OSCE

383832 Representatives of national human rights institutions from the OSCE region participate in a group discussion during the fifth NHRI Academy co-organized by ODIHR and ENNHRI. Helsinki, 5 June 2018. Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

Representatives of national human rights institutions (NHRIs) from the OSCE region developed their knowledge and skills in promoting and protecting human rights during the fifth NHRI Academy organized by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and the European Network of National Human Rights Institutions (ENNHRI). The Finnish Human Rights Centre hosted this year’s NHRI Academy, which took place from 4 to 8 June in Helsinki.

The aim of the annual NHRI Academy is to support NHRIs by training their staff in topical human rights and NHRI-related topics. The curriculum of this year’s Academy focused on topics such as NHRI involvement in lawmaking through legislative review and on working with and supporting human rights defenders, including those working on women’s rights, human rights of LGBT persons and minority rights. The 27 participants – 17 women and 10 men – were also trained in mainstreaming gender into their work, and developed action plans to be implemented after the training.

“This year’s Academy is a milestone for ODIHR, as it is the fifth time we successfully organized this training for NHRIs, together with our ENNHRI partners,” said Katarzyna Gardapkhadze, ODIHR’s First Deputy Director, adding that over 120 NHRI staff members have been trained so far by ODIHR through the Academy. “We will continue to support the development of strong and independent NHRIs in the OSCE region.”

“The Academy provided me an opportunity to learn from peers in other countries and to share and discuss methods for working more closely with human rights defenders on human rights issues in our countries,” said Saba Brachveli, Chief Specialist at the Public Defender’s Office in Georgia.

The event was also marked by the signing of a memorandum of understanding between ODIHR and ENNHRI on 6 June, which formalizes co-operation between the two institutions in the field of NHRIs.

“This document provides us with a strong shared basis to continue and expand our co-operation with ENNHRI in supporting and strengthening independent NHRIs in the OSCE region,” Gardapkhadze said.

“The NHRI Academy is an excellent example of how ENNHRI supports its members together with ODIHR and helps ensure the implementation of OSCE human dimension commitments,” said Lora Vidovic, ENNHRI Chair and Ombudswoman of Croatia. “The signing of the memorandum is a natural continuation of our ongoing and deepening co-operation with ODIHR.”

SARAJEVO, 7 June 2018 – Members of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly’s Ad Hoc Committee on Countering Terrorism (CCT) today concluded a visit to Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), where they learned more about local and regional challenges in countering terrorism and violent extremism. In Sarajevo on Wednesday, members met with colleagues from the BiH Parliamentary Assembly, the OSCE Mission to BiH, civil society, government ministries, and law enforcement officers to exchange best practices and promote the role of parliamentarians in the field of counter-terrorism.

The CCT delegation visited Zenica and Travnik today, meeting with the Police Commissioner of Zenica Doboj Canton to get better acquainted with terrorism-related threats at the local level, and visited Zenica prison, where a number of convicted terrorists are incarcerated. At the prison, members met with the Director to discuss radicalization challenges and rehabilitation efforts in places of detention. Members also paid a visit to the OSCE Mission to BiH Field Office in Travnik.

The delegation was led by the Committee’s Chair, Makis Voridis (Greece) and included Vice-Chair Stéphane Crusniere (Belgium) and members Aude Bono-Vandorme (France) and Abid Raja (Norway). The CCT delegation had a briefing with the Head of the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ambassador Bruce Berton, during which the members learned more about the mission’s counter-terrorism activities.

“The OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina is doing exemplary work in the field of counter-terrorism, including by monitoring the implementation of BiH’s anti-terrorism strategy. This work is something that can be emulated throughout the OSCE region in an effort to save lives and preserve our democratic values. As parliamentarians, we should build on these efforts and contribute with our policy-making and oversight functions,” Voridis said.

Noting the importance of international co-operation, Amb. Berton stressed that broader parliamentary engagement is needed to effectively counter terrorism.

“Preventing and combatting terrorism and violent extremism is a priority for the OSCE. It requires a multidisciplinary approach and broad social engagement,” Amb. Berton said. “I am particularly pleased with the Mission’s strong engagement with a broad range of actors, from the government and law enforcement agencies, to civil society and individuals in tackling this issue.”

He stressed that the OSCE Mission to BiH will continue to co-operate with all relevant actors in BiH and support their future efforts in countering violent extremism.

During the visit, CCT members met with the Speaker of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Parliamentary Assembly House of the Peoples, Barisa Colak, as well as with senior representatives of the Ministries of Security and Justice. The CCT has also met with the Bosnian Intelligence Agency, the Acting Chief Prosecutor and with representatives of civil society.

Meetings have focused on the efforts of local authorities to counter and prevent terrorism, including the threats stemming from returning foreign terrorist fighters, with CCT members encouraging local officials to continue working in synergy with the OSCE Mission.

“I commend the dedication of BiH authorities to effectively counter terrorism and violent extremism despite existing financial and organizational constraints. I hope they work with their regional and international partners to further border control efforts, ensure timely information-sharing among relevant stakeholders and implement sound rehabilitation and reintegration policies to prevent terrorism,” Voridis concluded.

The next official meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee on Countering Terrorism will take place in Berlin, Germany on 7 July 2018 at the margins of the OSCE PA Annual Session.

For more information on the OSCE PA's activities in the field of counter-terrorism, please click here.​

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384000 Communication and Media Relations Section

A high-level meeting to discuss key findings of an OSCE-conducted needs assessment on combating illicit trafficking in weapons, ammunition and explosive (WAE) in and across Ukraine’s borders and determine potential areas for subsequent project co-operation took place on 7 June in Kyiv.

Some 30 representatives of Ukrainian government ministries and agencies and the donor community participated in the meeting.

Rasa Ostrauskaite, the OSCE Secretariat’s Co-ordinator of Activities to Address Transnational Threats, stressed the importance of the Needs Assessment as it establishes the baseline for providing technical assistance and institutional support to develop capacities of Ukrainian authorities in their efforts to combat the trafficking in WAE in a holistic way.

“The OSCE is ready to assist national authorities in Ukraine tackling challenges and threats stemming from illicit WAE trafficking. The best way to do this is through mutually reinforced partnerships both at national and international levels,” noted Ostrauskaite.

Lieutenant General Vasyl Servatiuk, the First Deputy Head of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine, said “The project collaboration with the OSCE will provide us with the opportunity to promote transfer of international best practices and lesson learnt, augmenting training and technical capacities. It will also enhance sub-regional co-operation and co-ordination frameworks necessary to effectively and efficiently combat illicit trafficking across Ukraine’s borders.”       

Representatives of the donor community from Germany, France and Poland commended the needs assessment report and expressed readiness to support development of Ukraine’s capabilities to combat illicit WAE trafficking.  

The meeting was organized with the generous support of Germany and France and was chaired by the OSCE Secretariat. The needs assessment was conducted at the request of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine, which co-chaired the meeting.

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region, compared with the previous reporting period. The Mission heard small arms fired near its position, assessed as directed at its SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) flying near Novoselivka Druha. An SMM long-range UAV was jammed near Debaltseve and Sofiivka. The SMM continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske; it recorded ceasefire violations near the Zolote disengagement area. The Mission’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas and was also restricted near Izvaryne at the border with the Russian Federation. The SMM observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line. The Mission continued to monitor the security situation around the Donetsk Filtration Station and again heard ceasefire violations in the area, despite security guarantees. It continued to monitor and facilitate repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations[1], including, however, more explosions (about 270), compared with the previous reporting period (about 170 explosions).

On the evening and night of 5-6 June, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, a projectile in flight from east to west, three undetermined explosions, four illumination flares in vertical flight and two projectiles from east to west, followed by totals of 52 undetermined explosions, nine illumination flares in vertical flight and 134 projectiles (121 from west to east, ten from east to west and three from south to north), all 0.5-3km south.

On the evening and night of 5-6 June, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard three explosions assessed as outgoing rounds of mortar and recoilless-gun (SPG-9, 73mm) fire 1-6km south-east, 12 explosions assessed as impacts (one mortar round, one round of recoilless-gun (SPG-9) fire and the remainder undetermined) 4-7km south-east and south, as well as eight undetermined explosions and  about 240 shots and bursts of anti-aircraft-gun (ZU-23, 23mm), heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 2-6km at directions ranging from east-south-east to south.

On the evening of 5 June, while in Debaltseve (non-government-controlled, 58km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard about 60 undetermined explosions, all 3-5km north-north-west. The following day, positioned on the eastern edge of Debaltseve, the SMM heard about 60 undetermined explosions, all 15-20km south-west.

On the evening of 5 June, while in Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 35 undetermined explosions and about 20 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 4-6km south-west.

The same evening, while in Donetsk city centre (non-government-controlled), the SMM heard 20 undetermined explosions 8-10km north-west.

During the day on 6 June, positioned on the western edge of Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk) for about five hours, the SMM heard about 60 shots of small-arms fire, all 1-1.5km south-west and west-south-west. The same day, positioned at the railway station in Yasynuvata for about four hours, the SMM heard an undetermined explosion and about 30 shots and bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 1-3km at directions ranging from south-west to north-west.

Positioned 1.6km south-south-east of Kamianka (government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard two undetermined explosions and 30 shots and bursts of infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-2) cannon (30mm), heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 1-7km at directions ranging from south-east to south-west.

While conducting a mini-UAV flight near Novoselivka Druha (government-controlled, 23km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard ten bursts of small-arms fire about 1km south-west of its position, assessed as directed at the UAV. The SMM immediately took shelter in and around its armoured vehicles. Shortly thereafter, the SMM landed the UAV without damage and left the area.*

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 50 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (three explosions).

During the day on 6 June, positioned in Obozne (non-government-controlled, 18km north of Luhansk), the SMM heard 30 undetermined explosions 20-25km north-west, assessed as part of live-fire training near Dmytrivka (government-controlled, 43km north of Luhansk) outside the security zone.

Positioned in Slovianoserbsk (non-government-controlled, 28km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 12 undetermined explosions 5-6km north-west and about 20 bursts of small-arms fire 2-3km south-south-east.

Positioned on the western edge of Novotoshkivske (government-controlled, 53km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard seven explosions assessed as impacts of mortar rounds, five explosions assessed as outgoing automatic grenade-launcher rounds and a burst of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 1.5-1.7km south-south-east.

Positioned 3km south of Muratove (government-controlled, 51km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard two explosions assessed as artillery rounds 2-2.5km south.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On the evening of 5 June, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded 23 projectiles in vertical flight 4-6km south (all assessed as outside the disengagement area).

During the day on 6 June, positioned in the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area and near the Petrivske disengagement area, the SMM observed calm situations.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas, on 4 June, an SMM long-range UAV spotted a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10, 120mm) on the eastern edge of Zaitseve (62km north-east of Donetsk). On 6 June, the SMM saw two stationary anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) at the railway station in Bakhmut (formerly Artemivsk, 67km north of Donetsk).

In non-government-controlled areas, on 4 June, an SMM long-rang UAV spotted a mortar (2B11 Sani, 120mm) south-west of Kalynove (60km west of Luhansk) and on 5 June, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted two tanks (T-64) parked between civilian houses in Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, 85km south of Donetsk) (see SMM Daily Report 10 April 2018). On 6 June, the SMM saw 13 stationary towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) east of Novooleksandrivka (75km south-east of Donetsk) (see SMM Daily Report 28 April 2018).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites in government-controlled areas, the SMM saw 14 tanks (T-64 BV) and three surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10), all stationary at the railway station in Bakhmut, and a tank (T-80) about 1km north of Mariupol (102km south of Donetsk).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. In non-government-controlled areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM noted that a towed howitzer (D-30) and 15 mortars (PM-38, 120mm) were again missing.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles (ACV)[2] in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 4 June, an SMM long-range UAV spotted three IFVs (BMP-2) within a residential area of Mykolaivka (57km north of Donetsk), five IFVs (BMP-1) near Novozvanivka (70km west of Luhansk), two IFVs (BMP-2) and an ACV (BMP variant) near Troitske (69km west of Luhansk) and two armoured personnel carriers (APC) (MT-LB and BTR-70) about 50m from houses in Vershyna (63km north-east of Donetsk). On 5 June, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted ten IFVs (one BMP-2 and nine BMP variants) near Novotoshkivske.

In non-government-controlled areas, on 4 June, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an APC (MT-LB) near Nadarivka (64km west of Luhansk), as well as an APC (MT-LB variant) and an artillery reconnaissance vehicle (PRP-4 Nard) near Veselohorivka (64km west of Luhansk). On 5 June, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted a probable ACV (type undetermined) near Verkhnoshyrokivske.

The SMM continued to observe mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO). On 5 June, an SMM mid-range UAV again spotted at least 100 anti-tank mines (TM-62) about 2km east of Novotoshkivske, in a field about 150m south of road T1303 (see SMM Daily Report 27 April 2018). The following day, the SMM observed a metal object, assessed as a 120mm mortar tailfin, covered by an overturned plastic crate wrapped with red tape on a road about 1km north-west of Pavlopil (government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol).

The SMM continued to monitor the security situation around the DFS. On the morning of 6 June, positioned on the western edge of Yasynuvata, the SMM saw three men in military-style clothing reinforcing positions surrounded by sandbags with shovels along the south-eastern side of road M04, about 1km south-east of the DFS. During the day, positioned in areas near the DFS, the SMM heard explosions and small-arms fire, despite explicit security guarantees (see above and the table below for ceasefire violations).

The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk).

The SMM visited two border areas not under government control. While at a border crossing point near Izvaryne (52km south-east of Luhansk) for 20 minutes, the SMM saw 13 pedestrians (men and women) exiting Ukraine and a bus (with Ukrainian licence plates) and a pedestrian (man in his sixties) entering Ukraine. After being present for ten minutes, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.* While at a border crossing point near Verkhnoharasymivka (57km south-east of Luhansk) for 30 minutes, the SMM saw 18 pedestrians (men and women, aged 30-35) entering Ukraine.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

 

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO, and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

 

Denial of access:

• Near Izvaryne at the border with the Russian Federation, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.

Related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by phone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[3]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by phone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.4
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. An armed formation member positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

 

Other impediments:

• An SMM long-range UAV was temporarily jammed while flying over areas near Debaltseve and Sofiivka (non-government-controlled, formerly Karlo-Marksove, 40km north-east of Donetsk).[4]
• While conducting a mini-UAV flight near Novoselivka Druha, the SMM heard ten bursts of small-arms fire 1km south-west, assessed as directed at the UAV. The SMM landed the UAV without damage and left the area.

 

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. The SMM cameras at the entry-exit checkpoints in Marinka and Pyshchevyk, as well as at Oktiabr mine were not operational during the reporting period.

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[3] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

[4] The interference could have originated from anywhere in a radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position.

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383502

Strengthening co-operation in the field of environmental and sustainable development in Central Asia was the focus of the 2018 OSCE International Business Forum on Green Technologies, organized by the OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Uzbekistan in co-operation with the State Committee of the Republic of Uzbekistan on Ecology and Environmental Protection and ITECA Exhibitions, on 5 and 6 June in Tashkent. 

The Forum, which was held concurrently with the Central Asian International Environmental Forum, which also included the First International Exhibition on Green Ecology Technologies in Central Asia, GETCA 2018, brought together over 200 participants from across the OSCE region, including private sector representatives, high-level government officials and representatives from embassies and international organizations. 

Over the course of two days, participants discussed sustainable mobility, waste and water management, renewable energy and energy efficiency. Throughout the proceedings, the focus was on specific technologies and economic models offering concrete ideas for the implementation of sustainable development initiatives in Central Asia. 

“The Project Co-ordinator in Uzbekistan supports capacity building for regulators and civil society on green economy strategies, including by exchanging best practices and creating platforms for discussion, and events like today’s Forum are an important part of that,” said Project Co-ordinator in Uzbekistan John MacGregor in his opening remarks.

Bakhrom Kuchkarov, Chairman of the State Committee on Ecology and Environmental Protection, said: “Today’s Forum gives us a chance to put into action our plans for sustainable development and moves us a step closer towards fulfilling the goals for sustainability as described in President Mirziyoyev’s decree On the Strategy of Actions to Further Develop Uzbekistan in Five Priority Areas for 2017-2021.”

The Forum was organized as part of the Project Co-ordinator’s project Support in Implementation of Green Economy Policies in Uzbekistan and is set to become an annual event. 

383628

The OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) facilitated the signing of an inter-agency protocol on addressing hate crime at an event on 6 June 2018 in Athens. It was organized in co-operation with the Ministry of Justice, Transparency and Human Rights of Greece. The document outlines obligations of various state institutions and other stakeholders, providing a legal basis for a co-ordinated effort to be launched against hate crimes in the country.

The ceremony was attended by the President of the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court Prosecutor, the Minister of Justice, Transparency and Human Rights Department, the Minister of Health, the Minister of Migration Policy, the Alt. Minister of Interior, the Director General of the National School of Judges and Vice-President of the Supreme Court. Representatives of the Racist Violence Recording Network and the Greek National Point of Contact for OSCE/ODIHR on Racist Crimes for Greece also participated.

Both the ceremony and the workshop that followed were held as part of ODIHR’s project Building a Comprehensive Criminal Justice Response to Hate Crime, with the aim of presenting the project’s achievements in Greece. Another objective of the event was to gather feedback from relevant stakeholders, including representatives of civil society, the national administration and international organizations working on hate crime-related matters in Greece. 

“ODIHR’s work in Greece focuses on three major elements: development of a national, inter-agency protocol on activities and policies to be implemented by relevant authorities and civil society to address hate crime; improving the database of hate crimes; and training prosecutors to enhance their ability to address hate crime. All of these activities form a comprehensive approach to hate crime that ODIHR is developing through this project,” said Cristina Finch, Head of the Tolerance and Non-Discrimination Department at ODIHR.

“The project, implemented in co-operation with ODIHR, demonstrates our determination to address hate crime by taking a comprehensive approach. All actors involved need to be alert and work in a co-ordinated manner to achieve this goal,” said Maria Giannakaki, Secretary General for Human Rights of the Greek Ministry of Justice.  

The lessons learned and best practices from Greece in drafting the inter-agency agreement will contribute to the development of a general toolkit, consisting of training packages, methodologies and guidelines on the topic of hate crime. The toolkit will become a useful resource in addressing hate crime for actors in criminal justice systems across the EU and the OSCE region.

 

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region, compared with the previous reporting period. Small arms were fired in the direction of an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) near Zaitseve and an SMM long-range UAV was jammed near Horlivka. The SMM followed up on reports of two civilian casualties, in Vozdvyzhenka and in an area close to the contact line. The SMM continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske; it recorded ceasefire violations near all three disengagement areas. The Mission’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas and was also restricted near Siedove, an area in Donetsk region near the border with the Russian Federation. The SMM monitored the security situation and successfully facilitated the access of Voda Donbassa water company employees to and from the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS), as well as of repair works to the DFS and demining activities around the station. Due to ceasefire violations registered in the area and the presence of explosive devices near the DFS, the Mission decided to suspend and review its facilitation of the physical access of DFS employees through enhanced SMM presence. It continued to monitor and facilitate repairs to the Petrivske pumping station in Artema.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations[1], including, however, fewer explosions (about 170), compared with the previous reporting period (about 180 explosions).

On the evening and night of 4-5 June, the SMM camera at the DFS (15km north of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, a projectile in flight from north-west to south-east, an illumination flare in vertical flight and a projectile from west to east, followed by totals of 24 undetermined explosions, one illumination flare in vertical flight and 138 projectiles (26 from east to west, 112 from west to east), all 1-4km south.

On the evening and night of 3-4 June, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, three undetermined explosions, five projectiles in flight from south-east to north-west and a projectile from south to north, followed by totals of 12 undetermined explosions and 330 projectiles (127 from south-east to north-west, 49 from north to south, 66 from south to north, 83 from north-west to south-east, one from north-east to south-west, one from south-west to north-east and three from east to west), all 1-2km east.

On the evening and night of 3-4 June, the SMM camera at Oktiabr mine (non-government-controlled, 9km north-west of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, two projectiles from west to east, seven projectiles from south to north and a projectile from east to west, followed by totals of two undetermined explosions, an illumination flare in vertical flight and 14 projectiles (one from north-west to south-east, 12 from south to north, and one from west to east), all 1-3km east and north-west.

On the evening and night of 4-5 June, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 57 undetermined explosions and about 920 shots and bursts of small-arms and heavy-machine-gun fire, all 3-5km south-south-east.

On the night of 4-5 June, while in Debaltseve (non-government-controlled, 58km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 16 undetermined explosions and three shots of small-arms fire, all 1-8km north-west and west-north-west.

Positioned at the DFS for about three hours, the SMM heard nine undetermined explosions and 13 bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 1-3km east and south-west.

Positioned about 1km north-west of the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk) for about two hours, the SMM heard 18 undetermined explosions and 11 shots and bursts of small-arms fire, all 1-4km north, west and south-west.

While conducting a mini-UAV flight in the western part of Zaitseve (government-controlled, 62km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard about 20 shots of small-arms fire, 50-70m south of its position. The SMM assessed that the shots had likely been aimed at the UAV. The SMM landed the UAV, which was undamaged. A few minutes later, two Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers approached the SMM and apologized for shooting at the SMM UAV. The SMM then departed the area.     

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations[2], including, however, more explosions (three explosions), compared with the previous reporting period (one explosion).

The SMM followed up on reports of two civilian casualties due to small-arms fire. In Luhanske (government-controlled, 59km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM spoke with a man (64 years old) with a bandage on his left hip. He told the SMM that he had been injured by a bullet on 28 May around 21:30 while he had been in the yard of his house at 96 Luhova Street in Vozdvyzhenka (government-controlled, 66km north-east of Donetsk), about 8km from the contact line. A Ukrainian Armed Forces representative of the JCCC told the SMM that a civilian with the same name and address had been wounded on 28 May. The deputy head doctor of a hospital in Svitlodarsk told the SMM that the man had been admitted to the hospital in the early morning hours of 29 May, received treatment for a bullet wound to his left hip and had been released on 30 May.

At the same hospital, a man (61 years old) told the SMM that he had been shot as he tried to cross the contact line on foot from the area around Debaltseve towards Svitlodarsk during ongoing fighting on the morning of 2 June. The SMM saw that he was in shock. Medical staff at the hospital told the SMM that the man had been admitted to the hospital on the afternoon of 2 June and had received treatment for an open displaced fracture of a bone in the lower part of his left leg, caused by a bullet which had penetrated and exited the bone. In Svitlodarsk, a police officer told the SMM that the man was a resident of the area around Debaltseve and had been admitted to the hospital on 2 June.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On the evening and night of 3-4 June, the SMM camera at the Prince Ihor Monument south-east of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk) recorded two undetermined explosions 4-8km north-north-east, as well as an illumination flare in vertical flight and 15 muzzle flashes 50-200m north and north-north-west (all assessed as outside the disengagement area). During the same evening, while on the eastern edge of Stanytsia Luhanska, the SMM heard six shots of heavy-machine-gun fire 3-5km south-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

On the night of 4-5 June, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded an undetermined explosion and six projectiles in flight (two from south to north and four from north-west to south-east), all 8-15km east (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

Inside the Zolote disengagement area, on 28 May, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted for the first time a footpath originating from the southern edge of the disengagement area (about 600m east of road T1316) and leading north-north-west along a tree line for about 900m, before turning west (for about 300m) and east (for about 200m). At the westernmost end of the footpath, the UAV spotted a newly dug trench about 40-metre-long.

Inside the Zolote disengagement area, the same UAV also spotted for the first time two rows of anti-tank mines: the first one about 600m north of the southern edge of the disengagement area and about 1km west of its eastern edge; the second one about 700m north from the southern edge of the disengagement area and 200m west of its eastern edge.

During the day on 5 June, positioned in Petrivske for about two and a half hours, the SMM heard 11 shots of small-arms fire 1-2km west (unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area).

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in government-controlled areas, on 5 June, the SMM saw two tanks (T-64) on a flatbed truck in the western outskirts of Pidhorodne (73km north of Donetsk) and a towed anti-tank gun (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) near Paraskoviivka (75km north of Donetsk).

The SMM revisited a permanent storage site whose location was beyond the respective withdrawal lines in a government-controlled area of Donetsk region and noted that the site continued to be abandoned and the following weapons were missing: 53 tanks (T-64) and seven mortars (five 2B9 Nona-S, 120mm, and two PM-38, 120mm).

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles and other indications of military-type presence in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 5 June, the SMM saw two armoured personnel carriers (APC) (BTR-80) near Voitove (33km north-west of Luhansk), and an armoured vehicle (unknown type) near Heorhiievka (27km south-west of Donetsk).

In non-government-controlled areas, on 3 June, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted two box-body military trucks (KamAZ-4310) with an antenna belonging to a TORN radio intelligence system near Debaltseve.

The SMM monitored the security situation and successfully facilitated the access of Voda Donbassa water company employees to and from the DFS, as well as of repair works to the DFS and demining activities around the station. Positioned in areas near the DFS, the SMM heard explosions and small-arms fire, despite explicit security guarantees (see above and the table for ceasefire violations). Approximately 1.2km north of the DFS on road H-20, the SMM continued to observe 25 anti-tank mines placed on the grass surface beside the eastern side of the road, and nine anti-tank mines in two rows on the western side of the road. (See SMM Daily Report 4 June 2018.) The SMM also saw for the first time a (probable 82mm) mortar tailfin sticking out of the asphalt on the eastern-side shoulder of the road. On 5 June, due to ceasefire violations registered in the area and the presence of explosive devices near the DFS, the SMM decided to suspend and review its facilitation of the physical access of DFS employees through enhanced SMM presence.

The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor repairs to the Petrivske pumping station in Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk).

The SMM visited a border area not under government control. While at a border crossing point near Novoazovsk (40km east of Mariupol) for about an hour, the SMM saw 22 cars (eight with Ukrainian, seven with Russian Federation and one with Lithuanian licence plates, as well as six with “DPR” plates) and two minivans (with Ukrainian licence plates) entering Ukraine. The SMM also observed 18 cars (six with Ukrainian, six with Russian Federation, and one with Polish licence plates, as well as five with “DPR” plates), one minibus (with “DPR” plates) and two cargo trucks (one with Ukrainian, and one with Russian Federation licence plates) exiting Ukraine.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO), and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (see, for example, SMM Daily Report 5 June 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a checkpoint about 1.2km north-west of Siedove (non-government-controlled, 33km north-east of Mariupol), near the border with the Russian Federation, four armed members of the armed formations denied the SMM access to the village, saying that a special operation was ongoing in the area and that the SMM needed to obtain permission from other members of the armed formations.

Related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by phone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[3]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by phone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.4
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. An armed formation member positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

Other impediments:

• An SMM long-range UAV was jammed for six minutes while flying over areas near Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk).[4]
• While conducting a mini-UAV flight near Zaitseve, the SMM heard about 20 shots of small-arms fire 50-70m south of the SMM’s position. The SMM landed the UAV, which was undamaged. A few minutes later, two Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers approached the SMM and apologized for shooting at the SMM UAV. The SMM then departed the area.   

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. The SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Marinka was not operational during the reporting period

[2] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

[3] The interference could have originated from anywhere in a radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position.

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VIENNA, 6 June 2018 - The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, today condemned the killing of journalist and videographer (or vlogger) Zachary Stoner, who was fatally shot on 30 May in Chicago, United States. Stoner published videos on his YouTube page called “zacktv1”, which has 170,000 videos and more than 180,000 subscribers. Stoner’s videos focused on the realities of life in his community and hip hop artists in Chicago.

“I am saddened by the murder of Zachary Stoner in Chicago. I urge the authorities to conduct a thorough and speedy investigation into his killing. This should include an investigation into whether his journalistic work was a reason for his murder,” Désir said. “Journalism is a far-reaching and multifaceted profession; it allows people to engage on sensitive and challenging experiences in society.”

Stoner was shot in the neck and head whilst he was driving along Clark Street in the South Loop neighbourhood of Chicago. He was taken to Northwestern Memorial Hospital in critical condition, but was declared dead at 4:20am on 30 May. 

The journalist had apparently received threats for his coverage of the death of a teenage girl, Kenneka Jenkins, in September 2017. Such threats, as well as the fact that his house had been broken into and his equipment had been stolen, made him decide against posting interviews related to the case until about two months after the threats.

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, twitter @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom.

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COPENHAGEN/BERLIN, 6 June 2018 – Registration is open for journalists interested in covering the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly’s 27th Annual Session, taking place 7-11 July at the Reichstag Building in Berlin.

Held under the theme “Implementing OSCE Commitments: The Role of Parliaments,” the Session will bring together some 300 parliamentarians from North America, Europe and Asia to debate and adopt resolutions on today’s most pressing challenges in the areas of security, human rights, economics and the environment.

Featuring high-level speeches and debates, the event will culminate in the adoption of the Berlin Declaration on 11 July. This document will contain recommendations to national governments, parliaments and the international community, providing policy input to the OSCE’s Ministerial Council later this year.

In addition to speeches by OSCE PA President George Tsereteli (MP, Georgia) and the Italian OSCE Chairmanship, keynote speeches are also expected by Dr. Wolfgang Schäuble, President of the German Bundestag, and Thomas Greminger, Secretary General of the OSCE.

High on the agenda will be issues such as counter-terrorism, climate change, migration, and access to education. Debates are expected in particular on the crisis in and around Ukraine, rising populism in Europe, protracted conflicts, the environmental impacts of war, and rebuilding trust in the OSCE area.

The Session is open to the media. Accreditation procedures for representatives of the media are explained here. Journalists are requested to register for the event by 27 June. For schedules, resolutions, live streaming during the event, press releases and other information, click here. Follow on Twitter: @oscepa #OSCEPABerlin2018.

 

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KYIV, 6 June 2018 – Ceasefire violations continue around the Donetsk Filtration Station in eastern Ukraine, says the Chief Monitor of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, Ertugrul Apakan.

“As is regularly outlined in SMM daily reports, the OSCE SMM is recording ceasefire violations on a daily basis, sometimes more than 100 violations a day in the wider DFS area. This places the women and men maintaining the plant and the unarmed SMM monitors facilitating their access in danger, and jeopardizes the operation of the plant itself, upon which over 300,000 civilians on both sides of the contact line depend for drinking water,” said Chief Monitor Apakan. “The Mission has also noted the presence of explosive devices on access roads to the facility.”

“In light of ongoing ceasefire violations by the sides, the Mission has been obliged to suspend and to review its enhanced presence at the facility,” the Chief Monitor said. He emphasized, however, that the OSCE SMM would, in line with its mandate, continue to monitor and report on the security situation in the wider DFS area, and would continue to facilitate security guarantees by the sides to enable access of DFS employees to the facility and the performance of other essential work related to the running of the facility.

 

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On 6 June 2018, the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) published the final report on the 18 March 2018 presidential election in the Russian Federation.  The report recommends that, in order to improve the electoral process, national legislation on fundamental freedoms and political, including candidates’ rights, be brought in line with OSCE commitments and other obligations, and that these rights and freedoms be fully respected by the authorities.

The report states that in order to increase public confidence in the electoral process efforts should be made to ensure election administration bodies are transparent, impartial and independent. 

It also recommends ensuring that all contestants in elections have equal opportunities and that restrictions on the right to be a candidate, which conflict with OSCE commitments and other international obligations and standards, should be removed. In addition, the report recommends that the authorities take decisive action to prevent voters from being pressured and investigate cases of alleged coercion, with a view to prosecuting those responsible.

The report recommends that media outlets should be free to establish their own editorial policies, and that the independence of public media should be strengthened. To that end, it recommends the creation of an independent body for media oversight.

The report notes that the legal framework for the presidential election is comprehensive, and recent amendments addressed some previous ODIHR recommendations. However, further efforts are needed to follow up on outstanding recommendations. For example, the report reiterates a previous recommendation that legislation should guarantee non-partisan citizen observers the opportunity to independently scrutinize the electoral process. 

The ODIHR Election Observation Mission joined efforts with the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly delegation to observe voting on election day.

 

Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

The OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) has released translations of five publications on different aspects of elections into six Western Balkan languages.

Three handbooks, entitled Follow-up of Electoral Recommendations, Observation of Voter Registration and Media Monitoring for Election Observation Missions, respectively, as well as two sets of guidelines, Reviewing a Legal Framework for Elections and Population Registration, have been translated into Albanian, Bosnian, Croatian, Montenegrin, Macedonian and Serbian.

"The translation of these publications not only makes them available to a broader audience, but also helps increase familiarity with ODIHR’s election observation methodology, and in doing so, enhances its transparency,” said Ingibjörg Sólrún Gísladóttir, Director of ODIHR. "This will help to facilitate the transfer of ODIHR expertise, tools and methodologies in order to support electoral reform efforts across the Western Balkans."

The translations were produced as part of the project Support to Elections in the Western Balkans, which is funded by the European Union and the Austrian Development Agency.

All OSCE participating States have committed themselves to following up promptly on ODIHR election assessments and recommendations. The translated publications build upon ODIHR’s existing support to participating States in following up on such recommendations.

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, compared with the previous 24 hours. The SMM observed fresh impact sites in Shyrokyne. The SMM continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske; it recorded ceasefire violations near the Zolote and Petrivske disengagement areas. The Mission’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas and was also restricted near Izvaryne, an area in Luhansk region near the border with the Russian Federation. The SMM saw weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line near Vodiane, Bohoiavlenka, Sentianivka and in Luhansk city. The SMM’s monitoring and facilitation of the access of Voda Donbassa water company employees to the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS), as well as demining activities near the DFS, was interrupted after the SMM heard ceasefire violations in nearby areas. The Mission continued to monitor and facilitate repairs to the Petrivske pumping station in Artema.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations[1], including about 180 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours (about 170 explosions).

On the evening and night of 3-4 June, the SMM camera at the DFS (15km north of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, a projectile in flight from west to east, eight projectiles from east to west and 15 projectiles from west to east, followed by totals of four explosions (one assessed as impact and the remainder undetermined), 73 projectiles (27 from east to west and 46 from west to east) and an illumination flare in vertical flight, all 0.2-2km south. The camera also recorded four projectiles from west to east, assessed as rounds of automatic grenade launcher, and their subsequent impacts 100-140m south (assessed as inside the DFS territory, on its south-western edge).

On the evening and night of 3-4 June, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, three projectiles in flight from south-west to north-east, an explosion assessed as outgoing and two projectiles from south-west to north-east, followed by totals of 246 projectiles (32 from north to south, 37 from north-west to south-east, 102 from south to north and 75 from south-east to north-west), 16 undetermined explosions and five illumination flares in vertical flight, all 1-4km east-north-east.

On the evening and night of 3-4 June, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard about 60 explosions (15 assessed as impacts, out of which three were assessed as impacts of mortar rounds; 12 assessed as outgoing, out of which four were assessed as outgoing mortar rounds; and the remainder undetermined), all 4-10km at directions ranging from east to south-west. The SMM also heard about 780 shots and bursts of small-arms and heavy-machine-gun fire, all 2-8km at directions ranging from east-south-east to south. During the day on 4 June, while at the same location, the SMM heard an undetermined explosion 3-5km south.

During the day on 4 June, positioned on the south-eastern edge of Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk) for about two and a half hours, the SMM heard about nine undetermined explosions 2-5km south-east and south. Positioned on the south-western edge of Avdiivka for about three hours, the SMM heard two undetermined explosions 4-6km south-east and south.

Positioned at the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk) for about five hours, the SMM heard two undetermined explosions 2-5km west-south-west and west. Positioned on the north-western edge of Yasynuvata for about three hours, the SMM heard about 15 undetermined explosions 1-3km at directions ranging from south-west to west. Positioned about 1km north-west of the railway station in Yasynuvata for about three hours, the SMM heard about 15 undetermined explosions and about 15 bursts and shots of small-arms and heavy-machine-gun fire, all 1-3km at directions ranging from south-west to north.

Positioned on road M04, about 400m west of Kruta Balka (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Donetsk), for about three and a half hours, the SMM heard about ten undetermined explosions 3km south-west.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations[2], including, however, fewer explosions (one), compared with the previous 24 hours (about five explosions).

During the day on 4 June, positioned 2km south of Muratove (government-controlled, 51km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard an undetermined explosion and about 200 shots of small-arms fire, all 1-10km south and south-west.

The SMM observed fresh impact sites in Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol). On 30 May, an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted fresh impact sites, including three destroyed buildings and six damaged buildings, as well as four craters in Shyrokyne. The SMM assessed them as caused by rounds of self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) fired from a north-easterly direction. Most of the impacts were located about 300m south of the centre of the town.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On the evening and night of 3-4 June, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded, in sequence, a projectile in flight from south-west to north-east and a projectile from west to east, followed by two projectiles in flight from north-west to south-east and a projectile from north-east to south-west, all 0.2-10km east (all assessed as outside the disengagement area). On 2 June, an SMM long-range UAV again spotted an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-1) and two armoured personnel carriers (APC) (an MT-LBS and a BTR-70) about 100-200m north of the disengagement area (see SMM Daily Report of 23 May 2018).   

During the day on 4 June, positioned 3km north of Petrivske for about half an hour, the SMM heard two undetermined explosions 4-9km north-west as well as 14 shots and bursts of small-arms and heavy-machine-gun fire 2km north-west (all assessed as outside the disengagement area). Positioned about 1km north of Petrivske for about ten minutes, the SMM heard two minutes of uncountable and overlapping explosions 2km west (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

During the day on 4 June, positioned in and near the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, the SMM observed a calm situation.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas, the SMM saw nine towed howitzers (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) and four anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) near Vodiane (42km south-west of Donetsk), as well as nine self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) near Bohoiavlenka (46km south-west of Donetsk). In non-government-controlled areas, on 2 June, an SMM long-range UAV spotted three mortars (2B11 Sani, 120mm) near Sentianivka (formerly Frunze, 44km west of Luhansk). On 3 June, an SMM-mini UAV spotted a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10) in a compound in Luhansk city.

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in a government-controlled area, on 2 June, an SMM mini-UAV spotted two surface-to-air missile systems (S-300) near Nikolske (formerly Volodarske, 97km south of Donetsk).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. In government-controlled areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM saw nine towed howitzers (2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm) and noted that 28 mortars (12 M120 Molot, 120mm, 15 2B11 and one BM-37 82mm), 119 towed howitzers (45 D-20, 152mm, 47 2A36, 18 2A65 and six D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm), 18 self-propelled howitzers (18 2S3) and 21 anti-tank guns (12 D-48, 85mm and nine MT-12) were again missing. It noted that six self-propelled howitzers (three 2S1 and three 2A65) were missing for the first time.

The SMM revisited a heavy weapons permanent storage site in government-controlled areas of Donetsk region and found the site abandoned and that 14 mortars (2B11) continued to be missing.

The SMM revisited a heavy weapons permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area in Luhansk region, whose location was beyond the respective withdrawal lines, and noted that seven towed howitzers (D-30) continued to be missing.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles and an anti-aircraft gun[3] in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 3 June, the SMM saw a military truck towing an IFV (BMP-2) near Trudivske (47km south of Donetsk), and an APC (BTR-3) parked near a house in Kyrylivka (26km north-east of Mariupol). On 2 June, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an IFV (BMP variant) and an APC (MT-LB) near Krymske (42km north-west of Luhansk), five reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-2) near Prychepylivka (50km north-west of Luhansk), five IFVs (two BMP-2 and three BMP-1) near Novotoshkivske (53km west of Luhansk) and two IFVs (BMP-2) near Troitske (69km west of Luhansk). On 3 June, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) and two IFVs (BMP-2) near Novhorodske (35km north of Donetsk), three APCs (two BTR-80 and one BTR-70) near Troitske (30km north of Donetsk), six IFVs (three BMP-1, one BMP-2 and two BMP variant) and an APC (MT-LB) near Troitske and an IFV (BMP-1) near Novoluhanske (53km north-east of Donetsk).

In non-government-controlled areas, on 2 June, an SMM long-range UAV spotted five IFVs (BMP-1) near Sentianivka as well as two IFVs (BMP-1) and two APCs (MT-LB) near Dovhe (22km north-west of Luhansk). On 3 June, an SMM mini-UAV spotted two APCs (BTR-80) in a compound in Luhansk city. On 3 June, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an IFV (BMP-1) near Sofiivka (formerly Karlo-Marksove, 40km north-east of Donetsk) and an APC (MT-LB) near Veselohorivka (64km west of Luhansk). On 4 June, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted an APC (MT-LB) near Lukove (72km south of Donetsk).

The SMM observed the presence of anti-tank mines. On 2 June, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted for the first time ten anti-tank mines laid across a road 6km south-west of the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk. On 3 June, an SMM mini-UAV again spotted nine anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid in a row across the western carriageway of road H21 approximately 700m north-west of the junction between road H21 and a road leading to Obozne (non-government-controlled, 18km north of Luhansk). The same UAV again spotted 30 anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid in seven rows on road H21, about 1.7km north-west of the aforementioned junction, and 42 anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid in three rows across road H21 about 200m south-east of the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk).

The SMM observed mine hazard signs and demining activities. The SMM saw about ten people wearing demining suits (including helmets and face shields) and vehicles of an international demining organization in a field marked with mine hazard signs (red square with “Mines!” written in Cyrillic) beside a road north-west of Sartana (government-controlled, 15km north-east of Mariupol) (see SMM Daily Report of 26 March 2018). On the northern outskirts of Nikishyne (non-government-controlled, 60km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM saw a Kamaz truck and three people carrying a metal detector in a field (marked with white tape) 20m west of the road running north from Nikishyne to the junction with roads M03 and E50 (see SMM Daily Report of 2 June 2018).

The SMM’s monitoring and facilitation of the access of Voda Donbassa water company employees to the DFS was interrupted due to ceasefire violations and presence of mines. On 4 June, on two occasions, the SMM continued to facilitate mine clearance conducted by demining teams of the armed formations of road H20 up to the access road to the DFS. On both occasions, positioned within a radius of 5km from the DFS, the SMM heard undetermined explosions and small-arms fire (see ceasefire violation section above), despite explicit security guarantees, and left the area.

The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor repairs to the Petrivske pumping station in Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk).

The SMM visited three border areas not under government control. While at a border crossing point near Izvaryne (52km south-east of Luhansk) for about five minutes, the SMM saw 45 cars (26 with Ukrainian, 14 with Russian Federation and one with Belarusian licence plates, as well as four with “LPR” plates) and 60 pedestrians (men and women, aged 40-60) in a queue to exit Ukraine. A member of the armed formations then told the SMM to leave the area.*

While at a border crossing point near Sievernyi (60km south-east of Luhansk) for about half an hour, the SMM saw five pedestrians (three women and two men, aged 30-50) entering Ukraine.

While at a border crossing point near Marynivka (78km east of Donetsk) for about half an hour, the SMM saw 31 cars (18 with Ukrainian, five with Russian Federation and one with Georgian licence plates, as well as seven with “DPR” plates) and two covered cargo trucks (one with Ukrainian licence plates and one with “DPR” plates) exiting Ukraine. The SMM saw four cars (two with Ukrainian and two with Russian Federation licence plates) entering Ukraine.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO), and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a border crossing point near Izvaryne, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.

Related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by phone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by phone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.5
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. An armed formation member positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.
• The SMM did not travel north on a road leading towards Shchastia due to the possible presence of mines. A member of the armed formations told the SMM that only limited demining activities had taken place in the area during the previous week. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

Other impediments:

• In Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), an SMM interlocutor told the SMM that she could not provide the SMM with information about civilian casualties without written permission from a senior “DPR” member.

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. The SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Marinka was not operational during the reporting period.

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[3] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

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ISTANBUL, 5 June 2018 – Ignacio Sanchez Amor (MP, Spain), the Special Co-ordinator of the short-term OSCE observer mission to the early parliamentary and presidential elections taking place in Turkey later this month, today wrapped up a visit to Istanbul where he has met with representatives of political parties, NGOs, analysts, and journalists.

The two-day visit also included a meeting with HDP’s presidential candidate Selahattin Demirtaş in Edirne’s high security prison and a visit to Edirnekapi Cemetery, where Sanchez Amor paid respects to those who lost lives during the attempted coup of July 2016.

“Over the past two days, I have met many dedicated men and women who share a desire for a democratic and prosperous Turkey. Candidates, journalists, election officials, activists and Turkish citizens from all walks of life all want to see Turkey succeed, and it is with them in mind that we will conduct a professional and fair-minded election observation mission of these early presidential and parliamentary elections,” Sanchez Amor stated.

He noted that the issue of security and media were of concern among several of his interlocutors, and issues to which election observers should pay close attention.

Meetings were held with representatives of the Justice and Development Party, Republican People’s Party, Nationalist Movement Party, People’s Democratic Party, Good Party and the Patriotic Party. Topics of discussion included the state of emergency that has been in force in Turkey since 2016.

Sanchez Amor also discussed with his interlocutors the general election environment including any challenges that exist to campaigning, campaign activities both inside and outside of Turkey, and the climate for journalists and election observers. He urged all stakeholders to refrain from any forms of violence or intimidation ahead of the elections.

As Special Co-ordinator, Sanchez Amor leads the OSCE’s short-term observation mission to the elections. He will deliver the international observers’ preliminary post-election statement on 25 June in Ankara. Peter Osusky (MP, Slovakia) will serve as the Head of Mission for the 60 OSCE PA observers.

The OSCE parliamentarians will participate in comprehensive briefings before deploying to polling stations in several regions for election day. They will work closely with observers from the OSCE/ODIHR and in co-ordination with colleagues from the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE).

The mission will assess the elections against democratic commitments contained in the OSCE’s 1990 Copenhagen Document.

For more information about the OSCE PA’s election monitoring work, please click here.

For photos of Sanchez Amor's pre-electoral visit, please visit our Flickr page.

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This report is for the media and the general public.

SUMMARY

Kamensk-Shakhtinskiy, Russian Federation. The Observer Mission (OM) continues to operate 24/7 at both Border Crossing Points (BCPs). The overall number of border crossings by persons decreased at both BCPs.

OPERATIONAL REMARKS

The OM is currently operating with 20 permanent international staff members, including the Chief Observer (CO). The Mission is supported administratively by a Vienna-based staff member.

OBSERVATIONS AT THE BORDER CROSSING POINTS

Persons crossing the border                                                                                                                                                                                         

The profile of the people crossing the border can be categorized as follows:

1. Adults travelling on foot or by car with little or no luggage;

2. Persons in military-style outfits;

3. Families (often including elderly people and/or children) travelling on foot or by car with a significant amount of luggage.

The average number of entries/exits decreased slightly from 11,482 to 11,452 per day for both BCPs compared to last week. The average net flow for both BCPs went from plus 213 (i.e., more entries into the Russian Federation) to minus 68 (i.e., more exits from the Russian Federation).

The Donetsk BCP continues to experience more traffic than the Gukovo BCP. The cross-border movements registered at both BCPs accounted for 35.6 per cent of all entries/exits in Rostov region[1].

Persons in military-style outfits                                                                                                                                        

During the reporting period, the number of persons in military-style outfits crossing the border in both directions was 55 at both BCPs compared to 58 last week; 25 of them crossed into the Russian Federation, 30 into Ukraine. Approximately 93 per cent of this category’s crossings occurred at the Donetsk BCP. They continued to cross the border individually or in groups. Most individuals crossed by foot, however, some made use of private vehicles, buses or minivans, making it more difficult for the observer teams (OTs) to observe their movement across the border, especially since some of the private vehicles have tinted windows, and buses and minivans have drawn curtains.

Families with a significant amount of luggage

The OTs continue to report on families crossing the border, sometimes with elderly people and/or children, at both BCPs with a significant amount of luggage, or travelling in heavily loaded cars. During this reporting week, two families were observed crossing to the Russian Federation and another four were observed crossing to Ukraine, compared to the previous reporting period when no such families were observed crossing the border.

Bus connections                                      

Regular local and long-distance bus connections continue to operate between Ukraine (mostly from/to the Luhansk region) and the Russian Federation. In addition to regular bus connections, the OTs continued to observe bus connections on irregular routes. Often the buses do not state their route; instead they have a sign on the windshield stating “irregular”.

During the reporting period the OTs observed 414 buses crossing the border at both BCPs (compared to 417 observed during the previous week), 214 of them were bound for the Russian Federation and 200 for Ukraine.

Among the bus connections observed by the OTs, the following “irregular” routes or destinations were noted: Kyiv; Stakhanov-Kyiv; Sevastopol and Rovenky-Kyiv.

On some occasions, the OTs noticed the bus drivers removing the itinerary signs from the windshields of their buses, while some buses do not display their route at all. The majority of long-distance buses commuting between the Luhansk region and cities in the Russian Federation have Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region.

Trucks

During the reporting period the OM observed a decrease in the number of trucks crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs. Compared to the previous week, the total number of trucks went from 955 to 948 (306 at the Gukovo BCP and 642 at the Donetsk BCP); 555 of these trucks crossed into the Russian Federation and 393 crossed into Ukraine. Most of the trucks observed by the OTs had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region.                                                                                          

Among them, the OTs continued also to observe tanker trucks crossing the border in both directions. During the reporting week, the number of tanker trucks slightly decreased from 64 to 63(compared to the previous reporting period). These trucks were observed crossing the border at both BCPs. The trucks had the words “Propane” and “Flammable” written across the tanks in either Russian or Ukrainian. The majority of tanker trucks have hazard signs, indicating that they are transporting propane or a mix of propane with butane.

All trucks undergo systematic inspection by Russian Federation officials, which may include an X-ray check. Due to the unfavourable position at the Gukovo BCP, the OTs continued to be unable to observe any X-ray checks. At the Donetsk BCP the OTs observed 132 X-ray checks: out of the total number of trucks scanned during the reporting period, 90 trucks (68 per cent) were bound for Ukraine; the remaining 42 trucks (32 per cent) crossed into the Russian Federation.

Minivans

The OM continued to observe passenger and cargo minivans[2] crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs. The OTs observed minivans predominantly with Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, the OTs also frequently saw minivans registered in the Russian Federation.

As compared to the previous week, the number of cargo minivans decreased from 190 to 169; 82 crossed into the Russian Federation and 87 into Ukraine.

Trains

The OTs continued to pick up the sound of trains running on the railway tracks located approximately 150 metres south-west of the Gukovo BCP. During the reporting week, the OTs heard trains on 31 occasions, compared to 30 last week; the OTs assessed that 16 trains were travelling to the Russian Federation and 15 to Ukraine. The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine was regularly informed about the trains bound for Ukraine.

Visual observation was not possible because of the line of trees located between the train tracks and the BCP.

Other observations

The majority of vehicles crossing the border had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region or Russian Federation licence plates. In addition, the OTs also observed vehicles registered in Georgia and Lithuania. A number of vehicles with “LPR” and “DPR” plates were also observed crossing the border in both directions.

On 30 May at 14:00 the OT at the Donetsk BCP observed an ambulance with “LPR” licence plates crossing the border from Ukraine to the Russian Federation. Later the same day at 16:50 the same ambulance was observed crossing back to Ukraine. Only the driver was observed inside.

For trends and figures at a glance covering the period from 24 May to 29 May 2018, please see the attachment here.

[1] Based on data received from Rostov-on-Don region Border Guard Service

[2] Cargo minivans: light commercial vehicles with a maximum authorized mass of more than 3.5 t and not more than 7.5 t; with or without a trailer with a maximum mass of less than 750 kg (small cargo vehicles which correspond to driving licence C1).                       

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383526 Communication and Media Relations Section

Some 20 representatives of law enforcement agencies from Belarus and the Russian Federation began an OSCE Secretariat-organized five-day training course, from 4 to 9 June 2018 in Minsk, on developing co-operation among law enforcement agencies in digital forensics and network investigations in combating drug-related and other crimes.

The course aims at introducing police investigators to the basics of digital forensics and to train them in using open source digital forensics software to identify, analyse, obtain and preserve relevant digital evidence and use it for prosecuting drug-related and other crimes.

 “Digital forensics and open sources investigations are gaining importance as the Internet and its resources are more and more used for criminal activities, including for trafficking in illicit drugs and psychotropic substances,” said Andrey Saladovnikov, Deputy Head of the Main Directorate for Drug Control and Combating Trafficking in Human Beings of the Criminal Police of Belarus. “Law enforcement agencies should focus their activities on tackling these modern challenges and continue gaining experience, building up capacities and exchange best practices with other countries in this domain.”

The course is organized by the Strategic Police Matters Unit (SPMU) and the Co-ordination Cell of the OSCE Transnational Threat Department with the support of Belarus’ Interior Ministry.

Rasa Ostrauskaite, the OSCE Secretariat’s Co-ordinator of Activities to Address Transnational Threats, said that in order to more effectively investigate cybercrimes, including those related to Internet use, law enforcement agents need to apply more sophisticated techniques and methods, such as digital forensics and open sources investigations.

“OSCE experts, in co-operation with other relevant organizations, are ready to assist national experts in tackling new challenges and threats by promoting best practices and applicable international standards, as well as by facilitating training of personnel and strengthening the capacities of OSCE participating States,” said Ostrauskaite.

383538 Ioanna Lachana, OSCE Mission to Skopje Mirvete Islam, OSCE Mission to Skopje

More than 100 students, teachers, and representatives of civil society and the international community gathered on 5 June 2018 in Skopje for an event of a project sponsored by the OSCE-supported grants programme, the Building Bridges Fund, aimed at increasing interaction among students of different communities.

Children and youth from different communities who attend the Institute for Rehabilitation of Children and Youth, the Rajko Zhinzifov primary school and the M Educational Center participated in different research activities, learning about the ecology and nature preservation, the importance of diversity and strong relationships.

“It was great to see such a diverse and enthusiastic group of young people, including children with disabilities, making friends across the lines that divide them,” said the Acting Head of OSCE Mission to Skopje, Jeffrey Goldstein. ”Without dedicated teachers and school administrators, this project couldn’t have happened. This is why the Building Bridges Fund will continue to award grants to schools and kindergartens with different languages of instructions throughout 2018 and 2019,” he said.

Netherlands Ambassador Wouter Plomp said that appreciation and acceptance of differences is a prerequisite for a strong and prosperous society. “We are happy that the Netherlands has supported this project that brings together children of different ethnic and religious backgrounds. The bridges they have built can be a learning example for all of us.”

Biljana Sterjadovska Stojcevska, Project Manager, said: “The students learned to take care of themselves, as well as of the others, to take chances and risks, to co-operate and to lend a supporting hand to their fellow students regardless of the language they speak.”

“I am glad that the Building Bridges Fund made it possible for us to meet new friends,” said a student Angel Angelov. “We had a great time together and I hope that similar activities will be organized in the future.”

The open call for the 2018 and 2019 grants, funded by contributions from the Netherlands and the governments of Austria, the United States, and Italy, can be downloaded from the website of the Ministry of Education and Science at http://www.mon.gov.mk/index.php/2014-07-23-14-03-24/vesti-i-nastani/2250-grantovi-za-zaednichki-aktivnosti-gradime-mostovi

 

 

Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

While finding that the 4 March 2018 parliamentary elections in Italy were conducted in a professional manner and characterized by a high level of public confidence in the election administration, the final report by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) recommends that existing regulations be codified in electoral legislation to ensure legal certainty and coherence, and that shortcomings noted in this and previous reports be addressed well in advance of the next elections.

The report, published on 6 June 2018, praises special arrangements to facilitate voting for persons with physical disabilities. However, it also notes that such arrangements were not made for persons with intellectual disabilities. It recommends that the election legislation be harmonized with the objectives of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities

The report assesses campaign finance regulations as generally satisfactory, but notes that the oversight system is not effective in ensuring transparency, integrity and accountability. It recommends enhancing oversight, including by assigning a body with the mandate, adequate powers and resources to lead pro-active and efficient supervision, investigation and enforcement of regulations.

Highlighting that the parliament’s jurisdiction over the validity of the election of its own members raises concerns about potential conflicts of interest, the report calls on the authorities to explicitly provide for the legal right to appeal election results to a court as the final authority, as well as to define adequate time limits for all election-related complaints.

Noting a discrepancy in the number of votes needed to be elected, particularly to the Senate and for the out-of-country constituency, the report recommends adhering more closely to the electoral quota for all constituencies, in line with international good practice concerning the equality of the vote, without prejudice to the protection of minorities.

The report notes that some previous ODIHR recommendations have been addressed. It also affirms the ODIHR’s readiness to support Italy in its continued efforts to bring electoral legislation and practice in greater compliance with OSCE commitments.

VIENNA, 4 June 2018 – OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media Harlem Désir today expressed his concern that the Spokesperson of the General Prosecutor of Ukraine published a list, which includes journalist Miroslava Gongadze and Chair of the National Union of Journalists of Ukraine Sergiy Tomilenko, accusing them of being traitors.

“The publishing of a list including names of journalists, accusing them of being traitors, is unacceptable and dangerous. This can have serious repercussions for the safety of journalists,” Désir wrote in a letter to the authorities. “I strongly encourage the authorities to intervene and suspend such practices, especially those undertaken by government officials, given the sensitive and difficult environment in Ukraine at the moment.” 

On 30 May, following an announcement by law enforcement that the death of journalist Arkady Babchenko was staged as part of a special operation, the Spokesperson of the General Prosecutor of Ukraine posted on her Facebook page a list of people, including Gongadze and Tomilenko, whom she named as traitors for their criticism of the state regarding journalists’ safety and impunity for crimes against media in the country. 

“Journalists and media must be able to express their opinions openly and freely. Labelling those with critical voices as traitors put them at great risk, and it must not be tolerated,” Désir added.

 

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COPENHAGEN, 5 June 2018 – Chair of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly’s Ad Hoc Committee on Migration Nahima Lanjri raised concerns today over reports in the United States that young migrant children are being separated from parents trying to cross the U.S.-Mexico border, as well as recent news that nearly 1,500 migrant children are unaccounted for in the U.S. due to lax monitoring by the federal government.

Noting that the U.S. government has been separating children from their families and placing them in foster care or in shelters while their parents are held at detention centers awaiting court dates, Lanjri, a member of the Belgian parliament, recalled relevant obligations under international law.

“The controversial practices by the U.S. government of separating children from relatives threaten to undermine international norms that enshrine the right to family unity and call for the best interests of the child to be the primary consideration in all actions concerning children,” she said. “This practice furthermore inflicts additional trauma on children who are already in an extremely vulnerable situation and who depend on their family members for emotional, psychological and material support.”

Lanjri called upon the U.S. and other governments to not only refrain from such practices but to take steps to prevent the separation of children and their relatives at border controls and during any other procedures.

She also raised concerns over recent reports that the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services had lost track of 1,475 unaccompanied migrant children who had crossed the U.S.-Mexico border. The children had been placed with adult sponsors in the United States but are now unaccounted for.

“Safeguards, including detailed background checks on potential sponsors and regular follow-up calls, must be put into place to ensure that unaccompanied migrant children are not trafficked or abused, remain with their sponsors, attend school and show up at their court dates,” Lanjri said.

Ad Hoc Committee member Sheila Jackson Lee, a member of the U.S. Congress from Texas, reiterated concerns over the monitoring of migrant children in the United States, noting that it is unacceptable that the department responsible for them cannot account for their whereabouts. “This crisis is not just an immigration matter nor is it just a foreign policy matter; it is a humanitarian crisis,” she said.

The topic of migration and unaccompanied migrant children will feature high on the agenda of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly’s upcoming Annual Session in Berlin. Last year in Minsk the OSCE PA adopted a resolution on “Ensuring a coherent, shared and responsible governance of migration and refugee flows,” which included a number of recommendations with respect to unaccompanied and separated minors.

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