Diplomacy & Crisis News

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The retired U.S. general and former CIA director on lessons from the war on terrorism and why military action is necessary—but not sufficient.

It is Common Knowledge that Soviet Soldiers Liberated Many Concentration Camps during the Second World War

In past posts on this page, I discussed what decisions are more likely to hurt a plausible victory for Ukraine and their allies by way of their own hands, as opposed to strategic decisions made by Russia during the conflict in Ukraine. Many of these bad decisions subsequently ramped up quite rapidly and in a short period of time, creating a larger cost to support for Ukraine than existed previously. Many of these problems were created by Allies to the war effort that have taken actions that may hurt Ukraine more than the help that was intended. While I will refrain from labelling a specific ally, this is a case study on how to not support your ally, and a notable one at that.

A few short weeks ago, one of Ukraine’s allies took to creating a diplomatic row with India. This was done in a method that is considered an aggressive and unusual diplomatic move between the two countries, seen as allies in their own right. India, as we have discussed in the past, is likely the key to many peace treaties and has value in creating diplomatic solutions between Russia and its allies, and Ukraine and their allies. India, as being a large and significant power in their region, is able to work with and have good relations with all sides in the conflict as neither side is willing to risk good relations with India over India’s own best self interests, even if it gives strength to the other side of the conflict. With Ukraine’s Ally pressuring India, India may alienate Ukrainian Allies in general or be motivated to give added support to Russia, where less critical diplomatic postures address concerns with the one of the world’s most significant democracies.

India’s position in the region has placed it on the opposite side of the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, where military support of Armenia and its people has run contrary to NATO allies permitting the Azeri military pushing out the Armenian population out of their historic ethnic region. While NATO and their supporting allies have invested billions a month to defend the civilian populations in Ukraine, there is little mention of the forced expulsion of Armenians from their homes in the region at the other end of the old Soviet sphere of influence. While Russian support for the region waned, American negotiations failed. The end result was another notable shock to a community that has suffered ethnic cleansing too many times over the last century and a half.

Turning back to the row with India, the same ally who is currently losing diplomats in India has been pitting the needs of their own population against support for Ukraine. The effect of underfunding their largest city and economy has turned the city into a place with high crime and limited systemic solutions for crime, poverty, housing and health care. It has come to the point that those who are physically weaker are afraid to use public transport, making them unable to pay for higher food and shelter taxes added on bi-annually by the Government. This Government sent a letter to the city saying they refuse to give them Covid funding that was previously promised, always highlighted by their support for Ukraine. This same Government then boasted that they have given appx.$6-$7 Billion of aid to Ukraine, despite not meeting their NATO minimum obligations and now deciding to cut military funding by nearly $1 Billion to their own soldiers, despite having their own near border with Russia. But this is not the worst of it…

In an act of extreme negligence or horrific intent, it was made evident that this ally of Ukraine has been accepting extremist elements from various groups around the world into their country for generations, nullifying any prosecution of their crimes, in many cases, crimes against humanity. The presenting of a member of the 14th SS Galicia Division in their Parliament was an offense to victims of Genocide worldwide, done during a state visit by Zelinsky himself close to Yom Kippur. This particular Division of the Nazi SS was known to be so severe that German soldiers at the time saw them as brutal and extreme in their own right, eliminating 98% of the Jewish population of the Galicia region. This Ukrainian SS officer was easily known to be part of the German 14th SS Division, and was taken as a hero in his fight against Russia in the Second World War by the Government of this Ally before their mea culpa. While Soviet soldiers of Russian, Ukrainian and other origins were liberating Concentration Camps in Galicia, a man who helped wipe out family after family in the region was praised. To this day, the sitting Government’s Cabinet has taken little personal or direct accountability for inviting such a man, despite their own Deputy Prime Minister being an academic expert on Ukraine herself. While Russians are constantly told that their historic enemies from Nazi Germany are the catalyst for this war in Ukraine, this Ally of Ukraine created the biggest propaganda tool for Putin that could ever have been wished for in 2023. On top of this, Poland is now seeking his extradition for war crimes from the Ally. With the same Ally refusing to sell oil and gas to Europe to displace Russian oil export wealth, it is surprising that such allegiances are deemed as acceptable by Ukraine or any nations seeking to help Ukraine win the war.

No one will voluntarily fight and die for the leader of such an Ally, and ties between Zelinsky and such an Ally will do nothing more but taint the valor of their Armed Forces. If Ukraine wishes to win this war, or at least meet reasonable objectives, they need to cut those who will make economic, political, public relations, and security losses a certainty.

As violence flares, Washington has shown it has influence, while Brussels’s policies have shown weakness.

The war in Gaza could soon spread to a country that can’t afford it in any way.

Concerns about a refugee crisis, financial strains, permanent displacement, and possible militancy in Sinai worry leaders in Cairo.

The strategic case for adhering to the laws of war.

A plan to return the Gaza Strip to Palestinians and keep Israel safe.

How Europe would benefit from a new government in Warsaw.

Six years ago, I testified before the United States Senate and suggested the return of mass and attrition as foundational force planning principles within the national defense strategy. I went on to note the need was urgent given our existing capability gaps against China and Russia in particular.

Fast forward to 2023 and a war of mass precision, at range and at scale, is taking place in Ukraine. Unfortunately, the US military did not use the intervening years to get well.

Congress and the Budget Control Act certainly did them no favors, either. But even worse is the seeming inability in Washington to plan beyond a preferred outcome, rather than a more likely—and bloody—reality. 

Policymakers should not be lulled into complacency by faulty assumptions of a technologically unmatched and better trained military, as years of prioritizing capability over capacity have created a brittle force. The war in Ukraine should also dispel any considerations that long and violent wars are unlikely. 

These myths become ever more apparent as China continues to achieve parity with—or exceed—the United States military in several modernization areas, including land-based conventional ballistic and cruise missiles, shipbuilding, integrated air defense systems, and land-based (stationary and mobile) intercontinental ballistic missile launchers.

Furthermore, China has the world’s largest standing army, navy, coast guard, maritime militia, and sub-strategic missile force. As of 2020, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) had 355 battle force ships, and the US Navy had 296. In the years since, that gap has only widened. Modern projections indicate that by 2035, China’s navy will grow to 475 ships, while the United States will remain stagnant at just 305 ships as ship retirements take their toll on the aging fleet. China’s fleet is also undergoing rapid modernization, with the PLAN of the future consisting of increased quantities of modern aircraft carriers, destroyers, cruisers, and nuclear-powered submarines.

China’s widening lead in terms of sheer quantity is reinforced by its staggering industrial ability to produce warships. Information from the Office of Naval Intelligence reveals the ever-growing gap between the shipbuilding industries supporting the American and Chinese navies. The briefing notes that Beijing’s fleet is being built by a robust Chinese military-civil shipbuilding industry, “…more than 200 times more capable of producing surface warships and submarines,” than the American shipbuilding industry. If conflict broke out and losses had to be replaced, Washington would have to make tough choices with limited production capacity, while Beijing could start putting down hulls of all shapes and sizes.

The war in the Ukraine has prompted the US Army to move significantly faster in munitions production and surge their defense industrial base to keep pace with demand for shells. But this surge is the exception and not the rule when it comes to the investment portfolios of the Armed Forces faced with looming budget cuts.

Worse yet, the inadequate levels of precision munitions on hand for the US military lays bare the fact that Washington has allowed America’s defense industry to size and scale to just one war at a time. The consequences of this atrophy are now painfully apparent as horrific wars are simultaneously underway in Europe and the Middle East. Washington should not be forced to choose which of our allies it can support at any given time.

All of these signs indicate that it is time to dump the failed Pentagon one-war planning and adopt a “three-theater” force-sizing construct that accounts for the vast range of activities the military performs.

To remain a global power, the United States must preserve a favorable balance of power in Europe, the Middle East and East Asia. Furthermore, Washington must remember that there is no one-size-fits-all solution to maintaining American security, and that the “ways and means of doing so differ from theater to theater,” as noted by my colleague Giselle Donnelly.

This means that not only must the active duty military grow—and budgets alongside it—but also be coupled with bolstered manufacturing ability to support those in uniform for a new era of protracted engagements. These engagements will require a strong industrial base to provide necessary capabilities for rapid repair in theater and sustained production. Just as equipment without soldiers to man them are essentially paperweights, so too are the armed forces without a robust and healthy industrial base necessary to maintain combat power.

Without a strong defense industrial base, America is destined to lose the next war more quickly.

Mackenzie Eaglen is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), where she works on defense strategy, defense budgets, and military readiness.

This article was first published by the American Enterprise Institute.

Image: Creative Commons.

As Israel prepares for a massive military operation against Hamas in Gaza, risks of an escalating regional conflict loom large. The most critical additional threat to Israel is from Hezbollah, the militant group and political party based across Israel’s northern border in Lebanon.

Hamas and Hezbollah are both backed by Iran and see weakening Israel as their primary raison d’etre. However, the two groups are not the same. Their differences will likely influence their actions – and Israel’s – in the days and weeks to come.

Unlike Hamas, Hezbollah has, to date, not gone to war purely for the Palestinian cause. That could change. Hezbollah has not yet fully entered the current conflict, but the group has exchanged fire with Israel, across the northern border with Lebanon. Meanwhile, Iran has said that an expansion of the war may be “inevitable”.

What is Hezbollah?

Named the “party of God”, Hezbollah bills itself as a Shia resistance movement. Its ideology is focused on expelling western powers from the Middle East and on rejecting Israel’s right to exist.

The group was founded in 1982 – in the middle of the 15-year Lebanese civil war – after Israel invaded Lebanon in retaliation for attacks perpetrated by Lebanon-based Palestinian factions. It was quickly backed by Iran and its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, which supplied funding, weapons and training in an effort to expand Iranian influence in Arab states.

Hezbollah’s military force continued to develop after the Lebanese civil war came to an end in 1990, despite most other factions disarming. The group continued to focus on “liberating” Lebanon from Israel, and it engaged in years of guerrilla warfare against Israeli forces occupying southern Lebanon until Israel’s withdrawal in 2000. Hezbollah then largely focused its operations on retaking the disputed border area of Shebaa Farms for Lebanon.

In 2006, Hezbollah engaged in a five-week war with Israel in an attempt to settle scores rather than with an aim to liberate Palestine. That conflict killed over 158 Israelis and over 1,200 Lebanese, mostly civilians.

From 2011, during the Syrian civil war, Hezbollah’s power grew further as its forces assisted Syrian president Bashar al-Assad, an ally of Iran, against mostly Sunni rebels. In 2021, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah said the group had 100,000 fighters (though other estimates range between 25,000 and 50,000). It boasts a sophisticated military arsenal equipped with precision rockets and drones.

The group has also functioned as a political party in Lebanon and holds significant influence, often described as a “state within a state.” Eight members were first elected to the Lebanese parliament in 1992, and in 2018, a Hezbollah-led coalition formed a government.

Hezbollah retained its 13 seats at the 2022 election but the coalition lost its majority and the country currently has no fully functioning government. Other Lebanese parties accuse Hezbollah of paralysing and undermining the state and of contributing to Lebanon’s persistent instability.

What is Hamas?

“Hamas”, which translates literally as “zeal,” is an Arabic acronym for the “Islamic resistance movement”. The group was founded in 1987, in Gaza, as an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, a prominent Sunni group based in Egypt.

Emerging during what’s known as the first intifada or uprising of Palestinians against Israeli occupation, Hamas quickly adopted the principle of armed resistance and called for the annihilation of Israel.

Palestinian politics shifted significantly after 1993’s Oslo accords, a series of agreements negotiated between the Israeli government and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) with the aim of establishing a comprehensive peace agreement.

Opposed to the peace process, Hamas’s armed wing, the al-Qassam Brigades, established itself as the primary force of armed resistance against Israel. It launched a series of suicide bomb attacks that continued through the early years of the second intifada (2000-2005), before shifting to rockets as a primary tactic.

Like Hezbollah, Hamas operates as a political party. It won parliamentary elections in 2006, and in 2007, it gained control of the Gaza Strip in a bloody battle with rival party Fatah that left over 100 dead. Hamas has controlled Gaza ever since, showing little tolerance for political opposition. They have never held elections, and political opponents and critics are frequently arrested with reports of torture.

Over this time, Hamas’s armed wing has become increasingly sophisticated. Its arsenal now comprises thousands of rockets, including long-range missiles and drones.

How are Hamas and Hezbollah different?

Hamas has increasingly received funding, weapons and training from Iran, but it is not in Iran’s pocket to the same degree as Hezbollah, which is backed almost exclusively by Iran and takes its directives from the Islamic Republic.

What’s more, as a Sunni organisation, Hamas does not share the Shia religious link to Iran that characterises Hezbollah and most of Iran’s proxies. As a result, while Hamas no doubt benefits from Iran’s patronage, it tends to operate more independently than Hezbollah.

In contrast, Hamas has received support in the past from Turkey and Qatar, among others, and operates with relative autonomy. The group was also long at odds with Iran over their opposing stances in Syria.

Right now, this is very much a war between Israel and Hamas. Hezbollah remains, however, a threat to Israel. If activated by Iran, its full involvement would rapidly change the course of the conflict and likely open up a regional war.

Julie M Norman is an Associate Professor in Politics & International Relations & Co-Director of the Centre on US Politics at UCL.

This article was first published by The Conversation.

Image: Creative Commons. 

In the wake of the horrific attack on Israel staged by Hamas terrorists on October 7, the relationship between Qatar and Hamas is coming under intense scrutiny among American observers. Some have argued that the United States should punish or at least heavily pressure Qatar, possibly alongside Turkey, as a result of their relations with Hamas and the wider Muslim Brotherhood. But shaking the foundations of the U.S.-Qatar security relationship, which has served the United States well since 1996, would be very unwise.

First, it is important to put Qatar’s relationship with Hamas in its U.S. and Israeli context. Hamas was at the center of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s policy of avoiding any serious discussion of a Palestinian state. It has been widely reported in the Israeli press that Netanyahu made remarks at a 2019 meeting with Likud leaders suggesting that Israelis who oppose a Palestinian state should support the (mostly Qatari) transfer of funds to Gaza because maintaining a separation between Gaza and the autonomous zones in West Bank under the Palestinian Authority would prevent it from being established. That was not Qatar’s motivation in providing funds to keep Gaza afloat in the absence of a normal economy, but Qatar was clearly acting with the knowledge and acquiescence of Israel’s leadership.

Second, Qatar has two larger neighbors, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, which seriously considered undertaking an act of military aggression against Qatar in 2017 at the outset of their blockade of travel and trade with Qatar. The large U.S. base near Doha seriously constrained any plans for such aggressive action, even as President Trump briefly seemed to support the Saudi-UAE side. While these countries have normalized relations and reopened embassies subsequently, the same rulers remain in power, and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman of Saudi Arabia remains a mercurial figure. Even after Qatar’s military buildup in subsequent years, it remains heavily overmatched by its neighbors. Thus, it would be highly irrational for Doha to use the Al Udeid basing rights as leverage against Washington, and it would shake the Qatar-U.S. relationship to the absolute core if the latter sought to move the base to either of those countries.

There are also several well-known obstacles to moving U.S. air assets to Saudi Arabia or the UAE. The State Department already paused the sale of F-35 fighter aircraft to the UAE due in part to concerns about potential Chinese influence and presence. It is also doubtful that Saudi Arabia would completely fund a U.S. base the way Qatar has. As the Biden administration’s recent negotiations with MBS over potential normalization with Israel have shown, MBS makes “asks” of the United States, not the other way around. Finally, it bears remembering that Qatar allowed Al Udeid to be used for attack missions in Iraq, even after Qatari officials had stated their opposition to the 2003 invasion. The UAE limited the use of the Al-Dhafra base during the 2003 invasion to non-lethal refueling and reconnaissance missions. Though the invasion of Iraq was clearly a mistake, the flexibility provided by our arrangement with Qatar when the chips were down, even as they wisely counseled us against it, was critical to the undertaking.

Finally, Qatar is currently undertaking delicate negotiations on behalf of both the United States and Israel with Hamas to seek the release of Israeli, American, and other hostages. Qatar is also presumably continuing to act as an intermediary between the United States and Iran as we seek to avoid escalation into a wider regional war and maintain some of the forbearance they have shown recently in their nuclear program. There will be a time for Washington and Doha to discuss Qatar’s relations with Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood. Still, there is no reason to shake the foundations of the bilateral security relationship at the moment. While there is no prospect of near-term normalization with Israel, they will continue to have contacts on the issue and any new framework for governance in Gaza. That may be more productive under a new Israeli government—the events of the last two weeks have demonstrated the bankruptcy of Netanyahu’s approach toward the Palestinian issue.

Greg Priddy is a Senior Fellow for the Middle East at the Center for the National Interest.

Image: Sven Hansche / Shutterstock.

Recently released documents show that the United States has conducted at least nine flight tests of a new long-range nuclear cruise missile meant to be carried by America’s B-52 and forthcoming B-21 Raider bombers. While details about this new missile, dubbed the AGM-181A Long Range Stand Off cruise missile (LRSO), remain limited, these successful tests suggest the weapon is well on its way to entering service before the close of the decade. 

While development on the LRSO has been no secret, discussions about this new nuclear-capable cruise missile have been rather muted in recent years. In fact, as far as Sandboxx News can tell, only one of the nine successful flight tests to date had previously been revealed. Word of the rest of these tests only reached the public in early October, when Air & Space Forces Magazine’s Editorial Director John Tirpak came across their inclusion in a 2022 Selected Acquisition Report (SAR). Although the report was dated December 2022, it was only released some weeks ago. 

The LRSO is slated to replace America’s aging fleet of AGM-86B Air Launched Cruise Missiles (ALCM). Its road to service began in 2017 with contracts awarded to both Lockheed Martin and Raytheon to develop competing designs. By 2020, the Air Force announced their decision to move forward with Raytheon’s design, moving Lockheed Martin into a support role rather than removing them from the effort. 

This new long-range weapon will be part of the venerable B-52 Stratofortress’ nuclear arsenal, but will also be carried internally by the forthcoming B-21 Raider – America’s new stealth bomber in active development. 

Although there were nine successful flight tests listed in the report, it appears as though the missile itself was only flown in four of them. The other five included things like captive-carry flight tests, where the missile is carried either internally or externally by aircraft to ensure its size, shape, dimensions, or mounting points don’t cause any unforeseen issues. Based on the information within the report, at least one of the successful flight tests was conducted with what was almost certainly an inert test article based on the W80-4 nuclear warhead. 

The Warzone was able to confirm this test via the Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration’s Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan, which highlighted the test’s success. 

“The LRSO and W80-4 Life Extension Program joint test teams completed the first powered flight test of a LRSO Cruise Missile with W80-4 Warhead released from a B-52 aircraft. The missile successfully released from the aircraft, powered its engine, and executed all in-flight maneuvers,” the report states. 

The W80-4 warhead is a life-extension program for the “dial-a-yield” W80-1 warheads already in service. These weapons come with two different yield settings: they are able to produce a relatively small five-kiloton blast (about one-third the power of the bomb dropped on Hiroshima in 1945), or a much larger 150-kiloton blast – or about 10 times the power of the Hiroshima bomb. 

This weapon is being designed primarily to serve as a long-range portion of the airborne leg of America’s nuclear triad, but the Defense Department has not ruled out the possibility of also fielding a conventionally armed variant for more tactical strikes. Early documents suggest plans to produce 1,020 missiles for service with 67 additional test articles, but it’s unclear if those figures have shifted in the years since the program’s announcement. 

Initially, plans called for this missile to enter service in 2030, but it now appears that the weapon could be ready much earlier. As a result, the hold-up may just be the W80-4 program, which is expected to be complete in 2027. 

Like the vast majority of new Air Force weapons and platforms, the LRSO is being designed with an open software and hardware architecture, which should allow the branch to take competing bids on upgrades and update efforts in the future from a variety of firms, bringing down the cost of keeping this new missile viable for years – or likely decades – to come. 

The B-52H is a highly capable and cost-efficient bomber, but it’s not sneaky. While the Air Force does maintain an inventory of nuclear bombs, air-launched cruise missiles make it possible for bombers like the modern B-52H to deploy nukes from stand-off ranges, or well outside the reach of enemy air defenses or even combat air patrols.

Alex Hollings is a writer, dad, and Marine veteran.

This article was first published by Sandboxx News.

Image: Keith Homan / Shutterstock.com

In the wake of the shocking attack against Israel by Hamas, much attention has focused on the role of Iran, given its material, financial, and rhetorical support for Hamas. What is the nature of the coordination between Iran, Hamas, and Hezbollah? How does Iran perceive its interests in this situation? Does Iran still view Hezbollah’s missile capabilities as a deterrent against a potential Israeli attack on its nuclear facilities? Or have Iran’s calculations potentially changed in a way which would make a large-scale attack by Hezbollah more likely than that would imply? On October 17, the Center for the National Interest hosted a discussion of these issues and more.

Dr. Raz Zimmt is an expert on Iran at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS). He holds a master’s degree and a PhD in Middle Eastern history from Tel-Aviv University and was selected as an Alice and Paul Baker Research Fellow at the INSS. His PhD dissertation focused on Iranian policy towards Nasserism and Arab radicalism between 1954 and 1967. He is also a research fellow at the Alliance Center for Iranian Studies at Tel-Aviv University. He is the author of the book “Iran From Within: State and Society in the Islamic Republic” published (in Hebrew) in 2022. In addition, he is the editor of “Spotlight on Iran,” published by the Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center. His main research interests are the politics, foreign relations, society & social media of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Greg Priddy, Senior Fellow for the Middle East at the Center, moderated the discussion.

Image: Anas-Mohammed / Shutterstock.

How the war in Ukraine ends is clearly the most important geopolitical question confronting the international community today. I do not claim to know how the war will end. That is because the mechanisms by which interstate hostilities normally cease—negotiated settlements and military victory—appear nowhere in sight.

Two intractable issues preclude the possibility of a peace agreement. The first is that Ukraine (understandably) demands the return of all the territory seized from it by Moscow beginning in 2014. This includes the oblasts of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, Zaporizhia, and Crimea. For its part, Russia sees this territory as a crucial buffer against Western encroachment and, therefore, has no intention of ever returning it to Ukraine. Absent Moscow’s willingness to return this land, there remain no grounds for a negotiated settlement.

The second issue involves that which arguably ignited the war in the first place—NATO’s intention to eventually extend membership to Ukraine. Moscow demands that the West renounce any present or future plans to incorporate Ukraine into NATO. Yet Ukraine and its Western allies refuse to accede to that demand, seeing it as morally reprehensible, an unacceptable violation of Ukrainian sovereignty, and counterproductive to their own national interests. Absent the West’s willingness to take NATO membership off the table, there remain no grounds for a negotiated settlement.

The possibility of an outright victory also appears unlikely for the foreseeable future. Because each side senses an existential threat from the other, Ukraine from Russia and Russia from the West, we can expect them to fight to the death. When it appears that one side is gaining the upper hand, the other side makes the necessary adjustments to even the playing field, with Moscow mobilizing more troops and increasing its defense spending and the West boosting its military support to Kyiv. Such has been the story since the war first broke out early last year, and the most important reason it has settled into a bloody stalemate today.

The caveat here, of course, is if the West eventually tires of supporting Ukraine and lets it go its own way. That possibility, though, shows no sign of materializing any time soon, if it ever does. The United States has demonstrated a remarkable ability to remain committed to unwinnable conflicts, as this one appears to be. Moreover, abandoning Ukraine would likely be seen as the greatest act of great power cowardice since the Munich debacle.

One thing is abundantly clear, though: this war is potentially even more dangerous than the Cold War. If Putin senses an existential threat to Russia or to his own survival, might he consider using nuclear weapons if the West continues to back him into a corner over Ukraine? This possibility represents one terrifying answer to the question of how the Ukraine war ends.

Nilay Saiya is an Associate Professor of Public Policy and Global Affairs at Nanyang Technological University.

Image: Shutterstock. 

Projecting how a war will end can be a fraught enterprise. Hoping for the complete collapse of the Russian military and a putsch overthrowing Vladimir Putin is pure fantasy at this point. It is also absolute hubris to argue that the next “new” weapon will transform the conflict, providing either Ukraine or Russia a free run at the opposition. 

Initially, it was the grand hopes of artificial intelligence and cyber operations, with cyber providing a “thunder run” opportunity for Russia to open the gates of Kyiv. At this point, a laughable conjecture is offered by very serious pundits. AI has also proven just as frustrating, playing a more significant role in battle coordination behind the scenes or for facial recognition of the dead rather than facilitating the emergence of a modern AI general to lead the military.

While the precision strike complex has transformed modern combat since the 1980s, enabling the massive destruction of armor on the battlefield, mines and layers of trenches remain the natural obstacles. Active surveillance facilitated by drones and satellites helps keep constant eyes on the battlefield, lessening the fog of war. Yet, this has been true since the advent of old-fashioned balloons and reconnaissance aircraft, as old as World War I.     

The latest hope is delivering the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMs). An advance in the range from the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS), an ATACM can reach 190 miles behind the front lines while HIMARS can reach forty-three miles. Unfortunately, these are not transformative weapons because the United States has too few, and Ukraine needs to advance further to hit critical targets deep in Crimea. 

Instead of advanced weapons transforming the war, we are witnessing the continuation of the security dilemma. As John Herz argued, advances in security cause a perceived decrease in the opposition’s security, facilitating a constant action-reaction search for a way out of the conflict spiral. Sadly, conflict spirals never end. Likewise, no magic weapon will facilitate the termination of this war. 

Advanced or even primary weapons supplied by the West will not win the war for Ukraine, nor will emergency supplies from North Korea or Iran deliver victory to the Russian side. All these developments will achieve is the revival of the military-industrial complex worldwide. There is no magic solution; the only thing left is to settle for a political solution or the slow attrition of either side’s will to fight. As Margaret Mead argued so long ago, war is a social invention, a poor and inefficient one that will only facilitate constant suffering and death until humans develop a better way. 

Brandon Valeriano specializes in military innovation and cyber security. He teaches at Seton Hall University and is also a Senior Fellow at the Royal Danish Defense College, the Marine Corps University, Gray Space Strategies, and the Cyberspace Solarium Commission 2.0.

Image: Shutterstock. 

Both China and Russia are eager to assert their own authoritarian models of national “greatness.” Related to this goal is knocking down the international order forged by the United States and its allies after World War II, an open, rules-based international system that brought prosperity to so many nations (including China once Beijing embraced it). 

But national greatness, whether political influence, soft power, or military might, is largely a function of economic power. By participating in (and in many cases gaming) the open, capitalist trade and economic system, China has built economic power. China and the world are now economically interdependent. Many depend on China’s exports, and global companies want to keep access to the Chinese market. 

Meanwhile, Russia has lost it. With a GDP the size of Italy and the hemorrhaging of its best and brightest after the invasion of Ukraine, Russia’s economy is a literal Potemkin village. Once weaned of dependence on Russia’s oil and gas, nobody needs Russia’s economy. The only way for Russia to assert influence in the world and to maintain the fiction of “greatness”—is by destructive military actions. 

Now, China risks losing its true source of power and influence—its robust, entrepreneurial, globally entangled economy. President Xi Jinping is reining in entrepreneurs and free speech, frightening away foreign businesses, investors, and Chinese entrepreneurs. China is losing business abroad as many countries and companies work to decouple from China’s corrupting, surveilling, and stealing state-run economic apparatus. China’s birth rate is dropping, growth is slowing, and political leadership is congealing around a “strongman” more focused on control at home and saber-rattling abroad than economic prosperity.

Most observers predicted that China’s rise would eclipse America’s economic and political influence in the world. That’s the story of American decline and China’s rise promoted by Xi Jinping. Conventional wisdom also sees this dynamic as the most likely source of a military clash between China and the United States. An “empire” in decline threatened by a rising power leads to conflict.

But this doesn’t describe the current reality. The United States and its allies are working hard. So far, they are keeping the economic high ground by making disruptive innovations like the fastest chips and artificial intelligence that drive new businesses and maintain national security. Russia’s innovation economy is gone, and China is chasing its own away, exposing the fragility of a system propped up by state spending, and political versus market direction.

However, this is not all good news. As we have seen, an increasingly isolated and diminished power like Russia chooses to lash out militarily. A China beginning to lose the underpinnings of its new-found international influence could prove even more dangerous—and more eager to assert its “greatness” through military adventures and political and economic coercion. 

Avoiding war requires a delicate balancing act. We in the United States must acknowledge the aspirational and identity-based yearnings of the Chinese people: namely, the desire to be recognized as a great nation and to rise economically.

We need to say to China: we welcome your rise as a great nation, a great culture and people. We have no desire to keep you “down.” But we don’t welcome political and economic coercion of other nations and peoples, acts of military force. We will, working with allies (that we still have), check and contain these efforts at every turn.

John Austin is a Nonresident Senior Fellow with the Brookings Institution and the Chicago Council on Global Affairs.

Image: U.S. Department of Defense.

One of the more closely guarded mission sets within the U.S. military is Personnel Recovery (PR). As defined by the Department of Defense’s Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA), the PR mission is the “sum of military, diplomatic, and civil efforts to prepare for and execute the recovery and reintegration of isolated personnel.” In simplest terms, when a U.S. service member goes missing in combat, is captured, or in some other way becomes isolated from other U.S. forces, the military sets in motion its personnel recovery efforts.

Those efforts range from preparing service members on how to become and behave as a prisoner of war – through committing to the U.S. military’s Code of Conduct – to classified rescue missions to bring them home. In between those benchmarks fall the diplomatic and civil efforts, as well as Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape (SERE) training, part of which involves training a service member to resist and escape captivity.

There are also highly classified programs that fall within the category of the personnel recovery mission set, the existence of which only a few in the entire Department of Defense (DOD) are aware. The U.S. military takes the PR mission very seriously, as we want our military to keep faith with the individual service members and make every effort to bring them home.

The various components of U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) can all play a role in the PR mission, as required. For example, when Army PFC Jessica Lynch was injured and captured in Iraq, she was rescued by a combined Joint Special Operations Task Force, with support from the Marines. Similarly, when wounded Navy SEAL Marcus Luttrell was forced to escape and evade following compromise by enemy forces in Afghanistan, he was rescued by a contingent of U.S. Army Rangers and Afghan National Army soldiers. Both operations are good examples of the PR mission as executed by U.S. SOF combined with conventional forces.

Further, PR missions are almost always supported by the U.S. intelligence community through the provision of on-the-ground human and technical intelligence reporting, as well as satellite imagery and other methods of support. The whole U.S. national security and defense structure in a given theatre, in other words, becomes involved in trying to bring home a lost or captured service member.

Here, it is worth placing a special emphasis on the Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) and its unique role in the PR mission. AFSOC’s Special Tactics Pararescuemen (PJs) are widely considered the premier force in the U.S. military when it comes to rescuing lost service members (in particular, downed U.S. pilots). The PJs are in fact the only DOD force specifically trained to conduct both conventional and unconventional rescue operations. Their primary function is to be personnel recovery specialists.

What differentiates the PJs from other SOF units that also conduct PR missions is both the advanced medical training they receive, as well as the broad range of technical rescue disciplines on which they train. These techniques range from technical extrication of trapped personnel from damaged/wrecked airframes, to rope rescues and water rescues, and everything in between. Therefore, PJs are of special importance when it comes to personnel recovery.

In contrast, a Navy SEAL element, for example, would primarily act as a direct action force in a combat PR mission. Similar to the Lynch and Luttrell rescues, the SEAL element would essentially be assigned to raid a target location, neutralize any on-scene enemies, and effect the rescue of the U.S. service member. Ofte a PJ contingent of one or two personnel will accompany a SEAL or other SOF element on such a raid, to take primary control of the possibly wounded U.S. service member who has just been rescued. The PJs would then be the primary responsible party for treating, packaging, and transporting the patient through the exfiltration process.

The PR mission is a complex and difficult one, and a mission that requires integration across different U.S. military components – both conventional and unconventional – as well as other parts of the larger U.S. government. Diplomacy could be involved, and both intelligence collection and special activities are also almost always required. Few operations will focus the mind in a combat zone like the rescue of missing U.S. personnel. Such missions become an “all hands” effort and are carried out with a sense of purpose and urgency that differentiates them from other more run-of-the-mill operations.

Frumentarius is a former Navy SEAL, former CIA officer, and currently a Captain in a career fire department in the Midwest.

This article was first published by Sandboxx News.

Image: U.S. Military/Creative Commons.

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