OSCE

TIRASPOL, 10 September 2018 - The Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office for the Transdniestrian Settlement Process, Franco Frattini, handed over the first Moldovan neutral-design licence plates to first applicants at a Vehicle Registration Office (VRO) in Tiraspol today. Frattini is visiting Moldova on 9 and 10 September to mark a new milestone achieved by the Sides in the Transdniestrian Settlement Process.

Chisinau and Tiraspol have met the commitment they made in the 5+2 Rome Protocol of 30 May to open two VROs on 1 September in line with the 24 April Agreement on a mechanism for the participation of vehicles from Transdniestria in international road traffic. Located in the left-bank cities of Tiraspol and Ribnita, the two offices were opened with funding from the Italian OSCE Chairmanship and the OSCE Mission to Moldova.

“A fully operational mechanism that allows vehicles to participate in international road traffic brings tangible benefits to the population. It is a confirmation of the commendable engagement and political will of the leaderships in Chisinau and Tiraspol to make progress in the settlement process,” Special Representative Frattini said. “The Agreement implemented reaffirms my full confidence that the Sides will  honour the remaining commitments from the 5+2 Rome Protocol to close the outstanding priorities from the ‘package of eight’ related to telecommunications, criminal cases and the freedom of movement.”

The representatives of the 5+2 format present at the event applauded the Sides for the implementation of the fifth agreement from the “package of eight”. The remaining agreements are expected to be finalized by the Sides by the end of 2018.

Commenting on the event, the OSCE mediator and new Head of the OSCE Mission to Moldova, Claus Neukirch, praised Chisinau and Tiraspol for following the output-based approach to advancing the negotiations. “It is very reassuring to see how the outputs of the tireless efforts undertaken by the Sides on the ground are benefiting the lives of people on both banks. The breakthrough we all witness today is the result of the local ownership and the growing trust between the two Sides, which will be the driving force to finalize the remaining issues by the end of 2018 as agreed upon in the Rome Protocol,” Neukirch said.

Since the beginning of 2018, in addition to the licence plate agreement, the Sides have implemented agreements on the access to the Dubasari farmland, the functioning of Latin-script schools on the left bank, the apostilization of Transdniestrian university diplomas and the opening of the Gura Bicului – Bychok bridge. With the resolution of the issues related to the freedom of movement, criminal cases and the implementation of the telecommunication agreement, the Sides will have met their commitment, documented in the 5+2 Rome Protocol, to have fully finalized the “package of eight” by the end of 2018.

Talks in the 5+2 format include the representatives of the Sides, mediators and observers – Moldova, Transdniestria, the OSCE, the Russian Federation, Ukraine, the United States and the European Union.

The goal of the 5+2 talks is to work out the parameters of a comprehensive settlement based on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova within its internationally recognized borders with a special status for Transdniestria, as reconfirmed by all 57 OSCE participating States in Ministerial Council Statements agreed upon in 2016 and 2017.

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This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region, compared with the previous reporting period. The Mission saw multiple launch rocket systems in violation of withdrawal lines. The Mission recorded ceasefire violations inside the Zolote disengagement area and near the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area. The SMM’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas, and again near Zaichenko and Novoazovsk.* The Mission continued to monitor the situation at the closed entry-exit checkpoint near Stanytsia Luhanska where it saw that construction and repair works were ongoing. The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station. It also facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to water infrastructure near Pervomaisk and Krasnyi Lyman.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations[1] including, however, fewer explosions (about 90), compared with the previous reporting period (about 260 explosions).

On the evening and night of 6-7 September, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 15 undetermined explosions and about 200 shots and bursts of small-arms fire, all 3-5km south-east. During the day on 7 September, the SMM heard five undetermined explosions 2-5km south-east.

On the same evening and night of 6-7 September, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk) recorded about 80 projectiles in flight (mostly from north to south) and two illumination flares, all 1-4km east-north-east, east and east-south-east.

On the same evening and night, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded two undetermined explosions, 57 projectiles in flight (mostly from west to east) and two illumination flares, all 1-3km south-south-west.

During the day on 7 September, positioned 1km north-west of the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard an undetermined explosion and about 380 shots and bursts of small-arms fire, all 1-4km south-east, south-south-west and north-west. 

On the evening and night of 6-7 September, the SMM camera 1km south-west of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol) recorded ten undetermined explosions, about 360 projectiles in flight (mostly from north to south and south to north) and 18 bursts of undetermined weapons, all 2-4km east-north-east, east and east-south-east.

On the same evening and night, the SMM camera south-west of Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) recorded 14 undetermined explosions and five projectiles in flight, all 0.5-3km north-north-east, north-east and east-north-east.

On the same evening and night, the SMM camera east of Lomakyne (government-controlled, 15km north-east of Mariupol) recorded 17 explosions (16 undetermined and one assessed as an impact) and 33 projectiles in flight (mostly from east-south-east to west-north-west), all 2-4km north-north-east, north-east and east.  

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including two explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (four explosions).

The SMM continued to monitor and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske[2] (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

During the day on 7 September, positioned 250m south of the Stanystsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM heard two undetermined explosions 1-2km north-east (unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area).

On the evening of 6 September, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded a burst of an undetermined weapon 2-4km south-east (assessed as inside the disengagement area).

During the day on 7 September, positioned near the Petrivske and Zolote disengagement areas, the SMM observed calm situations.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in a government-controlled area, the SMM saw 12 multiple launch rocket systems (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) near Poltavka (54km north-west of Donetsk).

Beyond the respective withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in a non-government-controlled area, an SMM mini unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted seven tanks (T-72) and a mortar (2S9 Nona-S, 120mm) mounted atop an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (MT-LB) in a training area near Shymshynivka (27km south-west of Luhansk).

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles[3] in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 5 September, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted two APCs (BTR-variants) south of Kamianka (20km north of Donetsk). On 7 September, the SMM saw an APC (BTR-80) moving west near Raihorodka (34km north-west of Luhansk).

The SMM observed that the entry-exit checkpoint north of Stanytsia Luhanska bridge remained closed. The Mission saw no pedestrians present at the entry-exit checkpoint or at the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the bridge. In the vicinity of the entry-exit checkpoint, it continued to observe ongoing repairs to the pedestrian road and parking lot, as well as the construction of concrete shelters and fencing and connecting of communication cables to offices at the site.

The SMM saw demining activity. In a field about 1.5km south-east of Lomakyne, the SMM saw two people wearing clothing bearing the logo of an international demining organization demining.

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire. The SMM recorded ceasefire violations near the station, despite explicit security guarantees (see above and the table below).

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair and maintenance works to water infrastructure near Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk) and Krasnyi Lyman (non-government-controlled, 30km north-west of Luhansk).

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• Two armed members of the armed formations at a checkpoint near Zaichenko (nongovernment-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol) again prevented the SMM from accessing Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, nongovernment-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) and south through Zaichenko citing security concerns, thus preventing the SMM from following up on reports of shelling in Pikuzy.
• Three armed members of the armed formations again prevented the SMM from passing through a checkpoint near Novoazovsk (nongovernment-controlled, 40km east of Mariupol), citing orders from a “superior,” thus preventing the SMM from following up on a recent civilian casualty at the hospital in Novoazovsk. While at the checkpoint, the SMM saw civilian vehicles passing in both directions.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by telephone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.5
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

Other impediments:

• At a hospital in Donetsk city, medical staff refused to provide information without permission from the armed formations while the SMM was following up on people injured from the explosion in Donetsk city centre on 31 August 2018. At two other hospitals in Donetsk city, medical staff provided limited information to the SMM on people injured in the abovementioned incident, however refused to provide further information without permission from the armed formations.

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] Due to the presence of mines, including those on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access   to its camera in Petrivske remains limited; thus, the review of the camera footage may take place days later.

[3] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

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This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region, compared with the previous reporting period. An SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle spotted at least five burned down houses in Zaitseve. The Mission recorded a ceasefire violation inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area and ceasefire violations near the Zolote disengagement area. It saw fortification works to a new military position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces inside the Zolote disengagement area. The SMM’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas, at a permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region and again in Verkhnoshyrokivske.* The Mission continued to monitor the situation at the closed entry-exit checkpoint near Stanytsia Luhanska where it saw that construction works were ongoing. The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station. It also facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to water infrastructure near Zolote. In Kyiv, the SMM monitored two public gatherings in front of the Parliament building. The Mission also followed up on reports of hazardous chemical air pollution in southern areas of Kherson region.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations,[1] including about 260 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (one explosion).

On the evening of 5 September, the SMM camera south-west of Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) recorded about 70 undetermined explosions, 11 projectiles in flight, two bursts and an illumination flare in vertical flight, all 1-4km at directions ranging from north-north-west to north-east.

On the same evening, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol) recorded 39 undetermined explosions, 48 projectiles in flight, a burst and an illumination flare in vertical flight, all 2-4km south-south-east and south.

On the same evening, the SMM camera east of Lomakyne (government-controlled, 15km north-east of Mariupol) recorded 53 undetermined explosions, 30 projectiles in flight, five bursts and three muzzle flashes, all 1-4km north-north-east, north-east and east-north-east.

During the day on 6 September, positioned about 2km south-south-east of Kamianka (government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard 20 undetermined explosions, ten shots of infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-1) cannon (73mm) fire and 17 shots and bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 2-5km south and south-west.

Positioned on the south-eastern edge of Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard 43 undetermined explosions 2- 4km south-east.

Positioned at the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard about 200 shots and bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire and 1-2km east-south-east.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including four explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (35 explosions).

On 5 September, an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted at least five houses that had burned down on Yesenina Street in a non-government-controlled part of Zaitseve (50km north-east of Donetsk). The long-range UAV also spotted another three houses that were still burning. (Damage was not visible on imagery from 29 August 2018). On the same day, a community member told the SMM that on 3 September around 12:00 they had heard shelling and that later in the day they had seen dry grass on fire in a nearby abandoned garden.

Also on 5 September, the SMM long-range UAV recorded at least four impact explosions of probable 82mm mortar rounds and one building burning at a military camp about 600m south of Travneve (government-controlled, 51km north-east of Donetsk).

The SMM continued to monitor and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske[2] (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On 5 September, the SMM camera in Stanytsia Luhanska recorded a shot from a probable sniper rifle (PTRD-41, 14.5mm) 200-300m south-west, assessed as outside the disengagement area. On the morning of 6 September, while on the eastern edge of Stanytsia Luhanska, the SMM heard an undetermined explosion 3-5km south, assessed as outside the disengagement area. Positioned 1km south-south-east of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM heard an undetermined explosion 1km north, assessed as inside the disengagement area.

On the evening of 5 September, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded an undetermined explosion and a projectile in flight from north-west to south-east 2-4km north-east (both assessed as outside the disengagement area). On 6 September, inside the disengagement area, the SMM saw a new position with three Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers digging a trench and laying sandbags around it on the eastern side of road T1316 about 100m south of the railway bridge.

During the day on 6 September, positioned near the Petrivske disengagement area, the SMM observed a calm situation.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Beyond the respective withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in a government-controlled area, on 5 September, an SMM long-range UAV spotted a surface to air missile system (9K37) in a field north-west of Klishchiivka (60km north of Donetsk).

Beyond the respective withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in non-government-controlled areas, aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence on 4 September of 19 tanks (type undetermined) and 29 pieces of towed artillery (type undetermined) in a training area near Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 23 August 2018). On 6 September, the SMM saw four tanks (T-64) in a training area near Kruhlyk (31km south-west of Luhansk).

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles[3] in the security zone. In a government-controlled area, on 5 September, an SMM long-range UAV spotted two IFVs (BMP variants) near Popasna (69km west of Luhansk).

In non-government-controlled areas, on 5 September, an SMM long-range UAV spotted six armoured personnel carriers (APC) (MT-LB) in Pervomaisk (58km west of Luhansk) and two APCs (MT-LB) near Kalynove-Borshchuvate (61km west of Luhansk).

The SMM observed that the entry-exit checkpoint north of Stanytsia Luhanska bridge remained closed. The Mission saw no pedestrians present at the entry-exit checkpoint or at the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the bridge. It continued to observe ongoing construction works at the entry-exit checkpoint.

The SMM continued to observe the presence of mines. On 5 September, an SMM long-range UAV spotted for the first time seven anti-tank mines (probable TM-62) laid out in one row blocking the road near a bus stop on Yesenina Street in a non-government-controlled part of Zaitseve.

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire. The Mission recorded ceasefire violations in the area near the station, despite explicit security guarantees (see the table below).

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair and maintenance works to a 350mm diameter water pipeline between Zolote and Popasna. In addition, in Luhansk region, the Mission facilitated and monitored a transfer of funds from non-government to government-controlled areas, reportedly in relation to a water payment.

The SMM continued to follow up on a wildfire in the area of government-controlled Bolotene (22km north-east of Luhansk). The Mission saw smoke on a 4-5km stretch running from east to west along the Siverskyi Donets River. A representative of the firefighting unit told the SMM that the fire was under control and that, weather permitting, it could be put out in the next few days.

In Kyiv, the SMM monitored two public gatherings in support of electoral reforms. At the Constitution Square in front of the Parliament building (5 Hrushevskoho Street), the Mission saw about 4,000-5,000 people (mixed genders and ages), including representatives of political parties, expressing their support for reforms of Ukraine’s Electoral Law. It saw many participants holding flags of various political parties. The SMM saw at least 400 National Guard officers and at least 500 police officers present, including 12 dialogue police officers. At the same location, the Mission concurrently monitored a smaller public gathering of about 100 people (predominantly women, mixed ages) who were expressing their support for equal representation of women in the Parliament. The SMM saw the participants holding Ukrainian flags and various posters promoting gender equality. Throughout both events, the Mission observed a calm situation.

The SMM followed up on reports of hazardous chemical air pollution in the area of Pershokostiantynivka (93km south-east of Kherson) and Preobrazhenka (90km south-east of Kherson) that had reportedly originated from a nearby chemical plant. At the crossing points on the ABL in Kalanchak (96km south-east of Kherson) and Chaplynka (90km south-east of Kherson), the SMM saw border guards wearing surgical masks. At the crossing point in Kalanchak and the area surrounding Preobrazhenka, the Mission noted a distinctive noxious smell. The SMM will continue to monitor the situation.

The SMM continued monitoring in Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 31 August 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• On 5 September, the SMM was unable to access a permanent storage site in an area of nongovernment-controlled Donetsk region as the compound was locked and no one was present.
• On two separate occasions, at a checkpoint west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, nongovernment-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), members of the armed formations again prevented the SMM from proceeding through the checkpoint.
• The SMM was prevented from accessing its camera in Krasnohorivka (governmentcontrolled, 21km west of Donetsk). The entrance to the camera site was blocked with barbed wire strung between two concrete blocks on either side of the entry way.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by telephone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by telephone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. On 5 September, the SMM camera in Kriakivka was operational during the reporting period. It was reported as non-operational.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] Due to the presence of mines, including those on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited.

[3] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

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Joana Karapataqi, OSCE Presence in Albania OSCE Presence in Albania

The OSCE Presence in Albania, in co-operation with the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung Office in Albania, launched a call on 7 September 2018 for researchers to undertake research projects on transitional justice in Albania.

Ten Albanian scholars will engage in one-year research projects on the topic of transitional justice in Albania. They will be guided by three world-renowned experts on transitional justice through intensive training and tutoring. The programme will include an autumn school to be held from 26 to 30 November 2018 in Tirana.

By involving the public – specifically students and academics – in a discussion on rule of law and human rights violations under Albania’s communist regime, and by fostering research on transitional justice as a whole, the project aims at leading to a better-informed and facts-based discourse in Albania about lessons to be learned both from the past and from other societies going through a period of transition.

Interested candidates can apply here until 07 October 2018. For further information please send an email to law-al@osce.org

CHISINAU, 7 September  2018 – The Special Representative of the Italian OSCE Chairperson-in-Office for the Transdniestrian Settlement Process, Franco Frattini, will visit Chisinau and Tiraspol from 9 to 10 September 2018 and meet the Sides.

In Chisinau, the Special Representative will meet with Deputy Prime Minister for Reintegration and Moldovan Chief Negotiator Cristina Lesnic and Minister of Foreign Affairs and European Integration Tudor Ulianovschi.

In Tiraspol, the Special Representative will meet with Transdniestrian Chief Negotiator Vitaly Ignatiev.

During his visit, Special Representative Frattini will also visit the recently opened Vehicle Registration Office (VRO) in Tiraspol on 10 September to hand over the first Moldovan neutral-design licence plates.

Media representatives are invited to the ceremony of handing over of the first neutral-design licence plates by the OSCE Special Representative Franco Frattini on 10 September, at 11:15 at the Vehicle Registration Office in Tiraspol, 14 Ushakov Street.

For more information, please contact the Press Office of the OSCE Mission to Moldova, at +373 22 223 495 or e-mail: MtMpress@osce.org.

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392948 Željka Šulc

The OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina and the European Institute for Gender Equality organized a two-day regional meeting in Sarajevo on the importance of data collection on violence against women in the Western Balkan region.

“Data collection, as an invaluable and essential part of the process of prevention of violence against women, is the only way to ensure effective analysis of policy implementation, assess the quality of support services, and meet international standards,” said Head of the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina Bruce G. Berton.

The meeting gathered academics, civil society experts and government officials from Bosnia and Herzegovina and the region, as well as representatives of the European Union and the United Nations.

The OSCE Mission to BiH remains highly committed to supporting data collection in the region as a crucial tool for the protection of victims and for the creation of policies that focus on victims of all forms of gender-based and domestic violence.

“In 2015, the Mission supported the development of a database on domestic violence cases in the Federation of BiH, which resulted in incredible progress in helping the authorities respond to domestic violence cases, while also easing the social and psychological burden of victims,” said Berton. He expressed the OSCE Mission’s readiness to assist the Republika Srpska Government with the development of a similar database in the near future.

CHISINAU, 7 September 2018 – The Italian OSCE Chairmanship has appointed Claus Neukirch of Germany as the Head of the OSCE Mission to Moldova. He will also serve as the OSCE mediator in the Transdniestrian Settlement Process.

Neukirch succeeds Michael Scanlan who completed his term as Head of the OSCE Mission to Moldova in August.

“I am happy to be assuming this important post at this time of unprecedented progress in the Transdniestrian Settlement Process. I look forward to working with all the participants of the 5+2 format to further nurture the output-based dynamic of the negotiation process, in keeping with the Mission’s mandate,” said Neukirch.

Previously, Neukirch served as the Head of the Council of Europe Office in Albania, Senior Political Advisor to the German OSCE Chairmanship, Deputy Director of the OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre and Deputy Head of the OSCE Mission to Moldova. He has over 20 years of professional experience in the OSCE area and holds a PhD in Political Science.

The core mandate of the OSCE Mission to Moldova is to help achieve a lasting, comprehensive political settlement of the Transdniestrian conflict based on the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Republic of Moldova within its internationally recognized borders, with a special status for Transdniestria within Moldova.

The mandate of the OSCE Mission to Moldova is endorsed and renewed every year by all 57 OSCE participating States, including the Republic of Moldova.

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This report is for the media and the general public.

#The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more ceasefire violations in Luhansk region, compared with the previous reporting period. It followed up on reports of a civilian casualty as a result of an explosion of a heavy-machine-gun round in Shchastia. The Mission recorded ceasefire violations inside the Zolote disengagement area and new military positions inside the Petrivske disengagement area. The SMM’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas as well as at a heavy weapons holding area in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region and in Verkhnoshyrokivske.* It observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines including in Buhaivka, Miusynsk and Khrustalnyi. The Mission’s long-range unmanned aerial vehicle spotted a convoy of trucks on a dirt road near the border with the Russian Federation where there are no border crossing facilities in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region, in the middle of the night. It continued to monitor the situation at the closed entry-exit checkpoint near Stanytsia Luhanska where it observed construction works and road repairs. The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station. The SMM also facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to water infrastructure near Zolote, Pervomaisk and Krasnyi Lyman.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations,[1] including one explosion, compared with the previous reporting period (about 100 explosions).

During the evening and night of 4-5 September, the SMM camera 1km south-west of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol) recorded 46 projectiles in flight (the majority from north to south) and an illumination flare in vertical flight, all 3-5km at directions ranging from north-east to east-south-east.

During the evening and night of 4-5 September, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded three projectiles in flight, an explosion assessed as an airburst and two muzzle flashes, all 1-5km south and south-south-west.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations (35 explosions), compared with the previous reporting period (12 explosions) (see disengagement section below for more details).

The SMM followed up on reports of a civilian casualty. At a hospital in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk), medical staff told the SMM that a man (26 years old) had been admitted just after midnight on 4 September with injuries that included a fractured left hand and shrapnel injuries to his chest, abdomen and an eye, all as a result of an explosion. Medical staff added that he had been transferred to a hospital in Sievierodonetsk (government-controlled, 74km north-west of Luhansk) for surgery the same day. A police officer in Novoaidar (government-controlled, 49km north-west of Luhansk) told the SMM that the victim had been on duty at the thermal power plant in Shchastia when he had sustained injuries as a result of an explosion of a 12.7mm heavy-machine-gun round. In Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), the man’s father told the SMM that his son had found a heavy-machine-gun round in a room at the Shchastia power plant and that it had exploded.

The SMM continued to monitor and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske[2] (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On the morning of 5 September, positioned at a checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces on road T1316, approximately 400m from the northern edge of the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM heard seven explosions 150-200m south-south-east. The SMM assessed four of the explosions as outgoing mortar rounds (type undetermined) and the remaining as outgoing rounds of undetermined weapons (unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area). Positioned about 5km north-west of the abovementioned checkpoint, the SMM heard 15 undetermined explosions 5-6km south-east of its position (assessed as inside the disengagement area).

The same morning, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded, between 08:35 and 10:13, nine explosions assessed as impacts of grenades fired from an automatic grenade launcher 1.4-1.6km south-east and south-south-east, all assessed as inside the disengagement area. (See SMM Spot Report 6 September 2018.)

Positioned about 1.5km north of Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the SMM also heard 13 explosions 2-2.5km north-west, assessed as the same explosions heard above, as well as two undetermined explosions 2-2.5km west (unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area).

On 4 September, an SMM mid-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted new construction on an existing bunker (not visible on imagery before 22 August 2018) and a recently-dug 50m trench (not visible on imagery before 25 August 2018), both assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces and located about 800m and 130m respectively from the northern edge, inside the Petrivske disengagement area.  The same SMM mid-range UAV again spotted 24 anti-tank mines laid across the road north of the Petrivske disengagement area between Bohdanivka (government-controlled, 41km south-west of Donetsk) and Viktorivka (non-government-controlled, 42km south-west of Donetsk).

During the day on 5 September, positioned in the Stanytsia Luhanska and near the Petrivske disengagement areas, the SMM observed calm situations.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of the respective withdrawal lines, in non-government-controlled areas, on 4 September, aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of a multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) (type unknown) near Buhaivka (37km south-west of Luhansk) and a probable piece of towed artillery near Shymshynivka (27km south-west of Luhansk). (The aerial imagery also revealed the presence of 68 armoured combat vehicles (type unknown) near Buhaivka.) On the same day, an SMM mini-UAV spotted four MLRS (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) near Miusynsk (62km south-west of Luhansk) and five MLRS (BM-21) near Khrustalnyi (formerly Krasnyi Luch, 56km south-west of Luhansk). On 5 September, the SMM saw six MLRS (BM-21) near Izhevka (66km north of Donetsk).

Aerial imagery also revealed the presence on 4 September of four tanks (type unknown) near Oleksandrivske (formerly Rozy Liuksemburh, 90km south-east of Donetsk) in a zone within which deployment of heavy armaments and military equipment is proscribed according to Point 5 of the Memorandum of 19 September 2014.

Beyond the respective withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites, in non-government-controlled areas, on 4 September, an SMM mini-UAV spotted 20 tanks (ten T-72 and ten T-64), ten self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm), 12 towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) and two surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10) near Miusynsk. Also on 4 September, an SMM long-range UAV spotted 18 towed howitzers (ten 2A65 Msta-B, 152mm and eight D-20, 152mm) at a compound in Khrustalnyi (57km south-west of Luhansk), 18 tanks (T-64), seven self-propelled howitzers (2S1), 15 towed howitzers (D-30), seven mortars (PM-38, 120mm) and 12 surface-to-air missile systems (9K35) at a training area near Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk), ten tanks, one towed howitzer (D-30) and a surface-to-air missile system (9K35) at a training area near Shymshynivka (see also aerial imagery below), as well as 16 tanks, 13 self-propelled howitzers (2S1), 12 towed howitzers (D-30), six anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm), seven mortars (PM-38) and two surface-to-air missile systems (9K35) at a training area near Buhaivka (see aerial imagery below). On 5 September, the SMM saw ten tanks at a training area in Ternove (57km east of Donetsk).

On 4 September aerial imagery revealed the presence of 22 tanks (type unknown) and a surface-to-air missile system (type undetermined) near Buhaivka, nine tanks (type unknown) near Shymshynivka, 41 tanks (type unknown) near Kruhlyk (31km south-west of Luhansk) and 45 tanks (type unknown) near Manuilivka (65km east of Donetsk).

Beyond the respective withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites, in a government-controlled area, the SMM saw a surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) near Izhevka.

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. In government-controlled areas in Donetsk region, the SMM saw for the first time 12 towed howitzers (D-20) and noted that 29 self-propelled howitzers (25 2S1 – three for the first time – and four 2S9 Nona, 122mm – all for the first time), four towed howitzers (D-30) – two for the first time – and three MLRS (BM-21) – all for the first time – were missing.

In non-government-controlled areas beyond respective withdrawal lines in Donetsk region, the SMM saw six self-propelled howitzers (2S1) and noted that 12 mortars (11 PM-38 and one 2B11 Sani, 120mm) remained missing.

The SMM revisited two permanent storage sites whose locations were beyond the respective withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region and noted that 18 tanks (ten T-72 and eight T-64), 15 anti-tank guns (MT-12) and nine mortars (2B14 Podnos, 82mm) remained missing.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles[3] in the security zone. In non-government-controlled areas, on 5 September, the SMM saw an armoured personnel carrier (BTR-80) at a checkpoint in Donetsk city.

An SMM long-range UAV spotted a convoy of trucks on a dirt road near the border with the Russian Federation where there are no border crossing facilities in the middle of the night. On 4 September, at 00:01 an SMM long-range UAV spotted a convoy of ten KAMAZ canvas-covered cargo trucks and four escort vehicles (one escort vehicle at the front of the convoy and three parked at the back), all parked in a single file line, oriented north, on an unpaved dirt road north-east of Manych (non-government-controlled, 76km east of Donetsk). About 10-15 people were walking around between the parked vehicles. After about 30 minutes, at 00:30, all the trucks moved towards the international border between Ukraine and the Russian Federation via the dirt road that leads across the border, while the four escort vehicles remained in Ukraine and drove north. (For previous similar observations, see SMM Daily Report 9 August 2018.)

The SMM observed that the entry-exit checkpoint north of Stanytsia Luhanska bridge remained closed. The SMM saw no pedestrians present at the entry-exit checkpoint or at the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the bridge. The SMM continued to observe ongoing construction works of shelters and road repairs.

The SMM observed demining activities. On road H-21 between non-government-controlled areas of Shakhtarsk (50km east of Donetsk) and Hirne (55km east of Donetsk), the SMM saw 17 men wearing clothes marked with “MChS” walking on both sides of the road with metal detectors and demining tools. On a road leading from road T0519 to Lomakyne (government-controlled, 15km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM saw about ten people wearing clothing bearing the logo of an international demining organization walking on the western side of the road and surveying the area for mines. A member of the organization told the SMM that they would be marking off mined areas.

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire.

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair and maintenance works to water systems near Zolote, Pervomaisk, and Krasnyi Lyman (non-government-controlled, 30km north-west of Luhansk).

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 31 August 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a heavy weapons holding area in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region, four members of the armed formations (two visibly armed) told the SMM that it could not access the site without “permission” from the armed formations.
• On two separate occasions, at a checkpoint west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), a member of the armed formations prevented the SMM from proceeding through the checkpoint, citing the “security of the SMM patrol”.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by telephone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[4]

• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.
• At a checkpoint of the armed formations south of the bridge in government-controlled Shchastia, a member of the armed formations told the SMM that there had been no demining activities in the area and that there were mines on the bridge. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

Other impediments:

• Staff at two different schools in non-government-controlled areas in Luhansk region told the SMM that it needed permission from the armed formations to visit the schools.
• On 3 September, for the majority of the flight, an SMM longrange UAV was jammed while flying near the following settlements in government-controlled areas of Vershyna (63km north-east of Donetsk), Vidrodzhennia (66km north-east of Donetsk), Troitske (69km west of Luhansk), Novozvanivka (70km west of Luhansk), Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote-4/Rodina (59km west of Luhansk), Hladosove (51km north-east of Donetsk), Maiorsk (45km north-east of Donetsk), Zoloti Pisky (12km NW of Donetsk), Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk), Berezove (31 south-west of Donetsk) and Novotroitske (36km south-west of Donetsk) as well as settlements in non-government-controlled areas of Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, 50km west of Luhansk), Dovhe (22km north-west of Luhansk), Oleksandrivka (20km south-west of Donetsk), Olenivka (23km south-west of Donetsk), and Staromykhailivka (15km west of Donetsk).[5]

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. The SMM camera in Kriakivka was not operational during the reporting period.

[2] Due to the presence of mines, including those on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited; thus, the review of the camera footage may take place days later.

[3] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

[5] The interference could have originated from anywhere in a radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position.

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WARSAW, 6 September 2018 – Some 1,500 representatives of governments and civil society from the OSCE’s participating States and partner States will gather in Warsaw for a two-week meeting beginning on 10 September. They will review the implementation of the commitments adopted by their governments in the fields of human rights and fundamental freedoms, democracy, and tolerance and non-discrimination. 

Addressing the opening session of the OSCE Human Dimension Meeting will be Jacek Czaputowicz, Foreign Minister of Poland, Alessandro Azzoni, Chairperson of the OSCE Permanent Council and Italy’s Permanent Representative to the OSCE, Ingibjörg Sólrún Gísladóttir, Director of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), Harlem Désir, OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Lamberto Zannier, OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, George Tsereteli, President of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, and Paul Bekkers, Director of the Office of the Secretary General of the OSCE.

In addition to addressing a broad range of human rights and democracy issues, this year’s meeting will feature specially selected topics on freedom of the media, the rights of migrants and combating racism, xenophobia, intolerance and discrimination.

The conference, organized by ODIHR, is unique in that civil society groups have full access to working sessions and can discuss challenges with government representatives on an equal footing. On the margins of the meeting, some 100 independent side events will be held by governments, civil society groups and OSCE institutions and field operations on specific topics of concern, as well as on country situations.

The opening and closing sessions of the event will be open to media representatives. Journalists are invited to attend the opening session, which will begin at 10:00 on Monday, 10 September at Sofitel Warsaw Victoria hotel, ul. Krolewska, Warsaw. Accreditation for journalists will be conducted on site, and they are advised to arrive at least 30 minutes ahead of the opening to ensure sufficient time to receive a badge.

The agenda, a list of side events, and other information will be available in English and Russian on the conference website: www.osce.org/odihr/hdim_2018.

Follow the conference on ODIHR's Facebook page, or on Twitter at @osce_odihr. Live streaming of the sessions in both English and Russian, throughout the entire 10-day conference, can also be accessed on ODIHR's Facebook page.

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Ioanna Lachana, OSCE Mission to Skopje Mirvete Islam, OSCE Mission to Skopje

An OSCE-supported roundtable discussion on print media sustainability was held from 4 to 5 September in Popova Shapka, Tetovo.

The two-day event, organized by the OSCE Mission to Skopje in co-operation with the Association for Print Media, brought together some 20 representatives from institutions, media associations and organizations and print media outlets.

The roundtable discussion, moderated by international media expert Sandra Basic Hrvatin, focused on international standards and best practices aimed at providing long-term support to print media.

“Print media should not be overlooked. Print media still matter, especially bearing in mind the fact that thousands of people consume news produced by print media. And there are many good reasons for that: print is usually credible and trustworthy. Print is tangible and more engaging,” said Ioanna Lachana, the OSCE Mission’s Chief of Communication and Media Relations Unit.

Lirim Dullovi, the President of the Association of Print Media, said, “Finally, we will tackle together the challenges in the print media industry which is in a deep crisis. There is still hope for improvement.”

The roundtable discussion is part of the Mission’s activities aimed at promoting media freedom and freedom of expression in line with OSCE commitments. 

At 10:10 on 5 September, an SMM patrol consisting of six members and two armoured vehicles was positioned at a checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces on road T1316, approximately 400m from the northern edge of the Zolote disengagement area. Two patrol members were standing next to the vehicles and the others were inside the vehicles with the doors open when they heard seven explosions 150-200m south-south-east. The SMM assessed four of the explosions as outgoing mortar rounds (type undetermined) and the remaining as outgoing rounds of undetermined weapons. The SMM immediately left the area.

At 10:25, the SMM was positioned about 5km north-west of the above-mentioned checkpoint where, between 10:25 and 11:00, it heard 15 undetermined explosions 5-6km south-east of its position. The SMM returned safely to its base in Sievierodonetsk.

On the morning on 5 September, the SMM camera in Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) recorded, between 08:35 and 10:13, nine explosions assessed as impacts of grenades fired from an automatic grenade launcher 1.4-1.6km south-east and south-south-east, all assessed as inside the disengagement area, south of its northern edge.

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MINSK, 5 September 2018 – The Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office in Ukraine and in the Trilateral Contact Group (TCG), Ambassador Martin Sajdik, made the following statement to the press after the meeting of the TCG ‎and its Working Groups in Minsk on 5 September 2018:

“As you know, today is the fourth anniversary of the Minsk Protocol. All the TCG members stressed once more their full commitment to the Minsk agreements.

As I mentioned last time, this summer has turned out to be the most peaceful since the beginning of the conflict.

Following the sides’ recommitment to ceasefire in connection with the beginning of the harvesting season and of the school year, it was possible to significantly reduce the level of ceasefire violations.

Over the whole summer, a decrease in civilian casualties was registered. According to preliminary UN data, their number in August reached, one more time, one of the lowest levels in the entire period of the conflict, with two fatalities and six injured. However, as I always underline, even one victim is one too many.

In this context, the Working Group on Security Issues discussed possible additional measures to ensure full implementation of the ceasefire, including the issue of the disengagement of forces and hardware.

The Humanitarian Working Group focused on the preparations to the fieldtrip of Ambassador Toni Frisch, its Coordinator. This trip will take place on 6-12 September. Ambassador Frisch will travel to the conflict-affected areas on both sides of the contact line to meet detainees and observe their detention conditions.

The Economic Working Group continued its discussion of further steps to restore and improve the quality of the Vodafone Ukraine mobile communication network in certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions (CADR and CALR respectively), as well as current issues of water deliveries in the "Karbonyt" and "Voda Donbasa" supply systems.

Pensions and social transfers to conflict zone residents was also a topic of discussions in the Working Group.

The Working Group on Political Issues further considered questions related to the implementation of the so-called ‘Steinmeier formula’, amnesty and modalities of local elections in CADR and CALR as foreseen by the Minsk agreements”.

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This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, compared with the previous reporting period. The Mission recorded ceasefire violations near the Petrivske disengagement area. The SMM’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas.* It continued to monitor the situation at the closed entry-exit checkpoint near Stanytsia Luhanska where it observed construction works. The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station. The SMM also facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to water infrastructure near Pervomaisk and Krasnyi Lyman.

The Mission resumed full operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, following earlier limited operations due to security considerations after an explosion in Donetsk city centre on 31 August.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations,[1] including about 100 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (six explosions).

During the day on 4 September, positioned on the north-eastern edge of Midna Ruda (government-controlled, 69km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard about 60 undetermined explosions 5km south-east, assessed as live-fire training in the security zone, in violation of the ceasefire and the decision of the Trilateral Contact Group (TCG) of 3 March 2016 that prohibits the conduct of live-fire training (exercises) in the security zone.

Positioned about 1km north-west of the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard seven undetermined explosions 3-4km south-west and west-south-west, and about 210 shots and bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire 2-3km south, the latter assessed as part of a live-fire training exercise in the security zone.[2]

Positioned on the eastern edge of Vidrodzhennia (government-controlled, 66km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 15 undetermined explosions and a burst of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 5km south-east, assessed as part of a live-fire training exercise in the security zone.[3]

Positioned in Dokuchaievsk (non-government-controlled, 30km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM heard an undetermined explosion 200-250m east.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations (12 explosions), compared with the previous reporting period (three explosions).

During the day on 4 September, positioned on the south-eastern edge of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 12 explosions, assessed as 120mm mortar rounds, 10-15km east.

The SMM continued to monitor and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske[4] (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

During the day on 4 September, the SMM camera in Stanytsia Luhanska recorded a large fire moving east-south-east of the camera. A representative of the Forestry Department told the SMM that there was a wildfire burning in the area of Bolotene (government-controlled, 22km north-east of Luhansk), in an area up to 3km north of the Siverskyi Donets River.

On 3 September, an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted two infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP-1) about 400m north of the northern edge of the Zolote disengagement area.

During the day on 4 September, positioned on the north-eastern edge of Katerynivka (government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk), the SMM saw two members of the Ukrainian Armed Forces walking inside the Zolote disengagement area in a north-eastern direction.  

Positioned about 2km north of Petrivske, the SMM heard about 80 shots of small-arms fire 2-3km south-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. In government-controlled areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM saw a towed howitzer (2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm) and noted that 39 towed howitzers (13 2A36 and 26 2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) and 18 anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) continued to be missing.

The SMM revisited a heavy weapons permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region and noted that seven towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) remained missing.

The SMM revisited a permanent storage site whose location was beyond the respective withdrawal lines in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region and noted that one tank (T-64) remained missing.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles and anti-aircraft guns[5] in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 3 September, an SMM long-range UAV spotted two anti-aircraft guns (ZU-23, 23mm) mounted on trucks near residential houses east of Vershyna (63km north-east of Donetsk). On 4 September, the SMM saw two IFVs (BMP-1) and an armoured recovery vehicle (BREM-Ch) on the eastern outskirts of Popasna, an IFV (BTR-4) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk) and an IFV (BTR-4) in Krasnohorivka (24km north of Donetsk).

In non-government-controlled areas, the same UAV spotted eight armoured personnel carriers (MT-LB) and two IFVs (MT-LB MB) near Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, 50km west of Luhansk).

The SMM monitored the situation at entry-exit checkpoints. The Mission saw that the entry-exit checkpoint north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge remained closed. The SMM saw no pedestrians present at the entry-exit checkpoint or at the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the bridge. It saw a crane, excavator, truck and a bulldozer involved in ongoing construction of shelters and road repairs, and three workers dismantling a bus station roof near the entry-exit checkpoint. The previous day, the SMM saw members of the Ukrainian State Border Guard Service dismantling the entry-exit checkpoint and its defensive walls, as well as a shelter in the parking area of the entry-exit checkpoint. The SMM also noted that shelters about 1km north of the bridge had been completely dismantled.

The Mission observed that entry-exit checkpoints near Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk), Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk)  and Novotroitske (government-controlled, 36km south-west of Donetsk), as well as checkpoints near Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), Oleksandrivka (non-government-controlled, 20km south-west of Donetsk) and Olenivka (non-government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) were open (see SMM Daily Report 4 September 2018).

The SMM saw new checkpoints, including two in Horlivka, one near Styla (non-government-controlled 34km south of Donetsk), one near Dokuchaievsk, and one on the northern outskirts of Yenakiieve (non-government-controlled, 41km north-east of Donetsk).  

The SMM observed two mine hazard signs for the first time (one red sign with white lettering indicating “mines” and one sign with red handwritten letters on wood indicating the same message, both in Russian) placed next to concrete barriers and piles of soil blocking a road leading from road H20 to the eastern part of Novotroitske.

The SMM observed that a previously reported anti-tank mine (TM-62) near the southern edge of a road leading from the entry-exit checkpoint near Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol) to a checkpoint west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol) had been removed.

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire. Positioned in areas near the station, the SMM recorded ceasefire violations nearby, despite explicit security guarantees (see the table below).

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair and maintenance works to water systems near Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk) and Krasnyi Lyman (non-government-controlled, 30km north-west of Luhansk).

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 31 August 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by telephone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[6]

• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by telephone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.5
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

Conditional:

• At a checkpoint of the armed formations on road H15 east of Kreminets (nongovernment-controlled, 16km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM were allowed to proceed only after an armed member of the armed formations inspected the SMM vehicle.

Other impediments:

• Staff at a school in Metalist (nongovernment-controlled, 7km north-west of Luhansk) told the SMM that it could not visit the school without prior written approval from the armed formations.

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. The SMM camera in Kriakivka was not operational during the reporting period.

[2] In violation of the ceasefire and the decision of the TCG of 3 March 2016 that prohibits the conduct of live-fire training (exercises) in the security zone.

[3] In violation of the ceasefire and the decision of the TCG of 3 March 2016 that prohibits the conduct of live-fire training (exercises) in the security zone.

[4] Due to the presence of mines, including those on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access   to its camera in Petrivske remains limited; thus, the review of the camera footage may take place days later.

[5] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[6] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

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PRAGUE, 5 September 2018- Harnessing the opportunities of the digital transition while curbing its negative security implications through human capital development, is the focus of this year’s  OSCE Economic and Environmental Forum which opened today in Prague.

In the next two days, participants will discuss how to achieve economic progress and security in the OSCE area, one of the priorities of the Italians Chairmanship, through innovation, human capital development and good public and corporate governance.  

Representing the 2018 OSCE Italian Chairperson-in-Office, Guglielmo Picchi, the Italian Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Co-operation said that the technological revolution is producing significant changes in all sectors, modifying, in particular, the nature of work itself and the basic skills needed to access labour markets.

“The impact of the ongoing digital transformation on security and co-operation in the OSCE area is still uncertain and full of contradictions. However, there is no doubt that this is a transformation that goes beyond national borders and is already having an influence on the social and economic dynamics of our countries,” said Picchi. 

Opening the Forum, the Deputy Foreign Minister of the Czech Republic, Tomáš Petříček, said the effect of digitalization on stability and security, economic development and the labour market, good governance and transparency is indisputable. “New business models are changing rules in areas ranging from science to the provision of public services, including healthcare,” said Petříček. 

Petříček added that digital applications in a shared economy redefine access to financing and provide entrepreneurs with new business opportunities. “The digital world has far-reaching implications for those who fail to adapt,” he said.

Senior government officials, experts from academia and NGOs and representatives of international organizations will discuss policies that could to foster a solid business climate, aiming at encouraging the full development of human capital, promoting the fight against corruption and the improvement of transparency.

Vuk Žugić, Co-coordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities, said that the outcome of this transformation is still uncertain. “There is no doubt that it is a global phenomenon that, going beyond national borders, requires collective action and close collaboration among the 57 OSCE participating States.”

Žugić said that one of the most disruptive consequences of technology could be the impact on work: “There is a strong need to re-think corporate governance as well as public-private partnerships to steward a technological transformation that is fair and leaves no one behind.” 

Roberto Viola, the European Commission Director General for Communications Networks, Content and Technology said that the European Union is pursuing an ambitious plan, the Digital Single Market strategy, to make sure that Europe is in the best possible position to attract investments, foster creativity and innovation, provide top-class public services and protect citizens.

“Digital is part of a positive agenda, where we can deliver rapid, demonstrable and easy to understand benefits to European citizens,” said Viola.

OSCE Secretary General Thomas Greminger and Ambassador Vinicio Mati, 2018 Italian Chairmanship Co-ordinator, will present concluding remarks on Friday, 7 September.

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VIENNA, 5 September 2018 – OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media Harlem Désir today expressed his concern about a court decision in Kyiv ordering the disclosure of mobile-phone data of a Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) investigative reporter and the host of its Schemes programme, Natalia Sedletska.

“Investigative journalism plays the essential role of a watchdog in societies and journalists must be able to protect their sources. This is an established right for journalists and one of the basic conditions for media freedom,” Désir said. “I call on the Ukrainian authorities to ensure that all steps in line with international standards and OSCE commitments are taken to respect Natalia Sedletska’s privilege to keep her sources confidential.”

The court ruling is part of a criminal investigation into the alleged disclosure of state secrets to journalists in 2017 by a high-level public official. Reportedly, the court decision would enable the Prosecutor-General’s Office to access all of Sedletska's phone contacts, as well as the date, time, and duration of all calls. The decision would also allow authorities to review all text messages sent and received on Sedletska’s phone during the 17-month period, as well as other data – such as the journalist’s geolocation when she received or made each phone call. Schemes is the RFE/RL’s investigative programme focusing on corruption issues.

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom.

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392498 Colin McCullough, OSCE Programme Office in Astana

Five alumni of the Central Asian Youth Network (CAYN) met with OSCE Secretary General Thomas Greminger in Vienna on 5 September 2018. They discussed security issues in Central Asia, the OSCE’s work and its comprehensive and co-operative approach to security.

The college students from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan travelled to Vienna to learn more about the work of various units of the OSCE Secretariat. They included the Conflict Prevention Centre, the Communication and Media Relations Section, the Transnational Threats Department, the Office of the Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities, Gender Section and the Office of the Special Representative and Co-ordinator for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings.

During their meeting with the OSCE Secretary General they discussed their ideas for promoting co-operation in the Central Asia region and ways to engage youth.

The group participated in a meeting of the OSCE Group of Friends of Youth and Security, where they spoke about their engagement in CAYN and shared their views on how the CAYN model might be applied in other regions.

OSCE Chairmanship Special Representative on Youth and Security and OSCE Focal Point on Youth and Security Anna-Katharina Deininger, who attended the CAYN seminar in 2015, discussed her role in promoting the role of youth in addressing the complex challenges to security in the OSCE area.

The group is scheduled to meet with representatives of the OSCE Italian Chairmanship and the delegation of the United States and their respective home countries. They will also have an opportunity to meet with the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, to discuss media issues across the OSCE region.

The members of the group were selected to visit Vienna based on their outstanding contribution to the 2018 CAYN seminar, which was held in June. It  focused on the theme “Innovating Central Asia” and involved some 40 students and CAYN alumni from the wider Central Asian region.

The visit was organized by the OSCE Programme Office in Astana, with financial and logistical support from the OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek and the Conflict Prevention Centre.

The Central Asian Youth Network was launched in 2004 to enhance promising students' knowledge and understanding of contemporary security threats and the OSCE's role in addressing them.

VIENNA, 5 September 2018 – Transparency and openness will be the main theme of Sweden’s Chairmanship of the OSCE Forum for Security C-operation (FSC), said the State Secretary to the Swedish Minister of Defence, Jan Salestrand.

In his opening address, Salestrand stressed that sustainable peace, security and a rules-based order in Europe can only be achieved by restoring respect for the principles and commitments of the OSCE and international law. “This is the approach of Sweden in the OSCE, including for the Swedish chairmanship of the FSC,” he said.

Noting the need to make sure that the OSCE’s documents and agreements in the politico-military field are upheld, Salestrand said that there is room for improvement in how they are utilized.

“Sweden believes that challenges to European security must be met through deepened co-operation and joint action. But on a national level, every country must accept its share of the responsibility,” Salestrand said, adding that the rules-based order can only function when everyone adheres to the rules.

Touching upon priorities of Sweden’s FSC Chairmanship, State Secretary Salestrand said that one of the emphases of the discussions within the security dialogue will be on regional co-operation, with the goal of increasing transparency and confidence. “We will outline examples of Nordic-Baltic co-operation in the Baltic Sea region, such as the work carried out in the Nordic Defence Cooperation and the Sea Surveillance Cooperation Baltic Sea.”

Salestrand noted that the Swedish FSC Chairmanship will contribute to the security dialogue on combating the spread of small arms and light weapons (SALW) by presenting the experience of a country that is on the receiving end of the illegal flow of arms. “We will give attention to the experience of countering illicit trafficking of small arms and light weapons in the Öresund region,” he said.  

This security dialogue will be followed by the Review Meeting on Small Arms and Light Weapons and Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition (CA) in October. The aim is to start the process of reviewing the normative side of the work relating to non-proliferation of SALW and CA.

The role of international organizations in the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction will be another topic for discussion during the Swedish FSC Chairmanship.

State Secretary Salestrand stressed the importance of women’s active participation in peace processes, as it essential for creating “legitimacy, ownership and sustainability” in peace and security. In this regard one meeting will be dedicated to the 18th anniversary of the adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security.

“The Chairmanship has invited women flag officers from both east and west of Vienna as speakers. We look forward to a constructive and meaningful exchange,” Salestrand concluded.

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This report is for the media and the general public.

SUMMARY

Kamensk-Shakhtinskiy, Russian Federation. The Observer Mission (OM) continues to operate 24/7 at both Border Crossing Points (BCPs). The overall number of border crossings by persons decreased at both BCPs compared to the previous week.

OPERATIONAL REMARKS

The OM is currently operating with 22 permanent international staff members, including the Chief Observer (CO). The Mission is supported administratively by a Vienna-based staff member.

OBSERVATIONS AT THE BORDER CROSSING POINTS

Persons crossing the border                                                                                                                                                                                          

The profile of the people crossing the border can be categorized as follows:

1. Adults travelling on foot or by car with little or no luggage;
2. Persons in military-style outfits;
3. Families (often including elderly people and/or children) travelling on foot or by car with a significant amount of luggage.

The average number of entries/exits decreased from 12,716 to 11,694 per day at both BCPs compared to last week[1].

During the reporting period, the majority of border crossings were to the Russian Federation, with an average net flow of plus 436 for both BCPs.

The Donetsk BCP continued to experience more traffic than the Gukovo BCP.

Persons in military-style outfits

During the reporting period, the number of persons in military-style outfits crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs increased to 49 persons (compared to 24 last week); 18 of them crossed into the Russian Federation, and 31 into Ukraine (84 per cent of this category’s crossings occurred at the Donetsk BCP). They continued to cross the border individually or in groups. Most individuals crossed on foot, however, some made use of private vehicles, buses or minivans, making it more difficult for the observer teams (OTs) to observe their movement across the border, especially since some of the private vehicles have tinted windows, and buses and minivans have drawn curtains.

Families with a significant amount of luggage

The OTs continued to report on families crossing the border, sometimes with elderly people and/or children, at both BCPs with a significant amount of luggage, or travelling in heavily loaded cars. During this reporting week, seven families were observed crossing into the Russian Federation and four were observed crossing into Ukraine, compared to the previous reporting period when three families were observed crossing the border into the Russian Federation and seven into Ukraine.

Bus connections                                         

Regular local and long-distance bus connections continued to operate between Ukraine (mostly from/to the Luhansk region) and the Russian Federation. In addition to regular bus connections, the OTs continued to observe bus connections on irregular routes. Often the buses do not state their route; instead they have a sign on the windshield stating “irregular”.

During the reporting period the OTs observed a decrease in the number of buses crossing the border at both BCPs (441 compared to 475 observed during the previous week). There were 237 buses bound for the Russian Federation and 204 bound for Ukraine.

Among the bus connections observed by the OTs, the following “irregular” routes or destinations were noted: Kyiv, Luhansk-Simferopol, Luhansk-Yalta and Sevastopol.

On some occasions, the OTs noticed the bus drivers removing the itinerary signs from the windshields of their buses, while some buses do not display their route at all. The majority of long-distance buses commuting between the Luhansk region and cities in the Russian Federation have Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region.

Trucks

During the reporting period the OM observed a decrease in the overall number of trucks crossing the border in both directions and at both BCPs. Compared to the previous week, the total number of trucks went from 808 to 753 (248 at the Gukovo BCP and 505 at the Donetsk BCP); 430 of these trucks crossed into the Russian Federation and 323 crossed into Ukraine. Most of the trucks observed by the OTs had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region.

Among them, the OTs also continued to observe tanker trucks crossing the border in both directions. During the reporting week, the number of tanker trucks slightly decreased to 52 (compared to 55 during the previous reporting period). These trucks were observed crossing the border at both BCPs. The trucks had the words “Propane” and “Flammable” written across the tanks in either Russian or Ukrainian. The majority of tanker trucks had hazard signs, indicating that they were transporting propane or a mix of propane and butane.

All trucks undergo systematic inspection by Russian Federation officials, which may include an X-ray check. Due to the unfavourable observation position at the Gukovo BCP, the OTs continued to be unable to observe any X-ray checks.

Compared to the previous week, the total number of X-ray checks at the Donetsk BCP increased from 86 to 121: out of the total number of trucks scanned, 78 trucks (64 per cent) were bound for Ukraine; the remaining 43 trucks (36 per cent) crossed into the Russian Federation.

Minivans

The OM continued to observe passenger and cargo minivans[2] crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs. The OTs observed minivans predominantly with Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, the OTs also frequently saw minivans registered in the Russian Federation. As compared to the previous week, the number of cargo minivans slightly decreased from 182 to 180 vehicles; 84 crossed into the Russian Federation and another 96 into Ukraine.

Trains

The OTs continued to pick up the sound of trains running on the railway tracks located approximately 150 metres south-west of the Gukovo BCP. During the reporting week, the OTs heard trains on 24 occasions, compared to 28 last week; the OTs assessed that 15 trains were travelling to the Russian Federation and the rest to Ukraine. The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine was regularly informed about the trains bound for Ukraine.

Visual observation was not possible because of the line of trees located between the train tracks and the BCP.

Other observations

The majority of vehicles crossing the border had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region, or Russian Federation licence plates. A significant number of vehicles with “LPR” plates were also observed crossing the border in both directions on a daily basis, as were vehicles with Lithuanian and Georgian licence plates.

On 29 August at 14:12 in Donetsk BCP, the OT observed a Russian MI-8 type helicopter with stub wings (assault version of the Mi-8 transport helicopter) which flew over the Donetsk BCP. The aircraft came from 350 degrees North, made a U-turn and left towards 70 degrees East – North East. That same day at 14:31 in Gukovo BCP, the OT observed a helicopter with the same description as above, which came from 60 degrees East – North East and turned to 120 degrees East – South East. During both sightings the aircraft remained inside the Russian Federation airspace.

On 30 August at 17:02 in Donetsk BCP the OT noticed an ambulance with Russian Federation licence plates which came from the Russian Federation side and went behind the central building of the BCP. During its stay the OT could not see any movement or action as to the purpose of its arrival at the BCP. The ambulance returned to the Russian Federation at 17:40.

On 31 August at 15:50 in Donetsk BCP, the OT observed an ambulance with “LPR” plates with a sign “urgent medical help” written in Russian on its side, which had arrived from Ukraine. The OT was able to observe two persons in red uniforms inside the ambulance. The ambulance remained within the compound of the BCP until 16:18 after which it crossed into the Russian Federation.

For trends and figures at a glance covering the period from 31 July to 4 September 2018, please see the attachment here.

[1] Based on data received from the Regional Representation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation.

[2] Cargo minivans: light commercial vehicles with a maximum authorized mass of more than 3.5 t and not more than 7.5 t; with or without a trailer with a maximum mass of less than 750 kg (small cargo vehicles which correspond to driving licence C1).

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This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, compared with the previous 24 hours. Following the explosion on Pushkina Boulevard in Donetsk city on 31 August, the Mission continued to observe a calm situation in the city centre. The Mission recorded ceasefire violations near the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area. The SMM’s access remained restricted in the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area as well as near Topolyne and Pryvilne.* The Mission observed weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines near Kremenivka. It continued to monitor the situation at the closed entry-exit checkpoint near Stanytsia Luhanska and to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station. The SMM’s observations remained limited due to security considerations.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations,[1] including a similar number of explosions (six), compared with the previous 24 hours (seven explosions).

On the evening and night of 2-3 September, the SMM camera in Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol) recorded 34 projectiles in flight 2-4km south-east and south.

During the day on 3 September, positioned 1km north-west of the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard four undetermined explosions and six shots and bursts of small-arms fire, all 1-6km south-west and west.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations (three explosions), compared with the previous 24 hours (five explosions).

Following the explosion on Pushkina Boulevard in Donetsk city on 31 August, on 3 September, the SMM continued to observe a calm situation in the city centre (non-government-controlled).

The SMM followed up on reports of people injured in the above-mentioned explosion. While at the Kalinina morgue in Donetsk city on 3 September, the SMM was informed that the bodies of Aleksandr Zakharchenko and another member of the armed formations (a member of Zakharchenko’s personal security detail) had been brought to the facility with fatal wounds from the explosion. On the same day, at the Gusak Hospital in Donetsk city, medical staff told the SMM that after the explosion on 31 August six people had been admitted with various blast-related injuries, however, they refused to provide the Mission with further details.* On the same day, medical staff at the Kalinina Hospital in Donetsk city refused to provide the SMM information about people injured in the explosion on 31 August without permission from senior members of the armed formations.*

The SMM continued to monitor and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske[2] (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

During the day on 3 September, positioned 150m north-north-west of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM heard an undetermined explosion 1-2km north-east. Positioned 700m north-north-west of the bridge, the Mission heard an undetermined explosion 5-6km south-east. Positioned 250m south-east of the bridge, it heard an undetermined explosion 700-800m south. The SMM assessed all explosions to have occurred outside the disengagement area.

Positioned near the Petrivske disengagement area, the SMM noted a calm situation.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of the withdrawal lines in a government-controlled area, on 3 September, the SMM saw 12 self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) on the eastern edge of  Kremenivka (27km north-west of Mariupol).

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles[3] in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 1 September, an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-80) near Troitske (30km north of Donetsk), an APC (BTR-70) and an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) near Nevelske (18km north-west of Donetsk), an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) near Krasnohorivka (21km west of Luhansk), two infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP-1) near Berezove (31km south-west of Donetsk), two IFVs (a BMP-1 and a BMP-2) near Hnutove (90km south of Donetsk) and four IFVs (three BMP-2 and a BMP-1) near Bohdanivka (41km south of Donetsk).

In non-government-controlled areas, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an APC (BTR-80) near Syhnalne (23km south-west of Donetsk).

The SMM monitored the situation at entry-exit checkpoints. The Mission saw that the entry-exit checkpoint north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge remained closed (see SMM Daily Report 3 September). It observed no pedestrians and saw an excavator, a crane, trucks and workers erecting a new structure in the parking area. Following the reported closure of checkpoints in non-government-controlled Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk) and Oleksandrivka (20km south-west of Donetsk) after the above-mentioned explosion in Donetsk city and their re-opening on 1 September (see SMM Daily Report 3 September), the SMM observed a calm situation with pedestrian and vehicular traffic crossing through the entry-exit checkpoints on the other side of contact line in Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk) and Maiorsk (45km north-east of Donetsk).

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire. Positioned in areas near the station, the SMM recorded ceasefire violations, despite explicit security guarantees (see above and the table below).

In Boiarka (21km south-west of Kyiv), the SMM monitored a dedication ceremony of a reconstructed monument at 42 Mykhaila Hrushevskoho Street. It saw about 100 people (mixed genders and ages) participating in the event, including members of the Jewish community. Participants told the SMM that the ceremony was to commemorate the Jewish victims of a pogrom at that location. Throughout the event, the Mission observed a calm situation.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 31 August 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• Two Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers denied the SMM access to a military compound near Topolyne (19km north-west of Mariupol), citing a need to obtain permission from superiors.
• An Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier denied the SMM access to a military compound near Pryvilne (31km north of Mariupol) saying he had not received information about an SMM visit.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC both times.[4]

Other impediments:

• Medical staff at the Kalinina Hospital in Donetsk city refused to provide the SMM information about people injured in the explosion on Pushkina Boulevard in Donetsk city on 31 August (see above) without permission from senior members of the armed formations.
• Medical staff at the Gusak Hospital in Donetsk city requested the SMM to obtain permission from senior members of the armed formations in order to provide details of people injured in the explosion on Pushkina Boulevard in Donetsk city on 31 August (see above).

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. The SMM camera in Kriakivka was not operational during the reporting period.

[2] Due to the presence of mines, including those on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access   to its camera in Petrivske remains limited; thus, the review of the camera footage may take place days later.

[3] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

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VIENNA, 4 September 2018 - OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media Harlem Désir today condemned continued targeted attacks by extremists against journalists covering protests in Chemnitz, Germany. The condemnation follows the latest attacks during an anti-migrant demonstration on 1 September.

“These attacks against the press are unacceptable and should not be tolerated. Journalists must be able to safely report on public demonstrations, and it is the duty of law enforcement forces to ensure their safety and to take action against those who attack journalists,” said the Representative. “I welcome the fact that the police are investigating and have arrested a perpetrator of the assault on the camera team of the local public broadcaster MDR.”

Over the last few days, Chemnitz has seen a wave of demonstrations in support of extremist movements and political parties. During these protests, participants also targeted the press with historically loaded chants of “Lügenpresse” (lying press), and several journalists were physically attacked while covering the events.

• In one of the more serious incidents, a camera team from the local public broadcaster MDR was assaulted when the journalists requested access to a balcony to film the demonstrations;
• A reporter from Der Spiegel reported that demonstrators consistently attacked him and his colleagues, attempting to seize their camera equipment and toss it away;
• A reporter from Watson online news portal was physically attacked by protesters attempting to confiscate his camera and microphone, right next to a police tank;
• A female reporter with Buzzfeed Germany had her camera grabbed out of her hands and thrown away in an aggressive move by protestors;
• A camera crew of the network of regional public service broadcasters ARD was targeted and forced to stop filming;
• A journalist with Funke Medien was also attacked while filming the events.

“These latest attacks clearly show a very problematic trend of targeted attacks against journalists during demonstrations. No individual or group must be allowed to prevent journalists from doing their job,” said Désir. “It is of utmost importance that in the future the police take all necessary measures to ensure that journalists can safely report on issues of public interest.”

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom.

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