN, including in times of crisis, and deems it to be of real importance. It is now time for Germany to more explicitly recognise its strategic interest in a strong and effective UNDS that can reinforce its foreign policies regarding stabilisation, reconstruction, refugees and the climate. Through multilateral organisations states can achieve more than they can alone. Although earmarked funding has helped the UNDS to expand its scope and scale, in the most prominent forms it has many negative repercussions in terms of efficiency, effectiveness and legitimacy.
Earmarking also comes with direct costs to German actors, who face challenges stemming from the multitude of earmarked funding arrangements and their administrative burden. In addition, the German government presents itself in a fragmented manner with regard to the UNDS, with differences across and within ministries and implementing agencies.
For Germany, being in the prominent position of second largest contributor to the UNDS, at a time when the largest contributor is withdrawing funding, comes with responsibilities and opportunities. To be an effective supporter of multilateralism, the German government needs to get its own house in order.
• It should view its allocation decisions as a means towards strengthening multilateralism and supporting UN reforms, and to that end it should work towards a better balanced funding mix with greater shares of flexible funds.
• It should more clearly communicate and justify its increased engagement in the UNDS to the German public and increase the coherence of its multilateral efforts.
• It should assess the hidden costs that arise through the use of implementing agencies and improve guidance on earmarked funding in line with commitments made in the context of the Grand Bargain (2016) and UN Funding Compact (2019).
• It should stabilise the recently raised levels of core contributions to UN development agencies, recognise the strategic importance of core contributions and also make greater use of softly earmarked forms of funding.