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L'édition 2016 de la soirée culturelle " Miss Bénin" qui devrait permettre d'élire la nouvelle ambassadrice de la beauté béninoise est repoussée à une date ultérieure. Prévue pour le samedi 23 juillet dernier, la soirée Miss Bénin n'a pas pu avoir lieu. La principale raison évoquée par le comité d'organisation présidé par Fortuné Dégbègni est que, la pluie qui s'est abattue toute la journée du samedi 23 Juillet 2016 sur Cotonou et qui a du coup rendu impossible l'exploitation du lieu qui devrait abriter la cérémonie. « Suite aux intempéries, la cérémonie Miss Bénin 2016 prévue ce soir (Samedi 23 Juillet 2016, ndlr) dans les jardins du Bénin Marina Hôtel est reportée. Le comité Miss Bénin et les sponsors vous présentent toutes leurs excuses, la nouvelle date vous sera communiquée ultérieurement ». Tel est le message qu'on pouvait lire sur la page Facebook du groupe MTN, qui est aussi un des sponsors de cet évènement.
En effet, le comité d'organisation de Miss Bénin avait envisagé pour la présente édition, d'exploiter le jardin (plein air) du Bénin Marina Hôtel, histoire de profiter de la lumière ambiante. Mais la pluie du samedi 23 Juillet 2016 sur Cotonou et environs, n'a pas favorisé la tâche aux membres de l'association culturelle Miss Bénin. Cette situation a obligé le comité d'organisation à repousser la date de cette soirée culturelle. « La nouvelle date retenue sera communiquée aux invités, par les voies et canaux appropriés au moment opportun », a rassuré un membre du comité d'organisation. Pendant ce temps, la Miss Bénin 2015, Chelsea Fandohan, profite de ce "vide juridique".

La miss 2015 joue toujours les prolongations

"A quelque chose, malheur est bon", enseigne un dicton populaire. Comme la Miss 2016 se fait attendre, l'ambassadrice de la beauté élue au cours de l'édition 2015, joue les prolongations pour le moment. Chelsea Fandohan, puisque c'est d'elle qu'il s'agit, profitera encore des honneurs de la couronne jusqu'au sacre d'une nouvelle ambassadrice de la beauté béninoise.

Une leçon qui doit inspirer le comité d'organisation

De mémoire d'homme, c'est pour la première fois qu'un tel évènement qui réunit assez de monde, et est suivi de par le monde, est reporté pour une raison aussi banale. Et pourtant, les préparatifs de cet évènement culturel sont prévus depuis au moins un an, et des dispositions allant dans ce sens devraient être prises en conséquence. Pour une fois, le bureau de Fortuné Dégbègni a failli en ne prenant pas les dispositions nécessaires vu la période.

Par : Amir NABIL

Le témoignage de la chef du service de vidéosurveillance de Nice, qui dit avoir subi des pressions du ministère de l'Intérieur pour son rapport sur le dispositif policier du 14-Juillet, semble comporter des failles, selon Europe 1.

La responsable de la vidéosurveillance accuse le ministère de l'Intérieur de pressions à propos du dispositif de sécurité du 14 juillet.

La Côte d’Ivoire et le Burkina Faso fument le calumet de la paix. Après la brouille diplomatique en relation à la chute de Blaise Compaoré et le coup d’Etat de septembre 2015,  les deux pays ont respectivement installé leurs ambassadeurs.

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ARY News reporting from Lahore said the chairman of Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) on July 24 opposed the Turkish ambassador’s demand to close down educational institutions run under the administration of Gulen mouvement.

Imran Khan questioned why Pakistani school children should have to suffer for the Turkish coup attempt and how Turkey could possibly be affected by Pakistani school kids.

He expressed his support for the Turkish democracy and clarified that Pakistan already had low literacy rate and closing down a large network of schools could be disastrous for the country.

The PTI chairman posted on his Twitter account: “While we stand firmly behind Turkish democracy, closing Pak-Turk schools in Pakistan, which has a high illiteracy rate, could be disastrous.”

According to the report, Gulen is running a large network of schools in Pakistan, providing education to students with meagre resources.

The post Pakistan-Gulen movement: Reactions to Turkey’s demands appeared first on New Europe.

La cérémonie de transfert de pavillon de la barge Sidi Ifni (photo Piriou) s’est déroulée ce 25 juillet. La barge Sidi Ifni, qui sera exploitée dans les eaux côtières du Maroc, quittera Concarneau fin juillet pour rejoindre Agadir, son port base, en convoi avec l’OPV 70 Bir Anzarane de la Marine Royale Marocaine.

Le contrat comprenait également la formation à Concarneau des 22 membres du premier équipage à la prise en main du navire et à son exploitation, formation qui s’est déroulée pendant 2 semaines début juillet à Concarneau.

Cette barge polyvalente de 50 m est un navire de charge de type LCT dérivé d’une version civile déjà construite en plusieurs exemplaires par Piriou. Prévue pour le transport de charges roulantes et de cargaisons diverses, pour le ravitaillement en eau et gasoil, cette barge est équipée de deux grues de manutention et d’une porte à l’avant permettant l’embarquement ou le débarquement aussi bien sur une plage que sur un quai.

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region on 23 July compared to 22 July and more on 24 July compared to the previous day. On both 23 and 24 July, ceasefire violations occurred mostly at daytime and focused in Yasynuvata. In Luhansk region, the SMM noted a sharp increase in the level of violence on 23 July compared to 22 July and a relatively low number of ceasefire violations on 24 July. The SMM recorded no ceasefire violations in Stanytsia Luhanska. The SMM followed up on reports of casualties and conducted crater analysis in Novooleksandrivka, Berdianske, Krasnohorivka, and Donetskyi. The SMM attempted to visit the proposed disengagement areas west of Petrivske, but could not do so due to the presence of mines. It observed weapons in violation of the withdrawal line and numerous armoured combat vehicles in the security zone. The SMM observed new mine hazard signs in Stanytsia Luhanska and Petrivske. Its freedom of movement was restricted on nine occasions, all in areas outside government control, including a border area.*

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations [1] in Donetsk region on 23 July compared to 22 July and more on 24 July compared to 23 July.  

Positioned in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk), during the day on 23 July, the SMM heard sporadically: 122 undetermined explosions, including 36 within 40 minutes, at locations ranging 1-7km from west-south-west to north of its position, and two outgoing salvos of multiple-launch rocket systems (MLRS; five and 12 rockets, respectively) 3-5km north-north-west of its position. The following day, the SMM heard 294 undetermined explosions and uncountable bursts and single shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all at locations ranging 1-7km from west-south-west to north of its position.

On 23 July, whilst in “DPR”-controlled Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk) the SMM heard two undetermined explosions and one explosion assessed as impact of a round from an unknown weapon, 2-3km south-south-west and west of its position.

The SMM camera in Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol), during the night of 23-24 July, recorded one undetermined explosion and two explosions assessed as outgoing mortar (unknown calibre) rounds from a westerly direction, as well as 29 bursts of direct tracer fire from west-south-west to east-north-east, and eight bursts of direct tracer fire from east to west.

Positioned in Donetsk city centre, in the morning hours of 24 July, the SMM heard 11 undetermined explosions 5-8km north of its position. Positioned at the “DPR”-controlled Donetsk central railway station (6km north-west of Donetsk city centre), during the afternoon hours, the SMM heard 55 undetermined explosions, including 27 recorded within seven minutes, 3-8km north, north-east, and north-west of its position.

In government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk), in the afternoon of 24 July, the SMM heard 16 explosions assessed as outgoing mortar rounds (82 and 120mm) and seven undetermined explosions, all 1.5-5km north-east and south-east of its position.

Positioned in “DPR”-controlled Kominternove (23km north-east of Mariupol) the SMM heard eight explosions assessed as outgoing mortar rounds (unknown calibre) at an undetermined distance north of its position.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded a sharp increase in the number of ceasefire violations on 23 July compared to 22 July, and a relatively low number of ceasefire violations on 24 July.

On 23 July, positioned north-east of government-controlled Popasna (69km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard one loud undetermined explosion and saw a plume of smoke 10-15km south of its position. Positioned west of Popasna, the SMM heard ten undetermined explosions and one impact assessed as caused by an unknown artillery system, at undetermined distances south-south-east of its position. Positioned 2km south of Popasna, the SMM heard, within 40 minutes, 50 explosions, most assessed as mortar rounds impacting at locations 1.5-4.5km east-south-east of its position.

Whilst in “LPR”-controlled Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, 50km west of Luhansk) the SMM heard, within 20 minutes on 23 July, 19 explosions assessed as 120mm artillery rounds 7-12km south-west of its position. Positioned in government-controlled parts of Zolote (60km north-west of Luhansk) the SMM heard seven loud undetermined explosions 10-15km south-west of its position. Positioned north of “LPR”-controlled Pervomaisk (58km west of Luhansk) the SMM heard six loud undetermined explosions, assessed as caused by 122mm weapons of unknown type, 5km south of its position.

On 23 July, whilst south of “LPR”-controlled Kalynove (60km west of Luhansk) the SMM heard, within 20 minutes, 35 explosions assessed as outgoing artillery rounds 2-3km north-west of its position, and four explosions assessed as outgoing self-propelled howitzer (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) rounds: one fired from the middle of an inhabited area just 500m north and three at a distance of 300m north of its position. In very close proximity of residential areas in Kalynove, the SMM saw four 122mm artillery systems, three of them assessed as self-propelled howitzers, firing. The following day, north-east of Kalynove, the SMM heard five to seven explosions assessed as automatic-grenade-launcher fire 2km west of its position, and observed tracks of heavy weapons assessed as artillery, in a stone quarry east of Kalynove. 

On 23 July, south of government-controlled Novozvanivka (70km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard, between 12:04 and 13:15, about 80 explosions, most assessed as incoming artillery (unknown type) fire, 3.6-4km east of its position. Positioned north of Novozvanivka, the SMM heard three undetermined explosions 2.8-3.8km south-east of its position.

The SMM followed up on civilian and non-civilian casualties. On 22 July, in Novooleksandrivka (65km west of Luhansk) a man in his eighties said that his wife had been injured by shelling on 16 July. The SMM saw a wound in her left leg. The man also showed the SMM five small craters in his garden, which the SMM assessed as caused by automatic grenade launcher (AGS) rounds fired from different directions. On 23 July, local police in Popasna informed the SMM that a couple had been injured by setting off a booby trap near government-controlled parts of Zolote on 19 July. Medical staff at a hospital in Avdiivka told the SMM that a woman had experienced severe blood loss due to a bullet wound that she had suffered while being in the industrial zone of Avdiivka on the night of 21-22 July. On 23 July, in Novozvanivka the SMM saw a wounded soldier transported by an armoured personnel carrier (APC; MT-LB) from the area where the SMM observed shelling on the same day and transferred to a civilian ambulance. The military personnel present told the SMM that other wounded soldiers were being transported from the same area to the road section where the SMM saw the ambulance waiting. In government-controlled Teple (31km north of Luhansk) six residents (women in their fifties, men in their thirties) separately told the SMM that on 20 July a 55-year-old man had died while trying to cut two pieces of UXO (82 and 120mm mortar shells) that he had found near his house.

The SMM conducted crater analysis on both sides of the contact line. On 23 July, in government-controlled Berdianske (18km east of Mariupol), the SMM observed at least 14 similar fresh craters, some 150m north of the SMM camera site. The SMM conducted analysis on four craters which it assessed as caused by 120mm mortar rounds fired from a north-easterly direction. In Soniachnyi neighbourhood of government-controlled Krasnohorivka (21km west of Donetsk), the SMM conducted analysis on six fresh craters near a five-story apartment building. The SMM saw four of the six fresh craters in an open field near the building, three assessed as caused by tank rounds and one as caused by an 82mm mortar round, all fired from an easterly direction. The SMM assessed one fresh crater at the playground of a school near the building as caused by an 82mm mortar round, and another crater on the north-east-facing exterior wall of the school assessed as caused by a 125mm tank round, fired from a north-easterly and easterly direction, respectively. The SMM saw that Ukrainian Armed Forces had an observation post on the last floor and roof of the school. The previous day, the SMM had observed fresh caterpillar tracks originating at the Krasnohorivka brick factory and continuing 6km south to government-controlled Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk) where the tracks turned east onto a residential street towards the contact line. In “LPR”-controlled Donetskyi (49km west of Luhansk) the SMM saw a fresh crater on the road 100m from an “LPR” compound, which the SMM assessed as caused by an automatic grenade launcher round fired from a westerly direction. On 24 July, in Popasna the SMM saw three fresh craters assessed as caused by 122mm artillery rounds fired from an east-south-easterly direction.

The SMM attempted to visit proposed disengagement areas. On 23 July, the SMM attempted to monitor the proposed disengagement areas west of “DPR”-controlled Petrivske (40km south-east of Donetsk), but could not reach there due to the presence of mines. The patrol saw mine hazard signs along the main road. However, after two months, the SMM could travel from Petrivske to Donetsk via “DPR”-controlled Styla (34km south of Donetsk) as the road had been demined.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in accordance with the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Minsk Memorandum.

In violation of the respective withdrawal lines, on 23 July, in very close proximity of the residential areas in Kalynove, the SMM saw four 122mm artillery systems, three of them assessed as self-propelled howitzers, firing.

Beyond the withdrawal lines, the SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage does not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification. In “DPR”-controlled holding areas, the SMM noted six MLRS (BM-21 Grad, 122mm), six towed howitzers (D-30, 122mm), six self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvodzika, 122mm), and four anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm). The SMM noted two mortars (PM-38, 120mm) present for the first time.

The SMM observed the presence of armoured combat vehicles and anti-aircraft weapons in the security zone. In government-controlled areas the SMM noted: one anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) and one APC (BTR-80) in Trokhizbenka (32km north-west of Luhansk), on 22 and 23 July respectively; on 23 July, a stationary APC (BTR-60) near Komyshuvakha (68km west of Luhansk); on 23 July a ZU-23 towed by an Ural truck near Heivka (27km north-west of Luhansk); and three stationary APCs (one BRDM-2 and two BTR-60) east of Popasna. The SMM observed on 24 July: a stationary infantry fighting vehicle (IFV; BMP-2) in Nyzhnie (56km north-west of Luhansk); three APCs (BTR-80) and four high mobility multi-purpose wheeled vehicles with heavy machine-guns (15.7mm) mounted on top near Raihorodka (34km north-west of Luhansk). In “DPR”-controlled areas the SMM noted: five IFVs (BMP-1) and two APCs (MT-LB) moving east in Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk), on 22 July. The next day at Lenina Street in the centre of Debaltseve, the SMM saw fresh multiple tracks assessed as caused by at least four IFVs (BMP). The SMM also noted multiple sets of fresh tracks assessed as caused by armoured vehicles on the asphalt road from government-controlled Netailove to Karlivka (22 and 26km north-west of Donetsk, respectively).

The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential infrastructure in Avdiivka where, on 23 July, the SMM together with the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) facilitated and monitored repairs to a power line.

The SMM observed the presence of unexploded ordnance (UXO) and new mine hazard signs. Near a Ukrainian Armed Forces compound between Stanytsia Luhanska and Malynove (16 and 19km north-east of Luhansk, respectively), on 23 July, the SMM noticed six new mine hazard signs - white board with “Mines” written in Cyrillic - recently placed on the side of the main road. On 23 July, in government-controlled Zolote-4, a 60-year-old woman showed the SMM an unexploded under barrel grenade, which, she said, had been there for two-three months. On 23 July, the SMM observed mine hazard signs - red with white letters - along the southern side of the main road in Petrivske and on the main road towards “DPR”-controlled Viktorivka (42km south-west of Donetsk). On 24 July, near a checkpoint in “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM saw a remnant of a recoilless gun (SPG-9) ammunition, assessed as five to ten days old.

The SMM monitored the situation of civilians at entry-exit checkpoints along the contact line. On 22 July, at a “DPR” checkpoint in Horlivka, the Russian Federation Armed Forces officer at the JCCC and an armed “DPR” member at the checkpoint told the SMM that 20-30 civilian cars had stayed in the area between government-controlled Maiorsk (45km north-east of Donetsk) and Horlivka checkpoints overnight, refusing to return to “DPR” areas after the closing time. On 24 July at the same checkpoint, the SMM observed 360 civilian cars and around 115 people queuing to travel towards government-controlled areas and 76 civilian cars and 42 people queuing in the opposite direction. The SMM observed 48 civilian vehicles and around 170 pedestrians in the area between the checkpoints waiting to travel towards government-controlled areas.

On 23 July, at the government checkpoint north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge the SMM noted, between 09:10 and 10:10, that 249 pedestrians crossed the checkpoint into government-controlled areas and 269 pedestrians crossed in the opposite direction. The SMM saw 65 people waiting at a shelter at the checkpoint and that drinking water was available. On 24 July, at the “LPR” checkpoint south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge the SMM observed a queue of around 350 civilians waiting to travel towards government-controlled areas. The SMM noted that drinking water was available. Several pedestrians (men and women, aged 40 to 70) complained about having to wait more than 2.5 hours due to the slow checking of documents.                                                                 

The SMM monitored border areas not controlled by the Government, and encountered a restriction there. The SMM visited four border areas in “LPR”-controlled areas and noted a generally calm situation. On 23 July, the SMM monitored the pedestrian border crossing point in Sievernyi (50km south-east of Luhansk). On 24 July, the SMM visited the border crossing point in Dovzhanskyi (84km south-east of Luhansk) and the pedestrian border crossing point in Novoborovytsi (79km south of Luhansk), which the SMM saw that it continued not to be staffed by armed “LPR” members. In Izvaryne (52km south-east of Luhansk), armed members denied the SMM access to the border crossing point.*

*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring is restrained by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines and unexploded ordnance, and by restrictions of its freedom of movement and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations.

Denial of access: 

• On four separate occasions, two each on 23 and 24 July, armed members denied SMM passage at the “LPR” checkpoint immediately south of Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (16km north-east of Luhansk) when the SMM refused to show its patrol plan (in the Russian language). The SMM informed the JCCC.
• On 23 July, in “LPR”-controlled Molodizhne (63km west of Luhansk), armed members prevented the SMM from flying an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) in the area of Kalynove, saying that his superiors had not granted permission. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• On 23 July, at a “DPR” checkpoint at the eastern entrance to Mykolaivka (39km north-east of Mariupol), armed members denied SMM passage, without any explanation.  The SMM informed the JCCC.
• On 23 July, at a “DPR” checkpoint east of Tavrycheske (35km north-east of Mariupol), armed members denied SMM passage, citing orders to do so. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• On 24 July, 100m before the border crossing point in Izvaryne, two armed “LPR” members, after stopping the SMM and writing down the SMM vehicles’ plate numbers, and the names and ID numbers of the SMM members, denied further passage to the SMM, citing special instructions from their superiors. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• On 24 July, armed members denied the SMM access to a compound in “LPR”-controlled Luhansk city for the third consecutive day (See SMM Daily Report 23 July). They again told the SMM to wait for permission from their superiors. After 25 minutes of waiting, they denied the SMM access. The SMM informed the JCCC.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report. 

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Továbbra is tart az éhségsztrájk a horgosi tranzitzóna közelében.

C’est un nouveau blocage dans le processus de dialogue national en République démocratique du Congo. Le rassemblement de l'opposition au président Kabila ne veut plus avoir affaire à Edem Kodjo. Le facilitateur de l'Union africaine est accusé d'avoir lancé « unilatéralement » et « dans la précipitation » les travaux préparatoires du fameux dialogue dont il a fixé la date pour 30 juillet. Ce dialogue, voulu par le chef de l'Etat, est censé mettre tout le monde autour de la table pour préparer les échéances électorales.

Peu avant le 14-Juillet, la commission sénatoriale des Affaires étrangères et des Forces armées a discuté d’un copieux rapport [.pdf] sur le bilan des interventions extérieures menées par la France depuis 2009. Comme l’on peut s’en douter, il est donc fait grand cas des opérations Serval et Sangaris. S’agissant plus précisément de l’opération Serval (mais […]

Cet article La mission militaire de formation de l’Union Européenne au Mali jugée pas assez efficace dans un rapport du Sénat est apparu en premier sur Zone Militaire.

via Washington Post. "After many years of sub-par growth in industrialized economies, and increasingly also in emerging markets, G-20 leaders are recognizing the risks of social cleavages and their...

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L’Institut de Recherche Stratégique de l’École militaire (IRSEM) a le plaisir de vous informer de la parution de sa Note de recherche stratégique n°27 intitulée : « BREXIT : Quelles conséquences stratégiques ? », de Pierre RAZOUX. Le 23 juin 2016, 52...

08.07.2016 La Lettre de l'IRSEM n°3 - 2016 Dossier stratégique : EUROSATORY 2016 : Quel avenir pour l'armement terrestre ? - Quel avenir pour l'industrie européenne de l'armement terrestre ? - European Defence: a British point of view. - Enjeux techniques...

Au Nigéria dans l’Etat d’Ogun au Sud-ouest du pays, un pasteur a posé un acte incroyable. L’homme de Dieu âgé de 40 ans a enfermé son fils de 09 ans qu’il a d’abord pris le soin d’enchaîner.

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Domestic migrant workers from South and South-East Asia are now considered Oman's "modern-day slaves". Credit: Zofeen Ebrahim/IPS

By Dominique Von Rohr
ROME, Jul 25 2016 (IPS)

In order to escape poverty and support their families back home, thousands of domestic workers from South and South-East Asia migrate to Oman with the promise of stable employment in local households.

Once they arrive in Oman, new employers often seize their passports so that they cannot depart when they want, ultimately, denying them their freedom of movement.

They are made subject to excessive working hours, sleep deprivation and starvation. Many suffer from verbal or sexual abuse.

All too often, the money they work so hard for is denied to them. According to a report by Human Rights Watch, a great number of female migrant domestic workers fall prey to such abusive employment, and become Oman’s modern-day slaves.

The country’s visa sponsorship system, known as kafala, as well as the absence of labour law protections for domestic workers make migrant workers highly vulnerable to exploitation.

The kafala creates an “unbreakable” tie between the migrant worker and their employer, which means that the migrant worker’s visa is directly conditioned by the employer.

This prohibits migrant workers from switching jobs, even if they face abuse at their workplace. At least 130’000 migrant domestic workers are affected by the kafala system.

Families in Oman acquire their services through recruitment companies, employing them to take care of their children, cook meals, and clean their homes.

The recruitment companies typically ask for a fee to be paid for the mediation, and several migrant workers interviewed by Human Rights Watch said that their employers demanded they pay them back the recruitment fee in order to be released from their service.

“Employers can force domestic workers to work without rest, pay, or food, knowing they can be punished if they escape, while the employers rarely face penalties for abuse”, Rothna Begum, a Middle East women’s rights researcher at Human Rights Watch, confirms.

A report from Human Rights Watch also stated that women who decide to escape their abusive employment often face legal penalties.

Asma K., a domestic worker from Bangladesh, told Human Rights Watch that she was not only “sold” to a man, her passport had also been taken away from her, and she was forced to work 21 hours a day tending to the needs of 15 people.

Asma was both sexually and verbally abused, denied of her right to a fair wage in addition to being deprived of food. Many other female domestic workers share Asma K.’s story.

Once a migrant worker has escaped an abusive employer, very few options remain. If the women go back to the agencies that recruited them, the agents often beat them and forcefully place them into new families.

The Omani police offers little help, usually dismisses the domestic workers’ claim, and returns them to the family they came from, where in several cases, the workers are assaulted by their employers, Human Rights Watch says.

Some women risk getting reported as “absconded”, an offense which can lead to their deportation or even a criminal complaint against them.

While several Omani lawyers confirm that they have no confidence in Oman’s labour dispute settlement procedure or courts for redress for domestic workers, some embassy officials dissuade domestic workers from even fighting for their case, due to the lengthy process and the high probability of facing defeat.

This process eventually leads to workers returning to their home countries without pay, with the dream of providing for their families shattered and no hope for justice.

In order to protect its nationals from abusive employment, Indonesia has banned migration to Oman, as well as other countries with a similar history of migrant labour abuse.

However, such bans often have an opposite effect, leaving those most desperate for work vulnerable to traffickers or forced labour as they try to sidestep their own country’s restrictions.

Human Rights Watch states that several countries do not protect their nationals against abusive employment, nor do they provide help to those who fall victim to trafficking, abuse and mistreatment living abroad.

In 2012, Oman promised the United Nations Human Rights Council to look for alternatives to the kafala system, however, Human Rights Watch states that no concrete proposal has since been made, and up until now, Oman’s labour law does not protect domestic workers.

In April 2016, a Ministry of Manpower official stated in the Times of Oman that Oman is considering protecting domestic workers under its labour law, however, when requested for information on possible law reforms or other measures to protect domestic workers, the Omani government remained silent.

Human Rights Watch states that Oman was further criticized by the United States government for not demonstrating increased efforts to address human trafficking.

In 2015, there were only five prosecutions on sex trafficking, with no prosecutions on forced labour at all.

In order to provide protection for domestic workers, Human Rights Watch urges Oman to revise the kafala system, and advises it to cooperate with the countries of origin to help prevent exploitation.

Instead of punishing migrant domestic workers for escaping their appalling conditions, they should be granted justice by means of fair prosecutions against those who manipulated, scorned and abused them.

Suite du procès de Simone Gbagbo à Abidjan. L’ex-première dame de Côte d’Ivoire comparaît pour crime contre l’humanité devant la cour d’assises pour son rôle présumé dans les violences post-électorales en Côte d’Ivoire en 2010-2011. Et ce lundi matin, les débats ont porté sur le bombardement du marché d’Abobo.

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Le Centre d'études stratégique de la Marine

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C’est ce qu’on appelle un « buzz » ou plutôt un « bad-buzz » sur Internet. La super-star congolaise Koffi Olomidé a été mise en cause ce week-end dans une vidéo devenue virale. Sur ces images, on voit le chanteur se diriger vers deux de ses danseuses et lancer un violent coup de pied en direction de celle de gauche. La vidéo a déclenché d’innombrables condamnations et le lendemain, Koffi Olomidé a été expulsé du Kenya, où il devait se produire le soir même. On apprend aujourd’hui qu’en Zambie un concert du chanteur prévu cette semaine est également annulé. Face à la mobilisation notamment des femmes sur les réseaux sociaux, Koffi Olomidé a présenté publiquement ses excuses et expliqué sa version des faits.