Diplomacy & Crisis News

As the world concerns itself with the fate of Ukraine, the turmoil in the Mideast, and rising tensions in the Taiwan Strait, there’s a conflict that is simmering much closer to home. At the tip of South America, the tropical socialist dystopia of Venezuela has been engaged in two years of hostilities with its much smaller, oil-rich neighbor of Guyana.

More generally, Venezuela has been committed to undermining the power and reach of the United States throughout Latin America wherever—and however—it can. 

Venezuela’s government has embraced a series of alliances to help Caracas intimidate its U.S.-backed neighbors and crush American power in the wider region. For instance, Venezuela’s regime has made common cause not only with a variety of drug cartels in the region but with the Islamic Republic of Iran. That’s especially odd, considering that the Chavismo regime in Caracas styles itself as atheistic and socialist.

Nevertheless, Venezuela and Iran are dangerously close to each other. This relationship has extended far beyond diplomatic friendship and has transmogrified into a full-blown military alliance, replete with arms sales. More to the point, Venezuela has striven to emulate Iranian unconventional warfare tactics of the kind that both Iran and its terrorist proxies, such as the Yemeni Houthis, have employed throughout the Middle East over the last decade. 

Venezuela’s Plot to Disrupt Shipping in the Panama Canal Zone

Specifically, there is real concern on the part of some U.S. strategists that Venezuela is planning to disrupt key shipping on the Panama Canal in much the same way that the Houthis have been disrupting international shipping in both the Red Sea or the Strait of Bab El-Mandeb or the way in which the Iranian Navy plans to shut down the Strait of Hormuz in the event of a direct conflict with the United States.

This further explains the incoming Trump administration’s seemingly random fixation on restoring direct U.S. control over the Panama Canal Zone, even at the risk of violating international agreements made with Panama. 

A key system that the Venezuelans have procured from their Iranian partners has been the Peykaap-III-class missile boat (known in Iran as the Zolfaghar-class), which was designed as a fast patrol craft meant to conduct quick, agile strikes. Interestingly, the Iranian boats that the Peykaap-IIIs are based on are themselves derived from the North Korean IPS-16 fast-attack boats. 

The Specs

Coming in at almost 57 feet in length with a beam of 12 feet and a draft of a little more than two feet, this fast and tiny boat is meant for conducting attacks in the shallowest of waters. Powered by two diesel engines, these boats can cruise at a top speed of almost 60 miles per hour. 

These boats carry two single anti-ship missile launchers, which can pop off either Kowsar or Nasr, Iranian-built, missiles. The Kowsar missiles have a range of around 12 miles while the Nasr goes out until about 21 miles. These two missiles rely on internal guidance and active terminal homing.

Peykaap-IIIs carry lightweight anti-ship torpedoes, compatible with Chinese (another close Venezuelan ally) C-701/FL-10 models. These boats come with heavy-caliber machine guns for close combat. Thus, the Peykaap-III boats are perfect for hit-and-run tactics, particularly against less maneuverable ships. Venezuela’s acquisition of the Peykaap-III-class missile boats began in 2023 and mean only one thing: at some point, Caracas will seek to do to international shipping in the Panama Canal Zone what both the Houthis and Iranians have done in the Red Sea and the Strait of Bab El-Mandeb. 

For the last two years, U.S. intelligence surveillance has spotted Peykaap-IIIs in Venezuelan waters around strategic areas like the Gulf of Paria near Trinidad and Tobago, suggesting an intent to dominate (or at least monitor) key maritime routes near Venezuela. The deployment of these boats so close to Guyana adds a layer of tension to overall regional maritime security. 

The Geopolitical Implications

Venezuela is a revanchist power in Latin America that is intent on rolling back U.S. power and influence in the region. It has aligned with Iran and other rivals of the United States to achieve this goal. The recent acquisition of Peykaap-III-class missile boats from Iran highlights this fact. 

And if the United States does not pay close heed to what Venezuela is up to in its own geostrategic backyard, then it might discover that the Venezuelans are doing to the Panama Canal that which Iranian-backed militias in the Mideast are doing to global shipping in that region. 

The Peykaaps are in Venezuela’s possession for one reason: to increase Venezuela’s power projection capacity and to complicate America’s. Sure, the United States Navy has infinitely more powerful, larger warships to enhance its power projection in the region. But the Peykaap-IIIs are specifically designed to stunt and stymie the larger powers of the world while still allowing the Venezuelans to run roughshod over international shipping and their neighbors.

Brandon J. Weichert, a Senior National Security Editor at The National Interest as well as a Senior Fellow at the Center for the National Interest, and a contributor at Popular Mechanics, consults regularly with various government institutions and private organizations on geopolitical issues. Weichert’s writings have appeared in multiple publications, including the Washington Times, National Review, The American Spectator, MSN, the Asia Times, and countless others. His books include Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His newest book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine is available for purchase wherever books are sold. He can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

Image: Shutterstock. 

America’s iconic B-52 Stratofortress first took wing during the halcyon days of the Truman administration. A long-range nuclear bomber that was designed to counter what was then the immense and growing nuclear threat that the Soviet Union posed to the United States, it has transitioned over the decades to a multirole platform capable of both conventional and nuclear missions. These behemoths have seen action in basically every post-World War II confrontation the United States has engaged in. 

The current variant, the B-52H, has been in service since 1961—meaning it has seen combat in every war or campaign from the Vietnam War to Desert Storm to the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq.

A new variant is in the offing, one which will totally knock the proverbial socks off the Air Force’s bomber jockeys and strategists alike. That’s the B-52J. Three key elements undergird the B-52J project. The B-52 is getting a new lease on life that will extend its service to our country until the middle of the century, effectively ensuring that the warplane will have served for a century.

That is truly incredible (and a shot across the bow at the fantasists who currently control U.S. defense policy, who seem to think that the newer, more complex, and costlier the plane, the better).

The Upgrades

But the Stratofortress will continue proving its worth with the Air Force’s three major upgrades to the bird’s engines, its avionics and sensors, and enhancements to its overall structure to make it more relevant to the modern (and evolving) battlefield. 

As for the most important upgrade for the B-52J variant, its new engines, these things are really the crux of the entire enhancement. The old engines were the Pratt & Whitney TF33s. These aging engines have been replaced by brand, sparkling new (and powerful) Rolls-Royce F130 engines. 

With these engines come greater fuel efficiency, reduced maintenance requirements, and overall better performance over the older Pratt & Whitneys. Of note, the engines grant the B-52J better takeoff and climb capacity, which are crucial in the kind of contested battlespaces these birds will be operating in over the next several decades.

The B-52J will feature a new Raytheon AN/APG-79B4 Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar, replacing the older mechanically scanned arrays, thereby increasing the aircraft’s situational awareness and targeting capabilities. Upgrades also include brilliant new communication systems, glittering cockpit displays, and an overall streamlining of onboard functions (one of the crew stations has been removed for the new B-52s).

All the aforementioned upgrades prioritize data networking and cross-integration with friendly combat platforms in any engagement. In other words, network-centric warfare comes to the B-52 with a vengeance.

Structural modifications were made to the airframe of the new B-52J to make it more relevant in modern combat scenarios. For instance, the Air Force removed some of the sensor pods to reduce drag and improve flight performance. The Pentagon then doubled down on its investment in defensive systems for these flying juggernauts, making it possible for them to avoid grisly fates at the hands of the vastly improved anti-aircraft systems of near-peer rivals, like those of China and Russia (should direct conflict with either of those powers ever occur).

Upgrades are Behind Schedule

Sadly, there is no program the Pentagon can take on today that won’t be met with abysmal delays, complications, and ghastly cost overruns. The B-52J is no different. Initial engine testing of the Rolls-Royce F130s was supposed to take place at the end of 2023. But these were delayed. Not only have there been delays with the engines, but there were serious complications with the fancy new software upgrades on the bird.

John A. Tirpak of the Air & Space Forces Magazine, reported last month that on December 13, “the Rolls Royce F130, has cleared its critical design review, meaning it can enter final development, test, and production on time.” Although, Tirpak assesses that the overall program is “still three years behind.” So, rather than starting ground and flight tests around 2028, the B-52J is unlikely to start real testing until around 2033.

Of course, these developments will only complicate America’s already flagging air warfare abilities as we enter into a period of severe great power competition that may result in another world war. The jury is still out as to whether the Air Force will even be able to meet the expected number and deployment timeline for this most important system. 

Brandon J. Weichert, a Senior National Security Editor at The National Interest as well as a Senior Fellow at the Center for the National Interest, and a contributor at Popular Mechanics, consults regularly with various government institutions and private organizations on geopolitical issues. Weichert’s writings have appeared in multiple publications, including the Washington Times, National Review, The American Spectator, MSN, the Asia Times, and countless others. His books include Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His newest book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine is available for purchase wherever books are sold. He can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

Image: Andrew Harker / Shutterstock.com

It was not shocking that the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States sought to defer a decision on Nippon Steel’s $14 billion offer to acquire Pennsylvania’s U.S. Steel until after the November 5 presidential election. What is shocking is President Joe Biden’s decision to block the transaction over concerns about foreign ownership.

In a White House statement, Biden asserted that blocking the takeover promotes U.S. national security and “resilient supply chains” by maintaining a “strong domestically owned and operated steel industry.” This would be considerably more persuasive if a Russian steel company, NLMK, did not already own three sites in Indiana and Pennsylvania at a time when Russian officials assert that Washington is “in a state of indirect war” with Russia.

Indeed, even as the Biden administration has imposed sanctions on thousands of Russian companies and individuals, the White House has avoided imposing sanctions on the Russian steelmaker. As a point of comparison, the Franklin Delano Roosevelt administration cut off exports of steel, scrap iron, and various other metals and metal products in an escalating wave of sanctions on Imperial Japan during World War II in the summer and fall of 1941; these policies, together with a U.S. oil embargo, aimed to punish Tokyo for its war in mainland China—not dissimilar to the current effort to impose costs on Russia for its invasion of Ukraine. This is not to say that an export ban of that time should be applied today, but it is striking that sanctions were used in an analogous situation but have not been used now.

The administration has not offered a public explanation for its restraint. Or, for that matter, for how its insistence that projects funded by the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act use domestically produced steel. The administration’s formal guidance, which the director of the White House Office of Management and Budget issued two months after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, did not make a distinction between steel produced domestically by American companies and that produced domestically by foreign-owned firms like NLMK USA, the Russian company’s U.S. subsidiary.

An earlier failed bidder for U.S. Steel, the American company Cleveland-Cliffs, apparently still hopes to buy all or part of the company, something that one analyst suggested could prompt antitrust objections, and to buy NLMK’s American facilities. Cleveland-Cliffs praised Biden’s September action to block the U.S. Steel takeover before the election.

One could make a case that a successful Cleveland-Cliffs acquisition of most or all of U.S. Steel, and NLMK USA, would strengthen the American steel industry. Moreover, this would usefully ease the Russian firm out of the U.S. market, in a manner respectful of the law and of property rights, unlike Russia’s approach to some U.S. and European companies. Considering American concerns about a potential future conflict with China, and that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has demonstrated the endurance of twentieth-century industrial war, there are significant national security reasons to increase domestic steel production capacity. In 2023, America’s total steel production was only about one-tenth of China’s. U.S., Japanese, South Korean, and German steel production combined reached only one-third of China’s.

Yet this is not the case that the Biden administration is making. Instead, U.S. officials appear to be facilitating that outcome without acknowledging it.

Paul J. Saunders is President of the Center for the National Interest and a member of its board of directors. His expertise spans U.S. foreign and security policy, energy security and climate change, U.S.-Russia relations and Russian foreign policy, and U.S. relations with Japan and South Korea. Saunders is a Senior Advisor at the Energy Innovation Reform Project, where he served as president from 2019 to 2024. He has been a member of EIRP’s board of directors since 2013 and served as chairman from 2014 to 2019. At EIRP, Saunders has focused on the collision between great power competition and the energy transition, including such issues as energy security, energy technology competition, and climate policy in a divided world. In this context, he has engaged deeply in energy and climate issues in the Indo-Pacific region, especially U.S. relations with Japan and South Korea. His most recent project at EIRP is an assessment of Russia’s evolving role in the global energy system.

Image: Shutterstock.

Shortly after assuming office, the new Trump administration will undertake a comprehensive review of the missile threats confronting the United States. Geopolitical and technical developments are undermining the longstanding foundations of U.S. missile defense policy. Potential adversaries such as Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea are deploying an expanding portfolio of ballistic, cruise, and hypersonic missiles—supplemented by large fleets of reconnaissance and strike drones. These countries are pooling their resources in the missile domain. Both Iran and North Korea give Moscow missiles and drones to use against Ukraine, while Russia is assisting these partners’ aerospace programs. Meanwhile, technology is transcending delineations between regional and homeland missile systems.

Some beneficial changes have already occurred. The Pentagon is deploying a Next-Generation Interceptor before the end of this decade. The new interceptor will make the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system protecting North America from intercontinental ballistic missiles more effective. The Missile Defense Agency has launched a new Transformation Task Force to evaluate options for realigning missions and responsibilities, integrating cross-domain capabilities, modernizing digital technologies, improving internal agency processes, and enhancing cooperation with operational forces and other partners.

Advances in U.S. missile defense capabilities have been evident in the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East. The United States can leverage these technologies to build a more comprehensive missile shield. However, budget constraints and competing priorities could degrade capabilities and increase risks.     

In particular, U.S. defenses against hypersonic missiles are lagging. The Chinese and Russian militaries are constructing several types of hypersonic conventional and nuclear delivery systems capable of traveling at many times the speed of sound. The Defense Department’s latest China military power report assesses that “The PRC has the world’s leading hypersonic missile arsenal.” Russia has employed several hypersonic missiles against Ukraine, including its new Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missile in December.

Chinese and Russian leaders perceive hypersonic weapons as providing their countries with critical strategic and operational capabilities. At the strategic level, long-range hypersonic glide vehicles flying unpredictable trajectories in the upper atmosphere can circumvent existing U.S. national missile defenses. At the regional level, hypersonic cruise and ballistic can quickly destroy high-value targets such as U.S. command centers, military bases, and forward-deployed forces.

The United States needs a well-constructed plan to parry these hypersonic threats. The Defense Department is developing constellations of Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor satellites to provide continuous coverage of hypersonic vehicles in flight. The Pentagon is further assessing a software program to upgrade the Long-Range Discrimination Radar under construction to identify hypersonic targets. 

But seeing and tracking fast maneuvering gliders in the upper atmosphere is only half the problem. The United States also needs to shoot them down. Congress has established a deadline for the United States to field an initial hypersonic interceptor capability by the end of this decade. The Pentagon is accordingly building the first system optimized to attack hypersonic gliders. Though a novel capability, this Glide Phase Interceptor (GPI) leverages proven technologies that the Navy has used to shoot down hundreds of missiles and drones in the Middle East. 

Unlike U.S. offensive hypersonic missile programs, which have experienced repeated technical setbacks, defensive efforts have been primarily budgetary rather than technologically constrained. The Pentagon spends less annually on hypersonic interceptors than it does on a pair of new F-35 fighters. Funding limits have compelled the Pentagon to curtail R&D contacts for engaging hypersonic gliders.

Meanwhile, proposals to divert the limited funding to build a “gap-filler” terminal interceptor with constrained capabilities have arisen to provide patchwork protection until the GPI is deployed. Though terminal interceptors shielding a few critical sites could help build a layered defense, funding for any gap filler should supplement rather than divide the budget for the GPI, which will protect a much wider area.

The GPI program also has built-in burden sharing. The Japanese government is allocating $368 million to support its development through a Cooperative Development agreement with the United States and other means. The president and Congress should leverage these matching funds to support a rigorous GPI development, testing, and deployment program.

Richard Weitz is a Senior Fellow and Director of the Center for Political-Military Analysis at Hudson Institute. His current research includes regional security developments relating to Europe, Eurasia, and East Asia, as well as U.S. foreign and defense policies. Before joining Hudson in 2005, Dr. Weitz worked for several other academic and professional research institutions and the U.S. Department of Defense, where he received an Award for Excellence from the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

Image: Andrea Izzotti / Shutterstock.com.

En décembre, alors qu'Israël poursuivait ses bombardements sur les camps de réfugiés dans la bande de Gaza, la question de l'échange de prisonniers restait au cœur des discussions en vue d'un cessez-le-feu. Les détenues palestiniennes sont souvent les premières libérées, avec les mineurs. Leur (...) / Palestine, Prison, Mouvement de libération, Éducation, Femmes - 2025/01

For the people of Vanuatu, climate change is not a distant threat—it’s here now. Rising seas swallow shorelines, storms batter homes, and entire villages face relocation. Desperate to hold the world’s biggest polluters accountable, this small Pacific island nation has asked the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to define countries’ legal obligations around climate justice. They point out that carbon emissions from major polluting nations have led to a crisis for their people and argue this injustice constitutes a violation of international human rights law. The ICJ will advise on whether or not existing human rights treaties cover climate and, if so, what comes next.

The United States, in its oral argument before the court earlier this month, defended the efficacy of the Paris Agreement, the existing global framework where countries set their own climate targets and cooperate to meet them, and argued that the court should not put climate under the purview of other treaties not designed to address climate. Activists quickly derided this position as “disheartening” and “morally bankrupt.” But practically speaking, the United States is right. The Paris Agreement—though far from perfect—is working: global warming projections have dropped significantly in the last decade, and large nations are cutting emissions. If the ICJ now takes human rights treaties not written with climate in mind and uses them to accuse historical emitters of human rights violations, they would risk alienating countries and muddying the global cooperation needed to continue tackling climate change.

While Vanuatu’s pursuit of climate justice is compelling, the ICJ can only offer symbolism and fresh rhetoric for “America bad” rallying cries that undermine productive climate efforts. To achieve real progress on climate change and true justice for low-lying nations like Vanuatu, diplomacy and cooperation remain the best path forward. 

Signed by 195 countries in 2015, the Paris Agreement is an international treaty intended to keep global warming to under 2°C above pre-industrial levels by 2100, and ideally under 1.5°C. Prior to its signing, the world was on pace to warm by nearly 4°C above pre-industrial levels by the end of the century, a truly devastating scenario. Today, scientists project about 2.7°C of warming—an improvement of over a degree. While far from sufficient, this new trajectory would likely avert several climate tipping points, including the abrupt greening of the Sahara, the collapse of East Antarctica’s ice shelves, and the Amazon rainforest reaching a dieback tipping point that would have released massive amounts of stored carbon and devastated biodiversity. While several tripping point threats remain on a 2.7°C pathway, the Paris Agreement has unquestionably steered the world away from some of the most dire outcomes.

Though the Paris Agreement is often criticized for lacking an enforcement mechanism, many top polluters are still taking major strides within its framework. China’s carbon emissions are set to fall for the first time in 2024, marking the beginning of a downward trajectory. The European Union has slashed emissions by 37 percent since 1990, including a staggering 8 percent reduction from 2022 to 2023. The United States has slashed emissions by 20 percent since 2005, and with help from the recently passed Inflation Reduction Act, projects to reach 40 percent by the end of the decade. Much of this progress is simply economics—clean energy is now often cheaper than fossil fuels—but the Paris Agreement likely spurred some of the investor confidence needed to push the sector to its current heights.

This progress needs to be accelerated to prevent a still-catastrophic 2.7°C warming scenario, but that’s not something the ICJ can achieve. Its ruling in Vanuatu’s case will be merely an advisory opinion clarifying existing international law. The opinion will be non-binding and unenforceable, and increasingly, countries like China and the United States ignore the ICJ’s authority. They may assert that certain human rights laws apply to climate change and demand additional action from major emitters, or they may assert that there is nothing outside the Paris Agreement. Either way, the ICJ will upset someone, which risks driving division when the cooperative approach has proven to work.

Some might point out that the Paris Agreement, even if it slows emissions, can’t deliver justice for Vanuatu and other low-lying nations who did the least to cause climate change but face the most severe consequences—and they would be correct. But in its current state, the ICJ can’t either. The ICJ president, Nawaf Salam, has a troubling record that undermines his court’s credibility on human rights matters. Prior to his current position, Salam (then Lebanon’s ambassador to the UN) defended Assad’s government in Syria on multiple occasions despite its use of chemical weapons and systemic violence against civilians. 

He also consistently shielded Iran’s regime from scrutiny while supporting policies that advanced its regional influence, even in the face of documented human rights violations. Furthermore, his 210 votes to condemn Israel—mostly tied to one-sided resolutions that ignored violations by other parties—compound concerns about his impartiality, especially as he now refuses to recuse himself from cases involving Israel as ICJ president. Considering this past, no one should value Salam’s opinion on any justice or human rights question, even on the off-chance that the broken clock is right twice a day.

Facing an existential threat from climate change, it’s admirable that Vanuatu is exploring every option. Their quest for justice is rooted in scientific reality, and their years of inspiring climate diplomacy have no doubt helped spur some of the aforementioned progress. However, when activists use this case to vilify the Paris Agreement, sow division between countries, and promote hopelessness by downplaying existing climate progress, that only hurts Vanuatu’s cause.

As an American, I can’t say what justice for Vanuatu and other vulnerable nations looks like. Yet, bilateral diplomacy seems a more credible and attainable path. The United States opened an embassy in Vanuatu this year and seems interested in improving relations with Pacific nations to counterbalance China’s influence in the region. This development makes Vanuatu’s future not just a moral imperative but a matter of national interest. The U.S. could consider providing direct foreign aid outside of the UN framework, sharing climate adaptation technologies, and sponsoring visits between the countries to promote mutual understanding. This would be a lasting investment in American leadership and global stability.

To put these investments into a justice framework, the United States could also offer a formal apology for its outsized contribution to global climate change. There is precedent: Reagan apologized in 1988 for the U.S. government’s internment of Japanese Americans during World War II, Clinton apologized in 1993 for the overthrow of the Hawaiian monarchy, and Biden apologized two months ago for the federal government’s role in running Native American boarding schools, which caused generational harm to Indigenous communities. An apology doesn’t change the realities on the ground and would face its share of cynics. Still, I have to imagine the apology—coupled with collaborative climate initiatives that actually help people—would carry more weight than an authoritarian-sympathizing ICJ president’s non-binding opinion and hopefully inspire other countries to take similar action.

Vanuatu’s fight for justice should not have to be so onerous, and climate progress should happen fast enough to keep the world safe. But the answer isn’t for activists to attack what’s working. The Paris Agreement, while imperfect, has brought the world closer to averting disaster than any other global effort. What’s needed now is to build on that foundation, accelerate emission reductions, and find common goals with affected nations like Vanuatu that can lead to support and mutual understanding. Climate advocates must focus on building bridges, not burning them, to uplift Vanuatu’s determination and turn progress into justice.

Ethan Brown is an award-winning climate journalist and a Writer and Commentator for Young Voices. He has a B.A. in Environmental Analysis & Policy from Boston University. Follow him on X @ethanbrown5151.

Image: Menno Van Der Haven / Shutterstock.com.

There are two main approaches to the future: prediction and planning. Prediction often falters in the face of an increasingly complex and interconnected world, where countless variables elude full comprehension. Planning, while not without flaws, offers a chance to achieve desirable outcomes through proactive policy. As we are now at the midpoint of the 2020s (and the quarter-point of the twenty-first century), it is clear that the legacy of this decade will be shaped by the lessons we learn and the actions we take. Here are five key insights that can be gleaned from the first half of the decade.

1) The Indispensability of Values

Not since the Munich Agreement of 1938 has it been so evident that fundamental values cannot be negotiated. Attempts to appease dictators rather than confront illegal actions have repeatedly failed to bring peace. History shows that such concessions only embolden aggressors. The conflicts in Georgia (2008), Crimea, and Eastern Ukraine (2014) were precursors to the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The West’s timid responses encouraged Moscow to grasp for more territorial gains. Compromising on core principles and obligations leads to outcomes far more devastating than a proactive and decisive intervention.

2) The Misguided Faith in Economic Interdependence

For years, many in the West believed that economic ties with Russia would deter it from violating international norms. The concept of Wandel durch Handel (“Change Through Trade”), a legacy of post-Cold-War-era diplomacy, encapsulated this belief. For several generations of politicians, it seemed almost undisputable that mutual commercial interests bear a higher priority for the Kremlin than imperialistic ambitions. Yet, on February 24, 2022, the images of Russian missiles raining down on Ukrainian cities shattered that illusion. Russia viewed the West’s dependence on its hydrocarbons, which emerged through the gas and oil trade, as a weakness to exploit.

In the years preceding World War I, similar faith in economic enlightened self-interest proved futile. In the years preceding the current war, European nations indirectly funded Russia’s military ambitions by purchasing its fossil fuels. It took Europe three years to reduce its dependence on Russian energy—a painful yet necessary step. In October 2024, the EU  Commissioner for Energy declared that the EU could now survive without Russian gas and that importation of it was no longer necessary.

3) The Resurgence Of Authoritarianism

Despite global trade and international agreements, authoritarian regimes remain undeterred. Democracies value peace; autocracies respect power. These opposing worldviews create a persistent clash. The 2023 Democracy Index from the Economist Intelligence Unit reported the average global score is the lowest since the index’s inception in 2006. Today, only 8 percent of the world’s population lives in “full democracies,” while nearly 40 percent live under authoritarian rule.

Each year sheds more light on the grim reality: when authoritarian regimes see opportunities to expand their power, they seize them. Frozen conflicts and political pauses are not deterrents; they are opportunities for autocrats to regroup and reassert dominance.

4) The Urgent Need to Defend Democracy

The rise of far-right movements in Europe’s core democracies, evidenced by Germany’s and France’s 2024 elections, shows that democracy is under siege even at “home.” Rapid technological advancements, particularly in artificial intelligence, exacerbate the problem. Disinformation and deepfakes are rapidly proliferating, corroding trust in institutions and making societies vulnerable to conspiracy theories.

Once hailed as friends of democratic engagement and freedom, new digital technologies are now tools for authoritarian regimes to undermine those very values. Russia’s disinformation campaigns on platforms like YouTube, Telegram, X (formerly Twitter), and TikTok illustrate this. The 2024 Romanian presidential election, marred by Russian interference, demonstrates the scale and sophistication of these efforts.

Without a concerted democratic “counter-offensive,” the 2030s could mirror the 1930s—an era defined by democratic collapse.

5) The Key Role of Civil Society

In 2024, violent crackdowns on protests in Tbilisi, Georgia, echoing the brutal suppression of demonstrations in Kyiv, Ukraine, in 2014. The patterns of authoritarian repression are unmistakable. Ten years ago, Ukraine withstood owing to its well-elaborated horizontal connections. Today, Ukraine’s resilience in the face of war also owes much to its strong civil society. Organizations like the East Europe Foundation, International Renaissance Foundation, ISAR Ednannia, and others have cultivated a capable ecosystem of grassroots NGOs that bolster national resilience. Thus, only the EEF’s network now includes over 600 local entities.

Unfortunately, emerging democracies are not the only ones at risk. The resurgence of the populist Far Right in older democratic political systems reminds us of the need for a vigilant and empowered civil society. In an age of relentless propaganda, civil society serves as a critical circuit breaker, preventing democratic backsliding.

A Watershed Moment

The year 2025 might be pivotal for the West and for Europe. Have we learned from past mistakes? Can we avoid the traps that lie ahead? The lessons of history remind us that peace cannot be purchased through concessions—it must be secured.

In an interconnected world, no nation is an island. A single fracture risks the collapse of the entire structure. These five insights are not exhaustive, but they offer a framework for decision-makers navigating this critical juncture. The future is still ours to shape—if we act decisively.

Victor Liakh is the CEO of East Europe Foundation. From 2005 to 2008, he was executive director of the Child Well-Being Fund Ukraine. Previously, he worked at the Ukrainian State Center for Social Services for Youth (1996–2001) and for UNICEF (2000–2001). Follow him on X @LiakhVictor or LinkedIn.

Image: Timon Goertz / Shutterstock.com.

Close Air Support (CAS) is a seriously underrated task that the United States military has a very finite number of systems capable of performing. Warplanes like the A-10 Warthog and the A-29 Tuscano are about the only two systems that can reliably perform this function. The Air Force, however, would have you believe that fifth-generation warplanes, such as the F-35 Lightning II, are more than up to the task of conducting CAS (from over the horizon, which, of course, negates CAS entirely). Of those two aforementioned CAS platforms, though, only one is truly iconic. That is the A-10 Warthog.

And the Air Force has been trying to kill the A-10 for years. 

It’s a stunning move by the Pentagon, because of all the warplanes in its fleet, the A-10 may be the most combat-effective modern warplane ever built by the Americans. Sure, it lacks the panache of the F-35, and it’s more expensive than the propeller-driven A-29. Yeah, fourth-generation warplanes, like the F-15, F-16, and F/A-18s all have an impressive track record. But there are countless American (and allies) servicemen and women who can reliably attest to the fact that they are only alive today because the A-10 Warthog was hovering overhead, providing air cover for them.

Very often, we conflate systems that are increasingly complex and expensive as being superior to those that are relatively simple and affordable. But this is a mistaken belief. After all, what other modern American warplane has successfully managed to have the kill ratio across multiple wars that the A-10 has and has saved the extraordinary number of U.S. troops in combat that the A-10 has saved by providing CAS? 

The answer is no other plane can or has done what the A-10 has achieved in its service. 

Not Understanding the Potency of the A-10

The Eggheads at the Pentagon and at Air War College argue that we’ve moved beyond the age of CAS because modern air defenses are so potent and complex that the slow-moving, loitering A-10 is a sitting duck today. Interestingly, the Pentagon’s Eggheads don’t share this assessment when it comes to U.S. aircraft carriers.

Because, in the age of anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD), it isn’t just the A-10 that would theoretically be rendered combat ineffective, but the far more expensive aircraft carrier. It’s almost as though the Pentagon just wants the systems that will cost the most amount of money to taxpayers (F-35s and aircraft carriers).

Alas, I digress.

In fact, there is a key difference between the A-10 and aircraft carriers when it comes to overcoming A2/AD threats. If the CAS mission set was as dead and the A-10 as obsolete as the Pentagon argues, then why is it that the U.S. Special Forces community continues to swear by the A-10? What’s more, why is it that the Special Forces community has invested so heavily in the A-29 in recent years? 

That’s because they require CAS for their missions to succeed and, with the future of the A-10 being uncertain, they are still trying to keep the CAS mission alive with the far less impressive A-29.

The idea that CAS can be conducted from over the horizon is one of those fanciful notions that only someone deeply ensconced in the Pentagon could believe. Sure, relying on an F-35 to provide the kind of cover for U.S. ground forces engaged in close combat with enemy units is better than nothing. But the F-35 lacks the endurance, firepower, and armor that the A-10 has when it comes to conducting CAS.

A far better use of resources would be to deploy A-10s in a mixed formation of warplanes. The F-35s, F-15s, etc., can operate in tandem with unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and even long-range missiles to knock out enemy A2/AD systems. 

Once the A2/AD networks have been breached, then the A-10s can be deployed to hover over battlefields and provide the kind of loitering CAS mission sets that they’ve proven ad nauseam they are the best at doing.

Trust me, American servicemen and women (and those of our allies) engaged in ground combat will be eternally grateful for the A-10s being overhead.

If Only the US Had Handed the A-10 Over to the Ukrainians Rather Than Old F-16s

There’s one last bit of thinking when it comes to deploying the A-10. 

Given that the Americans and their NATO allies have (over) committed themselves to the Ukrainian cause against Russia’s invasion, it never made much sense as to why all the older A-10 Warthogs that had been sent to the Air Force’s boneyard were not re-tasked and handed over to the Ukrainians.

Now, of course, it’s too late for the A-10s (or any system) to make a difference.

Had the Americans, though, listened to the likes of Erik Prince, and handed over some of those A-10s along with the blessed Main Battle Tanks, it might have made a difference at the tactical level for the Ukrainians.

Alas, the refusal to hand those systems over and instead to give a handful of old F-16s has done little to help the Ukrainians in their cause. Here again, the A-10 could have proven itself to be the most useful, successful modern warplane the West has ever produced. The institutional bias against the A-10 prevented that. Indeed, the institutional bias against the A-10 is going to get many Americans killed when the next big war erupts and U.S. forces find themselves on foreign battlefields without adequate CAS.

Brandon J. Weichert, a Senior National Security Editor at The National Interest as well as a Senior Fellow at the Center for the National Interest, and a contributor at Popular Mechanics, consults regularly with various government institutions and private organizations on geopolitical issues. Weichert’s writings have appeared in multiple publications, including the Washington Times, National Review, The American Spectator, MSN, the Asia Times, and countless others. His books include Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His newest book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine is available for purchase wherever books are sold. He can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

Image: Charles T. Peden / Shutterstock.com

Critics of Washington’s gradualism are misreading Putin’s redlines.

Washington should create the conditions to withdraw U.S. troops.

Without a doubt, the Allies defeated the Axis during World War II thanks in large part to air superiority; this air superiority was due to fantabulous fighter planes such as the P-38 Lightning, P-47 Thunderbolt, and especially the P-51D Mustang.

Yet ironically, in one of the great statistical anomalies of the war, the top-scoring individual aces of the Axis far outscored the Allies’ top aces. (An “ace” is defined as a combat aviator with a minimum of five air-to-air victories.) For example, the top three Allied aces were the Soviet Union’s Ivan Nikitovich Kozhedub (sixty-four kills); Britain’s (South African-born) Marmaduke Thomas St John “Pat” Pattle (at least forty victories, more likely over fifty); and America’s Richard Ira “Dick” Bong (forty kills). Compare and contrast those numbers with the top three Axis aces: Imperial Japan’s Tetsuzo Iwamoto (at least ninety-four victories; 202 kills personally claimed); Nazi Germany’s Gerhard "Gerd" Barkhorn (301 kills); and Germany’s Erich Hartmann (whose mind-numbing tally of 352 kills makes him the most successful fighter ace in the history of aerial warfare).

Though both sides of the war had their fair share of “aces in a day” (including America’s Chuck Yeager), the Germans also laid the claim to the fastest pilot and plane combo to achieve that rarified status: then-Major Werner Streib and the Heinkel He 219 Uhu (“Eagle-Owl”).

Where It Began: Heinkel He 219 Uhu Early History and Specifications

The Uhu made her maiden flight on November 15, 1942, and officially entered operational service with "die Vaterland (the Fatherland)" the following year. The warbird had a number of features that were then state-of-the-art, such as cannons mounted to fire at an oblique angle, the first steerable nosewheel on an operational German aircraft, and the world's first ejection seats on an operational aircraft of any nation.

The He 219’s specifications and vital stats included:

-Fuselage Length: 50 ft 4 in (15.33 m)
-Wingspan: 60 ft 8 in (18.5 m)
-Height: 13 ft 5 in (4.1 m)
-Empty weight: 24,692 lb (11,200 kg)
-Gross weight: 33,731 lb (15,300 kg)
-Powerplant: two × Daimler-Benz DB 603E V-12 inverted liquid-cooled piston engines, 1,324 kW (1,776 hp) each
-Max Airspeed: 420 mph (670 km/h, 360 kn) at 23,000 ft (7,000 m)
-Cruise Speed: 340 mph (540 km/h, 290 kn)
-Combat Range: 960 mi (1,545 km, 834 NM)
-Service Ceiling: 41,700 ft (12,700 m) (absolute)
-Armament
--two × 20 mm (0.787 in) MG 151/20 cannons in a detachable fairing under the fuselage, 300 rounds per gun (rpg)
--two × 20 mm MG 151/20 cannons in wing roots, 300 rpg
--two × 30 mm (1.181 in) MK 108 cannons, Schrage Musik (oriented 65 degrees)

Total production of the He 219 amounted to just under 300 airframes.

Where It Began Part Deux: Werner Streib’s Early Life and Mini-Bio

Werner Streib was born on June 13, 1911, in Pforzheim in the southwest German state of Baden-Wurttemberg. Werner began his military career as an infantryman in the Wehrmacht in 1934; however, he obtained a transfer to the Luftwaffe in 1936 and started as an observer in a reconnaissance unit. He later trained as a fighter pilot.

He scored his first aerial victory on May 10, 1940, setting the stage for a very successful combat record.

How It Happened: Streib’s Ace-in-a-Day Engagement

Warren Gray of Gunpowder Magazine tells the story in a September 25, 2021, article:

“[The Uhu’s] auspicious, combat debut occurred on the night of June 11 to 12, 1943, when Major Werner Streib, a Messerschmitt Bf 110G-4 Zerstörer (“Destroyer”) night-fighter ace with 50 confirmed kills to his credit already, and his radar operator, Sergeant Helmut Fischer, sitting back-to-back inside the cockpit, flew their He 219 pre-production prototype V9, recently upgraded to He 219A-0/R2 production standards, and marked “G9+FB” on the sides of the aircraft, on a nocturnal sortie from Venlo Airfield, in the German-occupied Netherlands … Streib quickly shot down a Royal Air Force (RAF) Halifax four-engine bomber at 1:05 AM, southeast of Roermond, then a second Halifax near Rheinberg at 1:20 AM, a third Halifax north of Mook at 1:55 AM, a four-engine, Avro Lancaster bomber southwest of Nijmegen at 2:16 AM, and a fourth Halifax bomber near Sambeek at 2:22 AM, for a total of five confirmed kills in a single mission, an astounding, ‘ace-in-a-night’ accomplishment. They expended virtually all of their ammunition.” 

Where Are They Now?

By the time of the collapse of the Third Reich, Werner Streib had attained the rank of oberst (colonel) with sixty-six confirmed aerial kills. He spent eleven years working in the grocery business, then resumed his military career with the post-WWII Luftwaffe (unlike the Wehrmacht turned Bundeswehr Heer [army] and the Kriegsmarine turned Deutsche Marine [navy], the German Air Force has retained its WWII moniker to the present day) from 1956 to 1966 retiring with the rank of brigadegeneral (Brigadier general). He passed away on June 15, 1986, at the age of seventy-five, and was buried with military honors at the Ostfriedhof (Eastern Cemetery) in Munich.

As for the aircraft flown by Streib on his history-making mission, there is exactly one fully intact, fully restored, surviving specimen today. Werknummer ("Work Number") 290202 is at the Smithsonian National Air & Space Museum's Steven F. Udvar-Hazy Center in Chantilly, Virginia (near Washington Dulles International Airport); I've personally toured the museum twice and recommend it highly.

About the Author: Christian D. Orr

Christian D. Orr is a Senior Defense Editor for National Security Journal (NSJ). He is a former Air Force Security Forces officer, Federal law enforcement officer, and private military contractor (with assignments worked in Iraq, the United Arab Emirates, Kosovo, Japan, Germany, and the Pentagon). Chris holds a B.A. in International Relations from the University of Southern California (USC) and an M.A. in Intelligence Studies (concentration in Terrorism Studies) from American Military University (AMU). He has also been published in The Daily Torch, The Journal of Intelligence and Cyber Security, and Simple Flying. Last but not least, he is a Companion of the Order of the Naval Order of the United States (NOUS). If you’d like to pick his brain further, you can ofttimes find him at the Old Virginia Tobacco Company (OVTC) lounge in Manassas, Virginia, partaking of fine stogies and good quality human camaraderie.

Image: Shutterstock.

North Korea’s expanding ballistic missile program, along with its advancing nuclear weapons project, is a serious and growing threat both to its regional neighbors and the United States. 

That is why the Trump administration’s quest to achieve a more stable diplomatic relationship, after literally decades of hostilities between the West and North Korea, was such a monumental move. 

One North Korean system of note is the Hwasong-7, otherwise known as the Nodong-1 intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM).

The Nodong-1 missile provides North Korea with the capability to reach out and threaten its regional neighbors both with conventional and, likely, nuclear attacks. Nodong-1 can cover all of South Korea and parts of Japan. Its accuracy, however, remains a major source of debate. Many Western analysts assess that the circular error probable for this system is one to two miles, meaning that this system is likely not as effective against military targets as it is against larger, softer targets like the cities of South Korea and parts of Japan. 

Although, these are all estimates made by the West and should be taken with a grain of salt, seeing as the intelligence picture of North Korea is even less informative to observers than black holes. 

North Korea’s Ballistic Missile Threat

One thing to keep in mind, though, is that North Korea’s overall ballistic missile threat has been growing. The technology undergirding the North Korean program has gotten better with each test launch. In turn, these launches have helped to further North Korea’s overall threat to the United States and its regional partners. 

And since 2013, when Pyongyang’s forces developed the capability to miniaturize nuclear warheads, North Korean ballistic missiles can now reliably carry advanced nuclear weapons. 

Anyway, the Nodong is especially helpful to Pyongyang as it seeks to gain leverage over its regional rivals. The presence of the Nodong system in large quantities allows North Korea’s negotiators to gain greater concessions from their rivals at the negotiating table. Should war ever erupt between North Korea and its neighbors, Pyongyang would have a significant capability to deal out death and wanton damage to its foes with the Nodong missile. 

So, it doesn’t only provide great diplomatic capital, but the Nodong-1 missile is a serious strategic advantage for North Korea’s military.

As of 2024, most intelligence assessments indicate that there are only 100 Nodong-1 launchers deployed. And since the Nodong-1 was first developed in the mid-1980s, North Korea’s ballistic missile program has truly evolved into a potent and comprehensive regional (indeed, global threat). Today, North Korea’s arsenal includes the Hwasong-12, Hwasong-14, Hwasong-15, and Hwasong-17, all of which likely overshadow the capabilities of the Nodong-1 IRBM system. 

Yet, the Nodong-1 is an important link in the evolution of North Korea’s ballistic missile program.

What’s more, the Nodong-1 is likely to be upgraded for at least the next decade before Pyongyang ever contemplates phasing this system out of its arsenal entirely. Further, as the incoming Trump administration finds its footing, it is probable that the administration will seek to rekindle its previous good relations with Pyongyang. 

A Powerful Bargaining Chip

A key element of renewed negotiations with North Korea will be in the domain of arms control. Having the 100 or so Nodong-1s still in service will force the Americans and their allies to focus and negotiate on those systems as opposed to newer ones. So, again, the Nodong-1 serves as a useful tool in terms of North Korean diplomacy with the West.

Like so many weapons in the North Korean arsenal, the Nodong-1 is derived from older Soviet-era missile technology. Specifically, the Soviet R-17 Elbrus (a.k.a. “Scud”) missile. The design was adapted by North Korean weapons designers to augment the range and lethality of its Soviet predecessor. Nodong-1 is a single-stage, liquid-fueled missile, which employs a unique combination of unsymmetrical dimethylhydrazine (UDMH) and AK-27 (nitric acid with nitrogen oxides) for propulsion. 

What Happens If We Get North Korea Policy Wrong?

Nodong-1 is approximately 53 feet in length, with a diameter of a little less than five feet. Its range is approximately between 745 miles to 932 miles and its payload capacity is about 2,600 pounds. Nodong-1 is a serious threat to its neighbors and the North Koreans should not be underestimated. 

The fact that Nodong-1 is not even the most advanced ballistic missile in North Korea’s arsenal shows how important arms control talks will be in the new Trump administration—and the price of getting America’s North Korea policy wrong.

Brandon J. Weichert, a Senior National Security Editor at The National Interest as well as a Senior Fellow at the Center for the National Interest, and a contributor at Popular Mechanics, consults regularly with various government institutions and private organizations on geopolitical issues. Weichert’s writings have appeared in multiple publications, including the Washington Times, National Review, The American Spectator, MSN, the Asia Times, and countless others. His books include Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His newest book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine is available for purchase wherever books are sold. He can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

Image: Shutterstock.

The deadly truck ramming and other violent incidents put authorities on alert as people rang in the new year.

2024 was the deadliest thus far in the war in Ukraine.

Both Russia and Ukraine lost hundreds of thousands of troops killed and wounded in the fighting. Russia, in particular, lost approximately 430,000 troops in just one year.

Costly Progress

The year 2024 will go down as the year in which the Russian military wrestled back the initiative and launched its attritional strategy.

Since January 2024, the Russian forces have been on the offensive, but it wasn’t until May that the Kremlin unveiled its attritional strategy. Under this strategy, the Russian military exchanged men for territory. Starting in May, the Russian military threw hundreds of thousands of men against the Ukrainian defensive lines. And, steadily but slowly, the Russian forces advanced, capturing important battlefield points in southeastern and eastern Ukraine.

Most of the progress achieved by the Russian forces took place in the fall.

“Russian forces made 56.5 percent of their 2024 territorial gains during the September through November 2024 period,” the Institute for the Study of War assessed in its latest estimate of the conflict.

In the closing days of 2024, Ukrainian commander-in-chief Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi revealed that the Russian forces took approximately 427,000 casualties throughout the year. In exchange for those casualties, the Russian forces captured about 1,609 square miles of territory in Ukraine and Russia (the Kursk Oblast salient). These numbers translate to around 267 men killed and wounded for every square mile captured. Moreover, the Russian losses translate to an average of 1,178 losses every single day, with lows in the low hundreds and highs of over 2,000 losses per day.

In terms of quality, the territory the Russian forces captured mainly comprised of farm fields and small settlements. Indeed, Bakhmut is the last major town the Russian forces captured in the war, and they did so back in 2023.

As far as losses, the Russian military has managed to recruit just enough troops through a variety of ways, including mercenaries, conscripts, and North Korean soldiers, to maintain its attritional strategy.

“Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev claimed on December 24 that 440,000 recruits signed military service contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) in 2024, suggesting that Russia is likely recruiting just enough military personnel to replace its recently high casualty rates one for one,” the Institute for the Study of War added.

But whether and for how long the Russian military can maintain such high recruitment levels remains the big question.

The Ukrainian Response

The Ukrainian military tried to stem the Russian progress by launching a surprise offensive against Russia itself. In early August, Ukrainian mechanized brigades stormed Kursk Oblast, which borders eastern Ukraine, and made immediate progress. In just a few days, the Ukrainians captured hundreds of square kilometers of territory and scores of settlements, creating a salient inside Russia. As a result of the Ukrainian attack, the Russian military was forced to draw forces from the fighting inside Ukraine to contain the threat in Russia.

However, the Ukrainian offensive proved to be only a temporary distraction for the Russian military.

Stavros Atlamazoglou is a seasoned defense journalist specializing in special operations and a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ). He holds a BA from Johns Hopkins University and an MA from Johns Hopkins’ School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). His work has been featured in Business Insider, Sandboxx, and SOFREP.

Image: ID1974 / Shutterstock.com

The Pentagon awarded Lockheed Martin a contract for 145 F-35 Lightning II stealth fighter jets worth almost $12 billion.

An Undefinitized Contract

In the last days of December, the Pentagon awarded Lockheed Martin an “undefinitized, fixed-price incentive (firm-target), firm-fixed-price modification” to a contract for the production of 145 F-35 Lightning II stealth fighter jets. The contract is worth $11.7 billion.

Essentially, the contract is an extension to a previously awarded contract for F-35s. But for legal and practical reasons, the U.S. military and some other F-35 customers order F-35s—and indeed other aircraft—in batches as opposed to making one contract for the full number. Indeed, in the case of the U.S. military, that would be mighty impractical since it has decided to order approximately 2,500 F-35s of all types for the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps.

This extension in the F-35 contract highlights the international nature of the F-35 program, which is one of its biggest strengths. Work for the 145 F-35s will be performed in at least four different countries (the United States, Italy, Japan, and the United Kingdom), and within the United States, five different states will benefit from the work (Texas, California, Maryland, New Hampshire, and Florida).

Specifically, the extension to the original contract is for the production and delivery of 145 F-35s from the Lot 18 batch. Out of these aircraft, there are forty-eight F-35A for the Air Force, fourteen F-35C for the Navy, and sixteen F-35B and five F-35C for the Marine Corps. Moreover, fifteen F-35A and one F-35B are destined for non-U.S. Department of Defense program partners, and thirty-nine F-35A and seven F-35B for Foreign Military Sales customers.

A Complex Program

As you can tell, the F-35 Program is a highly complex one with twenty member countries and three variants of the same aircraft (F-35A, F-35B, and F-35C) involved.

The twenty member countries are the United States, United Kingdom, Italy, the Netherlands, Canada, Australia, Denmark, Norway, Israel, Japan, South Korea, Belgium, Poland, Singapore, Finland, Switzerland, Germany, the Czech Republic, Greece, and Romania. Turkey was also in the program until it decided to purchase the S-400 Triumpf air defense system from Russia, thus triggering the anger of the United States and NATO and resulting in its defenestration from the program.

The total order of F-35s from these countries is approximately 3,579 aircraft. In terms of the specific variants, the F-35A is the most popular, with around 2,700 orders, followed by the F-35B, with 575 orders, and the F-35C, with 340 orders. The U.S. military is by far the largest F-35 purchaser with a total order of 2,456 aircraft (the Air Force has ordered 1,763 F-35As, the Navy 270 F-35Cs, and the Marine Corps 353 F-35Bs and seventy F-35Cs). Interestingly, the U.S. military is the only one operating the F-35C, which is designed for aircraft carrier operations.

The F-35 Lightning II is the most advanced fighter jet in the skies today and is capable of evading enemy air defenses with its stealth characteristics.

Stavros Atlamazoglou is a seasoned defense journalist specializing in special operations and a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ). He holds a BA from Johns Hopkins University and an MA from Johns Hopkins’ School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). His work has been featured in Business Insider, Sandboxx, and SOFREP.

Image: MyPlanePics / Shutterstock.com

The United States Air Force saw thirty-nine—or nearly 20 percent—of its fleet of 218 Cold War-era Fairchild Republic A-10 Thunderbolt II close air support (CAS) attack aircraft retired in 2024. In fact, these birds were sent to the 309th Aerospace Maintenance and Regeneration Group (AMARG) for long-term storage at Davis-Monthan Air Force "Boneyard" in Tucson, Arizona. The cuts were double the number of A-10s that had been retired in the fiscal year 2023 (FY23), and even more, Thunderbolt IIs will face the chopping block in the coming months.

That could include the two dozen stationed in South Korea at Osan Air Base with the 25th Fighter Squadron, which is likely to return to the United States in the coming weeks, Simple Flying reported.

As part of the annual defense policy bill for fiscal year 2025 (FY25), signed into law by President Joe Biden last month, the Air Force could see its operational fleet of A-10s further reduced.

The A-10: The Unstoppable Tank Buster

Known affectionately among pilots and ground crews as the Warthog, the A-10 first entered service in March 1976, replacing the Vought A-7D Corsair as the Air Force's primary CAS aircraft. The aircraft was developed to counter a Soviet invasion of Western Europe, where it served as a modern tank buster.

It more than delivered when it went to war—albeit in Iraq rather than Europe.

It was during the 1991 Gulf War, Air & Space Forces magazine reported in 1993, that "the A-10 force was credited with destroying 987 tanks, 926 artillery pieces, 1,355 combat vehicles, and a range of other targets-including ten fighters on the ground and two helicopters shot down in air-to-air engagements. The A-10 force, flying more than 8,000 combat sorties, suffered only five A-10s destroyed (a loss rate of .062 percent)."

Over three decades later, the A-10 has continued to fly in a CAS role, and it was among the aircraft that the Air Force deployed to the Middle East in 2024. It was reported to have flown strafing runs on Iranian-backed Iraqi Shia militia columns and ISIS targets in Syria.

First Cut Wasn't the Deepest

Despite the role the aircraft continues to play, the Air Force has sought for years to retire the aging A-10, arguing that it is ill-suited to a modern conflict with a near-peer adversary such as China. Those calls for its retirement met repeated objections from lawmakers. Yet finally, in 2022, Congress approved the service's calls to begin to retire the iconic attack plane.

The U.S. Air Force has set a goal to see the last of the A-10s sent to the Boneyard by 2030.

Could The A-10 Head to Ukraine or Jordan?

Even as some in the U.S. Air Force have apparently lost faith in the A-10, there has been chatter that the Warthog should be sent to Ukraine or Jordan.

As previously reported, in July, lawmakers on the United States Senate Committee on Armed Services directed Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin III to "explore the possibility of transferring" the A-10s now being retired to the Royal Jordanian Air Force. The Warthog may be well-suited to Jordan's ongoing counter-drug campaign, which has included airstrikes on positions near the Syrian border. The Middle Eastern kingdom also played a significant role in fighting ISIS over the past decade and could likely do so again. The A-10 is an ideal aircraft for such campaigns against insurgent forces.

Jordan isn't the only nation that has expressed interest in the A-10.

The U.S. Air Force had previously discussed a plan to supply Colombia with a squadron of Thunderbolt IIs to counter drug cartels in that country, but it never moved forward.

Of course, aviation experts have continued to suggest that the A-10 could be the perfect aircraft for the Ukrainian Air Force, as it was designed to survive even after sustaining heavy damage and can operate from austere airfields. In contrast, the Ukrainian Air Force already operates the similar (but far less capable) Sukhoi Su-25 (NATO reporting name Frogfoot). This slow-flying ground attack aircraft has been employed to strike Russian tanks.

The A-10C Demo Team Had Its Final Show Last Year

For aviation buffs, 2024 also marked the end of the line for the A-10C Thunderbolt II Demonstration Team, which took to the skies for a final time at the Stuart Air Show in Witham Field, Florida, as part of the Veterans Day Weekend celebrations in November.

"We want to extend a huge thank you to everyone who supported us and everyone who came out to watch an amazing airframe, pilot, and team, perform for you at 1800 shows across 10 countries over the course of more than 40 years," the A-10C Thunderbolt II Demonstration Team expressed in a statement, posted to Facebook.

Author Experience and Expertise: Peter Suciu

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

Image: BlueBarronPhoto / Shutterstock.com

What Europe’s 1990s wars can teach the next U.S. president about Ukraine.

In the wake of the horrific Hamas attacks on Israel on October 7, 2023, the Israeli government initiated a series of strikes upon its enemies to both seek justice for the terrorist attacks upon Israel and to restore deterrence that had been lost by the attacks. 

Beginning with their counterstrike on Hamas targets in Gaza, the Israelis pushed hard against their enemies in the West Bank and Syria and even the Iranian-backed Hezbollah terrorist network to the north in Lebanon. 

Indeed, the Israeli Air Force (IAF) even managed to launch long-range strikes against the Iran-backed Houthis in distant Yemen and against targets within Iran itself.

A Dazzling Display by Israel

In the aftermath of those stunning Israeli airstrikes directed against Iranian targets, the government of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu proudly announced that it had obliterated a key component of Iran’s purportedly complex air defense network. Countless Russian-built S-300 air defense systems were destroyed by the striking F-35I Adir fifth-generation warplanes that the Israelis had deployed to attack those targets within Iran. 

Israel claims that they eviscerated the Iranian national air defense networks surrounding key targets in their nation. In other words, the Israeli military is saying that they maintain escalation dominance. With those key targets being vulnerable to repeat attacks from the IAF. 

What’s more, now that the pro-Iran (and Russian-backed) Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria has collapsed, the Israelis have taken over large swathes of the country that borders their eastern territories. The IDF is now ensconced in Syria and has created what amounts to an air corridor that its planes can use to reliably strike Iran and return to safety.

A lack of reliable air defenses means that Israel now holds all the cards in any military engagement against Iran. 

But did Israel really destroy all the air defense systems that the Iranians possessed? Surely, Iran has more systems than just the Russian-made S-300. Since the Israeli strike that knocked out all of Iran’s S-300 air defense batteries, the Islamist regime in Tehran has fought to downplay the damage. Both the Israeli government and the Biden administration have told The Times of Israel that the Islamic Republic is “essentially naked.” 

In April of last year, the Iranians expressed interest in purchasing the more powerful Russian-built S-400 air defense system. By November, though, Iran claimed it did not need the Russian system. Instead, the Iranians have the Bavar-373, which Tehran claims is comparable to the Russian S-400. According to Iranian state sources, the Bavar-373 is a long-range anti-ballistic missile defense system that can, purportedly, destroy Israeli and American fifth-generation warplanes.

Of course, the question that everyone should be asking is, why didn’t these systems knock Israel’s F-35Is out of the sky before they could obliterate the Iranian S-300 sites and sensitive Iranian military targets during their October airstrikes on the Islamic Republic? 

Iran Lacks Proper Air Defense Doctrine

The fact is that the Iranians have struggled to beef up their air defense network. That’s partly because they’ve not fought a near-peer rival since the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s (and Iran barely survived that experience). 

There’s more, too. For instance, the Iranian military, on top of being saddled with older indigenously built systems, lacks the appropriate doctrine for effectively using air defense systems. While it’s true that older systems are not especially helpful against newer fifth-generation warplanes, like the F-35I, a lack of proper understanding of the science and tactics behind reliable air defenses complicates Iranian attempts at defense. 

Meanwhile, the Iranians have expanded their defensive perimeter into Shiite-controlled zones of neighboring Iraq. But that extended defense perimeter only works if, again, the Iranians are using reliable technology and have an effective air defense doctrine they’re employing.

So, yes, the Israelis have basically ensured they have escalation dominance over the Iranians. 

Israel’s Escalation Dominance 

A weakened central Syrian government in the post-Assad era is presiding over the de facto partition of Syria, leading the Israelis to take portions of western Syria near the Golan Heights.

The Israelis are trying to create an air corridor to allow their planes to strike deep inside Iran. If Iran’s air defenses are truly gone the way that Israel and the United States claim they are, then Tehran is going to be subjected to the mother-of-all air wars over the next year or so, as the Israelis seek to end the Iranian regime’s threat and the Americans back their play.

Further, the Israeli destruction of Iranian air defenses with their F-35I is a testament to the fact that the F-35, while it has certainly encountered massive problems over the course of its development, is still quite a lethal fighter.

Brandon J. Weichert, a Senior National Security Editor at The National Interest as well as a Senior Fellow at the Center for the National Interest, and a contributor at Popular Mechanics, consults regularly with various government institutions and private organizations on geopolitical issues. Weichert’s writings have appeared in multiple publications, including the Washington Times, National Review, The American Spectator, MSN, the Asia Times, and countless others. His books include Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His newest book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine is available for purchase wherever books are sold. He can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

Image: Ian Cramman / Shutterstock.com

Russian social media is running wild with images of an American M1A1 Abrams Main Battle Tank (MBT) being captured by the Russian Army fighting in Ukraine. According to these Russian sources (take from them what you will), the Abrams in question is being sent back to Moscow to be reverse-engineered. Indeed, this is hardly the first American Abrams captured by Russian forces fighting in Ukraine. 

As Military Watch Magazine has assessed, since September, “the rate at which Ukrainian forces have been losing Abrams tanks has increased significantly.”  

And it isn’t just the Abrams MBT that has struggled in the muddy, blood-soaked killing fields of Ukraine. Most of the other classes of NATO MBTs have either been destroyed or rendered useless in Ukraine’s fight against the invading Russians. Even the much-ballyhooed German-built Leopard 2A6 MBTs have not fared as their proponents in NATO claimed they would.

An Incredibly Poor Performance 

Most independent analysts assess that of the thirty-one Abrams tanks handed over to Ukraine, an astonishing twenty of them have been destroyed within the first year of their deployment to Ukraine. According to Military Watch Magazine, most of the kills that the Russians have enjoyed over the Abrams tanks have been conducted by the ubiquitous “kamikaze” unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) that both sides in the war have been using to terrorize each other. 

More shockingly, at least one confirmed Russian kill of the M1A1 Abrams in Ukraine was achieved by an old Russian T-72B3 MBT (thereby proving this author’s long-running supposition that the T-72 is the best tank in the Ukraine War).

Multiple media sources have interviewed U.S.-trained Ukrainian tank crews, all of whom have expressed extreme dissatisfaction with the Abrams tank. In the summation of these tank crews, their Abrams tanks are plagued with technical issues, and there is very little active defense provided against the aforementioned threat posed by Russian kamikaze drones. 

What’s more, the advances in anti-tank weaponry have complicated the ability of MBTs belonging to both sides in the Ukraine War to defend themselves. 

In the case of Russia, their 9M133 Kornet dual-warhead anti-tank weapon is a nightmare for any Ukrainian tank (as much as the NATO-provided Javelin anti-tank system is a problem that Russian MBTs struggle to overcome).

The real question that Western strategists must answer is why the M1A1 Abrams has struggled to perform well in the Ukraine War.

Wider Implications For America 

After all, the Abrams is America’s primary MBT, and the Pentagon is spending gobs of money on an updated variant of the Abrams, which will be the U.S. Army’s primary armor force for decades to come. However, if the M1A1 Abrams’ lackluster performance in Ukraine is any indication of its utility in a future war, then the Pentagon’s investment in this system might be a bad choice.

Is this really a case of the vaunted Abrams finally being made obsolete by the changing tide of warfare, or is this really a user error?

While it’s easy to simply say that the Americans have not kept pace with the changing face of war in the modern age, the fact remains that the M1A1 Abrams, along with the other tanks provided by NATO, such as the aforementioned German-built Leopards, are highly technical. It takes years for troops to master these systems. NATO expected Ukrainians under siege to learn the intricacies and innovate tactics for these systems in a few months’ time. 

Making The New AbramsX Ready For A Future War

What’s more, the tanks in question had to undergo several retrofits to better comport with the radical demands of the Ukrainian battlefield. So, between the rapid technical changes along with the novice-level crews manning these systems, to say nothing of the absurdity of placing so much hope on what amounts to a small number of tanks against such a large Russian force, the Abrams’ experience in Ukraine was doomed from the outset. 

That’s not to say that the Americans aren’t going to need to radically upgrade their existing fleet of M1A1 Abrams as well as to ensure that the new AbramsX the Pentagon is developing can better cope with the kind of anti-tank weapons and drones that adversaries will use against American MBTs in a future conflict (which is coming sooner than most people think). 

Brandon J. Weichert, a Senior National Security Editor at The National Interest as well as a Senior Fellow at the Center for the National Interest and a contributor at Popular Mechanics, consults regularly with various government institutions and private organizations on geopolitical issues. Weichert’s writings have appeared in multiple publications, including the Washington Times, National Review, The American Spectator, MSN, the Asia Times, and countless others. His books include Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His newest book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine, is available for purchase wherever books are sold. He can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

Image: ArChe1993 / Shutterstock.com.

The irony of his leadership is that a seemingly transformational figure cannot embrace change.