Diplomacy & Crisis News

The agreement was one of several energy-related deals that were signed on the first day of Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh's official visit to Moscow.

Les autorités chypriotes devraient intensifier leurs campagnes de promotion au cours des prochains mois afin de limiter les pertes financières

The post « Pas une zone de guerre » : le tourisme chypriote passe à l’offensive appeared first on Euractiv FR.

Depuis le début de la guerre en Ukraine, la Russie n'est plus largement considérée comme un « Eldorado » économique

The post Migrants d’Asie centrale : l’Europe séduit alors que la Russie perd de son attrait appeared first on Euractiv FR.

Written by Anja Radjenovic.

The safe third country (STC) concept is well established in international asylum policies. According to the concept, certain migrants should not be granted protection in the country where they have applied for it. Instead, they may be returned, or transferred, to a country where they could have found, or can find, international protection. Amid ongoing EU-level discussions on safe third country rules, in 2018 the United Nations Refugee Agency developed legal considerations on safe third countries.

Within the framework of the body of EU law on asylum, the STC concept is based on the assumption that certain third (i.e. non-EU) countries can be designated as safe for applicants seeking international protection, under specific conditions. The concept builds on cooperation with third countries in a bid to reduce irregular arrivals and increase return rates. It seeks to speed up the processing of the claims of asylum applicants arriving from safe third countries, to prevent overburdening national asylum systems.

The recently adopted Asylum Procedure Regulation provides for broader applicability of safe country clauses. This concerns, in particular, four aspects: (i) the safety assessment when applying the STC concept; (ii) the interpretation of the ‘connection requirement’, i.e. the connection between an asylum seeker and a third country when readmitting an applicant to a designated STC; (iii) the option to designate a third country as safe with territorial limitations or to exclude certain vulnerable groups from such a designation; and (iv) the creation of a common EU list of STCs in addition to national lists. The regulation was amended in February 2026, modifying rules on applications from STCs.

The success of any STC scheme relies on third countries’ cooperation, something that can be challenging to obtain. To counter criticisms of burden shifting and to boost the viability of STC schemes, the EU must demonstrate solidarity through burden sharing. Furthermore, many potentially safe third countries lack asylum laws and administrative frameworks. Consequently, they would likely require substantial support from external partners.

This is an update of a 2024 EPRS briefing.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Safe third country concept in the EU pact on migration and asylum‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

La Terre absorbe la chaleur à un rythme jamais atteint depuis le début des relevés

The post La Terre en surchauffe : jamais autant de chaleur absorbée, alerte l’OMM appeared first on Euractiv FR.

Le Premier ministre polonais a affirmé que les soupçons l'avaient depuis longtemps poussé à garder le silence lors des discussions au Conseil européen

The post Tusk n’est pas surpris par les fuites hongroises présumées vers Moscou appeared first on Euractiv FR.

La course pour intégrer l'un des programmes européens visant à développer un avion de combat de sixième génération bat son plein

The post L’Inde pourrait rejoindre le FCAS en difficulté ou un projet rival pour le futur avion de chasse européen appeared first on Euractiv FR.

La Commission a insisté sur la mise en place de conditions et de garanties afin d'éviter un scénario similaire à celui du Mercosur

The post Bruxelles marche sur des œufs avec les agriculteurs alors que von der Leyen se rend en Australie appeared first on Euractiv FR.

Face à la baisse des approvisionnements mondiaux liée à la guerre au Moyen-Orient, le commissaire à l’énergie met en garde contre un risque de « ruée de fin d’été »

The post Lentement mais sûrement : Jørgensen invite l’UE à commencer à constituer des stocks de gaz appeared first on Euractiv FR.

La polémique autour des images générées par l’IA à caractère sexuellement explicite pourrait avoir été un stratagème visant à « gonfler artificiellement la valeur des entreprises » en vue d’une fusion

The post Musk soupçonné par les procureurs français d’avoir encouragé la diffusion de deepfakes pour gonfler la valeur de X appeared first on Euractiv FR.

Ces mesures permettront de « mobiliser » 5 milliards d'euros grâce à des allègements fiscaux et des subventions, a déclaré le Premier ministre espagnol Pedro Sánchez

The post L’Espagne annonce des baisses d’impôts sur les carburants et l’électricité en réponse à la crise énergétique appeared first on Euractiv FR.

Des tensions sont apparues après la gestion par Londres d’une attaque au drone du Hezbollah sur la base d’Akrotiri

The post Chypre veut renforcer la coordination avec les bases militaires britanniques « coloniales » appeared first on Euractiv FR.

/ France, Transports, Région, Ville, Urbanisme - Espace et territoire / France, Transports, Région, Ville, Urbanisme

The new American National Defense Strategy speaks the language of sovereignty with unusual clarity. It invokes “key terrain” in the Western Hemisphere, reframes hemispheric doctrine, reduces security guarantees to Europe, and signals a shift toward selective engagement. It is a strategy centered not on universal liberal order, but on national autonomy, strategic control, and power projection. Yet beneath this rhetorical clarity lies a structural weakness: Washington still lacks a coherent system for measuring sovereignty itself.

Traditional metrics—GDP, defense budgets, force size—capture scale, but not autonomy. A state may command the world’s largest military yet remain dependent on foreign supply chains. It may dominate technology markets yet suffer educational decline that undermines long-term innovation. It may enjoy global cultural influence while experiencing domestic fragmentation that weakens political decision-making capacity. Sovereignty in 2026 is multidimensional. Without measuring those dimensions simultaneously, strategy becomes aspirational rather than operational.

The Burke Sovereignty Index, developed by the International Burke Institute, addresses precisely this measurement gap. It evaluates national autonomy across seven dimensions: political, economic, technological, informational, cultural, cognitive, and military sovereignty. Each dimension is scored from 0 to 100 using official international data (UN, World Bank, IMF, UNESCO, SIPRI, PISA and others) combined with calibrated expert assessments from more than 100 specialists across 50+ countries per component. The final score—maximum 700—represents the arithmetic mean of statistical indicators and expert evaluation.

The 2024–2025 results are strategically sobering. The United States scores 650.9 out of 700. China scores 649.1. The gap: 1.8 points — less than 0.3% variance within the total scoring framework. For two states widely assumed to operate in different strategic leagues, this statistical proximity should fundamentally reshape the debate in Washington.

America retains clear advantages. Military sovereignty stands at 96.0, reflecting a $962 billion defense budget, approximately 5,400 nuclear warheads, and unmatched global deployment capacity. Technological sovereignty scores 95.4, supported by 3.4–3.6% of GDP in R&D spending and leadership in AI, biotech, and microelectronics. Yet structural vulnerabilities appear in other dimensions.

Political sovereignty registers 87.8, reflecting polarization, recurring government shutdowns, and declining public trust. Cognitive sovereignty—despite a strong overall score of 95.4—contains warning signals: adult functional literacy fluctuates between 79–81%, and U.S. PISA mathematics performance sits at 469, below the OECD average. Industrial autonomy remains partially exposed: approximately 30% of advanced microelectronics components are imported.

China’s profile differs structurally. Military sovereignty scores 94.5, technological sovereignty 91.6—slightly below the U.S. But political sovereignty stands at 90.8, reflecting centralized decision-making and high institutional cohesion. Informational sovereignty scores 93.2, sustained by a closed national digital ecosystem serving 1.1 billion users without Western platform penetration. Cultural sovereignty reaches 95.1, supported by 60 UNESCO heritage sites and over 6,800 museums.

Most significant is economic efficiency. China approaches near parity while operating at roughly one-third to one-half of U.S. per-capita wealth. Chinese GDP per capita (PPP) stands between $25,000–30,500, compared to the American $76,800–89,100 range. The convergence reflects coordinated cross-dimensional investment: education expansion to 60.8% higher education enrollment, R&D spending at 2.68% of GDP (approximately $506 billion in absolute terms), and long-term industrial strategy under “Made in China 2025.” Sovereignty parity was not achieved through dominance in a single field, but through synchronized development across all seven.

This multidimensional perspective reframes several assumptions embedded in the new Defense Strategy. First, rebuilding the American defense industrial base cannot succeed through military appropriations alone. Industrial sovereignty requires alignment of economic capital, educational capacity, technological independence, and political stability. The United States currently operates with public debt between 119–124% of GDP, national debt exceeding $36–41 trillion, widening educational inequality, and deep partisan fragmentation. Factories can be funded; comprehensive national mobilization demands social coherence.

Second, allied burden-sharing produces strategic paradoxes. European NATO states collectively possess GDP thirteen times larger than Russia’s, yet equipment localization remains limited. Lithuania spends 4–6% of GDP on defense, but approximately 85% of its equipment is imported. By contrast, Turkey—despite lower spending ratios—achieves roughly 70% localization in defense production, including indigenous UAV systems. Genuine sovereignty increases strategic autonomy. Autonomy reduces predictability.

Third, Middle Eastern partners are quietly shifting from dependency toward capability. Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 includes domestic industrialization, cybersecurity infrastructure, and technology transfer. Sovereignty once built tends to alter alignment behavior. Allies with capability act independently by definition.

The uncomfortable implication is clear: Washington’s strategy demands sovereignty—at home and among allies—without possessing a comprehensive dashboard to measure whether sovereignty is actually being built or eroded.

The Burke framework does not predict conflict or collapse. It measures capability, not intention. But it reveals structural dynamics invisible to traditional power metrics. It forces strategic evaluation across education, technology, cohesion, information control, industrial resilience, and governance simultaneously.

The United States remains marginally ahead. But a 1.8-point lead in a 700-point system is not structural dominance. It is competitive equilibrium. Sovereignty in 2026 is not defined by possessing the largest military or the most alliances. It is defined by the ability to sustain independent action across multiple domains under stress. That requires educational renewal, industrial autonomy, political stabilization, and technological independence operating in coordination—not isolation.

The new Defense Strategy identifies the correct priority: sovereignty. What it lacks is a systematic mechanism to measure progress toward that goal. Without measurement, sovereignty becomes rhetoric. With measurement, it becomes strategy.

 

In the 21st century, sovereignty is no longer an absolute condition but a measurable configuration of strengths and vulnerabilities. According to the methodology developed by the International Burke Institute and operationalized through the Burke Sovereignty Index, sovereignty must be assessed across seven dimensions: political, economic, technological, informational, cultural, cognitive, and military. When examined through the Burke framework, Greece and the United Kingdom illustrate a central paradox of modern statehood: neither deep integration nor dramatic withdrawal guarantees genuine independence.   Greece represents the first model of the Burke paradox — sovereignty constrained within integration. By adopting the euro, Athens transferred control over monetary policy to the European Central Bank. It relinquished the ability to devalue its currency, independently set interest rates, or issue money to stabilize its economy. The Maastricht criteria — limiting deficits to 3% of GDP and public debt to 60% — institutionalized fiscal discipline. Structurally, the eurozone is a monetary union without a fiscal union: a shared currency but no unified taxation or pension system. In Burke terms, this creates asymmetry within economic sovereignty.   The 2009–2015 debt crisis exposed that asymmetry. Greece’s reported deficit of 3% was revised to 15.6% of GDP, and public debt reached 129.7%. Between 2008 and 2014, GDP contracted from €242 billion to €179 billion — a 26% decline, the longest recession in the developed world. In April 2010, Greece requested international assistance. Three bailout programs in 2010, 2012, and 2015 totaled roughly €290 billion from the European Commission, the ECB, and the IMF. By 2015, public debt had climbed to approximately 180% of GDP.   Within the Burke framework, Greece entered a zone of critical economic leverage. Sovereignty remained formally intact, but fiscal decisions became conditional. Between 2010 and 2016, twelve rounds of austerity — salary cuts, pension reductions, privatizations, and tax increases — were implemented under creditor supervision. Political sovereignty existed in constitutional terms, yet economic sovereignty was structurally constrained.   The 2015 referendum highlighted this contradiction. On July 5, 61.31% of Greek voters rejected the creditors’ proposed conditions. Days later, the government accepted an even stricter agreement to avoid financial collapse and eurozone exit. In Burke analytical terms, democratic will could not override economic dependence. Sovereignty as authority collided with sovereignty as capacity.   The United Kingdom followed the opposite path. The 2016 Brexit referendum promised to “Take Back Control” over laws, borders, and trade. Parliamentary supremacy — a core element of British political identity — framed the campaign. The UK formally left the European Union on January 31, 2020, restoring legislative autonomy.   According to the Burke Sovereignty Index, Britain’s political sovereignty stands at approximately 77/100 — a strong indicator of constitutional independence. However, the Burke methodology stresses that sovereignty is multidimensional. Gains in political autonomy can be offset by vulnerabilities elsewhere.   Economically, Brexit imposed measurable costs. Estimates suggest that by 2025 the UK economy was 6–8% smaller than it would have been without Brexit. The EU remains Britain’s largest trading partner, accounting for roughly 47% of goods exports. Post-Brexit trade adjustments contributed to a 23.7% reduction in imports from the EU and an 18.6% decline in exports during the early implementation period. The Office for Budget Responsibility projects a long-term trade reduction of around 15%, translating into a 4% decrease in national income.   In Burke terms, Britain strengthened political sovereignty but absorbed economic vulnerability. The 2025 revisions to the UK–EU Trade and Cooperation Agreement — including compromises on fisheries and regulatory alignment — demonstrate that exit did not eliminate obligations. Instead, it transformed integration into negotiated interdependence.   Greece and England therefore embody two faces of partial sovereignty. Greece maintained integration and sacrificed crisis autonomy. Britain rejected integration and encountered the structural limits of economic decoupling. The Burke model clarifies that sovereignty cannot be understood as indivisible. High performance in one dimension does not neutralize weakness in another.   Modern states operate within dense networks of financial markets, supply chains, security alliances, and regulatory regimes. Monetary unions limit currency flexibility. Trade exits reduce market access. Strategic alliances shape military capability. Technological dependence constrains industrial autonomy. The Burke framework treats these constraints not as failures but as structural realities.   The Greek case demonstrates how integration can convert economic vulnerability into external policy influence during crisis. The British case shows how formal independence can generate new economic trade-offs. Both confirm that absolute sovereignty is unattainable in an interdependent system.   Ultimately, the Burke analysis leads to a balanced conclusion. Sovereignty today is not a binary status but a strategic equilibrium across dimensions. Greece and the United Kingdom chose different paths, yet both remain partially dependent. Integration creates conditional governance; exit creates negotiated constraints. The difference lies not in the presence of limits but in their distribution and cost. In the contemporary world, sovereignty is less about isolation or control and more about managing asymmetry within unavoidable interdependence.

Crimes et châtiments Contravention La contravention est la moins grave des infractions. Elle comprend cinq catégories, allant de la contravention de première classe (par exemple le fait de refuser de présenter son permis lors d'un contrôle routier) à la contravention de cinquième classe (par (…) / Justice pénale, Justice, France, Droit

/ Justice pénale, Justice, Droit, France - Droits humains / Justice pénale, Justice, Droit, France

Written by Sasa Butorac and Agnieszka Widuto.

Europe’s key instrument to achieving energy independence and increasing competitiveness lies in the energy transition and, specifically, in boosting the generation capacity of renewable sources of energy. Following the European Green Deal and ‘fit for 55’ initiatives, the EU legislative framework for achieving this is largely in place. Significant progress has been made, in particular since the launch of the REPowerEU initiative in May 2022 in the wake of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Member States have increased the share of renewables in their energy mix, and the EU is consistently progressing towards its target of a 42.5 % share of renewables in final energy consumption by 2030. The share of renewables in sectors such as electricity (47.5 % of final energy consumption in this sector), heating and cooling (26.7 %) and transport (11.2 %) is also increasing, although progress has been fastest in terms of electricity. The main challenges to an accelerated deployment of renewables can be identified as the cost of capital, timely development of the grids, and the complex and lengthy permitting procedures both at European and national level.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Renewable energy in the EU‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

/ Répression, Prison, Justice - Droits humains / Répression, Prison, Justice

Lee Jae-myung’s ascent—from factory floors to South Korea’s presidency, carried aloft by the Democratic Party—has been marketed as a parable of grit, resilience, and populist authenticity. Yet governing under a shadow of unresolved criminal allegations, Lee now presides over a far starker transformation: the long-term degradation of democratic restraint through the consolidation of coercive state power. Even where convictions were overturned or cases remain pending, the scandals themselves—Daejang-district profiteering, politically convenient rezoning deals, and illicit remittances linked to North Korea—continue to cling like exhaust fumes that never quite dissipate. Under the banner of “reform,” the prosecutorial system was dismantled and replaced by a swollen police apparatus that concentrates authority over major crimes, intelligence gathering, and institutional oversight units—an architecture that trades legal contestation for administrative command. Revived police intelligence units, cosmetically rebranded but structurally familiar, resurrected the habits of political surveillance without restoring the external checks that once constrained them. This is not the democratization of justice so much as a classically illiberal power swap: authority shifted from a visible, litigable institution to a sprawling police bureaucracy insulated by discretion and scale. In the long run, such hypertrophy corrodes democratic development itself, normalizing surveillance as governance and substituting managerial control for popular accountability. South Korea’s old prosecutorial monopoly has been exchanged for a mega-police—accountable upward, politicized downward—an arrangement not merely convenient for a presidency under a permanent cloud, but actively hostile to the patient, adversarial checks on which durable democracy depends.

Lee Jae-myung holds four confirmed prior convictions—all resulting in fines—that together sketch an early and revealing pattern of ethically dubious, ends-justify-means conduct. In the early 2000s, he impersonated a prosecutor in order to secretly record and intimidate the mayor of Seongnam City during a corruption investigation; when confronted, he escalated by filing false charges, ultimately earning convictions for simulating public authority and perjury, compounded by violating a confidentiality pledge when he publicized the recording. Earlier still, as a political activist in the 1990s, Lee led a violent occupation of the Seongnam City Council over an ordinance dispute, obstructing official proceedings and physically injuring three councilors—injuries lasting two to three weeks—for which he was fined five million won. These pre-office episodes—abuse of authority, betrayal of trust, and willingness to deploy physical coercion—take on added significance when viewed alongside unresolved mega-cases rooted in municipal governance: the Daejang-dong public–private development project in Seongnam City (roughly $375 million in public losses tied to preferential treatment for private developers, with close aides already convicted), the Baekhyeon-dong rezoning scandal involving alleged breach of trust and illicit lobbying, accusations of embezzlement through Gyeonggi Province funds, and approximately $8 million in illegal remittances to North Korea. The absence of jail time and the lack of post-inauguration verdicts as of February 2026 have not softened these critiques; they have sharpened them, reinforcing the view that Lee is a serial opportunist whose early methods have merely scaled up alongside his power.

From Criminal Exposure to Police Expansion, South Korea Moves Toward a Surveillance State

It is within this context—not abstraction—that Lee’s signature institutional project must be judged. Branded as “prosecutorial reform,” his government did not merely curb an overmighty legal caste. It dismantled the prosecutorial system altogether, formally abolishing prosecutors’ investigative authority by October 2026 and transferring its core functions to the police. What replaced the so-called “prosecutor republic” was not a diffusion of power, but its consolidation—this time in uniform.

The centerpiece of this shift is the Heavy Crime Investigation Headquarters (hereafter Jungsubon). By 2026, Jungsubon had expanded to more than 6,400 officers, absorbing over 1,600 new hires in a single year. Its jurisdiction now spans the “nine major crimes”: corruption, economic crime, public officials, elections, defense, disasters, drugs, national security, and cybercrime—virtually the entire domain once monopolized by prosecutors. Budgets and manpower increased by roughly 30 percent in tandem, while oversight mechanisms lagged behind. The police, unlike prosecutors, operate without an external indictment authority or a genuinely independent supervisory body. Power moved laterally, not downward.

The internal dynamics of this expansion are equally revealing. In 2026 alone, 1,214 officers were reassigned from riot control units into Jungsubon divisions focused on phishing, narcotics, and financial crime. Applications for detective posts surged by 2.2 times amid public hype surrounding the new elite investigative corps. Career advancement within the police has been recalibrated around centralized investigation and intelligence work, embedding surveillance-oriented policing at the apex of institutional ambition. This was not accidental. It was design.

The resurrection of the police Information Division completes the picture. Officially abolished in 2024 after decades of criticism over political surveillance, the division returned quietly but extensively: 1,424 officers redeployed across 198 police stations nationwide. The stated rationale was operational failure—intelligence lapses exposed by a high-profile kidnapping case in Cambodia. Yet the response was not narrow correction but wholesale revival. To blunt public backlash, the units were rebranded as “Cooperation Officers,” a cosmetic fix meant to sanitize a historically toxic function. Interior Ministry assurances that there would be “no spying” were paired with a telling caveat: oversight would remain internal.

What emerges from these reforms is not democratized law enforcement but a fused apparatus of investigation, intelligence, and enforcement—a “mega-police” state. Authority now flows through Police Review Boards and the National Police Commission, bodies structurally tethered to the executive. The old prosecutorial monopoly has been replaced by something more opaque: a police force that gathers intelligence, controls investigations, and reviews itself, all within a single bureaucratic ecosystem.

Defenders argue that this merely ends prosecutorial abuse. But the cure may be worse than the disease. Prosecutors, for all their pathologies, were constrained by courts, adversarial procedure, and public visibility. Police power, by contrast, is front-loaded with surveillance—communications metadata, financial tracking, informant networks, digital monitoring. When such tools are deployed at scale across elections, corruption, and national security, the boundary between crime control and political management erodes rapidly.

The danger here is structural, not conspiratorial. Under a presidency burdened by ongoing legal exposure, the incentives for politicized enforcement need not be explicit. Anticipatory compliance—investigators intuiting the preferences of those who control budgets, promotions, and jurisdiction—does the work quietly. Abuse does not require orders; it emerges organically.

South Korea did not slide into a surveillance state through tanks in the streets. It arrived there through reform bills, staffing tables, and administrative fixes to elite crisis. In dismantling one illiberal institution, Lee Jae-myung’s government constructed another—larger, less transparent, and harder to challenge. What he governs today is not merely a country under a cloud, but a security architecture optimized for governing under one.