Diplomacy & Crisis News

Summary and Key Points: U.S. aircraft carriers face growing threats from China’s anti-ship ballistic missiles, like the DF-21D and DF-26B, designed to target and potentially sink these massive vessels.

-As carriers have been pivotal in U.S. military strategy, losing one would be catastrophic and could reshape naval warfare. The question now is whether these supercarriers are still viable in modern conflicts, especially against a near-peer adversary like China.

-While carriers remain central to U.S. power projection, their vulnerability to advanced missile systems could prompt a reassessment of their role in future warfare.

Military planning is about considering the numerous hypothetical scenarios – such as how and where an enemy might strike, but more importantly whether and even how a potential foe's weapons systems can be countered. No doubt America's enemies likely have considered how to hit and sink an aircraft carrier – and it is just as likely U.S. Navy officials have been kept up at night worrying about such an unthinkable event.

The sailors of the United States Navy must do everything right absolutely every time, while an enemy only has to get lucky once. That fact is no doubt understood by the sailors who have been serving in the Red Sea, facing missile and drone strikes launched by Houthi rebels operating in Yemen.

So far the United States Navy has a perfect record, countering every missile fired at its warships. Arguably the odds are stacked in favor of the U.S. military, which has the best and most advanced air defense systems in the world operated by highly trained sailors.

In a conflict against China, however, the odds could shift.

As previously reported, three decades ago, China introduced its DF-21D (Dong Feng-21, CSS-5), a medium-range, road-mobile ballistic missile. It has been described as the world's first anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) or "carrier killer." Designed to replace the obsolete Dong Feng-2 (CSS-1), it was China's first solid-fuel road-mobile missile to use solid propellant. Able to deploy a 600 kg payload with a minimum range of 500 km (311 miles) and a maximum range of 2,150 km, the DF-21D’s warhead is likely maneuverable and may have an accuracy of 20 m CEP (circular error probable).

Beijing has since developed multiple DF-21 variants, including a dual nuclear/conventional capable version (DF-21C) and another designed as an anti-ship ballistic missile (DF-21D). In 2016, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) also revealed that it believed a new nuclear variant, the DF-21E CSS-5 Mod 6) was also being produced.

Moreover, while the DF-21D could be used near the "home waters" of China, Beijing has also developed another missile that poses a threat to warships operating throughout much of the Indo-Pacific region.

This is the DF-26B (Dong Feng-26), a road-mobile, two-stage solid-fueled intermediate-range ballistic missile that was first unveiled during a military parade in September 2015. It has a reported range of 4,000km (2,485 miles) and it can be used in both conventional and nuclear strikes against ground as well as naval targets.

The mobile launcher can carry a 1,200 to 1,800 kg nuclear or conventional warhead, and as it could directly strike a target such as the U.S. territory of Guam in the event of war it should be seen as a formidable weapon. More ominously, the DF-26B has been described as a carrier killer due to how it could be used to target the U.S. Navy’s fleet of Nimitz- and Gerald R. Ford-class nuclear-powered supercarriers.

Aircraft carriers were vital during the Second World War in defeating Japan in the Pacific, and the flattops have proven vital in confronting aggression during the Cold War and throughout the Global War on Terror (GWoT). Yet, the number of carriers has actually diminished even as the United States Navy operates 11 nuclear-powered aircraft carriers – more than any other nation in the world.

Instead of having a large fleet of conventionally powered carriers, the United States relies on a smaller number of massive flattops. The question now is whether the United States Navy could risk such vessels in a conflict against a near-peer adversary, notably China.

Losing a single carrier would be devastating as it couldn't be quickly replaced.

Yet, a war against China wouldn't simply be a replay of World War II. Even if the conflict were to be fought in the Indo-Pacific, it wouldn't be an island-hopping campaign. More importantly, U.S. bombers can already strike any spot on the globe thanks to aerial refueling fly CONUS-to-CONUS missions.

Thus, the hypothetical is whether carriers are now the weapons needed for a war against China. It is unlikely that such a conflict would be decided by even a single decisive naval battle. Rather it would likely be one of stealth bombers, missiles and possibly even nuclear weapons should the conflict escalate to that point.

Yet, the point remains that if an enemy has enough missiles, drones, aircraft, submarines, etc. – a carrier is going to be sunk. But that goes both ways. China can ill afford to lose its capital ships any more than the U.S.

Perhaps that realization is enough that cooler heads will prevail again, and keep any potential Cold War 2.0 from turning hot.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

Image Credit: U.S. Navy Flickr and Creative Commons. 

Summary and Key Points: While the Ford-Class aircraft carrier boasts advanced technology and reduced crew requirements, recent events raise questions about its vulnerability to modern threats like drones and "carrier killer" missiles.

-The Navy faces the challenge of justifying the high costs and strategic relevance of these massive vessels in an era where smaller, more agile threats pose significant risks.

The USS Gerald R. Ford, the lead vessel of a new class of nuclear-powered carriers that will begin to replace the Cold War-era Nimitz-class on a one-for-one basis over the next several decades, isn't just the largest warship ever built – it is also the most expensive.

Its total price tag came in at about $13.3 billion, nearly 30 percent higher than initial estimates. It has suffered from numerous delays and the "kinks" are still being worked out of some of its key systems. That fact isn't entirely surprising as it is a new-class of carrier loaded with new technology.

Things are supposed to be easier, while the costs are expected to reduced to build the next carriers in the class.

It was also reported that the U.S. Navy can expect to save about $5 billion per ship in maintenance costs over the life of the program than the preceding Nimitz-class. The service had previously set a target of $4 billion per ship in savings.

Moreover, the Ford-class of carriers relies on greater automation, and the vessels were designed to operate effectively with nearly 700 fewer crew members than the Nimitz-class. The savings in operations and maintenance could free up money for other readiness and acquisition needs.

The U.S. Navy's nuclear-powered supercarriers can provide force projection around the world. No other naval force in the world can send carriers to deal with multiple hotspots at the same time.

This would seem to justify the $13.3 billion price tag of CVN-78 and the future vessels of the class that are to come. Yet, recent lessons from the battlefield and advances in technology could put this into question.

Earlier in 2023, an Iranian drone flew near the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN-69), which is now operating in the Persian Gulf. The unmanned aerial system (UAS) reportedly came within 1,500 yards of the warship. Though it didn't do any damage, it isn't hard to believe that a loitering munition system – also known as kamikaze drone – such as Russia's Lancet, or a drone swarm could be employed and do significant damage to a carrier.

Such a strike might not sink a Nimitz-class or Ford-class carrier, but there is no denying that a supercarrier is truly a big target. It is a situation where an enemy only needs to get lucky one time!

As has been seen in the war in Ukraine, sea-based drones have successfully targeted the Russian Navy's Black Sea Fleet in port, and a carrier could make a tempting target for terrorists and rogue operators. 

Then there are China's "carrier killer" missiles, notably the DF-26B (Dong Feng-26), a road-mobile, two-stage solid-fueled intermediate-range ballistic missile that was first unveiled during a military parade in September 2015. It has a reported range of 4,000km (2,485 miles) and it can be used in both conventional and nuclear strikes against ground as well as naval targets.

Such weapons should be seen a real threat to warships.

The Moskva, flagship of the Black Sea Fleet, was sunk in the spring of 2022 by Ukrainian land-based launchers. It was the largest warship sank since the Second World War.

Though a carrier is far more protected, it is still a big and expensive target.

Earlier in 2023, the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. held a series of war games that simulated a Chinese invasion of Taiwan in 2026. In the simulations, the U.S. and its allies, including Japan, were able to successfully defend Taiwan but still lost two carriers – and sometimes as many as four!

Replacing such warships would take tens of billions of dollars and decades to build them. That should serve as a warning that perhaps the large carriers are as antiquated as the battleship.

It should be remembered that the Casablanca-class escort carrier USS Bismarck Sea (CVE-95) was the last U.S. Navy flattop to be sunk in combat – after she was hit by two Japanese kamikaze attacks on February 21, 1945. 

We must hope that CVE-95 will remain the last carrier to ever be sunk, but a $13.3 billion warship is a mighty tempting target!

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu.

Image Credit: Creative Commons. 

Summary and Key Points: The U.S. Navy faces significant challenges with its aircraft carrier fleet, despite having 11 nuclear-powered carriers. High costs, lengthy construction times, and a strained supply chain make building more carriers difficult.

-The Navy's recruiting struggles and maintenance demands leave only half of the fleet fully operational at any given time. Additionally, workforce and material shortages compound these issues.

-Even as the Ford-class carriers replace the aging Nimitz-class, the U.S. Navy is stretched thin, unable to easily expand its fleet or meet new crises.

Aircraft carriers remain the largest capital warships in the world today – and there are actually quite a few of the vessels in service. Including amphibious assault ships (LHA), there are now 47 active aircraft carriers in the world, operated by fourteen navies. More than a third of the flattops are in service with the United States Navy, which maintains eleven nuclear-powered CATOBAR carriers, including ten Nimitz-class and one Gerald R. Ford-class.

In addition, the U.S. Navy operates two America-class LHAs of a planned 11; as well as seven Wasp-class ships – while an eighth was seriously damaged by fire and subsequently decommissioned in 2021.

The current U.S. fleet of Nimitz-class carriers will also be followed into service, and replaced on a one-for-one basis by future carriers of the Gerald R. Ford-class, which are more automated as part of an effort to reduce the amount of funding required to maintain and operate the vessels. In its 2018 report to Congress, the Navy stated its intention to maintain a 12 CVN force as part of its 30-year acquisition plan.

The current plan calls for Ford-class carriers to then replace the Nimitz-class flattops on a one-for-one basis over the next four decades. Yet, it is also just as likely that the United States Navy will never actually replace each of its Nimitz-class carriers and instead could seek to develop smaller warships that could still do the job.

The question likely being considered by U.S. naval planners is whether there are now enough carriers in service right now. The short answer is that the U.S. carrier fleet – despite its size – is spread thin.

The Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN-69) has remained in the Middle East engaging the Houthi rebels in Yemen, while the first-in-class USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) saw its deployment to the Mediterranean extended twice. The latter carrier is now undergoing maintenance availability, primarily to address software upgrades and other general touch-ups.

Such post-deployment overhauls and refits are routine and necessary. The longer the carrier is deployed, the longer it then spends in port. And as it stands just three carriers are now able to respond to developments in the Indo-Pacific.

In other words, while the U.S. Navy may have 11 nuclear-powered carriers on paper, it would seem that only half are ever fully available – leaving the sea service stretched thinner than it would like.

The next obvious question would be to build more carriers. Yet, there are several factors why that isn't even close to an option.

As Brandon J. Weichert noted for The National Interest, "Today, the average cost for building a nuclear-powered, aircraft carrier­a supercarrier, such as America's new Gerald R. Ford-class is upwards of $13.3 billion. It costs an additional hundreds of millions of dollars to maintain. Previous models are only slightly less expensive."

Weichert added, "Their complexity and exorbitant cost make them not only tempting targets for rivals, but if they were to be destroyed or seriously damaged in combat, it would effectively make them a wasting asset. Billions of dollars would be lost and the US Navy’s power projection abilities would be seriously degraded."

In other words, the United States can't afford to lose such a high-value target in a war, but it also can't afford to build more. And this only factors in the monetary cost. The United States Navy – like nearly all the branches of the U.S. military – is struggling to meet recruiting quotas.

It barely has the sailors needed to operate the current fleet, which is at the smallest it's been since the First World War. Yet, short of conscription, it is doubtful the U.S. Navy would have the sailors for even a few more supercarriers.

The final consideration is that today's supercarriers take years to build, and even if the U.S. suddenly had the money and the manpower, it lacks the facilities to build any additional carriers.

In January, the Aircraft Carrier Industrial Base Coalition (ACIBC) warned that rough waters lay ahead following a survey it conducted last November. The trade association represents about 2,000 vendors from across the country that make up the supply chain for Huntington Ingalls Industries (HII), the largest military shipbuilding company in the United States.

Those companies provide parts and services for the construction and maintenance of U.S. Navy aircraft carriers, and according to the survey, it is a critical moment for the industry as 95% of the vendors have faced challenges due to rising costs from inflation, while 79% have experienced raw material cost increases of at least 7%. More than one in 10 (91%) of vendors surveyed said they faced challenges as a result of material availability or delivery, and 76% said they directly experienced an increase in the amount of time it takes to build and deliver their products.

Workforce issues also remain a serious problem, as 85% of the firms said they continue to face challenges in hiring, training, and retaining their respective workforces. Moreover, 32% said that workforce-related challenges have had a detrimental impact on their ability to fulfill contracts.

The takeaway is that the future Ford-class carriers are already running behind schedule, but hopefully, they won't be as over budget as the lead vessel of the class. The Navy is also scaling back on its mid-to-long-term projects to focus on the near term.

That will mean relying on the carriers it has, and hoping that there aren't multiple crises and that no carrier is suddenly lost to overseen circumstances.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

All images are from the U.S. Navy. 

Summary and Key Points: The Ford and Nimitz classes are America's most modern aircraft carriers, each with distinct advancements. The Nimitz uses a steam-powered catapult system, while the Ford features the more efficient Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System (EMALS).

-For landing, the Nimitz employs the MK 7 Aircraft Recovery System, whereas the Ford uses the Advanced Arresting Gear (AAG) system, designed to handle a wider range of aircraft with less maintenance.

-These differences highlight the technological evolution in carrier operations, improving sortie rates and reducing costs.

Since the invention of the aircraft carrier in the early twentieth century, the general design of the hallmark vessel has remained unchanged. Aircraft carriers are, invariably, a vessel built to transport, launch, and land aircraft.

Accordingly, aircraft carriers have a runway atop what is generally a massive hull with the capacity to house large crews, large amounts of aircraft, and all that is necessary to sustain both crew and aircraft. But, of course, the specifics can change from aircraft carrier to aircraft carrier. The runway. The launching system. The radar systems. The propulsion systems. The crew quarters. Plenty of opportunity for variation exists in what is functionally both a floating city and a floating air base.

Let’s take a look at the differences between America’s two most modern classes of aircraft carriers, the Ford and the Nimitz.

Vital to the function of any aircraft carrier is the ability to launch aircraft. In the early days of aircraft carriers, prop planes would simply take off from the carrier deck, generating enough momentum and lift, of their own accord, to be able to take off within the length of runway that the aircraft carrier deck allowed. But modern American supercarriers, launching modern jets, rely on a catapult system. The catapult hitches to the jet’s wheel and slingshot the jet forward, building speed quickly and seamlessly.

The Nimitz and Ford have different types of catapult systems, however. The Nimitz relied upon a steam power catapult, which generated and harnessed steam to engage the catapult. The newer Ford dispelled with the Nimitz, in favor of the EMALS system.

The EMALS, or Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System, is what the name implies: an electromagnetic catapult. The EMALS is an improvement over the traditional steam catapult, offering increased reliability and efficiency,  with more accurate end-speed control and smoother acceleration. The result is a higher sortie rate, and over time, a cost reduction due to decreased manning and maintenance requirements.

What goes up must come down. The counterpoint of the launching system is the arresting gear used to safely land an aircraft back on an aircraft carrier’s deck. Easier said than done. Most modern runways are 5,000 to 8,000 feet long, allowing pilots a significant margin of error and plenty of space to decelerate their aircraft smoothly. Carriers, on the other hand, afford a pilot just 350 feet within which to land and halt their aircraft – which requires the assistance of an arresting gear.

On the Nimitz, landing aircraft were arrested with the MK 7 Aircraft recovery system. The MK 7 is a “hydropneumatics system composed of the engine structure, a cylinder and ram assembly, a crosshead and fixed sheaves…and cable arrangement.” The MK 7 is fairly ‘old school.’ The Ford operates with an updated arresting gear, the Advanced Arresting Gear System (AAG). The AAG uses rotary engines and water turbines paired with an induction motor; the AAG was built to handle a wider range of aircraft, with less manpower and less maintenance. The result is an arresting gear system that is more hands-off, yet can handle more aircraft.

So, despite outwardly appearing quite similar, the Ford and Nimitz have some crucial differences with respect to the nuts and bolts required to successfully complete carrier operations.

Harrison Kass is a defense and national security writer with over 1,000 total pieces on issues involving global affairs. An attorney, pilot, guitarist, and minor pro hockey player, Harrison joined the US Air Force as a Pilot Trainee but was medically discharged. Harrison holds a BA from Lake Forest College, a JD from the University of Oregon, and an MA from New York University. Harrison listens to Dokken.  

All images are Creative Commons. 

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Summary and Key Points: The F-16XL was an advanced variant of the F-16 Fighting Falcon, designed with a delta wing and increased payload capacity, earning it the nickname "beast mode."

-It was developed to compete with the F-15E Strike Eagle in the USAF's Enhanced Tactical Fighter Program.

-Despite its ability to carry more ordnance, achieve supercruise, and provide greater lift and maneuverability, the F-16XL lost out to the F-15E due to production costs and the existing F-15 infrastructure.

-The F-16XL remains a symbol of untapped potential in military aviation.

The F-16XL was a bomb and missile truck – what we would call “beast mode” today. It was even faster than the standard F-16.

You can’t picture the Air Force without the F-16 Fighting Falcon.

It has flown for nearly 50 years. It is fast, compact, and highly-maneuverable.

The F-16 is combat proven. At least 25 air forces fly it around the world.

It has been updated over the decades to make it even better. The F-16 may fly with the U.S. Air Force until 2025. But one version has military analysts wondering what could have been. Try contemplating the F-16XL, which was a delta-wing model that could have changed the F-16 program – maybe for the better.

In 1977, the F-16XL was meant to replace the variable sweep wing F-111 Aardvark. Designers of the F-16XL decided to go with a delta-wing design that would be twice the area of the F-16 wings. It was thought that the cranked arrow wing shape, paired with the strength of the standard F-16 fuselage, would garner even more speed and maneuverability. General Dynamics thought the best way to test these new configurations was to hook up with NASA in 1980. This partnership yielded 3,600 hours of testing just in a wind tunnel alone.

The main idea behind the F-16XL was to evaluate whether the different air frame could achieve supercruise (sustained supersonic cruising without afterburners) capability. This would allow the F-16XL to save on fuel and extend its range.

Wing Design Gave It Excellent Performance

Meanwhile, the cranked arrow wing shape would accomplish a quarter more lift than the base F-16. All those tests with NASA created a version called the Model 400. As Alex Hollings from Sandboxx described it, “This new wing design, which saw a 50-degree angle near the root of the wing for supersonic performance and a 70-degree angle where the wings extended for subsonic handling.”

That meant the aerial combat capability could send the F-16XL into the territory of the F-15, “much smoother ride at high speeds and low altitudes.” The F-16XL was also 600 pounds lighter than the standard F-16, which added to its maneuverability. And Air Force technicians could add more ordnance to its payload under those new wings. Twenty-seven hardpoints were now possible. This could make the F-16XL into a bomb and missile truck – what we would call “beast mode” today. No external fuel tanks would be required. And the F-16XL would be faster than the F-16.

The consortium produced two F-16XLs. They first flew successfully in 1982. A year earlier the Air Force announced the Enhanced Tactical Fighter Program which was a competition between the F-16XL and the  F-15E Strike Eagle from McDonnell Douglas to replace the F-111. General Dynamics believed the F-16XL’s range and weapons payload would best the F-15E. Unfortunately, for the F-16XL, the F-15 was already in production. The F-16XL was going to be more expensive to build at serial production. The F-15E was slightly faster with its two engines. This would allow it to lose an engine in combat and still be able to fly back to base.

The Air Force thus chose the F-15E and the F-16XL goes down as a fighter that had so much potential that it was a shame it lost out. The design gave it more than capable performance and all the weapons it carried at supercruise would make it a tough customer with its high maneuverability and extended range. This must have been a disappointment to the design crew at General Dynamics. The F-16XL will be remembered by that team as a superior airplane that would have made the Air Force and many of its pilots happy.

Dr. Brent M. Eastwood is the author of Humans, Machines, and Data: Future Trends in Warfare. He is an Emerging Threats expert and former U.S. Army Infantry officer. You can follow him on Twitter @BMEastwood. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science and Foreign Policy/ International Relations.

All images are Creative Commons and or Shutterstock. 

Summary and Key Points: The F-16XL, a variant of the F-16 Fighting Falcon, was designed to compete with the F-15E Strike Eagle in the USAF's Enhanced Tactical Fighter competition.

-Although it lost to the F-15E, the F-16XL's innovative cranked arrow wing design offered greater lift, maneuverability, and payload capacity.

-Two prototypes were later used by NASA for research, contributing valuable data on supersonic flight and sonic booms. Today, these prototypes are preserved as testaments to the aircraft’s advanced design and potential.

The F-16 Fighting Falcon made headlines last year when the White House granted Ukraine the green light to fly them amidst the ongoing invasion.

The American-made supersonic multirole fighter aircraft was initially designed for the U.S. Air Force more than five decades ago. While the platform may be aging, it plays a critical role in the service’s fleet.

Over the last fifty years, several Fighting Falcon variants emerged, all featuring enhanced capabilities designed to keep the platform relevant in the modern era.

However, not all these variants made it to the service phase.

Notably, General Dynamics’ F-16XL was turned over to NASA a few years after losing the USAF’s Enhanced Tactical Fighter competition to the F-15E Strike Eagle.

Following the lessons learned in the Vietnam War, U.S. officials recognized the need for an air superiority fighter.

Engineers outlined that a small, lightweight aircraft that could maneuver with minimal energy loss would be an ideal fit. The Air Force initially opposed the Advanced Day Fighter concept as the service felt it would jeopardize its F-15 Eagle program.

Ultimately, however, the idea of competitive prototyping was finalized and the Lightweight Fighter proposal was funded. By the 1970’s, the F-16 Fighting Falcon was designed.

Shortly after manufacturer General Dynamics was awarded the Lightweight Fighter program contract, subsequent Fighting Falcon variants were conceptualized.

The Air Force desired a replacement fighter for its F-111 Aardvark and McDonnell Douglas submitted its new Fighting Falcon design to go up against the new F-15E Eagle. The USAF ultimately awarded McDonnell Douglas the contract. However, this wasn’t the end of the rope for the F-16XL idea.

Two of these F-16XL prototypes referred to by their serial numbers #849 and #848 were eventually relegated to NASA’s Langley Research Center. Both jets were used in a variety of experiments that only concluded in the late 1990’s.

In 1995, F-16XL #849 participated in a sonic boom study where it successfully flew 200 feet behind a NASA SR-71 Blackbird to ascertain the boundary of the airframe’s supersonic shockwave. NASA heavily modified the two Fighting Falcon variants, installing a turbine-drive suction system and a thickened left-wing pulled in boundary layer air flowing over the wing.

The F-16XL was designed with a cranked arrow shape that accomplished greater lift than the base F-16.

As Alex Hollings from Sandboxx described it, “This new wing design, which saw a 50-degree angle near the root of the wing for supersonic performance and a 70-degree angle where the wings extended for subsonic handling.” Weighing nearly 600 pounds less than earlier variants, the F-16XL possessed greater maneuverability. The F-16XL could also carry twice the ordinance of the F-16A and deliver it 50% farther.

While the F-16XL prototypes are currently sitting in storage at the Air Force Flight Center Museum at Edwards and on display at the Museum Air Park, they are still revered by aviation buffs.

Maya Carlin, National Security Writer with The National Interest, is an analyst with the Center for Security Policy and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in many publications, including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post, and Times of Israel. You can follow her on Twitter: @MayaCarlin. 

All images are Creative Commons. 

Summary and Key Points: The B-21 Raider, the U.S. Air Force’s next-generation stealth bomber, is expected to cost approximately $750 million per unit, making it less expensive than the B-2 Spirit it replaces.

-Despite its lower cost, the B-21 is designed to ensure enduring air superiority with advanced capabilities, including an open architecture for integrating new technologies.

-While the Air Force currently plans to procure around 100 units, concerns remain that China could produce its Xi’an H-20 bombers in greater numbers, potentially challenging U.S. air dominance in a future conflict.

If reports are correct, the U.S. Air Force’s next-generation B-21 stealth bomber won’t break the bank when it is introduced into service. The upcoming platform, designed to replace the Air Force’s aging B-1B Lancer and B-2 Spirit bombers, is estimated to cost roughly $750 million per unit. 

If this number, estimated by GlobalData, holds, the Raiders will actually be less expensive than the Spirit bombers they replace. The bomber’s lower cost will be especially important, considering the Air Force is simultaneously developing its Next Generation Air Dominance fighter jet. While the Raider’s budget will help anchor support for the B-21 program, the timely introduction of the airframe is what matters most. Tensions across the globe are continuing to escalate, and Beijing and Moscow are both pursuing next-generation bomber platforms of their own.

Like all U.S. bombers before it, the B-21 is being designed to ensure America’s enduring airpower capability and to cement U.S. air superiority over adversaries for another generation. The B-21 is named to honor the Doolittle Raiders of WWII, whose innovation and daring are recognized for altering the course of the conflict. In 1942, the Raiders became legends when they launched B-25 Mitchell bombers off the flight deck of the USS Hornet before carriers were actually designed for aircraft take-offs. 

The Air Force established the Long Range Strike Bomber program in 2011. Manufacturer Northrop Grumman was awarded the development contract a few years later, outcompeting Lockheed Martin and Boeing. According to a 2016 Government Accountability Office report on the program, Northrop was selected due to the lower costs associated with its design prototype. The bomber was formally designated the B-21 the same year. In 2018, the program completed its critical design review, and the Air Force selected Ellsworth Air Force Base in South Dakota to host the bomber and its training unit. 

Once introduced, the bomber will certainly be the most advanced airframe of its kind. It will operate alongside the Boeing B-52J Stratofortress. 

“The B-21 Raider program is on track and continues flight testing at Northrop Grumman’s manufacturing facility on Edwards Air Force Base, Calif,” the Air Force said in a press release. “The B-21 will have an open architecture to integrate new technologies and respond to future threats across the spectrum of operations, greatly enhancing mission effectiveness and joint interoperability in advanced threat environments, strengthening U.S. deterrence and strategic advantage.” 

A senior Air Force official mirrored this rhetoric in a recent Senate Armed Services Committee hearing. 

“We are in the flight test program, the flight test program is proceeding well,” Andrew Hunter, assistant secretary of the Air Force for acquisition, technology and logistics, stated during the hearing. “It is doing what flight test programs are designed to do, which is helping us learn about the unique characteristics of this platform, but in a very, very effective way.”

Most of the aircraft’s specs and capabilities remain highly classified. However, the service and Northrop have revealed limited information. According to released footage of the bomber, the Raider is expected to be much smaller than its Spirit predecessor. Based on its smaller size, the B-21 could sport roughly half of the B-2’s 60,000-pound payload capacity. Additionally, a recent Sandboxx News report suggested that the bomber’s wingspan could be around 15% shorter than the Spirit, meaning the new bomber will be harder to detect on radar.  

With the B-21 now expected to cost a lot less than the B-2, perhaps the Air Force could procure more than its planned 100 airframes. Some analysts are concerned that even if the Raider is more advanced than its Chinese counterpart in terms of capabilities, the Xi’an H-20 bomber could be quantitatively superior. Beijing could produce double or triple the number of B-21s, which would certainly impede the Air Force in a potential conflict.

Maya Carlin, National Security Writer with The National Interest, is an analyst with the Center for Security Policy and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in many publications, including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post, and Times of Israel. You can follow her on Twitter: @MayaCarlin. 

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Summary and Key Points: The U.S. Air Force plans to limit B-21 Raider production to 100 units, citing potential future technological advancements as a reason to avoid overcommitting.

-Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. David Allvin highlighted that better technology may emerge by the mid-2030s, altering procurement strategies.

-Despite initial projections of up to 250 units, the production rate is expected to be slow, at less than 10 per year, to protect the program from budget cuts.

-This cautious approach reflects past experiences with scaled-back procurement of advanced military systems.

How many B-21s will the US Air Force need?

The U.S. Air Force (USAF) has stated that they do not intend to buy more than 100 B-21s. The reason: building so many B-21s takes time. And by the time so many B-21s are built, the USAF may well have a better, more advanced option to buy.

As Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. David W. Allvin explained in April, the B-21 “is the future of our bomber force,” but better technology may be available in the near future, making the USAF reluctant to commit to procuring more than 100 B-21s.

Allvin suggested the USAF would reach 100 B-21s sometime in the mid-2030s, perhaps later. “I think there are other technological advancements that we would see to be able to augment that and have better mix…before we commit to that as being the platform…beyond that.”

Originally, the USAF was expected to procure between 80 and 100 B-21s.

That number was then upgraded to “at least 100.”

At one point, some pundits recommended that the USAF procure as many as 250 B-21s, to supplement retirements of the B-1 and B-2 bomber fleets.

Obviously, the 250 projection was overblown; Allvin’s 100-airframe cap is the new expectation.

If the USAF doesn’t produce 100 or so B-21s until the mid-2030s, that would mean the airframe is produced at a relatively languid pace—less than 10 per year.

As Air and Space Forces Magazine reported, “Pentagon acquisition and sustainment chief William LaPlante recently said that the B-21’s production rate was deliberately set at a low level to protect it from budget cuts.”

“One of the key attributes of this program,” LaPlante said through a spokesperson, “has been designing for production from the start – and at scale – to provide a credible deterrent … if you don’t produce and field to warfighters at scale, the capability doesn’t really matter.”

Procurement projections tend to change. Especially when the procurement relates to a system as advanced and expensive as the B-21 Raider.

Consider the F-22 Raptor, which was ultimately procured in far fewer numbers than originally projected.

The B-2 Spirit, the stealth bomber that the B-21 is being produced to replace, suffered similarly; less than two dozen B-2s ever joined the Air Force fleet.

Airframes are hardly the only system to have their budget and production cut.

The Seawolf class submarine was canceled after just three vessels were completed.

The Zumwalt class destroyer was cancelled after just three of the 32 planned vessels were completed. The narrative arc is routine.

And the B-21 is still early enough in its production life where it is vulnerable to suffering a similar fate – especially if the Air Force only intends to build the B-21 at a rate of ten or so airframes per year.

The B-21 may have added pressure, however, relative to other programs that were canned mid-way through production.

The B-21 is expected to be a lynchpin of the US bomber fleet moving forward. Existing airframes are being retired just to make way for the B-21, so failing to supply it would lead to a shortage relative to current bomber numbers.  

Harrison Kass is a defense and national security writer with over 1,000 total pieces on issues involving global affairs. An attorney, pilot, guitarist, and minor pro hockey player, Harrison joined the US Air Force as a Pilot Trainee but was medically discharged. Harrison holds a BA from Lake Forest College, a JD from the University of Oregon, and an MA from New York University. Harrison listens to Dokken.

All images are Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock. 

Summary and Key Points: The U.S. Air Force's B-21 Raider program faces rising costs, with Northrop Grumman renegotiating higher prices for the next batch of 19 aircraft.

-Initially agreed to take a loss on early lots, Northrop has now secured a higher cost ceiling, raising concerns about the affordability of the B-21.

-The bomber's price tag could reach $600 million per aircraft, potentially limiting the total number the Air Force can procure. This development could challenge plans to replace aging bombers and maintain the Air Force's strategic capabilities.

Everything is costing more, and it isn't just groceries, and the burritos at Chipotle. The United States Air Force is going to have to shell out a few more bucks to pay for its fleet of B-21 Raider long-range strategic bombers to Northrop Grumman, the prime contractor of the next-generation aircraft.

The aerospace firm had previously agreed to take a "loss" on the first lots of the B-21, following negotiations with the contractor early this year, but as Defense One first reported on Monday, Northrop Grumman has been able to subsequently re-negotiate "a higher cost ceiling" for the next batch of 19 aircraft.

"B-21 remains on track to meet its key performance parameter for Average Procurement Unit Cost (APUC) of $550 million in Base Year 2010 dollars," Northrop Grumman stated in a June 18 press release, which highlighted key factoids about the future backbone of the U.S. Air Force's bomber fleet.

"The government has fixed price production options for the first 21 aircraft. Final terms, quantity, and pricing beyond the first 21 aircraft are subject to negotiation. The government and Northrop Grumman have established not to exceed pricing for an additional 19 aircraft. The average not to exceed value for the subsequent lots is above the average unit price of the five LRIP lots," the aerospace firm added. 

The B-21 Raider, which is set to replace the aging B-1B Lancer and B-2 Spirit in the coming decade, has been touted as being the most advanced bomber aircraft ever built. It is also on track to be the most expensive, potentially exceeding the B-2 if enough Raiders aren't built.

Current estimates put the price tag for the bomber as high as $600 million per aircraft, but only if the Air Force can buy the aircraft in volume to spread out the R&D costs. Yet, due to the rising costs, there had been concerns that the United States Air Force would be hard-pressed to buy enough of the B-21 Raider bombers in the coming years. In other words, the air service is facing a dilemma – it needs to buy more of the bombers to lower the per unit cost, but the price could still go up anyway, reducing the number that it can reasonably afford to buy!

The Raider entered its Low-Rate Initial Production (LRIP) in January, and the first five production lots of the B-21 will total just 21 airplanes. However, that is entirely by design and was meant to ensure the costs are managed accordingly. That may not work out as planned.

The Air Force hasn't provided an updated unit cost, while the service has also scaled back how much it requested to go towards the program for fiscal year 2025 (FY25), down to $2.7 billion from $4 billion projected last year.

As previously reported, the U.S. Air Force anticipates a need for about 100 B-21 Raiders, while Northrop Grumman, which as the prime contractor has a vested interest in producing more aircraft, recommended a program of at least 200 bombers.

The total number of the B-21 Raiders will come down to what lawmakers are likely willing to fund.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

Image Credit: Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock. 

Summary and Key Points: The B-21 Raider, the U.S. Air Force’s next-generation stealth bomber, recently completed its first test flight and is set to replace the B-2 Spirit.

-While the program appears to be progressing, concerns remain about its completion due to high costs and public scrutiny.

-Critics question whether the B-21 is necessary, given the U.S.'s already substantial defense budget.

-However, with significant investment and minimal controversy, the B-21 is likely to proceed as planned, aiming to enhance America's deep penetration bombing capabilities and maintain its military advantage.

The B-21 Raider is being heralded as the next big entry into the USAF’s force structure.

Slated to replace the B-2 Spirit as America’s stealth bombing option, the B-21 recently made its first test flight, and is expected to join the force within the next few years.Yet, some observers are asking whether the program will be completed or whether the B-21 might suffer a fate similar to the B-1A, whose funding was cut before the bomber could ever be produced.

Last November, the B-21 made its maiden test flight. And while the Air Force hasn’t chosen to share much about the program with the public, the B-21 seems to be moving along satisfactorily.

“The B-21 Raider is in flight testing,” said Ann Stefanek, an Air Force spokeswoman. Stefanek emphasized that the testing is an important step toward providing “survivable, long-range, penetrating strike capabilities to deter aggression and strategic attacks against the United States, allies, and partners.”

The B-21 would be the first new American bomber to join the fleet in about three decades. The last US bomber, the B-2, was developed through the 1980s and 90s.

And although it’s been more than a generation since the US last produced a new bomber, the cost of the program, plus the secrecy of the program, has some observers asking questions, wondering whether the project will ever be completed, or whether the project ever should be completed.

The need for the B-21 derives, in theory, from the advancements made in air defense technology.

Essentially, the B-2 is no longer as stealthy, as capable of deep penetration missions, as when first debuted. The result is that the US may have lost some ability to deliver ordnances behind enemy lines, undetected. And as such, US deterrence may be reduced.

The B-21 would, in theory, rejuvenate the US’s ability to perform deep penetration bombing runs, hence rejuvenating our deterrence.

But deep penetration bombing runs aside, and some naysayers are pointing out that America has, without even a close second, the highest defense budget of any nation on Earth.

The commitment to a new stealth bomber is naturally going to raise questions from a public who has watched so much of their tax base go directly to Lockheed Martin, or the B-21’s creator, Northrop Grumman.

The B-21 program appears to be moving ahead as planned. Things change. But significant resources have already been invested in the B-21.

Also, unlike most canceled programs, the B-21 is not a political hot potato. For the most part, the general public is unaware of the B-21; no one is pressuring their local congressperson to take a stance on the B-21. It’s just not a controversial issue (like the B-1A, or the F-35). Which means the bomber will likely proceed as planned.

“The ability to conduct long-range strikes at scale in all threat environments has been a decisive U.S. military advantage for more than 7 years,” wrote retired Air Force Colonel Mark Gunzinger. “Long-range bombers enable theater commanders to strike enemy targets inaccessible to other U.S. and allied forces.”

With Gunzinger, and like minded military-brass, and profit-minded aerospace executives, leading the charge for the B-21 – without public opposition – expect the B-21 to be produced as scheduled.

Harrison Kass is a defense and national security writer with over 1,000 total pieces on issues involving global affairs. An attorney, pilot, guitarist, and minor pro hockey player, Harrison joined the US Air Force as a Pilot Trainee but was medically discharged. Harrison holds a BA from Lake Forest College, a JD from the University of Oregon, and an MA from New York University. Harrison listens to Dokken.

Image Credit: Creative Commons. 

Summary and Key Points: China’s DF-17 missile, equipped with a hypersonic glide vehicle, represents a significant challenge to U.S. military dominance in the Indo-Pacific.

-Capable of evading traditional defense systems, this weapon extends China's anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities, making U.S. military operations near Chinese shores increasingly difficult.

-The DF-17's range and maneuverability threaten U.S. carriers and bases, complicating power projection in the region.

As the U.S. grapples with developing countermeasures, the DF-17 underscores the shifting balance of power in favor of China.

China has developed a comprehensive ability to defeat the United States military in combat. No, it’s not some new warship or airplane. It’s both simple and unconventional. Beijing has determined that the Americans cannot be beaten by matching them bullet-for-bullet. 

Instead, China’s military has accurately assessed that any war with the United States will be fought close to China’s shores, giving China what amounts to a homefield advantage. While the Americans must come from distant lands. 

Therefore, if China can deny the Americans the ability to reliably project power into China’s backyard, then Beijing’s forces can defeat the Americans—and enjoy free reign over their part of the Indo-Pacific.

As I have detailed in previous reports for this site, the Chinese have built a long-range, comprehensive anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capability that can prevent the deployment of most US military platforms in the event of a geopolitical crisis between the two great powers. Meanwhile, China has the capability, with these missiles, to target US military bases in the Indo-Pacific. 

What’s more, the Chinese have created so many of these relatively cheap missiles, drones, and hypersonic weapons that the Chinese can easily pop these weapons off at will—and have enough spares on hand to delay US power projection long enough for them to wrest control over the South China Sea, or the Senkaku Islands, or even, God forbid, Taiwan itself.

One such system is the Dong Feng-17 (DF-17) Medium-Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM). It comes equipped with a Hypersonic Glide Vehicle (HGV), which can fly at speeds above Mach Five and radically maneuver while in flight, making defending against this weapon with traditional anti-missile defense systems difficult, if not impossible. The DF-17 was first introduced to the public during China’s National Day military parade in October 2019, after it had reportedly been in development since 2014.

The DF-ZF, or the designation for the DF-17 HGV, is launched atop a ballistic missile, providing the initial boost to high altitudes before releasing the aforementioned HGV. The DF-ZF glides back to the Earth at hypersonic speeds, radically altering its course to avoid anti-missile defenses. 

The range of this beast is around 1,118 to 1,553 miles, meaning that no US aircraft carrier will be able to get within range of wherever a war between China and the United States erupts. Indeed, these A2/AD systems complicate the ability of any US Navy surface warship to safely and effectively operate near these Chinese systems. 

Let us not forget, too, that the DF-17 is meant to be used primarily for conventional strikes. 

Although, it can be equipped with a nuclear warhead as well, according to Army Recognition. The Chinese military has already stated its intention to sink up to three US Navy aircraft carriers in the event of a war between the United States and China. Our elite laugh out loud at those claims, confusing the Chinese military of today with the Chinese military of thirty years ago. 

But Washington should wake up to the fact that it isn’t 1994 anymore. 

The unipolar moment is long over. And the United States is a drastically declining power (thanks to the current crop of leaders who’ve failed the country on every level) whereas the Chinese, whatever the future may hold, are for now a rising power with the ability to dominate their near-abroad at the expense of the United States. The DF-17 is one such example of how the Chinese have completely done an end-run around America’s perceived strategic advantages—notably at sea.

The DF-17 can be used in a variety of missions, from precision strikes against high-value targets to strategic deterrence. The missile’s ability to evade current defense systems, such as the much-ballyhooed Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), if any are even available since so many of these systems have been deployed to Ukraine, and Patriot systems (again if any are available for the Indo-Pacific, considering how many have been sent to the Mideast and Ukraine), makes the DF-17 a true challenge to the US military.

Washington is closely monitoring the development of the DF-17 and other hypersonic weapons. Further, the US is struggling to create both its hypersonic capabilities as well as its defenses against Chinese (and Russian) hypersonic weapons, such as the DF-17. 

More generally, until the Pentagon can reliably overcome the Chinese A2/AD threat, which they currently cannot, the US military will be defeated by China in any fight over Taiwan. 

And that fight is coming much sooner than most people realize.

Brandon J. Weichert, a National Interest national security analyst, is a former Congressional staffer and geopolitical analyst who is a contributor at The Washington Times, the Asia Times, and The-Pipeline. He is the author of Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His next book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine, is due October 22 from Encounter Books. Weichert can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

All images are Creative Commons or Shutterstock. All photos are of various submarine styles. 

From the Vault

Russia Freaked Out: Why the U.S. Navy 'Unretired' the Iowa-Class Battleships

Battleship vs. Battlecruiser: Iowa-Class vs. Russia's Kirov-Class (Who Wins?)

Image Credit: Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock.

While the RMS Titanic is, by far, the most storied ocean liner in history, the most storied ocean liner in United States history is, likely, the aptly named SS United States.

Built in the postwar period between 1950 and 1951, the United States Lines SS United States is the largest ocean liner ever built domestically. The SS United States is also the fastest ocean liner to ever cross the Atlantic Ocean. In fact, the SS United States still holds the Blue Riband (an unofficial accolade awarded to the ocean liner with the fastest Atlantic Crossing), which she has held since her maiden voyage in 1952.

William Francis Gibbs was credited with designing the SS United States. Curiously, Gibbs began his career as an attorney but gained notoriety as a project manager in the restoration of a German ocean liner. Eventually, Gibbs and his brother would become prominent warship designers during World War II, with credits to their names including the Liberty-class and Fletcher-class. Gibbs was especially known for efficient hull designs and propulsion – which would come into play as he designed the SS United States.

The SS United States cost $79 million to construct – most of which the United States government underwrote. The vessel was built to the demanding specifications of the US Navy, which called for the vessel to be strictly compartmentalized, and to feature separate engine rooms. The reason for the stringent safety standards: the Navy wanted to be able to convert the SS United States into a warship, with minimal transition time, in the event she was needed for wartime service.

Gibbs built the SS United States to the Navy’s standards – and also to his own standards. The propulsion system, as was Gibbs’s calling card, was efficient. The vessel featured eight M-Type boilers capable of generating 310,000 pounds of steam per hour. The boilers were split into two separate engine rooms, as per the Navy’s requirements. Four were located forward, and four others were located after. Steam from the boilers turned four Westinghouse double-redaction geared turbines. Each turbine was capable of producing 60,000 horsepower, for a combined 240,000 horsepower. The turbines led to four shafts,  which in turn led to four propellers. The two outermost propellers had four blades while the innermost two had five blades. The unorthodox blade configuration helped to reduce cavitation and vibration and allowed the SS United States to achieve her record-breaking speeds.

The top speed of the SS United States is still disputed, after being withheld as sensitive military information. Different sources have published different top speeds, ranging from between thirty-five knots and forty-three knots. The true speed is believed to be about thirty-eight knots per hour.

The vessel’s speed was put to good use on her maiden voyage, in 1952, when the SS United States crossed the Atlantic Ocean, from New York, New York to Cornwall, United Kingdom in just here days, ten hours, and forty minutes. The run was fast enough to earn the Blue Riband, which has not been relinquished in the seventy years since. On her return voyage, the SS United States set a record for the fastest westbound voyage, with a run of three days, twelve hours, and twelve minutes.

Harrison Kass is a defense and national security writer with over 1,000 total pieces on issues involving global affairs. An attorney, pilot, guitarist, and minor pro hockey player, Harrison joined the US Air Force as a Pilot Trainee but was medically discharged. Harrison holds a BA from Lake Forest College, a JD from the University of Oregon, and an MA from New York University. Harrison listens to Dokken.

Image Credit: Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock. 

Summary and Key Points: The U.S. Marine Corps’ VMFA-311 “Tomcats” squadron has achieved initial operational capability with the F-35C Lightning II, marking a significant milestone in readiness for carrier-based operations.

-This achievement means the squadron is fully equipped and trained to deploy in combat if needed. The F-35C’s advanced capabilities make it a critical asset for air superiority, close air support, and intelligence missions.

-The Marine Corps has a total order of 420 F-35s, including 67 F-35Cs, emphasizing the importance of these aircraft in future operations.

The U.S. Marine Corps tactical aviation community achieved an important milestone this week after its second fighter jet squadron achieved initial operational capability with the F-35C Lightning II stealth fighter jet.

Designed for aircraft carrier operations, the newest F-35C squadron is now combat-ready in the event of a contingency.

Last week, Marine Fighter Attack Squadron (VMFA) 311 “Tomcats” declared initial operational capability and is ready to fly the F-35C to war if necessary.

“I am incredibly proud of the Marines and Sailors in this squadron as they hit this critical milestone that ensures greater lethality and operational readiness for the Wing, the Marine Corps, and the joint force,” U.S. Marine Corps major general James Wellons, the commanding general of 3rd MAW, said in a press release.

Achieving initial operational capability is a big milestone and signifies that the unit has the aircraft, the right equipment, and the necessary trained pilots and maintainers.

“Initial operational capability is a milestone and achievement in readiness. It’s all on the backs of the Marines out there. What they do in their day-to-day actions is what made this possible,” Marine Corps Lieutenant Colonel Michael Fisher, the commanding officer of VMFA-311, stated.

Previously, the squadron flew the AV-88 Harrier and F/A-18 Hornet fighter jets.

“Nothing changes for us, our pursuit of excellence and how we carry ourselves, initial operational capability is a byproduct of daily competency and being good at our job,” Fisher added. “It is a great accomplishment, but when we wake up the next day, we are going to keep doing the same thing. Now full operational capability is the goal.”

F-35C activity is picking up. Only a few days ago, the Navy announced the forward deployment of an F-35C squadron in Japan to be close to China, Russia, and North Korea. And now, the Marine Corps announced the second operational F-35C squadron.

“The Tomcats have a storied history that includes legends such as Ted Williams and John Glenn, and participation in every major conflict since World War II. Today’s Marines add another chapter to that legacy with the introduction of the F-35C and fifth-generation capabilities to VMFA-311,” Wellons added.

The Marine Corps has ordered a total of 420 F-35 Lightning II stealth fighter jets. Broken down, the order is for about 353 F-35B aircraft, which rely on a Short Take-Off, Vertical Landing (STOVL) mechanism to take off and land, and sixty-seven F-35Cs. The Marine Corps is the biggest customer of the F-35B (the United Kingdom has ordered 138 F-35Bs, Japan forty-two F-35Bs, Italy thirty F-35Bs, and Singapore twelve F-35Bs). It is also one of the only two customers for the F-35C, with the U.S. Navy being the other and biggest one with an order for 273 F-35Cs.

A fifth-generation, multirole fighter jet, the F-35 Lightning II can conduct six mission sets: Air Superiority, Close Air Support, Strategic Attack, Electronic Warfare, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD), and Destruction Enemy Air Defense (DEAD). The aircraft comes in three versions: the F-35A, the conventional take-off and landing version; the F-35B, which is a STOVL aircraft; and the F-35C, which is designed for carrier operations.

Stavros Atlamazoglou is a seasoned defense journalist specializing in special operations and a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ). He holds a BA from Johns Hopkins University and an MA from Johns Hopkins’ School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). His work has been featured in Business Insider, Sandboxx, and SOFREP.

All images are Creative Commons. 

As the rise of multipolarity is testing the resilience of the liberal international order, states are rushing to decouple economically from their political competitors. This makes Central Asia a focal point for geopolitical competition, with global and regional powers vying for influence.

Central Asia is a critical region due to its abundant natural resources and geographic position. Rich in oil, gas, and rare minerals, the region also serves as a crucial transit corridor linking the Asia-Pacific, the Middle East, and Europe. These facts elevate Central Asia’s importance for Russian, Iranian, and Chinese strategic calculations.

Due to increased international isolation after its invasion of Ukraine, Moscow is now increasingly relying on Central Asia as a sanction evasion hub and an export and transport route for energy exports. China, whose regional interest was focused on the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), is now also aiming to secure cheap energy and raw materials and hedge against Europe’s potential economic decoupling. Tehran aims to leverage its cultural ties to develop strategic transport corridors that bypass its rivals, enhancing its influence and mitigating economic isolation.

The three states’ competing visions for a regional order in Central Asia are giving rise to diverging interests in the security, energy, and trade spheres, which the West could leverage to deepen its engagement with the region.

1) Security

Russia, China, and Iran share a common interest in countering U.S. influence in Central Asia. After 9/11, the United States established military bases, like the Transit Center at Manas in Kyrgyzstan and K2 in Uzbekistan, to support operations in Afghanistan. After the closure of these bases, U.S. strategy shifted towards security cooperation programs focusing on training and joint exercises. The United States continues to engage in Central Asia to balance Russian, Chinese, and Iranian influence while promoting the stability and independence of Central Asian states, which the three powers view as a direct challenge to their regional dominance and strategic interests. Counterterrorism is also a shared preoccupation for Russia, China, and Iran in Central Asia. Concerns about ISIS and Al-Qaeda have led to security cooperation and intelligence-sharing through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), to which Iran was admitted as a full member in 2023.

In spite of these shared interests, Russia, China, and Iran have conflicting aims in Central Asia, in particular regarding security dominance. Russia has the most significant military presence, with major bases in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, and it leads the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). To counterbalance Russia’s dominance without challenging it directly, China has expanded its security engagement through the SCO and established a rapid-response military outpost in Tajikistan. At the same time, Iran seeks to make up for its lack of military presence in the region through security and economic partnerships.

Another pain point is their differing approaches to Islamist groups. While all three states oppose extremism, they disagree on which groups should be classed as such. Iran has historically supported Islamist movements in Central Asia, such as the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT), Hizb ut-Tahrir, and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). Russia and China, on the other hand, see Islamic movements as regional and domestic security threats. Russia sees IMU as a significant security threat due to its connections with Chechnya militants. Similarly, Russia views Hizb ut-Tahrir as destabilizing due to its radical ideology and purported desire to establish a caliphate. China shares similar concerns regarding IMU and Hizb ut-Tahrir as a direct threat to regional stability and its interests in Xinjiang.

This divergence complicates trilateral cooperation in addressing security threats, as each country prioritizes its strategic alliances and ideological stances. At the same time, Central Asian states are weary of overreliance on Russia for border and regional security, seeking to diversify their security partners to hedge against Russian domination. While the regional sentiment is not currently favorable to increased military cooperation with the West, policymakers should monitor the evolution of these different regional security doctrines to detect a more favorable timing for security re-engagement with Central Asian Republics.

2) Energy

The outbreak of the war in Ukraine and Russia’s subsequent loss of the European gas market has led to the temporary convergence of Russia and China’s energy interests in Central Asia. This has left Central Asian states with narrowing space for maneuver. While Central Asian countries are eager to reduce their dependence on China and Russia, the West’s ability to step up is severely hindered in the short term by the lack of viable alternative export routes.

The reversal of the flow of gas in the Central Asia-Center (CAC) gas pipeline system in October 2023 marked the first time in which Russian gas was imported to the ex-Soviet Republics and, thus, to China via Uzbekistan. While the far-reaching partnership that Russia envisioned with its proposal for a “Trilateral Gas Union” with Astana and Tashkent did not materialize, Gazprom committed to supply 2.8 billion cubic meters of gas yearly to Uzbekistan. 

With this deal, Tashkent hopes to alleviate its chronic winter energy shortage, which led to the almost complete stoppage of energy exports. Kazakhstan has also reportedly sought to take advantage of its newfound role as a transport corridor for Russian energy exports to China. Astana’s decision was partly spurred by Western energy companies’ reticence to commence new projects and their reported intention to divest from the region due to sanctions risks.

Russian gas has become a key source of cheap energy for China, with recent exports surpassing Turkmenistan. China is leveraging its position in this buyer’s market by demanding better prices from Moscow for a new gas pipeline through eastern Siberia. Beijing and Moscow’s energy relationship remains opportunistic rather than strategic. China and Russia aim to prevent Central Asia from accessing other export markets and limit Iran’s role in the energy market.

Russia’s new role as an energy exporter in Eurasia has altered the status quo in the region, creating urgent dilemmas for the ex-Soviet Republics. Turkmenistan has the most to lose from Russia’s eastward pivot and has frantically looked for new export markets. The outpour of cheaper Russian gas into the Eurasian energy market threatens around 80 percent of Turkmenistan’s state revenues. This has spurred renewed interest in completing the decades-old Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) pipeline project, with new proposals to ship Turkmen gas to Europe via Pakistan. The completion of the TAPI pipeline, however, remains highly uncertain due to its planned passage through Afghanistan.

With the TAPI pipeline nowhere near completion, the other favored route to Europe, a Trans-Caspian pipeline connecting Turkmenistan to Europe’s Southern Gas Corridor via Azerbaijan, is once again on the table. The project was revived in May 2024 with promises of gas delivery to Europe by 2030. While the Trans-Caspian pipeline remains a lynchpin in Europe’s efforts to reduce its dependence on Russian gas, it may be too little too late to prevent China from securing its dominance in the Turkmen gas market.

The fundamental divergence of interest in Central Asian energy markets between Russia and China on the one hand and Iran on the other should be carefully leveraged by Western nations. The West should focus on becoming an indispensable partner to Central Asia by offering successful energy transition roadmaps and economic diversification. This engagement needs to be sustained long-term, addressing both diplomatic and economic aspects, and coupled with commitments to meet short-term needs to compete with Russia and China effectively. 

However, to incentivize Central Asian nations to reduce their immediate dependency on the Chinese market, Western nations may consider allowing Central Asian states to transit gas and oil through Iran to India. Iran’s limited economic and political influence in Central Asia, along with its recent setbacks in the energy market, makes it less of a regional threat to Western interests. In contrast, India’s energy demand can compete with Chinese imports. This strategy could create more breathing space for regional countries and buy Europe time to build the Trans-Caspian pipeline.

3) Trade

The current commercial landscape in Central Asia provides an ever more favorable, though time-sensitive, prospect for strategic Western engagement. Recent geopolitical conflicts have not fundamentally transformed Iran, China, and Russia’s commercial interest in Central Asia. They have, however, increased its strategic importance for two reasons. Firstly, Central Asian states, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan in particular, have been a critical link in Russia’s sanctions evasion strategy. Secondly, Russia, Iran, and China aim to capitalize on Central Asia’s recent economic growth. If China and Russia have more to gain from cooperating to exclude Iran from the energy market, Iran and China stand to gain from trade cooperation through BRI at the expense of Russia.

Due to Russia’s preoccupation with the war in Ukraine, China’s trading position in the region has strengthened considerably at the expense of Russia, especially in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. Moreover, China’s BRI mainly focused on expanding the “Middle Corridor,” connecting Chinese manufacturers with European consumers through Central Asia and Iran while bypassing Russia. The operability of the Middle Corridor could provide a win-win scenario for Europe and China by providing alternative trade routes that can insulate both parties from overreliance on maritime supply chains, which are susceptible to geopolitical shocks and blockades through the Taiwan Strait and the Suez Canal, respectively.

Recent signs, however, point to a temporary lull in China’s commercial projects in the region, driven most likely by adverse domestic economic conditions. In spite of the recent signing of an agreement for the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway, China’s foreign direct investment has reportedly slowed down significantly in 2024. This gives Western nations a chance to strengthen their partnership with Central Asian states. Western focus should be on providing the kind of investment that can foster the bottom-up regional growth and cooperation that underpins the B5+1 forum, for example, by building domestic and regional connections outside of the narrow east-west path that China’s BRI follows. 

Once again, these policies will take time to bear fruits, and Western nations will need a short-term tactic to counter Chinese commercial dominance in the region. One option could be to allow India to trade with Central Asian Republics through the Iranian port of Chabahar, for which it had initially obtained a sanctions exemption in 2018. This would play into Iran’s desire to compete with China through the establishment of a north-south corridor, fuelled by the disappointing economic benefits of Iran’s cooperation with Beijing.

Keeping a Finger on the Pulse

The primary driver for cooperation among Russia, China, and Iran in Central Asia is their shared perception of mutual threats. The U.S. presence in the region, with its history of military bases and security cooperation, is seen as challenging its regional dominance. Similarly, the threat of terrorism and extremism, particularly from groups like ISIS and al-Qaeda, compels these nations to collaborate on counterterrorism efforts and intelligence sharing.

However, with the United States' relative disengagement from Central Asia and growing competition for its resources, the underlying conflicts of interest among these countries become more apparent. Russia, China, and Iran each aim to secure their energy needs and economic interests, leading to rivalries often masked by their cooperative façade against common threats.

Therefore, while mutual antagonism towards the United States and a desire to reshape the international order currently unites Russia, China, and Iran on a global level in Central Asia, their collaboration is more a strategic convenience than a deep-seated alliance. Beyond the surface, there are more conflicts than commonalities, underscoring the fragile nature of their cooperation in the region.

However, unless Western nations commit to a long-term plan for strategic engagement with Central Asia, it is unlikely that these simmering tensions will drive a wedge in their de facto alignment. To do so, Western countries should enact policies that encourage energy and trade competition among Russia, China, and Iran, as well as with other regional actors such as India and Turkey. This would give space to the Central Asian Republic to hedge by turning the regional dynamic into an economic and diplomatic “sellers’ market.”

Arman Mahmoudian is an adjunct professor at the University of South Florida’s Judy Genshaft Honors College, teaching courses on Russia, the Middle East, and International Security. He is also a research assistant at the USF Global and National Security Institute, focusing on Russia and the Middle East. Follow him on LinkedIn and X @MahmoudianArman.

Valentina Pegolo is a Junior Consultant at Plenitude Consulting and holds a Doctor of Philosophy in International Relations, a Master of Philosophy in International Relations, and a Bachelor of Arts in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics from the University of Oxford. Her research interests include Iranian foreign policy, political ideology, Eurasian geopolitics, global economic and technological interconnectedness, interstate and transnational political violence, and its relationship to financial crime.

Image: plavi011 / Shutterstock.com. 

Summary and Key Points: The U.S. is ramping up its military presence in the Middle East, including deploying more fighter jets and warships, in response to escalating threats from Iran and its proxies. The Navy is exploring the use of laser weapons, such as the HELIOS, to counter the growing threat of drone and missile attacks.

-Although progress has been made with laser systems like the LWSD and AN/SEQ-3, these technologies are still in the testing phase.

-Incorporating lasers could significantly enhance the Navy’s defense capabilities against UAV swarms.

The shadow war between Israel and Iran appears to be stepping into the light, and the U.S. is preparing for conflict to grow in the Red Sea. 

Last week, American officials announced that additional fighter jets and Navy warships would be deployed to the Middle East in an effort to thwart escalating threats from Tehran and its regional proxy groups. Since Hamas launched its October 7 massacre against Israel, the U.S. Navy and its allies have shot down scores of attack drones and missiles fired by Iran’s affiliates. In April, Iran directly launched a massive barrage of projectiles toward the Jewish state. While the Israel Defense Forces, the U.S., and other allies intercepted the vast majority of the more than 300 missiles and drones Iran launched, the incident caused officials and analysts to wonder whether a laser system might bolster the U.S. Navy’s efficacy against such barrages.

Earlier this year, Rear Adm. Fred Pyle discussed the service’s progress on developing a laser weapon. High-energy lasers (HELs) and high-power microwaves (HPMs) in theory could counter unmanned aerial vehicles  and rockets better than existing countermeasures. However, despite years of research on the concept, the Navy has not fielded any laser weapon. “We continue to invest in directed energy capabilities,” Pyle said. “It requires space, weight, power and cooling, which can be a challenge on our current surface combatants.”

Pyle noted that the means the Navy uses in the Middle East right now to defend Israel and commercial shipping are “performing extremely well. But we’re very focused on delivering directed energy capability and we’re building it into the future [budget requests] in mind with our frigate and the DDG(X) [the next-generation destroyer].”

One decade ago, the Navy installed the AN/SEQ-3 Laser Weapon System on the USS Ponce amphibious transport dock. This unique system strikes at the speed of light, roughly 50,000 times the speed of an incoming ICBM. In 2021, the service’s USS Portland test-fired the 150-kilowatt Solid State Laser Technology Maturation Laser Weapons System Demonstrator (LWSD) in the Gulf of Aden. This LWSD packed five times the power of its AN/SEQ-3 predecessor. Most recently, the Navy installed its HELIOS high-energy laser on an Arleigh Burke-class destroyer. Capable of blasting more than 60 kilowatts of directed energy toward targets, this weapon is perhaps the most promising.  

Although the incorporation of laser technology on every warship would be significant for the Navy as the threat of swarm UAV attacks rises, the service has been unable to fully field any directed-energy tool so far. 

Navy warships carry a finite supply of munitions, so a vast enough volley of enemy UAVs is a real threat. The Standard Missile-2 is a formidable asset, but the introduction of laser weapons would certainly elevate the Navy’s ability to thwart enemy bombardments.

Maya Carlin, National Security Writer with The National Interest, is an analyst with the Center for Security Policy and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in many publications, including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post, and Times of Israel. You can follow her on Twitter: @MayaCarlin. 

Image Credit: Creative Commons. 

Summary and Key Points: Ukraine has received its first batch of F-16 fighter jets, a significant development in the Russo-Ukrainian War. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky expressed confidence in the jets' potential impact.

-However, questions remain about their effectiveness given the limited number delivered and the strength of Russian air defenses.

-Additionally, concerns about potential Russian escalation in response to the F-16s have been raised, though a major escalation seems unlikely. The effectiveness of these jets and the broader impact on the war will be closely watched.

After months of lobbying and waiting and wanting, Ukraine has received its first batch of donated F-16 fighter jets. Ukraine, which pressed the United States and its allies zealously for the single-engine, fourth-generation fighters, hopes the new jets will change the momentum in the Russo-Ukrainian War in favor of the Ukrainian resistance. 

“F-16s are in Ukraine. We did it. I am proud of our guys who are mastering these jets and have already started using them for our country,” Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said. “These jets are in our sky and today you see them. It’s good that they are here and that we can put them to use.”

Now that the F-16s are finally in Ukraine, months of speculation end. Whether the F-16s are effective will be determined, and whether the Russians escalate in response will be seen.

One reason the U.S. and NATO allies had reservations about sending the F-16 to Ukraine was the fear of a reactive Russian escalation. But escalation as a direct response to F-16s arriving in Ukraine seems unlikely. 

For one, the West has been supplying the Ukrainian resistance for years. In principle, very little is different about the F-16. Second, Russia’s options for escalation are limited. It could perhaps carry out strikes in Poland to intercept weapons shipments, or deploy a tactical nuke. But those are serious moves. A proportional escalation, something befitting the shipment of fourth-generation fighter jets, might be difficult to devise. Russia has proven wisely hesitant to directly confront NATO. The wisdom of doing so now has not changed. 

Similarly, Russia so far has not been willing to deploy a tactical nuke. It seems unlikely that a shipment of F-16s would be the tipping point that pushes Putin to be the first world leader since 1945 to use a nuclear weapon in combat.

Still, the risk of Russian escalation is higher after the F-16 shipment, which brings up the question of whether, from the U.S. and NATO perspective, it is worthwhile.

The F-16’s impact on the battlefield will likely be more modest than Zelensky led his people to believe.

According to Ukrainian officials, Ukraine will need 130 F-16s to neutralize Russian air power. The exact number of F-16s just delivered to Ukraine was not disclosed, but we can assume the number is nowhere near 130. That means the F-16s will not be able to neutralize Russian air power and will be vulnerable to Russia’s advanced air defense systems. And because the F-16s are so precious to the Ukrainians, we can expect the new jets to be used conservatively, meaning they will not likely make a significant impact on the outcome of this intractable conflict.

Harrison Kass is a defense and national security writer with over 1,000 total pieces on issues involving global affairs. An attorney, pilot, guitarist, and minor pro hockey player, Harrison joined the US Air Force as a Pilot Trainee but was medically discharged. Harrison holds a BA from Lake Forest College, a JD from the University of Oregon, and an MA from New York University. Harrison listens to Dokken.  

All images are Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock.   

Summary and Key Points: The F/A-18, a fourth-generation fighter jet, is an enduring symbol of advanced aviation technology. Originally developed from the YF-17, which failed to win the Air Force's Lightweight Fighter (LWF) competition, the F/A-18 found new life when the Navy adopted and adapted it into a versatile aircraft.

-Known for its agility, thrust-to-weight ratio, and ability to perform air-to-air and air-to-ground missions, the F/A-18 has evolved from the Hornet to the Super Hornet, serving as a critical asset for the U.S. Navy for over four decades.

The fourth generation of fighter aircraft has been the most enduring and widely used. Fourth-generation aircraft first emerged in the 1970s and are still relevant today, even if they no longer represent the best of fighter jet technology. 

One of the generation’s most iconic and prominent aircraft is the F/A-18, which recently starred alongside Tom Cruise in Top Gun: Maverick. But the F/A-18 almost never was. The airframe was developed from a bid that failed to impress the U.S. Air Force. Fortunately, the Navy saw great potential in a jet the Air Force had discarded.

Before the F/A-18, there was the YF-17 – a prototype lightweight fighter built specifically to win the Air Force’s Lightweight Fighter (LWF) bid. 

The LWF, as its name implies, was an effort to field a smaller, lighter, cheaper fighter in response to the belief that aircraft like the F-15 were too large and expensive for certain mission profiles. Two prototypes were considered: the single-engine YF-16, and the two-engine YF-17. The YF-16 won and became the venerable F-16 Fighting Falcon, so the program did work out, supplying the Air Force with an exemplary lightweight fighter that has been in service for almost 50 years. But the Air Force also passed on an exemplary lightweight fighter – a jet that caught the attention of the Navy, which had also been present to observe LWF testing.

The Navy also needed a small, cheap fighter, specifically to complement the large and expensive F-111, and to replace the aging F-4. The YF-17, the losing bidder from the Air Force’s LWF program, fit the bill. 

The YF-17 was understood to be capable of meeting all of the Navy’s requirements, including air superiority performance, fleet air defense, escort attack, air to ground attack, long loitering time, long range, and an appropriate approach speed for carrier landings. The YF-17 hit all the right specifications, was redesigned to more perfectly match the Navy’s needs, and was redesignated as the F/A-18.    

The F/A-18 was ahead of its time, which is why the airframe is still relevant today, 45 years after taking its first flight. Well, the airframe was updated along the way, and the McDonnell Douglas F/A-18 Hornet has since become the Boeing F/A-18 Super Hornet, with the original Hornet being retired in 2019. But the Super Hornet shares much in common with the original airframe.

With two engines and a midwing design, the F/A-18 is capable of conducting a variety of mission sets. With a solid thrust-to-weight ratio and a digital fly-by-wire system, plus leading edge extensions, the F/A-18 is highly maneuverable. The trapezoidal wings are swept back 20 degrees and the vertical stabilizers are canted, enabling a high angle of attack in flight.

The F/A-18 has proven its worth in air-to-air and air-to-ground missions, and it has been the workhorse of the U.S. Navy for decades.

Harrison Kass is a defense and national security writer with over 1,000 total pieces on issues involving global affairs. An attorney, pilot, guitarist, and minor pro hockey player, Harrison joined the US Air Force as a Pilot Trainee but was medically discharged. Harrison holds a BA from Lake Forest College, a JD from the University of Oregon, and an MA from New York University. Harrison listens to Dokken.

All images are Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock. 

Summary and Key Points: The U.S. Navy's Virginia-class submarine program is facing significant delays, with the USS Massachusetts (SSN-798) now expected to be delivered in early 2025 instead of late 2024.

-This marks yet another setback for the program, which is already running three years behind schedule. Huntington Ingalls Industries reported a minor disruption during testing, causing the delay.

-The USS Arkansas (SSN-800), the next submarine in line, is also behind schedule but is reportedly making progress. These delays highlight ongoing challenges in the construction of nuclear-powered submarines, with only three of the ten Block IV Virginia-class submarines currently deployed.

In February, Huntington Ingalls Industries’ Newport News Shipping launched the future Virginia-class nuclear-powered fast attack submarine USS Massachusetts (SSN-798). The boat was transferred from a construction facility to a floating dry dock, the company announced. Once there, it began the final outfitting, testing, and crew certification in advance of the ship being handed over to the U.S. Navy.

SSN-798 is the 25th submarine of the Virginia class and the 12th that will be delivered by NNS, but that delivery is running late. Part of the issue is that NNS operates one of just two shipyards capable of designing and then building nuclear-powered submarines for the Navy.

"During the quarter, SSN-798 construction team experienced a minor disruption to Massachusetts’ test program due to some equipment replacement identified during testing,”HII president and CEO Chris Kastner told investors on an August 1 quarterly call with investment analysts. “The disruption has been resolved, and the team is back into the test program making steady progress. It does, however, shift delivery from late 2024 to early 2025. We are reaffirming our shipbuilding margin outlook for the year.

"We're marching towards delivery on 798," Kastner added. "We did have that minor move on the milestone, but they're making progress on the test program now. And it's a good team on it. It's a good crew. It's a good leadership. So I fully expect 798 will resolve at the beginning of next year."

Kastner also said that the future Virginia-class submarine USS Arkansas (SSN-800) – the next of the boats in line – was running late but was "making progress."

The future USS Massachusetts and USS Arkansas are two of 10 Block IV Virginia-class submarines. The program as a whole is now running about three years behind schedule. Just three boats of the block have been deployed.

When SSN-798 enters service, she will be the eighth vessel named for the Bay State, and the first since the South Dakota-class fast battleship USS Massachusetts (BB-59) was retired in 1947.

The first ship named for the New England state was a "Revenue-Marine" cutter that was in service for just one year. It was followed by a sloop that served with the U.S. Navy for about a decade until 1804.

Notably, two warships named USS Massachusetts were never completed. Those included the Kalamazoo-class monitor and a battleship of the first South Dakota class, which was canceled following the Washington Naval Treaty in 1923. Two battleships did bear the name, including BB-2, an Indiana-class battleship that saw action in the Spanish-American War, and the aforementioned BB-59.

The Navy will have to accept that later is better than never. Unlike those two battle wagons that never sailed, it does look like SSN-798 will finally enter service next year.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

All images are Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock.