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A Stratégiai Tanulmányok Központjának (CSS) "Találkozás gyakolati szakemberekkel" sorozatában Ehud Barak korábbi miniszterelnök és Dan Meridor korábbi miniszterelnök-helyettes voltak a vendégeink Izraelből 2017. október 23-án. A zártkörű beszélgetésen szóba került a Közel-Kelet helyzete, a terrorizmus és a jobboldali populizmus előretörése a nyugati világban. A képen ők láthatók a CSS igazgatójával, Monica Tofttal, aki a diskurzust moderálta. A beszélgetésről írtam legutóbbi posztomat a CSS "Elefánt az irányítóközpontban" blogjára. (Szokolyi Szabolcs kollégám-barátom fordításában: "Elefánt a stratégiai tervezés porcelánboltjában.") A poszt az alábbi linken olvasható:

Engaging Practitioners: CSS Hosts Ehud Barak and Dan Meridor from Israel

Economic trends and security are set to dominate debates at the 34th session of the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly in Haiti, starting on 18 December.

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

Economic trends and security are set to dominate debates at the 34th session of the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly in Haiti, starting on 18 December.

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

Economic trends and security are set to dominate debates at the 34th session of the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly in Haiti, starting on 18 December.

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

« Servir », le livre de l’ancien chef d’état-major des armées a trouvé son public alors que l’auteur refuse d’entrer dans les polémiques

Dans la RDN, le député européen revient sur les critiques faites à la Revue stratégique

A couple of weeks ago, my daughter asked me to help her with her homework. She needed help with a project on Antisemitism. The assignment was to take 4 cartoons -- 2 antisemitic cartoons from the Nazi era and 2 current anti-Israel/antisemitic cartoons -- and compare them..

She wanted my help to find them.

The first two cartoons were easy to find online. Der Stürmer cartoons are easy enough to find.

Title: Brood of Serpents 
Caption (not shown): “The Jew’s symbol is a worm, not without reason.
He seeks to creep up on what he wants.”
Title: Don't Let Go.
Text: Do not grow weary, do not loosen the grip,
This poisonous serpent may not slip away.
Better that one strangles it to death
Than that our misery begin anew.
Title: Insatiable 
The lead article is on the Moscow show trials.
The cartoon caption: “Far be it from the Jews to enslave a single people.
Their goal is to devour the entire world.”There is no problem or argument in seeing these cartoons for what they are. They portray Jews as ugly, threatening and outright dangerous.

According to Wikipedia, the Nazis themselves found Streicher's cartoons downright embarrassing:
Since the late 1920s, Streicher's vulgar and inconsiderate style was increasingly a cause of embarrassment for the Nazi party. In 1936 the sale of the Der Stürmer in Berlin was restricted during the Olympic Games. Joseph Goebbels tried to ban the newspaper in 1938. Hermann Göring forbade Der Stürmer in all of his departments, and Baldur von Schirach banned it as a means of education in the Hitler Youth hostels and other education facilities by a "Reichsbefehl" ("Reich command").Though Hitler supported him, Streicher's luck finally ran out after the war when he was tried at Nuremberg. According to the prosecutors, Streicher's paper incited Germans to kill the Jews, thus making him an accessory to murder. He was found guilty of crimes against humanity and hanged.

Fast forward to today.

If the Nazis themselves realized that Streicher was going too far, can we assume that today's antisemites are equally aware of lines that cannot be crossed?

Not if you are Rutgers Professor Michael Chikindas

Michael Chikindas' tweet
Over three weeks later and Rutgers is still trying to figure what to do about this.

Let's face it: we will always have people who get deranged over Der Sturmer.

Those older cartoons demonized Jews, and did it in a way that was so obvious and so over-the-top that a time came that the Nazis themselves had a sense they had gone to far.

Are people more sensitive to antisemitism and anti-Israel propaganda today?

How about the cartoon below from a Berkeley editorial. I gave it to my daughter as a current example of an anti-Israel/antisemitic cartoon.


Raphael Magarik at the Forward justified the cartoon and claimed it wasn't antisemitic at all, but to do so he had to resort to proving his point by avoiding it.

He picked up on the accusation that this was a "blood libel" -- and defended the cartoon because the whole issue was that blood is being spilled. He then goes on to defend the cartoon by claiming that the various implied attacks in the cartoon on Dershowitz and his politics are justified, which is actually besides the point.

Overlooked was the fact that the image was not of Alan Dershowitz, but of Dershowitz with the body of a spider, an image used in Nazi cartoons, with all that image implies.

I pointed out to my daughter the demonization in the cartoon and I think she understood the point.

A few years ago, the Economist printed a cartoon that it then retracted as being antisemitic:



In the cartoon, the US and Iran, symbolized by Obama and Khamenei are being prevented from completing the Iran deal. Iranian hardliners are holding Khamenei back. Congress is holding Obama back. But one of those stars on that emblem of Congress is a Jewish star.

The issue is not the implication that Jews in the US were trying to prevent the Iran deal. As citizens they had the right to oppose it. The implication was that Jews (or Israel) controlled Congress. It may be more subtle than the Dershowitz cartoon, but that implication was an element of demonization of Jews -- and it was a point that was brought home when even the New York Times attempted to make opposition to the Iran deal into a "Jewish" issue.


The creepiest infographic you'll see today, courtesy of the NYT. Categories include "Jewish?" http://t.co/NenSllbqk8 pic.twitter.com/PxDgZY3bTE— Oren Kessler (@OrenKessler) September 10, 2015Even Linda Sarsour gets in on the action:


Israel should give free citizenship to US politicians. They are more loyal to Israel than they are to the American people.— Linda Sarsour (@lsarsour) July 29, 2014

In another cartoon, at the beginning of the year, The New York State Education Department apologized for including a political cartoon on its global studies Regents exam that critics claimed was anti-Israel propaganda.

Here is the exam question:


Considering the correct answer is (3) Negotiations have failed, the cartoon -- which criticizes Israel and only Israel -- is a poor illustration of the point. Using Natan Sharansky's 3 D's for determining antisemitism -- demonization, double standard and delegitimization -- none of those 3 factors seem to exist in the cartoon in a blatant hyperbolic way.

The AJC condemned the cartoon as being
“blatantly anti-Israel, disparaging of Israeli soldiers … and is entirely inappropriate to include on a test administered to young minds.”Granted the cartoon is "blatantly anti-Israel" and "disparaging of Israeli soldiers," does that make it "inappropriate"?

The exam was in New York.
What would have happened if this appeared on a test in Iowa?

Antisemitic and anti-Israel cartoons may not be as blatant as this one attack Ariel Sharon and Israel:


But this Ariel Sharon cartoon was "cleared" of being antisemitic by a UK press watchdog. More than that,  the cartoon went on to win the UK's "Political Cartoon of the Year Award for 2003" of the Political Cartoon Society.

But what about the resemblance to the Nazi cartoon above of a Jew eating people? Someone decided the cartoon was criticism, not demonization. Does over-the-top criticism automatically become demonization, antisemitism and anti-Israel propaganda?

Fourteen years later, how do we distinguish antisemitic cartoons from criticism -- valid or not -- of Jews or Israel, especially when those cartoons can sometimes be more nuanced?

Dershowitz opens what may be a Pandora's Box when he quotes approvingly from a letter to the editor from students from a pro-Israel organization at Berkeley printed in the Daily Cal:
To a Jewish student on this campus, seeing this cartoon [of Dershowitz] in the Daily Cal is a reminder that we are not always welcome in the spaces we call home…

Telling Jews that we can or cannot define what is offensive to us, because of our status as privileged minority in the United States, is antisemitic.Considering that this strategy is being used by other groups on campuses across the US, Jewish students should be able to use it too -- especially when the antisemitism on campus is such a threat.

Not to mention antisemitic crime incidents over the years as tracked by the FBI:


But do we really want to have to resort to the "safe spaces" argument?

If we demand the right to define what is offensive to us as Jews, as opposed to seeing it as mere criticism, are we validating the claim that Jews deliberately define criticism of Israel as antisemitism?

Safe spaces are not the answer.
The line between criticism and demonization of Israel may not always be so clear.
We have little choice but to stand our ground.




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PONARS Eurasia has just published my memo on Russian military modernization plans from our September policy conference in Washington. I’m reposting it here. Lots of other very interesting memos are available on the PONARS website.

By the end of 2017, Russian President Vladimir Putin will approve Russia’s State Armament Program for 2018-2027. This memo summarizes publicly available information regarding the types of armaments that will be procured for the Russian military in the next eight years and assesses the likelihood that the Russian government will be able to meet these commitments. Based on these plans, Russia seems primed to stay ahead of its competitors in some capabilities (anti-ship missiles, electronic warfare, air defenses), narrow the gap in areas such as drones and precision-guided munitions, and continue to lag well behind in a few areas such as surface ships and automated control systems.

The Scope of the Program

The Russian State Armament Program (SAP) for 2018-2027, which is set to be approved toward the end of this year, will set out Russia’s rearmament priorities for the next ten years. The previous program, which runs through 2020, was the blueprint according to which the Russian military has been modernizing its equipment since 2011. That program had a total budget of 19.3 trillion rubles. SAP-2027 was initially regarded as a kind of lifeline for SAP-2020, whose expensive, long-term programs were to be transferred to the next ten-year plan. The cost of the successor program is expected to total 19 trillion. This suggests that military procurement spending is actually being kept fairly constant because the ruble amount remains about the same and almost all of the purchases are from domestic suppliers, meaning the sales are not impacted by changes in the ruble’s exchange rate.

The size of the program was the subject of an extended tug-of-war between the Defense Ministry and the Finance Ministry. As early as 2014, the military asked for funding in the range of 30-55 trillion rubles over a ten-year period, while the finance ministry set a target of 14 trillion. As the country’s financial situation began to deteriorate in 2015 and the adoption of the SAP was postponed until 2017, both sides lowered their targets. In 2016, the Defense Ministry asked for 22-24 trillion rubles for eight years, while the finance ministry suggested no more than 12 trillion. After an extended and sometimes tense negotiation, a figure of 17 trillion rubles was agreed last winter. This has now been increased to 19 trillion rubles, with the duration extending to the normal ten years. As a result, a number of the most ambitious and expensive projects, including new designs for aircraft carriers, destroyers, strategic bombers, and fighter-interceptor combat aircraft will all be postponed.

This was not the end of tensions over defense financing, however. Although the total amount has been decided, there is now an internal conflict within the defense ministry over how much procurement financing will go to each branch of the military. The various branches have produced documents defending the importance of what they do. As highlighted by the recently approved naval doctrine, such documents often have little connection to any real assessment of either Russian military needs or the capabilities of the defense industry for producing the requested weapons and platforms. Although the final version of the program will not be adopted until the end of the year, it has become increasingly clear that the Russian Navy is in the process of losing the battle for financing. The highest priority for procurement funding will go to the ground forces and to the modernization of nuclear weapons, while the navy, which had the highest level of funding in SAP-2020, will fall to the bottom of the pecking order.

Nuclear Forces

The development priorities of Russian nuclear forces through 2027 are largely clear. After 2021, the naval component of the nuclear triad will consist of six Delta IV-class and eight Borei-class strategic ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), evenly divided between the Northern and Pacific Fleets. This will allow for 12 submarines to be in service at all times, while two undergo overhauls and modernization. The air component is being upgraded, with modernized versions of both Tupolev Tu-95MS (Bear H) bombers and 11 Tu-160 (Blackjack) bombers receiving new engines and avionics, as well as weapons upgrades. The new long-range cruise missile, labeled Kh-101, is replacing the Kh-55, with a range of up to 4,500 km in the nuclear variant. In addition, the Russian military has announced that it will resume building new Tu-160s, with serial production expected to resume no earlier than 2021. This is a more cost-effective and technologically feasible alternative to bringing a completely new design (known as PAK DA) to the point of serial production in a reasonable time frame.

The future development of the land component of the Russian triad presents the least certainty. There are three projects under way, the Rubezh road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), the Barguzin rail-mobile ICBM, and the Sarmat heavy silo-based ICBM. The Rubezh project is closest to fruition, with testing completed in 2015 and deployment expected later in 2017. The RS-26 Rubezh is a further development of the RS-24 Yars, with independently guided warheads designed to break through missile defense shields. The Barguzin is expected to be ready for flight testing in 2019, even though there was a period of several months in 2016 when it appeared that the program was going to be suspended due to budget cuts. The Barguzin is expected to be superior in range and accuracy as compared to the Soviet rail-based system that was decommissioned in 2005. The RS-28 Sarmat is the next-generation silo-based ICBM. It was originally expected to be ready for deployment in 2018, but unspecified snags in its development have pushed ejection testing from the original target date of 2015 to no earlier than June 2017. As a result, the Sarmat is unlikely to be deployed any earlier than 2020, assuming the difficulties have been overcome and the tests proceed as scheduled.

Ground Forces

After being largely starved of funding in SAP-2020, the ground forces are expected to get the largest share of funding in SAP-2027. Some sources indicate that over a quarter of the total program budget will go to equipping the Ground Forces and Airborne Forces. This is in part due to Russia’s experience in Ukraine leading to an increased perception that ground forces may be needed in future conflicts, but mostly the result of new armored vehicle and tank designs being ready for serial production. T-90 and T-14 Armata tanks, Kurganets-25infantry fighting vehicles and Boomerang armored personnel carriers are all expected to enter the force over the next eight years, though numbers of some items such as Armatatanks may be limited due to their high cost of production.

The production of artillery and ground based missiles has been a bright spot for the ground forces. Deployment of medium-range Iskander missiles is proceeding on schedule, with all units set to be in place by 2019. New Uragan and Tornado-S multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) are also being deployed beginning in 2017, with purchases expected to continue throughout the duration of SAP-2027. Procurement of the Koalitsiya self-propelled gun started in 2016. It is eventually expected to fully replace the Soviet-era Msta system. New short range air defense systems will also be procured.

There are more problems with tactical automated control systems for the ground forces. Originally expected to be deployed to 40 brigades by 2020, these remain in field testing in a single division. Reports indicate that the military has mixed feelings about the system and may decide that it needs improvement before it can be widely adopted. In that case, the development of network-centric warfare capabilities may be delayed beyond 2027. In the meantime, the ground forces will continue to receive intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) and electronic warfare systems that have been used to good effect in Syria.

Naval Forces

The Russian Navy stands to be the big loser in SAP-2027. After being allocated 4.7 trillion rubles in SAP-2020 and finding itself unable to spend all of that money due to a combination of problems with Russia’s shipbuilding industry and the impact of Western and Ukrainian sanctions, the Russian Navy’s allocation is expected to be cut to 2.6 trillion rubles in SAP-2027. Despite grandiose plans being mooted in documents such as the recently approved naval doctrine, Russia is planning to focus its naval construction on submarines and small ships. In surface ships, the focus will be on new corvettes of several different types that will have greater displacement and better armament than existing classes, as well as the start of serial production of the long-delayed Admiral Gorshkov-class of frigates. Until the problems with the Admiral Gorshkov are resolved, the Navy will continue to build the less advanced Admiral Grigorovich-class frigates.

The only new class of surface ships expected to be built in the next eight years are the so-called Super Gorshkov-class, an 8,000-ton frigate that is increasingly seen as a cheaper and more practical alternative to the 14,000-ton Lider-class destroyers. The key takeaway is that the Russian Navy is looking to increase the size of its smaller ships in order to increase their armament and endurance, while reducing costs by indefinitely postponing the procurement of larger ships such as destroyers, amphibious assault ships, and aircraft carriers.

As for submarines, SAP-2027 will undoubtedly include financing for the completion of six Yasen-M nuclear attack submarines and possibly for a seventh, as well as for the modernization of four to six each of the Soviet-era Oscar– and Akula-class nuclear attack submarines. Construction of fifth-generation nuclear attack submarines (tentatively named the Husky-class) will begin in the mid-2020s. In diesel submarines, the focus will be on developing air independent propulsion systems for the forthcoming Kalina-class, while Lada– and improved Kilo-class boats are built in the meantime.

More important than new ships and submarines, the coming eight years will see the Russian Navy concentrate on developing new weapons systems and improving existing ones. The introduction of Kalibr missiles has provided the Russian Navy with a standoff anti-ship and land-attack cruise missile capability that can be used to make even small ships that have to stay near home ports a potential threat to adversaries, included NATO member states. The Russian military recognizes the advantages that these missiles provide and has put them on a wide range of ship and submarine classes. Over the next eight years, Russia will continue to deploy these missiles on most new surface ships and submarines, retrofit some existing vessels to carry the missiles, and work to improve the accuracy and reliability of the missiles themselves. It is also working to develop a new hypersonic missile that could pose an even greater threat to Russia’s adversaries in the medium to long term.

Air Forces

In the last seven years, the Russian Air Force has begun to receive modern aircraft in significant numbers and has continued to pay for the development of new designs such as the recently christened Sukhoi Su-57 fifth generation fighter jet (formerly known as the T-50or PAK FA). The Su-57 is not expected to enter into serial production until upgraded engines are ready, which is unlikely to happen until 2027. Over the next eight years, Russia will continue to purchase small numbers of these planes for testing. It will also continue to purchase Su-35S fighter jets, with a new contract for 50 additional aircraft signed in late 2016. Purchases of Su-30SM fighter jets and Su-34 strike aircraft will also continue, most likely at rates of 12-18 aircraft per year of each type. Mikoyan MiG-35 fighter aircraft may also be procured, but probably not in large numbers. Overall, with many modern fighter aircraft now in place, rates of procurement will slow in order to allow for the purchase of other types of aircraft. The same goes for military helicopters, since the Russian military has received what it needs in new helicopters during the last seven years. Development of a new high-speed helicopter will not start until after 2027.

Transport and refueling aircraft, long an area of weakness for the Russian Air Force, will be one area of focus. Serial production of the long-troubled Ilyushin Il-76-MD90A is expected to start in 2019, and the Russian military is expecting to receive 10-12 such aircraft per year thereafter. A light transport aircraft is under development, with prototypes expected to be completed in 2024. The A-100 airborne warning system (AWACS) aircraft, based on the Il-76MD90A, was expected to be delivered starting in 2016 but has been repeatedly delayed. Nevertheless, procurement of this aircraft will be included in SAP-2027. Finally, Russia is experiencing a boom in domestic production of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). By 2020, it will have a strike UAV in production, as well as a new generation of reconnaissance UAVs.

For air defense, Russia will continue to deploy S-400 long-range missiles and Pantsir-Sshort-range missiles. However, it seems increasingly unlikely that the next generation S-500air defense system will be ready for serial production any time soon, though official plans still indicate that a prototype will be built by 2020. Original plans called for serial production of the S-500 to start in 2015. The new standard short-range air defense system has just started development and is not expected to be ready for production until 2030.

Impact on Capabilities and Regional Security

SAP-2020 has been widely described as the first successful armament program of Russia’s post-Soviet history. It was designed to help the Russian military catch up from the extended procurement holiday caused by Russia’s economic collapse in the 1990s. During the last seven years, the Russian military has made great strides in modernizing its weapons and equipment. By and large, these new armaments have been based on updated versions of late Soviet designs. The Russian defense industry now faces the far more formidable challenge of bringing new designs into serial production. It has been successful in this regard in some areas, such as nuclear submarines, missile systems, and UAVs. It has been less successful with combat ships and air defense systems. The verdict is still out on combat aircraft and tanks and armored vehicles.

With the most significant gaps largely filled, SAP-2027 is designed to transition the Russian military to a more regular procurement schedule. Funding will remain relatively constant, though it may be adjusted depending on the economic situation. The previous program has shown that this level of funding is more or less achievable for the government budget and for the Russian defense industry to sustain. The biggest challenge will be in bringing new designs successfully to serial production.

In terms of impact on military capabilities, Russia is already strong enough to defend itself in a conventional war against any adversary and to defeat any neighboring state other than China. It also has a more than sufficient nuclear deterrent capability. New procurement will thus be targeted at keeping pace with technological improvements made by its peer competitors (NATO member states and China). In some areas, such as air defenses, anti-ship missiles, and electronic warfare, Russia will continue to maintain capabilities superior to those of its peers. In other areas, such as UAVs, precision-guided munitions, and tanks and armored vehicles, it appears poised to narrow the gap. Finally, in a few areas, such as surface ships, transport aircraft, and automated control systems, it will remain well behind the United States and may start to lag behind China as well.

Article paru dans L'Orient Le Jour (Beyrouth)Le ministre français des Affaires étrangères, Jean-Yves Le Drian (à g.), en compagnie du Premier ministre libanais démissionnaire, Saad Hariri, le 16 novembre 2017, à Riyad. Valérie Leroux/AFP×1 / 2
Proche-Orient : Que peut faire la France?
Frédéric Charillon (Professeur des Universités en science politique, UCA, Sciences Po, ENA – ancien directeur de l’institut de recherche stratégique de l’école militaire)

La France s'efforce, depuis longtemps, de maintenir ou d'adapter son rôle au Moyen-Orient. Aujourd'hui ses grands partenaires (Egypte, Arabie) inquiètent par leurs crispations internes ou leur aventurisme extérieur. Le Liban, auquel elle tient tant, est dans la tourmente.  Face à cette situation, sa diplomatie se heurte à plusieurs obstacles : un contexte international défavorable, la difficulté à trouver des relais régionaux, la contradiction des intérêts français eux-mêmes. Paris peut néanmoins aborder cette séquence difficile avec une nouvelle méthode de dialogue.

Un contexte difficile
Les encouragements donnés par Washington aux postures dures contre l'Iran favorisent la confrontation dans la région. Ni l'état actuel de l'Union européenne, ni la longue prudence des émergents, ne contrebalancent cette tendance. Et Moscou est suffisamment occupé par la Syrie pour se risquer à des arbitrages ailleurs. Dès lors, la France, plus préoccupée que d'autres par la situation libanaise et qui a souhaité y réagir vite, se trouve bien seule pour mener une initiative.
Ayant établi une relation de confiance avec Riyad (essentiellement avant la nomination du nouveau prince héritier), Paris soigne également son dialogue avec Le Caire, et se refuse à donner des leçons à quiconque, comme il l'a été rappelé lors de la visite à Paris du président Sissi. La posture a ses mérites comme ses défauts, mais elle ne permet pas de transcender le problème principal : aucune de ces capitales arabes n'est en mesure d’être un hégémon consensuel dans la tourmente actuelle. L'initiative appartient même désormais aux puissances non arabes, Israël, Iran, Turquie.  Acteurs avec lesquels Paris entretient des relations tendues, et dont l'intransigeance se prolonge (Israël), se renforce (Turquie), ou fait l'objet de rapports de force internes (Iran).
La France doit enfin faire l’inventaire de ses intérêts dans la région. L'affaire syrienne, depuis 2013, reste l'objet d'un débat : en exigeant alors le départ de Bachar al-Assad, Paris a pris le risque d'avoir moralement raison tout en se mettant diplomatiquement hors-jeu. Voir s'effondrer les régimes de l'Arabie ou de l'Egypte serait une nouvelle terrible, mais il est impossible de leur donner carte blanche pour jouer la politique du pire. Soutenir le Liban et le protéger du chaos est un réflexe à Paris : les événements libanais remontent plus haut et plus vite au sommet de l'Etat que beaucoup d'événements internationaux, et la France ne souhaite ni une mainmise étrangère sur le pays, ni un étouffement progressif interne qui ne respecte pas la pluralité libanaise. Mais l'on se souvient du temps passé pour rien à tenter de résoudre la crise institutionnelle en 2007.

L'indispensable changement d'optique
A région bouleversée, méthode nouvelle. La politique des blocs a vécu, l'unité arabe aussi, et les sociétés s'expriment de plus en plus. Comment Paris peut-il se réinventer un rôle ? Les équipes Macron, dans lesquelles on compte plusieurs connaisseurs de la zone, tablent d'abord sur le dialogue avec tous les acteurs, en l’élargissant même à de nouveaux, quels que soient les points de désaccord ; ensuite sur le multilatéralisme ; enfin sur la réaffirmation des principes.
Cette méthode (esquissée par le Président devant les Ambassadeurs français à Paris, où les Nations Unies à New York) peut-elle s’appliquer au Proche Orient ? Le dialogue à tout prix, on l’a vu dans la réception de Sissi à Paris, comme d’ailleurs avec Trump ou Poutine, consiste à chercher les points de convergence en dépit de tensions réelles. Le multilatéralisme, lui, pourrait peut prendre la forme de conférences internationales aux formats ad hoc, sur la Syrie ou pourquoi pas sur le Liban, qui mettront l'accent sur l’avenir des peuples plutôt que sur les compétitions étatiques. La réaffirmation des principes enfin, consiste à édicter la position et les lignes rouges de la France, mais sans en faire un casus belli.
Un enseignement s’impose, sur la période récente : laisser les capitales régionales dériver vers la manière forte pour ménager leur susceptibilité, n'a renforcé ni la stabilité régionale, ni l'influence française. La France teste donc sa nouvelle méthode. Elle maintient le lien historique avec Le Caire ou Riyad, mais mise aussi sur les Emirats, acteur montant. Emmanuel Macron, puis son ministre des Affaires Etrangères (ce dernier fort d’une relation de confiance ancienne avec l’Arabie) rendent visite au Prince héritier saoudien pour parler du Liban, mais invitent dans la foulée Saad Hariri à Paris, comme pour souligner que la souveraineté libanaise n’est pas négociable.
Pour peser davantage, la France doit sortir des dilemmes traditionnels: Doha ou Riyad, Sissi ou pas Sissi, Bachar ou Daech, le Hezbollah ou Hariri, etc. D’autant qu’ainsi formulés, c’est le Proche-Orient qui en est la première victime. Surtout, elle peut tenter de prendre l’initiative, en y associant les institutions internationales, de nouveaux acteurs étatiques, et les nouveaux acteurs sociétaux (jeunes, intellectuels, femmes). La réussite n’est jamais garantie au Proche-Orient, mais il est temps d’essayer ce qui ne l’a pas encore été.

Jómúltkor a Facebook oldalamon hüledeztem azon, ahogy az Iszlám Állam és Hezbollah/Aszad-rezsim (gondolom mögöttük az oroszok és az irániak is jóváhagyták) leboltoltak egymással és több tucat busszal a terroristák átautózhattak Szírián keresztül a másik szegletbe, al-Bukamalba.
A várost a napokban elérte a végzete, a kormányerők elfoglalták, majd az alagutakban megbújó (állítólag) ISIS tagok visszafoglalták a várost, nem is tudom most kinek a kezében van akkor.
De nem e konkrétum miatt írok, hanem azért mert a BBC készített egy fantasztikus riportot Rakka elfoglalásáról.. Aki nem követné az eseményeket, annak elmondom, hogy az Iszlám Állam visszafoglalásáról szóló hírek narratívája az volt, hogy a SDF (szíriai kurd és arab erők), hogy bekerítették a várost, majd súlyos harcok után, de relatíve gyorsan (Moszulhoz képest) visszafoglalták a várost, hetek alatt úgy emlékszem. Még drónos video is volt a városban történt pusztításokról.

Ehhez képest jön a BBC riportja, ami azt mondja - bizonyítékokkal, interjúkkal alátámasztva -  hogy az SDF leegyezett az Iszlám Állammal, nyilván a amerikaiak tudtával, hogy ha feladják a várost, elmehetnek, kiengedik őket.

A sofőrök változatos becslése szerint mintegy 4000 embert, ebből sok száz fegyveres és családjaikat, vitték ki: Another driver says the convoy was six to seven kilometres long. It included almost 50 trucks, 13 buses and more than 100 of the Islamic State group’s own vehicles. IS fighters, their faces covered, sat defiantly on top of some of the vehicles.

Az uticél náluk is főleg al-Bukamal volt, de néhányan a török határ felé vették az útjukat. Sok implikációja van ennek a sztorinak, de én csak arra akarok fókuszálni, hogy egyrészt a SDF nem engedett be semmilyen médiát Rakkába, hírzárlat volt ebben az ügyben, amíg csak lehetett. Nyilván nem voltak büszkék rá, ez oké, meg az is, hogy inkább így foglalták el, mint sok száz saját halott árán. Bár az SDF még mindig a legjobb társaság Szíriában, azért ott is van kontroll.

A másik, hogy az USA elfogadta ezt. Persze megtehette volna, hogy szétbombázza a konvojokat, de nem tette. Állítólag egy embere ott volt a dealnél, de nem szólt bele. Szerintem hihető. Ezt azért fontos tudomásul venni, mert az USA nem önmaga akarja megnyerni a háborút (ezek szerint) és respektálta a SDF- amely a helyi partnere, de nem szövetségese - akaratát. Az USA bombázhatott volna, de azzal az SDF hitelességét nullázza le.

Végül külön örülök, hogy a BBC hozta le sztorit. Ennyi előnye még mindig van a nyugatnak az oroszokkal szemben :)

Back in July, when Palestinian Arabs protested against the use of metal detectors to secure and protect visitors to the Temple Mount from terrorist attacks, Walter Russel Meade made an interesting point. He noted on his website, The American Interest, the key role Palestinian terrorism has played -- not only in the innovation and development of terrorist strategies, but also in the effort to protect against them:
With the possible exception of al-Qaeda, Palestinian terrorism—which pioneered the use of plane hijackings, airport attacks, and suicide bombings—has perhaps done more to force the introduction of metal detectors into our daily lives than just about any other cause.While plane hijackings in the 1970's were just as easily associated with Cuba as with the Palestinian Arabs, it was the latter that pushed the US to increase security on airplanes.


In September 6th and 9th in 1970, 5 planes were were hijacked by members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). Of the 5 airliners, 3 of them were forced to land at Dawson's Field, located near Zarka, Jordan.

This became then-President Nixon's own "9/11":
The crisis opened Nixon's eyes.

His chief of staff, H.R. "Bob" Haldeman, recorded in his diary on September 7, 1970, that Nixon was "very anxious to develop some dramatic administration action about hijackings, need tough shocking steps, especially guards on planes."

Nixon responded to the trio of hijackings in a written statement listing seven steps to combat "air piracy." Beyond the air marshals, he called on foreign governments to join the United States in combatting hijackings and ordered electronic surveillance at airports to spot potential terrorists.

Nixon also envisaged that the 100 initial air marshals would eventually grow to a force of thousands. But over the ensuing years, as the threat from hijackings receded, the force never reached full capacity.President Richard Nixon, who faced his own 9/11 in the form of
Palestinian terrorism. Credit: Wikipedia
On September 11, Nixon responded to the Palestinian hijackings with a program on dealing with the problem.
I have directed the Departments of Transportation, Treasury, and Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Office of Science and Technology, and other agencies to accelerate their present efforts to develop security measures, including new methods for detecting weapons and explosive devices. At the same time, the Departments of Defense and Transportation will work with all U.S. airlines in determining whether certain metal detectors and x-ray devices now available to the military could provide immediate improvement in airport surveillance efforts. To facilitate passenger surveillance, appropriate agencies of the Federal Government will intensify their efforts to assemble and evaluate all useful intelligence concerning this matter and to disseminate such information to airlines and law enforcement personnel. (emphasis added)Metal detectors, which decades later Palestinian Arabs would protest as an impediment, were first deemed necessary as a result of Palestinian terrorism.

Nixon reiterated this point later that month, while speaking to some of the released Americans who had been held hostage



Again, in speaking to the released hostages, Nixon emphasized that in addition to the newly instituted air marshals, "new electronic devices" would be put in place as well.

Times have changed since then, in ways that Nixon could never have imagined.

The years during which Palestinian Arabs terrorized the airways have been forgotten. Who today remembers that the tools used now to secure travelers against terrorist attacks were originally developed to protect them against Palestinian terrorists.

Instead, the only irony greater than the attempt to used those security devices on Palestinian Arabs is their protest that such tools impinge on their rights.

Meanwhile, the world endures the legacy of Palestinian terrorist innovations used by other terrorist groups: hijackings, airport attacks, suicide bombings -- and now car-rammings.

Nixon may not have foreseen these developments, but he did try to prevent them.



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A Nemzeti Kutatási, Fejlesztési és Innovációs Alap „Vállalatok K+F+I tevékenységének támogatása” című pályázati felhívásán 141,85 millió Ft állami támogatást nyert el az Izotóp Intézet Kft.

A 328 millió forint összköltségű projekt során új típusú cézium-sugárforrások előállítása, környezetbarát kezelési technológia keretrendszerének kifejlesztése történik.

Az Izotóp Intézet Kutató, Fejlesztő, Termelő és Szolgáltató Kft. radioaktív izotópok és egyéb termékek kutatásával, fejlesztésével, gyártásával foglalkozik. A vállalkozás Sugártechnika üzletága kis és nagy aktivitású sugárforrásokat gyárt, továbbá technológiai módszereket fejleszt a radioaktív hulladék újrahasznosítására.

Jelen projekt keretében a lejárt szolgálati idejű, nagy aktivitású, környezeti szempontból a porlódás miatt veszélyes Cs-137 hulladék újrafelhasználását kívánják megvalósítani, kidolgozva a cézium szervetlen mátrixhoz (kerámiához) való kötésének technológiáját. Ezáltal a kerámiához kötött nem porlódó és vízben nem oldható Cs-137 új típusú sugárforrások alapanyagává válik. Ily módon a kezelendő vagy tárolandó radioaktív hulladékból Cs-137-alapanyagot, majd abból nagyobbrészt a nemzetközi piacokon jól eladható forrásokat készítenek, ezáltal a radioaktív hulladéktároló üzemek mentesülnek az újra feldolgozott Cs-137-hulladék elhelyezésétől.

A projekt során létrejön egy komplett gyártórendszer új típusú, kerámiához kötött Cs-137 sugárforrások előállítására, az új típusú Cs-137 sugárforrás prototípusa, valamint egy komplett gyártástechnológiai leirat új típusú Cs-137 sugárforrások előállítására és a gyártórendszer üzemeltetésére.

A projekt keretében két K+F-álláshellyel bővül az Izotóp Intézet Kft. kutatói létszáma.

Az NKFI Alap „VÁLLALATI KFI_16” pályázati kiírásán 141 855 878 Ft állami támogatást elnyert, 328 024 327 Ft összköltségvetésű projekt 2017. szeptember 1-én indult és várhatóan 2019. augusztus 31-én zárul.

A Nemzeti Kutatási, Fejlesztési és Innovációs Alap „Vállalatok K+F+I tevékenységének támogatása” című pályázati felhívásán 141,85 millió Ft állami támogatást nyert el az Izotóp Intézet Kft.

A 328 millió forint összköltségű projekt során új típusú cézium-sugárforrások előállítása, környezetbarát kezelési technológia keretrendszerének kifejlesztése történik.

Az Izotóp Intézet Kutató, Fejlesztő, Termelő és Szolgáltató Kft. radioaktív izotópok és egyéb termékek kutatásával, fejlesztésével, gyártásával foglalkozik. A vállalkozás Sugártechnika üzletága kis és nagy aktivitású sugárforrásokat gyárt, továbbá technológiai módszereket fejleszt a radioaktív hulladék újrahasznosítására.

Jelen projekt keretében a lejárt szolgálati idejű, nagy aktivitású, környezeti szempontból a porlódás miatt veszélyes Cs-137 hulladék újrafelhasználását kívánják megvalósítani, kidolgozva a cézium szervetlen mátrixhoz (kerámiához) való kötésének technológiáját. Ezáltal a kerámiához kötött nem porlódó és vízben nem oldható Cs-137 új típusú sugárforrások alapanyagává válik. Ily módon a kezelendő vagy tárolandó radioaktív hulladékból Cs-137-alapanyagot, majd abból nagyobbrészt a nemzetközi piacokon jól eladható forrásokat készítenek, ezáltal a radioaktív hulladéktároló üzemek mentesülnek az újra feldolgozott Cs-137-hulladék elhelyezésétől.

A projekt során létrejön egy komplett gyártórendszer új típusú, kerámiához kötött Cs-137 sugárforrások előállítására, az új típusú Cs-137 sugárforrás prototípusa, valamint egy komplett gyártástechnológiai leirat új típusú Cs-137 sugárforrások előállítására és a gyártórendszer üzemeltetésére.

A projekt keretében két K+F-álláshellyel bővül az Izotóp Intézet Kft. kutatói létszáma.

Az NKFI Alap „VÁLLALATI KFI_16” pályázati kiírásán 141 855 878 Ft állami támogatást elnyert, 328 024 327 Ft összköltségvetésű projekt 2017. szeptember 1-én indult és várhatóan 2019. augusztus 31-én zárul.

US bipartisan support for Israel -- when and how did that start?

Apparently, the birth of that bipartisan support for Israel came about during the term of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, despite FDR's antagonism towards Zionism.

FDR. Photo by Leon A. Perski, 1944.
Source: Wikipedia
And a lot of the credit seems to be due to Netanyahu.


In FDR’s Retreat on Zionism–and What it Means Today, Rafael Medoff writes about Roosevelt's attitude towards then-Palestine and Zionism.

Roosevelt opposed both, vigorously:

On January 17, 1943, on the question of restoring the pre-war equal rights of North Africa’s 330,000 Jews following the liberation of Casablanca, Roosevelt suggested that “the number of Jews engaged in the practice of the professions (law, medicine, etc) should be definitely limited to the percentage that the Jewish population in North Africa bears to the whole of the North African population,” so that local Arabs would not be angered.

Roosevelt also opposed settling Jewish refugees in North Africa: “I know, in fact, that there is plenty of room for them in North Africa but I raise the question of sending large numbers of Jews there...That would be extremely unwise.”

In April 1943, Roosevelt approved of a suggested Allied ban on all public discussion of Palestine until the end of the war. He backed down after Secretary of War Stimson called such a measure "alarmist"

On March 9, 1944, Roosevelt rejected the request of Rabbis Stephen S. Wise and Abba Hillel Silver to open Palestine to Jews fleeing Hitler. He claimed that the move would enrage Arabs and responded to them, “Do you want to start a Holy Jihad?”

Rabbi Stephen Samuel Wise; Library of Congress portrait.
Wikipedia
Abba Hillel Silver; excerpt from YouTube video
Also in 1944, Republican Senator Robert Taft introduced a resolution affirming US support for the creation of a Jewish national home in Palestine. In response, Roosevelt claimed that the resolution would be “responsible for the death of a hundred thousand men.” As a result, the resolution was table for a year, and when Congress passed it – there was no Arab rioting.

Yet despite all this, the same Roosevelt who rejected a request by the Palestine (Jewish) Symphony Orchestra to name one of its theaters the “Roosevelt Amphitheatre” for fear it would link him too closely the Zionists -- did in fact turn around and support Zionism.

To a degree.

In the fall of 1943, it appeared that the Republican contender in the 1944 presidential election would go after the Jewish vote.

A major factor in adapting a strong pro-Zionist plank at the Republican National Convention was Netanyahu -- Benzion Netanyahu, the father of Israel's current prime minister.

Benzion Netanyahu in 2007. Source: Wikipedia
Medoff writes:
Benzion Netanyahu, scholar and activist (and father of the current prime minister) arrived in the United States in 1940 as an emissary of Revisionist Zionism, the militant wing of the Zionist movement, headed by Vladimir Ze’ev Jabotinsky. Netanyahu organized rallies and authored full-page newspaper advertisements challenging the Roosevelt administration for abandoning European Jewry and the Zionist cause.

Netanyahu also spent part of his time on Capitol Hill. In an interview with this author, Netanyahu recalled the political landscape he encountered in the nation’s capital: “Most of the Jewish and Zionist leaders, led by Rabbi Stephen Wise, were devoted Democrats and supporters of President Roosevelt. The idea of having friendly relationships with Republicans was inconceivable to them.” In the months prior to the June 1944 Republican National Convention, Netanyahu did the inconceivable–he took his case to GOP leaders, including former president Herbert Hoover; Senator Robert Taft, who was chairing the convention’s resolutions committee; and the influential Connecticut congresswoman Clare Booth Luce, who was slated to deliver the keynote address at the convention and would also serve on the resolutions committee. Netanyahu’s goal was to have the GOP platform include a plank supporting Jewish statehood in Palestine. Neither party had ever before taken such a stand.The efforts of Netanyahu -- and Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver -- resulted in the inclusion of the following in the Republican platform :
In order to give refuge to millions of distressed Jewish men, women and children driven from their homes by tyranny, we call for the opening of Palestine to their unrestricted immigration and land ownership, so that in accordance with the full intent and purpose of the Balfour Declaration of 1917 and the resolution of a Republican Congress in 1922, Palestine may be reconstituted as a free and democratic commonwealth. We condemn the failure of the President to insist that the Palestine Mandatory carry out the provisions of the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate while he pretends to support them.In response, Rabbi Wise felt forced to try to get the Democrats, with Roosevelt's approval, to include a pro-Zionist statement in its platform as well.

To a large degree he was successful. The Democratic platform supported the “unrestricted Jewish immigration and colonization” of Palestine as well as the establishment of “a free and democratic Jewish commonwealth.”

One could argue that this was the beginning of the bi-partisan support for Israel that despite its ups and downs continues to this day.

Medoff writes:
Wise summed up what was achieved: “With the plank in both platforms the thing is lifted above partisanship.” The adoption of the two party planks ensured that support for Zionism, and later Israel, would become a permanent part of American political culture. No subsequent Republican or Democratic convention could go back on it without significant electoral ramifications.Despite the questions that are raised today about the extent and degree of Democratic support for Israel, that bi-partisan support does in fact continue.

As does the tendency of Netanyahu's not to quietly acquiesce to US policy towards Israel.











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Thursday is the 100th anniversary of the Balfour Declaration, yet after 100 years people still argue over it and Abbas is still asking Great Britain for an apology.

What did the Balfour Declaration actually do?
And what did the Balfour Declaration recognize?

The second question is no more settled than the first, but gives a surprising answer.


Arthur Balfour. Credit: Wikipedia

We all are familiar with the language of the declaration:
His Majesty's government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.But while the declaration seems to be talking about the future, in The Case For Israel, Alan Dershowitz writes that by the time the Balfour Declaration was published in 1917, that national home already existed:
Even before the Balfour Declaration of 1917, there was a de facto Jewish national home in Palestine consisting of several dozens of Jewish moshavim and kibbutzim in western and northeastern Palestine, as well as in Jewish cities such as Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, and Safad. The Jewish refugees in Palestine had established this homeland on the ground without the assistance of any colonial or imperialist powers. They had relied on their own hard work in building an infrastructure and cultivating land they had legally purchased.This was an area under Ottoman control until the end of WWI. Even before WWI, there was no sovereign state, just a collection of districts under the control of foreign Ottoman control.

Dershowitz's interpretation is not his own. He quotes Winston Churchill, who in the British White Paper of 1922 wrote:
During the last two or three generations the Jews have recreated in Palestine a community, now numbering 80,000, of whom about one fourth are farmers or workers upon the land. This community has its own political organs; an elected assembly for the direction of its domestic concerns; elected councils in the towns; and an organization for the control of its schools. It has its elected Chief Rabbinate and Rabbinical Council for the direction of its religious affairs. Its business is conducted in Hebrew as a vernacular language, and a Hebrew Press serves its needs. It has its distinctive intellectual life and displays considerable economic activity. This community, then, with its town and country population, its political, religious, and social organizations, its own language, its own customs, its own life, has in fact "national" characteristics. When it is asked what is meant by the development of the Jewish National Home in Palestine, it may be answered that it is not the imposition of a Jewish nationality upon the inhabitants of Palestine as a whole, but the further development of the existing Jewish community, with the assistance of Jews in other parts of the world, in order that it may become a centre in which the Jewish people as a whole may take, on grounds of religion and race, an interest and a pride. But in order that this community should have the best prospect of free development and provide a full opportunity for the Jewish people to display its capacities, it is essential that it should know that it is in Palestine as of right and not on the sufferance. That is the reason why it is necessary that the existence of a Jewish National Home in Palestine should be internationally guaranteed, and that it should be formally recognized to rest upon ancient historic connection. [emphasis added]Sir Winston Churchill, by Yousuf Karsh. Source: Wikipedia

The Balfour Declaration was not addressed to a foreign group, giving them permission to enter the land. On the contrary, it was recognition of what Jews -- who have an indigenous connection to the land  -- had already accomplished and would continue to develop.

As Dershowitz puts it:
The political and legal seeds were were thus sown for a two- (or three- ) state solution to the "Palestinian problem." This was a perfect example of self-determination at work.This is more than an abstract theory.

Take a look at the 1925 Larousse French dictionary entry for "Palestine":


Here is a closeup view of the beginning of the entry:



This translates as:
PALESTINE, the land of Syria, between Phenicia in the North, the Dead Sea in the South, the Mediterranean in the West, and the Syrian Desert in the East, watered by the Jordan. It is a narrow strip of land, narrowed between the sea, Lebanon, and traversed by the Jordan, which throws itself into the Dead Sea. It is also called, in Scripture, Land of Chanaan, Promised Land and Judea . It is today [in 1925] a Jewish state under the mandate of England; 770,000 inhabitants. Jerusalem capital.Already in 1925, before WWII and before the Israeli War of Independence, there was a recognition of a Jewish state called Palestine, a state of 770,000 inhabitants that included both Jews and Muslims. It's capital was Jerusalem, which did not have that designation under Ottoman rule.

Not everyone may have recognized Palestine as such, certainly the Arabs did not, but the ideas expressed by Churchill were more than abstract and had gained a certain acceptance.

Dershowitz notes that even US President Woodrow Wilson, who was a champion of self-determination and opposed British-French plans on dividing the Ottoman Empire after WWI, saw a Jewish state in Palestine as self-determination:
I am persuaded that the Allied nations, with the fullest concurrence of our own government and people, are agreed that in Palestine shall be laid the foundations of a Jewish commonwealth.Woodrow Wilson. Library of Congress.
Source: Wikipedia
The culmination of that self-determination -- with a state for the Arabs -- was prevented by war and a refusal to accept even the presence of Jews on the land.

So, what were the Jews doing in Palestine before the Lord Balfour came out with his famous declaration? They were not waiting around to enter as invited guests. Instead, they worked on a land to which they have a 3,000 year history. Jews with indigenous roots to the land worked to re-establish it as a sovereign state, something it had never been since the time of the Romans.

Jews made a choice.
The Arabs made their own choice too.


Hat tip: EG


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I promised a readout of my impressions of the Valdai Club meeting. This was the first time I had been invited to attend this event and I was curious to get a sense of both the content of the discussions and the atmosphere. The four day conference was held at a Gazprom-owned mountain resort an hour outside of Sochi, though after the first day we had virtually no opportunities to go outside, much less leave the compound. When I decided to take a walk in the hills during the lunch break on the last day of the conference, I was very nicely told by the guard at the gate in the fence that the gate was closed for the day (almost certainly because that was the day that Vladimir Putin was supposed to appear). That was very indicative of the setup. Having a conference in a beautiful mountain resort is very nice, but it’s also a good way to keep the participants from wandering off or seeing anything the organizers might not want them to see.

1) I had not realized just how little of the conference would be on Russia. The theme was “Creative Destruction: Will a New World Order Emerge from the Current Conflicts?” The individual panels within that theme were all on grand topics such as man vs. nature or rich vs. poor. There was one panel on “the conflict between differing geopolitical worldviews,” where most of the panelists ended up either spouting self-serving formulations of the “China just wants to share its prosperity with the world” variety or seemed bizarrely naïve, such as one European speaker arguing that Britain would not leave the European Union and Europe would be just fine. A Russian scholar talked about how the US and Russia were engaged in a new Cold War that was even worse than the old one and of course this was America’s fault. The one exception was a prominent American IR scholar, who tried to bring some sense to the proceedings, but with limited success.

The surreal nature of the choice of panel topics was highlighted by the special panel on US domestic politics. First, its presence on the program highlighted the absence of a panel on Russian domestic politics. Second, the speakers included a senior Russian diplomat and two highly respected American experts on Russian politics. Absent were any experts on US politics, which lent the proceedings a slightly odd air, even as the participants did their best to explain the Trump presidency to the audience.

The best panel was another special panel – on the Russian revolution in honor of its 100th anniversary, with five top historians giving their interpretations of the meaning and impact of the revolution on Russia and the world. Overall, though, it seemed odd to gather a large number of experts on Russia just to have them discuss big conceptual issues such as climate change and poverty on which they were experts. As a result, the most interesting discussions I had were in the corridors and in the bar, where there were plenty of opportunities to interact with and learn from both Western and Russian colleagues.

2) The meetings with Russian officials are usually the highlight of the event, yet they seemed to be somewhat disengaged. The senior officials who came to speak with us included Sergei Lavrov, Sergey Kislyak, Igor Shuvalov, Vyacheslav Volodin, German Gref and, of course, Vladimir Putin himself. The dominant theme of all the meetings was that the United States had betrayed Russia’s trust in the 1990s. As Putin said when asked about any mistakes Russia had made in its relations with the United States, our greatest mistake was that we trusted you too much and your greatest mistake was that you took our trust as weakness. The video and transcript of the Putin speech are widely available, so I won’t go over the content in detail. Putin’s attitude was perhaps more interesting than the content of his speech and answers to questions. He seemed disinterested and disengaged. The answers he gave were rote. Some attendees who had been present at Valdai last year indicated that some of the answers were virtually verbatim repeats of things he had said the year before. Given that Putin’s press secretary Dmitry Peskov had promised a “major announcement” from Putin at Valdai, the audience members were left wondering if they had missed something.

Putin clearly wanted to really hammer home the double standards argument that he has been making vis-à-vis the West (and particularly the United States) for years now. He spent an inordinate amount of time on a minute relitigation of the ICJ court case affirming Kosovo’s declaration of independence, pulling out a folder with printouts of the decision and of the reactions to it of various Western governments, which he spent a good 10 minutes reading out loud. He went on a little tirade about Ukrainian nationalism, though he seemed to conflate Petliura and Bandera in the process.

The most interesting thing about his speech was perhaps the conclusion. In response to moderator Fyodor Lukyanov’s tongue in cheek closing comment about how Valdai would miss Putin if he stopped attending because he was no longer president, he asked “will you not invite me if I’m not president?” and followed up with a joke about an oligarch who discovers that he has lost all his money and tells his wife that they will have to sell the fancy cars and houses and move back to the old apartment in Moscow. When the oligarch asks her if she will still love him, she says “yes and I will miss you very much.” The implication was that Putin very much recognizes that his status derives from his position and that leaving the position is fraught with the threat of great personal losses for him. The joke was perhaps the only time when Putin allowed a glimpse of his actual views on the world or his role in it, going beyond the by now stale script of how Russia didn’t want to be opposed to the West but had been forced into the position after being repeatedly betrayed by the United States.

The other officials all spoke off the record, but the impression they gave was not a particularly positive one. Lavrov was smart and cynical as usual. Shuvalov seemed to have dropped the “I am a good pro-Western liberal” act and was just acting like a post-Soviet bureaucrat defending his government’s policies. Volodin was, if anything, worse. As my colleague Rawi Abdelal put it, if Shuvalov looked like he had come from 1994, Volodin seemed to have arrived directly from 1974. He lost his cool on a couple of occasions, including in responding to a question about Navalny, and his scowl was really a sight to behold (see below). Gref seemed to have taken over the role of good Western liberal from Shuvalov, giving a slick presentation about various disruptive 21st century technologies and their potential impacts on Russia in general and on Sberbank in particular. The audience members’ level of interest in the presentation was inversely proportional to their familiarity with the technologies being discussed. Gref came off as a neophyte who had just discovered these new scientific developments that he mostly but not completely understood but thought were really really important and couldn’t wait to share them with everyone.

3) Finally, it’s worth briefly addressing the optics of the event. The parts of the event that involved Russian officials were clearly highly choreographed. The first few questions to Putin gave all signs of being pre-arranged softballs asked by known members of the “Russia understanders” camp. It was quite noticeable that the moderator of the Putin Q&A avoided calling on Americans until the very end, when he did call on Toby Gati. The Lavrov and Putin meetings were slightly odd in another way, as rather than taking the stage alone to address the audience and answer their questions, they were instead on panels with other speakers (colloquially called “side dishes”), who gave short presentations and then sat more or less uncomfortably as the audience addressed their questions to the Russian officials while ignoring them. The Putin panel included Hamid Karzai and Jack Ma (Alibaba CEO), as well as a representative of the Nobel Research Institute. I imagine these are not people who are used to being ignored for long periods of time. Also, there was a gala awards dinner the first evening, emceed by Sofiko Shevardnadze. It all seemed a bit too forced and too loud, like amateurs trying to put on the Oscars and ending up with something more like a small town’s annual good citizen award ceremony. It would probably be best to drop this event, or at least tone it down, as I overheard a lot of participants making uncomplimentary remarks about it afterwards.

There’s always a lively debate in the United States about whether one should attend Valdai. This was the first year I was invited, but I have always thought that for those of us who study Russian politics, it is our job to take any and all opportunities to gain a better understanding of the country and of its leadership. Activists may take a different position, eschewing any signs of “collaboration” in what is clearly a staged and choreographed event. While I wish there were more panels focusing more directly on Russian politics and foreign policy, seeing Putin, Lavrov, et al in action was worthwhile in and of itself. I’ll certainly go back if invited again, since it would be useful to compare the messaging pre- and post-2018 elections.

Atlantista üdvözletem!

Megjelent legújabb írásom a Stratégiai Tanulmányok Központjának (CSS) blogján, amely az "Elephants in the War Room" nevet viseli (fordítsuk így: "Elefánt az irányítóközpontban").

A CSS "Kutatás és Politika Szeminárium" sorozatának keretében - amelynek én vagyok a koordinátora - saját kutatóink és vendégprofesszorok mutatják be még írás alatt álló tanulmányaikat, amelyeket a CSS-hez tartozó oktatók, posztdoktori ösztöndíjasok és doktoranduszok kritika alá vesznek. A Kutatás és Politika Szeminárium vendégelőadója 2017. október 2-án Peter Dombrowski, a Naval War College (Haditengerészeti Főiskola) stratégia-tudományi professzora volt.

Dobrowski bemutatta "Transoceanic Control: Rethinking American Strategy" című, írás alatt lévő tanulmányát, amelyben a jelenlegi amerikai katonai (és elsősorban haditengerészeti) stratégiával szemben egy radikálisan más stratégiára tesz javaslatot. A tanulmány lényege, hogy az USA az elmúlt évtizedben arra készült, hogy globális/regionális kihívóit (elsősorban Kína, kisebb részben Oroszország) azok saját "hátsó fertályában", környező tengereiken győzze le. Dombrowski szerint ez eleve hátrányos helyzetbe hozza az amerikai haditengerészetet, ezért a cél inkább a "globális tengeri uralom" (global sea control) megvalósítása lehetne.

Dombrowski tanulmányának én voltam a felkért opponense. Kritikáim és kérdéseim elővezetése, valamint a szerző reagálása után a szemináriumon részt vevő professzorok, posztdoktori ösztöndíjasok és doktoranduszok élénk vitát folytattak a tanulmány kapcsán az amerikai stratégiáról.

A tanulmányt és a szemináriumon elhangzottakat összegző írásom a linkre kattintva olvasható el:

Elephants in the War Room Blog - Zoltan Feher - Research & Policy Seminar: Peter Dombrowski on “Transoceanic Control: Rethinking American Strategy”

Atlantista üdvözletem!

Megjelent legújabb írásom a Stratégiai Tanulmányok Központjának (CSS) blogján, amely az "Elephants in the War Room" nevet viseli (fordítsuk így: "Elefánt az irányítóközpontban").

A CSS "Kutatás és Politika Szeminárium" sorozatának keretében - amelynek én vagyok a koordinátora - saját kutatóink és vendégprofesszorok mutatják be még írás alatt álló tanulmányaikat, amelyeket a CSS-hez tartozó oktatók, posztdoktori ösztöndíjasok és doktoranduszok kritika alá vesznek. A Kutatás és Politika Szeminárium vendégelőadója 2017. október 2-án Peter Dombrowski, a Naval War College (Haditengerészeti Főiskola) stratégia-tudományi professzora volt.

Dobrowski bemutatta "Transoceanic Control: Rethinking American Strategy" című, írás alatt lévő tanulmányát, amelyben a jelenlegi amerikai katonai (és elsősorban haditengerészeti) stratégiával szemben egy radikálisan más stratégiára tesz javaslatot. A tanulmány lényege, hogy az USA az elmúlt évtizedben arra készült, hogy globális/regionális kihívóit (elsősorban Kína, kisebb részben Oroszország) azok saját "hátsó fertályában", környező tengereiken győzze le. Dombrowski szerint ez eleve hátrányos helyzetbe hozza az amerikai haditengerészetet, ezért a cél inkább a "globális tengeri uralom" (global sea control) megvalósítása lehetne.

Dombrowski tanulmányának én voltam a felkért opponense. Kritikáim és kérdéseim elővezetése, valamint a szerző reagálása után a szemináriumon részt vevő professzorok, posztdoktori ösztöndíjasok és doktoranduszok élénk vitát folytattak a tanulmány kapcsán az amerikai stratégiáról.

A tanulmányt és a szemináriumon elhangzottakat összegző írásom a linkre kattintva olvasható el:

Elephants in the War Room Blog - Zoltan Feher - Research & Policy Seminar: Peter Dombrowski on “Transoceanic Control: Rethinking American Strategy”

On May 8, 2001, Koby Mandell, a 13 year old Israeli with American citizenship and 14 year old Yosef Ishran, were killed on the outskirts of Tekoa where their families lived. Though the actual identities of the murderers was never determined, the Israeli government determined that Palestinian terrorists were responsible.

Their murders led to Congressional legislation strengthening the US response to the killing of Americans overseas.

Koby Mandell. Source: YouTube video

But it was not easy.


The original version of the Koby Mandell Act applied pressure on the US government to deal with Palestinian terrorists who murdered American citizens in attacks on Israel.

The Koby Mandell Act criticized the US government for its failure to dedicate the necessary resources to apprehending Palestinian terrorists:

1. Numerous American citizens have been murdered or maimed by terrorists around the world, including more than one hundred murdered since 1968 in terrorist attacks occurring in Israel or in territories administered by Israel or in territories administered by the Palestinian Authority.
   
   
2. Some American citizens who have been victims of terrorism overseas, especially those harmed by terrorists operating from areas administered by the Palestinian Authority, have not received from the United States Government services equal to those received by other such victims of overseas terrorism.
   
   
3. The United States Government has not devoted adequate efforts or resources to the apprehension of terrorists who have harmed American citizens overseas, particularly in cases involving terrorists operating from areas administered by the Palestinian Authority. Monetary rewards for information leading to the capture of terrorists overseas, which the government advertises in regions where the terrorists are believed to be hiding, have not been advertised in areas administered by the Palestinian Authority.

The bill was criticized by Jewish groups for being too narrowly focused on Palestinian terrorism and for being more interested in criticizing the government than in developing more effective terrorism countermeasures.

Other aspects of the bill, seemed to be very relevant:
(7) The Office shall endeavor to monitor public actions by governments and regimes overseas pertaining to terrorists who have harmed American citizens, such as naming of schools, streets, or other public institutions or sites after such terrorists. In such instances, the Office shall encourage other United States Government agencies to halt their provision of assistance, directly or indirectly, to those institutions.But one of the most important elements of the bill provided for rewards:
(1) The Office shall assume responsibility for administration of the Rewards for Justice program and its web site, www.rewardsforjustice.com, and in so doing will ensure that--
(A) rewards are offered to capture all terrorists involved in harming American citizens overseas, regardless of the terrorists’ country of origin or residence;
(B) such rewards are prominently advertised in the mass media and public sites in all countries or regions where such terrorists reside;
(C) the names and photographs and suspects in all such cases are included on the web site; and
(D) the names of the specific organizations claiming responsibility for terrorist attacks mentioned on the site are included in the descriptions of those attacks.The key element of the bill is that US victims of Palestinian terrorism receive justice:
To create an office within the Department of Justice to undertake certain specific steps to ensure that all American citizens harmed by terrorism overseas receive equal treatment by the United States government regardless of the terrorists' country of origin or residence, and to ensure that all terrorists involved in such attacks are pursued, prosecuted, and punished with equal vigor, regardless of the terrorists' country of origin or residence.The result was the creation of the Office of Justice for Victims of Overseas Terrorism (OVT)

Where do things stand now?

On February 2, 2016, Representative Ron DeSantis chaired a hearing before the Subcommittee on National Security addressing the job the OVT was doing in general and in prosecuting Palestinian terrorists in particular.

Representative Ron DeSantis. Credit: Wikipedia

A key exchange between Congressman DeSantis and Brad Wiegmann, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, in the Department of Justice went like this:
Mr. Wiegmann, the committee has counted that since ’93, at least 64 Americans have been killed, as well as two unborn children, and 91 have been wounded by terrorists in Israel in disputed territories.

Mr. DESANTIS. How many terrorists who have killed or wounded Americans in Israel or disputed territories has the United States indicted, extradited, or prosecuted during this time period?
Mr. WIEGMANN. I think the answer is—is none.

Mr. DESANTIS. Okay. How many terrorists who have killed or wounded Americans anywhere else overseas has the United States indicted, extradited, or prosecuted?
Mr. WIEGMANN. I don’t have an exact figure for you.

Mr. DESANTIS. But it would be a decent size number, though, correct?
Mr. WIEGMANN. It would be a significant number, yes.

Mr. DESANTIS. Okay. Does the DOJ plan to prosecute any of the terrorism cases committed by Palestinian terrorism and Israel in the disputed territories?
Mr. WIEGMANN. So we have a number of open investigations. I can’t comment further on the status of the investigations.

Mr. DESANTIS. Do you know how many, though?
Mr. WIEGMANN. I can’t give you that number.

Mr. DESANTIS. Why not?
Mr. WIEGMANN. I don’t have the number, and I don’t think we want to comment exactly, because the more we say about the number of investigations we have, the more we tell the bad guys who we are trying to get.

Mr. DESANTIS. ...In your opening statement, you said that these prosecutions, when Americans are killed by terrorists overseas, including in Israel, that that was the highest priority, and that there should be no stone left unturned. And I understand when you’re talking about foreign jurisdictions, and you alluded to some of the issues that arise, and I think that point is well taken. But when it’s zero for 64, I think you see some people, who have been affected negatively, wonder, you know, what exactly is the Department doing within this particular aspect of terrorism that occurs in Israel?Another exchange between Wiegmann and Representative DeSantis concerned whether US foreign might influence the the Department of Justice pursued terrorists:
Mr. DESANTIS. ...Now, it’s been alleged that the reason that DOJ does not prosecute the Palestinian terrorists who harm Americans in Israel, the disputed territories, is that the Department of Justice is concerned that such prosecutions will harm efforts to promote the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, or that it will actually harm the Palestinian Authority.

So let me ask you straight up, is that a consideration the Department of Justice?
Mr. WIEGMANN. I can assure that is absolutely not the case.

Mr. DESANTIS. And has the State Department ever made arguments to the Department of Justice to handle some of the Palestinian terrorism cases differently than you may normally handle, say, a terrorism case in Asia?

Mr. WIEGMANN. Absolutely not. The State Department has nothing to say about cases that we bring, whether in Palestinian territories related to these cases or not. So it absolutely makes zero difference to us whether the terrorist attack occurred in Israel, whether it’s a Palestinian terrorist group, whether it’s ISIL, Al Qaeda, they are all the same to us. We want to protect Americans regardless of who they are victimized by.An important issue in the US pursuing and extraditing terrorists in general and Palestinian terrorists in particular is the question of double-jeopardy. Does the US consider pursuit of Palestinian terrorists released from prison, for example in the Gilad Shalit exchange, to be off-limits:
Mr. DESANTIS. ...Now, some have said that if you have a situation where a terrorist who kills Americans in Israel is prosecuted by the Israelis, then they are later released in a prisoner exchange or release, that somehow if we were to prosecute them here, that would trigger double jeopardy. Is that the Department’s position?

Mr. WIEGMANN. Absolutely not. We have prosecuted people who have been released from prison before. Sometimes it takes us a while. One prominent case is an older case, actually a case involving a Palestinian terrorist who hijacked an airliner in Pakistan. He spent, I think, 8 to 10 years in a Pakistani prison. Then he was released, made his way to another country, and was, I think, more, 10, 12, 15 years later that we were able finally to apprehend the person, prosecuted him in 2004, and he’s got a 60-year sentence today.

So we have prosecuted people who have been released from prison before, and certainly, nothing in the Israeli prison release would be any different. We fully intend to pursue charges in any of those cases if we can.Some of Wiegmann's testimony is positive -- that the prosecution of Palestinian terrorists is not influenced or hampered by foreign policy and that double-jeopardy is not an issue.

But the fact remains that the record of the OVT is horrendous. Some of the parents and relatives of victims made clear they thought the Department of Justice and the Office of Justice for Victims of Overseas Terrorism were not doing their job, undercutting the intent of the Koby Mandell Act. Apart from the clear failure to apprehend even one Palestinian terrorist, other complaints during the hearing were that the OVT was not in contact with them..

Sherri Mandell herself indicated in 2012 that the OVT was not doing its job

• When she the head of the American Consulate in Israel to find out about the recent activities of The Office of Justice for Victims of Overseas Terrorism , she never heard back.
• Her family was not informed of key personnel changes in the OVT.
• Although Rewards for Justice distributed 100 million dollars to 70 people who have given information leading to the apprehension of terrorists -- the program had not been activated in Israel.

We are approaching the end of 2017 and still the OVT has been a failure.

Most recently, efforts to bring Ahlam Tamimi to justice have been thwarted by Jordan's refusal to honor its extradition treaty with the US. It is unclear what the US is going to do to prevent this from being one more failure in the record of the the Office of Justice for Victims of Overseas Terrorism.

And in the record of the Koby Mandell Act.





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