OSCE

VIENNA, 23 August – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, today called for the immediate release of Ukrainian journalist, writer and blogger Stanislav Aseev (Vasin), who appeared on a Russia-24 tv report on 17 August for the first time since the beginning of his detention.

“I am relieved that Stanislav Aseev is alive,” Désir said. “He must be released immediately and any attempt to force or manipulate a ‘confession’ must be stopped as a violation of international law,” the Representative stated.

Stanislav Aseev has been a contributor to various media, including the Ukrainian Service of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. Aseev has been in detention by the armed formations in the non-government-controlled area of the Donetsk region on spurious charges of espionage for Ukraine since June 2017.

Désir recalled a number of statements issued by Ukrainian journalists and media organizations representatives as well as joint statements of the National Union of Journalists of Ukraine and the Union of Journalists of the Russian Federation https://www.osce.org/fom/324546 https://www.osce.org/representative-on-freedom-of-media/373447  calling for an end to Aseev’s detention.

The Representative has repeatedly intervened on this case (see https://www.osce.org/fom/333066 and June 2018 https://www.osce.org/representative-on-freedom-of-media/383217, including during his visits to Russia and Ukraine.

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom.

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This report is for the general public and the media. 

SUMMARY

On 23 August at 06:45 (Moscow time), the seventy-eighth[1] Russian convoy arrived at the Donetsk Border Crossing Point (BCP). A total of 21 vehicles were checked by Russian Federation border guards and customs officers prior to their crossing into Ukraine. All 21 vehicles had crossed back into the Russian Federation by 15:34 on 23 August.

DETAIL

Leaving the Russian Federation

On 23 August at 06:45, the Observer Mission observed the arrival of a Russian convoy at the gate of the Donetsk BCP. A Russian Ministry of Emergency Situations (MES) team co-ordinated and led the movements of the convoy. The convoy consisted of 15 cargo trucks and six support vehicles, including one ambulance. Fourteen out of the 15 cargo trucks bore the inscription “Humanitarian help from the Russian Federation” (in Russian language). In addition, three trucks and all support vehicles bore the MES sign on the side doors.

At 06:45 the vehicles entered the customs control area and queued in three lines. Once the convoy arrived, the vehicles were visually checked from the outside by Russian Federation border guards and customs officers. The Russian MES staff rolled up/opened the tarpaulins of the trucks and the border guards and customs officials performed a visual observation from the outside.

Three Ukrainian border guards and two customs officers were observed accompanying their Russian counterparts; they also performed a visual observation of the vehicles from the outside (without entering the trucks’ cargo space). Two of them had clipboards in their hands and were taking notes. One service dog was present during the procedure. By 07:21 all of the vehicles had left the BCP towards Ukraine.

Returning to the Russian Federation

At 15:04 the convoy returned and queued in the customs area. The tarpaulins of the trucks were opened and Russian Federation border guards and customs officers visually checked the returning convoy from the outside. Ukrainian representatives – three border guards and two customs officers – were present during this check. The Ukrainian officials also performed visual checks of the opened trucks from the outside. By 15:34 all 21 vehicles had crossed back into the Russian Federation.

[1]According to the statement of the Russian Federation officials, this convoy is considered to be the eightieth Russian convoy which was sent to Ukraine. As two of these convoys did not cross through the “Donetsk” or “Gukovo” BCPs, the Observer Mission did not record them. Hence, based on the Observer Mission’s counting, this convoy is considered the seventy-eighth convoy that has crossed into Ukraine.

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This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region, compared with the previous reporting period. The SMM’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas and it was also restricted in Styla, Staromykhailivka and again in Zaichenko, as well as near Novoazovsk, near the border with the Russian Federation.* The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station. It facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to water infrastructure in Luhansk region on both sides of the contact line. It facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to residential houses in Avdiivka.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations[1], including about 60 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 200 explosions).

On the evening and night of 21-22 August, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol) recorded nine undetermined explosions, 56 projectiles in flight, 32 airbursts and an illumination flare, all 2-5km at directions ranging from north-east to south-south-west. During the same evening and night, the SMM camera 1km south-west of Pyshchevyk recorded two undetermined explosions and 39 projectiles in flight, all 2-5km at directions ranging from north-east to east.

On the evening and night of 21-22 August, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard three explosions (one assessed as an impact of a mortar round and two undetermined) and about 15 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 1-4km south-south-east.

On the same evening and night, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded an undetermined explosion, 11 projectiles in flight, two muzzle flashes and an illumination flare, all 0.5-2km south and south-south-west.

During the day on 22 August, positioned about 1km north-west of the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard five undetermined explosions and about 25 shots and bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 1-3km south-west and south-south-west.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 70 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (33 explosions).

During the day on 22 August, positioned in Obozne (non-government-controlled, 18km north of Luhansk), the SMM heard 24 explosions of artillery rounds 10-20km north-east.

Positioned in Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), the SMM heard 22 explosions (some of which were assessed as outgoing artillery rounds and some others as impacts of artillery rounds) 8-15km north-west.

Positioned near Muratove (government-controlled, 51km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard two undetermined explosions 10km north-east and 25 undetermined explosions 8-10km south-west.

The SMM continued to monitor and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk)[2], as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

During the day on 22 August, the SMM saw a man assessed as Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel armed with a machine gun standing near the bridge and another man assessed as Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel walking north from Katerynivka (government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk), both inside the disengagement area. On the same day, the SMM saw a different man assessed as Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel driving a car with black licence plates into and exiting the disengagement area multiple times.

Positioned near the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, the SMM observed a calm situation. The SMM was unable to monitor the situation through patrolling near the Petrivske disengagement area.*

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in non-government-controlled areas, aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence on 19 August of 21 tanks (type undetermined) and 25 pieces of towed artillery near Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk) (in the same area, aerial imagery available to the SMM also revealed the presence of 82 armoured combat vehicles). On 21 August, an SMM mid-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted three tanks (probable T-72) near Manuilivka (65km east of Donetsk). On 22 August, the SMM saw a tank (T-64) in a training area near Myrne.

The SMM revisited a heavy weapons permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region whose location was beyond the respective withdrawal lines and noted that a tank (T-64) continued to be missing.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles and an anti-aircraft gun[3] in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 21 August, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP variant) and an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) near Maiorsk (45km north-east of Donetsk), and an SMM long-range UAV spotted an armoured personnel carrier (BTR variant) near Verkhnotoretske (23km north-east of Donetsk). On 22 August, the SMM saw seven armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-2): five near Voitove (33km north-west of Luhansk) and two near Raihorodka (34km north-west of Luhansk).

On 21 August, an SMM mid-range UAV and an SMM long-range UAV spotted two armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-2) and an IFV (BMP-1) north-west of Shumy (41km north-east of Donetsk); the same SMM long-range UAV spotted an additional armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) in the same area.

The SMM observed the presence of unexploded ordnance (UXO) and a new mine hazard sign. On 22 August, in the eastern outskirts of Tavrycheske (non-government-controlled, 76km south of Donetsk), the SMM saw for the first time a tailfin, assessed as part of a mortar (120mm) round, protruding from the tarmac. On the side of the same road, a few metres away from the aforementioned tailfin, the SMM saw for the first time a red square-shaped sign with “Mines” written on it in Russian language.

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire. Positioned in areas near the station, the SMM recorded ceasefire violations, despite explicit security guarantees (see table below).

The SMM also facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema, a water pipe in Zolote and a water channel junction in Stanytsia Luhanska, as well as to enable the installation of a new segment of the water pipeline near Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk). The SMM also facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to residential houses in Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk).

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Coordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 15 August 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a checkpoint near Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage, saying that it was unsafe for the SMM to proceed.
• While an SMM patrol was driving towards the Petrivske disengagement area, at a checkpoint near Styla (non-government-controlled, 30km south-west of Donetsk), six armed members of the armed formations denied it passage, saying that “an operation was ongoing in the area”.
• At a checkpoint near Novoazovsk (non-government-controlled, 40km east of Mariupol), two members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage, saying that “an operation was ongoing in the area”.
• At a checkpoint near Staromykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 15km west of Donetsk), a member of the armed formations denied the SMM passage, saying that it was unsafe for the SMM to proceed due to “frequent shelling in the area”.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by telephone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.5
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] Due to presence of mines, including those on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited; thus, the review of the camera footage may take place days later.

[3] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

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MINSK, 22 August 2018 – The Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office in Ukraine and in the Trilateral Contact Group (TCG), Ambassador Martin Sajdik, made the following statement to the press after the meeting of the TCG ‎and its Working Groups in Minsk on 22 August 2018:

As you may already know, three Working Groups, namely on Security, Political and Humanitarian Issues, have held two-day meetings. The Economic Working Group and the TCG convened only today.

I would like to note that this year we are witnessing the calmest summer since the beginning of the conflict. Since August, no civilian fatalities have been recorded. However, unfortunately, according to the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine, three injured civilians  have been registered so far.

In this regard, compliance with the ceasefire and the overall security situation in the conflict zone were addressed today by the Trilateral Contact Group and its Security Working Group.

In this spirit, the TCG adopted the following Statement on the ceasefire on the occasion of the beginning of the school year:

“The Trilateral Contact Group, with the participation of representatives of certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine, reiterates its full commitment to a permanent ceasefire on the occasion of the beginning of the school year, starting at 00:01 on 29 August 2018.

The sides shall take all necessary steps to ensure that the ceasefire is sustainable.

For the purpose of monitoring, the sides shall also ensure safe and secure access of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) throughout the whole territory of Ukraine, in accordance with its mandate.”

I personally call on the sides to support this decision at the highest political level.

The Humanitarian Working Group further considered issues related to the exchange of detainees.

The Working Group also discussed the preparation for the forthcoming trip of Ambassador Toni Frisch, the Coordinator of the Working Group, to the conflict zone. Among others, the Coordinator shall meet detainees and assess their detention conditions on both sides of the contact line.

The Working Group on Political Issues further considered the implementation of the ‘Steinmeier formula’ as well as amnesty.

The Economic Working Group continued its discussion of issues related to the operation of civilian infrastructure. The Group also considered further steps to restore and improve the quality of the "Vodafone-Ukraine" mobile communication network in certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions (CADR and CALR respectively), as well as current issues of water deliveries in the "Karbonyt" and "Voda Donbasa" supply systems.

In this regard, I would like to express my gratitude to the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission. Its mediation to provide necessary “windows of silence” is essential for the solution of the above mentioned issues.

Let me provide some examples: Thanks to the support of the OSCE SMM, the first delivery of spare parts and equipment for "Vodafone-Ukraine" in CALR has been successfully completed. Also, repair works to restore main connecting cable in Stanytsia Luhanska are now under way. In addition, the first stage of works to reinforce phenol sludge reservoire in the town of Zalizne and repairs of the gas pipeline in Avdiivka have been recently completed.”

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This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and Luhansk region, compared with the previous reporting period. The SMM followed up on a civilian casualty as a result of unexploded ordnance in Khartsyzk. The Mission observed fresh mortar round impacts in the Zolote disengagement area and an explosion near the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area. Its access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas as well as in Verkhnoshyrokivske and Sosnivske.* The SMM observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line. The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station. It facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to water infrastructure in Pervomaisk and Stanytsia Luhanska; however, repairs to residential houses in Avdiivka and water infrastructure in Novotoshkivske were cancelled due to ceasefire violations in the area. In Kyiv and Lviv, the SMM monitored public gatherings in support of Ukrainian filmmaker Oleh Sentsov.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations[1], including about 200 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (60 explosions).

On the evening and night of 20-21 August, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 95 undetermined explosions and about 540 bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 2-6km south-east and south-south-east.

The SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk) recorded 60 projectiles in flight and three illumination flares, all 2-4km at directions ranging from east-north-east to south-east.

During the day on 21 August, positioned on the south-western edge of Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard 30 undetermined explosions 3-6km south-east and south.

Positioned on the south-eastern edge of Avdiivka, the SMM heard 15 explosions (one assessed as outgoing, one assessed as an impact and 13 undetermined), about 105 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, as well as heard and saw four airbursts, all 0.5-4km east, east-south-east and south-east.

Positioned about 1km north-west of the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 49 undetermined explosions, about ten shots and bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire and a total of three minutes of uncountable shots and bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 2-4km at directions ranging from south-east to west.

On the evening of 20 August, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol) recorded three undetermined explosions, 70 projectiles in flight, 20 muzzle flashes and two illumination flares, all 2-4km at directions ranging from south-east to south-south-west.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including 33 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (25 explosions).

Positioned near Muratove (government-controlled, 51km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 14 undetermined explosions and about ten bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 1.5-2km south-south-west. 

The SMM followed up on reports of a civilian casualty in Khartsyzk (non-government-controlled, 26km east of Donetsk). On 9 August, medical staff at the Children’s Hospital in Donetsk told the SMM that a boy (13 years old) had been admitted on 7 August with serious shrapnel injuries to his hands, right eye, right thigh and abdomen caused when an explosive device he had found had gone off in his hands earlier that day.  Medical staff added that the boy was in critical condition and had lost fingers from his right hand, while his left hand had been amputated. On 20 August, medical staff at the same hospital told the SMM that the boy remained in critical condition. The next day, the mother of the boy told the SMM that her son had been injured in an explosion at home on 7 August when he attempted to disassemble a 12cm metal object he had found, that she said had been similar in shape to a bullet.

The SMM continued to monitor and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk)[2], as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

During the day on 21 August, inside the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM saw two fresh craters assessed as impacts of 82mm mortar rounds, less than 1m west of road T-1316, in the middle of the disengagement area between the checkpoints at the northern and southern edges of the area. The SMM also saw damaged trees and bushes on the east side of the road. All above damage was located about 400m north-west of three craters spotted by the SMM on 19 August (see SMM Daily Report 21 August 2018).  

In the early morning of 21 August, while in Stanytsia Luhanska, the SMM heard an undetermined explosion 5-7km south-west (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

Positioned near the Petrivske disengagement area, the SMM observed a calm situation.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas, on 20 August, an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted three towed howitzers (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) transported by prime-movers through woodland about 3km east of Memryk (33km north-west of Donetsk). The next day, the SMM saw a surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) about 1km south of Pylypchatyne (76km north-east of Donetsk).

In violation of withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas, on 19 August, aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of a multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) (type undetermined) in a training area near Buhaivka (37km south-west of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in government-controlled areas, on 20 August, the SMM saw a self-propelled howitzer (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) near Novoolenivka (48km north-west of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in non-government-controlled areas, on 19 August, aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of 21 tanks (probable T-72), four surface-to-air missile systems (probable 9K35 Strela-10) and 75 armoured combat vehicles (ACV) (probable infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) BMP variants) [3]  in a training area near Buhaivka; five tanks (probable T-72) in a training area near Shymshynivka, 33 tanks (probable T-64 and T-72) and 26 ACVs (probable IFV (BMP variants))[4] in a training area near Kruhlyk (31km south-west of Luhansk) and 30 tanks (probable T-64 and T72) in a training area near Manuilivka (65km east of Donetsk).

On 21 August, the SMM saw three tanks (type undetermined) in a training area about 1km north of Svobodne (non-government-controlled, 73km south of Donetsk) in a zone within which deployment of heavy armaments and military equipment is proscribed according to Point 5 of the Memorandum of 19 September 2014.

On 19 August, aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of 22 towed howitzers (or mortars) in a training area near Buhaivka, as well as seven self-propelled howitzers (or mortars) and a towed howitzer (or mortar) in a training area near Shymshynivka (non-government-controlled, 27km south-west of Luhansk). 

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. In government-controlled areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM noted that 23 MLRS (BM-21 Grad, 122mm), a self-propelled howitzer (2S1) and two surface-to-air missile systems (9K35) remained missing.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles[5] and other indications of military-type presence in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 20 August, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted three IFVs (BMP-1) about 1km north-west of Katerynivka (64km west of Luhansk), and again spotted a well-maintained 30m trench in the yard of residential houses in Katerynivka, as well as two additional networks of trenches south-west and north-west of Katerynivka, respectively. On the same day, an SMM long-range UAV spotted two IFVs (BMP-2) near Bohdanivka (41km south of Donetsk). On 21 August, the SMM saw an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (MT-LB) in Pavlopil (26km north-east of Mariupol) and an APC (BTR-70) near Hirske (63km west of Luhansk).

In non-government-controlled areas, on 20 August, an SMM mid-range UAV again spotted a well-maintained network of trenches about 1km north-east of Molodizhne (63km north-west of Luhansk) and about 700m west of the Zolote disengagement area.

At the site of the SMM camera 1km south-west of Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol), on 20 August, the SMM observed three new electrical cables that had been connected to the camera’s fuse box, in addition to another cable previously seen (see SMM Daily Report 3 July 2018). The SMM addressed the issue to a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC).

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire. Positioned in areas near the station, the SMM recorded ceasefire violations, despite explicit security guarantees (see the table below).

The SMM also facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to a segment of the water pipeline near Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk) and to a water channel junction in Stanytsia Luhanska. The SMM also facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire violations to enable repairs to residential houses in Avdiivka as well as to a water pipeline near Novotoshkivske (government-controlled, 53km west of Luhansk), however, both activities were cancelled after a short period of time due to security concerns over ceasefire violations in the area.

In Kyiv and Lviv, the SMM monitored public gatherings in support of Oleh Sentsov on the 100th day of the Ukrainian filmmaker’s hunger strike in the Russian Federation (see SMM Daily Report 10 July 2018). In Kyiv, the SMM saw about 75 people (20-40 years old, men and women) in front of the Embassy of the Russian Federation at 27 Povitroflotskyi Avenue, some holding signs with messages in support of Oleh Sentsov’s release from detention such as “Sentsov is 100 days on hunger strike – Freedom to captives of the Kremlin” and “Save Sentsov” in Ukrainian, English and French. The SMM saw about ten National Guard officers and ten police officers around the embassy. In Lviv, the SMM monitored a gathering of about 25-30 people (30-40 years old, men and women) in front of the Consulate General of the Russian Federation at 95 Levyts'koho Street, some holding signs with messages in support of Oleh Sentsov such as “Free Sentsov” in Ukrainian, Russian and English. The SMM saw about 15 police officers around the Consulate. Both gatherings ended peacefully without incident.   

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 15 August 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a checkpoint in Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, nongovernment controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), four members of the armed formations again prevented the SMM from proceeding to Novoazovsk (nongovernment-controlled, 102km south-east of Donetsk) and Bezimenne (non-government-controlled, 30km east of Mariupol), citing “an ongoing operation in the area”.
• At a checkpoint at the entrance to Sosnivske (nongovernment-controlled, 35km north-east of Mariupol), three members of the armed formations prevented the SMM from entering the village. One of the members, identifying himself as the “commander”, told the SMM that only residents and others with authorization are allowed to enter.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[6]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by telephone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.5
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

Conditional access:

• While at a checkpoint near Horlivka (nongovernment-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), a member of the armed formations demanded to search the SMM’s vehicles, quickly opening multiple doors of both vehicles and inspecting before allowing the SMM to proceed.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[2] Due to presence of mines, including those on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited; thus, the review of the camera footage may take place days later.

[3]  This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4]  This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[5]  This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[6] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

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VIENNA, 22 August 2018 - OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media Harlem Désir today welcomed the release of Khayrullo Mirsaidov on appeal by decision of the Sughd regional court. “I am relieved that the court decided to set Mirsaidov free today. While this is a welcome step forward, I very much hope that the remaining charges against him are finally dropped,” Désir said.

Khayrullo Mirsaidov was originally charged under Articles Incitement to Inter-Ethnic Hatred, Embezzlement, Forgery of Documents, Stamps and False Accusation. On 11 July the court found him guilty of the charges and sentenced him to 12 years in a penal colony. The charges of extremism have since been dropped. 

Today the Sughd regional court heard Mirsaidov's appeal and commuted his sentence to a fine of approximately 80,000 Somoni (or roughly 8,500 US dollars) and correctional labor. His family has previously paid a fine of 124,000 Somoni to the state. Many of the charges against him were upheld.

“I have and will continue to offer my assistance and that of my Office to the authorities of Tajikistan in an effort to improve the media situation in the country,” the Representative stated.

The Representative has previously made public statements on Mirsaidov’s case (see https://www.osce.org/representative-on-freedom-of-media/37776; https://www.osce.org/representative-on-freedom-of-media/387599) and written to State authorities in March of this year.

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom.

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KYIV, 22 August 2018 – The Principal Deputy Chief Monitor of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, Alexander Hug, will hold his regular news briefing on Thursday, 23 August, in Kyiv.

He will talk about the security situation throughout Ukraine and the Mission’s recent activities.

Journalists are invited to attend the news briefing tomorrow, 23 August, at 13:30 (Kyiv time), at the Ukrainian Crisis Media Centre, at the Ukrainian House, 2 Khreshchatyk Street.

Live streaming of the news briefing will be available at http://uacrisis.org/ru/stream/#eng

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This report is for the media and the general public.

SUMMARY

Kamensk-Shakhtinskiy, Russian Federation. The Observer Mission (OM) continues to operate 24/7 at both Border Crossing Points (BCPs). The overall number of border crossings by persons increased at both BCPs compared to the previous week.

OPERATIONAL REMARKS

The OM is currently operating with 22 permanent international staff members, including the Chief Observer (CO). The Mission is supported administratively by a Vienna-based staff member.

OBSERVATIONS AT THE BORDER CROSSING POINTS

Persons crossing the border                                                                                                                     

The profile of the people crossing the border can be categorized as follows:

1. Adults travelling on foot or by car with little or no luggage;
2. Persons in military-style outfits;
3. Families (often including elderly people and/or children) travelling on foot or by car with a significant amount of luggage.

The average number of entries/exits increased from 12,999 to 13,489 per day at both BCPs compared to last week[1].

During the reporting period, the majority of border crossings occurred into the Russian Federation, with an average net flow of plus 81 for both BCPs.

The Donetsk BCP continued to experience more traffic than the Gukovo BCP.

Persons in military-style outfits

During the reporting period, the number of persons in military-style outfits crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs decreased to 27 persons (compared to 66 last week); 12 of them crossed into the Russian Federation, and 15 into Ukraine (78 per cent of this category’s crossings occurred at the Donetsk BCP). They continued to cross the border individually or in groups. Most individuals crossed on foot, however, some made use of private vehicles, buses or minivans, making it more difficult for the observer teams (OTs) to observe their movement across the border, especially since some of the private vehicles have tinted windows, and buses and minivans have drawn curtains.

Families with a significant amount of luggage

The OTs continued to report on families crossing the border, sometimes with elderly people and/or children, at both BCPs with a significant amount of luggage, or travelling in heavily loaded cars. During this reporting week, four families were observed crossing into the Russian Federation and none wereas observed crossing into Ukraine, compared to the previous reporting period when six families were observed crossing the border into the Russian Federation and another eight into Ukraine.

Bus connections                                        

Regular local and long-distance bus connections continued to operate between Ukraine (mostly from/to the Luhansk region) and the Russian Federation. In addition to regular bus connections, the OTs continued to observe bus connections on irregular routes. Often the buses do not state their route; instead they have a sign on the windshield stating “irregular”.

During the reporting period the OTs observed a slight increase in the number of buses crossing the border at both BCPs (508 compared to 505 observed during the previous week). There were 259 buses bound for the Russian Federation and 249 bound for Ukraine.

Among the bus connections observed by the OTs, the following “irregular” routes or destinations were noted: Kyiv, Luhansk-Simferopol, Rovenki-Kyiv, Stakhanov-Kyiv, Luhansk-Kharkiv-Kyiv and Luhansk-Yalta.

On some occasions, the OTs noticed the bus drivers removing the itinerary signs from the windshields of their buses, while some buses do not display their route at all. The majority of long-distance buses commuting between the Luhansk region and cities in the Russian Federation have Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region.

Trucks

During the reporting period the OM observed an increase in the overall number of trucks crossing the border in both directions and at both BCPs. Compared to the previous week, the total number of trucks went from 830 to 876 (308 at the Gukovo BCP and 568 at the Donetsk BCP); 531 of these trucks crossed into the Russian Federation and 345 crossed into Ukraine. Most of the trucks observed by the OTs had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region.

Among them, the OTs also continued to observe tanker trucks crossing the border in both directions. During the reporting week, the number of tanker trucks slightly increased to 97 (compared to 95 during the previous reporting period). These trucks were observed crossing the border at both BCPs. The trucks had the words “Propane” and “Flammable” written across the tanks in either Russian or Ukrainian. The majority of tanker trucks had hazard signs, indicating that they were transporting propane or a mix of propane and butane.

All trucks undergo systematic inspection by Russian Federation officials, which may include an X-ray check. Due to the unfavourable observation position at the Gukovo BCP, the OTs continued to be unable to observe any X-ray checks.

Compared to the previous week, the total number of X-ray checks at the Donetsk BCP increased from 118 to 148: out of the total number of trucks scanned, 79 trucks (53 per cent) were bound for Ukraine; the remaining 69 trucks (47 per cent) crossed into the Russian Federation.

Minivans

The OM continued to observe passenger and cargo minivans[2] crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs. The OTs observed minivans predominantly with Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, the OTs also frequently saw minivans registered in the Russian Federation. As compared to the previous week, the number of cargo minivans increased from 165 to 252 vehicles; 129 crossed into the Russian Federation and another 123 into Ukraine.

Trains

The OTs continued to pick up the sound of trains running on the railway tracks located approximately 150 metres south-west of the Gukovo BCP. During the reporting week, the OTs heard trains on 35 occasions, compared to 26 last week; the OTs assessed that 22 trains were travelling to the Russian Federation and the rest 13 to Ukraine. The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine was regularly informed about the trains bound for Ukraine.

Visual observation was not possible because of the line of trees located between the train tracks and the BCP.

Other observations

The majority of vehicles crossing the border had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region, or Russian Federation licence plates. A significant number of vehicles with “LPR” plates were also observed crossing the border in both directions on a daily basis and at both BCPs.

For trends and figures at a glance covering the period from 3 July to 7 August 2018, please see the attachment here.

[1] Based on data received from the Regional Representation of the the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation.

[2] Cargo minivans: light commercial vehicles with a maximum authorized mass of more than 3.5 t and not more than 7.5 t; with or without a trailer with a maximum mass of less than 750 kg (small cargo vehicles which correspond to driving licence C1).                       

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This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more ceasefire violations in Luhansk region, compared with the previous 24 hours. The SMM followed up on reports of a civilian fatality as a result of an explosion in Pionerske. The Mission observed fresh impacts in the Zolote disengagement area and ceasefire violations near the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area. Its access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas as well as at a heavy weapons holding area in non-government-controlled parts of Donetsk region, in Markyne, and again in Bezimenne.* The SMM observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines near Kostiantynivka and Khrustalnyi. The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station. It facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs of residential houses in Avdiivka and water infrastructure in Nyzhnoteple, Novotoshkivske, Pervomaisk and Stanytsia Luhanska.            

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations[1], including 60 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours (80 explosions).

On the evening and night of 19-20 August, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded ten undetermined explosions, 68 projectiles in flight, 12 muzzle flashes and an illumination flare, all 1-3km at directions ranging from south-south-east to south-south-west.

On the evening and night of 19-20 August, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk) recorded about 13 undetermined explosions, 135 projectiles in flight, three illumination flares and about four bursts, all 1-4km at directions ranging from north-east to south-east.

On the evening and night of 19-20 August, the SMM camera 1km south-west of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol) recorded about seven undetermined explosions, 300 projectiles in flight, 43 muzzle flashes and 11 bursts, all 2-4km east-north-east, east and east-south-east.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including 25 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours (two explosions).

Positioned about 500m south of Holubivske (non-government-controlled, 51km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard seven undetermined explosions about 6-8km north-east.

The SMM followed up on reports of a woman who was killed by an explosion near Pionerske (non-government-controlled, 19km east of Luhansk). On 20 August, the mother (70 years old) of the woman (39 years old) told the SMM that her daughter had left their house on 28 July around 12:00 and had died in an explosion reportedly caused by a mine about 300-400m from the village near the bank of the Siverskyi Donets river later the same day. The mother said that her brother and members of the armed formations had retrieved parts of the body, and that she had buried the remains. A local resident (male, 50 years old) told the SMM that he had known the deceased woman for many years and that he had heard an explosion around 13:15 that had shaken the windows of his shop. Two other local residents (a man and a woman) separately told the SMM that they knew the deceased woman and that they had heard the explosion on 28 July around midday. The SMM was unable to visit the site of the explosion due to security considerations.

The SMM continued to monitor and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk)[2], as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On 19 August, inside the Zolote disengagement area, an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted three fresh craters assessed as impacts of mortar rounds 1km north from the southern edge of the disengagement area and about 1.8km west of its eastern edge (not visible in imagery from 17 August 2018). The SMM assessed that the rounds were fired from a probable northerly direction. The craters were spotted within 90m from a set of four fires, in an area where on 19 August the SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable firefighting activity near the southern edge of the Zolote disengagement area. (See SMM Daily Report 20 August 2018).

The same UAV spotted a well-maintained trench in the Zolote disengagement area, about 900m north of the disengagement area’s southern edge and about 1.4km west of its eastern edge, which the Mission had previously observed (see SMM Daily Report 25 July 2018).

On the evening of 19 August, positioned on the eastern edge of Stanytsia Luhanska, the SMM heard a shot of an undetermined weapon 3-4km south (unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area). On 20 August, positioned inside the disengagement area about 600m north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM heard 18 explosions assessed as impacts of rounds of undetermined weapon(s) about 3-4km north-west (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in a government-controlled area, on 18 August, an SMM long-range UAV spotted 18 self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) at the railway station in Kostiantynivka (60km north of Donetsk).

In violation of withdrawal lines in a non-government-controlled area, on 18 August, an SMM long-range UAV again spotted six multiple launch rocket systems (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) at a compound east of Khrustalnyi (formerly Krasnyi Luch, 56km south-west of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in government-controlled areas, on 19 August, an SMM mini-UAV spotted 18 tanks (T-64) and two surface-to-air missile systems (9K35, Strela-10) near Zatyshne (64km south-west of Donetsk). On 20 August, the SMM saw 18 tanks (T-64B) loaded on train flatbeds at the railway station in Kostiantynivka.

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in non-government-controlled areas, on 18 August, an SMM long-range UAV spotted three self-propelled howitzers (2S1) near Teple (formerly Krasnodon, 33km south-east of Luhansk) and again spotted 18 towed howitzers (ten 2A65 Msta-B, 152mm and eight 2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm) at a compound east of Khrustalnyi.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles and an anti-aircraft gun[3] in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 18 August, an SMM long-range UAV spotted three armoured combat vehicles (types undetermined) near Troitske (69km west of Luhansk). The SMM observed an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (type undetermined) near Zolote-4/Rodina (59km west of Luhansk) as well as an APC (MT-LB with an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) mounted on it and an infantry fighting vehicle (BTR-4) north-east of Stepove (30km north-east of Luhansk).

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire. Positioned in areas near the station, the SMM recorded ceasefire violations, despite explicit security guarantees (see the table below).

The SMM also facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to residential houses in Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk), to Petrivske water pumping station infrastructure in Nyzhnoteple (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), to water pipelines near Novotoshkivske (government-controlled, 53km west of Luhansk) and to a water channel junction in Stanytsia Luhanska, as well as to enable the installation of a new water pipeline near Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk).

The SMM visited a border area outside of government control. While at a border crossing point near Marynivka (78km east of Donetsk) for about 45 minutes, the SMM saw 29 vehicles (nine with Ukrainian, 19 with Russian Federation and one with Latvian licence plates), including two covered cargo trucks, exiting Ukraine, and 13 vehicles (four with Ukrainian and nine with Russian Federation licence plates), including a covered cargo truck, entering Ukraine.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Coordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 15 August 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a heavy weapons holding area in a nongovernment-controlled area of Donetsk region, three armed members of the armed formations denied the SMM access to the site, saying that “there is no order to allow SMM entry.”
• At a checkpoint about 2.5km west of Bezimenne (nongovernment-controlled, 30km east of Mariupol), four armed members of the armed formations again prevented the SMM from proceeding west on road E58, with one of the armed members citing “demining activities in the area”.
• On a road south of Markyne (nongovernment-controlled, 94km south of Donetsk), four armed members of the armed formations prevented the SMM from traveling east toward the border area, citing an “ongoing special operation”.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by telephone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.5
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.
• The SMM did not travel across the bridge in Shchastia (governmentcontrolled, 20km north of Luhansk) due to the presence of mines south of the bridge. A member of the armed formations told the SMM that no demining had taken place. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] Due to the presence of mines, including those on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited; thus, the review of the camera footage may take place days later.

[3]   This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

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391205 Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights Guiding Principles on Human Rights in the Return of Trafficked Persons

The OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) launched its Guiding Principles on Human Rights in the Return of Trafficked Persons in the Ukrainian language at an event in Kyiv on 21 August 2018.

The Guiding Principles are intended for use by state authorities and civil society bodies, as well as by inter-governmental organizations involved in developing, applying, evaluating and reforming national laws, policies and practices related to trafficking, particularly to the return of trafficked persons.

The event participants stressed that trafficked persons may face a multitude of problems after returning to their country of origin. They also noted that authorities often fail to adequately assess protection needs or develop individual reintegration plans.

“The application of human rights standards in the return of survivors of trafficking in human beings is an essential step in ensuring their rehabilitation and reintegration, and in preventing re-victimization,” said Tatiana Kotlyarenko, ODIHR Adviser on Anti-Trafficking Issues. “The Guiding Principles outline the manner in which the return of survivors of trafficking should be conducted and emphasize the importance of co-operation between countries of origin and destination.”

The Commissioner of the President of Ukraine for Children's Rights, Mykola Kuleba, said: “The best interest of the child should be the primary consideration in the return process of trafficked children and should incorporate children’s views regarding their future. Referring to the Guiding Principles, he also added that every stage of the return process must be conducted in a safe and child-appropriate manner.

COPENHAGEN, 21 August 2018 – In observance of International Day of Remembrance and Tribute to the Victims of Terrorism, Makis Voridis (Greece), Chair of the OSCE PA’s Ad Hoc Committee on Countering Terrorism, issued the following statement:

“On this day, we pause to remember all of the victims of terrorism, to offer support to the survivors, and to wish peace and solace to the families of those who have lost lives to extremist violence. Remembering the victims, supporting their loved ones, and acknowledging the profound human cost of this violence gives focus to our work and helps to change the narrative that terrorists seek to create.

“As the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly continues its efforts to promote effective counter-terrorism measures, we should always keep in mind the human lives affected by this senseless violence and find inspiration in their stories of resilience.”For more information about the Ad Hoc Committee's work, please click here.

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391178 Communication and Media Relations Section

The International Organization for Migration (IOM) office in Turkmenistan and the OSCE Centre in Ashgabat organized a workshop from 16 to 17 August on how to set up an Advance Passenger Information (API) system in Turkmenistan. The event was part of wider efforts to prevent the movement of foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) and enhance aviation security.

An API system is an electronic system through which biographic data from a traveller’s passport and flight details are collected by airlines and transmitted to the relevant national authorities at the border, before the departure or arrival of a specific flight. By checking the data against law enforcement watch lists, such as those of INTERPOL, border officials can know in advance whether FTFs or other suspicious individuals are attempting to enter their country.

API data has been increasingly used in recent years by law enforcement agencies and the establishment of national API systems is now mandatory. “The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) has made it a standard and the United Nations Security Council, in its Resolutions 2178 and 2396, has called upon all states, including Turkmenistan, to collect API data,” explained Natasa Rasic, Officer-in-Charge at the OSCE Centre in Ashgabat. “Setting up such a system would greatly contribute to countering terrorism and improving border security in Turkmenistan and Central Asia as a whole”.

15 representatives from all agencies involved in passenger processing in Turkmenistan took part in the event, including the State Migration Service, the State Customs Service, the State Border Service, the Ministry for National Security, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the General Prosecutor’s Office. The main purpose of the workshop was to provide participants with practical insights about the features and functions of an API system. They also learned about administrative, technological and operational procedures related to implementing and operating a passenger data programme.

Attendees benefited from the presence of border control officers from Hungary and the United States, as well as experts from some of the OSCE’s international partners, like the European Union (EU) and INTERPOL, as well as commercial service providers and representatives from Turkmenistan Airlines. The experts shared their experience in setting up an API system and identified best practices, such as the establishment of inter-agency co-operation mechanisms and the creation of a single entity to receive API data on behalf of all national agencies.

The event in Turkmenistan was the tenth workshop on API organized in the OSCE region since December 2016. The OSCE Transnational Threats Department’s Border Security and Management Unit will conduct one more workshop in 2018, which will take place in Kyiv (Ukraine) in December.

391067 Andrii Dziubenko

Ukrainian judges who were trained by the OSCE Project Co-ordinator to apply the European Convention on Human Rights and the case law of the European Court in their decisions, increased their use of these instruments in their work by more than one third. Moreover, eight out of ten justices who never referred to the Convention in their practice started doing so after the training. Between 2014 and 2017, more than 6000 judges participated in training workshops organized by the OSCE in partnership with the National School of Judges.

The findings were presented in a report of the Institute of Applied Humanitarian Research and based on the analysis of court decisions in the online Register of Court Decisions (a copy of report in Ukrainian is available for download here - https://www.osce.org/project-coordinator-in-ukraine/390503). The analysis is part of the training evaluation exercise that covered 3,604 court decisions made by 680 judges and is based on a specially designed methodology (link (https://www.osce.org/project-coordinator-in-ukraine/321746?download=true).

The report also revealed legislative gaps, identified further training needs and resulted in recommendations for further efforts, needed to safeguard human rights in Ukraine.

The training workshops aimed at developing a sustainable system of judicial human rights education, which   now consists of four distance courses and more than ten trainer-led courses. The training workshops and the report were carried out in the framework of the “Safeguarding Human Rights through Courts” project, implemented v in partnership with the National School of Judges and Supreme Court and with financial support from Global Affairs Canada.

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions between the evenings of 17 and 18 August, compared with the previous reporting period. Between the evenings of 18 and 19 August, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more ceasefire violations in Luhansk region, compared with the previous 24 hours. The SMM followed up on reports of recent damage caused by shelling and gunfire in a residential area of Yasynuvata. The Mission observed a ceasefire violation and recently dug trenches inside the Zolote disengagement area. Its access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas.* The SMM observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines near Kostiantynivka and Krasnohorivka, as well as in Mariupol. The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station. It facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs of residential houses in Avdiivka and firefighting activity south of the Zolote disengagement area. In Odessa, the SMM observed an “Odessa Pride March”.                  

In Donetsk region, between the evenings of 17 and 18 August, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations[1], including, however, a similar number of explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (115 explosions). Between the evenings of 18 and 19 August, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 80 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours.

On the evening and night of 17-18 August, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded eight undetermined explosions, 80 projectiles in flight, a muzzle flash and two illumination flares in flight, all 0.5-5km at directions ranging from south-east to south-west. The camera also recorded three projectiles from east to west 100-300m south. On the evening and night of 18-19 August, the camera recorded about 25 projectiles in flight, four undetermined explosions, two airbursts and two illumination flares, all 0.5-4km at directions ranging from south-south-east to south-south-west. The camera also recorded an undetermined explosion 200-500m south-south-west and a projectile from west-north-west to east-south-east 300-500m south.

On the evening and night of 17-18 August, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk) recorded about 215 projectiles in flight, seven undetermined explosions, four muzzle flashes, ten illumination flares in flight and about 25 bursts, all 0.2-4km at directions ranging from north-east to south-east. On the evening and night of 18-19 August, the camera recorded 145 projectiles in flight, 11 undetermined explosions, five muzzle flashes, four illumination flares and three bursts, all 1-4km at directions ranging from north-east to east-south-east.

On the evening and night of 17-18 August, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol) recorded about 135 projectiles in flight, an undetermined explosion and three muzzle flashes, all 1-4km south-east, south-south-east and south. On the evening and night of 18-19 August, the same camera recorded about 80 projectiles in flight, an undetermined explosion and a muzzle flash, all 1-4km south-east, south-south-east and south. The same evening and night, the SMM camera about 1km south-west of Pyshchevyk recorded 100 projectiles in flight, eight undetermined explosions and four muzzle flashes, all 2-4km east-north-east, east and east-south-east.

On the evening and night of 17-18 August, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard about 60 undetermined explosions and about 85 bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 2-4km south-east and south. On the evening and night of 18-19 August, while at the same location, the SMM heard about 40 undetermined explosions and about 70 bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 2-6km south-east, south and south-west.

On the evening and night of 18-19 August, the SMM camera in Krasnohorivka (government-controlled, 21km west of Donetsk) recorded about 130 projectiles in flight, two undetermined explosions and about 20 bursts, all 1-4km at directions ranging from east to south.

In Luhansk region, between the evenings of 17 and 18 August, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including ten explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (no ceasefire violations). Between the evenings of 18 and 19 August, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations (two explosions), compared with the previous 24 hours.

During the day on 18 August, positioned on the southern edge of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard eight undetermined explosions 3-8km north-north-east and east-north-east. Shortly thereafter, positioned on the south-eastern edge of Popasna, the SMM heard two explosions assessed as mortar rounds 2-5km south-south-east.

On 18 August, the SMM followed up on reports of recent damage caused by shelling and gunfire in a residential area of Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk). Seven metres from a house at 14/2 Hoholia Street, the SMM saw a pile of scorched wood and noted a fresh burning smell. A female resident of the house told the SMM that at around 21:00 on 17 August, she and her husband, while at home, had heard explosions and gunfire and then seen their wooden shed burning. Their neighbours living in the adjacent house at 16 Hoholia Street told the SMM that at around 21:00 on 17 August, they had seen tracer rounds and the aforementioned shed on fire. The SMM was unable to assess the type of weapon used or the direction of fire.

The SMM continued to monitor and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk)[2], as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On 17 August, inside the Zolote disengagement area, an SMM mid-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted a recently dug 30m-long trench, about 200m south of the northern edge of the disengagement area and 500m west of its eastern edge (not visible in imagery from late July 2018), as well as an approximately 10m-long recent extension (not visible in imagery from 2 August 2018) of a previously observed trench, about 150m south of the northern edge of the Zolote disengagement area and about 1km west of its eastern edge (see SMM Daily Report 9 June 2018). Also inside the disengagement area, the UAV spotted a recently dug 10m-long trench and a firing position among vegetation (not visible in imagery from 2 August 2018) near a previously observed 20m-long trench (assessed as a firing position) on the southern side of the railway line, 1.3km south of the northern edge of the disengagement area and 1.2km east of its western edge (see SMM Daily Report 14 July 2018). The SMM assessed all abovementioned positions as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

The same UAV spotted wooden logs deposited on the ground in which fresh footpaths leading north and south were observed, about 800m north of the Zolote disengagement area’s southern edge and 1.7km east of its western edge (not visible in imagery from 2 August 2018). The SMM was unable to assess whether these belong to the Ukrainian Armed Forces or the armed formations.

During the day on 18 August, positioned on the northern edge of the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM heard four bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire 3-4km south-east (unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area) and saw columns of black smoke 4-5km south-east. Positioned on the western edge of Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard four bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire 3km north (unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area). The following day, positioned on its southern edge, the SMM heard an undetermined explosion 1-1.5km north-west, assessed as inside the disengagement area. Positioned on the north-eastern edge of Katerynivka (government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk), the SMM saw two persons in military-style clothing armed with automatic rifles, as well as a military truck with military licence plates and five persons in military-style clothing on board entering the disengagement area.

On the evening of 18 August, the SMM camera near the Prince Ihor Monument south-east of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk) recorded an undetermined explosion 3-5km west-south-west, assessed as outside the disengagement area.

During the day on 19 August, inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, the SMM noted that a previously observed tailfin of a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG-7) in a field, about 2.5m east of a road approximately 100m south of a Ukrainian Armed Forces forward position north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge was no longer present (see SMM Daily Report 20 July 2018).

During the day on 18 August, positioned near the Stanytsia Luhanska and Petrivske disengagement areas, the SMM observed calm situations. The following day, positioned near all three disengagement areas, the SMM observed calm situations.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas, on 17 August, an SMM mini-UAV spotted two self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) at the railway station in Kostiantynivka (60km north of Donetsk). The same day, an SMM mini-UAV spotted a probable mortar (2B11 Sani, 120mm) near Krasnohorivka. On 18 August, the SMM saw four towed howitzers (2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm) loaded on flatbed trains travelling east about 1km west of the central railway station in Mariupol (102km south of Donetsk), six stationary self-propelled howitzers (2S1) – three of which were loaded on flatbed trains – at the railway station in Kostiantynivka and nine self-propelled howitzers (2S1) being transported on trailers travelling south-east in Kostiantynivka. On 19 August, the SMM saw six stationary self-propelled howitzers (2S1) at the railway station in Kostiantynivka.

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in government-controlled areas, on 17 August, an SMM long-range UAV spotted five tanks (T-72) in a training area near Dmytrivka (43km north of Luhansk). On 19 August, the SMM saw a surface-to-air-missile system (9K33 Osa) travelling east of Svobodne (55km south of Donetsk) and six stationary tanks (T-64) at the railway station in Kostiantynivka.

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. In non-government-controlled areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM observed six multiple launch rocket systems (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) and six self-propelled howitzers (2S1), and noted that five mortars (four PM-38, 120mm and one 2B11 Sani, 120mm) were again missing.

The SMM revisited permanent storage sites whose locations were beyond withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region and noted that 18 tanks (ten T-72 and eight T-64), 15 anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) and nine mortars (2B14 Podnos, 82mm) were again missing. At such sites in non-government-controlled areas of Luhansk region, the SMM noted that four tanks (three T-64 and one T-72) were again missing.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles (ACVs), anti-aircraft guns[3] and other indications of military-type presence in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 17 August, an SMM mini-UAV spotted four infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP variants) on the premises of a house on the western edge of Marinka, and an SMM mid-range UAV spotted a firing position (not visible in imagery before 26 July 2018) about 100m from the nearest house in Zolote-4/Rodina (59km west of Luhansk). The same day, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-variant) near Stanytsia Luhanska and an APC (BTR-variant) north-west of Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk), and an SMM mid-range UAV spotted a probable IFV (BMP-variant), as well as damaged and destroyed residential houses, some of which were assessed as occupied by military personnel – with military trucks parked alongside the houses – in the Zhovanka neighbourhood of Zaitseve (50km north-east of Donetsk). On 18 August, the SMM saw two IFVs (BMP-1) and an armoured recovery vehicle (BREM-Ch) near Popasna and two anti-aircraft guns (ZU-23), one of which was mounted atop an APC (MT-LB), near Stanytsia Luhanska.

In non-government-controlled areas, on 17 August, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted a 10m-long trench (not visible in imagery before 26 July 2018) – 1.2km east-north-east of the north-eastern edge of the Zolote disengagement area – about 100m from the nearest house in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (58km west of Luhansk), and an SMM long-range UAV spotted two IFVs (BMP-2) near Vesela Hora (16km north of Luhansk). The same day, an SMM long-range UAV spotted at least 16 houses engulfed in fire in an eastern part of Zholobok (47km west of Luhansk) and a house engulfed in fire in a southern part of Dolomitne (53km north-east of Donetsk).

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire. On 18 and 19 August, positioned in areas near the station, the SMM recorded ceasefire violations, despite explicit security guarantees (see the table below).

The SMM also facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to residential houses in Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk) on 17 and 18 August and firefighting activity near the southern edge of the Zolote disengagement area on 19 August.

On 19 August the SMM monitored a pre-announced “Odessa Pride March” organized by the lesbian, gay, bi-sexual and transgender (LGBT) community in Odessa. The SMM saw about 80-90 people (mostly women, aged 18-50) marching from Vorontsovskyi Lane to the city hall at 1 Dumska Square. Some participants held signs with messages such as “Life is diverse” and “Family is where love is”. Along the marching route, the SMM saw another gathering of 10-15 people (mixed gender, aged 30-60) at the Duke statue, with some participants holding Ukrainian flags and signs that read: “All together for the family”. The smaller gathering directed comments and chants on a loudspeaker at the marchers. At city hall, the SMM also saw 10-15 Right Sector members (mostly men, aged 18-23) chanting against the march participants. About 250-300 law enforcement officers were present along the marching route, and the SMM observed no incidents.

On 17 August, the SMM followed up on reports of the Mekhanik Pogodin tanker moored in a port in the south-western outskirts of Kherson city. At the entrance gate of an oil terminal on Marii Fortus Street, a man, who introduced himself as a member of the Security Service of Ukraine, told the SMM that it needed to obtain prior permission from the port authorities to access the facility. The SMM will follow up on this matter.

The SMM continued monitoring in Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Coordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 15 August 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• On 18 and 19 August, the SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC both times.[4]
• On 18 and 19 August, the SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by telephone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC both times.5
• On 19 August, the SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

 

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[2] Due to presence of mines, including those on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited; thus, the review of the camera footage may take place days later.

[3] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

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COPENHAGEN, 20 August 2018 – In response to a decision by the Republika Srpska National Assembly (RSNA) requesting the annulment of the 2004 Report of the Commission for Investigation of the Events in and around Srebrenica in July 1995 which acknowledged the mass killing of Bosniaks by Serb forces, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly's Special Representative on South East Europe, Mark Pritchard (United Kingdom), today issued the following statement: 

"The decision to annul the Srebrenica report is a regrettable and short-sighted move that will only serve to deepen divisions and derail the reconciliation process. The facts established in the 2004 report are not in dispute, having been confirmed by international and domestic criminal courts. The wounds of the Srebrenica tragedy should not be reopened for short-term political gains and Bosnia and Herzegovina’s leaders must avoid divisive, nationalistic rhetoric ahead of the general elections in October. 

"I urge parliamentarians to reconsider this decision for the sake of reconciliation and to focus on issues of importance for BiH’s citizens, namely economic opportunities and prosperity, education, health care and the fight against corruption." 

The decision to reject the 2004 report was taken on 14 August by the RSNA. On 18 August, the RS Government, which published the original Report, decided to annul it in a special session.For more information about the Special Representative on South East Europe’s work, please click here.

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This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, compared with the previous reporting period in Donetsk region. It recorded no ceasefire violations in Luhansk region. The SMM observed fresh impact sites in residential areas of Dokuchaievsk and Holmivskyi. The SMM continued monitoring all three disengagement areas; it saw a man wearing military-style clothing entering the Zolote disengagement area. Its access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas, as well as at a checkpoint near non-government-controlled Verkhnoshyrokivske.* The SMM observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines near Kostiantynivka and Sopyne. The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station, as well as repairs and maintenance works to critical water infrastructure in Luhansk region on both sides of the contact line.                  

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations[1], however, fewer explosions (115), compared with the previous reporting period (about 150 explosions).

On the evening and night of 16-17 August, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk), recorded nine explosions (one assessed as an outgoing mortar round, one as an impact of a mortar round and the remainder undetermined) and about 80 projectiles in flight, all 1-5km at directions ranging from south-east to south-west.

On the evening and night of 16-17 August, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol) recorded three undetermined explosions and about 140 projectiles in flight, all 3-5km south-east, south-south-east and south.

On the evening and night of 16-17 August, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 19 undetermined explosions and about 30 shots and bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 2-6km south-east and south.

During the day on 17 August, positioned about 1km north-west of the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard and saw seven explosions assessed as impacts 2-3km south-west and west-north-west; it also heard 13 undetermined explosions and about 190 shots and bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 1-5km south and south-west.

Positioned about 2km south-east of Kamianka (government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard and saw an undetermined explosion 3-4km south; it also heard 35 undetermined explosions and 15 shots and bursts of small-arms fire, as well as a total of 35 minutes of uncountable overlapping shots and bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 1-5km east and south.

Positioned on the south-eastern edge of Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard and saw three undetermined explosions 1-2km south-east; it also heard 22 undetermined explosions and about 220 bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 1-4km at directions ranging from east-south-east to south.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded no ceasefire violations. During the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded seven ceasefire violations (all explosions).

The SMM observed fresh impact sites in a residential area of Dokuchaievsk (non-government-controlled, 30km south-west of Donetsk) and Holmivskyi (non-government-controlled, 49km north-east of Donetsk).

In Dokuchaievsk, at 6 Oktiabrska Street, the SMM saw a fresh hole in both layers of a double-pane south-west-facing glass window on the second floor of a two-storey apartment building. The SMM assessed the hole as caused by a bullet fired from a south-westerly direction (it could not assess the calibre). On the same day, the SMM saw fresh tracks assessed as those of armoured combat vehicles along Oktiabrska Street.

In Dokuchaievsk, at 35 Pionerska Street, the SMM saw a hole in the east-facing window of a one-storey residential building. The SMM assessed it as caused by a bullet (it could not assess the calibre or the direction of fire). (Aerial imagery from 1 February 2018 revealed that the forward positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the armed formations on the western outskirts of the town were approximately 800m closer compared with their positions in imagery from 10 December 2017. At one point, they are about 350m from each other.)

In Holmivskyi, at Mykytivska Street 11, the SMM saw a fresh impact on the second floor of the north-facing façade of a two-storey apartment building. The SMM could not assess the type of weapon or the direction of fire.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement areas and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk)[2], as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On 17 August, the SMM saw an armed man wearing military-style clothing walking entering the Zolote disengagement area on the north-eastern edge of Katerynivka (government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk).

Positioned near the Stanytsia Luhanska and Petrivske disengagement areas during the day on 17 August, the SMM observed a calm situation.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas, on 16 August, an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted six anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) travelling from the railway station in Kostiantynivka (60km north of Donetsk) to a compound in Oleksandro-Kalynove (47km north of Donetsk). Inside the compound, the same UAV spotted three additional stationary anti-tank guns (MT-12). On 17 August, the SMM saw a stationary surface-to-air-missile system (9K35, Strela-10) 1km north of Sopyne (16km east of Mariupol).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in government-controlled areas, on 16 August, an SMM long-range UAV spotted 13 stationary tanks (T-72), three of which were loaded on transporters and six anti-tank guided missile systems (9P148 Konkurs, 135mm) travelling from the railway station in Kostiantynivka to a compound in Oleksandro-Kalynove (see above). (The same UAV also spotted 57 infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP-2) at the railway station in Kostiantynivka.) On 17 August, the SMM saw four stationary towed howitzers (probable D-20, 152mm) near Novomaiorske (64km south-west of Donetsk) and 30 tanks (T-64) parked at the railway station in Zachativka (74km south-west of Donetsk).

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles, anti-aircraft guns[3] and other indication of military-type presence in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 15 August, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) near the north-eastern part of Zaitseve (50km north-east of Donetsk) and an IFV (BMP-2) near Mykolaivka Druha (55km north of Donetsk). On 17 August, the SMM saw an IFV (BTR-4) in Avdiivka, an IFV (BTR-4) near Krasnohorivka (24km north of Donetsk) and a self-propelled anti-aircraft system (ZSU-23-4, Shilka, 23mm) near Sopyne.

In non-government-controlled areas, on 16 August, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted a 400m-long trench south of Nova Marivka (64km south of Donetsk) (not visible in imagery from 5 July 2018). The same day, an SMM long-range UAV spotted a probable armoured personnel carrier (APC) (MT-LB) and eight IFVs (BMP-1) near Dovhe (22km north-west of Luhansk) and an IFV (BMP-2) and three APCs (two BTR-80 and one BTR-70) near Smile (31km north-west of Luhansk).

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire. Positioned in areas near the station, the SMM heard ceasefire violations, despite explicit security guarantees (see above and the table below).

The SMM also continued to facilitate and monitor repairs and maintenance works to a water pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), water pipelines near Zolote and Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk) as well as to a water channel junction near Stanytsia Luhanska.

The SMM visited two border areas not under government control. While at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for about one hour, the SMM saw 17 cars (five with Ukrainian and nine with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as three with “DPR” plates), a covered cargo truck with Ukrainian licence plates, a bus with Ukrainian licence plates and approximately 15 passengers on board, as well as 24 pedestrians (mixed age and gender, including a child) exiting Ukraine. The SMM saw four cars (one with Ukrainian and one with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as two with “DPR” plates), a covered cargo truck with Ukrainian licence plates and 12 pedestrians (mixed aged and gender) entering Ukraine.

While at a border crossing point near Ulianivske (61km south-east of Donetsk) for about 30 minutes, the SMM observed no traffic in either direction. 

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Coordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 15 August 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• On two separate occasions, at a checkpoint on the western edge of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, 85km south of Donetsk), three armed members of the armed formations denied the SMM passage. On one occasion, one of them told the SMM that he had received “orders” not to allow the SMM to access areas near Novoazovsk (nongovernment-controlled, 40km east of Mariupol).

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by telephone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.5
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.
• The SMM did not travel across the bridge in government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk) due to the possible presence of mines. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.5

Other impediments:

• The SMM temporarily lost communication with its midrange UAV flying over Lebedynske (government-controlled, 16km east of Mariupol), assessed as due to jamming. The SMM landed the UAV safely.[5]
• In Obozne (nongovernment-controlled, 18km north of Luhansk), medical staff at a hospital told the SMM that they could not provide information to the SMM without the permission of senior members of the armed formations.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[2] Due to presence of mines, including those on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited; thus, the review of the camera footage may take place days later.

[3] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

[5] The interference could have originated from anywhere within the radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position. 

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This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, compared with the previous reporting period. The SMM heard explosions and small-arms fire 100-500m from their location in Holmivskyi, including two shots assessed as flying overhead. The SMM recorded ceasefire violations near the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area. Its access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas, as well as in Horlivka and Mykolaivka, and near Kreminets*. The SMM observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines near Ocheretyne, Sopyne and Sofiivka. The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station, as well as repairs and maintenance works to critical water infrastructure in Luhansk region.                  

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations[1], however, more explosions (about 150), compared with the previous reporting period (about 105 explosions).

On the evening and night of 15-16 August, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk) recorded 23 undetermined explosions, about 95 projectiles in flight, a burst of an undetermined weapon and an illumination flare in vertical flight, all 0.5-10km at directions ranging from north-east to east-south-east.

During the same evening and night, the SMM camera at the entry-exit point in Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) recorded nine undetermined explosions and about 45 projectiles in flight, all 2-4km at directions ranging from east-north-east to south-east.  

During the same evening and night, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk) the SMM heard about 65 undetermined explosions and about 140 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 4-5km at directions ranging from south-east to south-west. On the morning of 16 August, at the same location, the SMM heard five undetermined explosions 5-6km south.

On the evening of 15 August, while in Debaltseve (non-government-controlled, 58km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard an undetermined explosion 6-10km north-east. During the night of 15-16 August, the SMM heard ten explosions assessed as outgoing rounds of undetermined weapons, 1-2km east.   

During the day on 16 August, positioned near Yevhenivka (government-controlled, 33km north-west of Donetsk), the SMM heard ten undetermined explosions 4-5km north-north-east.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including fewer explosions (seven), compared with the previous reporting period (20 explosions).

The SMM heard explosions and small-arms fire 100-500m from their location near Holmivskyi (non-government-controlled, 49km north-east of Donetsk). While conducting patrols on both sides of the contact line to facilitate and monitor adherence to the ceasefire for repairs of a power line by Voda Donbassa and maintenance to an SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk, three patrol members outside the vehicles on the north-eastern edge of Holmivskyi heard an undetermined explosion approximately 500m north and another undetermined explosion about 500m south-south-east. The explosions were followed by about ten shots of small-arms fire 100-150m north and north-west, two of which were assessed as flying over the heads of the three patrol members who were outside the vehicles. The SMM immediately left the area and returned safely to its base in Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk) (see SMM Spot Report 16 August 2018).

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement areas and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk)[2], as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

While on the eastern edge of Stanytsia Luhanska on the night of 15-16 August, the SMM heard two undetermined explosions 3-4km south-west, assessed as outside the disengagement area.

Positioned near the Zolote and Petrivske disengagement areas during the day on 16 August, the SMM observed calm situations.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas, on 15 August, an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) again spotted a self-propelled howitzer (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) south-east of a residential area of Ocheretyne (31km north-west of Donetsk). On 16 August, the SMM saw a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10) north of Sopyne (16km east of Mariupol).

In violation of withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas, on 15 August, an SMM long-range UAV again spotted three probable towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) near Sofiivka (formerly Karlo-Marksove, 40km north-east of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in government-controlled areas, on 15 August, the SMM saw a surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) in a firing position north of Kasianivka (22km north of Mariupol). On the same day, an SMM long-range UAV spotted four surface-to-air missile systems (9K35) at the railway station in Kostiantynivka (60km north of Donetsk). On 16 August, the SMM saw six surface-to-air missile systems (9K35) and 13 tanks (T-72) at the train station in Kostiantynivka.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles and anti-aircraft guns[3] in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 15 August, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-70) in a south-eastern residential area of Verkhnotoretske (23km north-east of Donetsk). The same day, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-1) near Vodiane (19km north-east of Mariupol), and an SMM mini-UAV spotted an APC (BTR-70), an IFV (BMP-1) and an armoured command vehicle (BMP-1Ksh Potok-2) near Muratove (51km north-west of Luhansk). On 16 August, the SMM saw two APCs (BTR-80) moving south-east on road H-21 near Voitove (33km north-west of Luhansk) and a self-propelled anti-aircraft system (ZSU-23-4 Shilka, 23mm) near Sopyne.

In non-government-controlled areas, on 15 August, an SMM long-range UAV spotted a probable IFV (BMP variant) near Sofiivka, as well as two target acquisition radar detection systems (1L22) and an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) near Shyroka Balka (34km north-east of Donetsk). On 16 August, the SMM saw an APC (BTR-variant) moving east about 2km north of Petrivske.

The SMM observed mine hazard signs for the first time in Slavne (government-controlled, 26km south-west of Donetsk) and Luhanske (non-government-controlled, 15km south-west of Donetsk) on 15 August. Both signs were placed on the edge of the roads and had red squares, white lettering and a skull and crossbones with the words “Danger Mines” written on them in English and Russian. The sign in Slavne was located in an area on the eastern edge of the village about 50m from an abandoned residential house. 

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire. Positioned in areas near the station, the SMM heard ceasefire violations, despite explicit security guarantees (see the table below).

The SMM also continued to facilitate and monitor repairs and maintenance works to a water pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), to water distribution infrastructure near Novotoshkivske (government-controlled, 53km west of Luhansk), Zolote and Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk) and to a water channel junction near Stanytsia Luhanska.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Coordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 15 August 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• In Mykolaivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Mariupol), an armed member of the armed formations prevented the SMM from continuing on two roads leading west towards the Kalmius river, a few minutes after the same man delayed the SMM in travelling to Mykolaivka and told the SMM patrol to remain in the village (see below). Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO: 

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by telephone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.5
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

Conditional access:

• At a checkpoint in Horlivka, while the SMM attempted to pass through towards Maiorsk, a member of the armed formations again allowed the SMM to proceed only after inspecting the SMM vehicle trunks.
• At a checkpoint on road H-15 east of Kreminets (non-government-controlled, 16km south-west of Donetsk), a member of the armed formations stopped the SMM twice on the same day and demanded to check an SMM trailer. On both occasions, the SMM was allowed to proceed only after its trailer was checked.
• In Shevchenko (non-government-controlled, 69km south of Donetsk), the SMM was stopped by two members of the armed formations and was only permitted to continue west towards Mykolaivka if the patrol stayed inside the village.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[2] Due to presence of mines, including those on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited; thus, the review of the camera footage may take place days later.

[3] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

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Colin McCullough, OSCE Programme Office in Astana

An OSCE-supported training seminar on the judicial application of the national environmental legislation and the Aarhus Convention principles took place on 17 August 2018 in Almaty, Kazakhstan.

The OSCE Programme Office in Astana, in co-operation with the Supreme Court of the Republic of Kazakhstan, organized the event for 25 judges from across Kazakhstan.

Judges from Belgium and Sweden, whose participation in the seminar was made possible through OSCE financial support, discussed the European Union’s legislative system, the principles and bodies of the Aarhus and Espoo conventions.  They also presented specific court case studies on access to information, public participation in decision-making and access to justice in environmental matters.

Beibut Shermukhametov, a Supreme Court judge from Kazakhstan, discussed the upcoming revisions in the national environmental code and collected recommendations from the participants on its further improvement. This event was also an opportunity for judges to discuss challenges in reviewing court cases on environmental matters and to exchange views on how to resolve them according to national and international best practices.

The seminar is part of the Programme Office’s multi-year activities to promote good environmental governance and to build capacity of Kazakhstan’s judiciary in meeting its commitments under the Aarhus Convention.

Colin McCullough, OSCE Programme Office in Astana

An OSCE-supported summer school session for law students and young researchers, focusing on the relationship between human rights and business, concluded on 17 August 2018 in Astana.

The three-day programme was organized by the OSCE Programme Office in Astana and M. Narikbayev KAZGUU University with support from the NGO “Legal Policy Research Centre”. During this summer session, 30 law students and young researchers from Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and the Russian Federation   developed their knowledge of the role of the state, business and society in promoting human rights within the framework of entrepreneurial activities.

They familiarized themselves with key concepts and principles of sound business practice and how this practice may contribute towards the protection and fulfilment of human rights. Exploring international experience in developing action plans on Corporate Social Responsibility was also part of the session.

National experts presented relevant examples of labour protection and social partnership, consumer advocacy as well as environmental impact assessments.

The event is part of the Programme Office’s long-standing activities to support human rights education in the host country.

390893 Munira Shoinbekova, OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe

The OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe donated technical equipment to the press centre of Tajikistan’s Committee of Emergency Situations and Civil Defence at a handover ceremony on 17 August 2018 in Dushanbe. The equipment will be used for broadcasting from locations where disasters occur, thus contributing to capacity building of journalists reporting on disasters, increasing the quality of coverage and preventing the spreading of inaccurate information.

A notebook, desktop computer, digital video and photo camera, studio lighting, teleprompter and all the necessary accessories were handed over to the Committee’s press center on 17 August 2018 in Dushanbe.

«With its comprehensive security approach the OSCE has an important role to play in addressing disaster risk reduction issues», said Head of the OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe, Ambassador Tuula Yrjola, congratulating the Committee on its 24th anniversary. «We plan to follow up the equipment donation with training offered to the Committee’s press center staff so that it can effectively raise the awareness of the population on disaster risk prevention».

The Chairperson of Tajikistan’s Committee of Emergency Situations and Civil Defence, Lieutenant-General Rustam Nazarzoda, thanked the OSCE for its constant support in disaster risk prevention activities and in enhancing the Committee’s press center: «We support co-operation with OSCE Program Office in Dushanbe and are grateful for the constant dialogue that promotes optimization of our interaction on disaster risk reduction issues in the future».