Summary and Key Points: The Akula-class submarines, built by Amur Shipbuilding Plant and Sevmash, are a testament to Russian naval engineering. Featuring a double hull design, these submarines offer greater buoyancy and versatility compared to their Western counterparts. Powered by the OK-650B pressurized water reactor, also used in various other Soviet submarines, the Akula-class submarines are known for their advanced capabilities and reliability.
-The Akula I variants include the Puma, Delphin, Kashalot, Kit, Pantera, Bars, and Narvel, while the improved Akula-class, Project 971U, consists of Volk, Morzh, Leopard, Tigr, and Drakon. The lone Akula II variant, Vepr (K-157), launched in 1994, showcases significant advancements in armament and sensors. India leased an Akula II submarine, renamed INS Chakra, from Russia, though it was returned early due to propulsion issues.
-The Akula-class submarines remain a critical component of the Russian Navy, with the Vepr expected to stay in service for decades.
Akula-Class: Russia’s Formidable Submarines and Their Role in Modern Naval WarfareThe Akula-class submarines were constructed by the Amur Shipbuilding Plant Joint Stock Company at Komsomolsk and by Sevmash at the Severodvinsk shipbuilding yard.
Each submarine was designed as a double hull system consisting of an inner pressure hull and an outer hull. This layout enables more freedom in the exterior hull’s shape, allowing the submarine to reserve more buoyancy than its Western counterparts.
Each Akula submarine is powered by one OK-650B pressurized water reactor, the same system incorporated onto many Soviet predecessors.
When the OK-650 was introduced to service in the 1970s, it was considered more advanced and reliable than previous submarine reactors. This reactor has also been installed on the Sierra I, Sierra II, the Oscar I, Oscar II, and Typhoon class submarines.
The first seven boats that make up the Akula I class are the Puma, Delphin, Kashalot, Kit, Pantera, Bars and Narvel. An improved Akula-class variant known as Project 971U includes the Volk, Morzh, Leopard, Tigr and Drakon.
In terms of armament, the Akula class was quite formidable. Each submarine was designed to carry S-10 Granat (designated by the West as SS-N-21 Sampson) cruise attack missiles. The S-10 Granat is comparable to the American-made Tomahawk. Subsequent Akula-class variants were fitted with six additional 533mm external torpedo tubes.
The submarine class also sported more advanced sensors than previous submarines. Specifically, the Akula’s surface search radar is the Snoop Pair or Snoop Half.
As detailed by Naval Technology, “]T]he submarine is fitted with the MGK 540 sonar system which provides automatic target detection in broad and narrow-band modes by active sonar. It gives the range, relative bearing and range rate. The sonar system can also be used in a passive, listening mode for detection of hostile sonars. The sonar signal processor can detect and automatically classify targets as well as reject spurious acoustic noise sources and compensate for variable acoustic conditions.”
The Akula II variantOnly one Akula II variant was ever completed- the Vepr (K-157).
In 1990, her keel was laid down and she officially launched four years later. In 1995, the Vepr commissioned. Two additional Akula II-class variants were planned in the late 1990s. However, neither boat was completed.
Notably, the hull sections from the Rys (K-333) and the Kuguar (K-337) were later incorporated in the constructions of the Alexander Nevsky and Yury Dolgorukiy. The Akula II submarines measured at 110m long and could displace up to 12,770t.
Each submarine in this class had a top speed of 35 knots submerged and a maximum diving depth of 600m. Although construction of the Akula II began back in 1991, it was suspended for nearly a decade due to a shortage of funds.
India and the Akula-ClassA unique leasing opportunity arose when Moscow granted the Indian Navy the ability to “rent” the Akula II submarine.
The SSN, renamed INS Chakra by New Delhi in 2023, was expected to enter service with the Indian Navy in 2007. However, several delays postponed this deadline. At first, issues with installing new systems and technologies onboard set engineers back in schedule. In 2008, a fatal gas leak that broke out on the submarine led to the deaths of 20 civilian crew members, further pushing the submarine’s entry to service back.
Ultimately, New Delhi would sail the INS Chakra for under nine years before returning the submarine to Russia in 2021. Reports suggested that the submarine was returned to Moscow early due to issues with its nuclear propulsion system.
The Akula II SSN was more formidable in armament than its sister variant. Armed with four 533mm torpedo tubes, the submarine could deploy Type 53 torpedoes, RPK-6 or RPK-2 missiles.
Additionally, this vessel could sport naval mines, the RPK-7 missile and four 650mm torpedo tubes.
In 2022, NATO naval forces monitored the Vepr when it transited from the Northern Fleet to the Baltic. The boat is expected to remain in service with the Russian Navy for another few decades.
About the Author: Maya CarlinMaya Carlin, National Security Writer with The National Interest, is an analyst with the Center for Security Policy and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in many publications, including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post, and Times of Israel. You can follow her on Twitter: @MayaCarlin. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.
All images are Creative Commons.
Summary and Key Points: The Russian Navy’s sole aircraft carrier, Admiral Kuznetsov, is widely regarded as a carrier in name only due to its persistent technical issues and operational failures. Commissioned during the Cold War, the Kuznetsov has faced numerous problems, from its reliance on low-quality mazut fuel to shoddy construction that prevents its boilers from operating at full capacity.
-Unlike Western carriers, which use advanced catapult systems, Kuznetsov uses a bow ramp that limits its ability to launch heavier aircraft. Its only combat deployment in Syria resulted in the loss of two aircraft due to faulty arresting wires.
-Despite its shortcomings, the Kremlin is unlikely to decommission the carrier amidst the ongoing invasion of Ukraine, using it instead as a propaganda tool to maintain its "carrier capable" -status.
Moscow’s Sole Carrier: Admiral Kuznetsov’s Tarnished LegacyWhile Russia may technically be an aircraft carrier nation, this title certainly exaggerates the extent of Admiral Kuznetsov’s capabilities. In fact, Moscow’s sole carrier is widely understood to be a carrier in name only.
For decades, the hefty ship has suffered from a myriad of unfortunate events that have effectively rendered its capabilities as an aircraft carrier useless. Amidst Russia’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine, however, the Kremlin is unlikely to officially scrap the Kuznetsov. Moscow’s ship fleet has already suffered serious damage at the hands of Ukrainian forces in the Black Sea and the decommissioning of the Kuznetsov would serve as another major blow to the country.
Instead, the Kremlin will continue to use its sole carrier as more of a prop for propaganda purposes.
The History of this Aircraft CarrierKuznetsov was initially commissioned in the Soviet Navy during the Cold War. Named to honor a revered USSR Admiral Nikolay Gerasimovich Kuznetsov, the carrier was designed to support and defend missile-carrying submarines and other aircraft in the Soviet Navy as a “heavy aircraft-carrying cruiser.”
Perhaps Kuznetsov's most distinctive characteristic is its fuel source. Unlike Western ships developed during the Cold War that used nuclear power or gas turbines for energy, the Soviet vessel was conventionally powered by mazut. This smoky, tar-like substance creates a thick viscosity and has therefore been designated as a low quality fuel source. Health-wise, mazut is horrible for the health of sailors. Additionally, the goopy substance is bad for the environment.
In addition to this poor fuel source, Kuznetsov was constructed shoddily at best. Specifically, insufficient piping installed during the carrier’s initial construction prevents its boilers from operating at full capacity simultaneously. This issue has only confounded the mazut’s shortcomings as proper boiler and piping installations are necessary to ensure it can be properly pre heated and pressurized.
More Problems for Russia's Last Aircraft CarrierThe purpose of an aircraft carrier is to serve as a floating airbase for a country’s military. Unlike its Western counterparts which use magnetic-powered catapults and steam-powered catapults to carry out flight operations, the Russian carrier uses a simple bow ramp. The bow ramp is far less effective than the alternatives and prevents Moscow from launching heavier aircraft. In fact, the only time Kuznetsov has deployed to combat, this launch system failed. The carrier deployed to Syria in 2016-2017 and lost two airframes when faulty arresting wires failed to secure their landing.
As detailed by USNI News, “A fighter assigned to the Russian carrier operating in the Eastern Mediterranean crashed during a landing approach on Sunday. The Mikoyan MiG-29K was part of a trio of MiGs that had sortied from Russian carrier Admiral Kuznetsov headed over Syria. At one point, for unknown reasons, one of the fighters turned back to the carrier and crashed while on approach to the carrier, the official said.”
Today, Kuznetsov remains useless and undeployable. Until Russia develops another aircraft carrier, however, this ship will likely remain intact to ensure the country retains its “carrier capable” status.
About the Author: Defense Expert Maya CarlinMaya Carlin, National Security Writer with The National Interest, is an analyst with the Center for Security Policy and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in many publications, including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post, and Times of Israel. You can follow her on Twitter: @MayaCarlin.
All images are Creative Commons.
Summary and Key Points: The Soviet-era Minsk, a Kiev-class hybrid warship, was intended to showcase Soviet naval prowess but fell short of American aircraft carriers.
-Built with a cruiser’s firepower and a limited aircraft deck, the Minsk carried more helicopters than warplanes, notably the subpar Yak-38. Despite its shortcomings, the Minsk marked a shift in Soviet naval strategy towards aircraft carrier operations. After the USSR's collapse, the Minsk was decommissioned and sold to China, where it became a theme park.
-This transformation from a military asset to a tourist attraction underscores the carrier’s mixed legacy and the challenges faced by Soviet naval ambitions.
Minsk Aircraft Carrier: Soviet Ambitions and a Unique Naval HybridThe Minsk was a Soviet Navy era aircraft carrier that was the second warship of the Kiev-class carriers. To call these platforms aircraft carriers does a disservice to the aircraft carriers that most Americans are used to seeing when they think of flat tops. This was not a large, flat-decked warship that deployed dozens of warplanes and helicopters.
Instead, this was a hybrid of a cruiser and a carrier. It was the spork of an aircraft carrier: it looked like a cruiser with a platform for launching and recovering a limited number of aircraft.
Not Being Who You AreThe Soviet warship Minsk was built at the Black Sea Shipyard in Nikolayev, Ukraine. It was commissioned in 1978. The Soviets were intent on proving to everyone that they could build a big, bad aircraft carrier just like the Americans could. Of course, Moscow wasn’t playing to type. In some cases, that’s a good thing. It’s always helpful to expand one’s horizons by learning new things.
Then again, however, in the midst of a Cold War, when there is a nuclear competition between two opposing Superpowers, wasting precious time and resources pretending to be something you’re not is usually a mistake.
Such as it was with the Soviet attempts to build an aircraft carrier for their navy. The Soviet, and modern-day Russian, expertise at sea boils down to submarines. Its surface fleet looks more like that of a great regional power rather than a superpower. That’s okay because historically Russia is a continental power. It is one of the largest nations in the world in terms of land area. Russia possesses a limited amount of warm water ports from which to permanently deploy its naval forces.
Nevertheless, in the last half of the Cold War, Moscow became obsessed with matching the Americans, system-for-system. In fact, this commitment to cloning the US military—when the Russians have their own unique culture, history, and way of warfare—is one of the reasons why the Soviet Union ultimately spent itself into oblivion.
Serious Firepower for Minsk Aircraft CarrierThe Minsk was equipped with some serious power, though (as most Soviet surface warships were). These boats had four twin SS-N-12 Sandbox surface-to-surface missile launchers, two twin SA-N-3 Shtorm surface-to-air missile launchers, and two twin SA-N-4 Gecko air defenses missile launchers. It also had a variety of guns, torpedoes, and anti-submarine launchers.
Essentially, this so-called aircraft was built to fire a massive missile farm.
Minsk was designed to carry up to 30 aircraft. But given its smaller landing deck (compared to American flat tops), the warplanes it carried had to have a vertical-takeoff and landing (VTOL) capability. In this case, the Yak-38 warplane was the primary warplane deployed from the Minsk. And as I’ve noted elsewhere, the Yak-38 was most definitely a subpar warplane. What’s more, only 12 Yak-38s could be carried aboard the Minsk. In fact, the Minsk carried more helicopters (16) than warplanes.
Russia’s Minsk had a crew capacity between 1,200 and 1,600 sailors. The warship had a range of 13,500 nautical miles (15,535 miles) and could cruise along the surface of the ocean at 18 knots (20 miles per hour). Not bad for such a large ship carrying such a heavy load.
A Transition for the RussiansWhile the Minsk (and its sister Kiev-class warships) were definitely not the cream of the crop when it came to aircraft carriers, the fact is that they represented a real shift in Soviet strategic thinking.
There was a significant desire on the part of late-stage Soviet leaders to not just make the Red Navy into a real maritime force, but to rival the Americans in terms of aircraft carrier operations and capabilities. The fact that the Minsk and its sister ship were hybrids between a cruiser and aircraft carrier, while inefficient for effective carrier operations, indicated that the Reds were trying make the change and that this was but a transition system.
Indeed, the Soviets would go on to develop a legitimate aircraft carrier—the Admiral Kuznetsov. But that flat top may be the single worst carrier ever designed in the history of aircraft carriers. Nevertheless, the Reds were clearly committed to becoming an aircraft carrier power and the Minsk and Kiev-class was the pathway forward for them.
That it went nowhere is less an indication of perennial inability by the Russians and more because the USSR collapsed. Following the collapse, Moscow had to focus on its core capabilities—of which the carrier was not a part.
An Ignominious EndOn June 30, 1993, the Minsk was decommissioned a couple of years after the collapse of the USSR. It was later sold to China in 1995, where the Chinese turned the old Soviet warship into a theme park called “Minsk World” in Shenzhen, China. Talk about an ignominious end for a once powerful, prized warship belonging to one of the two world’s superpowers!
Bottom line: the Minsk carrier was one of a handful of attempts by the old Soviet Union to build a big, bad carrier to rival that of the Americans. Ultimately, this boat was just bad. Sure, it had some impressive features and armaments. And, in the tighter regions where Russian maritime power could actually be reliably projected—such as the Black Sea or the Baltic Sea—this boat could hold its own.
But its record of success during the course of its service to Russia was very limited. Once it was decommissioned and sold to a foreign power, rather than being retooled and deployed as part of that foreign power’s navy, it was converted into a theme park.
Author Experience and Expertise: Brandon J. WeichertBrandon J. Weichert, a National Interest national security analyst, is a former Congressional staffer and geopolitical analyst who is a contributor at The Washington Times, the Asia Times, and The-Pipeline. He is the author of Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His next book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine, is due October 22 from Encounter Books. Weichert can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.
All images are Creative Commons.
From The Vault
As a presidential candidate in 2016, Donald Trump said that he would hire “only the best people in the world” to serve in his administration. If only. The truth, of course, is that Trump routinely delivered effusive tributes to his cabinet officials as president, only to turn on them, often within months. He called his former Secretary of State Rex Tillerson “dumb as a rock” and “totally ill prepared and ill equipped to be Secretary of State,” raising the question of why he hired him in the first place. He also branded his national security adviser, John Bolton, “washed up” and a “liar” in June 2020 after his memoir appeared. Turnover on what the Brookings Institution called his “A Team,” which did not include cabinet officials, was over 92 percent during his presidency.
Is JD Vance about to become the latest member of the Trump entourage to suffer defenestration? Reports are now circulating that Trump is having second thoughts about the thirty-nine-year-old Ohio Senator whom Trump tapped to represent the generational change in the GOP. Tim Alberta stated on X that the “Most striking thing I heard from Trump allies yesterday was the second-guessing of JD Vance—a selection, they acknowledged, that was borne of cockiness, meant to run up margins with the base in a blowout rather than persuade swing voters in a nail-biter.”
It’s become increasingly clear that Trump was unprepared for President Joe Biden’s departure from the race, which allowed Vice President Kamala Harris to win the majority of Democratic delegates on Monday. Put otherwise, Trump, who selected Vance at the recommendation of his son, Don Jr., was caught flatfooted.
Vance was supposed to rev up the GOP base for the election, but he will not help with Trump’s appeal to swing voters and suburban moms. Instead, he’s being pilloried for a number of stands, including his support for menstrual tracking by state law enforcement agencies as part of his battle against abortion rights. He has suggested that women in abusive marriages should not leave their husbands: “This is one of the great tricks that the sexual revolution pulled on the American populace. Making it easier for people to shift spouses like they change their underwear.” And, consistent with his admiration for the policies of Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orban, he is a staunch pro-natalist, dismissing women who do not have children as “childless cat ladies.”
Needless to say, none of these sentiments bother Trump in principle. But it’s the prospect of having to go up against Harris at a moment when polls indicate that fewer women will vote for him than in 2020 that may be causing him second thoughts about the Ohioan. As Politico notes, “Women currently comprise 51 percent of the voting-age population in the U.S., and they’ve been making their vote felt since Roe v. Wade was overturned in June 2022.”
It remains unlikely, of course, that Trump would actually dump Vance. It would testify to panic in the campaign and underscore the already existing unease about Trump’s volatility and judgment. But Trump’s feelings about Vance are hardly likely to be soothed by fresh press reports about his repeated denunciations of him in 2016 for engaging in sexual assault.
Still, embarking upon a new quest for a vice president would allow Trump to go on the offensive in shaping the narrative of the race, which he’s currently lost control over. Harris, at least for now, has captured the spotlight that Trump covets. How Trump must miss running against Biden. Now that Harris has entered the race, it has actually become one.
About the Author:Jacob Heilbrunn is editor of The National Interest and is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center. He has written on both foreign and domestic issues for numerous publications, including The New York Times, The Washington Post, The Wall Street Journal, Financial Times, Foreign Affairs, Reuters, Washington Monthly, and The Weekly Standard. He has also written for German publications such as Cicero, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, and Der Tagesspiegel. In 2008, his book They Knew They Were Right: the Rise of the Neocons was published by Doubleday. It was named one of the one hundred notable books of the year by The New York Times. He is the author of America Last: The Right’s Century-Long Romance with Foreign Dictators.
Image: Consolidated News Photos / Shutterstock.com.
Summary and Key Points: The British military has completed trials for a next-generation body-worn technology aimed at enhancing frontline troops' survivability and situational awareness. The new gear includes a laser detection system to alert soldiers if they are targeted, drone thermal detection for identifying enemy threats, and ground sensors for detecting approaching foes.
-Additional technologies tested include a helmet-mounted strobe alert system, advanced digital day/night optics for weapons, a mesh network to extend radio range, and a smart hub for integrated power and data supply.
-These advancements, developed in collaboration with the Defense Science and Technology Laboratory (Dstl) and industry partners, aim to provide UK Armed Forces with superior operational capabilities and battlefield awareness.
Revolutionizing Soldier Gear: UK's New Body-Worn Tech Targets Modern Battlefield ChallengesThe British military is planning a new body-worn kit with impressive new technologies for its soldiers.
The new gear is designed to deal with the new realities of the modern battlefield and help counter drones and laser detection, among other things.
Next Generation Body KitThe British military just completed a set of trials to test a next-generation body-worn technology for its frontline troops. The overall goal of the technology is to increase soldiers’ survivability by enhancing their situational awareness and decisionmaking capabilities.
Some of the technologies that were tested and might become operational in the future include a laser detection system to warn a troop if an enemy has located them, a drone thermal detection system to identify enemy soldiers and weapon systems in the area, and ground sensors that can detect approaching enemies and alert allied soldiers.
“This government is clear in our commitment to advancing technology that ensures the safety and superiority of UK Armed Forces. This cutting-edge technology will bolster operational lethality and elevate battlefield awareness. I welcome the continued collaboration between government, industry, and scientists on this innovative programme,” Minister for Defence Procurement and Industry Maria Eagle said.
Other technologies include a helmed-mounted strobe alert system that identifies friend from enemy; advanced digital day/night optics for weapons; a mesh network that connects a troop’s radio with other radios in the vicinity, thus increasing range; and a smart hub that acts as the “brain” of the integrated power and data supply for all digital devices.
The testing was conducted by troops from the 2nd Battalion, the Royal Anglian Regiment and scientists from the Defense Science and Technology Laboratory (Dstl).
“This technology will protect the lives of our Armed Forces by improving operational capability by giving them the advantage over the enemy,” Jon Russell, a senior principal scientist at Dstl said about the next-generation systems.
“It is great to see the Future Integrated Dismounted Soldier Vision is clearly proving how a soldier system containing multiple knowledge capabilities that are designed to combine crucial data to improve operational advantage,” Russell added.
“Our aim is to develop the most capable armed forces in the world, by merging different technologies to advance battlefield awareness,” he concluded.
The fighting in Ukraine has shown that militaries need to evolve when facing a superior adversary. Drones, electronic warfare, and guided artillery are dominating the fighting in Ukraine. As such, soldiers need the right countermeasures and defense against these new threats.
“The trial, led by Dstl, was a showcase of future technologies and digital integration. The research has now advanced, bringing together industry to enhance capabilities with Command, Control, Communications, Computing and Information Systems,” the regimental sergeant major of the infantry trials and development unit said about the new gear.
“As the Army’s lead in dismounted close combat trials and development, we are at the forefront of improving operational advantage and look forward to supporting its future development,” he added.
The U.S. military has been working on a similar project to modernize the basic loadout of its infantrymen so that they can be more effective on the modern battlefield.
About the AuthorStavros Atlamazoglou is a seasoned defense journalist specializing in special operations and a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ). He holds a BA from Johns Hopkins University and an MA from Johns Hopkins’ School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). His work has been featured in Business Insider, Sandboxx, and SOFREP.
Summary and Key Points: The Ford-class aircraft carriers, the most advanced in service today, boast several key features that set them apart from previous generations. The electromagnetic-powered aircraft launch system (EMALS) provides more accurate and smoother acceleration for a wider range of aircraft.
-The carriers are powered by two upgraded A1B nuclear reactors, offering significant energy capacity for future defense systems.
-The Advanced Arresting Gear (AAG) system allows for safer and more efficient aircraft recovery. Advanced Weapons Elevators (AWE) enhance the speed and safety of ordnance movement.
-Additionally, quality of life enhancements for the crew, including improved berthing compartments and better gyms, make these carriers a standout in modern naval aviation.
Ford-Class Carriers: Unmatched Power and Innovation in Modern Naval WarfareThe Ford-class is larger and offers several features that truly make it the best aircraft carrier in service anywhere today. Here are five of the stand-out features of the Ford-class aircraft carriers:
EMALSCVN-78 was the first aircraft carrier in the world to be equipped with an electromagnetic-powered aircraft launch system (EMALS). It offers numerous advantages over the traditional steam-powered catapults of the Nimitz-class carriers, including more accurate end-speed control, with a smoother acceleration at both high and low speeds.
The system also possesses the necessary energy capacity to support an increased launch envelope and a capability of launching both current and future carrier air wing platforms – from the lightest unmanned aerial vehicles to heavy strike fighters.
Improved Nuclear ReactorsThe EMALS wouldn't be possible without the carriers' two upgraded A1B nuclear reactors. In addition to powering systems like the electromagnetic catapult and multifunction radar, the increased generating capacity could be employed in the future to support new ship defenses utilizing directed-energy weapons (DEWs) and other systems.
Though the actual performance is classified, it is estimated that the thermal power output of each A1B will be around 700 MWth, some 25% more than provided by the A4W on the Nimitz-class supercarriers.
Advanced Arresting GearEMALS can help get the aircraft in the sky faster, while the Advanced Arresting Gear (AAG) system provides Ford-class ships with the ability to recover both current and projected carrier-based, tailhook-equipped aircraft. As a follow-on system to the Mark-7 system of the Nimitz-class, AAG can also allow for the recovery of a broader range of aircraft and, through its greater control, reduces the fatigue-impact load on the recovered platforms. The AAG architecture also includes built-in test and diagnostic technologies.
The AAG further requires less maintenance and manpower to operate than the legacy arresting system, while it can help increase the sortie rates. It also offers lower energy consumption and a decreased gross ship weight.
Advanced Weapons ElevatorsThe Ford-class features new pathways that were designed to facilitate the movement of modern munitions. The Advanced Weapons Elevators (AWE) employs several advanced technologies, including electromagnetic motors and hydraulic systems, which enables fewer sailors to safely move ordnance from weapons magazines to the flight deck with unparalleled speed and agility.
Quality of Life EnhancementsThe Ford-class carriers were designed to substitute technology for manpower in many activities, thereby reducing the crew size by as much as 20%. As a result of being less manpower-intensive, the carrier will have extra space for a number of quality of life enhancements that include improved berthing compartments, better gyms, and more ergonomic work spaces.
Author Experience and Expertise: Peter SuciuPeter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.
All images are from either Creative Commons or Shutterstock.
Summary and Key Points: The U.S. Navy's Gerald R. Ford-class aircraft carriers were designed to replace the aging Nimitz-class, boasting advanced technology and enhanced capabilities.
-However, these carriers, costing $13.3 billion each, may be ill-suited for modern warfare, particularly against anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) systems deployed by rivals like China. While the Ford-class carriers promise greater lethality and efficiency, their high cost and vulnerability to cheaper A2/AD systems raise concerns.
-As the Navy continues to invest in these carriers for a 50-year service life, there is growing apprehension that they may represent a strategic misstep, tailored for past conflicts rather than future threats.
The Gerald R. Ford-class nuclear-powered aircraft carrier came about because the U.S.Navy believed it needed a replacement for its enduring Nimitz-class carriers. There are currently 10 of the aging nuclear-powered Nimitz-class vessels.
The Navy is stuck in a strategic rut. The maritime branch seems to think it is still 1996, and that U.S. carriers can travel unmolested and dominate any distant target the Navy desires.
That is not the case.
The advent of anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) systems complicates the old American view of carriers as the ultimate – and easiest – form of power projection.
The Specs on the Ford-ClassWhen the Navy was seeking to build a new carrier class, they wanted to catapult carrier designs and capabilities into the next half-century. American planners envisioned a carrier so advanced no other power, notably a rising near-peer power such as China, would ever challenge the might of the U.S. Navy at sea.
Every advanced system imaginable was thrown into the construction of this boat. Thus, the Gerald R. Ford class costs the taxpayer an astonishing $13.3 billion per ship. (That number is supposed to decrease over time.) It is the most expensive warship ever made.
The Gerald R. Ford class is the largest warship ever built, too.
Built by Huntington Ingalls Industries Newport News Shipbuilding, the USS Gerald R. Ford has two A1B nuclear reactors and is armed with Evolved Sea Sparrow missiles, Rolling Airframe Missiles, and the Close-In Weapons System.
Its air wing comprises 75 aircraft, and the warship itself carries a combined crew of 4,539 souls (the ship crew, airwing, and staff). Interestingly, the new boats are designed to be operated by 700 fewer crew than the Nimitz-class aircraft carriers. Automation is a big deal, and the airwing on this boat is also designed to operate with 400 fewer personnel.
The first vessel was ordered by the government on Sept. 10, 2008. It was scheduled for delivery eight years later, but because of all the new technologies involved, it could not be deployed on time.
The Navy claims that the new carrier delivers 20% more lethality than existing platforms. Designers of the CVN-21 Program argue that the warship has greater interoperability across the other U.S. services, as well as with friendly navies, enhancing lethality and cost-sharing on deployments.
The advanced technologies skyrocketed the cost, and these systems also complicated the development and deployment of the boats. Expensive systems meant to make the carrier more lethal in combat and more effective when at sea have not operated as advertised. This is one reason why the USS Gerald R. Ford, the first warship of the class, was significantly delayed in its planned deployment.
Not the Right War for Aircraft CarriersEven if the technology onboard the great warship worked exactly as it was supposed to on day one, the cost of the warship itself is a liability. That’s because the A2/AD systems that China has deployed throughout the South China Sea and along its coastline are infinitely cheaper than what the carriers cost.
What’s more, as a sailor who has spent his career on aircraft carriers remarked to me: No matter how awesome the new carrier class may be, no ship can repel every attack.
In other words, no matter its own lethality, if this $13.3 billion monstrosity gets too close to those A2/AD systems, it will be destroyed or severely damaged.
The Navy knew this going into the design and production of the Gerald R. Ford.
Yet, like trying to turn a speeding aircraft carrier on a dime, trying to get the acquisitions office for the Navy to make adjustments to their carefully laid plans was nearly impossible. The bureaucracy didn’t even try.
The Navy intends for the Gerald R. Ford class to have a 50-year service life. So, as the Nimitz class is decommissioned over the next decade, the Navy may have just invested in a giant boondoggle that is a large, easy target for China’s A2/AD systems.
This carrier was designed to fight yesterday's wars with tomorrow’s technologies.
It does not represent the quantum leap that its proponents argue, although it does come with a price tag worthy of the idea. It is the equivalent of a sunk cost, both figuratively and metaphorically, as it could be destroyed by systems that are far less advanced and cheaper.
About the AuthorBrandon J. Weichert, a National Interest national security analyst, is a former Congressional staffer and geopolitical analyst who is a contributor at The Washington Times, the Asia Times, and The-Pipeline. He is the author of Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His next book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine, is due October 22 from Encounter Books. Weichert can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.
Image Credit: Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock.
Summary and Key Points: Since the start of the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Russia has reportedly lost around 330 aircraft as of June, with the Su-34 Fullback being particularly affected. This Soviet-era fighter, derived from the Su-27 Flanker, officially entered service in 2014 and has been essential for Russia's air operations.
-However, Ukraine's use of advanced Western-developed weapons, including the U.S.-supplied Patriot air defense missile system, has significantly impacted the Fullback's effectiveness. Ukrainian claims of destroying nine Russian jets in May alone highlight the vulnerability of the Su-34.
-Videos circulating online support these claims, showing the destruction of Russian fighters. As the war continues, the depletion of Russia's Su-34 stockpile is expected to worsen, challenging Moscow's air capabilities.
Su-34 Fullback: Russia's Workhorse Fighter Hit Hard in Ukraine ConflictSince invading Ukraine in February 2022, Russia has reportedly lost some 330 aircraft as of June. Moscow’s fighter airframes have proven vulnerable to Ukraine’s stockpile of advanced Western-developed weapons.
Ukrainian officials claimed that nine Russian jets were destroyed in May alone. While these numbers cannot be independently verified, the U.S.-delivered Patriot air defense missile system has certainly aided Kyiv’s ability to take down Moscow’s top-tier fighters, including the Su-34. Nicknamed the “Fullback” by NATO, this all-weather supersonic fighter has been an essential asset for Russia for many years.
Introducing the Su-34 FullbackThe Soviet-era Su-34 fighter derived from the Su-27 Flanker during the Cold War. While the Su-34 took its maiden flight before the collapse of the USSR, evolving requirements imposed by the Russian Aerospace Forces pushed back the fighter’s official introduction to service until 2014.
The Fullback’s several unique characteristics include a platypus nose and side-by-side cockpit. Aside from these external characteristics, the jet retains its predecessor’s basic layout, engine, construction, and wing structure. The jet is powered by a pair of Saturn AL-31FM1 engines, which give it a top speed of Mach 1.8 and a service ceiling of around 56,000 feet.
The Fullback can lug more than 17,000 pounds of weapons across a dozen hardpoints positioned underwing and beneath the fuselage. The jet can also carry a wide range of precision-guided and unguided bombs and rockets, including KAB-500 laser-guided bombs. As detailed by Airforce Technology, the jet can also carry Vympel R-27, Vympel R-73, and NPO-R-77 missiles used primarily for defense against adversarial aircraft if detected by the rear-facing radar.
Two distinct variants of the Fullback have been produced, both of which Russia exports to foreign client states. The Su-34FN is the maritime strike fighter version of the Fullback, equipped with anti-submarine warfare systems, a Sea Snake radar, a radio sonobuoy system, and other unique attributes. Since this model is designed to elevate the fighter’s naval warfare capabilities, it is highly sought out across the globe.
How Has the Fullback Fared in Ukraine?The Kremlin may claim that its Su-34 fighter is essentially invulnerable, but the platform’s performance in Ukraine suggests otherwise. As explained by Ukrainian Air Force spokesperson Yurii Ihnat, "Our experience suggests that after Russian planes are downed and destroyed, the occupiers do not dare come closer – this is the case across the northern, southern, and eastern fronts. The closer the aircraft armed with guided bombs approach, the farther those bombs can reach into our defenses."
Countless videos have circulated in recent months purporting to show the destruction of Russian fighters, including Fullbacks. As the war rages on with no end in sight, Moscow’s Su-34 stockpile will surely dwindle further.
About the Author: Maya CarlinMaya Carlin, National Security Writer with The National Interest, is an analyst with the Center for Security Policy and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in many publications, including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post, and Times of Israel. You can follow her on Twitter: @MayaCarlin.
All images are Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock.
Summary and Key Points: The Russian Su-34 fighter bomber has become a crucial asset in the Ukraine War, frequently recorded in combat over contested skies. Despite sustaining significant losses, including 26 Su-34s since the war began as of early this year, the aircraft remains the backbone of Russia’s Air Force.
-While the attritional nature of the war means that both sides are suffering heavy losses, Russia’s larger industrial and manpower resources allow it to endure longer than Ukraine. However, the loss of Su-34s, compounded by production challenges, indicates that Russia is struggling to replenish its fleet quickly.
-This ongoing attrition raises questions about the long-term sustainability of Russia's air operations in the conflict.
Russia's Air Force Struggles: The Impact of Su-34 Losses in UkraineThe Su-34 has become what many observers describe as the “backbone” of Russia’s Air Force in the Ukraine War. Indeed, it is a warbird that is most commonly recorded in combat in the contested skies of Ukraine – and it is a plane that has sustained an astonishing number of losses.
The question is: What does that data point mean for the overall war effort?
It’s hard to tell, given the amount of lying from both sides in this interminable, bloody war.
One thing is clear, though, both sides have suffered an extraordinary amount of losses in terms of personnel and equipment. And there doesn’t appear to be any end in sight of the suffering.
At least, not anytime in the next few months.
Russia Endures, Ukraine WeakensMany cannot help but to ponder just when these staggering losses will catch up to either side sooner. Even with the Su-34 being decimated by Ukrainian air defenses, the attritional nature of the Ukraine War means that, so long as the combatants can sustain these high losses for a protracted period of time, the losses will not be catastrophic.
Since it is the Russians sustaining these losses, and their industrial base—as well as the country’s manpower and commodities bases—is far greater than that of Ukraine, the loss of the Su-34s in combat will not lead to defeat.
Writing at Bulgarian Military, Bokyo Nikolov, assessed the delivery of four new Su-34s since January of this year. According to Nikolov, “the production of Su-34s seems to be falling short, with significant loss reports since early 2024.
Conflicting accounts suggest that on June 14, at least five Su-34 fighter bombers were lost during a Ukrainian drone attack on Morozovsk airport in Russia.” Nikolov continued in his analysis by concluding that, “it’s evident that Russia struggles to compensate for its losses. With five Su-34s lost after June 14 and only four new Su-34s delivered since January, the challenge is clear.”
Just so we’re all on the same page, I find it necessary to remind readers that the Russian Federation still holds the territories in Eastern Ukraine and Crimea – positions that have been hardened over the years – that they held before the war.
What’s more, it appears the Russian offensive is ramping up against a Ukrainian Army that is increasingly hollow and in need of constant replenishment in terms of money, equipment, and recruits . The Russians, meanwhile, continue to churn out tanks and aircraft like sausages from their factories in the Russian Far East.
It's true that the Ukrainians are crafty fighters. They have utilized NATO-provided air defense systems at the front of their war against Russia in creative and effective ways. That’s why, since February 2022, it is believed that Russia has lost twenty-six Su-34s. (These numbers were collected until February of this year).
As I have reported in these pages, though, the Russians are adapting to innovative Ukrainian tactics as well. One such adaptation is to deploy longer-range glide bombs with higher yields.
Russia is Adapting with Su-34The piece above references the fact that Su-34s are now being loaded with FAB-500M62 homing bombs under their wings. Further, “there has been a noticeable rise in the deployment of cruise bombs” against Ukrainian targets by Russian air assets. Russia has therefore reduced the vulnerability of their warplanes to the Ukrainians.
In other words, all this fixation by Western analysts on the fact that Russia is producing one less Su-34 compared to the number of Su-34s that were lost over the last six months in Ukraine is ridiculous. At best, it shows how utterly incompetent most analyses of the war from the Western perspective have been. At worst, many Western writers are spreading outright propaganda designed to further distract easily distracted audiences from the fact that the war is going poorly.
A war of attrition is something that most Americans cannot remember. The last serious attritional war the U.S. fought was against Vietnam, and it lost. The Russians, on the other hand, traditionally fight wars of attrition. Admittedly, the Ukraine War was not intended to be a war of attrition. The Putinist regime had a wildly different idea of how the war would be fought and won. They envisaged a quick blitz into Ukraine that would last a few weeks and end with a mighty victory parade through the abandoned streets of a broken and defeated Kyiv.
The Su-34 Losses Don’t MatterThe war lasted longer and consumed more resources than Putin intended. But now that they’re in it, the Russians are not going to just quit. They will grind it out and wear their opponent down. Attrition is how the Russians liberated themselves from the Mongols. It’s how they stopped Napoleon. And how the Russians defeated Hitler.
Regardless of how many Su-34s they lose, the Russians are still winning.
America should be encouraging their Ukrainian allies to make a deal while they still can with Moscow, not fixating on any single datapoint, such as the fact that Russia has lost a large number of Su-34s.
Author Experience and Expertise: Brandon J. WeichertBrandon J. Weichert, a National Interest national security analyst, is a former Congressional staffer and geopolitical analyst who is a contributor at The Washington Times, the Asia Times, and The-Pipeline. He is the author of Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His next book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine, is due October 22 from Encounter Books. Weichert can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.
All images are Creative Commons or Shutterstock.
From the Vault
Russia Freaked Out: Why the U.S. Navy 'Unretired' the Iowa-Class Battleships
Battleship vs. Battlecruiser: Iowa-Class vs. Russia's Kirov-Class (Who Wins?)
Summary and Key Points: The U.S. Navy's reliance on aircraft carriers, despite their high costs and growing vulnerability to anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) systems, has raised strategic concerns. The $13 billion Gerald R. Ford-class carriers, designed for long-range power projection, face new threats from advanced missile systems that can locate and target them from over 1,000 kilometers away.
-Suggestions to use carriers as tactical distractions draw comparisons to historical naval battles but overlook the potential for significant losses and the current fragility of the U.S. defense industrial base.
-Instead of focusing on carriers, the Navy should prioritize developing hypersonic weapons, unmanned underwater vehicles, submarines, and directed-energy weapons to counter the A2/AD threat. This shift is essential to maintain naval superiority and effectively respond to modern strategic challenges.
The Navy Might Use Its Aircraft Carriers as DistractionsOutside of nuclear weapons, America’s aircraft carriers are probably the country’s biggest long-term strategic investment. The newest Gerald R. Ford-class carriers cost an astonishing $13 billion per unit, although the Navy insists that costs decrease with each new unit they build.
Since the Second World War, when aircraft carriers proved their mettle in the Pacific Theater, Washington has made the flattop its primary platform for long-range projection of naval power.
But the world has moved on.
Specific technologies like the anti-ship ballistic missile pair with comprehensive approaches like China’s anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) strategy to negate many of the advantages the aircraft carrier once bestowed. The sheer cost of these platforms means that losing even one in combat – or having one significantly damaged – could punch a hole in the United States’ strategic posture, with horrific cascading effects throughout the rest of the force.
America's Obsession with Aircraft Carriers is DangerousThe Navy, of course, understands the changing reality it now faces.
Yet it has done little to address the A2/AD threat. Instead, Washington continues flooding hard-earned U.S. tax dollars into building more expensive flattops whose utility is in question under present strategic conditions. If the aircraft carrier cannot get within range of a contested battlespace during a crisis, then it cannot launch its airwing. If it cannot launch its airwing, its usefulness as a power projection platform is erased.
What’s more, these large systems are increasingly easy for rival A2/AD systems to locate, track, and target with extremely long-range weapons that are devastatingly precise.
The threat of A2/AD attacks could keep an American carrier force over the horizon of a contested battlespace. Some of these systems have a range over 1,000 kilometers.
Trevor Phillips-Levine and Andrew Tenbusch, writing in Maritime Executive, suggest using America’s aircraft carriers as a ruse in any tactical situation. Drawing inspiration from the Imperial Japanese Navy during the Battle of Leyte Gulf, the two authors argue the United States should deploy their carriers as a means of distracting a potential rival in a naval battle long enough for non-carrier units to be used more effectively in combat by the Americans. It’s an interesting suggestion.
The Japanese had correctly assumed that American intelligence analysts would detect the mass movement of Japanese warships and fixate on the presence of aircraft carriers. Japanese strategists understood that the Americans placed a high value on their own carriers, and they correctly postulated that the Americans would assume the Japanese similarly valued theirs.
Japan got one over on the Americans.
Of course, what the authors fail to mention is that while the Japanese diversion at the Battle of Leyte Gulf was successful in tricking the bulk of the American fleet, it ultimately ended in failure. Not only did the Americans still win the battle, they went on to win the whole war not long after that incident.
One of the biggest issues facing Japan by the time this specific battle occurred was that the Imperial Japanese Navy, like the rest of the Japanese military, no longer had a healthy industrial base supporting their efforts. The forces deployed against the Americans were basically all that was left of the Japanese military.
Once those Japanese units were stymied, that was it for Tokyo.
America’s Broken Defense Industrial BaseThe United States today, while much larger than Japan was, is in a similar predicament. Its shipyards are in shambles. The U.S. Navy is the smallest it has ever been. The military is saddled with massive, complex, and costly systems. Losing one in combat would deal a crippling blow to American morale and to its overall strategic posture.
The greater defense industrial base is lying prostrate, too, after years of being gutted by short-sighted financial interests, inconclusive Mideast wars, and a wasteful commitment to the lost Ukrainian cause.
If the United States and China find themselves at war, the Americans will be at a serious disadvantage.
Further, U.S. carriers are far too costly to risk in a ruse. Even if the maneuver were successful, the U.S. lacks requisite platforms to serve as alternative power projection units in a contested environment. A2/AD is a threat to all surface combatants, and the U.S. fleet is woefully lacking in submarines.
Sly moves and strategic feints, while always a necessity in combat, will not save the U.S. from its overcommitment to aircraft carriers. Instead, the Americans must develop counter-A2/AD systems and strategies. Once an A2/AD network is removed as a threat, more conventional moves by the Americans, such as deploying aircraft carriers, can be attempted.
What Must Be Done InsteadInstead of ruses, the Navy needs to focus on building hypersonic weapons, swarms of unmanned underwater vehicles, more submarines, and directed-energy weapons, for starters. Other services must back up the Navy in these endeavors.
The overcommitment to expensive, massive flattops has created a severe vulnerability the likes of which have not been since the Royal Navy’s HMS Hood was sunk within the first five minutes of its major engagement with Hitler’s navy.
Breaking the A2/AD web that China has created throughout the Indo-Pacific is the first, and only, priority of the U.S. Navy. Its carriers are useless until A2/AD can be overcome.
Author Experience and Expertise: Brandon J. WeichertBrandon J. Weichert, a National Interest national security analyst, is a former Congressional staffer and geopolitical analyst who is a contributor at The Washington Times, the Asia Times, and The-Pipeline. He is the author of Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His next book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine, is due October 22 from Encounter Books. Weichert can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.
All images are Creative Commons or Shutterstock.
From the Vault
Russia Freaked Out: Why the U.S. Navy 'Unretired' the Iowa-Class Battleships
Battleship vs. Battlecruiser: Iowa-Class vs. Russia's Kirov-Class (Who Wins?)
James Graham Wilson. America’s Cold Warrior: Paul Nitze & National Security from Roosevelt to Reagan (Ithaca, Cornell University Press) 336 pp., $32.95.
Ten years ago, James Graham Wilson, a historian at the U.S. State Department, wrote The Triumph of Improvisation, an insightful account of Reagan, Gorbachev, and the end of the Cold War. Mr. Wilson’s America’s Cold Warrior, a biography of Paul Nitze, now reaches back to the Cold War’s origins and the long years of nuclear negotiations that followed. Wilson portrays Nitze, who died in 2004 at age ninety-seven, as the forerunner of the post-World War II generations of American national security professionals.
Nitze may be best known for guiding the preparation in 1950 of NSC-68, allegedly America’s strategic plan for prevailing in the Cold War. By the time the U.S. government declassified NSC-68 in 1975, the seventy-page document had achieved near-mythical status. As Wilson explains, later policy planners—including Deputy Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, a protege of Nitze—looked to NSC-68 as a model for rallying Americans to wage long struggles against formidable foes. No doubt today, Washington teems with aspirants who dream of drafting a new NSC-68 strategy to overcome China.
Nitze’s NSC-68 reflected the fearful era of the early Cold War, including the hot Korean conflict, threats to Berlin and Europe, and the new nuclear rivalry. Nitze had visited Hiroshima in 1945 and led surveys of strategic bombing. All his life, he worried about a nuclear showdown. His consistent solution was for the United States to secure a “preponderance of power,” both nuclear and conventional.
Nitze recognized, however, that policy plans had to be translated into actions, which he wanted to direct. Wilson recounts Nitze’s extraordinary experience on the front lines, often amid the risk of escalation to nuclear war: the Berlin and Cuban crises, the early nuclear negotiations, Vietnam, the Nixon- Kissinger treaties to limit strategic arms, and up to Reagan’s elimination of intermediate-range missiles, START negotiations, and strategic missile defense. Given all that experience, Colin Powell later reflected that working with Nitze “was like having Moses at the table.”
Moreover, Nitze was a sharp critic when out of power, so his biography targets the nuclear and arms control policies of Presidents Eisenhower, Carter, and George H.W. Bush, as well. By explaining Nitze’s views over fifty years, Wilson succinctly summarizes the nuclear debates of the Cold War.
The book also treats Nitze as a harbinger of a new technocratic cadre: the national security professional. Indeed, Nitze helped found and fund a new graduate school in Washington to train his successors, the School for Advanced International Studies (SAIS), now part of Johns Hopkins University.
Nitze’s experience suggests some cautions for future security pros. He not only demonstrated his political independence by switching parties and working across administrations but also seemed dismissive of public attitudes, political constraints, and Congress.
Even though Nitze began as a prodigy on Wall Street in the 1930s and later contributed to the Marshall Plan, his definition of strategic power narrowed to nuclear and conventional forces. He dismissed Eisenhower‘s balancing of economic prospects with burdens of defense spending and overlooked the USSR‘s economic weaknesses until the very end.
Nitze also failed to recognize the limits of his intellectual tenacity. According to one of his bosses, Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford, Nitze’s “peevishness“ and “unveiled contempt” for others doomed his appointment to the topmost rank. If Nitze did not receive deference, he could be vengeful.
Wilson’s biography acknowledges that Nitze’s service reflected his wealth, privilege, and formative early experience. After traveling in Europe as a boy in the summer of 1914, Nitze’s later outlook was always shaded by a sense that unexpected tragedy loomed. As a nuclear strategist, Nitze struggled to assure superior strength for the United States while maintaining stability and avoiding Armageddon. This conflict was one of the “tensions between opposites“ that fascinated him.
The author observes that today’s national security professionals still contend, as Nitze did, with issues of deterrence, nuclear threats, and confrontations among powers amidst newer dangers. In Nitze’s last years, he focused on the existential risks of climate change. Wilson has ably shown (in less than 300 pages) how State Department historians can extend their remit from publishing documentary records to enlivening the past—and educating those who seek to navigate the future.
Robert Zoellick served in national security and international economic posts during four U.S. administrations and is the author of America in the World.
Image: Rob Bogaerts / Anefo, CC0, via Wikimedia Commons
Summary and Key Points: The U.S. Air Force's bomber fleet, once over 400 strong, has dwindled to just 157 airframes, many of which are outdated B-52s. This reduction poses a significant risk as tensions with China, which is developing the advanced H-20 stealth bomber, continue to rise. To maintain air superiority and deterrence, the Air Force is banking on the B-21 Raider, a next-generation stealth bomber born from the Long Range Strike Bomber program.
-However, with only 100 units planned for the next decade, concerns about insufficient production loom. The Raider, featuring a shorter wingspan for enhanced stealth and modular designs for future upgrades, is crucial for replacing the aging B-2 Spirit and ensuring the U.S. stays ahead in aerial warfare capabilities.
-Bottomline: Abandoning the B-21 program would severely compromise national security and America's ability to counter modern threats.
The Future of U.S. Bombers: The Imperative of the B-21 Raider Amid Growing ThreatsThe U.S. Air Force’s bomber fleet is much diminished. Fleet size has fallen to 157 bombers, and most of these aircraft are outdated B-52s. Until the early 1990s, the Air Force’s bomber fleet held more than 400 airframes. The downturn in numbers will be a problem if a full-blown war emerges in the near future.
While the service is trying to add to its ranks by developing its latest stealth bomber program, only 100 B-21 Raiders are expected to reach the skies over the next decade. Some military experts believe such small production numbers may not match China’s own future bomber program, the Xi’an H-20 subsonic stealth bomber.
Without adequate bomber numbers, the Air Force’s air superiority over China comes under question. And in addition to their role in conventional operations, these airframes are a great deterrent to war.
But what would make matters worse is nixing the Raider program altogether. If the Air Force does not adequately upgrade its aging bomber fleet, the service will be left unable to compete with its modernizing Chinese aerial counterparts.
What Is the Raider Program All About?The U.S. Air Force currently flies three strategic bombers: the B-52 Stratofortress, the B-1B Lancer, and the B-2 Spirit. All three airframes remain viable, and the Spirit possesses stealth capabilities, but the service must deliver on its next-generation bomber program in order to keep up with its peers.
The Raider was born out of the service’s Long Range Strike Bomber program in 2011.The Air Force is so committed to the Raider concept now that it seems to be purchasing the platform upfront, before the bomber has been fully vetted. This is a risk. Indeed, the “Fly Before You Buy” concept was perhaps best explained by Senator David Pryor back in the 1990s on the Senate floor: “Fly Before You Buy is not a new concept. It was first promoted in the wake of the Vietnam War after thousands of American soldiers lost their lives because of weapons that failed to perform as expected…Operational testing is of little or no use if it is conducted after the weapon system has been purchased.”
Specs and capabilities surrounding the new Raider remain highly classified, but some information and images have been shared. The upcoming platform’s wingspan is reportedly at least 15% shorter than its predecessors. This will make the Raider more challenging for enemy radar to detect – a key capability considering China’s modernizing defensive systems. Like the F-35 Lightning II fighter platform, the B-21 will also incorporate modular designs that will facilitate future upgrades as new technologies emerge.
The U.S. Cannot Afford to Nix the Raider ProgramThe U.S. must see the Raider program through. The B-2 Spirit is America’s sole operational stealth bomber, and its generation-old stealth technology will probably fall well short of the Chinese H-20’s eventual capabilities. Since the U.S. and its allies rely on the Air Force’s stealth bombers for deterrence, it would be a huge blow to national security if the Raider does not make it to the production line in time to properly replace the Spirit.
About the Author: Defense Expert Maya CarlinMaya Carlin, National Security Writer with The National Interest, is an analyst with the Center for Security Policy and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in many publications, including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post, and Times of Israel. You can follow her on Twitter: @MayaCarlin.
All images are Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock.
Summary and Key Points: The F-4 Phantom II, a third-generation American-built warplane, played a pivotal role in the Israeli Air Force (IAF) from the 1960s until its retirement in 2004. Known for its advanced avionics, versatile weaponry, and durability, the F-4 was integral in Israel's long-range and deep-penetration missions, especially during the Six Day War, the Yom Kippur War, and the Lebanon War.
-The Israeli-modified F-4s carried sophisticated radar systems, electronic warfare equipment, and a range of Israeli-made weapons, making them formidable adversaries in both air-to-air and air-to-ground combat.
-While Israel has since moved on to more advanced aircraft like the F-16I Soufa and the F-35 Lightning II, the F-4 Phantom II remains a symbol of Israel's resilience and aerial superiority during crucial conflicts in the mid-twentieth century.
The F-4 Phantom II: A Symbol of Israeli Defiance and Military StrengthThe Israeli Air Force extensively used the American-built F-4 Phantom II. This aircraft was part of the third-generation warplane family, and it was an iconic warbird that defined America’s air war in Vietnam. The F-4 Phantom II was also a highly exported plane.
Today, the isolated Islamic Republic of Iran still utilizes some vintage F-4 Phantoms. But back in the 1960s, the F-4 was a gamechanger for the IAF and played a significant, productive role in several conflicts in the mid-twentieth century.
Israel’s F-4 Phantom IIs engaged in long-range missions and delivered substantial firepower.
SpecificationsWhat made Israel’s version of this plane so special was the special modifications installed to meet the specific needs of the IAF. The Israeli F-4s were equipped with advanced avionics, including a more sophisticated radar system, and they carried a variety of Israeli-made weapons. The IAF’s Phantom variants were fitted with electronic warfare systems, enhancing their survivability in hostile environments.
The Israeli F-4s could carry a multiplicity of air-to-air missiles, notably the AIM-7 Sparrow and AIM-9 Sidewinder, along with a variety of air-to-ground munitions. Thus, the IAF’s Phantom was a lethal interceptor fighter capable of engaging both aerial and ground targets.
Defensively, the F-4 Phantom was equipped with chaff and fire dispensers to confuse enemy radar and infrared-guided missiles. The Phantom’s frame could withstand a hit better than most other warplanes.
Important Wars that Israel Used the F-4 Phantom II to FightThe last squadron of Israel’s F-4 Phantom II fleet was retired in 2004. For nearly half a century, the F-4 was a mainstay of Israel’s fleet. This warbird served in a variety of conflicts, including the Six Day War, the Yom Kippur War, and the Lebanon War. The first two wars were widely considered to be existential fights in which Israel was nearly destroyed by its Arab neighbors.
F-4 Phantoms were one of the symbols of Israeli defiance and ultimate victory over their Arab neighbors.
The IAF chose the Phantom due to its excellent performance, versatility, and ability to carry a substantial payload. That last point, coupled with the Phantom’s long range, made it ideal for Israel’s operational requirements, notably for deep penetration missions into enemy territory. This is a key point, considering how far-flug many of Israel’s rivals are.
The Future of Israel’s Air ForceThe F-4 Phantom was a crucial asset for the Israeli Air Force. This system helped to deliver multiple strategic victories to the Israelis in key conflicts they were involved in throughout the last half of the twentieth century.
Inevitably, Israel purchased for themselves other, more advanced warplanes, notably the fourth-generation F-16I Soufa. More recently, Israel has acquired the F-35 Lightning II, a fifth-generation warplane built by the Americans.
Nevertheless, the F-4 Phantom II was a critical platform for Israel when it needed advanced systems most. For that reason alone, the F-4 will always hold a special place in the hearts and minds of Israeli aviators.
Author Experience and Expertise: Brandon J. WeichertBrandon J. Weichert, a National Interest national security analyst, is a former Congressional staffer and geopolitical analyst who is a contributor at The Washington Times, the Asia Times, and The-Pipeline. He is the author of Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His next book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine, is due October 22 from Encounter Books. Weichert can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.
All images are Creative Commons or Shutterstock.
From the Vault
Russia Freaked Out: Why the U.S. Navy 'Unretired' the Iowa-Class Battleships
Battleship vs. Battlecruiser: Iowa-Class vs. Russia's Kirov-Class (Who Wins?)
Summary and Key Points: Nearly 900 days into Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the skies over the battlefield remain fiercely contested, prolonging the conflict. The Ukrainian Air Force, initially reliant on an antiquated fleet of Soviet-era fighter jets, is on the verge of receiving significant reinforcements from NATO countries, including around eighty-five F-16 Fighting Falcons from the Netherlands, Norway, and Denmark, and an unspecified number of Dassault Mirage 2000D fighter jets from France.
-This influx of modern Western aircraft, coupled with intensified drone strikes on Russian air defenses, aims to achieve air superiority, potentially paving the way for an operational breakthrough on the ground.
-Training and logistical support from the UK and US are also bolstering Ukraine's aerial capabilities. Establishing control of the skies is seen as a crucial step towards ending the prolonged conflict.
Ukraine Prepares to Transform Air Warfare with F-16s and Dassault MiragesNearly 900 days after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the skies over the battlefield remain contested. This is the main reason why the war has dragged on for so long.
A lack of air superiority means that the Ukrainian Air Force and Russian Aerospace Forces haven’t been able to use aircraft consistently to take out ground targets and thus pave the way for an operational breakthrough somewhere along the contact line.
But now, Ukraine seems determined to change that and wrestle control of the skies.
F-16 Fighting Falcons, Dassault Mirages, Drones, and Deep StrikesWhen the war began, the Ukrainian Air Force operated a largely antiquated fleet of Soviet- and Russian-made fighter jets. But now, Kyiv is getting close to receiving dozens of F-16 Fighting Falcon and Dassault Mirage fighter jets from several NATO countries. The addition of these Western combat aircraft will most likely change the dynamics over the skies of Ukraine and could lead to progress on the ground.
As it stands, Ukraine is set to receive approximately eighty-five F-16 fighter jets. Specifically, the Netherlands has committed up to forty-two F-16 Fighting Falcons, while Norway has committed to sending twenty-two and Denmark nineteen.
However, the type and condition of each aircraft varies. As a result, it is very likely that a smaller number of these aircraft will be operational, with the rest acting as a ready reserve of spare parts. In addition to the aircraft, several other countries, including the United Kingdom and the United States, have been providing training and logistical support to the Ukrainian Air Force.
The Ukrainian Air Force expects to receive a yet unspecified number of Dassault Mirage 2000D fighter jets from France. In June, French president Emmanuel Macron announced his decision to transfer the combat aircraft to Ukraine to help it win control of the skies.
In the meantime, the Ukrainian military has been using suicide drones to target and harass Russian air defenses with the goal of creating a gap that could be exploited later on by Kyiv’s new fighter jets.
“Ukrainian drone strikes deep within Russia continue to pressure Russia's air defense umbrella and force the Russian military command to prioritize allocating limited air defense assets to cover what it deems to be high-value targets,” the Institute for the Study of War assessed
in a recent operational estimate of the war.
F-16 Fighting Falcons and Dassault Mirage 2000D fighter jets equipped with modern Western munitions would have an easier job establishing air superiority and taking out high value targets if the Russian air defense umbrella is sufficiently weakened.
“Ukrainian forces continue targeting Russian air defense systems in occupied Ukraine and in Russia’s border areas to set conditions to field F-16 fighter jets following their anticipated Summer-Fall 2024 arrival to Ukraine,” the Institute for the Study of War added.
Taking control of the skies is an important first step in creating the conditions for an operational breakthrough on the ground that could finally end this brutal conflict.
About the Author:Stavros Atlamazoglou is a seasoned defense journalist specializing in special operations and a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ). He holds a BA from Johns Hopkins University and an MA from Johns Hopkins’ School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). His work has been featured in Business Insider, Sandboxx, and SOFREP.
All images are Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock.
Summary and Key Points: The United States Air Force and the newly elected UK Labour government are both showing hesitation towards their respective sixth-generation fighter jet programs due to rising costs. The US Air Force's Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) program and the UK's Global Combat Air Program (GCAP) face scrutiny, with concerns paralleling past budget overruns seen in the B-2 Spirit and F-22 Raptor programs.
-UK Armed Forces Minister Luke Pollard emphasized the importance of the GCAP but noted the need for cost-effective procurement. The Labour government is currently reviewing its defense strategy, potentially impacting the £12 billion commitment to GCAP.
-Both programs involve multinational collaborations, including Japan and Italy for GCAP, highlighting the global implications of these cost concerns.
Labour Government Hesitates on GCAP Amid US Air Force's NGAD ApprehensionsThe United States Air Force is apparently getting cold feet regarding the development of a sixth-generation fighter, which is being developed as part of the Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) program that calls for a system of systems, including an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) that could act as a loyal wingman. The cost of the manned fighter component of the NGAD is a major concern, and the U.S. Air Force can ill afford an expensive mistake – possibly noting how both the B-2 Spirit and F-22 Raptor programs were significantly scaled back.
It would seem that the apprehension over the cost of the future fighter isn't one limited to the U.S. Air Force, as it was reported last week that the new UK Labour government, which took power earlier this month, now views the UK-led Global Combat Air Program (GCAP) as "important," yet isn't ready to go all in.
"It is a really important program for us. It's important for our partners in Japan and Italy … and we're meeting both those partners next week to underline that. But it's not right for me to prejudge what might happen in the [Strategic] Defence Review." explained Armed Force Minister Luke Pollard at the Global Air and Space Chiefs Conference in London on Thursday, according to a report from Breaking Defense.
"We need cutting-edge capabilities," added Pollard. "We need to make sure that when we're procuring systems, high-end systems, future systems that we need to keep our people safe, we do it in the most cost effective way and that is by working with our partners."
As Breaking Defense further reported, the Tory government had committed spending upwards of £2 billion ($2.6 billion) on GCAP until 2025 and an additional £12 billion ($15.5 billion) on the program overall, yet, it is unclear if Labour will stick to that level of funding.
Prime Minister Keir Starmer, who took office on July 5, had launched a strategic defense review. Labour is expected to continue the efforts of the Conservative Party that called for greater investment in military defense, and to maintain the UK's prominent role in the NATO alliance.
Will Lack of Confidence in the NGAD Shoot Down the GCAP?However, there is also speculation that the UK could follow the lead of the U.S., and that could be the breaks on the GCAP.
"It's notable that the US Air Force is saying it can't potentially afford NGAD, and given that NGAD already has prototypes flying around is their third or fourth attempt to build a combat stealth aircraft, they're very good at it and it's US funding, if the US thinks it is maybe unaffordable … then I think we probably need to look very carefully at how we're going to do this in Europe," Justin Bronk, senior research fellow for airpower and technology at the Royal United Services Institute, also said at the Global Air and Space Chiefs Conference. "But for the immediate term, you’ve got to stop the Russians from trying to test NATO militarily in this decade, otherwise, everything else is kind of irrelevant."
Where the UK may have an advantage is that it has lined up foreign partners. The UK and Italy's Tempest program merged with the Japanese F-X project. In December 2022, the UK, Japan, and Italy signed an international treaty to collaborate on the development of an advanced front-line fighter.
Tempest was initiated to develop a replacement for the Eurofighter Typhoon, which is operated by both the Royal Air Force (RAF) and the Italian Air Force, while the F-X program was jumpstarted to produce an aircraft to replace the aging Japanese F-2 fighters. It is worth noting that all three nations have adopted the Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II multirole fifth-generation stealth fighter – but appeared to be looking towards a sixth-generation combat aircraft.
The multi-national industry team includes BAE System, Rolls-Royce, Leonardo, MBDA UK, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, IHI, and Mitsubishi Electric.
Author Experience and Expertise: Peter SuciuPeter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.
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