Feed aggregator

Felhívás az ágazati szintű, a felsőoktatásba való bekerülést, bennmaradást (lemorzsolódást megakadályozó) támogató rendszereket ágazati szinten támogató illetve azok mérését lehetővé tevő rendszerfejlesztések vagy rendszerelem fejlesztések megvalósítására

Pályázati cél: Magyarországon megrendezendő nemzetközi és/vagy országos hatókörű turisztikai vonzerőt jelentő kulturális, gasztronómiai rendezvények kulturális programjainak (programsorozatok/fesztiválok) támogatása.

A Magyarország 2017. évi központi költségvetéséről szóló 2016. évi XC. törvény (a továbbiakban: költségvetési törvény) 3. mellékletének I. 5. pontja, valamint 3. mellékletének Kiegészítő szabályok 1. c) pontja alapján megalkotásra került a települési önkormányzatok helyi közösségi közlekedésének támogatásáról szóló 2017. évi pályázati kiírás (a továbbiakban: pályázati kiírás), amely 2017. május 17-én jelent meg a Hivatalos Értesítő 24. számában.

The US and Uganda are stopping the hunt for notorious rebel leader Joseph Kony but he is still a threat.

In recent weeks, the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) has lost a significant part of its stronghold in Nangrahar as well as several senior commanders and its overall leader, Sheikh Abdul Hasib. Its losses have been mounting steadily since early April when American and Afghan special forces intensified their campaign against the group. This included dropping the largest, non-nuclear bomb in the US arsenal on an ISKP-held network of caves in Achin district on 13 April 2017. AAN’s Borhan Osman looks at the offensive in detail, including ISKP responses. He also assesses the US goal of ‘defeating’ ISKP this year and asks what defeat of such a group would look like.

 

The rolling back of ISKP in Nangrahar – a summary of events

ISKP’s control of territory in Nangrahar reached its peak in summer 2015 when it became the dominant insurgent group in eight of the province’s 22 districts. (For detail on why it was so successful in this province, see AAN reporting here and here.) ISKP had overrun large swathes in the districts which lie along the Spin Ghar mountain range to the south of the provincial capital, Jalalabad, mostly from the Taleban. Most of these districts are close to or on the border with Pakistan’s tribal agencies: to the south-east of Jalalabad, they are Achin, Kot, Nazyan and Bati Kot and to the south-west, Deh Bala (also called Haska Mena), Khogyani, Sherzad, Pachir wa Agam and Chaparhar, whose borders begin at the outskirts of Jalalabad city. ISKP never managed to capture any of the district centres, although it was twice close to overrunning the district centres of Achin and Deh Bala.

Since then, the Taleban have fought to take back territory and the group has also been pounded by US air strikes. ISKP territory had shrunk to four districts by the end of 2015, with territory mainly re-taken by the Taleban. ISKP then dug in through 2016 in all its remaining districts, that is, Achin, Kot and Nazyan in the south-eastern districts (Bati Kot had returned to Taleban control), as well as Deh Bala in the south-west. ISKP’s hold over these districts looked firm until mid-March, or the beginning of the Afghan spring 2017, when US and Afghan special forces stepped up their attacks against it.

In early April 2017, these combined forces launched a new campaign dubbed Operation Hamza, which, according to the US military, was targeted against ISKP not only in Nangrahar, but also in Kunar. In Kunar, the group has not yet established definitive territorial control, but it has actively recruited from members of militant groups there, including from the Afghan Taleban. Kunar has also served as a place of retreat for ISKP members when pressed in southern Nangrahar.

Nevertheless, the group is still most entrenched in southern Nangrahar, and particularly strongly in Achin and Deh Bala districts. It has turned Achin’s Mamand Valley into its command base with the adjacent Pekha Valley, to the east of Achin district centre, next in strategic value. Both these valleys border Pakistan’s Khyber Agency, from where, according to numerous local residents AAN has spoken to, the group receives weapons and ammunition which arrive on the backs of mules.

US-Afghan forces take the battle to ISKP’s heartland

The offensive by US and Afghan special forces, which has been taking place since mid-March 2017, and especially since the launch of Operation Hamza in early April, has focused on these two valleys and the surrounding areas. Ground offensives and night raids have been coupled with heavy air strikes by the US military. Missiles launched from the US military base at Jalalabad airfield have also hit targets in and around the two valleys. These precision-guided munitions, described by locals as ‘cruise missiles’ and often fired in batches of a few dozens, have become a frequently used element of the campaign. The offensive has had a tangible impact on ISKP, appearing to have severely weakened the group in its stronghold.

What has added to the pressure on ISKP’s Mamand stronghold is not only the penetration of US and Afghan forces into Pekha to the east, but also the group’s loss of Kot district to the west. Kot has been almost entirely cleared of ISKP as a result of this year’s campaign. The loss of Kot has, for the first time in several years, confined ISKP to three districts. Afghan forces, mostly local militias made up of the so-called uprising forces and Afghan Local Police, have established bases and checkposts in the newly captured territory to consolidate the government’s hold there. Most of the southern and eastern parts of the district, which have long been under the control of ISKP, are deserted after most of the local population fled and settled around Jalalabad. The displacement had been happening since 2015, but, according to residents of the district, sharply increased when the US-Afghan operations intensified in mid-March.

By losing Kot district, ISKP has not only seen its territory shrink, but also suffered a huge logistical setback: an important supply route which connected its eastern districts with its western ones has been cut. Kot was the main way for it to get weapons from Achin and Nazyan, on the border, to Deh Bala and further westward, including to Chaparhar on the outskirts of Jalalabad. ISKP, according to local residents in all these districts, would re-load ammunition, which had arrived by mule from Khyber agency, in Pakistan, to Achin and Nazyan, onto trucks and other vehicles to take it to Deh Bala. Now, with Afghan forces deployed in Kot, there is no longer a vehicle route from the Achin-Nazyan border available for ISKP to supply its fighters in Deh Bala.

While Kot might have been relatively easy for Afghan and US forces to capture, the two valleys, Mamand and Pekha, in neighbouring Achin district, have proved the most difficult. ISKP has been able to entrench itself deep into these valleys due both to the geography – the hard, mountainous terrain – and to the local society, which has been weakened and fractured (see this AAN analysis). ISKP fighters have occupied villages in the two valleys, often after forcing local people out. With the onset of Operation Hamza, the US and Afghan forces moved to capture the two valleys through ground offensives supported by air strikes. Getting into the Mamand Valley required passing through a complex network of caves that was situated at the valley entrance, in the Asadkhel area. The caves had been formed over decades by miners digging out slate, and ISKP was using them as bunkers; the caves protected the fighters from air strikes, but also acted as staging points from which to attack the advancing enemy.

According to Mamandis who spoke to AAN, getting across the Asadkhel area was hard for the US and Afghan forces as ISKP fighters positioned within the bomb-proof caves would come out in unexpected places to ambush the advancing forces. The US military bombed the caves repeatedly in the first week of Operation Hamza, but the munitions could not get through the rock and earth to destroy the cave complex below. On 13 April 2017, the US decided to loose a Massive Ordnance Air Blast (MOAB), nick-named ‘the mother of all bombs’, on the cave complex. This paved the way for the American and Afghan forces to get into the valley to launch a full offensive against ISKP.

The mother of all bombs and the death of the ISKP amir

The US and Afghan forces had managed to enter the other strategic valley, Pekha, during the week before the MOAB was dropped. The destruction of the Asadkhel caves also then allowed US-Afghan forces to enter Mamand, which is the more important stronghold for ISKP.

The US-Afghan forces’ progress into the two valleys has been described by local residents (who had left their homes, but still remain abreast of the situation on the ground through speaking to those few people still left in or around the area) as “snail-paced, but consistent.” They described how it often took the US and Afghan special forces two or three days to capture an ISKP village due to the severity of the fighting. In some parts of the valleys, ISKP has mined public routes and fields, which is further slowing down the progress of Afghan and US forces. As of mid-May 2017, more than half of the two valleys were still under the control of ISKP, but Afghan and US forces were continuing to steadily to advance.

As well as losing territory, ISKP has also been losing leaders and fighters. Since mid-March 2017, four senior commanders have been killed, including the latest amir (he took over in early August 2016), Sheikh Abdul Hasib, on 27 April. Between mid-March and mid-May, it also lost, according to rough estimates by local residents in whose homes the militants had been staying, about 300 members. The residents who spoke to AAN have long resettled in Jalalabad, but remain in touch with people still left in these areas, or by the occasional visits of relatives. They knew precisely, by name and location, the ISKP commanders who lived in their homes and, more broadly, in their villages. Although, sometimes they just repeated rumours that could not be corroborated after cross-checking and further questioning, they are still the most neutral and possibly best informed sources on developments in their areas. One caveat: their account of the ISKP death toll needs to be taken with a pinch of salt unless those who have been killed come from their area who they know personally or by reputation. It is less easy to ascertain the deaths of foreign militants because of the absence of nuance and details which help reassure a researcher that the account is true. These might be funerals held, graves dug or people knowing relatives in what is a well-connected society.

One notable batch of ISKP casualties took place during the operation that targeted Abdul Hasib on 27 April. Residents described that operation as lengthy, intensive and complex. It lasted several hours, with heavy bombing and the parachuting of US special forces and Afghan commandos into the heart of ISKP territory to conduct raids. The operation involved almost an entire night of close-range fighting in several villages. Local residents put the number of those killed in this operation at over 30; they spoke of the fighting men and their families together, although without knowing the details of children and women killed. They had not noticed the death of Abdul Hasib, most likely because he was not a known or prominent figure, locally. Habib came from Logar and therefore had no interaction with the locals in Nangarhar before his joining to ISKP.

The news of the ISKP amir’s death was made public by the US military on 7 May 2017. Another commander killed in the same operation was commander from Pakistan’s Orakzai tribal agency, who was known to the locals only by his nom de guerre, Dahshatgar (meaning ‘terrorist’, in Urdu). ISKP’s FM radio station, Khilafat Ghag, on 28 April reported that about 100 people had been killed and wounded as a result of the air strikes of 27 April. The group’s broadcasters described the victims as members of muhajir families. Muhajir means ‘migrant’, but is used here as a religious term for those leaving their homes for the sake of jihad or to escape repression, from which it can be understood that the radio station was referring to the families of the foreign and/or Pakistani militants who had settled in the homes of the local residents. The radio station aired interviews with those it said were relatives of the victims, including children, who spoke of losing their mothers and younger brothers and sisters in the air strikes.

The death of Abdul Hasib dealt a significant blow to ISKP as the group had already been struggling to find replacement leaders after a succession of them had been killed (more detail on which will come in a subsequent dispatch). The ascension of Abdul Hasib, a little-known figure, to the overall leadership in early August 2016 was itself witness to the fact that all the prominent commanders of the group, indeed the entire first-tier leadership, had already been killed. They included about a dozen senior commanders and leaders. While the death of Hasib was important in terms of its impact on morale and the symbolic loss of an amir, he had not been a compelling or impressive leader. He was more a Salafi-jihadist ideologue who inspired fighters with his high-flying speeches and visions of the future. He had not possessed particularly remarkable military skills. Now, as Abdul Hasib is gone, the discussion for his succession seems to have begun with the Aslam Faruqi, a nom de guerre for a mid-level commander from Orakzai agency, tipped as the most likely successor.

Pressed in the east, ISKP spreads westward

At the same time as coming under increased pressure in Achin and Kot, however, ISKP has made considerable advances into another district, Chaparhar, which is adjacent to Jalalabad and has long been contested. The group captured almost half of Chaparhar in a sudden and coordinated attack against the Taleban on 2 and 3 April 2017. ISKP claimed to have killed 30 Taleban in the fighting, although Taleban sources speaking to AAN only admitted to losing a dozen fighters. With the district centre having always remained under the government’s control, the rest of the district has changed hands between ISKP and Taleban several times over the past two years. It had the highest density of pro-ISKP Salafi fighters which made it difficult for the Taleban to establish solid control, as reported earlier by AAN. It was also one of the districts that saw the earliest defections of Taleban fighters to ISKP, in late 2014 and early 2015.

In the meantime, ISKP’s control over most of the tiny Nazyan district, that neighbours both Kot and Achin, as well as over Deh Bala district further southwest, has remained intact. ISKP is largely in control of the countryside in both the districts with the government confined mainly to the district centres. In Nazyan, the majority of the militants are members of a smaller and older group, Lashkar-e Islam, which has its origins in Pakistan’s Khyber Agency just across the border from Nazyan, but has been staying in Nangarhar for several years. The group, ideologically similar to the Pakistani Taleban, is led by Mangal Bagh, who has been an ally of ISKP since the latter’s emergence (read more about Lashkar-e Islam here). His group seems to have been tasked with keeping control of Nazyan, ruling there as a proxy of ISKP, thus making the district ISKP territory by extension. In Deh Bala, where ISKP is mainly made up of local militants, most of whom are former members of the Afghan Taleban, the group’s grip is also still tight. In both these districts, occasional US air strikes have targeted the group’s members, but they have not yet had to withstand a concerted operation against them. This may be to come.

‘Defeating ISKP’ in 2017: an achievable goal for the Americans?

The launching of Operation Hamza came in the wake of the US military announcing  its goal of “eliminating” ISKP by the end of 2017. The commander of US forces in Afghanistan, General John Nicholson,  has since repeatedly vowed to “defeat” ISKP in 2017.

It is the intent of defeating ISKP within a specific time-frame that makes Operation Hamza distinct from previous, similar operations conducted against ISKP. American and Afghan forces have, since the summer of 2015, undertaken several concentrated offensives against ISKP with ground and air components, although possibly less intense than the current one. In almost all these operations, ISKP lost parts of its turf and a number of its fighters, but the common pattern that emerged in the aftermath of these operations was not long-lasting loss for the group; rather, it demonstrated its resilience. ISKP usually bounced back after the campaigns subsided. It would recapture territory as the Afghan forces, often the Afghan National Police and ‘uprising militias’, that were supposed to hold the territory would retreat in the face of its counter-offensive. This has been the case in Achin, Kot and Deh Bala districts. The only areas where ISKP could not do this has been when it lost land to the Taleban, in the districts of Bati Kot, Khogyani and Pachir wa Agam.

With the public avowal by the US military that it will eliminate or defeat ISKP through Operation Hamza, it remains to be seen what the pattern will be this time – and also what the Americans mean by ‘defeat’.

Supposing the advances of US and Afghan forces continue and Operation Hamza targets ISKP in the whole of Nangrahar, dislodging the group from all these areas would take a long time. Moreover, if the Americans want to deny ISKP the opportunity to come back to areas it once ruled, the ANSF must be able to hold territory. If ISKP could be completely stripped of a physical foothold, there would be huge consequences, both to its morale and capabilities. It has been the control of territory that has distinguished the ISKP in Nangrahar from most other Islamic State allied groups in Afghanistan

However, denying ISKP the space to rule would not necessarily amount to ‘defeat’, as long as it has at least a few hundred members and enjoys some measure of continuing appeal. Dismantling ISKP from its physical base could just force it to change tactics, making it a clandestine, hit-and-run group which, for example, could shift its focus even more towards urban areas. If it could transform itself into a clandestine network without a physical base where it could be bombed, it would become far less easy to deal with.

If defeating ISKP means not just taking its territory, but also killing a large number of its members, with the aim of eliminating or at least minimising its ability to launch attacks in the Afghanistan/Pakistan region, then the goal might also be elusive. The first tier leadership of the group has already been eliminated and, according to the US military’s estimates), 75 per cent of the group’s fighters have also been killed. It has nonetheless been able to launch two major assaults in Kabul since March. One of the attacks claimed by the group was the massive and coordinated assault by several suicide bombers against the military hospital in the highly fortified Wazir Akbar Khan neighbourhood on 8 March 2017, which killed about 50 people. The other attack took place in an even more secure and important area in a neighbourhood close to the US embassy, the defence ministry and the presidential palace in Shashdarak on 12 April 2017; this killed eight Afghan civilians and wounded two US soldiers (a media report here). ISKP is thus apparently still able to carry out attacks in urban centres.

In addition to the Kabul attacks mentioned earlier, the group has carried out two attacks in Herat and Jalalabad more recently. In Herat, a bomb attached to a motorcycle exploded in an area predominantly inhabited by Shias on 12 May 2017. The explosion near a bakery killed six people and ISKP claimed responsibility for it, saying the target was the Shia community. (This incident was not widely reported in the media and some media outlets reported the incident as a gas cylinder exploding.) In Jalalabad, ISKP suicide bombers attacked the provincial branch of the state radio and television office on 17 May. Six people were killed in a three-hour gunfight that ensued after the attackers stormed the building. ISKP released details of only two attackers, but provincial officials said the attack was carried out by four people.

In a nutshell, the ongoing US-Afghan operation that has cost ISKP many members, most of its leadership and a great deal of territory, has put the group under significant strain. It will be difficult, this time, for it to recover its former strength any time soon. However, dismantling the group in a way that makes it unable to launch attacks or impossible for it to re-emerge is not so assured. ISKP may well continue to recruit fighters, step up its appeal and propaganda efforts, launch occasional attacks on urban centres and continue to be a particularly nasty, albeit still marginal, insurgent actor.

Edited by Kate Clark and Thomas Ruttig

The US Navy's newest Independence-class littoral combat ship (LCS) USS Omaha (LCS 12) has successfully completed its sea acceptance trials before being delivered to the navy.

 

 

Amtsinhaber Hassan Rohani konnte sich mit großem Vorsprung gegen den Kandidaten der Konservativen, Ebrahim Raisi, durchsetzen. Was bedeutet das Ergebnis?

Le porte-drapeau de la France insoumise a fait escale dans le 18e arrondissement de la capitale pour soutenir son candidat, Paul Vannier, et se poser en défenseur du code du travail.

Les officiers du G5 Sahel ont été confrontés à un exercice exigeant une prise de décision conjointe. (Crédit : EUTM Mali)

(B2) Pour que la force conjointe du G5 Sahel soit opérationnelle avant la fin de l’année, les Européens ont organisé, du 1er au 12 mai, une nouvelle formation pour 23 officiers des armées de Mauritanie, Mali, Niger, Tchad et Burkina Faso.

Objectif : déployer la force conjointe du G5

Les deux semaines de formation ont été axées sur un objectif clair : permettre aux officiers de liaison des cinq pays de mieux appréhender un déploiement de la Force conjointe du G5 Sahel. Les cours théoriques ont donc été mis en pratique grâce à un exercice pratique, permettant de « tester leurs compétences, de réfléchir sur leur rôle et d’expérimenter les frictions inhérentes à une opération multinationale dans un environnement complexe », selon la mission.

Opération Gecko

L’opération Gecko, qui a duré trois jours, consistait en un déploiement actif de la nouvelle Force conjointe G5 Sahel dans la région de Liptako-Gourma. Les différentes équipes de stagiaires ont été confrontées à « de nombreux incidents qu’elles ont abordées » selon un tryptique de mots d’ordre « qui ont servi de ligne rouge tout au long de l’exercice : coopération, coordination et communication ».

Apprendre à travailler ensemble

La première semaine du cours a porté sur la compréhension partagée du rôle d’un officier de liaison, de la situation dans la région, du contexte de la Force conjointe du G5 Sahel et des principaux acteurs régionaux, y compris les Nations Unies, la Croix-Rouge, EUCAP Sahel Mali et Niger avec lesquels ces officiers devront interagir au quotidien. Des initiations aux modalités d’interview ont également été faites par les officiers de presse d’EUTM.

Notons qu’il s’agit de la troisième formation de ce type. La première avait eu lieu en août 2016. Lire : Première formation en commun d’EUTM Mali pour les officiers du G5 Sahel

(LH)

Lire aussi :

• Une unité régionale au Sahel va être créée. Feu vert des 28
• EUTM Mali passe le cap du 10.000ème soldat formé

EXPOSITION DE PHOTOGRAPHIES
Klavdij Sluban - East to East Mardi 18 avril, 19h Vernissage en présence de l'auteur L'exposition est ouverte jusqu'au 22 mai Belgrade, Institut français, Knez Mihailova 31
Mercredi 19 avril, 19h Présentation de l'œuvre de Klavdij Sluban Galerie ArtGet, Trg Republike 5/I
« Le photographe Klavdij Sluban vient de la moitié d'Europe séparée, il est habitué aux enclos et aux barreaux. Il a voulu aussi enseigner la photographie en prison. Avec ce livre, il visite l'Est, un ex (...)

Ramadan is a time of selfless devotion and a month of above-ordinary worship. It is time of taking a spiritual inventory and reflecting deeply on all matters of moral significance—what it means to be a Muslim, and where does one fit in this vast panoramic community that we know as ‘humanity’.

It is a month long spiritual marathon and a time to cleanse the heart and the mind from a yearlong consumption of spiritual pollution. More importantly, it is a time for practicing Muslims to celebrate the most radical ideas that Prophet Muhammad introduced to an anarchical, Godless society who practiced, among other atrocities, female infanticide.

Number thirty, killing a person unjustly is equivalent to killing all mankind. Life is a sacred blessing granted by the Creator, as such, no human-being is at liberty to unlawfully destroy it. Therefore those parents who ruthlessly buried their infant daughters out of shame are bound to face God’s judgement.

Twenty nine, with forbearance and patience all wounded hearts are mended, and all relationships are strengthened. Vengeance only perpetuates hate and bloodshed. So, forgive the one who transgresses against you; reach-out to the one who cuts you off; give to the one who deprives you or denies you your rights, and, difficult as it may be, forgive those who may have oppressed you.

Twenty eight, speak good or maintain silence. The tongue is the primary vehicle through which ideas, affirmations, and objections of life are conveyed. No other organ in the human body is capable of building more relationships or destroying them more than the human tongue.

Twenty seven, as in justice, kindness and compassion cannot be selective. Be kind, compassionate and fair, even to those who may seem ‘unworthy’.

Twenty six, side with justice even against your loved-ones or against your own self. One should not be blinded by any personal, tribal, or systemic biases set against the marginalized and the disenfranchised.

Twenty five, deal with others in the best manners and employ your best language. Nothing demonstrates your faith more than your character, nothing demonstrates your character more than your manners, and nothing confirms your good manners more than the sensitivity of your language.

Twenty four, one’s gratitude towards God is gauged by one’s gratitude towards other human-beings. From birth onward, each one of us has depended on the compassion and love of other human beings. The same while his or her is on their deathbeds. One’s gratitude is enhanced when one evaluates his or her blessings by looking at those who are less fortunate than them.

Twenty three, give utmost care to all that is entrusted to you. Be trustworthy to all people, including those of other faiths or no faith at all.

Twenty two, seek beneficial knowledge until you find yourself in the grave. Not all knowledge is beneficial and not all beneficial knowledge is spiritual.

Twenty one, control your emotions to avoid volcanoes of anger and tsunamis of wrath. The capacity to overcome anger is the most underestimated power that anyone could possess. He who can control such emotional storms is stronger than the rest.

Twenty, Divine blessings are rotational or function like a pendulum. What you possess today in terms of authority or fortune belongs to others tomorrow. No one, no nation, no race and no faith has exclusive right or claim to it.

Ninteen, whosoever is devoid of gentleness is devoid of all goodness. God grants with the gentle attitude what He would never grant with the harsh one. Even when it does not come naturally, one must take a gentle approach to all matters.

Eighteen, don’t cheat anyone because he cheated you. There are certain wrongs that you do not have the right to get even by doing the same onto the offender. Doing so will put one on a dangerous moral slippery slope.

Seventeen, dignity is found in humility. Above any person of knowledge there is another who is more knowledgeable. Likewise, above all rich person there is another, and above all those with authority, there is another who is more powerful. The best form of humility is the one intentioned to please God.

Sixteen, the legitimate leader of the people is the one who is their tireless servant. Leadership is not designating exclusive privileges and rights to the one whom authority is vested on.

Fifteen, without the right balance, nothing is sustainable. Life is a balancing act. Balance is essential to the spiritual and material well-being as well as all other things in life.

Fourteen, love for your brother that which you love for yourself. One must also hate for one’s brother that which one hates for oneself. Brotherhood is a multilayered concept that includes brotherhood in humanity.

Thirteen, the wealthiest among you is the one who is given contentment of the heart. True wealth is a spiritual state of mind. It is taming one’s greed and appreciating what God portioned for the individual.

Eleven, no one is racially superior to another so long as their essence is the same. All human-beings are children of Adam and Adam is made of dust.

Ten, no jihad is greater than one’s own struggle to overcome one’s evil tendencies. That process of self-purification to tame the elusive impulses of lust, envy, rage and such is the most difficult task to undertake.

Nine, tame your ego with deliberate deprivation. No selfish behavior should be promoted, especially when seeking access to power.

Eight, with right intentions all things fall in their right places. While worldly matters may be judged based on their results, in the spiritual realm all matters are judged based on their intentions.

Seven, faith is a lifeline that each one needs. It is the mechanism through which one navigates his or her way out of the darkness of spiritual ignorance. The highest level of faith is state of relentless God-consciousness and self-policing as each will be summoned before The Judge of all judges.

Six, stand with and empower the poor, the needy, and the oppressed. If one, due to circumstances, found oneself incapable, the least one could do is to provide moral support, or at least hate it in one’s heart.

Five, inquiry is the most effective cure for ignorance. When one does not have all the facts or is not sure, one should ask those who do know, regardless of their faith.

Four, in one capacity or another, each one of you is a leader. Each is a shepherd in a particular setting of life or another- family, community, work, etc. Each shall be judged based on how each discharges his or her responsibility.

Three, the best form of jihad is speaking truth to power. Never assist a tyrant, never capitulate to his oppression, and never trade bloody anarchy for repression.

Two, your neighbors have special rights upon you. Not only should they never be the target of your vices and evils, you should never go to bed bellyful while your neighbor is hungry. Your neighbors are those who live in forty houses in every direction.

One, there is only One Absolute Truth. It is The Truth that transcends all other truths. It is what all other truths stem out of or mimic. It is the Divine Litmus Test through which all proclaimed truths are authenticated. And that never-changing Truth is God. He created all things and set time in motion.

Though nowadays the ritualistic aspect of the month veils its more profound meaning, it is never too late to embrace Ramadan’s radically transformative power.

The post Radical Ideas Muslims Celebrate In Ramadan appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Good evening and welcome to this press conference. Today we welcomed Bruno Le Maire, the new Minister for the Economy of the French government. We all look forward to working together with him. We had to say goodbye to Michael Noonan, who has announced that he will step down from his post. He could still be with us for the June meeting but I didn't want to take the chances of missing his farewell, so we thanked him for all the work he has done for Ireland and for the eurozone. 

I will only speak about Greece, because I think it is the only topic of interest to you tonight. We have made huge progress on the policy package on which so much work had been done in the last months and on which an agreement had been reached between Greece and the institutions. The Eurogroup, of course, welcomed that very much. We are also very positive on the work done in Greece to implement those agreed measures and reforms in prior actions. The Commissioner will say more about that, but a lot of work has already been done in Greece by the Greek government and they are committed to continue that work as soon as possible, so that we can work towards that next disbursement before the summer. 

Having said that, on debt sustainability, we have always said that if there was an agreement on the second review - and I think we are close to formally closing the second review, with a positive outcome - if there is agreement on that, that would open up the debt discussion to see where we are in terms of debt sustainability. This afternoon and this evening we had a first in-depth discussion on the topic of debt sustainability, looking very carefully at needs, options, constraints. But at this point, we have not reached an overall agreement on that part of our discussion. In the coming weeks, we will continue our work on that. We will try to come to an definite conclusion in the next Eurogroup meeting which will be in 3 weeks time. We will use that time well to work hard with the institutions and all member states involved. 

The Eurogroup today has made quite clear that it is ready and prepared to specify further what could be envisaged if needed, in terms of debt relief. Of course, there are two guiding principles for the Eurogroup: that it needs to be inside the package that we had already agreed on 16 May, and that the final decision on what is actually needed and will be put in place, in terms of debt relief, will be taken at the end of the programme. 

The IMF today also made it clear that they welcomed very much the progress made. They are impressed by the reforms and the work done by the Greeks and they still stand ready to go to the board. But they will also wait for the final discussion that we hope to have in 3 weeks time, in the next Eurogroup, on the issue of debt.

So overall - positive developments from Greece, lots of work done tonight. I think we are very close to that agreement. But tonight, we were unable to close a possible gap between what could be done and what some of us had expected should or could be done. We need to close that by looking at the additional options or by adjusting our expectations. Both are possible, and perhaps both should be done. That I think will surely bring us to a more positive and definite conclusion at the next Eurogroup, in June.

A cégek érdeklődése erős a GINOP-3.2.2-8.2.4-16 kódú pályázattal kapcsolatban, mely a vállalati komplex infokommunikációs és mobilfejlesztéseket, felhőalapú online üzleti szolgáltatásokat támogatja. A nagy érdeklődésre való tekintettel összeszedtük, hogy milyen lépéseket tegyenek meg először azok a vállalkozások, melyek még nem kezdtek el foglalkozni a pályázattal.
Egyeztessünk szakemberrel
Bár vannak a pályázat keretében a laikusok számára is egyértelmű célterületek, a keretösszeg legoptimálisabb felhasználása érdekében érdemes már a pályázási folyamat legelején IT szakemberekkel egyeztetnünk.
Az egyszerűen értelmezhető célterületek közé tartozik többek között a beszerzési és logisztikai terület, vagy az internetes értékesítés terület, mely keretében olyan webáruház létrehozására kaphatunk támogatást, mint például a Csokoládé Webshop.
Vannak azonban nehezebben értelmezhető területek, mint például az RFID technológiát alkalmazó specializált rendszer, vagy vállalati CRM terület. Ezek bevezetése persze hasonlóan hasznos lehet, ezért szakember segítségével mérjük fel, hogy vállalkozásunknak pontosan mire van szüksége.

A megfelelő szállító kiválasztása
A felhívás alapján a pályázat benyújtásához elegendő csupán egy árajánlat csatolása, ettől függetlenül viszont célszerű  körültekintően kiválasztanunk a megfelelő céget. A pályázat melléklete pontos követelménylistában határozza meg a szoftverek moduljaival kapcsolatos elvárásokat. Fontos, hogy ennek a szempontrendszernek megfeleljen a bevezetésre kerülő szoftver, ezért a kiválasztás során érdemes megkérdezni a szállítókat, hogy tudják-e teljesíteni a kritériumokat.
Ezen felül a szállítókra vonatkozó kritériumfeltétel, hogy fel tudjanak mutatni három érvényes referenciát. Ezt már csak azért sem érdemes figyelmen kívül hagyni, mert ellenőrzésre kerülhet, hogy valóban rendelkezik-e megfelelő referenciákkal.

Kiknek érdemes pályázni?
A támogatható tevékenységek köre egészen széles, ezért szinte mindenkinek érdemes megismerkednie a pályázatban rejlő lehetőségekkel. Manapság már a versenyképesség egyik alappillére az összes ágazatban, hogy vállalkozásunknál korszerű informatikai megoldások működjenek. Mivel a támogatásra szánt keretösszeg folyamatosan csökken, javasolt minél előbb megtenni az első lépéseket.

Ist ja Alles länger bekannt, das diese Banden, sogar Bettell, Diebstahl und Einbruchs Schulen haben und in Luxus Villen in London, Rumänien, Rom leben. In Deutschland hat man ihnen in Hamburg komplette Strassen Züge zur Verfügung gestellt, inklusive kostenloser Krankenhaus Versorgung. EU und OSCE haben eine Extra Betreuungs Mafia vor Jahren eingerichtet, wo die Politik NGO’s alle Gelder stehlen, als Schleuser arbeiten, diverse NGO’s entsprechend finanziert werden. Hoch gefährliche Leute, welche ihr Unwesen mit Hilfe korrupter Politiker ausüben. Wo sind die vielen Millionen der EU, OSCE verblieben? Die ROMA Mafia mit Luxus Villen und Schleuser Organisationen wie Kinder Handel Roma Schlösser, teilweise mit Goldenen Wasser Hähnen, auch auf Mallorca organisiert, […]

Italy's coastguard pull a man to safety after he was left clinging to a ship's rudder in the Mediterranean.

www.globoport.hu

Mivel 17 millió emberre jut egyetlen fül-orr-gégész Malawiban, a Magyar Afrikai Társaság (AHU) mostani műtős missziójának tagjai egészen elképesztő esetekkel találkoznak munkájuk során. Ahogy számítottak is rá.

Tovább a cikkre

A Magyar Afrika Társaság 15. orvosi missziójának kiemelt együttműködő partnere a Victofon Hallásjavító Kft.
További támogatóink: Erdős és Fiai Cukrászda, Heinz Kurtz GmbH Medizintechnik, Pécsi Tudományegyetem.
Ezúton is minden támogatónak köszönjük a misszióhoz nyújtott segítséget!

Similitudes historiques, affinités culturelles : l'Iran et la Turquie affichent une singulière proximité. Contrairement à bon nombre de leurs voisins au Proche-Orient, ces deux États non arabes sont de construction ancienne. Issus de deux grands Empires, le safavide et l'ottoman, dont la rivalité remonte au XVIe siècle, ils se sont souvent combattus ; ils sont également parvenus, parfois, à trouver des terrains d'entente.

Leur développement politique au cours du XXe siècle présente de multiples ressemblances. Tant la révolution constitutionnelle de 1906 en Perse que celle des Jeunes-Turcs en 1908 transforment la scène politique nationale. Après la Grande Guerre, les deux capitales lancent de concert des programmes de transformation pilotés par l'État. Dès sa fondation par Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, en 1923, la République de Turquie a mis en œuvre une politique de modernisation autoritaire dont Reza Chah s'est inspiré à l'établissement de la dynastie Pahlavi, fin 1925. Après la seconde guerre mondiale, et jusqu'à la révolution islamique de 1979, Ankara et Téhéran redoutent la « menace soviétique » : proches des Occidentaux, et en particulier des États-Unis, ils coopèrent sur le plan militaire au sein du pacte de Bagdad (1955-1958), remplacé après la chute de la monarchie irakienne, en 1958, par l'Organisation du traité central (Cento, 1959-1979).

À partir de 1979, deux systèmes politiques de nature très différente, l'un laïque, l'autre théocratique, doivent coexister. Le nouveau régime iranien condamne la laïcité, rejette le kémalisme et l'occidentalisation de la société turque. Il réprouve les liens d'Ankara avec les États-Unis, avec l'Organisation du traité de l'Atlantique nord (OTAN) et, plus tard, avec Israël. En politique internationale, il opte pour le mouvement des non-alignés et inaugure une « diplomatie islamique » qui rejette à peu près toutes les formes de régime existant au Proche-Orient et plus largement dans le monde musulman. Mais, lors de la guerre Iran-Irak (1980-1988), Téhéran n'a d'autre choix que de mener une politique plus conciliante à l'égard de son voisin : les relations commerciales bilatérales irano-turques redémarrent progressivement. Après la fin de la guerre, malgré le fossé idéologique qui les sépare et l'apparition périodique de dissensions, les deux pays continuent de développer leurs échanges commerciaux, évitant toute aggravation des tensions.

En 2002, l'arrivée au pouvoir du Parti de la justice et du développement (AKP, à l'époque islamiste modéré) en Turquie favorise une reprise plus ample de la coopération. La décennie 2000 se caractérise par un rapprochement inédit depuis la chute du chah. Les liens politiques se renforcent, les visites officielles se multiplient, la collaboration dans le domaine énergétique se confirme, et les échanges économiques connaissent un essor sans précédent. Le volume du commerce passe de 1 milliard de dollars en 2000 à 16 milliards en 2011 (1). En 2012, l'Iran est le premier fournisseur pétrolier et le deuxième fournisseur gazier de la Turquie, juste après la Russie (2). Les sanctions américaines ayant affecté les relations commerciales et financières entre l'Iran et Dubaï, la Turquie joue le rôle de base de repli pour les compagnies iraniennes. Leur nombre explose dans le pays. Selon le ministère turc de l'économie, on en comptait 3 604 en 2014.

Sur le plan diplomatique, Ankara, en coopération avec le Brésil, s'implique dans une médiation sur la question nucléaire iranienne ; sans succès. Cette initiative soulage cependant Téhéran face aux pressions occidentales. En votant contre la résolution 1929 du Conseil de sécurité de l'Organisation des Nations unies (ONU), qui imposait de nouvelles sanctions contre l'Iran, en juin 2010, la Turquie lui a d'ailleurs confirmé son soutien.

(1) « Direction of trade statistics, yearbook 2015 », Fonds monétaire international (FMI), Washington, DC, octobre 2015.

(2) « Oil and gas security. Emergency response of IEA countries », Agence internationale de l'énergie, Paris, 2013.

www.globoport.hu

Az első műtős nap picit lassan indult. Doktoraink az előre többször egyeztetett időpontban beöltözve és bemosakodva már tűkön ültek, míg a betegek még el sem voltak altatva – jelentette Blantyre-ből a magyar műtős missziót segítő Magyar Kereskedelmi és Kulturális Központ (HTCC) malawi irodavezetője, Szeremley Csaba.

Tovább a cikkre

A Magyar Afrika Társaság 15. orvosi missziójának kiemelt együttműködő partnere a Victofon Hallásjavító Kft.
További támogatóink: Erdős és Fiai Cukrászda, Heinz Kurtz GmbH Medizintechnik, Pécsi Tudományegyetem.
Ezúton is minden támogatónak köszönjük a misszióhoz nyújtott segítséget!