Diplomacy & Crisis News

Since early August, the Ukrainian military has occupied a salient inside Russia, in the Kursk Oblast.

Now, the Russian military is trying to eradicate that salient by throwing thousands of Russian and North Korean troops at it.

“Russia’s counter-offensive against the Ukrainian-occupied salient in Kursk oblast continues with tactical gains in territorial control observed in the last week,” the British Military Intelligence assessed in a recent estimate of the war.

The Russian forces have been making steady progress, slowly pushing back the Ukrainian units. The Ukrainian offensive took the Russian leadership by surprise and managed to capture hundreds of square miles and scores of settlements before the lines solidified.

“In the north-western corner of the salient, Russian forces have advanced up to 4km south-east along a front of approximately 4km, contesting the village of Kruglen’koe. In the south-eastern corner of the salient, Russian forces have advanced west approximately 2km from the town of Plekhovo and remain near the outskirts of Makhnovka, approximately 3km to the north,” the British Military Intelligence added.

In many ways, the Ukrainian military has achieved its objective of distracting the Russian forces and forcing the Kremlin to commit elite units to the salient in Kursk, diverting them from the fighting inside Ukraine.

“Ukrainian forces control approximately 480 sq km of Russian territory, down from approximately 510 sq km a week ago, and a high point of 800-900 sq km in August 2024. The recent loss of territory is likely due to Russian counterattacks being led by Naval Infantry, Airborne (VDV) forces and troops from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” the British Military Intelligence stated.

The war in Ukraine is the largest conflict on European soil since the end of World War II. That is a fact both in terms of troops engaged, resources spent, and casualties suffered.

“Ukraine’s incursion into Kursk, in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, is the first time since the Second World War that foreign troops have occupied Russian territory,” the British Military Intelligence added.

“Russia will almost certainly continue carrying out limited attacks to reduce the amount of territory in Kursk oblast under Ukrainian control,” the British Military Intelligence concluded.

But progress hasn’t come cheap for the Russian forces.

The Russian military, paramilitary units, and pro-Russian separatist forces keep taking extremely heavy casualties. For example, over the past twenty-four hours, the Russian forces took almost 2,000 losses. In addition to these manpower casualties, the Russian forces lost approximately sixty-seven tactical vehicles and fuel trucks, fifty-five unmanned aerial systems, twenty-nine artillery pieces and multiple launch rocket systems, fifteen infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers, six main battle tanks, two pieces of special equipment, and one cruise missile.

Overall, the Russian forces have suffered over 775,000 personnel killed or wounded in over 1,000 days of fighting. Despite the extremely heavy losses, the Russian military is persisting with its attritional strategy. And, notwithstanding the casualty rate, the strategy seems to be working for a Kremlin devoid of quality troops and officers who can fight a more modern type of warfare.

Stavros Atlamazoglou is a seasoned defense journalist specializing in special operations and a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ). He holds a BA from Johns Hopkins University and an MA from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). His work has been featured in Business Insider, Sandboxx, and SOFREP.

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“I don’t want no teenage queen/I just want my M14…”

My fellow military film buffs will instantly recognize those two lines as part of a classic running cadence from the boot camp sequence of Stanley Kubrick’s iconic 1987 Vietnam War film “Full Metal Jacket.”

Though not quite as famous or controversial as either the M16/M4/AR-15 series or Avtomat Kalashnikova, i.e., the AK-47 platform and its variants, the M14 is a plenty famous and historically significant military rifle. Some experts thought it was an overweight, overpowered, and overrated hunk of junk, while others thought it was a wonderfully accurate, reliable, hard-hitting weapon that never should’ve been replaced by the “Plastic Fantastic” M16 to fight the Vietnam War. Overall, the positive assessments of the M14 seem to far outweigh the negative ones.

That legend began with the M1 Garand, a rifle that had served American GIs so faithful during both World War II and the Korean War and was praised by no less than General George Smith Patton Jr. himself as “the greatest battle implement ever devised.” But as superb as the Garand truly was, it did have one glaring weakness: the “M-1 ping,” i.e., the rifle would eject its empty stripper clip with a loud “ping!” which sent a pretty strong auditory clue to Axis troops that the American GI’s weapon was empty.

The M14, with its detachable 20-round box magazine, eliminated that problem, and as a major bonus, provided a 150 percent increase in ammunition capacity over the WWII-era weapon. The M14 was designed in 1954 and officially became the standard-issue rifle for the U.S. Armed Forces from 1959 to 1964, with over 1 million units produced over that relatively short span of time. The weapon was (and still is) a gas-operated 7.62x51mm NATO (.308 caliber) rifle, capable of both semiautomatic and fully automatic fire, with the following specifications.

• Cyclic rate of fire (full-auto mode): 700-750 rounds
• Muzzle velocity: 2,800 feet per second
• Maximum effective range: 500 yards
• Maximum overall range: 3,275 yards
• Overall length: 44.14 inches
• Barrel length: 22 inches
• Empty weight: 9.2 pounds
• Weight with fully loaded magazine:10.7 pounds

The M14 soon established a reputation for ruggedness and superb accuracy. Two perceived problems for general-issue infantry usage in the jungles of Vietnam were the heavy weight and lack of controllability during full-auto fire, especially compared to the M16, which could carry more rounds in a more lightweight and lower-recoiling platform. 

However, for elite SpecOps units like the Navy SEALs, those aforementioned concerns aren’t as pressing. As noted by the Navy SEALs webpage: 

“Navy SEALs started using modified M14s as sniper rifles as early as Vietnam. They have used them in Afghanistan and Iraq, primarily as designated marksman and sniper rifles. Navy SEALs keep the M14 in inventory due to its excellent accuracy, effectiveness at long range, and strong takedown capabilities of the 7.62mm round.”

The SEALs’ M14s certainly haven’t remained frozen in time (Vietnam vintage, that is). Their latest and greatest iteration is the Mk 14 Mod 0 Enhanced Battle Rifle (EBR), which is manufactured by Smith Enterprise Inc. (headquartered in Tempe, Arizona) and has the following fancy features:

• An 18-inch barrel
• A telescopic stock
• A pistol grip for improved ergonomics
• New front sights
• A folding bipod
• A set of Picatinny rails around the barrel allows for the mounting of various accessories such as scopes, torches, laser pointing systems, etc.
• Lighter materials (the EBR is constructed from lightweight aircraft alloy)

In addition, during the Battle of Mogadishu in 1993, U.S. Army Delta Force sniper Sergeant First Class Randy Shughart used an M14 for his heroic actions that would earn him a posthumous Medal of Honor.

Besides the SEALs, the M14 is also reportedly still issued by the Hellenic (Greek Navy). Meanwhile, semiauto-only variants remain extremely popular with civilian shooters, particularly the semiauto-only Springfield Armory M1A, which, in its most basic, no-frills version, carries an MSRP of MSRP $1,770.00-$1,875.00.

Christian D. Orr is a Senior Defense Editor for National Security Journal (NSJ). He is a former Air Force Security Forces officer, Federal law enforcement officer, and private military contractor (with assignments worked in Iraq, the United Arab Emirates, Kosovo, Japan, Germany, and the Pentagon). Chris holds a B.A. in International Relations from the University of Southern California (USC) and an M.A. in Intelligence Studies (concentration in Terrorism Studies) from American Military University (AMU). He has also been published in The Daily Torch, The Journal of Intelligence and Cyber Security, and Simple Flying. Last but not least, he is a Companion of the Order of the Naval Order of the United States (NOUS).

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Iran’s Simorgh missile, officially known as a Space Launch Vehicle (SLV), represents a key element of Iran’s (growing) space and ballistic missile programs. The missile is named after the mythical Persian bird known for its strength and benevolence, Simorgh is a two-stage, liquid-fueled rocket designed primarily to place satellites into low-Earth orbit (LEO). 

Yet, its development has sparked consternation among the international community, which fears that Iran may be using their supposedly civilian nuclear weapons program as little more than a cover for their ballistic missile program. And that ballistic missile program is, of course, the cornerstone undergirding their nuclear weapons program.

Back in 2010, the cartoonish former Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad authorized the creation of the Simorgh, also known as Safir-2. Officially, the Simorgh rocket is meant to place Iranian satellites in orbits around the Earth. 

It has a length of about eighty-nine feet and can place a 551-pound satellite into an orbit as high as 310 miles away. The missile has had varying degrees of success since its inception in 2010. Of the seven official missions it was sent on, three were unsuccessful, though four is more than half, so technically this missile has been a success. 

The Context

Western economic sanctions have specifically targeted the Simorgh and the components that make the missile up. So, the Iranians have struggled to get this system to its full potential in the last fourteen years. Nevertheless, the Islamic Republic possesses the industrial capabilities to build such machines. 

Anyway, the Simorgh rocket is not a vehicle for peaceful exploration or civilian satellite operations. It is very much a dual-use system, meaning that it can have both civilian as well as military applications. Even in the realm of satellites, having a satellite in the attic and a bomb in the basement helps the Iranian nuclear weapons program. Satellites will help Iran’s military have greater over-the-horizon attack capabilities and would help Iran to better target distant targets. 

And let’s just say that this was a civilian project. The lessons learned from the use of the Simorgh rocket could easily be applied to an actual intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). According to the publication Iran Primer, “It would take a handful of years” to “transform its Simorgh into an ICBM” and “would not likely become operational before 2023 or 2024.” The cited article was written in 2021, so the suspenseful music should be playing in your head right now.

Iran’s Nuclear Weapons Threat

While there are real debates about how advanced the Iranian nuclear weapons program is, even if the Iranians do have some rudimentary warheads, they lack the miniaturization technology needed to mount these weapons atop ICBMs, such as the Simorgh or an actual ICBM. 

At the same time, though, the collapse of the Assad Regime in Syria and the subsequent withdrawal of Russian forces from Syria means that Iran is on the strategic backfoot when it comes to its shadow war with Israel and the United States. Now, Tehran will need to expedite the development of its nuclear weapons arsenal and the subsequent delivery systems, including miniaturization technology. 

Iran’s Simorgh, though, would be more akin to an inter-range ballistic missile (IRBM) than an ICBM. The farthest many experts believe the Simorgh could reach is Europe. The United States would remain insulated from the Simorgh. The Middle East has been completely destabilized. Iran now finds itself on the back foot, with the U.S.-Israeli coalition riding high after Assad’s ouster. Tehran will next seek to expand its nuclear weapons capabilities, which, in turn, would bring about the ire of much of the rest of the world. 

America is on notice, but it has not noticed. 

Brandon J. Weichert, a National Interest national security analyst, is a former Congressional staffer and geopolitical analyst who is a contributor at The Washington Times, the Asia Times, and The-Pipeline. He is the author of Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His next book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine, is available for purchase wherever books are sold. Weichert can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

Image Credit: Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock.

Valued at $725 million, the latest package of U.S. military aid to Ukraine includes air defense weapons, munitions for multiple rocket launch systems and artillery, anti-tank weapons, and unmanned aerial systems.  

Specifically, the latest package of security assistance includes munitions for National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems (NASAMS); FIM-92 Stinger missiles shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles, counter-Unmanned Aerial Systems (c-UAS) munitions, ammunition for the M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) and M270 Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS), 155mm and 105mm artillery shells, Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS), non-persistent land mines, Tube-launched, Optically tracked, Wire-guided (TOW) missiles for anti-tank roles, FGM-148 Javelin and AT-4 anti-tank weapons, small arms and ammunition, demolitions equipment and munitions, equipment to protect critical national infrastructure, spare parts, ancillary equipment, services, training, and transportation. 

The Russian military has been making gains over the past few months, and the Ukrainian forces are desperate for all the help they can get. 

In addition, the U.S., France, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, Norway, the Czech Republic, and the United Kingdom have provided important military aid. Dozens of other countries have sent billions of dollars worth of weapon systems and munitions to Kyiv’s aid.  

This is the 71st package of military aid to Ukraine since August 2021, a few months before the large-scale Russian invasion. To this date, the U.S. has provided approximately $64.1 billion in military aid to Ukraine. 

This amounts to about $22 billion per year and is quite a small sum for the impact it has on the ground. With this military aid, the Ukrainian forces have managed to severely degrade the capabilities of the Russian military, killing and wounding almost 800,000 men and destroying tens of thousands of heavy weapon systems. 

In a way, the U.S., which spends more than $800 billion on its defense every year, is getting a bargain out of its support of Ukraine.   

“Russian aggression still poses a threat to Ukrainian sovereignty. The Ukrainians have demonstrated and expressed the will to continue to fight. And as Secretary Austin has said many times, Ukraine matters not only to European security but to U.S. and international security,” Pentagon Press Secretary Air Force Major General Pat Ryder said in a press briefing.  

“So, we will continue to consult with our Ukrainian partners. We'll continue to consult with our allies and partners around the world in terms of what Ukraine needs to defend itself. And so, we will continue to support them in their fight,” Ryder added.  

It remains to be seen whether the new administration will continue to support Ukraine in its defense against Russian aggression. It is a noble cause with strategic benefits, a rare combination.  

Stavros Atlamazoglou is a seasoned defense journalist specializing in special operations and a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ). He holds a BA from Johns Hopkins University and an MA from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). His work has been featured in Business Insider, Sandboxx, and SOFREP.

Image Credit: Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock.

As the United States Air Force and Navy struggle to justify the exorbitant cost of their sixth-generation warplane programs to an understandably skeptical Congress, it’s important to remember that time the military tried to create an entirely new capability using surplus parts. But that was what the Air Force sought to do with their proposed YA-7F Strikefighter. Using old, surplus A-7 Corsair II attack jets, the Air Force made them more maneuverable, installed better engines, and basically created a nighttime supersonic battlefield interdiction jet for cheap.

It was the mid-1980s and the Air Force was trying out new concepts as the Cold War raged and the Reagan administration was on a defense spending spree. Interestingly, that was the time some in the Pentagon opted to start working on a cheap alternative to the costlier warplanes that were favored by the Pentagon. 

The Air Force wanted planes for close-air support (CAS) missions, anticipating the need for such platforms when—and if—the Cold War turned hot and NATO forces found themselves in a shooting war in Europe. Specifically, the Air Force wanted more speed and agility than what its current CAS systems possessed. Back then, the A-10 Thunderbolt II, the Air Force’s primary CAS warplane, got little love. It was viewed by the Air Force brass as being too slow for some modern combat situations.

So, the Air Force wanted to take the resilience of the A-10 but marry it to a faster moving plane. Thus, the YA-7F Strikefighter.

This bird was based on the subsonic, old A-7 Corsair II attack jet that had served the Air Force and Navy. The Strikefighter was transformed into a transonic aircraft that had the ability to go faster than the speed of sound. The Air Force upgraded the Strikefighter to newer Pratt & Whitney F100-PW-220 engines, providing about 26,000 pounds of thrust, hence its supersonic capabilities. Because of the newer, more potent engine, the fuselage was lengthened by four feet, with the designers adding sections to the fuselage both before and after the wings. That four feet of fuselage improved the speed as well as aerodynamics.

Engineers also made the vertical stabilizer higher and alterations to the original control surfaces for high-speed performance. Therefore, the YA-7F could enjoy a 7-g turn which meant its handling and maneuverability were superior to the A-7 Corsair II on which it was based. Pilots were also given quite a spectacle when flying the bird. After all, this plane, while ugly on the outside, had a modernized cockpit. A heads-up display (HUD) was available and the bird had advanced avionics. 

The plane could explode from 400 to 550 knots while carrying 17,380 pounds of ordnance all in under 15 seconds. What’s more, the bird could sustain a speed of about Mach 1.5 with extra fuel. 

These birds could carry nearly 18,000 pounds of armaments, too.

The YA-7F was very promising when it was prematurely canceled by the Pentagon. The plane was a victim of its own success. Indeed, it was far cheaper (and nearly as effective) as the other planes that were being considered. The military, though, wanted as many shiny new F-16s and other fourth-generation planes as possible—and America’s defense contractors were all too happy to steer the Pentagon in that direction.

Canceling the YA-7F was one of the worst decisions the Pentagon ever made. The plane would have been a useful bird and could have filled CAS roles that required speed and agility. Further, it exemplified the kind of cost-saving the Pentagon could engage without losing any significant capabilities.

It is also a portent of what should be done about the costly Air Force Next-Generation Air Dominance program. America doesn’t need this system. The Pentagon could easily enhance the existing aircraft fleet it has without blowing its budget on building the wünderwaffe.

Unlike the 1980s, when the United States could still somewhat afford the Pentagon’s excess, today the only chance the United States has at surviving is if every American gets more involved and demand an end to the wasteful spending in the Pentagon.

Nevertheless, the YA-7F Strikefighter program is an excellent reminder of why the Air Force should reuse its older platforms to exert power. In today’s strategic and economic environment, the Pentagon should really start reusing platforms. For today’s strategic situation, it is actually far better to reuse and enhance than to take the time to build from scratch. 

Brandon J. Weichert, a National Interest national security analyst, is a former Congressional staffer and geopolitical analyst who is a contributor at The Washington Times, the Asia Times, and The-Pipeline. He is the author of Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His next book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine, is available for purchase wherever books are sold. Weichert can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

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The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has, for the first time, sent combatant units abroad, to aid Russia in the war in Ukraine. As noted in the Joint Statement on the DPRK’s Deployment of Troops to Russia this development indelibly connects the Indo-Pacific and European theaters, testifying to the growing systemic entanglement of crises globally. 

Ukraine’s shock incursion into Kursk in early August has been diverting Russia’s attention. Although Russia has not had to redeploy troops away from Ukraine, the May-September 2024 period saw Russia’s highest rate of military losses since the war began. Additionally, Moscow has struggled to meet its recruitment goals. 

North Korean troops deployment provides an avenue for alternative force generation for Russia. Against this backdrop, the DPRK’s decision to deploy troops can be understood as a way to uphold its obligations under the Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between the two countries, signed on June 19, which enshrines the immediate provision of military and other assistance if either side is in a state of war.  

While Ukrainian, U.S., and South Korean intelligence have confirmed that North Korean military personnel will be deployed primarily if not exclusively in the Kursk Oblast, the composition of this force is yet to be fully disclosed. Possibly, in the immediate future, the number of troops deployed by the DPRK will remain limited to maintain the military balance on the Peninsula, and manage and minimize the negative externalities of this deployment, such as desertion, dissent within military ranks, domestic discontent due to to to casualties and ideological contamination, and maximize both short and long-term benefits. 

The short-term benefits for Pyongyang are, to a degree, limited. Russia has already been providing food, oil, raw materials, and parts used in weapons manufacturing as payment for over nine million artillery shells, KN-23 and KN-24 ballistic missiles, and other weaponry. Through this deployment, North Korea might be actively seeking to receive advanced military technology, including nuclear, aviation, naval, and space-related know-how. 

Such a development would tip the balance in Northeast Asia irreversibly ensuring a sequence of escalatory actions from Japan, South Korea, and the United States.   

The most immediate advantage North Korea will gain from this deployment will be exposure to the dynamics of modern combat, which would aid Pyongyang in understanding state-of-the-art military technologies and equip its military with practical on-the-ground experience. This will, in turn, have a long-term effect on North Korea’s military doctrine, allowing it to convert the lessons learned on the battlefield into strategies for better asymmetric and defense warfare especially in the face of technologically superior adversaries such as the United States and South Korea. 

Additionally, the deployment of troops in Russia and the promise of payment from Moscow, set for $2000 per soldier, serves the purpose of replenishing Pyongyang’s coffers. Somewhat in line with the DPRK’s traditional practice of utilizing North Korean workers overseas, which as of 2023 were estimated to inject back into the DPRK an annual revenue of 500 million dollars, this deployment is testimony to the country’s need for hard currency to complete the various projects and plans Kim Jong Un has launched over the last few years. 

Beyond the direct benefits for Pyongyang, North Korea’s troop deployment indelibly connects the European and Indo-Pacific theaters testifying to the rapid worsening of the ongoing great power competition. North Korea’s deployment of troops in concomitance with the escalation of military action on both Russia’s and Ukraine’s side, and possible direct involvement of South Korea in the conflict through direct lethal aid support to Kyiv potentially prolong the continuation of the War in Ukraine, beyond the mandate of the incoming Trump administration. 

North Korea’s involvement could not only prompt a more direct South Korean involvement but may also accelerate decisions regarding intervention in various European capitals. This could indirectly prove beneficial to Washington if one takes into consideration that the various fronts the United States is currently either directly militarily involved in or supporting through lethal aid or other donations is straining its resources.  

Riccardo Villa is the Project Coordinator and Junior Research Fellow at ISDP’s Asia Program and Korea Center and also serves as Director of Security Affairs at The New Global Order, a Rome-based think tank. He is also a Kelly A. Korea Fellow at the Pacific Forum, conducting research on nuclear non-proliferation, military advancements, and innovation on the Korean Peninsula. His research primarily addresses inter-Korean relations and Northeast Asia's security dynamics, specializing in arms control and mediation.

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Long-range global strike is exactly what it sounds like: a military capability to deliver weapons with high precision from great distances. For the United States, which possesses a more robust long-range global strike capability than nearly any other nation, the task falls to both long-range bombers and intercontinental ballistic missiles. Both delivery systems fall under the purview of the Air Force Global Strike Command (AFGSC).

Let’s consider the options available to AFGSC.

The Air Force is fortunate to have multiple long-range capable bomber options available—the B-1, the B-2, and the B-52. The B-1 will soon be phased out but is distinct for being the United States’ only supersonic bomber option. With sweep wings and an elongated fuselage, the B-1 was first brought into service during the Reagan administration after years of production halts.

The B-2 is also being phased out soon. The B-2 is especially distinct; with a flying wing design, the B-2 is the first (and still the only) stealth bomber ever produced. While the B-2’s stealth capabilities have become outdated, the bomber was a technological marvel when she first flew in 1989, a product of Area 51 and one of the United States’ most secret weapons development programs.

Both the B-1 and the B-2 are being phased out to make way for the upcoming B-21 Raider—which bears a striking resemblance to the B-2 and is expected to be the world’s preeminent stealth bomber.

And of course, the Air Force has the B-52 available. Remarkably, the B-52 has been flying active duty since the 1950s—and is slated to continue serving until the 2050s, which means the massive, eight-engine bomber should have an Air Force career spanning a full century.

All three of the American bombers are capable of delivering both conventional and nuclear ordnance.

AFGSC’s long-range strike capabilities also include intercontinental ballistic missiles, specifically, the LGM-30G Minuteman III. Currently, the United States has up to 400 Minuteman missiles at its disposal. According to the Department of Defense, the Minuteman “is a strategic weapon system using a ballistic missile of intercontinental range,” which is “dispersed in hardened silos to protect against attack and connected to an underground launch control center.” Minuteman missiles are manned around the clock. Each Minuteman weighs about 40 tons, relies upon three stages of rocket boosters, and has a range in excess of 6,000 miles. So, while the Minuteman cannot reach any target on Earth, the system does provide the United States with a reliable, domestically-based option that can cross oceans with ease.

To further augment long-range strike options, the United States is working to develop reliable hypersonic missile systems. Hypersonic missiles are a burgeoning variety of missiles which rely on kinetic energy rather than an exploding warhead to cause damage.

In sum, the United States has an enviable and diverse array of long-range strike options.

Harrison Kass is a defense and national security writer with over 1,000 total pieces on issues involving global affairs. An attorney, pilot, guitarist, and minor pro hockey player, Harrison joined the US Air Force as a Pilot Trainee but was medically discharged. Harrison holds a BA from Lake Forest College, a JD from the University of Oregon, and an MA from New York University. Harrison listens to Dokken.

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The conflict in Ukraine has introduced drone warfare at an unprecedented scale. There is a constant buzzing of drones of all sizes above the battlefield in Ukraine as both sides are using unmanned aerial systems in great numbers.

Drones have become so important throughout the war that the Ukrainian military has established a separate drone service to control and coordinate the employment of the weapon systems. And now, the Russian military is following suit and is trying to centralize command and control of its drone forces in order to maximize effectiveness. However, although logical, that move might have the opposite effect.

The Russian military is trying to centralize command and control of drone units. But that might not have the desirable tactical effect.

“The Russian Ministry of Defense’s (MoD) efforts to centralize control over informal Russian drone operation units may degrade the effectiveness of Russian drone capabilities,” the Institute for the Study of War assessed in its latest operational estimate of the conflict.

The Russian military has a tendency to centralize its capabilities. But that can easily put bureaucracy in front of efficiency on the battlefield and cost lives. Moreover, the Russian military is taking precious drone operators from support units and is assigning them to line infantry units that conduct human-wave attacks against the Ukrainian positions. In that way, experienced drone operators are killed in senseless World War I-style attacks, thereby depriving the Russian forces of their capabilities.

Russian military bloggers are already making a noise about the “redeployment” of drone operators in infantry tasks, highlighting the tactical and strategic shortcomings.

Although suicide drones, or one-way attack drones or loitering munitions, are the “sexiest” drones because they have a direct impact on the enemy and the course of the fighting, they only account for a very small number of the drones operating in the war. Most of the drones are used for artillery fire support and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. Through drones, commanders now have a literal picture of the battlefield as opposed to an imagined one on a map based on reports.

The Ukrainian military is truly a pioneer in drone warfare. It has created a dedicated service for drones and has brought every pertinent party, from drone operators on the contact line to drone manufacturers to software engineers, together to work closely and improve their effectiveness. The different stakeholders work together to refine capabilities and use data from previous missions to improve. It is delicate work that involves thousands of personnel on the contact line and the rear. But that is the way to win

Indeed, the way the Ukrainian military is treating its drone capabilities resembles the way the U.S. military tackled the terrorism problem during the war in Iraq when it created an industrial counterterrorism machine centered around the Joint Special Operations Command.

Although not new, drone warfare has truly come of age in the war in Ukraine, and the lessons are plenty.

Stavros Atlamazoglou is a seasoned defense journalist specializing in special operations and a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ). He holds a BA from Johns Hopkins University and an MA from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). His work has been featured in Business Insider, Sandboxx, and SOFREP.

Image: Shutterstock.

There is often no peace on Earth for those who serve in the military during wartime. That is sadly true for U.S. military personnel deployed to the Middle East—as there remains a threat they could come under attack even on Christmas. However, since the country's earliest days, Americans in uniform have risked life and limb for their nation, knowing that war doesn't stop for the holidays.

This is a tradition that dates back to the American Revolution.

Every school child knows—or at least should know unless they stopped teaching such things—that in 1776, General George Washington famously crossed the Delaware River on Christmas and surprised the British forces at Trenton.

There are a few key details to understand about this event.

First, it was very much true that the Continental Army had suffered a number of defeats in the early stages of the American Revolution and the cause looked bleak as winter set in. Washington desperately needed to rally the troops and restore hope. Thus, General Washington devised a plan to conduct a raid on Trenton, New Jersey, where a unit of Hessian troops was stationed. These were actually German troops, essentially the mercenaries or private military contractors of the day, who had been hired by the British to bolster their ranks in the American colonies.

What is incorrect in most tellings of the story is that Washington struck on Christmas Day. In fact, Washington made the crossing on Christmas evening, catching the Hessians after their holiday celebrations and not on Christmas morning.

It is also important to note that Christmas was a minor holiday for the American colonists at that point, yet it was often a rowdy affair for the Germans. Washington's troops essentially caught the Hessians in a state of post-celebration slumber and most of them surrendered within an hour and a half.

The raid, which became known as the Battle of Trenton, proved to be as much a propaganda victory as a strategic success. It raised the spirits of Washington's troops and more importantly, revived the hope of the American colonists.

However, it almost didn't work out. Only one of the three planned river crossings was successful and even worse, spies and deserters had informed the British that an attack was planned. Fortunately, the Hessian commander, Col. Johann Rall, dismissed that there was any threat.

As for the famous painting by Emanuel Leutze—it is pure nonsense. It was almost pitch dark, and Washington didn't stand at the bow of the boat in a historic pose. Leutze completed work on the painting almost eighty years after the famous event, and he based it on the river Rhine, not on the Delaware. The German river is far wider than what Washington had to endure on that still very cold evening.

One part of the story not quite suitable for children is that Washington is recorded to have told the portly General Henry Knox, who was already seated on one side, "Shift that fat ass Henry… but slowly, or you'll swamp the damned boat."

In a final Christmas connection to the American Revolution, it should be noted that a legend tells that following the British defeat at the Battle of Yorktown in 1781, the British Army band under Lord Cornwallis played the tune "The World Turned Upside Down." Many history books still propagate the story, though it only first appeared about a century after the surrender. What those books fail to note is that the English ballad was first published in the 1640s as a protest against the policies of Parliament that banned the celebration of Christmas—and it was hardly considered a military march at the time.

Given that the American Civil War was one described as pitting brother against brother, it is not surprising that the conflict saw numerous engagements at Christmas time—but not like children fighting over a new toy.

The most significant was at Fredericksburg, Dec 11-15, 1862—which was also arguably the most one-sided battle in the war, and a major Confederate victory. Another battle two years later proved to be a major debacle for the Union. That was the First Battle of Fort Fisher, which Union forces tried to take beginning on Christmas Eve 1864. The battle continued until December 27, when Union Major Benjamin Butler declared the fort to be impregnable.

However, that same year, General William Tecumseh Sherman said he had a Christmas gift for President Abraham Lincoln—the city of Savannah, Georgia, which was captured on December 22.

What is also important to note is that Christmas had a different meaning depending on where the soldiers may have been from. By the 1860s, the South tended to celebrate the holiday, while Christmas celebrations were seen as an unnecessary expense in Massachusetts. In reality, Christmas didn't actually become an official Federal holiday until 1870 when President Ulysses S. Grant made it so as an attempt to unite north and south.

Being away from family is never easy for military personnel during the holidays, but it was even worse for the American soldiers who were surrounded by the German military during the Battle of the Bulge in December 1944. Just a week before Christmas, the Germans launched the largest counteroffensive in the war in the war.

The fighting has been described as intense, without accounts that the snow literally turned red with blood—and there is even a tragic account of a young American nurse whose body was delivered home swaddled in parachute cloth. The battle lasted six weeks and finally came to its apex during the Siege of Bastogne, which began on December 20.

There are accounts of small "Christmas Truces" that occurred, and by some accounts, it was a season of miracles as the determined U.S. forces successfully held out against repeated German attacks. It also wasn't until January 28 that the battle ended in a German failure. Yet, the "Bulge" was still the largest and bloodiest single battle fought by the United States, with some 19,000 killed. It was also the third-deadliest campaign in American history.

It was fifty years ago this month, during the Vietnam War, that the United States launched the largest aerial bombing campaign in military history. Known officially as Operation Linebacker II, a follow-up to the Operation Linebacker air interdiction campaign, it was designed to be a "maximum effort" bombing campaign that would destroy major target complexes in Hanoi and Haiphong.

Ordered by President Richard Nixon, it was also the largest heavy bomber strike launched by the U.S. military since World War II. Taking part from December 18 to 29, it earned the nickname "the 11 Days of Christmas," and involved some 207 B-52 Stratofortress bombers along with nearly 2,000 tactical aircraft—with the bombers taking off from and returning to Andersen Air Force Base (AFB), Guam.

The only day that both sides received any reprieve was Christmas Day when American troops were given a thirty-six-hour break to celebrate the holiday. During that brief interlude, Nixon called upon the North Vietnamese to return to the bargaining table, which they initially refused to do. Only when Hanoi agreed to resume peace talks did the bombing campaign come to an end.

During those eleven days, U.S. aircraft dropped 15,000 tons of bombs during 729 U.S. Air Force sorties that involved some 12,000 airmen. According to United States Department of Defense figures, the raid destroyed or damaged 1,600 structures, 500 rail targets, and ten airfields; while 80 percent of North Vietnam's electric-generating capacity was impacted by the Linebacker II campaign.

It was a costly endeavor for the Americans as well.

Sixteen B-52s were shot down, four more suffered heavy damage, and five others suffered medium damage, while a dozen U.S. tactical aircraft also fell victim to enemy fire. A total of forty-three American personnel were killed and forty-nine more were taken prisoner. The United States claimed that six MiG-21s were also shot down, while North Vietnam reported that 1,624 civilians were killed.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

Image Credit: Shutterstock.

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When President Donald Trump returns to the White House, most expect he’ll give Israel a long leash to do as it sees fit in the Middle East. However, that expectation could be tested and might prove to be wrong altogether. It is clear enough that Trump cannot stand it when allies defy him the way Israel has defied President Joe Biden on bringing about a ceasefire and a hostage deal since October 7, 2023. Furthermore, if Tel Aviv’s ongoing regional aggression embarrasses Trump by scuttling his ambitious plans to bring peace to the Middle East, Trump’s frustrations will likely boil over into a bid to reign Israel in. 

The big question, then, is: how can he do that? The answer lies in changing the structure of the U.S.-Israeli alliance, namely by making it more ambiguous. A strategically ambiguous alliance will benefit both Israel and the United States. It will ensure Israeli defenses against regional foes, temper Israeli adventurism, and provide the foundation for expanding the Abraham Accords, which Trump is especially keen to do.

A phenomenon that political scientists call “moral hazard” lies at the heart of the troubles that Trump (like Biden) is almost certain to face with Israel. Moral hazard tends to emerge when a great power makes a robust security pledge to a revisionist ally, meaning a state that is desperate to fix its security problems and/or alter the prevailing security order. Protection by the great power shields the ally from the consequences of its actions, making it more risk-acceptant and less responsive to the great power’s demands. On the hook to bail out the ally when trouble comes, the great power finds that its security costs rise to unsustainable levels.

Since October 7, 2023, moral hazard has left Washington at the mercy of its junior partner, Israel. Backed by Washington’s “ironclad” security commitment to Israel and massive supplies of U.S. weapons, Israeli leaders openly boast about manipulating the United States. “The U.S. has our back,” Netanyahu said confidently in July. Resting on that assurance, Israel has largely ignored Washington as it has barreled forward, repeatedly undercutting the kinds of efforts at peace Trump wants to see in the Middle East. According to one expert, Israel is telling Washington that the war in Gaza will end “on our terms and timeline. Not yours.”

The record bears this out. In early July, Biden pressed Netanyahu to negotiate. Tel Aviv instead hardened its negotiating terms, launched airstrikes in Lebanon and Gaza, and assassinated Hamas’s political leader, Ismail Haniyeh.

The same story prevailed in September and October. Biden pushed a “take it or leave it” ceasefire. Israel rejected it and then dramatically expanded the war through pager strikes in Lebanon and the killing of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah. Getting Israeli cooperation is “like pulling teeth,” said one U.S. official.

The price tag for Israeli moral hazard has been high. Since October 7, the United States has spent $26 billion defending Israel; strains on U.S. weapons stockpiles have grown due to historic levels of shipments to Israel; and three U.S. service members have died, with another 183 injured.

Israel’s gains against Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran have emboldened Israel in ways that could scuttle Trump’s plans for de-escalating regional conflicts and reducing U.S. security costs. In fact, Trump’s election appears set to make Israel’s moral hazard worse, not better. Israeli leaders anticipate Trump “will support their country unconditionally,” a belief reinforced by the pro-Israel bent of Trump appointees. Despite Trump saying he wants a Gaza ceasefire before inauguration day, Israel helped kill ceasefire talks just after Trump’s election and seems largely unchanged in its position on current negotiations. Likewise, Israel’s post-Assad invasion of Syria belies Trump’s stated wishes that Syrians work out their future alone, without outside interference.

If moral hazard remains a problem going forward, Trump should do what Biden lacked the foresight or courage to do and add strategic ambiguity to the partnership with Israel. This would start by replacing the “ironclad” commitment with an explicit pledge whereby the United States “reserves the right,” as with Taiwan, to defend Israel at Washington’s choosing on a case-by-case basis. Also, as with Taiwan, Trump could pare back the supply of offensive military hardware to Israel and send mostly defensive supplies instead (Washington is Israel’s main arms supplier). A progressive drawdown of U.S. forces sent to protect Israel would help signal ambiguity, too.

Some might call this abandonment. It’s not. The United States never abandoned Taiwan with its policy of strategic ambiguity. Taiwan remains a close U.S. partner in Asia and has been shielded by U.S. power from Chinese attacks for more than seven decades. The same would go for Israel in the Middle East.

Ambiguity will help reduce moral hazards (as in the past with Taiwan) by making Israel bear, or think it will bear, more of the costs of its own security. Consequently, Israel will need to take diplomacy more seriously, giving Trump more leverage to de-escalate conflict and shift attention away from the Middle East. With bigger problems elsewhere in Asia, this course is what U.S. interests dictate. 

C. William “Will” Walldorf, Jr. is an Associate Professor and Shivley Family Faculty Fellow at Wake Forest University, as well as a Non-Resident Fellow at Defense Priorities. He is the author most recently of To Shape Our World For Good: Master Narratives and Regime Change in U.S. Foreign Policy, 1900-2011. Will is currently writing a book titled America’s Forever Wars: Why So Long, Why End Now, What Comes Next that, among other things, develops a comprehensive model for over-the-horizon counterterrorism for the current era.

Image: Noam Galai / Shutterstock.com. 

The word “Typhoon” means different things to different people. Besides the actual natural disaster, old-school WWE fans may remember Typhoon (real name Fred Otto), the professional wrestler who teamed up with the late Earthquake (real name John Tenta; June 22, 1963-June 7, 2006) to form the tag team known as The Natural Disasters, who briefly held the WWF World Tag Team Championship back in 1992.

Meanwhile, since a typhoon is a natural disaster of the aerial variety, it should come as no surprise that more than one military warplane has borne the Typhoon moniker. During World War II, there was Great Britain’s Hawker Typhoon, a piston-engine, prop-driven Royal Air Force (RAF) fighter-bomber that, among other things, performed devastating rocket attacks against German radar stations along the coast and strafing attacks against Nazi German Wehrmacht infantry and armor columns during the D-Day campaign. Fast forward to the present day, and you have the multinational twin-engine, supersonic, canard delta wing, multirole 4.5-generation jet fighter known as the Eurofighter Typhoon. Let us now say “Hello/Bonsoir/Guten Tag/Buona Sera” to this remarkable warbird.

Manufactured by a consortium of France’s Airbus (that famous maker of civilian airlines is also involved in military aircraft manufacturing), Britain’s BAE Systems, and Italy’s Leonardo—all, in turn, working through a joint holding company known as Eurofighter Jagdflugzeug GmbH—this Typhoon made her maiden flight on March 27, 1994, which, according to the BBC, was “two years later than expected”; however, for the sake of fairness and balance, that same BBC report reported that this “troubled” warbird nonetheless “successfully completed airborne system and handling checks in a 40-minute flight at Manching in Germany.”

According to the official RAF info page on the Typhoon:

“The Typhoon FGR.Mk 4 is a highly capable and extremely agile multi-role combat aircraft, capable of being deployed for the full spectrum of air operations, including air policing, peace support and high-intensity conflict. Initially deployed in the air-to-air role as the Typhoon F.Mk 2, the aircraft now has a potent, precision multi-role capability as the FGR4. The pilot performs many essential functions through the aircraft’s hands on throttle and stick (HOTAS) interface which, combined with an advanced cockpit and the Helmet Equipment Assembly (HEA), renders Typhoon superbly equipped for all aspects of air operations.”

The warbird has the following specifications and vital stats:

• Fuselage Length: 15.96 m (52 ft 4 in)
• Wingspan: 10.95 m (35 ft 11 in)
• Height: 5.28 m (17 ft 4 in)
• Max Takeoff Weight: 23,500 kg (51,809 lb)
• Powerplant: Twin Rolls-Royce Eurojet EJ200 turbofan; 20,000 lbf (90 kN) each with afterburner; 13,500 lbf (60 kN) each without afterburner
• Max Airspeed: Mach 2.35 (2,385 km/h (1,482 mph, 1,288 kn)
• Service Ceiling: 16,764 m (55,000 ft)
• Combat range: 1,389 km (863 mi, 750 nmi)
• Armament:
  
  • 1 × 27 mm Mauser “Bordkanone (onboard cannon)” BK-27 autocannon with 150 rounds
  • Total of thirteen external store stations: five (incl one wet) under the fuselage and four (incl one wet) under each wing
  • Mix of Beyond Visual Range Air-to-Air Missiles (BVRAAM) and Short-Range Air-to-Air Missiles (SRAAM) carried externally
  • Four BVRAAM under the fuselage in semi-conformal carriage configuration
  • Laser guided bombs
  • Advanced anti-armor weapons
  • Conventionally armed stand-off missiles

Reportedly 592 airframes have been built as of 2023. Besides the Royal Air Force, the Luftwaffe, the Italian Air Force, and the Spanish Air and Space Force, the warbird has also been adopted by Austria as well as the air forces of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member nations Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia.

For an assessment of the Eurofighter’s real-world combat performance, we turn to back to the RAF info page:

“Although Typhoon has flown precision attack missions in all its combat deployments to date, its most essential role remains the provision of quick reaction alert (QRA) for UK and Falkland Islands airspace … Having first deployed into combat for Operation Ellamy (over Libya) in 2011, Typhoon Force began an enduring commitment to Operation Shader (Iraq/Syria) in December 2015. It has also been a regular contributor to the Baltic Air Policing effort under Operation Azotize and bolstered NATO air defence over the Black Sea, deploying jets to Romania, and Iceland, in addition to the standing commitment of QRA in the UK and Falkland Islands.”

Meanwhile, in a delightful non-combat-related human interest story, this past April the RAF had one of its display Typhoons—based at RAF Coningsby in Lincolnshire—repainted a camouflage color scheme with black and white stripes on its wings to commemorate the eightieth anniversary of the D-Day landings. “It means the world to me,” the plane’s pilot, Flt Lt David Turnbull, was quoted as saying.

“No rest for the weary,” as the saying goes (or as some prefer to phrase it, “No rest for the wicked”). Craig Hoyle of FlightGlobal noted last year that the RAF had dramatically ramped up the ops tempo for its Typhoon fleet ever since Vladimir Putin initiated Russia’s so-called “special military operation” in Ukraine in February 2022, and with the end of that conflict seemingly nowhere in sight, that ops tempo probably won’t be slowing down anytime soon.

Meanwhile. other countries expressing an interest in purchasing the Eurofighter include Serbia (somewhat ironic in light of the Serbs’ longstanding “Little Brother-Big Brother” relationship with Russia), Bangladesh, Colombia, and Ukraine.

Christian D. Orr is a Senior Defense Editor for National Security Journal (NSJ). He is a former Air Force Security Forces officer, Federal law enforcement officer, and private military contractor (with assignments worked in Iraq, the United Arab Emirates, Kosovo, Japan, Germany, and the Pentagon). Chris holds a B.A. in International Relations from the University of Southern California (USC) and an M.A. in Intelligence Studies (concentration in Terrorism Studies) from American Military University (AMU). He has also been published in The Daily Torch, The Journal of Intelligence and Cyber Security, and Simple Flying. Last but not least, he is a Companion of the Order of the Naval Order of the United States (NOUS).

Image: Soos Jozsef / Shutterstock.com

While the French today are mocked for their surrender to Hitler’s Germany in World War II, Americans and others around the world make the mistake of underestimating this once great and proud nation with a rich history of martial prowess.

What’s more, France has a highly sophisticated and reliable defense export sector.

One of the most enduring products of the French defense industrial base is the Dassault Rafale. In fact, it has been described to me at times by proud French defense experts as the “pinnacle of French aeronautical engineering.” It is, without a doubt, the most impressive indigenously produced French warplane. This bird has demonstrated a high degree of versatility, technological prowess, and combat effectiveness across multiple battlefields globally.

The Rafale began its storied existence in the 1980s, as the Europeans were feverishly trying to develop a European-produced next-generation fighter. As always, the French strategic vision diverged from those of the rest of Europe. Thus, much like their development of a nuclear weapons arsenal, the French independently created a delta-canard configured jet that emphasized stealth, agility, and versatility. It became a great system for air superiority and ground attack roles. This bird has a reduced cross-section, making it harder to spot on radar. While it isn’t a stealth plane. It is very effective at cutting down on its radar visibility.

An RBE2 Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar comes with the Rafale that greatly improves target detection and tracking capabilities. More importantly, the Rafale uses the SPECTRA EW suite which gives the pilot 360-degree protection against radar and infrared threats, making it one of the most survivable aircraft in its class. All this, of course, merges into the aforementioned Thales Scorpion Helmet Mounted Display System (HMDS) for greater pilot situational awareness and off-boresight targeting. 

The M88-2 engine developed originally by Snecma (now Safran Aircraft Engines) powers the Rafale. The M88-2 allows for the plane to enter a supercruise mode, meaning this bird can go supersonic without needing afterburners. This, in turn, conserves fuel for longer missions or increased combat persistence. When used in conjunction with the Rafale’s fly-by-wire control systems, the Rafale has incredible maneuverability.

As a multirole fighter, the Rafale can carry a wide range of weapons, from air-to-air missiles to air-to-ground attack systems and precision-guided munitions. It’s a truly adaptable warplane for nearly any kind of combat environment. The Rafale’s long service life, as well as its popularity as an export system for France, has allowed for it to see combat across a wide variety of regions. 

Fighting in places like Libya, Mali, Iraq, and Syria, the Rafale has been praised for its precision strike capabilities, its survivability in contested environments, and its role in coalition operations. The Rafale is a highly interoperable plane with other NATO and allied nations. 

In fact, French pilots upstaged the United States Air Force during a training exercise in the Middle East when a Rafale supposedly destroyed an F-22A Raptor in combat. The Americans were understandably humiliated by this and issued a series of denunciations against their French allies. 

Yet, the French military maintains that its Rafales outperformed the F-22 in that instance. It remains a point of controversy between the two air forces today. Still, it showed the amazing capabilities that the older, cheaper fourth-generation French plane had when compared to even fifth-generation warplanes.

Thus, the Rafale is an astonishing plane that routinely protects French territory while projecting French power—and giving the French considerable leverage in the global arms industry. 

The French might not be the dominant world power they were a couple of centuries ago. That doesn’t mean they should be underestimated. 

Brandon J. Weichert, a National Interest national security analyst, is a former Congressional staffer and geopolitical analyst who is a contributor at The Washington Times, the Asia Times, and The-Pipeline. He is the author of Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His next book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine, is available for purchase wherever books are sold. Weichert can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

Image: Arjan van de Logt / Shutterstock.com

It is no fresh news that the Russian forces have been taking extremely heavy losses in Ukraine. Moscow has lost almost 800,000 men in the fighting thus far. But what about materiel losses? How many heavy ground weapon systems have the Russian force lost in the fighting?

“Russian military equipment losses in Ukraine continue to increase. Russia has lost over 3,600 Main Battle Tanks and nearly 8,000 armoured vehicles since February 2022,” the British Military Intelligence assessed in a recent estimate on the conflict.

According to the Oryx independent open-source analysis website, which has been visually tracking Russian materiel losses since the start of the conflict, the Russian forces have lost approximately 3,660 main battle tanks and 8,900 infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers.

However, the Ukrainian estimates put the number of Russian materiel losses at vastly higher figures. Specifically, the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense assesses that the Russian forces have lost approximately 9,600 main battle tanks and 19,900 armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles.

That is quite a discrepancy in numbers between the Western and Ukrainian intelligence assessments, and the truth may very well lie somewhere in between. The Ukrainians are closer to the action and have a better picture. But they also have a vested interest in portraying high Russian losses.

To counter the extremely heavy attrition on the frontlines, the Russian military has resorted to using obsolete weapon systems and vehicles. These obsolete weapon systems include T-54/55 main battle tanks, which were designed at the end of World War II; Degtyaryov heavy machine guns, dating from World War I; artillery pieces built eighty years ago; and armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles from the 1950s and 1960s.

“This has led to a reliance on outdated and poorly maintained Soviet-era equipment from strategic storage depots. Armoured equipment is being hauled out of storage, upgraded where possible and sent to the frontline,” the British Military Intelligence added.

The Russian military has sent thousands of these older weapon systems to the frontlines to fill the gap created by the heavy attrition.

“Imagery has confirmed a large reduction of stored armoured vehicles at tank storage bases at Arsenyev, Buy and Ulan-Ude since 2022,” the British Military stated, referring to strategic weapon storage facilities operated by the Russian military.

There is a strategic consequence to what is transpiring in Ukraine. The Russian military’s ability to fight modern, maneuver-type warfare has largely diminished. Indeed, if a near-peer conflict between Russia and NATO breaks out tomorrow, the Russian military would very likely not be able to match the transatlantic alliance’s conventional capabilities on the ground—notwithstanding escalation to the use of nuclear weapons. And that is the case with other capabilities.

For example, the Russian special operations forces community has suffered extremely heavy losses in the fighting. Some Spetsnaz units have lost up to 80 percent of their personnel. And when it comes to special operators, recruiting and training take years. As such, it will likely take the Russian military years to recreate a strategic special operations capability once the war is over.

Stavros Atlamazoglou is a seasoned defense journalist specializing in special operations and a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ). He holds a BA from Johns Hopkins University and an MA from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). His work has been featured in Business Insider, Sandboxx, and SOFREP.

Image: Andrii Marushchynets / Shutterstock.com

Are the signs in Eastern Europe pointing to peace? On the surface, one could interpret several recent trends in this way. 

On one hand, Ukraine is under enormous pressure, both on the battlefield and on the international stage. Russian troops are slowly but surely advancing in the Donets Basin and Russian attacks on Ukraine's energy infrastructure are having an ever-stronger effect.

In the United States, President-elect Donald Trump has announced that he wants to end the war as quickly as possible. In Western and Central Eastern Europe, a phalanx of populist parties has emerged, for whom international law, European solidarity, and democratic values, and thus the fate of Ukraine, are of secondary importance at best. 

Not only radical left and right-wingers, but also some centrist politicians, such as German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, are conducting election campaigns as would-be peacemakers, whose level-headedness is allegedly preventing an escalation of the war.

On the other hand, Putin's rule in Russia is coming under economic pressure. Inflation is rising and the ruble is falling. Russia's human and material losses on the Ukrainian front are enormous and Moscow can only partially compensate for them. In the Middle East, South Caucasus, and Central Asia, Russia is being ousted as a power factor, and with that, Putin's reputation as a geopolitical strategist is being lost. 

In both Ukraine and Russia, recent polls now show majorities in favor of a quick ceasefire in the Donets Basin.

Does this finally give Europe a chance to end the war permanently? Hardly, because most of the well-meaning approaches and well-intentioned proposals in this direction lead to deadlocks. 

For one thing, several ceasefire plans and more far-reaching ideas for a settlement do not take into account the involved parties’ basic preferences. They run counter to both, Russia's ambitious hegemonic aspirations and/or Ukraine's fundamental security interests. The echoed statement “Nothing about Ukraine without Ukraine” is not only a noble political maxim but also a guarantee of survival for Kyiv. Russia is seeking not only to curtail the Ukrainian nation but to abolish it as an independent cultural community and sovereign nation-state.

On the other hand, many peace projects either consciously or unconsciously develop conflict resolution strategies that imply rewarding Russian military aggression and punishing Ukrainian nuclear abstinence. Similar to the consequences of careless treatment of the natural environment, the international acceptance of a Russian victory in Ukraine would plant a time bomb under the international security system. A partial ceasefire might be possible today for a certain period. 

However, the codification of territorial gains for Russia and/or sovereignty losses for Ukraine would encourage their repetition and imitation by later Russian or other revisionist governments.

Furthermore, a treaty-regulated territorial and/or political reduction of the Ukrainian nation-state would become a warning sign for other countries around the world that are relatively weaker than their neighbors. Whether democratically elected or having come to power undemocratically, many governments would rethink their national security strategies. Regional arms races would be likely, and new atomic weapons programs and an end to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, as well as to the conventions on chemical and biological weapons would become a distinct possibility.

Many proponents of a partial capitulation of Ukraine are now posing as friends of peace and opponents of war. However, the price of a Russian Siegfrieden (victorious peace), currently the only possible temporary end to the war, would not only be blatant injustice to Ukraine. It would also mean the undermining of the international system of states.

Mankind would enter a kind of “New Old World”: Borders would again be shifted by the might of the stronger, weaker states would be militarily suppressed by imperial powers, and expansionist governments would commit genocide with impunity. Only those who are willing to pay this high price have the right to demand an end to arms supplies to Ukraine, a reduction of sanctions against Russia, and the transfer of Ukrainian spoils of war to Moscow: occupied territories, deported children, expropriated real estate, etc.

Many apparent friends of peace do not recognize their rhetorical support for Russian imperialists and the warmongers of this world. Most of the alleged war opponents in Europe forget or keep quiet about the fact that they are talking about rewarding a campaign of conquest, thus making future wars more likely. Allowing an aggressor to reap the fruits of his aggression is considered to be de-escalatory, and not a mistaken pacifist strategy that makes new use of force more attractive.

In addition to their ignorance of the high level of collateral damage to the world and the security policy of a Russian victory, many advocates of negotiations suffer from political cretinism regarding Russia’s imperial intentions. Today's Moscow leadership may not yet have fully fascist qualities, but it wants much more than a mere restriction of sovereignty and cession of territory in Ukraine. The ultimate goal is to abolish the independent Ukrainian nation-state as far as possible.

Ukraine is also a political testing ground, geostrategic instrument, military deployment zone, and resource reservoir for Russia in pursuit of its broader goals in Eastern Europe and beyond. Since 2022, both Moscow's hostility and its objectives vis-à-vis the West have steadily expanded. 

The subjugation of Ukraine is now less of a prize than the first step in a fundamental revision of European and world politics that Moscow is seeking. This does not yet mean an immediate continuation of kinetic warfare beyond Ukraine's borders. Moscow's repeated threats against the West with conventional weapons and ones of mass destruction are less-so announcements of action than part of a hybrid toolbox for corroding democratic societies, states, and organizations.

At certain stages, diplomatic activities are also suitable instruments of subversion for Moscow rather than an alternative approach to conflict resolution. 

As the Swedish political scientist Charlotta Rodhe recently put it, the “Russian negotiation theater” has more performative and manipulative than practical functions. A minimal goal of negotiations can be to stall the negotiating partner, and a maximal goal can be to extract concessions that would otherwise have to be won by purely military means. 

Foreign advocates of negotiations today act as welcome "useful idiots" for the Kremlin, facilitating Moscow's hybrid warfare and unconsciously hindering an actual and sustainable peace solution by strengthening Ukraine.

Russia's attack on Ukraine is not only a war of conquest and extermination but also acts as a wedge for Moscow. The debates about helping Ukraine and ending the war are fragmenting Western parties, parliaments, governments, and alliances. The flood of refugees from Ukraine is boosting anti-Western populist parties such as the Alternative for Germany and the Sarah Wagenknecht Union in the Federal Republic of Germany. 

Last but not least, a Russia that conquers Ukraine militarily, diplomatically, or by a combination of the two, would use it as a springboard and resource for Moscow's activities further west, whether kinetic or hybrid.

In particular, European states, but also other Western and non-Western countries, should have a range of national interests in a just peace to end the Russian-Ukrainian war. This will only be possible, however, if there are new successful Ukrainian offensive operations based on good equipment with modern weapons. 

As long as this basic condition is not met, the search for a balance and compromise with Moscow will only further fuel Russia's already adventurous foreign policy ambitions, rather than containing them.

Dr. Andreas Umland is an analyst at the Stockholm Center for Eastern European Studies (SCEEUS) of the Swedish Institute of International Affairs (UI).

Image Credit: Shutterstock.com.

A historian writing about the 2022 war in Ukraine would probably spend a lot of ink and pages on unmanned aerial systems and their impact on the fighting.

Both Russia and Ukraine are using thousands of drones to support their ground forces on a scale never before seen in warfare. The Russian military, in particular, has been heavily relying on the deployment of drones to achieve kinetic results both on the contact line and against Ukrainian urban centers.

For example, in November, the Russian forces launched approximately 2,300 one-way attack drones of varying types against Ukrainian military positions and urban centers. That is a record number of kinetic drone attacks, and the volume of drone attacks keeps increasing every month.

“Monthly [drone attack] numbers have been increasingly consistently throughout 2024, with significant increases—greater than 200 on the previous month—since July 2024,” the British Military Intelligence assessed on Monday.

Equipped with explosive charges of varying destructive capabilities, ranging from grenade- to missile-level, one-way attack drones are very useful and can take out an enemy command and control posts and incapacitate heavy main battle tanks.

“It is likely that through September-November 2024, as many as 50-60% of the total launches were ‘decoy’ [One Way Attack Uncrewed Aerial Systems] OWA UAS,” the British Military Intelligence stated.

But the Ukrainians are also using drones quite effectively. For example, the Ukrainian military has killed and wounded scores of North Korean troops in the Kursk Oblast with suicide drones,

“The rate of increase from October to November dropped in comparison to previous months. December 2024 launch figures show approximately 850 launches so far. However, it is likely that weather has impacted operations in December, evidenced through some nights with significantly larger waves following a period of low or no activity,” the British Military Intelligence stated.

Moscow has received thousands of unmanned aerial systems from Iran, as well as the know-how to replicate Iranian drones in Russia.

“With no impact on launch sites of production, it remains likely that Russia can sustain numbers at least in excess of 1,500 per month. Russian OWA UAS maintain coverage of targets across the entirety of Ukraine, enabling Russia to maintain pressure while allowing Long Range Aviation Missile stocks to replenish,” the British Military Intelligence concluded.

In many ways, the war in Ukraine is the first drone war. To be sure, unmanned aerial vehicles have been around for decades—the U.S. Intelligence Community and military pioneered their use in intelligence gathering and precision strike missions in the 1990s and 2000s.

But, until the large-scale invasion of Russia in Ukraine, there hadn’t been such a prolific employment of drones by two conventional militaries against one another. Today, in the trenches of Ukraine, ordinary foot soldiers can rely on the support of several drones when advancing or defending, while they have to keep an eye out for enemy surveillance and one-way attack unmanned aerial systems.

Stavros Atlamazoglou is a seasoned defense journalist specializing in special operations and a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ). He holds a BA from Johns Hopkins University and an MA from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). His work has been featured in Business Insider, Sandboxx, and SOFREP.

Image: Drop of Light / Shutterstock.com

The Russian forces continue to make tactical gains in the direction of Pokrovsk, in the Donbas.

A key point on the Ukrainian defensive line, Pokrovsk is a logistical hub that supports both offensive and defensive operations in the region. The Russian forces have been trying to capture it for months, throwing tens of thousands of troops and thousands of heavy weapon systems against it.

“Russian forces are gradually advancing south and southwest of Pokrovsk, but it remains unclear if Russian forces will be able to exploit these gains to envelop the town or if they intend to advance to the administrative boundary of Donetsk Oblast,” the Institute for the Study of War assessed in its latest operational estimate of the war in Ukraine.

One of Russia’s main claims in the war is that the Donetsk Oblast should gain its independence (alongside Luhansk, Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, and Crimea Oblasts) and secede from Ukraine.  

“It remains unclear which effort the Russian military command will prioritize, as Russian President Vladimir Putin may have tasked the Russian military with securing territorial gains rather than seizing significant settlements,” the Institute for the Study of War added.

But capturing Pokrovsk might not be the Russian military’s ultimate goal. With the prospect of peace negotiations in the background, it is likely that the Kremlin wants more land to strengthen its bargaining power.

“Putin appears to be increasingly characterizing Russian advances in terms of square kilometers instead of highlighting the seizure of particular settlements as he had previously done. Putin may have instructed the Russian military command to delay the seizure of Pokrovsk in favor of making further gains through open fields and small settlements, particularly as Russian forces advance closer to the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast administrative boundary,” the Institute for the Study of War added.

Based in Washington, DC, the think tank has been providing timely and critical analysis on the strategic, operational, and tactical developments of the conflict.

Meanwhile, the Russian forces continue to take heavy losses on the ground. Over the past twenty-four hours, the Russian military, paramilitary units, and pro-Russian separatist forces had approximately 1,630 troops killed or wounded in the fighting. In addition, the Russian forces lost approximately forty-seven tactical vehicles and fuel trucks, forty-four unmanned aerial systems, thirty infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers, ten artillery pieces and multiple launch rocket launchers, nine main battle tanks, and three pieces of special equipment.

Overall, the Russian forces have lost almost 780,000 troops in the fighting, with approximately 200,000 killed and 580,000 wounded. These casualties reveal the reality of Putin’s disastrous decision to invade Ukraine.

The Russian leader believed that his “special military operation” would last for three days to two weeks. Putin was convinced that his forces would sweep through Ukraine, while a friendly Ukrainian people would welcome them with open arms and flowers. Well, there were arms, but of a different kind than what Putin and his Kremlin advisers expected.

Stavros Atlamazoglou is a seasoned defense journalist specializing in special operations and a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ). He holds a BA from Johns Hopkins University and an MA from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). His work has been featured in Business Insider, Sandboxx, and SOFREP.

Image: Jose HERNANDEZ Camera 51 / Shutterstock.com

Just a few weeks ago, the Atlantic Council posted a caustic headline that bleated, “In a war against China, the US could quickly exhaust its weapons.” Their solution is “A new Indo-Pacific defense initiative.” 

Sadly, the Atlantic Council is only half correct. 

Indeed, had you been reading anything I’ve written for the last three years you’d already know about the staggering drain of critical weapons stores the U.S. military has been made to endure (due to increased demand being met with a hopelessly sclerotic national defense industrial base). 

The solution, contrary to what the bureaucrats in DC think, is not to create more multilateral regional bureaucracies. Already, the attempt to create a “NATO of the Indo-Pacific” in things like the much-ballyhooed Quadrilateral (Quad) partnership consisting of the United States, India, Japan, and Australia or the meandering Australia-United Kingdom-United States (AUKUS) nuclear submarine construction consortium has floundered.

In fact, these attempts at regional defensive alliances, while admirable, are looking as wasteful as the old Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) alliance that the Americans crafted during the Cold War.

America’s problem is not a lack of allies in the region. Nor is its problem a lack of multilateral bureaucracy that mirrors the byzantine (and outdated) NATO alliance in Europe. The quandary America faces is simple: its defense industrial base, especially its military shipyards, is broken. Pouring more money into the industrial base is not the solution. We’re so far beyond that, it’s not even funny. 

Washington needs to ask itself: why, precisely, was the United States able to create all these complex, multilateral regional alliances in the previous century? 

It was industrial might and economic heft. America’s industries today are, as noted, shells of their former selves. Shipyards cannot keep up with existing demand, let alone meet the increased demand of wartime that would inevitably occur within a few weeks of any major great state conflict. 

More importantly, the overall industrial base cannot reliably keep the U.S. military (or its allies) supplied under present conditions. Should a general war erupt between the United States and a near-peer competitor, such as China, the Americans will be gutted. 

With a new administration set to take power soon, regardless of which candidate wins this Tuesday, the new government in Washington must prioritize getting its industrial base in order—no matter the burden or the cost. 

At the same time, with the rise of the so-called “BRICS” bloc (it’s really just a Chinese-led Eurasian geoeconomic counterweight to the United States), with the U.S. economy sputtering along, and a Greek-style debt crisis appearing to be at hand (regardless of who wins the White House), the U.S. economy is nowhere near as attractive as it was a century ago when things like NATO were founded. 

Even if the United States can somehow avoid a massive debt crisis in the next decade, the BRICS challenge to the U.S. dollar is real. And that means America’s massive debt—as well as its profligate deficit spending—is enough to weaken the American ability to attract allies in their bid to counter China.

What this means is that, as the Chinese and Americans inch closer to war, with America’s conventional strength waning and China’s rising, the prospect of nuclear war increases exponentially.

For example, the United States will find itself likely boxed out of the critical strategic area of the South China Sea under current conditions. Whatever may happen in the long run, the Americans will be hard-pressed to break into any region that China is contesting due to Beijing’s relative military superiority in that area of operation.

And should China be foolish enough to open any potential war on Taiwan with a series of surprise attacks on U.S. military facilities throughout the Indo-Pacific (such as Guam) or by attacking, and possibly sinking, U.S. aircraft carriers, the chance for uncontrolled escalation into nuclear warfare is very real, particularly due to the aforementioned limits of America’s conventional forces today.

If, however, the Chinese can contain their rage and keep things just below the threshold of war, the prospects of nuclear warfare diminish. Neither Donald Trump nor Kamala Harris will risk war with China, especially nuclear war, if U.S. assets are not attacked by Chinese forces. This is why a blockade against Taiwan is China’s most likely move. It delays and stymies the American military response while giving Beijing’s forces escalation dominance in the near term. 

Instead of building more and more alliances, the Americans should spend the next decade engaged in realistic diplomacy while doing whatever it takes to enhance the country’s defense industrial base, its indigenous human capital base, its ailing infrastructure, its domestic industries, and restoring trust as well as confidence in its failing institutions. 

Once that is achieved, the Americans will again be on top of the world, as there is simply no other regime out there capable of competing with a restored America governed according to its constitution.

To better defend Taiwan and defeat China, America must nation-build at home.

Brandon J. Weichert, a National Interest national security analyst, is a former Congressional staffer and geopolitical analyst who is a contributor at The Washington Times, the Asia Times, and The-Pipeline. He is the author of Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His next book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine, is available for purchase wherever books are sold. Weichert can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

Image: Shutterstock.

To most naval history buffs, the term “battlecruiser” evokes thoughts of warships of a bygone era, an era that ended with World War II and was arguably most famously represented by the pride of Britain’s Royal Navy at the time, the HMS Hood (Pennant No. 51). To Star Trek fans, meanwhile, the term is more likely to conjure up the image of a fearsome future spaceship that enforces the will of the Klingon Empire.

Whether one chooses to interpret it as a throwback to the past or as going “Back to the Future” (sorry, I couldn’t resist using a second sci-fi franchise reference here), the only remaining nation in the world using battlecruisers is Russia. Say “Privyet (Hello)” to the Kirov-class battlecruisers.

For present-day contextual purposes, the Naval Encyclopedia roughly defines “battlecruiser” thusly:

“If the term ‘battlecruiser’ is frequently use by historians to describe them, both official records and NATO designations only mentions ‘heavy missile cruisers’. The only ship for the USN that could roughly match this was the unique 1960 USS Long Beach, matching its superior radar and command capabilities, nuclear power, but its missile armament and overall displacement and size did not matched [sic] the Soviet ships. None of the subsequent cruiser [sic] ever arrived close, especially not the almiost [sic]-contemporary Ticonderoga class, which were more destroyers with more advanced capabilities. The last true USN cruisers were the West Virginias in the 1970s. They were half the tonnage of a Kirov.”

From there, we get some early history in addition to technical context:

“Heavy nuclear missile cruisers of project 1144 ‘Orlan’—a series of Soviet/Russian multi-purpose steam/nuclear (CONAS) guided missile cruisers for oceanic operations and fleet coordination, built at the Baltic Shipyard from 1973 to 1996: Kirov, Admiral Lazarev, Admiral Nakhimov and Peter the Great. Chief designer was B. I. Kupensky. The end design became the largest and most powerful non-aircraft carrier combat surface ships with nuclear power plant [sic] in the world, and record holder in terms of armament. According to NATO classification, the project received soon the term “battlecruiser” due to its huge size, armor and powerful armament, but it still remained a ‘large missile cruiser’ in the Soviet inventory. As of 2020, only one, Peter the Great is operational, while ‘Admiral Nakhimov’ is under modernization, expected completion in late 2023.”

As already indicated, the Kirov—named for Bolshevik revolutionary and Joseph Stalin toady Sergei Mironovich Kirov (March 27, 1886—December 1, 1934) —was the lead ship of the class laid down on March 27, 1974, launched on December 26, 1977, and commissioned on December 30, 1980 (coincidentally a mere three weeks of the inauguration of U.S President Ronald Wilson Reagan, who would initiate a foreign policy that would accelerate the collapse of the Soviet Union).

The Kirov and her sister ships bore/bear the following specifications and vital stats:

• Displacement: 28,000 tons fully laden
• Hull length: 252 m (827 ft)
• Beam Width: 28.5 m (94 ft))
• Draft: 9.1 m (30 ft)
• Propulsion: 2-shaft CONAS, nuclear propulsion with steam turbine boost; 140,000 shp
• Max speed: 32 knots (59 km/h; 36 mph)
• Crew Complement: 727 core crew of commissioned officers and enlisted sailors; eighteen aircrew, fifteen flagstaff
• Armament:    
  
  • 2 × AK-100 100 mm (3.9 in)/L60 DP guns.
  • 8 × AK-630 hex Gatling 30 mm/L60 PD guns            
  • twenty P-700 Granit (SS-N-19 Shipwreck) antiship missiles
  • 12 × 8 (96) SA-N-6 Grumble (S-300PMU) surface-to-air missiles (SAMs)

NOTE: For the basis of comparison & contrast, World War II battlecruiser HMS Hood had a hull length of 860 ft 7 in (262.3 m), a displacement of 47,430 tons, and packed a main armament of eight 15-in (381 mm) guns and a secondary armament of fourteen 4-inch (102 mm) guns.

The Kirovs were originally conceived to counter the U.S. Navy’s submarines with its large payload of SS-N-14 anti-submarine missiles, and were later intended to operate alongside prospective nuclear-powered aircraft carriers for global power projection—but that never came to fruition (and we all know what a sick joke the Russians’ lone aircraft carrier, the Admiral Kuznetsov, has turned out to be). Meanwhile, in a classic example of the Law of Unintended Consequences, the commissioning of the Kirovs spurred the U.S. Navy into recommissioning its Iowa-class battleships (true, old-school battleships with the 16-inch guns to prove it).

The Kirov class has turned out to have a pretty inauspicious past and present. My colleague Brandon J. Weichert elaborates in a September 13, 2024 article for The National Interest titled “Russia’s Kirov-Class Nuclear-Powered Battlecruiser ‘Has Outlived Its Usefulness’”:

“The Kirov-class battlecruisers played a major role in the Cold War, projecting Soviet power in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. Their operational history has been marred by several incidents and accidents, including the accidental explosion of the Kirov’s nuclear reactor in 1990, which, naturally, led to its decommissioning … Due to their age and operational limitations, these warships have seen limited deployment in recent years, reducing their overall utility to the Russian Navy—especially in a time of war. Russia needs every platform it can get. The Kirov-class battlecruiser simply doesn’t deliver.”

Christian D. Orr is a Senior Defense Editor for National Security Journal (NSJ). He is a former Air Force Security Forces officer, Federal law enforcement officer, and private military contractor (with assignments worked in Iraq, the United Arab Emirates, Kosovo, Japan, Germany, and the Pentagon). Chris holds a B.A. in International Relations from the University of Southern California (USC) and an M.A. in Intelligence Studies (concentration in Terrorism Studies) from American Military University (AMU). He has also been published in The Daily Torch , The Journal of Intelligence and Cyber Security, and Simple Flying. Last but not least, he is a Companion of the Order of the Naval Order of the United States (NOUS).

Image: Shutterstock