Diplomacy & Crisis News

/ Frontières, Palestine (Gaza), Conflit israélo-palestinien - Proche-Orient / Frontières, Palestine (Gaza), Conflit israélo-palestinien - Proche-Orient

/ Géopolitique, Palestine, Diplomatie, État, Crime de guerre, Relations internationales - Proche-Orient / Géopolitique, Palestine, Diplomatie, État, Crime de guerre, Relations internationales - Proche-Orient

The emergency Arab-Islamic summit in Saudi Arabia, which brought togethers leaders from the Arab world, including Bashir Al-Assad, Turkey, and even the president of Iran, has come to a close with the rejection of Israel’s claims to self-defense against Hamas, and a joint call for an immediate ceasefire and an end to the war in Gaza. None of the usual saber rattling from these circles is likely to bring Israel to withdrawal from Gaza before its military objectives are met; even the US, which has repeatedly pressured Israel on instituting humanitarian pauses and pushed it in the direction of a ceasefire, allegedly as a condition for hostage release, will not be much affected by these comments. However, without a doubt, this gathering, unequivocally equating Hamas with the Palestinian cause, is a strategic communication to Jerusalem and Washington. As any overt messages with covert meanings, it is worth deciphering. There are several takeaways that jump to mind if one follows the trajectory of the unfolding events in the Middle East for the past several years.

First, GCC states are terrified of the escalation of the conflict, already ongoing and easily observable from the multiple recent Houthi border attacks on Saudi Arabia, which were more successful than their attacks on Israel. There is also a shared regional concern that if Hizbullah and other Iran-backed proxies escalate, as they have threatened to do in response to Israel’s prolonged ground operations in Gaza, this increased terrorist activity could destabilize Iraq where Saudis, Emiratis, and others recently invested billions. Moreover, after the series of recent bilateral normalization agreements with Bashir Al-Assad, GCC and others are embarrassed that Syrian Iran-backed militias are emerging as some of the most active players in the widening conflict, particularly against US troops. Whatever may have been the behind-the-scenes pressure, Assad takes Iran’s lead, and backing by Russia and increasingly China, as far more persuasive than the calls from Riyadh and elsewhere.

The region is not prepared for what Iran might do next. The entire East of Saudi Arabia is Shia majority, and Iran has been indoctrinating the population there for decades. Houthis are bordering Saudis and are ready to strike, and on the other side of KSA are the Iraqi militias, also organized to strike. None of that is in the news. There has been no action taken by the Defense Ministry to defend the borders. UAE is a small state heavily dependent on Iran for trade and has been a past victim of Houthi missiles as well. Abu Dhabi has no real chance to succeed in a direct war with Iran or its proxies. Bahrain has a huge Shia presence linked to Hezbullah and Iran, and the Arab Spring would have resulted in the loss of monarchy there if not for the Saudis who are no longer in position or willing to defend them. We have seen the Saudi silence in the face of a recent Houthi drone attack on a Bahraini base in Yemen which killed several people and wounded over 50 Bahrainis.

The Islamists and their corrupt supporters who are now clearly taking charge of foreign policy in KSA  have been making money from the financial arrangements resulting from the normalization with Iran and not willing to give up power to face Iran off. They have allowed Iranian presence into the country with the return of the Iranian diplomats. They have also facilitated the free flow of intelligence through Qatar and Iran and Houthis, starting with the push for the ill-begotten Al-Ula agreement. The Foreign Ministry has for years have worked to legitimize the Houthis as a peace partner contrary to MBS’s and his brother’s agenda. For that reason, Khalid bin Salman, the defense minister, was seemingly missing in action during recent Houthi attacks on Saudi borders that killed several soldiers. Turkey is not so much worried about Iran as it agrees with its agenda on this issue and has been actively helping Iran. Erdogan has refused to oust Hamas from Turkey, and for years has allowed Hamas cells to plan attacks in Israel. Qatar has effectively sided with Iran – the coordinated statements following the October 7 attack are quite clear. Kuwait is essentially ruled by the Muslim Brotherhood, which is overwhelmingly in control of the population, with the Royal Family forced to cater to their ideology. Oman is one of Iran’s top trade and military partners; Baghdad and Assad have been essentially coopted by Iran. The Iraqi government is hostage to Tehran’s whims. Egypt is increasingly isolated internationally; according to many reports, the Islamists in Egypt are on the rise and taking advantage of the economic crisis; pro-Islamist political factions in Egypt are more interested in working with Russia, China, and Iran than with the US.

In Morocco, the King has been less visible and there have been many shocking and largely unreported pro-Hamas rallies recently despite the Muslim Brotherhood party being formally out of government. There is reason to believe that many hidden Islamists rose through security institutions to take the royal system by surprise. Moreover, unideological but otherwise corrupt officials made common cause with Iran through covert trade circles and business deals despite lack of formal relations between these countries. These lobbies are now taking advantage of the regional situation to isolate those who have supported King Mohammed VI’s regional vision for integration. In short, anyone willing to stand up to Iran and its spheres of influence has been either discredited, ostracized, or compromised. The rest are either willing to help Iran or are scared of Pro-Iran forces and the potential and growing support for them from Russia and China. Simultaneously, US is clearly unwilling to engage in a show of direct force and even lets its own troops get attacked in Iraq and Syria.

Second, it has long since become apparent that Iran is the new leader and decisionmaker in the region; the Gaza summit runs parallel to a summit with Iran president who came to Saudi Arabia for this purpose. These two events cemented this perception. Although Saudi Arabia recently normalized with Iran, there are tensions inherent to this relationship; KSA remains a target of Iran’s theocratic dogma and single-minded dedication to become the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques and Tehran’s aspiration to assert religious, not just geopolitical primacy over the region and the Muslim world. Iran has been calling the shots behind the scenes on the theater of war in Gaza and regionally the entire time; those who presume that Hezbullah or any other proxy makes its decision independently are misguided.

A WSJ report from 6 months before the October 7 attack on Israel underscores Iran’s influence, as an Iranian official traveled to Beirut in April to call on Gaza and Hezbullah to attack Israel; Ramadan riots, which also featured Palestinian Islamic Jihad rockets from Gaza ensued at about the same time. Later reports indicate that at least some officials in Iran had direct knowledge of the October 7 attack and gave a final approval to it; Hamas also indicated the level of long-term Iran support that went far beyond general proxy-building. A month before the Simchat Torah assault, 500 Hamas and PIJ fighter reportedly trained in Iran. All logistical and military calculations are done by Iran, and Iran calls the shots on the level of involvement by various proxies. Thus the summit is less about forcing Israel into a withdrawal and more about acknowledging Iran’s lead on this issue; GCC states and others need to appease Iran, not Israel, if they wish to avoid escalation and entrapment by Iran’s regional army; therefore the purpose of the summit was simply to ingratiate themselves to the overlords in Tehran. The summit represents a weakened Saudi Arabia and the Arab world to appease Iran and to follow its lead on information warfare for fear of being punished if they appear not sufficiently obsequious to its goals.

Third, it is clear that the Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman is no longer in charge – if he ever was fully in charge – but is compelled to carry out instructions and to follow the official Saudi foreign policy dictated by others. Indeed, officially, the foreign policy of the country is subject only to the king himself. Much fanfare has been made in the media over Mohammed bin Salman’s allegedly assertive role in regional affairs; however, should the king choose to put a limit to this responsibility, his son would still have to follow the official orders as the Prime Minister. Moreover, while the king himself has not been visible in the past 6 months, it is very clear that given the choice, the Crown Prince would likely have continued his previous line, which has always clashed with the Foreign Ministry and other more conservative elements of the country’s advisory circles. This entire arrangement of normalizing with countries and ideologies he clearly despised, including Assad, who had very little to bring to the Saudi table, as well as the tone of the two summits, have run so sharply in contrast to his previously stated concerns and policies that one can only surmise the Crown Prince has been deprived of any choice on the course of the events.

The answer to who is really running the show in Saudi Arabia lies with the people who have been pushing a pro-Iran and pro-Houthi policy the entire time, such as the long-serving Saudi Ambassador to Yemen, Mohammed AlJaber, who has been in that position since before Mohammed bin Salman rose to his current status, and who has been pushing for diplomatic channels with Houthi and undermining the official defense policy at the time Mohammed bin Salman was still the Defense Minister. Others of that ilk have been making more frequent appearance in public pushing the Palestinian cause in contrast to MBS’s efforts, since the start of the COVID pandemic, as the supporters of the Crown Prince’s policies became increasingly quieter first in the Saudi Arabic language media, and then in the outreach to the pro-Israel circles in the US. One early warning sign of the change in the political trajectory was Prince Turki Al Faisal’s surprise appearance at the Manama Summit immediately following the conclusion of Saudi Arabia’s G20 hosting duties in late November 2020, where he waxed at length about the importance of that issue while attacking Israel, despite the fact that the very purpose of the Manama Summit was to disengage from the old-school politicizing of the Palestinian cause. Its aim, undermined by Turki Al-Faisal’s comments, was to focus on integrating the region, including Israelis and Palestinians under the economic umbrella, envisioned by the Trump administration.

People such as AlJaber and Turki Al-Faisal are the so-called “Old Guard” of the Saudi politics, the portion of the Royal Family close to the late King Abdullah and the former Crown Prince Mohammed bin Nayef, many of whom share pro-Muslim Brotherhood paradigm and who even attempted to reunify Hamas and Fatah at a summit in Saudi Arabia over Ramadan this past year. Turki Al Faisal is also the former Saudi intelligence chief, who had faded into the background as the Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman had risen in influence, but who has, for the last three years, once again displaced Mohammed bin Salman in public view, especially with respect to addressing regional concerns. Turki Al-Faisal has in fact recently restated Saudi opposition over the war in Gaza, attacking Netanyahu, repeating the Foreign Ministry’s initial position that Israel brought the Hamas attack on itself, and justifying the Hamas attack as provoked by “occupation”, a message that had been widely shared by Hamas and by Muslim Brotherhood in the days and weeks preceding Turki Al-Faisal’s public appearance. His role in this matter was surprising, because normally MBS or his brother, Khalid bin Salman, the defense minister, would have been expected to express the official foreign policy. The shift indicates that despite senior official titles, the order of importance has shifted from Salman’s and his sons to some other branch of the family, and Prince Turki was speaking on their behalf.

Finally, the collective gathering to issue the statement calling for an immediate ceasefire and rejecting Israel’s claim to self-defense, underscores that all who gathered there, however reluctantly, have agreed to accept Iran as the leader on the Palestinian cause and have also accepted Iran’s position that Hamas, rather than anyone else, represents Palestinians. By agreeing to these underlying premises, the participants have implicitly acknowledged that they are also accepting all claims by Hamas, however unlikely, self-serving, and outright fictitious. This means that by accepting Hamas’s legitimacy in public and its rule over Gaza this gathering may eventually act beyond verbiage such as the failed motion to impose an oil embargo to force the US and its allies to pressure Israel into putting a stop to combat and to save Hamas from severe military losses. UAE and Bahrain have rejected the breakdown of the Abraham Accords de jure, but de fact the damage has been significant. In months leading up to the attack, there already has been a roll back in the sale of Israeli products in UAE; pro-Israel speakers were becoming unwelcome at the Emirati universities. And while the Bahraini shura (council) never ratified the Abraham Accords to begin with, the fact that it was now vocally rising up to challenge the foreign policy adopted by the King is also a worrying sign. 

Ultimately, 11 countries declined to ratify the punitive clauses that would sanction #Israel, embargo oil in a repetition of the 1973 crisis, or severe diplomatic relations. In fact, according to media reports, KSA was one of the countries to help block the most extreme of these initiatives. The reasons for that may seem paradoxical given the context. Ironically, Saudi Arabia is perfectly fine with doing underhanded business deals with Israeli companies so long as they are registered outside Israel. Moreover, the Saudis and Israelis, along with the other Abraham Accords signatories, continue some level of defense cooperation. But any political, social, and cultural movement towards improved relations, much less formal diplomacy, has become a taboo topic.  American Jews, such Jared Kushner, are given a platform to push for normalization at public business events aimed at attracting foreign investors; however, that topic is not visited in internal discussions. Likewise, the feverish media campaign about the alleged prospects for normalization between Saudi Arabia and Israel, was superficial; there was no real movement in that direction, as confirmed to the author from multiple sources. It was politically beneficial to the US, to Netanyahu who strove to tout regional diplomacy and to distract from domestic upheavals, and gave the Saudis an excuse to earn some cheap PR points with Biden in an election year while pushing for defense-related concessions. October 7 gave them a much needed excuse to withdraw from the appearance of talks – always exclusively with the US, with no participation by any Israeli officials – rather quickly. But Saudi Arabia was not the only interested party in the double talk on this issue – tough political posturing on the one hand, while looking for leeway to avoid a complete breakdown in relations. Egypt, too, despite a significant bilateral deterioration in relations, has avoided withdrawing from the peace treaty. At least one of the reasons for that is economic: Cairo is dealing with a significant economic crisis; Israel’s withdrawal from gas related extraction as a result of the war impacted Egypt’s business. It also cannot afford to lose the remnants of US aid, directly dependent on normalized relations.

Countries like Mauritania and Somalia were alleged to be in the middle of rapprochement with Israel and one or both of them were expected to join up with the regional ministerial N7 gathering that was to be held by Morocco, and that had already been postponed even before the attack. Maintaining a lifeline to Israel out of economic self-interest may prevent a repetition of the 1970s for now; if the war lingers on, that could change. However, despite avoiding a drastic fallout, the Arab states are faced with the reality that the Hamas attack on Israel in the wake of the US continued search for some sort of a diplomatic breakthrough leaves them vulnerable to Iran, as Israel is now perceived to be weakened. They are losing control of their own populations, which, by and large, did not back the Abraham Accords and did not have an opportunity to be fully immersed in the people-to-people outreach. The attack has reversed much of the slow progress made over the past years since the conclusion of the Accords, and probably set back these relations many years.

Indeed, despite suffering military losses in Gaza, Hamas is enjoying its greatest public relations victory since the 2007 takeover of Gaza in the partial elections that took place. The rhetoric from the Arab and Muslim states is emboldening the fighters to continue its stand-off with Israel; the successful galvanizing of the masses of supporters globally are amplifying the propaganda success, and the recruitment of new followers who are now reinvigorated by the apparent mass victory, and example of the Hamas fighters in avoiding detecting and striking a major blow to the enemy, is likely through the roof. That, too, has an impact on the Arab street who for years was beginning to think that Muslim Brotherhood-linked movements were dying. The OCtober 7 attack sent the message to the contrary. The result is now an additional pressure factor on the Arab governments to avoid internal upheaval they may not be able to control

Israel’s messaging has not always been effective either, in this context. The government sees its neighbors as having turned against it and views such actions as betrayal. But countries like Egypt are left in between a rock and a hard place, and are managing to hold back waves of popular resentment as some of the military action by Israel near their own borders that they see as overreach and which may not be necessary to meet immediate objectives. Israel, in an uncompromising mode, is unlikely to be listening to these concerns, which only adds fuel to the fire. Without a doubt, however, the hardcore conservatives in the Middle East, are taking full advantage of this congruence of factors to their full advantage. Let’s recall a telling revelation from the recent explosive Semafor article by Jay Solomon, who reveals the extent of IRanian influence campaigns in Europe and the United States.

Ariane Tabatabai, currently a Pentagon official who still has access to classified information, at one point turned to senior Iranian officials for guidance on some of her duties. She was told to hold off responding to an invitation by Israelis to a conference there, but received a greenlight to accept an approach from Turki Al-Faisal in Saudi Arabia, which took place in 2014, years before Mohammed bin Salman reached the peak of his influence. At the time, it appears, Iran viewed the Saudi Old Guard as a possible partner for some of its agenda. After all, Khomeini had the Muslim Brotherhood texts translated to Farsi and popularized in Iran following the Islamic Revolution. Despite some ideological differences, the revolutionary fervor, nepotism, corruption, conservatism, and similar dogmatic and authoritarian approaches among the Islamists in power circles were, on some level, always stronger than ethnic and religious strife that has kept Iran and Saudi Arabia at a distance historically. All of these factors were bubbling under the surface of the Arab-Muslim Summit – but this complex history and political dynamics were apparently disregarded by the US officials who had spent countless hours since the war broke out traveling around the region in an effort to bring the regional leaders into the US fold on this issue and against Hamas.

Despite this seemingly active shuttle regional diplomacy by various high level US officials, the outcome has been a dismal failure. The limitation of the US foreign policy is that it has not brought anything to the table that would address any of the above mentioned concerns. It has not given up on a futile policy of trying to come to a deal with Iran; it has not properly countered China’s growing political and aspirational military presence in the Middle East and North Africa; it has not been willing to name Iran’s direct hand in the October 7 attack, and it has not provided its Middle Eastern allies with any reassurances, commitments, or offers that would make it worth their while to align with Israel. 

It has also failed to differentiate between the various competing factions in these governments and the divergent interests over the future of their countries, much less the general trajectory of the region. The conservatives in GCC begrudgingly went along with some of the more aggressive reforms, particularly in Saudi Arabia, but overall wished to limit these reforms to specific economic and cosmetic social changes, without a full reimaging of the entire infrastructure and political direction of their societies, which would include a more open and integrated approach to other ethnicities, religious views, and countries. They viewed most of MBS’s Vision2030 as fundamentally in conflict with their own values, but so long as he appeared to have power and some level of backing from the US, were willing to play along. The Khashoggi fallout undid much of the international good will, weakened the Crown Prince politically, and gave these factions an an opening to return to power and to put pressure from within to hinder, slow down, or reverse the progress made in reimagining Saudi Arabia and the region away from these fundamentalist or in many cases, completely ahistorical convictions and misinterpretations. These factions were willing to use the Palestinian cause to retain or regain the favor of the street, and for decades have been much more conciliatory towards Iran than the more nationalist-inclined of the factions, such as the reformists. T

hey believed that they could come to some sort of a power sharing understanding with Tehran, and on the basis of tribal and nepotistic interests, were more concerned with what would happen to their own private fiefdoms and gravy trains, than how Iran’s hold in the region could affect the societies and the region overall. Hence, we saw years of parallel shadow diplomacy with the Houthis, Iran, and other proxies and factions that seemed to contradict and undermine the official, assertive line and defense position which also extended to other Saudi allies. Ultimately, such positioning not only contributed to the weakening of the nationalist line and leadership in KSA, but contributed to strife with some of its closest regional allies. Similarly, UAE was maneuvered by such lobbies away from a strong cohesive line supportive of an anti-Islamist anti-Iran position, and into rivalry with Riyadh. The result of these divisive politics was increased regional sectarianism, deteriorating relations, and opening for Iran and its proxies to divide, conquer, and push their own agendas, while isolating Arab states, and turning them against each other.  Moreover, Israel’s catastrophic intelligence failures made it appear weak and isolated, undermining its position as a regional asset capable of standing up to Iran. ISrael was once seen as an additional unifying factor that could bring the region together against Iran and smooth over the edges among the Arab “brothers”. But that perception started to change with the Al Ula agreement, which brought Qatar, as a Trojan horse, back into the fold of the Arab states, and weakened Israel’s position.

The October 7 events struck an even stronger blow to Israel’s deteriorating status. The only way for it to accomplish that  – to return to the prestige of the bygone era of only a few years ago – is to restore deterrence, but because it is seen as the “weaker horse”, the Arab and Muslim world will be working against it, not with it, in this matter (the Gaza war). US and Israel are also not willing to confront the fact of Islamist agenda, generously funded by Qatar, continuing to repeat past political mistakes in that regard, which only empowers the anti-Islamist elements. ISrael has had a policy of non-interference in the internal political affairs of the Arab states; it showed no particular interest in the power struggle between the reformists and the Old Guard; the Sunni and the Shia; the nationalists and the nepotists. And the US, for decades, preferred the Islamists and genuinely considered them as a grassroots movement reflective of the majority of the population, and thus worthy of respect, rather than than a fanatic, exclusivist, hierarchical highly tribal faction that represented problematic ideology that threatened US security interests in the region and beyond. Both countries, Israel and the US,  have either intentionally or by negligence betrayed the reformists in Saudi Arabia, who previously led the region and their effort to stand up to Iran, leading to a chain of events which culminated in the Arab-Islamic Summit in Saudi Arabia; the only way to fix the situation is for Israel to prevail and to wise up to the fact that Iran and Hamas are political problems as much as military ones while finding a way to help their few beleaguered allies.

Irina Tsukerman is a Fellow at the Arabian Peninsula Institute and a Fellow at the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs.

/ Défense, Armée, Israël - Proche-Orient / Défense, Armée, Israël - Proche-Orient

Version remaniée et mise à jour de cartes du Manière de voir « Palestine. Un peuple, une colonisation ». / Conflit israélo-arabe, Palestine (Gaza), Palestine (Jérusalem), Palestine mandataire 1922-1948, Palestine (Cisjordanie), Guerre israélo-arabe 1967, Israël, Histoire, Palestine, Conflit (...) / Conflit israélo-arabe, Palestine (Gaza), Palestine (Jérusalem), Palestine mandataire 1922-1948, Palestine (Cisjordanie), Guerre israélo-arabe 1967, Israël, Histoire, Palestine, Conflit israélo-palestinien - Proche-Orient

Après une offensive éclair des forces de l'Azerbaïdjan le 19 septembre dernier, la quasi-totalité des habitants de la république autoproclamée du Haut-Karabakh ont fui vers l'Arménie. Cet exode vécu comme une nouvelle tragédie par tous les Arméniens s'inscrit dans un conflit séculaire marqué par le (...) / Frontières, Azerbaïdjan, Arménie, Géopolitique, Autodétermination des peuples, Diplomatie, Droit international, Guerre du Haut-Karabakh 1988-1994, Conflit - 2023/11

En 1921, l'Anglaise Nancy Cunard (1896-1965) s'installe à Paris. Très liée à Louis Aragon, elle tourbillonne avec l'avant-garde et fréquente les surréalistes. Elle, l'héritière de la compagnie de navigation transatlantique Cunard Line, va adhérer au communisme. Elle consacre deux ans à susciter des (...) / Intellectuels, Impérialisme, Idées, Afro-Américains, Droits des minorités, Droits humains, Histoire - 2023/11

Troisième plus gros vendeur d'armes du monde, la France ne figure pas à ce rang par hasard. Ce commerce fut au cœur de l'ambition de Paris d'incarner une puissance autonome vis-à-vis des États-Unis et de l'ex-URSS. Une stratégie qui a conduit son administration à se mettre au service des industriels (...) / Stratégie militaire, Défense, Armée, Industrie de l'armement, Économie, Capitalisme - 2023/11

Discussions surrounding the entrance into a Third World War by some media commentaries take the position that wars in Eastern Europe and the Middle East will lead to an inevitable conflict between China and Taiwan without many other options to quell the oncoming conflict. While the War in Ukraine was entering a period of set defensive positions and trench warfare, September of 2023 actually saw an upcoming peace treaty forming in the Middle East between two of its major powers, China attempting to play the role as peace broker between conflicting parties, and India making roads into regions beyond its own to balance the power dynamic abroad. Conflict is never inevitable, but contributing to self inflicted wounds will always have a negative impact on one’s own society.

Russia has been able to renew production in one of its main factories that produce the T-72B3M tank and the newer and more modern T-90 and T-90M tanks due to increased revenues gained during the war. While Russia has been taking old stocks of T-62s and T-55s and putting them into active combat, the revenue it has gained from oil sales since heavy sanctions were placed on them since the start of the war in 2022 has not hurt Russia’s economy as intended. Some analysts claim that while Russian oil exports were cut to some degree to the rest of Europe, a main source of oil from Azerbaijan to Europe could include a good percentage of Russian energy exports. It is claimed that Russia has been able to still sell its energy exports to Europe through third countries, who purchases the oil from Russia and sells it into Europe via their established links. If generally known by NATO and its allies, funds going through a third party to Russia is clearly and knowingly evading sanctions and fuelling not only European energy grids, but Russian tank factories extending the war. Increased military spending to Ukraine thus becomes less effective when funds are also leaking into Russia to support their war economy as well. Quelling further conflict is an economic issue as much as it depends on victories on the battlefield. NATO must secure their energy needs from their allies to end the war. Funding conflict by any means only leads to more conflict.

The result of the oil dependency on Azerbaijan has lead to conflict on the borders of Europe and Russia, where a historic act of Ethnic Cleansing has taken place as a result of the situation discussed above. In September of 2023, the region of Nagorno-Karabakh/Artsakh was taken over by Azeri forces completely, and much of the ancient Armenian population of the region was actively and passively removed from the ethnic enclave they have resided in for thousands of years. Russian treaties establishing peacekeepers in the region was not activated in 2023 due to Russian attention in Ukraine, as well as what some suggest the oil arrangement mentioned above between Russia and Azerbaijan. American efforts to negotiate between the two sides gave few results, while US NATO ally Turkey, enabled much of the military achievements by Azerbaijan over Armenian militia in Artsakh. As recent as September 2023, a major human rights tragedy has taken place, with little to no mention of it in Western media, even though it was against Western strategic interests and values.

The links between Russia, Iran and China are often geographical, and like minded peoples in the region should be welcomed without reservations to bolster a peaceful alliance of nations. The historic neutral position India has taken had always enabled it to be a broker between NATO and the Soviet Union in the past, and had lead to some interesting agreements. An example of this is the Indian military, that uses French aircraft and British equipment while producing under contract Ex-Soviet and Russian weapons for their domestic military. Much of the export focus and infrastructure agreements between Russia and Iran focuses on a path to get Russian export to India, one of Russia’s largest markets. While the West should allow India to take any measures it deems necessary to secure their national interests, it should also stand with India against threats it sees in its own region from fundamentalism and pressure from China. India is set to become one of the most powerful nations in the world, and is the key to many peace agreements by working to end conflicts to its own benefit. India has even sold MLRS systems Armenia, seeing that distant nation as one that should be supported, even when Russia and the United States had let their community suffer another bout of atrocities. Any NATO or Western ally that intends to sour relations with India or enable further conflict will only enable future wars. India and its values are similar to those in the West, and support for those values are what ends future conflicts.

Western countries must be clear and concise in applying their laws equally, and should have zero tolerance for activities in their nations that produce conflict locally and in other parts of the world. This also means that actions in Western countries should have legal and political consequences if they contribute to conflict, terror and atrocities themselves. Funding for groups and the enablement of systemic corruption to foreign nations via systemic loopholes is one of the key sources of financing for many of the security issues we see today. This applies abroad, as well as internally. Allowing illegal funds to flow through a stable community will subject many legal transactions to sanctions due to their links to crimes against humanity abroad. A purchase of a car or even a home can produce a massive loss of assets if it discovered that the asset is linked to nefarious organisations, and a Western or any Government should be liable if it allows extreme elements to benefit or manipulate their economic systems to the detriment of their own populations. Allies must be allies in every sense of the word, or be ejected from NATO and other organisations for negligence and corruption. As we see post Sept 2023, a false ally leads to some of the worst consequences known to humanity.

The Sinjar Mountain range was the site of a massacre of the small Yazidi community in 2014.

The values that created the concept of Proportionality are as essential to a democratic system as the core tenets of Human Rights and all core Constitutional foundations. Arbitrary justice towards innocent people are as damaging as the disproportionate application of laws and state actions towards anyone accused of an act against the state. This basic standard has to be applied even in cases when an illegal act occurred, is unproven, or simply fictional. Ignoring or removing Proportionality from society does not only unravel justice, but is inherently Anti-Renaissance and has no final resolution that would be recognisable in a modern society.

The normalisation of brutal actions against some of the oldest cultures to still exist on Earth came after 2013 when the world was forced to acknowledge the human rights atrocities taking place in the Sinjar Mountains against a small, ancient community known as the Yazidis. Like many of the oldest communities to still exist in that region, that era saw the introduction of atrocities reflective of the most darkest of ages, with actions being taken against defenseless civilians not seen since the Second World War.

Despite that era demonstrating the capacity of brutality against innocents, there was little discussion of atrocities taking place against the Yazidis after the initial condemnation. While conflict was still taking place and shifts in territory and power were constant, the initial response from Western media turned to silence on the issue. Despite many being taken into slavery, tortured and executed for simply being born of their ancient culture, an unacceptable silence was coordinated that avoided and ignored their plight. The commission of acts of crime against humanity done to Yazidi women and youth, along with such crimes against other ethnic minorities inside Iraq and the surrounding region, was not unique to being subject to silence. Since then, silence has come in the same manner to other human rights atrocities and in many cases were made to become an appalling standard for acceptance. What such responses have done was to normalise a mark on humanity where our descendants will look back at our time in history with shame.

The silence and normalisation of the actions taken against the Yazidi and other victims of brutality did not end with a silence of words, but continued with silencing justice as well. While some Yazidi women were able to escape and survive their atrocity, there were  documented cases in a Western countries where the Yazidi refugee/survivor ran into their torturer in the same country and city they sought protection in. In one notable case, when the refugee sought help and protection after being threatened yet again, she was told to be silent about it and ignore her most basic rights to justice and security. The same government who pushed her silence then used such silence to create more danger to her and others afterward, eventually celebrating their historic loss of Proportionality in an epic display of both ignorance and viciousness in their democracy. This normalisation started a trend that has now become something most would see as unrecognisable to their community just a few very short years ago.

The normalisation of this unravelling of Proportionality through silence, harassment, and open contempt for others has no end game that would build anything apart from a disproportionate set of laws that only offer justice to a few generational elites and those who would commit to power through coercion. The reality is that such actions have that as their core purpose. That purpose has no future for any of us in any form.

The fall of the Soviet Union lead to severe economic and security challenges for Russia and its former Soviet States. The recent fall of Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijan and evacuation of the historical Armenians in the region was a direct result of Russia no longer challenging for the safety of their religious allies. Russia always took to protecting their Armenian allies, who were under the protection of Russia for generations, and maintained a status quo in the region since 1991. This failure to shield them from religious and ethnic conflict near Russia’s borders in 2023 may be a policy that those living in Russia would have a difficult time supporting.

While the lines in Ukraine seems to have solidified for the time being, the end result of the depletion of Russian forces and influence in regions that once bordered the Soviet Union is significant. Russia suffered greatly from extremist elements of their own after the collapse of the Soviet Union, with the two wars in Chechnya causing great harm and political chaos for Russians in the not too distant past. The Beslan School Massacre and terror attack in the Moscow Theater Siege were some of the most horrific acts of violence against Russian citizens since the Second World War. Much of the issues on Russia’s southern border regions was the motivation for sending in Russian Armed Forces in a multi year operation against ISIS in Syria, ending in a change in operational culture and ethics by Russian soldiers themselves being witness to the brutality of that war. This exposure to excessive violence may have resulted in a mindset that ended with atrocities being committed under the Russian flag in Ukraine.

Recent events in the Middle East will play greatly into the view Russians will have of their own Government in the near future. While Russia produced some of the most advanced technologies and weapons in human history, the purchase of low technology drones from Iran to be used as terror weapons in Ukraine is a strategy that would not be recognizable by their grandparents who liberated many Concentration Camps and won what they call in Russian, The Great Patriotic War. Much of the public support Russia receives for its military in Ukraine comes from the past honours it achieved against liberating Eastern Europe from the Nazis. This historical tradition is one of the main narratives Russia uses as a motivation for the war in Ukraine. Tying themselves to allies that would cause chaos in their southern regions and that have a major role in the current death and kidnapping of Russian nationals is not what past generations would have accepted as a norm for Russia.

While Russia had assumed an assertive, but privately neutral position with all the major powers in the Middle East, it is difficult to see why they would decide to link themselves to narratives that have caused chaos in the past within their own borders and lead to the death of Russians themselves. Russia is still a significant player in their own region and those adjacent, and any actions that pull them towards civilian deaths caused by interests far from their own is something most Russians will remember for generations. These crucial policy decisions can unravel stability very quickly, usually not to the benefit of innocent people. Such events are not unknown to those who grew up in Russia or the former Soviet Union, and can easily become today’s reality.

Undoubtedly, Vladimir Putin’s decision to invade Ukraine was a miscalculation. Nevertheless, many international observers were shocked when Russian tanks started to roll across the border despite mounting evidence that Putin would go through with it. Ostracizing his country from the Western liberal economies was incomprehensible to most. At the same time, it is all too easy to denounce his exploits as the work of a revisionist madman. Yes, Ukraine was once a part of the Soviet Union, and Putin certainly disdains NATO expansion, but there is an ideology underlying his seemingly erratic behavior. This year, the Russian Federation officially adopted Eurasianism as its foreign policy concept. A peculiar fusion of Russian imperialism and socialism, this socio-political dogma looks set to guide Russia’s role in the world for the remainder of Putin’s tenure. But what exactly is Eurasianism, and what geographical region even constitutes Eurasia?

In 1881, poet Fyodor Dostoevsky remarked of the Russians, “In Europe we were Tatars, whereas in Asia we, too, are Europeans.” After a series of political setbacks in Europe during the late 19th century, the Russian elite started to embrace the geographical and cultural isolation that the Western powers long looked down upon. Turning inwards and to the East for inspiration, many concluded that Russia is neither European nor Asiatic but rather a unique conglomeration of the two. This shift in mentality marked a departure from the Westernization process initiated by Peter the Great and laid the foundation of Eurasianism.

In its earliest form, the ideology emerged as an alternative to Bolshevism, developed in exile by White Russian émigrés who fled the 1917 October Revolution. However, the philosophy gained little traction, and it was not until the fall of the Soviet Union that it resurfaced. That collapse, which Putin called “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century,” left an ideological void in Russia for the first time in its history. “Each stage had its own ideology,” said the recently reelected President Boris Yeltsin in 1996, but now, he continued, “We have none.” Unquestionably, this period of political disorientation played a pivotal role in Putin’s psychological development, who remained determined to restore meaning to the Russian government and the place it once held in the world.

The 2023 foreign policy concept designates Russia as a “Eurasian and Euro-Pacific power.” In the Kremlin’s eyes, Eurasia includes, at a minimum, all the former territories of the Soviet Union. By virtue of geography and historical destiny, Russia sees itself as the region’s predominant power, asserting its rightful sphere of influence. Moreover, the concept characterizes Russia as a “country-civilization” with unique values, morals, and historical mission. Consequently, the country cannot be evaluated or understood through the Western lens of liberal democracy. According to the document, this mission is to maintain the global balance of power and foster a multipolar international system. In practice, this aspiration reflects the long-held Eurasianist goal of positioning Russia as an alternative center of power, distinct from the West and Asia. Reminiscent of the USSR’s lost international prominence, Putin envisions his country as the future military-political nucleus of the non-Western world. As expected, this vision and so-called historical mission are inseparable from his desire to erode America’s global influence.

Thus, it probably comes with little surprise that today’s Eurasianists are vehemently anti-Western, particularly against the U.S. and its associated values. America is portrayed as the archetypal nemesis, imposing its democratic norms and way of life on the world. In contrast, Eurasianists are fiercely traditional and religious, at least in principle, maintaining a quasi-spiritual outlook. They perceive a West suffering from intellectual and societal decay, forsaking its Christian values. Following decades of suppression under the Soviets, the Russian Orthodox Church has regained its influential role in society and consistently supported Putin’s imperialist inclinations. Like the Moscow Patriarchate, autocratic traditions run deep in Russian history, with Putin the latest in a long line of absolutists. Eurasianists contend that democracy is dangerous, individualistic, hedonistic, and antithetical to the country’s political foundations.

In retrospect, Putin’s speech at the 2007 Munich Security Conference made it perfectly clear that his patience with the West and its rules-based order was starting to run thin. Unfortunately, European and American leaders dismissed it as a one-off tirade, believing the Russian threat died with the Soviet Union never to rise again. Nearly 17 years later, U.S.-Russian relations are as strained as they were at any point during the Cold War.

While a complete rapprochement between Moscow and the West appears exceptionally elusive, Eurasianism offers a glimpse of how future Russian foreign policy might unfold. To be sure, Putin remains a pragmatic opportunist subservient to no ideology. However, given the rupture between his country and the West, Eurasianism provides a rationale for his diplomatic reorientation to Southeast Asia. This shift is already evident, with China and India purchasing oil at discount rates while supplying goods targeted by Western sanctions to Russia. In the first seven months of 2023, Beijing’s total trade with Moscow increased 36% from a year before. Beyond expanding economic ties, Putin’s activities abroad signal a clear intent to challenge the existing order, supposedly in an attempt to fulfill its historic mission as the facilitator of global multipolarity. Whether it is pushing for the rapid expansion of BRICS or courting dictators in the Middle East, the essence of this guiding doctrine appears centered on diminishing American influence at every available opportunity. Serving as the bridge between Asia and Europe, the successful realization of Eurasianist thought in Russia hinges on its dominance of the near abroad, a harsh lesson that the Ukrainian people are tragically experiencing. The prospects of Putin restoring Russia’s place in the world are doubtful, but one thing is certain: his Eurasianist principles ensure that his country will not go down without a fight.

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