Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

On Thursday, June 17th, IPI together with the Permanent Missions of the Republic of Korea and Germany to the UN is cohosting a virtual policy forum entitled “The United Nations Strategy for the Digital Transformation of Peacekeeping: Implications for the 2021 UN Peacekeeping Ministerial.”

Remarks will begin at 6:00am PST / 9:00am EST

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Today, the majority of UN peacekeeping missions are deployed in complex, high-risk environments that have compelled the UN to better integrate technology into its field operations. This integration of technology can improve situational awareness and early warning/action; enhance camp and convoy security; provide stable Internet and integrated communication networks; strengthen conflict monitoring and analysis; promote energy efficiency and reduce environmental pollution; and provide training and capacity building in these and other areas. The COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated many of the challenges faced by UN peacekeeping missions and has spurred the rapid adoption of available technology for day-to-day communication, remote work, and other routine tasks.

Technological solutions can support UN peacekeeping operations in implementing their mandates in complex environments, including by helping them to adapt to changing conflict dynamics and take advantage of increased efficiencies. The Strategy for the Digital Transformation of UN Peacekeeping seeks to advance the use of technology across the Action for Peacekeeping (A4P) themes, including performance, safety and security, politics, protection, and peacebuilding. It sets out goals and actions and indicates areas for support from the Secretariat and external actors (member states, the technology sector, and others) over the next three years.

In this context, the Republic of Korea has identified technology and medical capacity building as cross-cutting themes for the 2021 UN Peacekeeping Ministerial, scheduled to take place in Seoul in December. The ministerial will have the aim of encouraging member states to consider pledges that will support and enhance ongoing efforts by the UN in these areas. Member states have already demonstrated the value of partnerships with the UN to provide technology solutions. These range from small-scale, high-impact projects based on member-state financial support to longer-term strategic cooperation whereby member states have worked with the UN to provide specific capacities and expertise in response to identified challenges.

This public virtual policy forum will share key elements of the UN peacekeeping technology strategy. It will highlight mission perspectives on how technological solutions can support mandate implementation, as well as potential risks. It will also indicate areas where member states, in their role as military, police, and financial contributors, can support the UN in matching technological solutions through their pledges at the ministerial.

Welcoming Remarks:
Mr. Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, IPI President

Opening Remarks:
H.E. Mr. Cho Hyun, Permanent Presentative of the Republic of Korea to the UN

Speakers:
Ms. Rania Dagash, Chief, Policy and Best Practice Service, UN Department of Peace Operations
Ms. Claudia Banz, Chief of Staff, United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali
Ms. Safia Boly, Chief of Staff, United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
Lt. Col. Stefan Lemm, German Bundeswehr
Dr. Sanjana Hattotuwa, Special Advisor at the ICT4Peace Foundation

Closing Remarks:
Mr. Patrick Carey, Acting Assistant Secretary-General for Information and Communications Technology, Department of Management Strategy, Policy and Compliance and Department of Operational Support

Moderator:
Mr. Jake Sherman, IPI Senior Director of Programs

Das DIW Berlin sucht zum nächstmöglichen Zeitpunkt eine/n

Kaufmännische/n Geschäftsführer/in (m/w/d).

Mit über 300 Mitarbeiter/innen und interdisziplinärer Ausrichtung bietet das DIW Berlin dem/der zukünftigen Stelleninhaber/in ein anspruchsvolles und vielfältiges Aufgabenfeld.

Der/Die Geschäftsführer/in ist Mitglied des vierköpfigen Vorstands des Instituts, dem ferner der Präsident und zwei wissenschaftliche Mitglieder angehören. Eines davon ist im Wesentlichen für die Infrastruktureinheit SOEP zuständig.

Zusammenfassung:

Jedes vierte bis fünfte Kind in Deutschland lebt in relativer Armut, schätzen ExpertInnen. Um soziale Teilhabe für alle Kinder zu ermöglichen, wird in einigen Wahlprogrammen zur Bundestagswahl 2021 gefordert, das Kindergeld deutlich zu erhöhen und eine Kindergrundsicherung einzuführen, die das Existenzminimum von Kindern effektiver sichern soll. Die vorliegenden Berechnungen zeigen, dass von der bisherigen steuerlichen Ungleichbehandlung durch Kindergeld und Kinderfreibeträge vor allem Haushalte mit hohen Einkommen profitieren. Um diese zu reduzieren, sollte der überhöhte Anteil für Betreuungs-, Erziehungs- und Ausbildungsbedarf im Kinderfreibetrag deutlich gesenkt werden. Die dadurch entstehenden Mehreinnahmen von bis zu 3,5 Milliarden Euro sollten vor allem für die Bildungsinfrastruktur und eine zielgenaue Kindergrundsicherung für einkommensschwache Haushalte eingesetzt werden. 

Die im DIW Berlin angesiedelte forschungsbasierte Infrastruktureinrichtung Sozio-oekonomisches Panel (SOEP) sucht zum nächstmöglichen Zeitpunkt eine studentische Hilfskraft (w/m/div) für 8 Wochenstunden.

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On Thursday, June 3rd, IPI together with Microsoft’s Office on UN Affairs is cohosting a virtual policy forum entitled “SDG Zero? A People-Centered Approach to Universal Connectivity.”

Remarks will begin at 6:00am PST / 9:00am EST

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As the COVID-19 pandemic has increased reliance on digital technologies, it has highlighted the growing digital divide between and within societies. Universal access to the digital world has become more urgent than ever, and failure to achieve it could undermine progress toward the Sustainable Development Goals. While closing the digital divide and increasing connectivity are among the UN secretary-general’s priorities for 2021, this goal remains elusive and faces many obstacles.

Authored by Jimena Leiva Roesch, Senior Fellow and Head of IPI’s Peace and Sustainable Development Program, the issue brief “SDG Zero? A People-Centered Approach to Universal Connectivity,” is based on a series of three roundtable discussions convened by IPI, together with Microsoft, in March and April 2021. The paper identifies obstacles to universal connectivity and considers how they can be overcome, looking particularly at the human rights risks of rushing to close the digital divide and how these risks can be mitigated. Ultimately, it concludes that achieving meaningful and sustainable progress toward digital inclusion requires all actors to commit to working through a multi-stakeholder platform.

Opening Remarks:
Mr. John Frank, Vice President for United Nations Affairs, Microsoft
H.E. Mr. Munir Akram, Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the UN, and seventy-sixth President of the Economic and Social Council (TBC)
H.E. Mrs. Valentine Rugwabiza, Permanent Representative of Rwanda to the UN

Speakers:
Mr. Byran Kariuki, Former Managing Director and Board member of Mawingu Networks LTD
Professor Antonio García Zaballos, Lead Specialist on Telecommunications, Inter-American Development Bank
Ms. Peggy Hicks, Director of the Thematic Engagement, Special Procedures, and Right to Development Division of the UN Human Rights Office (TBC)
Mr. Chris Fabian, Co-Founder, Giga UNICEF

Closing Remarks:
Mr. Achim Steiner, Administrator, UN Development Program (TBC)

Moderator:
Dr. Adam Lupel, IPI Vice President and Chief Operating Officer

Zur geplanten Übernahme von Deutsche Wohnen durch Vonovia äußert sich Claus Michelsen, Immobilienökonom und Konjunkturchef des Deutschen Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin), wie folgt:

Deutsche Wohnen und Vonovia würden bei einer Fusion mit dann rund 570 000 Wohnungen zur Nummer 1 der Immobilienkonzerne in Europa aufsteigen. Die Marktmacht wäre aber dennoch begrenzt, ihre Tätigkeit vor allem auf Deutschland konzentriert. Hierzulande hätte der Konzern dann etwa eine halbe Million Wohnungen in der Vermietung. Dies klingt zunächst viel, würde aber mit etwa 2,4 Prozent am gesamten Mietmarkt nur einen relativ geringen Anteil ausmachen. Deutschlands Wohnungsmarkt ist auch dann noch relativ kleinteilig strukturiert, vor allem die privaten KleinvermieterInnen machen mit gut 60 Prozent Marktanteil den mit Abstand größten Teil des Mietwohnungsbestands aus.  

In Städten wie Berlin sieht das aber anders aus: Hier würde ein fusionierter Konzern einen Marktanteil von gut zehn Prozent erlangen und damit einen deutlich größeren Einfluss auf das Marktgeschehen in der Hauptstadt haben als in der Fläche. Gleichwohl: Auch hier ist mit KleinvermieterInnen, Genossenschaften und kommunalen Wohnungsunternehmen nach wie vor ein deutliches Gegengewicht vorhanden. Für MieterInnen würde dies kurzfristig kaum Änderungen mit sich bringen, zumal die Konzerne angekündigt haben, dass sie den Anstieg der Mieten in ihren Beständen in den nächsten fünf Jahren deckeln wollen.  

Allerdings sind mittelfristig durchaus Änderungen zu erwarten: Ein größerer Konzern hätte gegenüber den Bezirken eine deutlich gestärkte Verhandlungsmacht, zumal auch in Berlin der Wohnungsbestand räumlich konzentriert ist. Die Stadtplanung und -entwicklung dürfte daher durch ein solch großes Unternehmen spürbar mitgestaltet werden. Auch die Unternehmenstöchter in den Bereichen der Verwaltung und der Wohnungsbewirtschaftung würden gestärkt. Handwerksbetriebe und andere Auftragnehmer müssten sich auf härtere Verhandlungen einstellen. Gleichzeitig würde der Konzern Sanierungsvorhaben kostengünstiger umsetzen können. 

Die Fusionspläne dürften die ohnehin aufgeheizte Debatte um die Enteignung dieser Konzerne befeuern. Dabei geht es nicht nur um die Frage des Geschäftsgebarens, sondern grundsätzlich darum, wer städtischen Raum prägen und gestalten sollte. Die Folgen der Fusion wären für das Wohnungsmarktgeschehen insgesamt überschaubar, dürften die Diskussionen über die demokratische Legitimation der Stadtentwicklung aber lauter werden lassen.

How has the COVID-19 pandemic affected armed conflict and political violence within countries? Focusing on Africa, a continent with a particularly high number of ongoing conflicts, this policy brief analyses the immediate and long-term implications of the pandemic on conflict and reflects on its implications for international peacebuilding efforts.
In the short term, conflict patterns on the continent are marked more by a continuation of previous trends than by a strong direct impact of COVID-19. Regarding armed confrontations, there was a rise in conflict intensity in some countries and one new war erupted in the Tigray region of Ethiopia in November 2020. As to lower-scale political violence, especially in the beginning of the pandemic, many states used excessive state violence against civilians when enforcing Corona measures.
Perhaps more important than the immediate effect of the pandemic, the consequences of the pandemic are very likely to accelerate violent conflict in the medium to long term. This is firstly because the pandemic exacerbates structural weaknesses, including the sharpening of societal divisions, severe disruptions in the education sector and deteriorating socio-economic circumstances. Secondly, the pandemic has curtailed actors and institutions that might be able to reduce the risk of violent escalation. Trust in the state and security institutions has suffered in many countries due to dissatis-faction with the handling of the pandemic. Moreover, demo¬cratic processes are hampered by the postponement of elections and increasing levels of government repression. At the same time, international peace support is negatively affected by social distancing and further threatened by looming cuts of commitments in official development assistance.
Bringing together both the short-term and longer-term effects of the pandemic on conflict clearly shows the risk that the pandemic poses to peace in Africa. It is therefore vital for the international community to:
1. Stay engaged and stay alert. If the international community continues to focus on handling the domestic consequences of the pandemic rather than international challenges, conflict will further increase in intensity and spread geographically. COVID-19 has already led to a reduction in international peace support, including peacebuilding initiatives and mediation. However, these instruments are vital to foster peace and prevent emerging and renewed conflict.
2. Invest in conflict prevention. The adverse effects of COVID-19 on economic, social and political structures can, and very likely will, provide the breeding ground for larger-scale conflicts, both in least developed countries (LDCs) and middle-income countries. Thus, conflict prevention must be taken seriously, including the strengthening of open and participatory (democratic) processes that enable societies to deal with societal conflicts peacefully.
3. Pay special attention to post-conflict countries. Many African countries have experienced large-scale civil wars in their history and continue to be LDCs struggling with societal tensions. The risk of renewed conflict in these places is particularly high.

How has the COVID-19 pandemic affected armed conflict and political violence within countries? Focusing on Africa, a continent with a particularly high number of ongoing conflicts, this policy brief analyses the immediate and long-term implications of the pandemic on conflict and reflects on its implications for international peacebuilding efforts.
In the short term, conflict patterns on the continent are marked more by a continuation of previous trends than by a strong direct impact of COVID-19. Regarding armed confrontations, there was a rise in conflict intensity in some countries and one new war erupted in the Tigray region of Ethiopia in November 2020. As to lower-scale political violence, especially in the beginning of the pandemic, many states used excessive state violence against civilians when enforcing Corona measures.
Perhaps more important than the immediate effect of the pandemic, the consequences of the pandemic are very likely to accelerate violent conflict in the medium to long term. This is firstly because the pandemic exacerbates structural weaknesses, including the sharpening of societal divisions, severe disruptions in the education sector and deteriorating socio-economic circumstances. Secondly, the pandemic has curtailed actors and institutions that might be able to reduce the risk of violent escalation. Trust in the state and security institutions has suffered in many countries due to dissatis-faction with the handling of the pandemic. Moreover, demo¬cratic processes are hampered by the postponement of elections and increasing levels of government repression. At the same time, international peace support is negatively affected by social distancing and further threatened by looming cuts of commitments in official development assistance.
Bringing together both the short-term and longer-term effects of the pandemic on conflict clearly shows the risk that the pandemic poses to peace in Africa. It is therefore vital for the international community to:
1. Stay engaged and stay alert. If the international community continues to focus on handling the domestic consequences of the pandemic rather than international challenges, conflict will further increase in intensity and spread geographically. COVID-19 has already led to a reduction in international peace support, including peacebuilding initiatives and mediation. However, these instruments are vital to foster peace and prevent emerging and renewed conflict.
2. Invest in conflict prevention. The adverse effects of COVID-19 on economic, social and political structures can, and very likely will, provide the breeding ground for larger-scale conflicts, both in least developed countries (LDCs) and middle-income countries. Thus, conflict prevention must be taken seriously, including the strengthening of open and participatory (democratic) processes that enable societies to deal with societal conflicts peacefully.
3. Pay special attention to post-conflict countries. Many African countries have experienced large-scale civil wars in their history and continue to be LDCs struggling with societal tensions. The risk of renewed conflict in these places is particularly high.

How has the COVID-19 pandemic affected armed conflict and political violence within countries? Focusing on Africa, a continent with a particularly high number of ongoing conflicts, this policy brief analyses the immediate and long-term implications of the pandemic on conflict and reflects on its implications for international peacebuilding efforts.
In the short term, conflict patterns on the continent are marked more by a continuation of previous trends than by a strong direct impact of COVID-19. Regarding armed confrontations, there was a rise in conflict intensity in some countries and one new war erupted in the Tigray region of Ethiopia in November 2020. As to lower-scale political violence, especially in the beginning of the pandemic, many states used excessive state violence against civilians when enforcing Corona measures.
Perhaps more important than the immediate effect of the pandemic, the consequences of the pandemic are very likely to accelerate violent conflict in the medium to long term. This is firstly because the pandemic exacerbates structural weaknesses, including the sharpening of societal divisions, severe disruptions in the education sector and deteriorating socio-economic circumstances. Secondly, the pandemic has curtailed actors and institutions that might be able to reduce the risk of violent escalation. Trust in the state and security institutions has suffered in many countries due to dissatis-faction with the handling of the pandemic. Moreover, demo¬cratic processes are hampered by the postponement of elections and increasing levels of government repression. At the same time, international peace support is negatively affected by social distancing and further threatened by looming cuts of commitments in official development assistance.
Bringing together both the short-term and longer-term effects of the pandemic on conflict clearly shows the risk that the pandemic poses to peace in Africa. It is therefore vital for the international community to:
1. Stay engaged and stay alert. If the international community continues to focus on handling the domestic consequences of the pandemic rather than international challenges, conflict will further increase in intensity and spread geographically. COVID-19 has already led to a reduction in international peace support, including peacebuilding initiatives and mediation. However, these instruments are vital to foster peace and prevent emerging and renewed conflict.
2. Invest in conflict prevention. The adverse effects of COVID-19 on economic, social and political structures can, and very likely will, provide the breeding ground for larger-scale conflicts, both in least developed countries (LDCs) and middle-income countries. Thus, conflict prevention must be taken seriously, including the strengthening of open and participatory (democratic) processes that enable societies to deal with societal conflicts peacefully.
3. Pay special attention to post-conflict countries. Many African countries have experienced large-scale civil wars in their history and continue to be LDCs struggling with societal tensions. The risk of renewed conflict in these places is particularly high.

In June 2021, the UN Security Council is expected to renew the mandate of the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS) for the first time. This comes at a pivotal moment in Sudan’s transition, with the Sudanese transitional government facing high expectations from the Sudanese public amid a rapidly changing environment.

In this context, the International Peace Institute (IPI), the Stimson Center, and Security Council Report organized a virtual workshop on April 26, 2021, to discuss UNITAMS’s mandate and political strategy. The workshop offered a forum for member-state representatives, UN officials, and outside experts to develop a shared understanding and common strategic assessment of the situation in Sudan. The session was intended to help the Security Council make informed decisions with respect to the strategic orientation, prioritization, and sequencing of UNITAMS’s mandate and actions on the ground.

While the current mandate broadly covers the substantive areas where the UN can play a constructive role, participants encouraged the Security Council and the mission to begin articulating a clearer focus for UNITAMS’s strategic objectives. They highlighted that UNITAMS’s credibility and capacity to promote more inclusive political processes and governance systems remain its greatest added value. They also emphasized that the Security Council should allow the mission the flexibility to scale up or reduce capacities as needed to address all major issues confronting Sudan—whether the peace processes, inclusive approaches to protecting civilians, or the building of frameworks and environments for sustainable peace and the protection of human rights.

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As humanity, we face many common challenges in the 2020s: climate change and its effects are at the core, resulting in demands for economic transformation geared towards more sustainability. Underlying are demographic changes, with the need to feed more people while maintaining the natural basis for our survival. Increased digitalisation, global health issues (this is not the first nor the last pandemic), and strong refugee and migration movements call for a united action to address these shared global challenges. Additionally, geopolitical changes bring new important actors onto the world scene.

As humanity, we face many common challenges in the 2020s: climate change and its effects are at the core, resulting in demands for economic transformation geared towards more sustainability. Underlying are demographic changes, with the need to feed more people while maintaining the natural basis for our survival. Increased digitalisation, global health issues (this is not the first nor the last pandemic), and strong refugee and migration movements call for a united action to address these shared global challenges. Additionally, geopolitical changes bring new important actors onto the world scene.

As humanity, we face many common challenges in the 2020s: climate change and its effects are at the core, resulting in demands for economic transformation geared towards more sustainability. Underlying are demographic changes, with the need to feed more people while maintaining the natural basis for our survival. Increased digitalisation, global health issues (this is not the first nor the last pandemic), and strong refugee and migration movements call for a united action to address these shared global challenges. Additionally, geopolitical changes bring new important actors onto the world scene.

Protracted crises and frequent natural disasters have generated an unprecedented number of people in need of humanitarian assistance. The international community faces a great challenge in supporting these populations, as the gap between needs and available funding is growing. To close this resource gap, the European Union (EU) aims to step up its engagement with emerging donors, particularly China, to increase their level of funding. Although China has previously been reluctant to engage in the international humanitarian system, its response to the COVID-19 pandemic indicates a change in attitude. Over the past year, China has delivered hundreds of tonnes of personal protective equipment (PPE) to over 150 countries and dispatched medical teams abroad. It has also donated $100 million to the World Health Organization (WHO) and the United Nations (UN) and pledged to establish a global humanitarian response depot and hub in China in cooperation with the UN.
Amidst increasing geopolitical tensions between China and the EU, China’s growing humanitarian engagement opens an opportunity for the EU to engage with China in the humanitarian sector. However, rather than framing China’s increased engagement in solely financial terms, the EU should develop a long-term strategy as to how to engage with China on humanitarian matters. A dialogue that takes both parties’ different approaches towards humanitarian aid into account and searches for common ground could open the door towards possible cooperation. This would not only help in narrowing the funding gap but carry the potential for greater coordination and consequently more effective assistance provision.
China conceptualises humanitarian aid as a subcategory of development aid and provides the majority of its assistance bilaterally. Beijing’s state-centric approach to humanitarian assistance means in practice that it engages mostly in the aftermath of natural disasters rather than conflict settings. The EU, on the other hand, has a separate humanitarian aid policy that guides the allocation of funds and provides its humanitarian assistance through non-governmental organisations (NGOs), UN agencies and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).
This Briefing Paper maps out the characteristics of Chinese humanitarian aid and outlines two areas on which the EU’s tentative steps towards a dialogue with China could focus.
• Food security sector: Food insecurity is a key component in existing humanitarian needs, only exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic. Food assistance and nutrition are already a key area of engagement for the EU and China. The EU should advocate for China to scale up its contributions to global food security through the World Food Programme (WFP), with whom China has a good working relationship. This could be combined with a political dialogue on how to foster cooperation on food security assistance.
• Anticipatory humanitarian aid: Disaster risk reduction, preparedness and response play an increasingly important role in global humanitarian aid. China has built up its most significant expertise in response to natural disasters. Enhancement of disaster risk reduction is one of the strategic priorities of the Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (DG ECHO) for 2020–2024. In light of both parties’ interest in anticipatory humanitarian aid, knowledge exchange in this area has the potential to open the door for future cooperation.