Diplomacy & Crisis News

The killing of Israeli civilians by Hamas and retaliatory airstrikes on the densely populated Gaza Strip by Israel raises numerous issues under international law.

Indeed, President Joe Biden made express reference to the “laws of war” in comments he made at the White House on Oct. 10, 2023, noting that while democracies like the U.S. and Israel uphold such standards, “terrorists” such as Hamas “purposefully target civilians.” Speaking the same day, the European Union’s top diplomat Josep Borrell condemned Hamas’ attack but also suggested that Israel was not acting in accordance with international law by cutting water, electricity, and food to civilians in Gaza.

But international law and the very nature of the conflict itself – along with the status of the two sides involved – is a complex area. The Conversation turned to Robert Goldman, an expert on the laws of war at American University Washington College of Law, for guidance on some of the issues.

What are the ‘laws of war’?

The laws of war, also known as International Humanitarian Law (IHL), consist of the four 1949 Geneva Conventions, their two Additional Protocols of 1977, the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, as well as certain weapons conventions.

Simply put, these instruments seek to spare civilians and others who are no longer active combatants from the effects of hostilities by placing restrictions and prohibitions on the conduct of warfare.

It is important to understand that modern IHL is not concerned with the reasons for, or the legality of, going to war. Rather, that is governed by the United Nations Charter and a member state’s own practice.

It is also important to note that violations of the laws of war are notoriously hard to prosecute and can be frustrated by lack of cooperation by the parties involved.

What is the nature of the conflict between Israel and Hamas?

The answer to this question is by no means clear.

Many humanitarian law experts would argue that Hamas and Israel are engaged in what is known as a “non-international armed conflict.” In other words, it would be classified the same way as a civil war that pits the armed forces of a state against an armed non-state actor, rather than an international conflict between two or more sovereign states.

If that were the case, the conflict would not be governed by the entirety of the laws of war, but instead by the more limited Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions along with numerous customary law rules, which derive from general practices accepted as law. Common Article 3, which applies to civilians and those no longer fighting, prohibits practices such as torture, summary execution and denial of a fair trial. But Prisoner of War status only applies to conflicts between states so would not apply.

But some international observers, including the United Nations, view Israel as, in effect, occupying Gaza – a view predicated on the fact that Israel controls Gaza’s borders and airspace and it supplies most of its electricity.

If that is the case, then the recent outbreak of hostilities between Hamas and Israel would trigger the entirety of laws of war.

That said, I do not believe that Israel is an occupying power in Gaza under a strict reading of the law. This is because Israel ceased governing and pulled its forces out of Gaza in 2005. Since 2007, Hamas, after expelling the Palestinian Authority, has in effect governed Gaza.

Is the bombing of Gaza illegal under international law?

Today the rules governing the conduct of hostilities in both international and non-international armed conflicts are essentially the same.

The foremost requirement in all conflicts is that combatants must always distinguish between civilians and combatants, and that attacks can only be directed at combatants and other military targets.

Protecting civilian populations caught in warfare essentially depends upon three factors:

1. Civilians must abstain from fighting;

2. The party in control of the civilian population must not place them at heightened risk of harm by using them as human shields; and

3. The attacking force must take precautions to avoid or minimize excessive civilian casualties when attacking lawful targets.

Not only are civilians in Gaza not lawful targets, they are also protected under IHL by the rule of proportionality. This rule prohibits an attack against a military target which foreseeably could cause civilian casualties that are excessive, or disproportionate in relation to the advantage anticipated from the target’s destruction.

In the case of Gaza, this rule requires that before launching an attack, the Israeli military analyze and determine the likely effect on civilians. If it appears that such an attack will cause disproportionate civilian casualties, then it must be suspended or canceled.

Given Gaza’s urban density, it will be extremely difficult for the Israelis to avoid substantial civilian casualties even when using precision weapons.

And this task will be nearly impossible if Hamas, as it has consistently done in the past, uses civilians and now hostages to shield military targets.

While Israel bears primary responsibility to avoid excessive civilian deaths in its bombardment of Gaza, Hamas’ ability to claim the bombardment constitutes a war crime would be weakened if it deliberately places its own people in harm’s way.

And while Israel is complying with its duty to give an advanced warning of an attack in north Gaza, the problem remains: Where do 1 million people go to seek safety when borders are closed and military targets are being hit throughout Gaza?

Is Israel’s siege of Gaza illegal?

Unlike in the past, total siege warfare now is unlawful regardless of whether the warring parties are involved in international or non-international hostilities.

Blocking the entry of all food, water, medicines and cutting off electricity – as appears to be happening in Gaza – will disproportionately affect civilians, foreseeably leading to their starvation. This is a banned method of warfare under customary and conventional IHL.

No matter how horrific the actions of Hamas, IHL does not permit an aggrieved party to respond in kind. Violation of the law by one party cannot, in principle, justify or sanction actions by the other that violate established prohibitions in international humanitarian law.

What are the status and obligations of Hamas under IHL?

IHL rules apply equally to all the warring parties irrespective of the nature of the conflict. This means that Israeli and Hamas combatants have the same rights and duties.

If, however, the conflict is non-international, then Hamas will be regarded as an armed non-state actor and its combatants ineligible for Prisoner of War status upon capture. Accordingly, Israel can try them for all their hostile acts whether or not Hamas complies with the laws of war.

But even if the conflict is an international one, then Hamas’s fighters would still be debarred from Prisoner of War status. They are not the armed forces of Palestine – which is recognized as a state by 138 nations and has the Palestine Authority as its government.

Rather, Hamas combatants are an irregular armed group. To be eligible for Prisoner of War status under Article 4A(2) of the Third Geneva Convention, members of an irregular armed group must adhere to very strict standards, both collectively and individually. These includes distinguishing themselves from civilians and complying with the laws of war. Manifestly Hamas has not and does not meet these standards. As such, Israel could lawfully deny them Prisoner of War status upon capture.

Israel, the U.S., and others label Hamas fighters as terrorists. Hamas’ recent acts – indiscriminately firing thousands of rockets into Israel, targeting, killing and taking civilians as hostages – are acts of terrorism in warfare and qualify as war crimes.

Robert Goldman is a Professor of Law at American University.

This article was first published by The Conversation.

Image: Anas-Mohammed / Shutterstock.com

There is a great streak of ingenuity that runs through the American people. The phrase improvise, adapt, and overcome is intertwined into our military culture for a reason. Our troops are pros at improvisation and they improvise on a regular basis even when it comes to their weapons.

Weapon improvisation has a role in a number of circumstances. Sometimes the weapons issued by a military force are not the best option for the task at hand and other times, the best option might not be. This is where you improvise and have to make do with what you have, and if you do it right, you’ll always overcome the situation.  

Today we are going to look at five examples of how our fighting men improvised, adapted, and overcame when it came to their weaponry. 

THE MARINES’ STINGER 

The Pacific Campaign in WWII involved brutal jungle warfare. Jungle ambushes are tough to fight through as hidden attackers wait to fight to the death. The best way to defeat an ambush is with sudden, overwhelming firepower– for an infantryman, this means using a machine gun.

The machine gun of the era, the Browning M1911, specifically the M1919A6, was a passable weapon but it suffered from having an old and boxy design and the infantry variant weighed 35 pounds. A few enterprising Marines quickly discovered that the aircraft variant of the M1919, the .30 AN/M2, weighed 21 pounds, plus, its firing rate was a blistering 1,500 rounds per minute. So, they picked through aircraft graveyards and began building an infantry version of the .30 AN/M2. 

This improvisation led to the Stinger which featured a Garand stock, BAR sights, a redesigned solenoid trigger, and a bipod. These enterprising Marines made six of the guns and used them heavily in Iwo Jima. Marine Corporal Tony Stein earned the Medal of Honor wielding a Stinger in the initial assault on Iwo Jima where he demolished Japanese pill boxes and killed 20 Japanese soldiers. 

A RADICAL M1911 FOR PILOTS

Pilots in World War II were lucky if they were armed with an M1911 and a Savage-Stevens survival rifle, but that wasn’t a lot of firepower if they found themselves shot down in enemy territory.

Army Air Corps, and later Air Force officer and pilot, David Schilling, was known to be a tinkerer. While stationed in Europe and becoming a fighter Ace, he found time to enhance his service pistol. 

Schilling took a standard 45 ACP M1911 and began working on it. He extended the magazine to 20 rounds, added a forward grip to the gun, and converted it to full auto. His little micro-machine gun could cycle insanely fast and throw a ton of .45 ACP. This was surely enough to suppress a capture party long enough for the pilot to escape.

Although Schilling may not have explicitly enhanced his pistol for that purpose, since he was at heart a tinkerer, his design is fascinating.

A CHOPPED RPD TO FIGHT AGAINST VIETNAMESE AMBUSHES

During the Vietnam War, the elite MACVSOG were given a lot of leeway. They often fielded the best and most modern guns America had to offer, but those weren’t always the best for their unique job. For example, the era’s squad support weapon was the M60, which was somewhat large, heavy, and had massive recoil. The men of MACVSOG needed belt-fed firepower, but they needed something more compact than the M60. 

By hook or crook, MACVSOG acquired some of the enemy’s RPD light machine guns. These were 7.62x39mm, belt-fed, light machine guns. They were lighter and smaller than the M60, but still not small enough, so the MACVSOG men chopped their barrels off. Since these were not U.S. weapons, there wasn’t an issue with command getting mad.

These chopped RPDs were light and handy for jungle warfare but were no longer squad-support weapons for fire and movement. Instead, they had become better suited to counter ambushes. They became point-and-fire guns that allowed the troopers to send a wall of lead into a close ambush. These RPDs lacked sight, but likely produced a massive fireball when fired and sounded similar to North Vietnamese RPDs making it tough for the VC to pinpoint the location of the MACVSOG men.

THE M2 ‘SNIPER’ RIFLE

Carlos Hathcock is likely the most famous sniper to have ever lived. This Marine legend fought in Vietnam, where he became known as White Feather. He was a prolific sniper with an impressive kill count. Hathcock hunted down enemy high-value targets, often alone or occasionally with a spotter. From 1967 until 2002, he held the record for the longest-confirmed kill with his improvisation of a sniper rifle. 

Gunny Hathcock took an M2 machine gun – which fired the .50 BMG round – and mounted an 8X Unertl scope to it and used a tripod stabilized by sandbags. The M2 naturally fits a tripod forming a stable platform and the sandbags made it all the more stable. This crew-served setup also fired in semi-auto and threw a very potent and capable round. 

Hathcock used this gun to shoot an enemy traveling with weapons along a jungle road. The shot was fired from 2,500 yards away and still stands as the fifth farthest kill achieved by a sniper – and it wasn’t even done with a sniper rifle. 

THE MARINES’ MOLOTOV COCKTAIL 

When Operation Phantom Fury kicked off, the Marines were faced with the daunting task of clearing the entire city of Fallujah from enemy fighters. It was a tactical nightmare. Insurgents rooted themselves in the city and traded blow after blow with the Marines. When you’re attacking, you have to often face dug-in opponents, and in that case, many jihadists were willing to be martyrs. 

Marines quickly found out that the best way to flush a dug-in fighter out wasn’t with grenades or rifle fire but by fire. So they turned to an old weapon and began producing their own Molotov cocktails to clear dug-in opponents.

Marines listed their production methods in the After Action Report for the Battle of Fallujah. The best recipe is a mixture of two parts gasoline and one part liquid laundry detergent. This old-school weapon was powerful and capable as it always has been. 

Travis Pike is a former Marine Machine gunner who served with 2nd Bn 2nd Marines for 5 years. He deployed in 2009 to Afghanistan and again in 2011 with the 22nd MEU(SOC) during a record-setting 11 months at sea. He’s trained with the Romanian Army, the Spanish Marines, the Emirate Marines, and the Afghan National Army. He serves as an NRA certified pistol instructor and teaches concealed carry classes.

This article was first published by Sandboxx News.

Image: Creative Commons.

When the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, now British Petroleum, discovered Iranian oil in 1908, a century of petroleum energy primacy followed. The same is rapidly becoming true for minerals like lithium, copper, cobalt, nickel, and rare earth elements (critical minerals) necessary for technologies that produce, transmit, and store electricity. These elements can be found all over the world, but China controls nearly all critical mineral supply chains. Today, the United States needs critical mineral access more than it depends on foreign oil. The greatest opportunity remaining for U.S. critical mineral independence hinges on South American lithium.

Like internal combustion engines and oil, Electric Vehicle (EV) lithium-ion batteries are “driving demand for batteries and related critical minerals,” according to the International Energy Agency. The market cap for critical minerals grew from $160 billion in 2018 to $320 billion in 2022, primarily due to an increase in EV sales that rose from 2 million to over 10 million during the same period. Road transportation has long been the backbone of oil demand globally, and now, the same relationship is unfolding for critical minerals. And like oil shocks, even if felt by manufacturers before consumers, Americans will be more vulnerable to critical mineral price spikes as our vehicles and grids modernize.

The countries the United States needs to prioritize to head off exponentially growing lithium battery demand depend on the battery composition the United States ultimately bets on. Lithium leads the battery race because it is the metal with the greatest energy-to-weight ratio. Within these batteries, there is competition between Nickel-Manganese-Cobalt (NMC) and Lithium-Iron-Phosphate (LFP) cathodes. Both use lithium to store and release electricity. LFP just uses more common materials—and more lithium—to complete the circuit through your device. Moreover, NMC provides higher energy storage for the greater driving range in cars, but LFP is cheaper, safer, and quickly closing the energy storage gap with NMC.

While both NMC and LFP are commercially viable options, they are not equal in terms of U.S. national security. NMC batteries depend on China’s near-monopoly over Congolese cobalt and trade sway over Indonesian nickel, the two largest global reserves and productions of their respective minerals. And China has a history of using critical mineral exports as leverage. Because LFP batteries could sooner achieve independence from China, the United States understands their strategic value, hence the planned public-private installation of the first LFP cathode facility in the United States and a national goal to eliminate cobalt and nickel in batteries by 2030. Engineering toward LFP would still require the United States to invest in the lithium processing and battery manufacturing that China presently dominates, which can be addressed with enough time and investment through domestic and multilateral industrial policies—easier said than done. However, sourcing enough lithium to meet domestic demand calls for the tried-and-true bilateral approach.

Just as it was in the United States’ interest to secure a better relationship with Saudi Arabia in 1945 to ensure a constant flow of oil, it is now in the United States’ interest to establish the stable relationships necessary to underpin lithium imports upon which U.S. national and economic security rely. Securing the majority of domestic battery demand will require the United States to leverage the 54 percent percent of proven world reserves of lithium underneath the “lithium triangle” between Chile, Argentina, and Bolivia and the 24 percent of global reserves in Australia. Mexico is also weighing in by seeking a lithium association with Argentina, Bolivia, and Chile—evoking comparisons to the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries. In exchange, Latin America wants trade agreements and financing to industrialize and recover from a legacy of “foreign harassment,” as Bolivian President Luis Arce puts it.

Lithium discoveries in Maine in July and Nevada in September do not mean U.S. lithium independence anytime soon. Domestic oil was not enough to sate American demand during the twentieth century, and domestic lithium will not be enough for the short to medium term. Meeting projected U.S. demand for EVS will require 300 percent more lithium carbonate equivalent by 2050 than the entire world annually produces today—765,570 tons in 2022—compounded by global lithium trends that project roughly 3-4 million tons of demand by 2030, while only slated to produce 2.7 million tons the same year.

This is why securing a stable and sufficient lithium supply for Americans rests on the United States reconciling a legacy of resource exploitation and political intervention in Latin America; this history has colored lithium nationalization strategies in Mexico, Chile, and Bolivia, and Chinese contracts are taking advantage of lagging U.S. investment and public relations in the region. This year, China is helping Chile build a processing plant in exchange for discounted lithium and a $290 million lithium cathode factory. In July, China invested $620 million to create an electric vehicle plant in Brazil on a facility Ford recently abandoned. Since 2018, China has accounted for 88 percent of all money spent on lithium merger and acquisition deals over $100 million in Latin America. The United States must convince critical mineral nations in the region that history will not repeat itself by offering more favorable terms.

Striking competitive critical mineral partnerships will also take more than money, which is China’s main advantage. Thanks to a different suite of incentives controlled by an autocratic regime, the Chinese Communist Party is willing to invest for reasons other than profit and without concern for regulatory, environmental, or political risk. For the United States and its allies to compete with the Belt and Road Initiative, it will have to up the ante through technology sharing, resources to streamline and better standards for environmental licensing, and joint oversight to protect labor and transparency.

First, technology sharing helps critical mineral states enjoy the technology their labor makes possible. Second, well-equipped licensing bodies can both raise the bar for environmental stewardship and shorten the lengthy approval process of environmental regulations bottlenecking mineral supply. Third, joint oversight protects workers and gets ahead of informal economy bribes that steepen private investment costs. On the surface, transnational oversight may not appeal to some corrupt government officials in Latin America, except following the recent regional groundswell of discontent driven by corruption, flipping more than a couple of heads of state, a favorable domestic optic of transparency tied to billions in foreign investment can. The United States’ best chance for a competitive edge in the Latin American lithium trade, counterintuitively, is underwriting joint legal frameworks, given that technology partnerships, humane standards, and private investment all rely on the rule of law.

Future technology and decarbonization expect critical minerals to become the most demanded global commodity—after fossil fuels reach their tragic or managed conclusion. In the meantime, the geopolitics of resource security will continue to play out between incumbent petroleum on the one hand and rising critical minerals on the other. At least for batteries, it is in the United States’ self-interest to build a deeper, not necessarily broader, critical mineral coalition to support its economic and national security, like it once did with the Arab Gulf.

Alex Elnagdy is the assistant director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative.

Image: Shutterstock.

As any army officer will tell you, it’s very hard to achieve a destroy mission. Yet that is what, publicly at least, Israeli leaders have tasked the Israel Defense Forces to do. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu vowed to ‘crush and destroy Hamas’, adding that ‘every Hamas member is a dead man’; Defence Minister Yoav Gallant promised to ‘wipe [them] off the face of the earth’ and said that they would ‘cease to exist’.

The IDF has been slightly more circumspect, saying variously that its mission is to ‘degrade and destroy Hamas’s capability to attack Israel’ or to ‘dismantle Hamas and its military capability’ and that it is targeting Hamas’s operational and government capabilities, including the group’s leadership.

There’s obviously a political imperative that drives members of Netanyahu’s government to use the words they use, given that it is a government on whose watch 1,200 Israelis were killed in the attack launched from Gaza on 7 October. And the ground phase of the Israeli response will be significant and consequential—as one spokesperson said, this is war, not another military operation. The Israeli air campaign has already been going for days and the ground campaign is not far off. Gallant has said that it will take weeks or months to achieve the military aim to eliminate Hamas.

So, what will mission success look like for Israel? Hostage recovery is obviously an immediate priority, and there’s no doubt that Hamas will pay an enormous price for it reckless and bloodthirsty attack that resulted in the deaths of hundreds of civilians, mostly Israelis but also many foreign nationals whose governments also hold Hamas accountable for their deaths. Israel has already indicated that this won’t be another mow-the-grass-style operation where ground forces’ incursions into Gaza are limited in duration and scope since the punitive effect is considered to have been sufficient to re-establish the rules of the game.

But the attack from Gaza did away with any concept of conflict norms, and because of that the region is entering uncharted territory. The number of civilians killed in Gaza has likely matched those killed in Israel already, and those numbers will only rise despite Israel’s direction that residents evacuate to the south of Wadi Gaza. Israeli ground and air forces will exact a frightening toll on Hamas during the course of the operation, setting back its operational capability by years. There’s no doubt that Hamas will be degraded to a larger extent than it has ever been before. But it is unlikely to be destroyed.

The big question, though, is what happens after the Israeli ground forces have prosecuted all the targets, cleared all the ground they have been required to clear and are left in the semi-deserted wasteland that is Gaza. If they seek to destroy Hamas, including its ability to govern, who will administer Gaza? To withdraw precipitously will simply allow Hamas, or those with similar views, to re-establish themselves, while the idea that the Palestinian Authority would be willing (or capable) of governing Gaza after an absence of 20 years is similarly fraught. And the idea that Israel would seek to re-occupy Gaza is untenable politically on many levels.

It’s likely that the Israeli government has yet to decide what happens after the bloodletting has been exhausted. For now, it’s time for war.

But if there’s one lesson that should have been learned from the US experience in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere; the Gulf states in Yemen; and Israel’s own two-decade-long occupation of south Lebanon, it’s that it is always easier to forcibly enter a country than it is to leave it. While the desire for revenge is the dominant driver of the Israeli government at the moment, its desire to destroy Hamas may not be practically achievable. More importantly though, Israel’s leaders needs to start turning their minds now to what happens after that desire for revenge has been sated.

Rodger Shanahan is a former Australian Army officer and Middle East analyst

This article was first published by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute.

Image: Anas-Mohammed / Shutterstock.com

Atlanta-based aviation firm Hermeus is actively developing a reusable hypersonic aircraft for both military and commercial applications, and this week it released a never-before-seen image of its technology demonstrator as it progresses toward ground testing in the months ahead.

Hermeus’ technology demonstrator, Quarterhorse, eventually aims to achieve speeds in excess of Mach 4 and potentially even higher thanks to the company’s unique propulsion system design. But before this high-speed platform can fly, it has to learn to walk… or more appropriately, taxi. And that’s precisely what the company’s recently unveiled Quarterhorse Mk 0 prototype aims to do.

Once complete, this non-flying aircraft will provide Hermeus with the opportunity to begin testing onboard systems like its remote flight controls, while production on the Quarterhorse Mk 1 – the company’s first flying prototype – is underway.

Quarterhorse measures about 40 feet in length and is powered by a turbine-based combined cycle (TBCC) engine of Hermeus’ own design dubbed Chimera. As its name reflects, this air-breathing jet engine could really be thought of as two engines in one: the first a turbojet and the second a ramjet. Turbojets are adept at powering aircraft from a complete stop and up to around Mach 3. Ramjets take over at high speeds; Chimera’s ramjet is designed to accelerate Quarterhorse past Mach 4 and potentially even beyond Mach 5 at altitudes as high as 95,000 feet.

Hermeus successfully demonstrated Chimera’s ability to transition from turbojet to ramjet power in a high-speed wind tunnel last November.

Achieving these speeds would make Hermeus’ Quarterhorse the fastest reusable jet of all time, eclipsing the legendary SR-71 Blackbird that has maintained the title for nearly 60 years, despite being retired for 24 of them. (There have been faster air-breathing jets like NASA’s scramjet-powered X-43 Waverider, but these platforms lacked the ability to land, and as such, were single-use.)

Hermeus doesn’t expect to steal the Blackbird’s title right away, however. Once ground testing is complete on Quarterhorse Mk 0, the next iteration – Mk 1 – will be tasked with taking flight to more thoroughly test its onboard avionics, flight controls, hydraulics, and other systems at likely subsonic speeds. Hermeus will then leverage lessons learned from the first two vehicles to begin construction on Quarterhorse Mk 2, which will stretch its afterburning legs beyond the sound barrier to begin a supersonic flight testing regime up to speeds below Mach 3.

Finally, with test data gathered from taxi, subsonic, and supersonic flight testing, construction will begin on the Quarterhorse Mk 3 – which Hermeus says will be able to fly faster than the SR-71, which had a publicly disclosed top speed of Mach 3.2. Hermeus isn’t aiming to just squeak by that record, however, and intends to push the Quarterhorse Mk 3 beyond Mach 4.

Using Hermeus’ Chimera TBCC propulsion system, it’s possible that Quarterhorse could eventually see speeds in excess of Mach 5 – which is commonly considered the hypersonic barrier. (Technically speaking, the hypersonic barrier is defined as the speed at which the chemical makeup of the air you fly through is affected by that interaction, but this tends to start happening at around Mach 5).

That would make this plucky start-up not only the owner of the world’s fastest reusable jet, but also Hermeus the world’s first company to field a reusable hypersonic aircraft.

With Quarterhorse under its belt, Hermeus then intends to move to its military-specific platform, Darkhorse, which will be powered by an even larger and more powerful TBCC engine using a Pratt & Whitney F100 turbofan as its foundation. The F100, which powers high-performance fighters like the F-15 Eagle, will provide more than four times the thrust of Chimera’s current J85, allowing for much larger payloads and even greater speeds.

Sandboxx News had the opportunity to tour Hermeus’ Atlanta facility this past June while the Quarterhorse Mk 0 was already under construction and immediately after the company had taken delivery on its first F100 turbofan.

HYPERSONIC MISSILES VS. HYPERSONIC AIRCRAFT

In recent years, hypersonic missiles have garnered a great deal of attention thanks to their ability to flummox even the most advanced air defense systems through a combination of speed and maneuverability, but the incredible cost of these weapons has left many questioning whether they offer any real practical combat value. According to one recent Pentagon estimate, hypersonic missiles may cost as much as $106 million each, or about $27 million more than a brand-new F-35A.

America’s geopolitical opponents, Russia and China, both claim to have unpowered hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs) in service, but their nuclear-capable deterrent role means neither country will need to demonstrate that these weapons work any time soon. (Russia’s Kinzhal, however, is nothing more than an air-launched ballistic missile that really puts the hype in hypersonic). The United States, on the other hand, has committed to fielding strictly conventionally armed (non-nuclear) hypersonic missiles with the goal of getting these weapons into the fight immediately upon entering service.

For a country like China, with its sights set on engaging America’s multi-billion-dollar supercarriers, a $100 million missile isn’t an unreasonable price point. But for the United States, which aims to use these weapons for conventional engagements the world over, there are very few targets that might warrant such a pricey munition.

Related: Hypersonic firm Hermeus proves their Mach 5+ jet engine works

A hypersonic platform like Hermeus’ Darkhorse, however, could defeat air defenses in the same way a hypersonic missile could. Modern air defense systems use advanced sensors to track and extrapolate a weapon’s trajectory, before launching an interceptor (another missile) at a point farther along that projected flight path – like a quarterback leading a wide receiver. By adjusting course even slightly, a hypersonic weapon or aircraft renders those calculations moot, forcing the system to start the process over again and potentially missing the opportunity to intercept at all.

But while the Pentagon assesses that its single-use hypersonic missiles in development may cost more than $100 million a piece, Hermeus projects that it can field its own reusable hypersonic aircraft for around that same price point. In other words, Hermeus could potentially take hypersonic flight out of the realm of high-dollar deterrent weapons with very few practical uses… and place it squarely in the realm of standard day-to-day operations.

Hermeus is not alone in this endeavor, however, with at least one other publicly disclosed program to field a hypersonic drone (of sorts) underway within the secretive confines of the Air Force Research Laboratory. The Air Force’s effort, currently known only as Mayhem, is aiming for higher speeds and will likely come with higher prices to match. Rather than combining a turbofan with a ramjet as Hermeus has, the Air Force intends to use a higher-speed scramjet instead.

From a practical standpoint, a combined cycle turbofan/ramjet and turbofan/scramjet work in very much the same way, but ramjets slow the inflowing air down to more manageable subsonic speeds before mixing it with fuel and igniting it for propulsion, whereas scramjet allows air to flow through them at supersonic speeds. As a result, ramjets likely can’t exceed Mach 6, whereas scramjets could potentially continue accelerating up to Mach 10 and even beyond.

However, all that added speed comes with a great deal of added complexity and cost. Scientists have likened ignition in the supersonic flow of a scramjet to trying to light a match in a hurricane. Despite a number of successful scramjet technology demonstrators over the years, no nation or company has so far managed to field a scramjet in an operational aircraft or weapon.

Ramjets, on the other hand, are based on older and more proven technology, and as a result, create fewer technical hurdles to overcome, which may just give Hermeus the leg-up it needs to be the first company to cruise past Mach 5, right into the record books, and all the way to the bank.

But before it can do any of that, Quarterhorse Mk 0 will need to prove it can manage the comparatively minor rigors of taxi tests right here on the ground.

Alex Hollings is a writer, dad, and Marine veteran.

This article was first published by Sandboxx News.

Image: Shutterstock.

Several months ago, I was introduced online to a former Russian diplomat with whom I was able to conduct a conversation on Zoom. Our topic was supposed to be Middle East politics, but not surprisingly, we went right to the war in Ukraine. I had been connected to the diplomat by a mutual acquaintance who holds liberal views on international affairs, and I expected the same from my new interlocutor. It did not take long for me to discover how those expectations were misplaced.

In order to start out non-aggressively, looking for common ground, I began by asking what he would think of an “Austrian solution,” hearkening back to the 1955 treaty which ended the post-World War II occupation of Austria, guaranteed its national independence, and established the principle of permanent neutrality. Wouldn’t that work for Ukraine?

His reply was unambiguous: absolutely not. The Russian goal, he insisted, was to conquer all of Ukraine and put Zelensky and his collaborators on trial.

There is a  lesson to draw from that encounter. While we in the West–in our think tanks, universities, and editorials–can be quite creative in designing compromises that would generously bargain away Ukraine’s territory, Russia–Ukraine’s adversary and ours–has shown no such inclination. We post-enlightenment liberals (one way or another) are inclined to look for exit strategies while the enemy plays to win.

This is the fundamental asymmetry of the moment. Unless the democracies overcome this aversion against the prospect of victory, the outcome will not be auspicious, and not only for Kyiv.

Not that long ago, one could envision a plausible end to the fighting in Ukraine with a return to the borders of February 24, 2022, a freezing of the conflict rather than a peace treaty, and continued ambiguity concerning Crimea. This would be far less than the legitimate goal of Ukraine to restore control over all its territory.

Still, there are limits to what Ukrainian forces can achieve without an acceleration of Western support. There has been too much foot-dragging in the delivery of weapons systems, especially in Washington and Berlin.

But that was then, and now, after the October 7 Hamas attack on Israel, geopolitics have shifted tectonically. Ukraine is no longer an isolated conflict. Ukraine and Israel alike face enemies sworn to their respective destruction, and both are supported by Iran. Both engage in systematic war crimes that are gruesomely identical. At stake ultimately is the collaboration of Russia and Iran, along with China and North Korea, to degrade American presence everywhere.

The U.S. is in a global conflict. Part of this conflict is the Ukraine War, which will only end when we finally decide to win it, which means recognizing the scope of the challenge, ramping up arms production, and committing to defeating–not appeasing–our enemies. 

Russell A. Berman, the Walter A. Haas Professor in the Humanities at Stanford University, is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution and a co-chair of the Working Group on Islamism and the International Order. At Stanford, he is a member of both the Department of German Studies and the Department of Comparative Literature at Stanford, and he specializes on politics and culture in Europe as well as in the Middle East. He has served in numerous administrative positions at Stanford, including as chair of the Senate of the Academic Council.

A U.S.-China war is not inevitable, but it is increasingly likely.

While recent choices such as an overuse of sanctions, mutual economic decoupling, and political stunts like needless visits to Taiwan by Nancy Pelosi or the cancellation of G20 attendance by Xi Jinping have raised tensions, the U.S. still has time and options to change its trajectory.

It can work to preserve economic coupling with China, maintain strategic ambiguity regarding Taiwan, improve cybersecurity to stay technologically ahead, elevate regional cooperation to protect Taiwan and the South China Sea, and avoid costly foreign engagements to preserve national strength.

But these and any other measures are just short-term solutions that China can circumvent because, ultimately, the long-term answer to the China problem lies in resolving issues under the surface at home, not just in policy abroad.

The success of effective foreign policy and national defense - the kind that deters war and incentivizes peace with China in the long term while promoting a strong America -  is dependent on consistency, loyalty, responsibility, and transparency in execution. Yet, with endless investigations of corruption, foreign interference, compromised voting integrity, and moral destitution on all sides of the American political aisle, it is clear that many if not most in Washington lack these qualities. With leaders like this, China simply won’t be discouraged by American military actions alone.

American immunity to Chinese subversion like the fentanyl crisis and free-speech censorship or propaganda in universities and media is contingent on strong communities, families, and smart individuals of moral character. But as society becomes increasingly epicurean, distractions like culture wars, moral divisions, partisanship, and consumerism produce susceptible people who don’t possess the capacity to resist China’s pressures. With weaknesses like this, China won’t ever be convinced by American shows of strength overseas that it should do anything other than try harder to upset American power through other means.

Truly deterring China is not the unidimensional task many geopolitical pundits paint it to be of making the right military and economic threats in the right places at the right times. It doesn’t just require strength projection abroad with bases in the Philippines and more ships in the Taiwan Strait. It involves strength projection from home as well, in the form of strong communities and families that can resist all forms of Chinese pressures and produce competent, committed leaders capable of rebuffing Chinese advances and following through on good foreign policy. Otherwise, China will only ever see American strategic endeavors as temporary setbacks that can be overcome with the proper applications of force over the proper amount of time… and they’ll be right.

As such, strengthening the foundational moral fabric of American society is not only a foundational requirement for resisting Chinese subversion, but also necessary for truly realizing effective foreign policy. This truth is echoed unironically in a line from the ancient Confucian text, DaXue, which says “To put the world in order, we must first put the nation in order; to put the nation in order, we must first put the family in order; to put the family in order; we must first cultivate our personal life; we must first set our hearts right.”

Any strategic prescriptions or genuinely good ideas enacted without addressing the underlying weaknesses in American society and government will just be like sending out ships full of holes; they will be well-intended actions that may be effective for a short time, but in the end only serve to mask the symptoms of our collision course with China until it's too late.

Garrett Ehinger is a China analyst who holds a bachelor’s in Biomedical Science with a minor in Mandarin Chinese from Brigham Young University in Idaho. He is currently a master’s student at the University of Utah studying public health. He has studied Chinese culture and language for over a decade.

Image Credit: Creative Commons. 

Whether or not Iran played a direct role in planning and executing Hamas’ brutal assault on Israel doesn’t really matter. What does matter is Iran’s indispensable, long-term role in building Hamas’ capability to do what it did. In the near term, Israel will settle for nothing less than the physical elimination of Hamas as a military, administrative, financial, and organizational entity in Gaza. There can be no return to the status quo ante. But for any success in destroying Hamas’ capabilities to endure, the Iranian regime must also be eliminated.

The Iran Challenge 

The Islamic Republic is a vile regime that shares the annihilationist ideology of Hamas. It is detested by large numbers of Iranians. Their resentment periodically erupts into widespread opposition, which is brutally repressed by methods reminiscent of many other tyrannies. 

This cycle will probably repeat itself in the future. Still, another round of demonstrations by anti-theocrats wearing green shirts or by women discarding their hijabs is unlikely to produce a different outcome. Nor is economic strangulation on the horizon as long as Russia, China, others in the Global South, and even Western democracies worry first of all (understandably) about their own energy security and economic well-being and, therefore, fail even to enforce all the sanctions they have already endorsed. 

Nor is there much enthusiasm for the kind of military coercion that ultimately ended vile regimes in Afghanistan (temporarily) and Iraq.

How to Rid the World of the Islamic Republic 

So, if the ayatollahs in Iran won’t change their aspirations, what can force them to leave the stage?

There are not many options, but one possible vulnerability merits attention: Iran’s demographic makeup. Only about 50-60% of Iran’s population consists of Shi’ite Persians. Even in this, the most responsive audience to demagogic appeals to Iran’s historical greatness, there is widespread disaffection. 

This, after all, was the core that provided most of the country’s modernizing elites before the Islamic Revolution. But on the country’s periphery, there are large non-Persian and/or non-Shi’ite minorities – Azeris in the north toward the Caucasus, Kurds in the mid-west, Arabs at the head of the Gulf, Baluch in the east, and several others. Many of these are alienated from, if not actively hostile to, the regime, and most are accessible from other countries or the sea.

Foreign actors threatened by Iranian behavior can support demands by these populations, if not for secession or disintegration of the country (which might well encourage Persians to rally around the flag), then certainly for a government more tolerant and respectful of their cultural, linguistic and economic needs – that is, for something similar to the autonomous status of Kurdistan in Iraq. The potential here is illustrated by the outraged response to the murder of Mahsa Amini, which spread throughout the entire country but was most pronounced in her native Kurdistan. 

Therefore, foreign parties can begin to erode the foundations of the regime, at first with non-violent means -- in the form of funds, logistics and communications, information technology, and diplomatic endorsement. 

However, the regime would certainly respond (as it has done in the past) with a brutal crackdown, so foreign parties should not set out on this path unless they are committed in advance not to abandon those advocating the pluralization/decentralization/democratization of the country when the going gets tough or short-term interests change – as happened on more than one occasion to the Kurds in Iraq. This implies a willingness to escalate to military support and other active measures, at least in the form of instruction, individual and unit weaponry and operational intelligence, if not direct intervention. Failure to follow through on that would be worse, both politically and morally, than failure to assume the challenge in the first place.

A Broad Effort Needed 

Israel lacks the resources to take such a geostrategic gamble on its own. But there are many others who are also threatened by the Iranian regime’s aspirations and capabilities. These include the partners in the Abraham Accords, the putative partners in the tripartite accord promoted by the Biden Administration, and other informal allies in the region and elsewhere. Israel will find it difficult to convince the United States to take the indispensable lead in a campaign for regime change in Iran and to influence other key components to join in. Its chances would improve if it could persuade potential partners that it is also truly prepared, after Gaza, to act constructively on the Palestinian logjam. 

But for that to happen, Israel may well need to undergo its own regime change. In other words, when this stage of the confrontation is over, Israel will need to change its current government, change its government’s policies, and allow a true test of the argument made by critics of Israeli actions in Gaza that not all Palestinians are Hamas supporters or sympathizers.

Mark A. Heller is a senior researcher at the Institute for National Security Studies and a Non-Resident Scholar at the Middle East Institute in Washington, DC. 

Sumit Ganguly is a Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Indiana University, Bloomington, and a Visiting Fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University.

Image Credit: Creative Commons. 

China’s efforts to position itself as a mediator in Middle East conflicts are now open to doubt. Particularly open to scrutiny is Beijing’s lack of concrete actions following the Israel-Hamas conflict is now subject to scrutiny. This may have immediate and long-term consequences for China’s standing in the broader Middle East. Bridging the gap between rhetoric and concrete actions will be crucial in China’s role as a regional mediator.

In recent years, mediation diplomacy has emerged as one of the central pillars of China’s foreign policy objectives and practice, with Beijing deliberately positioning itself as a peacemaker in the Middle East region. This approach aligns with China’s broader foreign policy objectives, including expanding its global influence, fostering economic ties, and positioning itself as a responsible international player. Earlier this year, China brokered a deal between Saudi Arabia and Iran that many hailed as a diplomatic breakthrough. It signaled Beijing’s desire to be a diplomatic heavyweight in the Middle East—a region traditionally dominated by American power. China’s top diplomat, Wang Yi, said the country would continue to play a constructive role in handling global “hotspot issues.” 

Over the decades, many players in the global and regional arena have intervened, at some stage or another, in the Middle East region conflicts, especially the Israel-Palestine conflict, as peace brokers. The United States, the EU, Russia, regional powers (e.g., Egypt, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia), and major international organizations have all tried without noticeable success to broker lasting peace and security in the region. As the world’s second economic and great power, China, unlike the Western powers or Russia, carries no religious, political, historical, or colonial baggage, making it a suitable candidate to break the gridlocks in the region’s conflicts and to play the role of an “honest broker.” China’s involvement could offer a fresh perspective and potential contributions to peace and stability in the region. However, its effectiveness will depend on its ability to navigate complex and deeply rooted issues, gain the trust of all relevant parties, and avoid being seen as pursuing purely self-serving interests.

Beijing has been eager to become more involved in Middle East conflicts, especially the Israel-Palestine conflict. China has a long history of friendly relations with Palestine. Since founding the Palestine Liberation Organization in 1964, China has recognized the State of Palestine and actively supported the Palestinians. Beijing has supported the Palestinian cause in international forums, consistently advocating for a peaceful solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict based on the two-state solution. In 2023, China signed a strategic partnership agreement with the Palestinian Authority, underscoring its commitment to strengthening its ties with Palestine.

At the same time, China-Israel relations have evolved and grown. Today, they are especially noteworthy in economy, culture, academic cooperation, and tourism, and in 2017, they signed a “comprehensive partnership.” Beijing’s prime interest in Israel is its advanced technology, and it sees Israel as a world leader in technology and innovation in cybersecurity, bio-agriculture, and green technology. Israel’s geographical location makes it a potential node in China’s “Belt and Road Initiative.” For Israel, the attraction of Beijing lies not only in its vast economy but also because Israel seeks to diversify its export markets and investments away from the United States and Europe. China (excluding Hong Kong) became Israel’s third-largest trading partner ($21 billion in two-way trade), behind the European Union ($48.5 billion in 2022) and the United States ($22 billion in 2022). In 2021, China officially surpassed the United States to become Israel’s most significant source of imports. To diversify its foreign reserves, Israel added the Chinese yuan to its central bank holdings in April 2022 while reducing its dollar and euro holdings. The two countries are expected to conclude a free trade agreement (FTA) soon.

Over the years, Beijing has consistently sought opportunities to project the image of a peace broker in the Israeli-Palestine conflict through rhetoric and peace plans without putting real weight behind them. Thus, China’s mediation role is part of a carefully devised conflict-management strategy, which suits the country’s non-interference policy framework. This approach, rather than conflict resolution, has served Beijing well over the past several decades. Therefore, China’s mediation efforts in the Israeli-Palestine conflict mainly aim at constructive conflict management rather than conflict resolution. Beijing’s inability to back up its promises with concrete actions may suggest a lack of willingness or capability to influence the situation in the Middle East. In the long run, this persistent pattern might affect China’s image and credibility as a reliable peace broker. Beijing’s longstanding non-interference policy can sometimes clash with its aim to demonstrate its great-power status.

China’s Response to Hamas Terrorist Attack

On October 7, the Palestinian terrorist organization Hamas launched large-scale surprise attacks on Israel. Hamas had fired thousands of rockets from Gaza and sent fighters to kill and abduct soldiers and civilians. At least 1,300 Israelis were killed, over a hundred kidnapped hostages, including children and the elderly, and more than 3,000 wounded after dozens of Palestinian militants infiltrated Israel from Gaza by land, sea, and air. Israel launched airstrikes on Gaza; at least 2,600 Palestinians have been killed and more than 9,000 injured in the Israeli strikes. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declared, “We are at war. Not an ‘operation,’ not a ‘round,’ but at war”, adding that “the enemy will pay an unprecedented price.”

The outbreak of violence between Israel and Gaza challenges China’s mediation efforts in the Middle East. Beijing has tried to position itself as a potential mediator in the region, and the international community closely scrutinizes its responses to such crises. However, the United States, the EU, and much of Asia, Africa, and Latin America issued statements condemning Hamas’ terrorist actions and expressing support for Israel. Beijing’s initial response to the attacks did not mention the militant group by name, instead calling for de-escalation, protecting civilians, and implementing a two-state solution. Its response was no condemnation of Hamas for a rampage that unleashed the killing of civilians and kidnapping of hostages, including children and the elderly: “China is deeply concerned over the current escalation of tensions and violence between Palestine and Israel. We call on relevant parties to remain calm, exercise restraint, and immediately end the hostilities to protect civilians and avoid further deterioration of the situation.”

The Foreign Ministry and Chinese officials continued to take this line throughout the week: “We call on relevant parties to remain calm, exercise restraint, and immediately end the hostilities to protect civilians and avoid further deterioration of the situation,” China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said in a statement last Sunday about the “escalation of tensions and violence between Palestine and Israel.” China’s permanent representative to the United Nations, Zhang Jun, together with the representative of Russia, prevented a formal condemnation by the Security Council against Hamas and said, “China condemns all violence and attacks against civilians in Israel and the Palestinian territories.” At the regular press briefing, Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Mao Ning said China “opposes and condemns acts harming civilians” and said the priority is to “end hostilities and restore peace as soon as possible.” 

Israel is disappointed by Beijing’s response, which expressed little sympathy or support for the Israeli people during these tragic times. Israeli diplomats in China have called for stronger condemnation of Hamas, “When people are being murdered, slaughtered in the streets, this is not the time to call for a two-state solution.” The current crisis raises the question of whether this would seriously impact Beijing’s role as the Middle East’s new peacemaker and its relationship with Israel in the longer term. Paraphrasing the words of Abba Eban, Israel’s legendary foreign minister, the “Chinese never miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity to play the role of peacemaker in the Middle East.”

Before the Hamas-Israel conflict outbreak, China tried to present itself as a mediator in conflicts in the Middle East. Its weak response may expose its limited regional influence and undermine its honest broker image. Mediating effectively in an area requires balancing diplomatic principles of non-interference and demonstrating a commitment to resolving conflicts. The vagueness of Beijing’s condemnation of the terrorist attacks on Israel is consistent with its policy of non-interference in global conflicts. Beijing’s reluctance to condemn Hamas has drawn comparison to its response to the Ukraine war. There, China has refused to condemn Russia’s aggression or consider it an “invasion.” It also reflects the limit of its diplomatic efforts in the Middle East and reconfirms the impression that Beijing will not be a peacemaker. Beijing has little to do, and its remarks and actions show that the mediation diplomacy approach is limited.

Moreover, China’s response does not come as a surprise; Chinese diplomacy has long been risk-averse, and the spiraling conflict between Israel and Hamas puts its diplomats in a difficult spot, given its traditional support for the Palestinians, its rivalry with the US, and its relationships with Russia and Iran. To be sure, Beijing can successfully manage problems by brokering reconciliation agreements (e.g., Saudi Arabia and Iran). However, when it comes to conflict resolution, it is a very different situation. Thus, China’s role in the Middle East, especially as a peacemaker, will continue to be a subject of scrutiny and debate. Its ability to adapt its diplomacy to the evolving dynamics in the region and take a more active role in resolving conflicts remains a significant question for international observers and stakeholders.

Israel does not expect Beijing to resolve the longstanding conflict with Hamas. Still, it would like China to demonstrate more support, and it hopes Beijing could use its power to weigh and influence some Middle Eastern allies as well. Israeli Ambassador Irit Ben-Abba called on Beijing to leverage its close relationship with Iran to rein in Hamas by engaging in talks around the conflict. “We really hope China can be much more involved in talking to its close partners in the Middle East and particularly Iran.”

The Hamas-Israel conflict may also hit Beijing’s relationship with Jerusalem and the broader Middle East. China has long tried to adopt a balanced position by supporting Palestinian statehood while maintaining strong economic and diplomatic ties with Israel. Beijing has reasons to balance its relationships on both sides of the conflict, with its bilateral trade with Israel totaling some $21 billion last year, and more than half of its exports to China are electric components, including microchips. This trade with Israel is crucial as the United States urges its partners to limit the sale of semiconductor technology to Beijing. While Washington provided Jerusalem with sympathy and practical support and is sending aircraft carriers to the region to prevent Iran and Hezbollah from escalating, China’s lax response can have an immediate and long-term price. For example, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu’s planned official visit to China probably did not materialize, and the two parties will not likely conclude an FTA, which has been under discussion for several years.

More importantly, the intensifying great power rivalry created a highly precarious situation for future Sino-Israeli ties. Israel faces a complex geopolitical and commercial calculus, with new pressures on managing its national security and economic development. This complicates its efforts to maintain hedging behavior within certain limitations and forces it to choose between keeping the U.S. security partnership or strengthening its economic and technological collaboration with Beijing. Washington expects Israel, its closest ally in the region, to align with its strategic interests and positions in rivalry with China. The special relationship between Israel and the United States is rooted in shared values and deep and practical cooperation in every field, from military and security to diplomacy and commerce. In times of need, true friends reveal themselves through their actions. The Hamas-Israel conflict can serve as a lesson to countries in the Middle East thinking through their relationship with China. 

Dr. Mordechai Chaziza is a senior lecturer at the Department of Politics and Governance and the Multidisciplinary Studies in Social Science division at Ashkelon Academic College (Israel) and a Research Fellow at the Asian Studies Department, University of Haifa, specializing in Chinese foreign and strategic relations.

Image: Shutterstock. 

That the current war in the Gaza Strip poses a clear existential threat to Hamas and potentially to the entire Palestinian cause is abundantly clear. But the current conflict, Israel’s pronounced intent to wipe Hamas off the face of the earth, even if this means a months-long war, will have profound long-term implications for any actor with a stake in the postwar balance of power and regional order in the Middle East. Israel’s purpose and identity as a viable country for and protector of the Jewish people are at stake. But the vital interests of the entire Iranian camp in the Middle East—the self-described “axis of resistance,” of which Hamas has become a key member in recent years, are also hanging in the balance. 

Spearheaded by Iran—its primary supplier of military hardware, know-how, and technology—the “axis of resistance” mainly consists of the Lebanese Hezbollah, the Gaza Strip, Syria, Yemen’s Houthi rebel movement Ansar Allah, and multiple Iran-backed Shiite groups in Iraq. Together, they have gained critical mass as a coordinated and synchronized strategic community. In recent years, these actors have become a regional bloc, thinking in geopolitical terms and sharing the aspiration for an anti-Western regional order in what Iran calls “West Asia.” 

In addition to their quest to defeat Israel and Western powers from the Middle East, “resistance” actors from Gaza, Lebanon, and Iran share a similar strategic concept. In essence, the basic underlying logic of the strategy of “resistance” accepts that superior actors such as Israel, the United States, and Saudi Arabia will always be able to visit immense civilian pain on their countries. However, although these actors exhibit severe civilian vulnerability, their military apparatuses, command-and-control systems, and continued conventional second-strike capability remain secure. This is precisely the logic behind the reliance of the “axis of resistance” on vast stockpiles of stand-off weapons such as rockets, precision-guided missiles, long-range attack drones, and shore-to-sea missiles.

In the Gaza Strip, Lebanon, Yemen, Iraq, and Iran, these military capabilities are secured in underground tunnels and facilities—what Iran calls “missile cities.” In every one of these conflict zones, the “resistance” actors have harnessed these capabilities in the service of subjecting their superior adversaries to what they call “rules of the game,” deterrence “equations,” and “rules of engagement.” Significantly, although all these originate with Iran’s advanced military industries, the strategic lexicon and mindset of the “resistance” originates not with Iran but with Hezbollah. Indeed, when it comes to “resistance” as a coherent asymmetric strategy, the primary “laboratory” has been the Israel-Hezbollah conflict.

On multiple occasions over the years, Hezbollah’s long-time Secretary General Hasan Nasrallah, who is a key, integral part of Iranian decision-making, explained the strategic logic of “resistance.” According to Nasrallah, rockets and missiles are the weaker “resistance” actor’s means of offsetting the stronger side’s aerial supremacy. Thus, as long as the stronger actor’s offensive continues, so do the weaker actor’s rocket barrages continue to impact its own cities. As Nasrallah explained, ultimately, the stronger side might be forced to unleash a land invasion—something that is supposed to level the playing field. A military invasion is thus seen as a desirable outcome.

For the “resistance” actors, this very strategy is currently at stake, which was rightly perceived as having withstood Israel’s military might in several conflicts in Lebanon in the 1990s and the thirty-four-day-long 2006 Lebanon War. In all these conflicts, Israel fell short of inflicting a decisive military blow or otherwise impacting its critical vulnerabilities. In all cases, what Israel failed to accomplish militarily, it was also unable to accomplish diplomatically. This meant that in the day after, Israel, despite its immense military superiority, was deterred. As a result, it was forced to abide by certain “rules of the game” and effectively tolerate continued violence and Hezbollah’s accelerated military build-up. 

Hezbollah later actively exported this model to the Gaza Strip, where Hamas drew on its experience and adopted its vocabulary. Thus, the same phenomena have applied to Israel’s conflicts in the Gaza Strip since Hamas’s June 2007 takeover. Hamas is now attempting to deter Israel and subject it to “deterrent equations” whereby Israeli assaults beyond a certain threshold are retaliated against with heavy rocket fire on Israel’s commercial capital, Tel Aviv. Calling the prospect of an IDF invasion of the Gaza Strip “laughable,” the spokesperson of Hamas’s Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades military wing stated that “nine-tenths of the Al-Qassam army” were eagerly waiting to confront any invading army. 

In the years after the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war, Hezbollah has established itself as Israel’s primary military threat. Ever since that war, which Hezbollah cast as a “divine victory,” Iran provided it with many of its advanced capabilities in a way that has in recent years diminished the Israeli Air Force’s freedom of action over Lebanon. Hezbollah’s current military capabilities, and those of Iran as well, are now far more advanced. As then-U.S. Central Command Chief Kenneth McKenzie admitted in 2021, “Iran’s strategic capacity is now enormous…. They’ve got overmatch in the theatre—the ability to overwhelm.” McKenzie’s successor, Michael Kurilla, stated in 2023 that the IRGC “of today is unrecognizable from just five years ago.”

Hamas undoubtedly drew courage and inspiration from its cooperation with Iran and Hezbollah, which has increased significantly since 2021, and from its sense that the entire “axis of resistance” had its back. Hamas’s military spokesman confirmed that Hamas’s “level of coordination with the brethren in the axis of resistance had increased and developed in terms of mobilizing the efforts with respect to the future of the conflict.” Nowhere was this more evident than in a recent interview by Salih al-Aruri, Hamas’s second-in-command, who stated in late August that a “decisive” multi-front regional war with Israel was not only desirable but, in fact, “necessary” in “the near term.” 

Warning that the Palestinians had between two to three years before Israel’s right-wing government increased the number of Jewish settlers in the West Bank to two million, the Beirut-based Al-Aruri said that there is currently a regional “interest that there be a regional war…there are parties who are extremely active in this regard, and who are discussing this.” Al-Aruri concluded that if war broke out, “Israel would be dealt a defeat that is unprecedented in its history. We are certain of this. And it will be subjected to new realities. Its standing, the way in which it is viewed by the world…their own belief in themselves…and also those in the region who have hopes that Israel will serve as a guarantor and protector—all of this will change.” 

One week after Hamas dealt Israel what its leaders are already calling the worst catastrophe inflicted upon Jewish civilians since the Holocaust, Al-Aruri’s words ring more prescient than anyone would have given him credit for before October 7, 2023. In order to disprove his prediction, Israel will engage in actions and behaviors that will likely clash with its enemies’ vital interests, thereby increasing the likelihood that the current war will become far broader. Already now, they are on the cusp of a regional war. Whichever way things develop, the regional repercussions will be formative. In more than one way, this could very well change not only the Middle East, as Israel’s prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu has pledged, but Israel itself. 

Daniel Sobelman is a research fellow with the Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs’ Middle East Initiative and an Assistant Professor of International Relations at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel. A former Arab affairs correspondent for Haaretz, Dr. Sobelman has published extensively on Israel’s conflict with Hezbollah and the “axis of resistance” for over two decades.

Image: Shutterstock.

President Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine has come at huge economic costs. By conservative estimates, the Russian economy has taken a US$67 billion annual hit as a result of war expenses and the effects of economic sanctions. In the early stages of the invasion, some analysts put the costs even higher, at $900 million per day.

These war costs show no sign of abating. The newly released Russian government budget for 2024 calls for a 70% defense expenditure increase, an astonishing reallocation of precious resources for a war that some observers expected to last a week at most.

Despite the toll of war and sanctions, the Russian economy has not collapsed and seems to have proven somewhat resilient against being shut out of global value chains.

Indeed, if you were to tune in to broadcasts of state-run RT television’s “CrossTalk” with American host Peter Lavelle, you’d be reassured that hardly anyone notices “irrelevant” Western sanctions, with even some reputable Western economists claiming that sanctions are harming Europe more than Russia.

Certainly, Muscovite oligarchs can still stroll across Red Square to Agent Provocateur and the GUM luxury shopping mall to buy lingerie for their wives and perhaps mistresses, too. And almost 8 in 10 Russians report to pollsters that sanctions have not affected their daily lives.

But from our standpoint as experts on Russian economic history, it looks very much like a Potemkin village – a false facade that belies harsh economic realities, including unsustainable defense spending, a plummeting currency and rising bond yields. Meat and poultry prices in Moscow continue to rise, retail sales across Russia have dropped by nearly 8% since February 2022, and Russia’s aviation industry has plummeted for lack of spare parts and maintenance.

Such an economic hit was to be expected. As we show in a preprint study, imperial overreach from Russia in territories that are not its own has resulted in long-term damage to the Russian economy for over a century. More importantly, even during czarist times, rebellion in the modern-day lands of Ukraine against Russian rule led to the highest costs for the Russian economy.

Huge boost in military spending

Russia’s ability to seemingly absorb massive shocks since February 2022 is due in part to producers becoming accustomed to the milder sanctions that began in 2014 with the initial invasion of Ukraine and annexation of Crimea.

However, a larger driver of performance has been the Russian government taking it upon itself to try to keep the economy afloat by increasing its involvement in all sectors of the economy, nationalizing formerly Western-owned businesses and pumping money from the state budget into the military industrial complex.

This approach has continued with the Russian government’s 2024 budget, which is currently on its way to be rubber-stamped in the Russian parliament, the Duma. While mobilization of troops for Russia’s growing quagmire is moving in fits and starts, the Kremlin has proceeded with a full-scale economic mobilization. Expenditures on defense are forecast to be 6% of the country’s GDP, making up a full 29% of all Russian government spending, according to an analysis by the Bank of Finland, and with an additional 9% spent on “national security.” In contrast, social programs are a mere 21% of the budget. Compare this with the United States, where defense spending is 3% of GDP and 12% of all government expenditures.

Financial markets have reacted poorly to Russia’s most recent imperial adventure. The ruble’s turbulence is well known, once again breaking 100 rubles to the dollar on Oct. 3, 2023, but Russia’s inability to service its debt has been more under the radar.

For the first time since the Bolsheviks refused to honor the country’s foreign debt in 1918, Russia defaulted on its foreign currency payments in June 2022, and major ratings agencies stopped rating Russian government bonds.

At the same time, bond yields on existing Russian government debt – an excellent measure of fiscal risk – have been climbing almost continuously since the first invasion of Ukraine in 2014, rising to nearly 14% in 2014 and recently climbing to over 13%, an 18-month high.

Ponzi-like scheme

The combination of military aggression, stretched finances and battlefield stagnation are nothing new for Russia, especially in Ukraine. As our study shows, czarist fiscal management from 1820 to 1914 was based on a Ponzi-like scheme that funded land grabs and military expansion with government borrowing through bond issues, taxation of newly acquired territories and bond repayment by a government now overseeing a more geographically extensive state.

By 1914, Czar Nicholas II had bonds worth more than $155 billion in 2022 dollars trading abroad – by comparison, the value of British debt in 1914 equates to approximately $123 billion today.

Vladimir Putin’s handling of the economy since the early 2000s has been based on a similar pyramid scheme, we would argue. A combination of aggressive foreign borrowing and natural resource exports have financed foreign wars and domestic repression in territories of Russia’s near abroad: These have included conflicts in Chechnya and Georgia in the 2000s; Crimea and the Donbas in the 2010s; and the rest of Ukraine in the 2020s. Until this current round of aggression toward Ukraine, the outcome of these conflicts appeared to favor Russia, with its seemingly strong central government, military and economy.

However, Russia may now be at an inflection point. Historically, when Russia’s military was successful, it was able to finance both its war machine and industrialization.

Yet even past military success put the regime on very shaky ground that allowed small setbacks to threaten its foundation. Military reversals such as the stunning loss to Japan in 1905 or even the costs associated with pacifying troublesome territories such as in the Caucasus created more difficulties and risk for Russian bond markets and its economy. Indeed, unrest, armed rebellion and serf revolts in the far reaches of the empire raised Russian bond yields by approximately 1%. This risk was much higher than if such unrest occurred even in St. Petersburg or Moscow.

And perhaps most importantly, in Ukraine the cost of empire during czarist times was the largest, with each rebellion or bout of unrest in Ukraine raising Russian yields by between 3% and 3.5%.

With its newest defense budget going “all in” on its already faltering invasion of Ukraine, Russia appears to have learned none of the lessons of its past. Then as now, Ukraine and Ukrainian defiance constituted a grave threat to Russian territorial ambitions.

In 2024, that defiance just might prove too determined and too costly for an increasingly fragile Russian economy. And as in 1917, the consequences could be far beyond the control of the modern-day czar in the Kremlin.

Christopher A. Hartwell is Professor of International Business Policy at the ZHAW School of Management and Law.

​Paul Vaaler is Professor of Law and Business at the University of Minnesota.

This article was first published by The Conversation.

Image: kibri_ho / Shutterstock.com

Recently, concerns have arisen regarding Chinese ambitions to establish overseas military bases. These concerns hold particular validity in certain regions, such as Cambodia and Pakistan, where Chinese influence is significant, and the prospect of military facilities is a genuine cause for worry. In other cases, while we cannot rule out the possibility of Chinese base establishment entirely, it remains uncertain, as in Vanuatu and West Africa. However, upon delving into the geography and history of the Solomon Islands and the technical specifications of Chinese equipment, fears of Chinese base construction, in this case, appear baseless. This paper will first review the background of the relations between the Solomon Islands and China, the history of its civil war, and then analyze why China is highly unlikely to construct a base in the archipelagic nation.

Initially, Taiwan and the Solomon Islands maintained strong diplomatic relations. This was largely due to Taiwan providing substantial financial incentives to Solomon Islands politicians. These financial incentives allowed politicians to divert a significant portion of foreign aid funds for personal gain while still having sufficient resources to distribute among their constituents. The distribution of Taiwanese aid to regular Solomon Islanders was similar to American pork barrel spending and outright vote buying. Consequently, Taiwan enjoyed widespread popularity among the Solomon Islands population, except for the educated elite in Honiara, who did not benefit from Taipei’s financial support.

Unfortunately for Taiwan, China has been actively pursuing a strategy of isolating Taiwan diplomatically. China offered the Solomon Islands a significantly larger financial incentive than Taipei could match. Additionally, China promised to fund the same programs that Taiwan had supported. Consequently, after the re-election of Manasseh Sogavare for another term in office, he pledged to investigate the possibility of switching diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to China. However, midway through the investigation, which was staffed with individuals favorable to China, Sogavare abruptly changed the Solomon Islands’ diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to China without waiting for the conclusions of the already biased committee. This decision sparked two riots, one of which led to the destruction of Honiara’s Chinatown, not for the first time. In addition, the violence required the intervention of Australian, Papuan, and Fijian peacekeepers from the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) to quell both riots.

Now is an opportune moment to delve into the history of the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands and its relevance in explaining why the Chinese would be highly unlikely to obtain permission to establish a military base in the Solomon Islands, even if they were interested. During the civil war in the Solomon Islands, the country notably lacked a legally recognized national military. The conflict primarily pitted the inhabitants of Guadalcanal against those from Malaita. During World War II, some residents had been forcibly displaced from their land to make way for a military base, leading them to seek refuge in a different part of Guadalcanal. These islanders were also never compensated.

Additionally, people from the island of Malaita came to the island of Guadalcanal due to the economic opportunities created by the base. However, the people of Guadalcanal regarded these people as invaders. After bias against the natives by the people in government, the people of Guadalcanal started to rise against the government and, through the actions of the Isatabu Freedom Movement, forced Malaitians into the city of Honiara. However, the people in government tended to side with the Malatian community, and the Royal Solomon Islands Police Force often gave arms and assistance to the people fighting on the side of the Malaitian Eagle Force. The civil war persisted until 2003 when Australian-led intervention forces entered the Solomon Islands. This intervention was crucial in establishing a fragile but generally enduring peace.

This historical context is essential for understanding the local dynamics and sensitivities in the Solomon Islands, which could significantly influence decisions regarding foreign military bases, such as those thought to be sought by China, as few, if any, governments would be willing to recreate the same circumstance that caused a civil war.

Given this historical context, it seems highly unlikely that the Chinese would be granted permission to establish a military base on Kolombangara Island, the area of their supposed interest. This island is relatively small, with a population of around 6,000 people. However, it’s crucial to consider that the Solomon Islands has a total population of 800,000 individuals. If one were to relocate the inhabitants of Kolombangara Island forcibly, it would be comparable to the United States displacing the entire population of cities like Chicago or Houston. This situation raises significant optical challenges. Evicting people from an island to build a military base would have horrible optics, especially in a country that experienced a civil war partially triggered initially by the displacement of people from an island to construct a military facility. A decision by a democratic government to do such a thing could have disastrous results in the next election or could start another riot. Additionally, technical concerns and practical constraints would further complicate using Kolombangara Island as a viable base location.

Indeed, several practical issues with Kolombangara Island make it unsuitable for establishing a PLA Navy base, regardless of historical considerations. One significant limitation is the island’s port infrastructure. First and foremost, the pier is only approximately fifty meters long before encountering very shallow water (see yellow line in Figure 1). This means that no oceangoing PLA-N ship can operate from that port (see the red line in Figure 1). Moreover, there’s just one pier at this port, which severely restricts its operational capacity. In the best-case scenario, the Chinese could only base two small naval combatants at this single pier. Expanding the port would necessitate displacing local villagers, as there is a town near the pier (see Figure 1). Consequently, the island’s port facilities are inadequate for hosting oceangoing ships, and the limited docking space available would only accommodate a maximum of two vessels. These limitations render the island ill-suited as a PLA Navy base, in addition to the historical and ethical considerations previously discussed.

Image: CNES/Airbus, Maxar Technologies/Google Maps

While there is an old airstrip on Gizo Island, an island right next to Kolombangara Island, suggesting the possibility of using the Solomon Islands for ground installations or missile deployments akin to some of China’s South China Sea bases, there are more technical limitations. The airstrip on the island measures approximately 1,100 meters in length. However, the lightest aircraft in China’s inventory capable of carrying substantial equipment for a base and covering the necessary distance to reach the Solomon Islands, the Y-8, requires a runway length of about 1,800 meters for safe landing. Extending the runway might seem like a viable solution, but it’s important to note that this airstrip is on an island with limited available space. In the case of Gizo airstrip, for instance, extending the runway would necessitate enlarging the island itself, as the airstrip already occupies nearly the entire length of the island (see Figure 2). These technical constraints further complicate, if not eliminate, the feasibility of using Kolombangara Island as a potential military base.

Image: CNES/Airbus, Maxar Technologies/Google Maps

Given the Solomon Islands’ small size and low population count, Chinese engineering projects expanding the port or airstrip would not work because of the potential impacts on any individual island. If the Chinese build a base on the Solomon Islands, they will likely force the Solomon Islanders out of their homes. Even if they don’t demolish villages, mass construction will destroy the only local source of income, logging. Even if the construction doesn’t take up the entire island, it would be doubtful that the Chinese would want a logging company to operate close to their military bases. As a result, logging will likely stop, forcing the island’s residents to go live elsewhere and possibly even trigger a second civil war. 

The concerns regarding a potential Chinese naval base on Kolombangara Island lack historical, technical, and geographic merit. However, should China genuinely desire a naval base in Melanesia, its focus would more likely be on Vanuatu. Vanuatu already possesses a Chinese-built port capable of hosting cruise ships, which can, in turn, accommodate various types of oceangoing warships in the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). Furthermore, Vanuatu is historically aligned with the concept of “Melanesian Socialism,” indicating a significant degree of ideological affinity between China and Vanuatu. Thus, if there are genuine concerns regarding the potential establishment of a PLAN base in the Pacific Islands, Vanuatu, rather than the Solomon Islands, should be the primary focus of such concerns.

Paul Weisko is a research fellow at the University of Haifa’s Maritime Policy and Strategy Research Center. He is a specialist in East Asian maritime security.

Image Credit: Chinese Military/YouTube Screenshot. 

Because of its unique national security challenges, Israel has a long history of developing highly effective, state-of-the-art defense technologies and capabilities. A prime example of Israeli military strength is the Iron Dome air defense system, which has been widely touted as the world’s best defense against missiles and rockets.

However, on Oct. 7, 2023, Israel was caught off guard by a very large-scale missile attack by the Gaza-based Palestinian militant group Hamas. The group fired several thousand missiles at a number of targets across Israel, according to reports. While exact details are not available, it is clear that a significant number of the Hamas missiles penetrated the Israeli defenses, inflicting extensive damage and casualties.

I am an aerospace engineer who studies space and defense systems. There is a simple reason the Israeli defense strategy was not fully effective against the Hamas attack. To understand why, you first need to understand the basics of air defense systems.

Air defense: detect, decide, disable

An air defense system consists of three key components. First, there are radars to detect, identify and track incoming missiles. The range of these radars varies. Iron Dome’s radar is effective over distances of 2.5 to 43.5 miles (4 to 70 km), according to its manufacturer Raytheon. Once an object has been detected by the radar, it must be assessed to determine whether it is a threat. Information such as direction and speed are used to make this determination.

If an object is confirmed as a threat, Iron Dome operators continue to track the object by radar. Missile speeds vary considerably, but assuming a representative speed of 3,280 feet per second (1 km/s), the defense system has at most one minute to respond to an attack.

The second major element of an air defense system is the battle control center. This component determines the appropriate way to engage a confirmed threat. It uses the continually updating radar information to determine the optimal response in terms of from where to fire interceptor missiles and how many to launch against an incoming missile.

The third major component is the interceptor missile itself. For Iron Dome, it is a supersonic missile with heat-seeking sensors. These sensors provide in-flight updates to the interceptor, allowing it to steer toward and close in on the threat. The interceptor uses a proximity fuse activated by a small radar to explode close to the incoming missile so that it does not have to hit it directly to disable it.

Limits of missile defenses

Israel has at least 10 Iron Dome batteries in operation, each containing 60 to 80 interceptor missiles. Each of those missiles costs about US$60,000. In previous attacks involving smaller numbers of missiles and rockets, Iron Dome was 90% effective against a range of threats.

So, why was the system less effective against the recent Hamas attacks?

It is a simple question of numbers. Hamas fired several thousand missiles, and Israel had less than a thousand interceptors in the field ready to counter them. Even if Iron Dome was 100% effective against the incoming threats, the very large number of the Hamas missiles meant some were going to get through.

The Hamas attacks illustrate very clearly that even the best air defense systems can be overwhelmed if they are overmatched by the number of threats they have to counter.

The Israeli missile defense has been built up over many years, with high levels of financial investment. How could Hamas afford to overwhelm it? Again, it all comes down to numbers. The missiles fired by Hamas cost about $600 each, and so they are about 100 times less expensive than the Iron Dome interceptors. The total cost to Israel of firing all of its interceptors is around $48 million. If Hamas fired 5,000 missiles, the cost would be only $3 million.

Thus, in a carefully planned and executed strategy, Hamas accumulated over time a large number of relatively inexpensive missiles that it knew would overwhelm the Iron Dome defensive capabilities. Unfortunately for Israel, the Hamas attack represents a very clear example of military asymmetry: a low-cost, less-capable approach was able to defeat a more expensive, high-technology system.

Future air defense systems

The Hamas attack will have repercussions for all of the world’s major military powers. It clearly illustrates the need for air defense systems that are much more effective in two important ways. First, there is the need for a much deeper arsenal of defensive weapons that can address very large numbers of missile threats. Second, the cost per defensive weapon needs to be reduced significantly.

This episode is likely to accelerate the development and deployment of directed energy air defense systems based on high-energy lasers and high-power microwaves. These devices are sometimes described as having an “infinite magazine,” because they have a relatively low cost per shot fired and can keep firing as long as they are supplied with electrical power.

Iain Boyd is Director at the Center for National Security Initiatives and Professor of Aerospace Engineering Sciences at the University of Colorado Boulder.

This article was first published by The Conversation.

Image: Creative Commons. 

Israel has declared war on the Islamist extremist group known as Hamas after a surprise attack that began on Saturday claimed the lives of more than 1,200 Israelis. While conflict between Israel and Palestine is nothing new, this attack has been characterized as unprecedented in terms of both organization and brutality by media outlets and defense officials alike.

Hamas is the ruling party of the Gaza Strip – one of the two occupied Palestinian territories in Israel. But while a great deal of internet discourse thus far has painted this conflict as between Israel and Palestine as a whole, the reality is more complex than that.

Hamas rules over the two million Palestinians living in the Gaza Strip, while a separate and more secular Palestinian political party known as Fatah, an inverted Arabic acronym for the “Palestine National Liberation Movement,” rules over the remaining 2.7 million living in the West Bank. Technically speaking, Fatah is a political party within the Palestinian Authority that is recognized as the ruling body of Palestine.

The Palestinian Authority is the internationally recognized Palestinian government, Fatah is the political party in charge of that government, and Hamas is an extremist organization outside that organizational hierarchy.

WHAT IS HAMAS AND HOW DID THEY RISE TO POWER?

Founded in 1987, Hamas is a Sunni Islamist extremist organization that rules over the Gaza Strip and has significant political power within Palestinian territories. In 1993, Hamas carried out its first suicide bombing and was designated as a foreign terrorist organization by the United States in 1997. Other countries, including the EU members, have also designated Hamas a terrorist organization.

In 2006, elections were held for the Palestinian Legislative Council in the Gaza Strip, with Hamas candidates securing some 44.45% of the popular vote and Fatah candidates winning 41.43%. After efforts to hammer out a power-sharing agreement sputtered, factional fighting between Palestinians began in what is now known as the Battle of Gaza. After days of fighting and hundreds killed, Hamas forced Fatah out of the Gaza Strip and has not held another election since.

Formal reconciliation efforts between Hamas and Fatah started and failed no fewer than seven times between 2006 and 2018, with the Hamas-led Gaza Strip engaging in three armed conflicts with Israel during the same time.

THE PALESTINEAN PEOPLE ARE NOT A MONOLITH

Although tensions between these Palestinian groups have lessened in recent years, there remain significant differences in both the ideologies and methodologies employed by their members. Hamas, is an inherently Islamist organization that adheres to a strictly enforced religious law, while Fatah is considered more secular. Likewise, Hamas believes the only solution to Israeli occupation is armed conflict, while Fatah prefers negotiation. However, it’s important to understand that Fatah’s preference for diplomacy should not be seen as tacit support for Israeli policies toward Palestine, as Fatah’s leadership is open about its disdain for what they see as Israel’s repressive policy decisions.

To that point, Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas has called on the United Nations to curtail Israel’s military operations against the Gaza Strip and has expressed solidarity with the civilians being affected by the ongoing fighting. The Palestinian Authority has not condemned Hamas’ attack, but thus far, does not appear to have been involved in its execution.

Some Western analysts have gone so far as to suggest that Abbas and the Palestinian Authority find themselves on very dangerous footing due to Hamas’ offensive. One could argue that Hamas does not seek to remove the boot of Israeli oppression from Palestine’s neck, but rather, simply replace it with its own. Any success in this conflict would strengthen Hamas’ hand and potentially undermine the future security of Fatah, but siding with Israel – even with vague statements – could undermine Fatah’s credibility among its own people, who would see such an act as siding with Israel against them.

WHAT IS THE GAZA STRIP?

The Gaza Strip is a 25-mile long, six-mile-wide Palestinian enclave bordered by Israel to the North, Egypt to the South, and the Mediterranean Sea to the west. Surrounded by walls and fences constructed by Israeli occupying forces, the Gaza Strip is home to some 2.3 million people and is among the most densely populated territories in the world.

In 2007, a year after Hamas’ victory in Gaza’s legislative elections, Israel enacted a number of policies aimed at isolating the Gaza Strip and its new extremist government; these included strict restrictions on people and even goods entering or exiting the territory. Israel, as a result, has been criticized by members of the international community. Human Rights Watch, a non-governmental organization accused Israel of turning the densely packed territory into an “open-air prison.”

While several independent organizations consider Human Rights Watch credible, it is important to note that the group has also been accused of selection bias at best and “hostility and hypocrisy” at worst by pro-Israeli groups. This is a running theme throughout a great deal of discourse surrounding Israel and Palestine as both groups have historic claims over the land (with Israel’s dating back further, but Palestine’s dominating modern history), and both groups likewise being subject to grave human rights abuses, often at the hands of one another.

For modern Palestineans, this conflict began in 1948 with the establishment of the nation of Israel – which included the forced relocation of Palestinians from their homes. But to the people of Israel, the Arab world began this blood feud in 722 BCE, when the Jewish population was forced out of their homes by invading Assyrians, leading to centuries of repression and genocide for the stateless people that culminated in the extermination of six million Jews in the Holocaust of World War II.

And therein lies an example of the sheer complexity of the ongoing conflict between Israel and Hamas. Contemporary discourse is dominated by social media and news headlines, which have a habit of robbing complex topics of their nuance in favor of succinct “hot takes” and highly meme-able messages. However, conflict is rarely as simple as it’s presented online, and few conflicts better reflect the quagmire of intertwined human nature and geopolitics quite like the fight between Israel and Palestine.

Related: The US Intelligence Community has a new strategy for the future

DOES HAMAS SPEAK FOR PALESTINE?

It’s important to understand the distinction between Hamas – the governing party of the Gaza Strip – and the civilians who live under Hamas’ rule. For many Palestinians, Hamas represents the rock and Israel the hard place they now find themselves stuck between.

A poll conducted in June 2023 by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR) showed that about half of the Palestinian population in both Gaza and the West Bank politically supports Hamas despite the group’s restrictive adherence to the Sharia-based Palestinian Basic Law.

There is evidence to suggest that this support may be based on the repressive measures enacted by Israel, rather than on confidence in Hamas and its standing leadership, however. According to a 2021 report from the U.S. State Department’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, there are credible reports of a wide variety of human rights violations enacted by Israeli forces against the people of Palestine spanning years.

“Significant human rights issues included credible reports of: unlawful or arbitrary killings; arbitrary detention, often extraterritorial detention of Palestinians from the occupied territories in Israel; restrictions on Palestinians residing in Jerusalem including arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy, family, and home; substantial interference with the freedom of association; arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy; harassment of nongovernmental organizations; significant restrictions on freedom of movement within the country; violence against asylum seekers and irregular migrants; violence or threats of violence against national, racial, or ethnic minority groups; and labor rights abuses against foreign workers and Palestinians from the West Bank,” the State Department’s report states.

The 2023 report shows that 73% of Palestinians believe Hamas-run institutions in the Gaza Strip are corrupt, an increase of 2% over the same poll conducted three months prior. Just shy of 60% of Palestinians in the Gaza Strip say they could not criticize Hamas’ authorities without fear of reprisal.

However, despite concern and fear of Hamas leadership, 55% of Palestinians in the Gaza Strip believed an armed struggle is the only way to end the Israeli occupation, with only 21% believing negotiation could work. It is worth noting, however, that 21% marks a three-percent increase over the same poll three months prior.

While 38% of Palestinians polled said establishing an independent Palestinian state should be their people’s first priority, 25% highlighted internal corruption as the more pressing issue facing Palestine today. In other words, Palestine is far from a monolith, and Hamas should be seen less as the de facto voice of an oppressed people, and more as an extremist element of an internally fractured Palestine. But extreme as Hamas may be, there’s no denying the group’s influence and allure to those struggling under what they consider to be inhumane Israeli policies.

Alex Hollings is a writer, dad, and Marine veteran.

This article was first published by Sandboxx News.

Image: Anas-Mohammed / Shutterstock.com

As the Israeli army has stepped up its counteroffensive into the Gaza Strip, questions remain on how the Palestinian Islamist group Hamas was able to use bulldozers, hang gliders and motorbikes to conduct the largest attack in 50 years against the most powerful military in the Middle East.

On Saturday, Oct. 7, 2023, around 6:30 a.m. local time, Hamas launched upward of 3,000 rockets and sent 1,000 fighters across the border from Gaza into Israel.

Despite the scale and scope of the attack, ABC News reported that Israeli defense officials claimed to have had no specific warning that Hamas “was preparing a sophisticated attack that required coordinated land, air and sea attacks.”

Many political and military analysts have criticized Israel for its intelligence failure to anticipate the attack, but the success of Hamas’ surprise attack was an operational failure as well.

Over the course of my military career in special operations, I conducted hundreds of tactical, operational and strategic missions based on intelligence. Never once did I expect intelligence to be perfect.

In fact, it rarely was. I based my plan on the best intelligence available, but I also thought of every possible scenario that I could in order to be ready for anything the enemy might throw at me. It seems the Israelis didn’t do that.

The limits of intelligence

If the definition of an intelligence failure is “when something bad happens to you and you didn’t know about it,” as former U.S. Sen. Warren Rudman once described it, then the Hamas surprise attack on Israel was clearly an intelligence failure.

At present, no one knows why the Israelis were unable to detect the Hamas attack, and it may be many months before the Israelis can answer the question.

Historically, Israel has been perhaps the best government in the world at penetrating terrorist organizations, which are arguably the most difficult to infiltrate with informants.

Israel built a defense plan that relies on preventing rocket attacks, border crossings and early warnings.

But intelligence can only do so much. The other key piece of defense is understanding how your enemy thinks and operates. And there the Israelis also appeared to struggle.

Known as the Iron Wall, the 40-mile-long security barrier that separates Gaza from Israel was completed in 2021 at a cost of US$1.1 billion. It includes a sensor-equipped, 20-foot-tall fence, hundreds of cameras and automated machine gun fire when sensors are tripped.

But the wall was not effective against the surprise Hamas attack. Hamas was able to breach the barrier in multiple locations around Gaza and continue its attacks without much initial resistance.

Likewise, Israel built its Iron Dome, an air defense system, to protect its citizens from rocket attacks emanating from Gaza. Completed in 2011, the dome cost the U.S. and Israeli governments $1.5 billion to develop and maintain. Before the surprise Hamas attack, the defense system had a success rate of between 90%-97% of striking down enemy rockets.

The Iron Dome worked well when militants launched relatively few rockets, but it was less effective against the Hamas attack. When Hamas launched as many as 3,000 rockets into Israel in just 20 minutes, the system was overwhelmed and not able to respond. The quantity “was simply too much for Iron Dome to manage,” according to an analysis by the Modern War Institute at West Point.

Beyond intelligence

In my view, the Hamas attack was not particularly sophisticated, nor particularly innovative. At its core, the attack was a textbook military operation involving ground, sea and air attacks launched by one group against another.

It’s my belief that this type of basic attack is something that the Israels could have and should have anticipated – even if not on the scale it was executed. Given that the basic goal of Hamas is “destroy the State of Israel,” Israel could have developed a defense plan that was not reliant on intelligence that is inherently unreliable.

Ancient Chinese military theorist Sun Tzu stressed the importance of “knowing the enemy.”

“If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles,” he wrote in “The Art of War.”

The problem for the Israelis, and many modern militaries, is that they have become too reliant on intelligence instead of knowing the goals of their enemy and developing a deeper understanding of how they think and operate.

That understanding may not prevent the next surprise attack, but it can help prepare the military defense.

Liam Collins is Founding Director of the Modern War Institute, United States Military Academy West Point.

This article was first published by The Conversation.

Image: Creative Commons. 

On Saturday, the Palestinian terrorist group Hamas launched a land and sea attack on Israel along with a barrage of thousands of rockets. Rocket attacks are nothing new for Israel or its world-renowned Iron Dome air defense system, but as rockets continued to pour into the country, it soon became evident that not all inbound weapons were being intercepted.

In our modern upvote/downvote culture, we have a habit of robbing complex topics of their nuance, and air defense is no exception. The common perception that modern air defenses serve as something akin to a shield capable of stopping all incoming threats, however, isn’t reality. Air defense is an extremely complex enterprise, and even the best systems in the world can’t stop everything.

WHAT IS THE IRON DOME?

Israel’s Iron Dome is a mobile short-range missile defense system developed by the Israeli companies Rafael, Elta Systems, and mPrest Systems with a specific focus on intercepting the sorts of short-range rockets and artillery attacks often mounted by Hezbollah (from Lebanon) and Hamas (from the Gaza Strip). Its development started in 2007 and it became operational in 2011.

Like many other air defense systems, an Iron Dome battery is comprised of multiple separate components, including a battle-management system, a fire control radar array, and between three and four launchers, each capable of carrying up to 20 Tamir missile interceptors.

Iron Dome can intercept munitions up to almost 45 miles away. But distance isn’t helping the Israelis in this conflict. The Gaza Strip, where Hamas is headquartered and from where it launches most of its attacks against Israel, is approximately 37 and 47 miles from Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, respectively. That means that the Iron Dome often has less than 120 seconds to intercept an incoming munition from the time it’s fired. That’s an extremely short amount of time and requires constant vigilance and superb capabilities to counter.

However, the Iron Dome does not operate on its own. Instead, it makes up the lower-altitude portion of a three-system approach to Israeli air defense, with another system known as “David’s Sling” focused on slightly higher altitudes and longer rangers than the Iron Dome, and yet another system dubbed “Arrow” serving as a long-range defense.

Related: America’s new precision strike missile has China in its crosshairs

HOW DOES THE IRON DOME PROTECT ISRAEL?

Israel maintains at least 10 Iron Dome batteries for short-range defense against rockets and similar attacks. These batteries are placed strategically around densely populated areas and valuable infrastructure. Each battery has a publicly disclosed protective umbrella that covers about 60 square miles, giving Israel a total area of only some 600 square miles under the Iron Dome’s protective eye.

When the Iron Dome’s radar array detects an incoming target, it uses an artificial intelligence-enabled algorithm to rapidly determine its trajectory and assess whether to engage it or not. This is important, as Israeli Tamir interceptor missiles can range in cost from $20,000 to $100,000 each, but do-it-your-own rockets launched by Hamas regularly ring in as low as just $300 each, making each intercept a losing fiscal proposition in even the best of cases.

If the incoming target poses a threat to citizens or infrastructure, the system calculates an intercept point in the target’s trajectory and launches a Tamir missile toward that point, steering the interceptor toward the target via radar until it is close enough to transition over to its onboard infrared seeker for terminal guidance.

Israel’s claimed success rate with the Iron Dome is extremely high – often between 85% and 90%. Yet, this figure doesn’t mean that Israel intercepts between 85% and 90% of all rockets, mortars, or drones, but rather that it successfully intercepts between 85% and 90% of the targets it deems to be a legitimate threat.

Related: US has no plans to join Israel conflict, say senior officials

REACHING A SATURATION POINT

Israel’s Iron Dome may be highly capable, but no air defense system is invincible. Many have exaggerated expectations of what such systems are capable of, and as a result, see any failed intercept as a failure of the system itself. There are a number of limitations these systems contend with and one of the most prominent is their saturation point, something that Hamas took advantage of.

Air defense systems can only track, target, and intercept so many incoming threats at once before becoming overwhelmed. Their limit is called the saturation point. With thousands of rockets pouring in from Gaza, Israel’s Iron Dome batteries often reached saturation points that allowed rockets to pass through without being intercepted due to the physical limitations of the system itself.

Also, the Palestinian fighters have had years to study the Iron Dome and understand its weaknesses. For example, they could have calculated how long it takes for the Israelis to reload the air defense batteries. Taking advantage of the system’s saturation point and those windows Hamas pierced the Iron Dome and managed to get munitions through its umbrella.  

Nevertheless, at the end of the day, the Iron Dome really does live up to its hype – but no system, no matter how capable, can stop everything. And as Hamas terrorists continue to lob thousands of missiles and rockets into Israel following their surprise attack, the Iron Dome is often what stands between life and death for many innocent civilians.

This piece was written by Alex Hollings and Stavros Atlamazoglou.

This article was first published by Sandboxx News.

Image: ChameleonsEye / Shutterstock.com