Pályázatok

By Asoka Bandarage
COLOMBO, Sri Lanka, Mar 25 2026 (IPS)

Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter prohibits member states from using threats or force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. Violating international law, the United States and Israel attacked Iran on February 28, 2026. The ostensible reason for this unprovoked aggression was to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon.

The United States is the first and only country to have used nuclear weapons in war, against Japan in August 1945. Some officials in Israel have threatened to use a “doomsday weapon” against Gaza. On March 14, David Sacks, billionaire venture capitalist and AI and crypto czar in the Trump administration, warned that Israel may resort to nuclear weapons as its war with Iran spirals out of control and the country faces “destruction.”

Although for decades Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, opposed nuclear weapons on religious grounds, in the face of current existential threats it is likely that Iran will pursue their development.

On March 22, the head of the WHO warned of possible nuclear risks after nuclear facilities in both Iran and Israel were attacked. Indeed, will the current war in the Middle East continue for months or years, or end sooner with the possible use of a nuclear weapon by Israel or the United States?

Widening Destruction

Apart from the threat of nuclear conflagration—and what many analysts consider an impending ground invasion by American troops—extensive attacks using bombs, missiles, and drones are continuing apace, causing massive loss of life and destruction of resources and infrastructure. US–Israel airstrikes have killed Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and top Iranian officials.

Countless civilians have died, including some 150 girls in a primary school in Minab, in what UNESCO has called a “grave violation of humanitarian law.” Moreover, the targeting of desalination plants by both sides could severely disrupt water supplies across desert regions.

Iran’s retaliatory attacks on United States military bases in Persian Gulf countries have disrupted global air travel. Even more significantly, Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz—the critical maritime energy chokepoint through which 20% of global oil and liquefied natural gas pass daily—has blocked the flow of energy supplies and goods, posing a severe threat to the fossil fuel–driven global economy.

A global economic crisis is emerging, with soaring oil prices, power shortages, inflation, loss of livelihoods, and deep uncertainty over food security and survival.

The inconsistent application of international law, along with structural limitations of the United Nations, erodes trust in global governance and the moral authority of Western powers and multilateral institutions. Resolution 2817 (2026), adopted by the UN Security Council on March 12, condemns Iran’s “egregious attacks” against its neighbors without any condemnation of US–Israeli actions—an imbalance that underscores this concern.

The current crisis is exposing fault lines in the neo-colonial political, economic, and moral order that has been in place since the Second World War. Iran’s defiance poses a significant challenge to longstanding patterns of intervention and regime-change agendas pursued by the United States and its allies in the Global South.

The difficulty the United States faces in rallying NATO and other allies also reflects a notable geopolitical shift. Meanwhile, the expansion of yuan-based oil trade and alternative financial settlement mechanisms is weakening the petrodollar system and dollar dominance.

Opposition within the United States—including from segments of conservatives and Republicans—signals growing skepticism about the ideological and moral basis of a US war against Iran seemingly driven by Israel.

A New World Order?

The unipolar world dominated by the United States—rooted in inequality, coercion, and militarism—is destabilizing, fragmenting, and generating widespread chaos and suffering. Challenges to this order, including from Iran, point toward a fragmented multipolar world in which multiple actors possess agency and leverage.

The BRICS bloc—Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, along with Iran, the UAE, and other members—represents efforts to create alternative economic and financial systems, including development banks and reserve currencies that challenge Western financial dominance.

However, is BRICS leading the world toward a much-needed order based on equity, partnership, and peace?

The behavior of BRICS countries during the current crisis does not indicate strong collective leadership or commitment to such principles. Instead, many appear to be leveraging the situation for national advantage, particularly regarding access to energy supplies.

A clear example of this opportunism is India, the current head of the BRICS bloc. Historically a leader of non-alignment and a supporter of the Palestinian cause, India now presents itself as a neutral party upholding international law and state sovereignty. However, it co-sponsored and supported UN Security Council Resolution 2817 (2026), which condemns only Iran.

India is also part of the USA–Israel–India–UAE strategic nexus involving defense cooperation, technology sharing, and counterterrorism. Additionally, it participates in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) with the United States, Japan, and Australia, aimed at countering China’s growing influence.

In effect, despite its leadership role in BRICS, India is closely aligned with the United States, raising questions about its ability to offer independent leadership in shaping a new world order.

As a group, BRICS does not fundamentally challenge corporate hegemony, the concentration of wealth among a global elite, or entrenched technological and military dominance. While it rejects aspects of Western geopolitical hierarchy, it largely upholds neoliberal economic principles: competition, free trade, privatization, open markets, export-led growth, globalization, and rapid technological expansion.

The current Middle East crisis underscores the need to question the assumption that globalization, market expansion, and technological growth are the foundations of human well-being.

The oil and food crises, declining remittances from Asian workers in the Middle East, and reduced tourism due to disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz and regional airspace all highlight the fragility of global interdependence.

These conditions call for consideration of alternative frameworks—bioregionalism, import substitution, local control of resources, food and energy self-sufficiency, and renewable energy—in place of dependence on imported fossil fuels and global supply chains.

Both the Western economic model and its BRICS variant continue to prioritize techno-capitalist expansion and militarism, despite overwhelming evidence linking these systems to environmental destruction and social inequality. While it is difficult for individual countries to challenge this dominant model, history offers lessons in collective resistance.

Collective Resistance

One of the earliest examples of nationalist economic resistance in the post- World War II period was the nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and the creation of the National Iranian Oil Company in 1951 under Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh. He was overthrown on August 19, 1953, in a coup orchestrated by the US CIA and British intelligence (MI6), and Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi was installed to protect Western oil interests.

A milestone for decolonization occurred in Egypt in 1956, when President Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal Company. Despite military intervention by Israel, the United Kingdom, and France, Nasser retained control, emerging as a symbol of Arab and Third World nationalism.

Following political independence, many former colonies sought to avoid entanglement in the Cold War through the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), officially founded in Belgrade in 1961. Leaders including Josip Broz Tito, Jawaharlal Nehru, Gamal Abdel Nasser, Kwame Nkrumah, Sukarno, and Sirimavo Bandaranaike promoted autonomous development paths aligned with national priorities and cultural traditions.

However, maintaining economic sovereignty proved far more difficult. Patrice Lumumba, the first democratically elected prime minister of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, was assassinated in 1961 with the involvement of US and Belgian interests after attempting to assert control over national resources. Kwame Nkrumah was similarly overthrown in a US-backed coup in 1966.

In Tanzania, Julius Nyerere’s Ujamaa (“African socialism”) sought to build community-based development and food security, but faced both internal challenges and external opposition, ultimately limiting its success and discouraging similar efforts elsewhere.

UN declarations from the 1970s reflect Global South resistance to the Bretton Woods system. Notably, the 1974 Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order (Resolution 3201) called for equitable cooperation between developed and developing countries based on dignity and sovereign equality.

Today, these declarations are more relevant than ever, as Iran and other Global South nations confront overlapping crises of economic instability, neocolonial pressures, and intensifying geopolitical rivalry.

Dr Asoka Bandarage has served on the faculties of Brandeis University, Georgetown University and Mount Holyoke College. She is the author of Crisis in Sri Lanka and the World: Colonial and Neoliberal Origins, Ecological and Collective Alternatives and many other publications (De Gruyter, 2023).

IPS UN Bureau

 

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By the time the auction begins at Nangurukuru fish market in Tanzania’s southern Lindi region, the crisis is already visible. Wooden canoes that once returned from the Rufiji River with heavy catches now bring only a fraction of what they used to. Traders scan for the long-whiskered catfish that once defined the market but find […]

The WTO reform agenda is a distraction. The real prize is dismantling MFN through plurilateral precedents. Credit: WTO

By Chien Yen Goh and Kinda Mohamadieh
GENEVA, Mar 24 2026 (IPS)

As trade ministers gather in Yaoundé, Cameroon, for the WTO’s 14th Ministerial Conference (MC14) on 26–29 March 2026, the preparatory process has produced a dense fog of competing reform proposals, draft ministerial statements, and work plans.

The facilitator-led consultations at the WTO headquarters in Geneva focused for the past few weeks on decision-making, development and Special and Differential Treatment (S&DT), as well as level-playing-field issues, while the United States, European Union and others tabled their own reform submissions.

The sheer volume and scope of this activity have muddied the picture of what exactly requires ministerial attention and decision.

This confusion, however, serves a purpose. It obscures the fact that the U.S. — which has done more than any other member to destabilise the multilateral trading system through unilateral tariffs, bilateral Agreements on Reciprocal Trade (ARTs), and paralysing the WTO Appellate Body — is not primarily interested in the reform or continued relevance of the WTO.

Its 2026 Trade Policy Agenda, released earlier this month, makes this plain: the US will push to reorient the WTO’s negotiating function by “favouring meaningful plurilateral agreements” and “urging reassessment of the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) principle” so that trading nations can differentiate among partners in their liberalisation commitments.

The MFN rule is the foundational principle of the WTO that requires any trade advantage granted to one WTO member to be extended equally to all. The U.S. WTO reform paper submitted to the General Council in December 2025 (WT/GC/W/984) goes further, arguing that MFN “is not just unsuitable for this era” but actively prevents countries from optimising their trade relationships.

Outside the WTO, the U.S. is pursuing its trade interests through bilateral ARTs with Bangladesh, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia and others. Since its Supreme Court struck down the legal basis for these ARTs, section 301 of the U.S. 1974 Trade Act has been activated. But within the WTO, the U.S. priority at MC14 is more focused and consequential than the reform agenda suggests.

The immediate objective is to secure adoption of the plurilateral Investment Facilitation Agreement (IFA) into the WTO’s legal architecture under Annex 4 of the Marrakesh Agreement — despite the U.S. not having participated in the IFA negotiations and having no interest in being a party to it. U.S. Ambassador Joseph Barloon identified the IFA as one of a limited number of issues the U.S. wants decided at MC14.

Why would the US push through an agreement it will not sign? Because the IFA is not the end but the means. Its incorporation into the WTO — while its initiation, negotiation and addition have been formally contested — would establish that plurilateral agreements can be adopted and added to the WTO rulebook without the consent of all members. Once that door is opened, the principle of consensus in WTO agenda-setting and rule-making is effectively undermined.

This is precisely what the U.S. wants. Its December 2025 reform submission argues that plurilateral agreements should allow “likeminded trading partners committed to fair and reciprocal trade” to strengthen ties “within the architecture of the WTO agreements,” with benefits limited to consenting parties — that is, on a non-MFN basis.

The paper warns that without a path for plurilaterals, the WTO is “not a viable forum for negotiating.” Read together with the Trade Policy Agenda’s call to reassess MFN, the logic is clear: plurilaterals are the vehicle through which the U.S. intends to displace MFN as the organising principle of the multilateral trading system. Members that cannot or choose not to join will simply be left out.

The second U.S. priority reinforces this trajectory. Washington is pressing developing countries to make permanent the moratorium on customs duties on electronic commerce transmissions. First adopted as a temporary measure in 1998, the moratorium was last renewed at MC13 in Abu Dhabi, where members agreed it would expire at MC14 or 31 March 2026. The U.S. now wants to lock it in permanently and expand the scope of digital goods and services beyond customs authorities.

The stakes are high and direct. UNCTAD has estimated that the moratorium costs developing countries up to $10 billion annually in foregone tariff revenue, with 95 per cent of the losses borne by developing countries. For many, customs duties constitute 10–30 per cent of total tax revenue — for some, over 50 per cent.

The primary beneficiaries are the large technology firms in developed countries that dominate cross-border digital trade. Making the moratorium permanent would formalise this revenue transfer and strip developing countries of policy space to regulate digital imports as the digital economy grows.

Both these issues — the IFA and the e-commerce moratorium — involve developing countries giving up something concrete (MFN treatment, consensus-based decision-making, effective say over agenda setting, customs revenue and regulatory autonomy) in exchange for nothing.

The U.S. is not offering concessions on agriculture, S&DT, or the longstanding mandated issues that matter to developing country Members. It is not proposing to fix the dispute settlement system it broke. It is leveraging reform to extract structural concessions that tilt the WTO’s institutional machinery in its favour, while pursuing its trade interests bilaterally.

Once plurilaterals are entrenched and the moratorium made permanent, the U.S. will have a freer hand to set the WTO agenda without negotiating with developing country and Least Developed Country members. S&DT, already under pressure from demands to end self-designation and narrow its application, will recede further as a meaningful principle and integral part of the negotiations.

The reform agenda, for all its complexity, is secondary to the structural question: will the WTO remain a consensus-based institution where MFN and consensus decision-making ensure the smallest member has a say? Or will it be refashioned into a platform for variable-geometry agreements where the powerful set the terms and the rest face compliance or exclusion?

Developing countries have fought for decades to preserve a multilateral trading system in which trade could serve as a tool for their development. That system is now under direct threat — not from its irrelevance, but from a deliberate strategy to hollow it out from within.

Chien Yen Goh and Kinda Mohamadieh are trade and investment lawyers at Third World Network (TWN) based in Geneva.

IPS UN Bureau

 

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Schweizer Autowerkstätten gehören zu den vertrauenswürdigsten weltweit. Luzern, Interlaken und Bern schaffen es unter die Top 10 einer globalen Studie, die auf Online-Bewertungen von Garagen in 155 Städten basiert. Den höchsten Score erreicht eine Stadt in Südamerika.

Die Schweiz will eine Alpen-Maut einführen für ausländische Autofahrerinnen und Autofahrer, die nur durch die Schweiz durchfahren und nicht anhalten. Bei unseren Nachbarn kommt das nicht gut an.

Face aux défis croissants liés à la gestion des ressources en eau, l’Algérie franchit une nouvelle étape en lançant une initiative nationale dédiée à l’innovation […]

L’article Innovation hydrique : un appel aux talents pour relever le défi de l’eau est apparu en premier sur .

Er war Chef der Terrorismusbekämpfung in der Trump-Regierung. Doch jetzt hat Joe Kent seinen Rücktritt bekannt gegeben. Der Schritt sorgt weltweit für Schlagzeilen. Kent ist die bislang ranghöchste Person, die öffentlich gegen Trumps Iran-Politik Stellung bezieht.

Silvia Wollny wehrt sich gegen schwere Vorwürfe ihres Schwiegersohns Servet Özbek. Laut ihm habe sie Sachspenden für die Türkei unterschlagen. Sie bestreitet dies entschieden und droht mit rechtlichen Schritten.

Der Iran fordert, alle WM-Spiele 2026 ausschliesslich in Mexiko auszutragen. Grund dafür ist der Konflikt im Nahen Osten

Kurz vor dem Ende ihrer Weltcup-Karriere zeigt sich Nadine Fähndrich noch einmal von ihrer besten Seite: Die Luzernerin läuft beim Sprint in Drammen auf das Podest. Den gleichen Rang belegt Alex Fiva beim Skicross-Weltcup in Montafon.

Am frühen Donnerstagnachmittag musste ein Polizist in Freiburg seine Waffe gegen eine aggressive Person einsetzen, die mit einer Stichwaffe drohte. Diese Person wurde verletzt und in ein Spital gebracht.

Pro-environmental behavior, such as recycling, often needs to be regular to be effective, and interventions to encourage behavioral change may therefore need to be repeated; yet, little evidence exists on the optimal time pattern and frequency of such repeated interventions. To fill this gap, we investigate the impact of mobile text reminders on households’ recycling behavior in urban Peru by randomly varying the exposure length and continuity of reminders. We find that reminders increase both the likelihood that households start to recycle and the frequency of recycling among households that already did so before the intervention. The effects are stronger when reminders are repeated over a longer period. Our findings suggest that both limited attention and habit formation matter for recycling behavior, and that low-cost mobile text reminders can effectively support regular pro-environmental behavior.

Bonn, 09. März 2026. Aktuelle weltpolitische Verwerfungen erweitern den Gestaltungsspielraum der Volksrepublik – und verlangen eine intensivere Auseinandersetzung mit China.

Für die Volksrepublik China ist bei Weitem nicht alles rosig. Die Krise des chinesischen Immobilienmarkts klingt nicht ab, die Binnennachfrage schwächelt und eine rapide alternde Bevölkerung bereitet der Regierung in Peking Kopfzerbrechen. International fordern die volatile Zollpolitik der US-Regierung und Spannungen zwischen den Großmächten die chinesische Wirtschaft heraus. Trotz einiger Trümpfe – Stichwort seltene Erden – hätten exportabhängige Sektoren bei einem eskalierenden Handelskrieg viel zu verlieren. Gerade erst wurde im Nationalen Volkskongress das niedrigste Wachstumsziel der letzten 30 Jahre ausgegeben.

Weltpolitisch jedoch könnte es für die Volksrepublik momentan kaum besser laufen. Während sich die Weltöffentlichkeit mit Russlands Krieg gegen die Ukraine oder den US-Militärschlägen gegen Iran beschäftigt, betont China die zentrale Rolle der Vereinten Nationen für eine stabile internationale Zusammenarbeit. Verglichen mit Donald Trumps oder Wladimir Putins Feldzug gegen zentrale Prinzipien der Nachkriegsordnung erscheint Xi Jinpings China als multilateraler Musterschüler. Chinas Nähe zu Moskau ist dabei für viele kein Grund, der Volksrepublik Vorwürfe zu machen. Während in westlichen Staaten erst seit Kurzem der Wegfall der USA als Sicherheitsgarant debattiert wird, kritisiert China schon lange die hegemoniale Rolle der US-Regierung. Für die Volksrepublik soll eine reformierte Weltordnung vor allem eines sein: weniger abhängig von Washington und damit stärker ausgerichtet auf Pekings Interessen.

Internationale Zusammenarbeit chinesischer Prägung

China unterstreicht dabei, dass es selbst keine hegemoniale Kontrolle anstrebt – auch, weil die Durchsetzung von Hegemonie zu viele Ressourcen beanspruchen würde. Für die chinesische Regierung ist das Überleben des eigenen Regimes im Einparteienstaat von übergeordneter Bedeutung. Statt die Rolle des angeblichen Weltpolizisten von den USA zu übernehmen, strebt Peking eine stärkere – durchaus von China dominierte – weltweite Vernetzung an. Ein zentraler Hebel dabei ist Chinas Position als primus inter pares in der heterogenen Gruppe der „Entwicklungsländer“, die den Großteil der Weltbevölkerung stellen. Wirtschaftliche Verflechtung, Entwicklungszusammenarbeit sowie rhetorische Unterstützung für Belange des Globalen Südens sind dabei zentrale Instrumente in Chinas Werkzeugkasten.

Auf multilateraler Ebene zielen chinesische Reformvorstellungen nicht nur auf Machtverschiebung, sondern auch auf Veränderungen in prozeduralen und normativen Logiken. Die UN, wie China sie sich vorstellt, soll weniger von einer multilateralen Bürokratie und mehr von zwischenstaatlichen Entscheidungen geprägt werden. Teilweise überlappt sich das mit Präferenzen in Moskau und Washington. Normativ positioniert sich China dabei in Opposition zu einem guten Teil liberaler Agenden. Statt zivile und politische Rechte von Individuen zu stärken, versucht China, das kollektiv gedachte Recht auf Entwicklung ins Zentrum globaler Menschenrechtsdiskurse zu stellen. Anstelle einer Schutzverantwortung der internationalen Gemeinschaft sieht Peking die Nichteinmischung in interne Angelegenheiten als Grundlogik multilateraler Zusammenarbeit. Vom Umgang mit Protestierenden in Hongkong bis zur „Wiedervereinigung“ mit Taiwan gibt es eine Reihe von Anliegen, bei denen die Volksrepublik freie Hand haben möchte.

China als komplexes Gegenüber

Insgesamt erweitert die Disruption der lange von den USA dominierten Weltordnung den Raum, in dem China seine Präferenzen und Reformvorschläge positionieren kann. Ungeachtet aller Diskrepanzen hat dadurch auch für Europa die längerfristige Relevanz der Volksrepublik zugenommen. Erst Ende Februar meldete das Statistische Bundesamt, dass das Handelsvolumen der Bundesrepublik mit den USA im Jahr 2025 um fünf Prozent zurückgegangen und China wieder Deutschlands wichtigster Handelspartner ist.

Trotz der in vielerlei Hinsicht nachvollziehbaren Tendenz europäischer Regierungen, Peking als systemischen Rivalen zu sehen, werden so – wie schon jüngst bei Friedrich Merz‘ Chinareise – auch die Konturen Chinas als potentiellem Partner wieder stärker in den Blick genommen werden. Das verlangt nach einer differenzierten Herangehensweise, die Detailwissen mit strategischer Klugheit verbindet. Bei der viel beschworenen Chinakompetenz, die in Deutschland oft zu wünschen übriglässt, geht es nicht nur um das Erlernen der chinesischen Sprache. Es geht auch um eine breitere gesellschaftliche Auseinandersetzung mit China als Land und der chinesischen Regierung als globalem Akteur.

Vor diesem Hintergrund muss der traditionelle Fokus auf die politische, wirtschaftliche und kulturelle Auseinandersetzung mit den USA dringend erweitert werden. Sowohl in Deutschland als auch in anderen Ländern, die sich nach wie vor als Teil des Westens sehen, scheint aktuell breiter Konsens zu herrschen, dass eine Neujustierung der internationalen Beziehungen vonnöten ist. China als komplexes Gegenüber sollte dabei einen zentralen Platz einnehmen. Das bedeutet, auch atypische Dialogformate auszubauen, Expertise in Forschung und Verwaltung zu bündeln und schon im Schulkontext der Beschäftigung mit China genug Platz einzuräumen. Und es bedeutet, durch konkrete Begegnungen mit Chines*innen eine Idee von der Vielfalt chinesischer Realitäten zu bekommen, die auch jenseits des Einparteienstaats und ungleicher Handelsbeziehungen Anknüpfungspunkte für ein kritisches globales Miteinander bieten können.

Le préfet du département du Plateau, Valère Sètonnougbo, a procédé à l'installation des chefs d'arrondissement et présidents des commissions permanentes dans les communes de Sakété et Ifangny, pour la mandature 2026-2033.
Ci-dessous la liste des CA et présidents des commissions
Commune de Sakété

Chefs d'Arrondissements
‎SAKETE 1 : Chafiou LASSISSI
SAKETE 2 : Nathanaël GBANGBOLA
‎AGUIDI : Gilbert OGOUDELE
‎ITA DJEBOU : Cécile ABALAWA
TAKON : Antoine OGOUDINAN
YOKO : Oscar FATON
‎
Présidents des commissions permanentes
– Commission des ‎Affaires Sociales, Culturelles et Sportives :
Président : Sylvain ADEICHAN
Rapporteur : ERIYOMI GILBERT
– Commission des ‎Affaires Financières et Économiques :
Président : Affissou BAMGBOTCHE
Rapporteur : Rachidi ADECHIAN
– Commission des ‎Affaires Domaniales :
Président : Noukpo SISSOEMON
Rapporteur : DESIRE KOUBOMISSI
– Commission de la ‎Coopération et Relations Extérieures :
Président : M. Aimé AKANHO
Rapporteur : M Séverin ADEGBOLA

Commune d'Ifangni

Chefs d'arrondissement
– Banigbé : Adandé Antoine
– Ko Koumolou : Affodegonkou Philippe
– Tchaada : Kpokpo Gérôme
– Ifangni : Amoussa Fataï
– Lagbè : Fayomi Yessoufou
– Daagbé : Bohoumbo Michel

Commissions permanentes
– Commission des affaires économiques et financières
Président : Etoévi Moïse
Rapporteur : Idohou Soulé
– Commission des affaires domaniales
Présidente : Eniayewou Florence
Rapporteur : Houssinou François
– Commission des affaires sociales, sportives et culturelles
Président : Atchambi Patrice
Rapporteur : Akotonou Martin
– Commission des relations avec les institutions
Président : Oloufade Parfait
Rapporteur : Kpokpo Jérôme.

Schockierende Enthüllung in ihrem Buch «You With the Sad Eyes»: Ihr Engagement in «Eine schrecklich nette Familie» verstärkte laut Christina Applegate ihre Essstörung. Auch auf eine Abtreibung kommt sie in ihrem Buch zu sprechen.

Ab 2031 gibt es neue Schweizer Banknoten. Die SNB präsentiert am Mittwoch die Gewinnerin des Design-Wettbewerbs. Das Thema: «Die Schweiz und ihre Höhenlagen». Stückelungen und Farben bleiben gleich. Auch die umstrittene 1000-Franken-Note gibts weiterhin.

This chapter traces the evolution of bus rapid transit (BRT) and examines its implications for urban mobility policymaking, particularly in cities in the Global South. It reviews BRT’s historical origins and global diffusion, its socio-economic and environmental impacts, as well as the distinct political dynamics that characterize the system’s implementation and operations. The chapter posits that BRT has undergone three key transformations since the 1960s-70s. The system originally emerged as a cost-effective alternative to urban rail projects, in the 2000s it then reinvented itself as a tool for sustainable urban development, and most recently it has started to reinvent itself yet again as a planning instrument for transportation formalization. Despite these changes in the policy objectives underpinning BRT initiatives, the system’s core innovation has remained unchanged: its modular flexibility. This flexibility has enabled the system’s widespread adoption and adaptation. The chapter argues that BRT offers policymakers an instructive case of how context-sensitive transit planning can help cities build more efficient, inclusive, and sustainable urban mobility systems.

Le financier déchu était en pourparlers pour acheter la luxueuse demeure Bin Ennakhil, mais l'achat n'a jamais été finalisé.

Ein 61-jähriger Motorradfahrer hat sich am Freitag in St. Gallen bei einem Selbstunfall schwere Verletzungen zugezogen. Der Rettungsdienst lieferte ihn ins Spital ein, wie die Polizei am Samstag mitteilte.

Bei einem Selbstunfall einer jungen Autofahrerin am Freitagabend in St. Gallen ist eine Beifahrerin schwer verletzt worden. Die Unfallverursacherin und drei weitere Mitfahrende zogen sich leichte Verletzungen zu.