OSCE

This report is for the media and the general public.

On the morning of 16 August, an SMM patrol consisting of five SMM members and two armoured vehicles was positioned on the north-eastern edge of Holmivskyi (non-government-controlled, 49km north-east of Donetsk). The patrol was part of two patrols, positioned on both sides of the contact line in order for both patrols to facilitate and monitor adherence to the ceasefire for repairs of a powerline by Voda Donbassa and maintenance to an SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk). Three SMM patrol members were outside the vehicles and the two others were inside. A member of the armed formations, armed with an automatic rifle, and a Voda Donbassa worker were speaking to the SMM, while two other armed members of the armed formations (also with automatic rifles) and two Voda Donbassa workers were in a van parked nearby. At 09:14, the three patrol members outside the vehicles heard an undetermined explosion approximately 500m north and another undetermined explosion about 500m south-south-east, followed by about ten shots of small-arms fire 100-150m north and north-west, two of which were assessed as flying over the heads of the three patrol members who were outside the vehicles.

The patrol got into their vehicles immediately and left the area and later returned safely to its forward patrol base in Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk). The armed man and Voda Donbassa worker boarded the van, which departed the area. The SMM notified the Ukrainian Armed Forces side of the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination and the armed formations about the incident and requested follow-up.

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This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region, compared with the previous reporting period. Small-arms fire was assessed as directed at an SMM unmanned aerial vehicle near Berezivske. The SMM observed military positions and a recently extended trench inside the Petrivske disengagement area. Its access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas, near Starolaspa and Zolote-2/Karbonit, and again near Zaichenko. The SMM observed a weapon in violation of withdrawal lines near Sopyne. The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station, as well as repairs and maintenance works to critical water infrastructure in Luhansk region.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations[1], including a similar number of explosions (about 105), compared with the previous reporting period.

On the evening of 14 August, the SMM camera east of Lomakyne (government-controlled, 15km north-east of Mariupol) recorded 31 explosions assessed as impacts of artillery rounds 4-6km east-north-east.

During the evening and night of 14-15 August, the SMM camera 1km south-west of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol) recorded 66 projectiles in flight, 21 muzzle flashes, a burst and an illumination flare, all 2-4km at directions ranging from north-east to south-south-east.

During the same evening and night, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk) recorded four undetermined explosions, 73 projectiles in flight, three of which were assessed as rocket-propelled grenades (RPG), three bursts, two illumination flares and a muzzle flash, all 0.1-5km at directions ranging from north-east to south-south-east.

During the same evening and night, the SMM camera in Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk) recorded seven explosions assessed as airbursts, eight undetermined explosions, 83 projectiles in flight, an illumination flare in vertical flight and six muzzle flashes, all 2-4km at directions ranging from east-south-east to south-west.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including 20 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 70 explosions).

On the evening of 14 August, while in Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, non-government-controlled, 50km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard six undetermined explosions 5-7km north-north-east.

On 15 August, positioned in Myrne (non-government-controlled, 28km south-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard eight undetermined explosions 9-10 km south, assessed as live-fire training outside the security zone.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement areas and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk)[2], as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On 14 August, inside the Petrivske disengagement area, an SMM mid-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted a 40m-long extension of a trench (not visible in imagery from 7 July 2018) which protrudes 5m into the disengagement area from its northern edge 300m from its eastern edge, assessed as belonging to the armed formations. It spotted again military positions approximately 1km south from the area’s northern edge and 1.9km east from its western edge, assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces. (For previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 21 May 2018.) The UAV also again spotted 36 anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid in four rows on the road between Bohdanivka (government-controlled, 41km south-west of Donetsk) and Viktorivka (non-government-controlled, 42km south-west of Donetsk), about 170m north of the Petrivske disengagement area (see SMM Daily Report 10 July 2018).

Positioned near the Stanytsia Luhanska and Zolote disengagement areas, the SMM observed a calm situation.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in a government-controlled area, the SMM saw a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10) north of Sopyne (16km east of Mariupol).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in non-government-controlled areas, aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed on 11 August the presence of 30 tanks (types undetermined) in a training area near Kruhlyk (31km south-west of Luhansk); five tanks (types undetermined), seven probable self-propelled howitzers (or mortars) and a towed howitzer (or mortar) in a training area near Shymshynivka (27km south-west of Luhansk); and 23 tanks (types undetermined) and 25 pieces of towed artillery (types undetermined) in a training area near Myrne.

The SMM revisited a heavy weapons permanent storage site in an area of Luhansk region outside government control whose location corresponded with the withdrawal lines and noted that seven towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) were again missing.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles[3] and a recently extended trench in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 6 August, an SMM mini-UAV spotted two armoured personnel carriers (a BTR-70 and a MRAP) near the entry-exit checkpoint near Novotroitske (36km south-west of Donetsk). On 14 August, an SMM mini-UAV spotted a recently dug trench, about 200m in length, near a road 1.5km north of Novooleksandrivka (65km west of Luhansk).

On 14 August, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted that over half of the total number of residential buildings in the Chyhari area of Pivdenne (government-controlled, 40km north-east of Donetsk) had been either destroyed by impacts of rounds from undetermined weapons or burnt down by fire. In Chyhari, the same UAV spotted several military positions consisting of networks of trenches connecting houses as well as underground bunkers. The UAV also spotted two destroyed minibuses (with a capacity of approximately 20-30 passengers) outside two burnt-down buildings. (For previous observations in the area, see SMM Daily Report 8 June 2018 and SMM Daily Report 27 June 2018.)

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire. Positioned in areas near the station, the SMM heard ceasefire violations, despite explicit security guarantees (see the table below).

The SMM also continued to facilitate and monitor repairs and maintenance works to a water pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk); water distribution infrastructure near Novotoshkivske (government-controlled, 53km west of Luhansk), Zolote and Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk); and to a water channel junction near Stanytsia Luhanska.

On 14 August, the SMM visited a border area outside government control. While at a border crossing point near Marynivka (78km east of Donetsk) for about an hour, the SMM saw 27 cars (15 with Russian Federation, eight with Ukrainian and one with Georgian licence plates, and three with “DPR” plates) entering Ukraine. At the same time, it saw 39 cars (17 with Russian Federation, 16 with Ukrainian and one with Georgian licence plates, and five with “DPR” plates), six covered cargo trucks (one with Ukrainian and one with Russian Federation licence plates, and four with “DPR” plates,) and a minibus (with “DPR” plates and about 15 people on board) exiting Ukraine.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Coordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 15 August 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a checkpoint 800m north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations again stopped the SMM and denied it passage westward to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol), from where the SMM has been receiving reports on civilian casualties.
• At a checkpoint 2km north-east of Starolaspa (non-government controlled, 51km south of Donetsk), two armed members of the armed formations denied the SMM access to the village, citing “an ongoing exercise of troops”.
• At a checkpoint on the eastern edge of Zolote2/Karbonit (government-controlled, 62km west of Luhansk), the SMM was not allowed to pass after it had refused to disclose the nationalities of the patrol members to two Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that he had no information about demining activities in the disengagement area. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by telephone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.5
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

Other impediments:

• While conducting a mini-UAV flight near Berezivske (non-government-controlled, 53km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard six bursts of small-arms fire where the UAV was flying, 1.7-2km north-west of the SMM’s position, assessed as aimed at the UAV. The SMM landed the UAV safely and departed the area.
• An SMM long-range UAV experienced multiple losses of signal, assessed as due to jamming, while flying over areas near Novopelahiivka (non-government-controlled, 30km east of Donetsk) and near Khartsyzk (non-government controlled, 26km east of Donetsk).[5]

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] Due to presence of mines, including those on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited; thus, the review of the camera footage may take place days later.

[3] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

[5] The interference could have originated from anywhere in a radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position.

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PODGORICA, 16 August 2018 – Wrapping up his first visit to the region as the OSCE PA’s Special Representative on South East Europe today, Mark Pritchard (United Kingdom) underlined the Assembly’s continued commitment to engagement on democracy, the integrity of electoral processes, rule of law, stability and security, human rights, and media freedom. In Albania, he urged speedy completion of justice reform to ensure functioning judicial safeguards and called attention to the rise of nationalist forces in the region.

Pritchard, who also serves as Head of the UK Delegation to the OSCE PA, visited Albania on Monday and Tuesday, and was in Montenegro Wednesday and Thursday. Meeting with government representatives and leaders of opposition parties, Pritchard urged political forces in both countries to come to agreements regarding the most urgent steps in the electoral reform process. In Albania, he noted that this is especially important in order to address the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights’ priority recommendations before local elections next year.

“As my first activity as the Assembly’s Special Representative on South East Europe, this week’s visit to Albania and Montenegro and to both OSCE field presences has been useful in becoming fully acquainted with the key actors here,” Pritchard said. “While the visit has been mostly fact-finding in character, I have also used the opportunity to underline the valuable contributions made by both countries to international Euro-Atlantic activities and to reiterate previous concerns raised by the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, including by my predecessor Roberto Battelli.”

He added: “I look forward to visiting other countries in South East Europe as soon as possible and continuing the Parliamentary Assembly’s commitment to full engagement with the region.”

He highlighted recent visits to the region by members of the OSCE PA Ad Hoc Committee on Countering Terrorism, who were in Bosnia and Herzegovina on 5-8 June, and the Ad Hoc Committee on Migration, who were in Serbia on 10-12 June.

In Albania, Pritchard met with Vasilika Hysi, Deputy Speaker of the Assembly, Deputy Prime Minister Senida Mesi, members of the OSCE PA delegation, representatives from various political parties and from civil society. He also met with Robert Wilton, Acting Head of OSCE Presence in Albania, for a discussion on areas of common concern and how to best develop synergy between the PA and the field presence.

In Montenegro, meetings were held with Ambassador Maryse Daviet, Head of the OSCE Mission to Montenegro; Veljko Milonjić, General Director of the General Directorate for Economic and Cultural Diplomacy; and Emil Atanasovski, Regional Director of the Westminster Foundation for Democracy, as well as other representatives of the international community in Montenegro. Programme Managers of the OSCE Mission to Montenegro briefed Pritchard on the Mission’s various areas of work.

In meetings with interlocutors in Podgorica, Pritchard congratulated Montenegro for progress along its European Union accession track and encouraged authorities to tackle previous recommendations by the ODIHR stemming from its 2016 and 2018 reports.

During his visit, Pritchard was accompanied by Amb. Andreas Nothelle, the OSCE PA’s Special Representative in Vienna.

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On 14 - 16 August 2018, the OSCE Mobile Training Team delivered an interactive course on identifying foreign terrorist fighters for officers of Turkmenistan’s border and migration services in Ashgabat. The deployment of the Training Team was organized by the Border Security and Management Unit of the OSCE Transnational Threats Department, with the support of the OSCE Centre in Ashgabat and in close co-operation with the host country.

Eighteen officers from border and migration services of Turkmenistan, including one female officer from the aviation security service, took part in the event. They were trained on regional and national legal frameworks, the effective use of Interpol databases, risk analysis and management in the identification of potential foreign terrorist fighters at borders, in compliance with international human rights standards.

“Identification, current location and flow of returning foreign terrorist fighters remain an absolutely critical priority for international community nowadays,” said the Officer-in-Charge at the OSCE Centre in Ashgabat, Natasa Rasic,. “To better detect foreign terrorist fighters we need to improve border screening, check passenger data, collect biometrics, and share information. We hope that the course helped the trainees to learn techniques that will enable them to quickly identify suspects and criminals on their daily duties in border security, law enforcement and immigration.”

The importance of risk analysis models applied to identify potential foreign terrorist fighters at the borders, as well as trends and current cases were discussed during the course. Participants also engaged in practical exercises on the detection of forged documents and impostors. Interactive exercises to deepen their understanding of behavioral indicators of foreign terrorist fighters were also part of the training. The participants received eighteen magnifiers to use for identifying forged documents.

Sessions were conducted by members of the OSCE Mobile Training Team from the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Georgia, Romania and Ukraine as well as experts from INTERPOL, the United States of America and the OSCE.

The OSCE Mobile Training Team was established by the Border Security and Management Unit of the OSCE Transnational Threats Department in 2016. It is composed of seventeen selected border and counter-terrorism experts from OSCE participating States and Partners for Co-operation.

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, compared with the previous reporting period. The SMM followed up on reports of an injured girl in Katerynivka. The SMM’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas, in Oleksandrivske and again near Zaichenko, Bezimenne, and Novoazovsk, near the border with the Russian Federation.* The SMM observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line. The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station, as well as repairs and maintenance works to critical water infrastructure near Artema, Obozne, Novotoshkivske and Zolote-5/Mykhailivka, as well as near Stanytsia Luhanska.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations[1], including about 100 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 200 explosions).

During the evening and night of 13-14 August, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded about 30 undetermined explosions, about 170 projectiles in flight and two muzzle flashes, all 0.5-5km in directions ranging from south to south-west.

During the evening of 13 August, the SMM camera in Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk) recorded 14 undetermined explosions, two muzzle flashes and 13 projectiles in flight, all 2-4km in directions ranging from east-south-east to south-east.

On 14 August, positioned about 1km north-west of the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard ten undetermined explosions and about 25 shots and bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 2-6km in directions ranging from south-south-west to north-west.

During the evening of 13 August, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk) recorded 30 explosions (27 airbursts and three undetermined), about 80 projectiles in flight, two bursts and nine illumination flares, all 2-4km in directions ranging from north-east to east-south-east.

On the evening of 13 August, while in Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard three undetermined explosions, heard and saw about four bursts and saw 90 bursts, all of anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) fire, all 4-7km in directions ranging from west to north-north-west.

On the evening of 13 August, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard an undetermined explosion and about 150 shots and bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 4-5km south-east.

During the evening and night of 13-14 August, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol) recorded 11 undetermined explosions, about 90 projectiles in flight, two muzzle flashes and an illumination flare, all 2-5km in directions ranging from north-north-east to south.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 70 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 470 explosions).

Positioned on the north-western edge of Sentianivka (formerly Frunze, non-government-controlled, 44km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 55 undetermined explosions and 200 shots of small-arms fire, all 2.5-6km north.

The SMM followed up on reports of an injured girl. On 10 August, at the Children’s Regional Hospital in Lysychansk (government-controlled, 75km west of Luhansk), the SMM spoke with a girl (16-17 years old) with burns, cuts and scratches on the left side of her face, as well as bandages on her left arm and left leg. She told the SMM that on 8 August she had been in a car near Katerynivka (government-controlled, 64km north-west of Luhansk) when it had been hit by a projectile. Doctors told the SMM that she had blast and shrapnel-related injuries and that she had been admitted on the evening of 8 August. On 11 August, an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted two burned vehicles (a station wagon and a small truck) on a dirt road about 1.5km north-east of Katerynivka and burned grass nearby. Near the vehicles, the SMM mini-UAV spotted a 2.5m tall cross and bouquets of flowers at the base of the cross. The SMM could not determine the cause of the vehicles burning.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk)[2], as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

Positioned in the Stanytsia Luhanska and Zolote disengagement areas, the SMM observed calm situations. Positioned in Bohdanivka (government-controlled, 41km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM observed a calm situation in the nearby Petrivske disengagement area.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas, on 6 August, an SMM mini- UAV spotted three probable self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) near Vidrodzhennia (66km north-east of Donetsk) (see SMM Daily Report 3 August 2018.) On 14 August, the SMM observed ten self-propelled howitzers (2S1) at the railway station in Kostiantynivka (60km north of Donetsk) as well as a truck transporting a towed howitzer (D-20, 152mm) moving north-west near Kostiantynivka.

In violation of withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas, on 13 August, an SMM long-range UAV again spotted six multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) at a compound east of Khrustalnyi (formerly Krasnyi Luch, 56km south-west of Luhansk)) and eight MLRS (BM-21) in a compound in the centre of Khrustalnyi,  as well as seven MLRS (BM-21) south of Sadovyi (57km south-west of Luhansk) and four self-propelled howitzers (2S1) south-east of Ternove (57km east of Donetsk). (For previous observations see SMM Daily Report 1 August 2018 and SMM Daily Report 13 August 2018.) The same day, an SMM mini-UAV spotted a probable MLRS (BM-21) south of Bohdanivka (44km west of Luhansk). On 14 August, an SMM mini-UAV spotted three probable towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) near Novohryhorivka (33km west of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in government-controlled areas, on 13 August, an SMM mini-UAV spotted eight MLRS (BM-21) west of Peredove (68km south-west of Donetsk). On 14 August, the SMM observed a tank (T-64) south-west of Kurakhove (40km west of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in non-government-controlled areas, on 13 August, an SMM long-range UAV spotted 18 towed howitzers (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) in one compound and a tank (T-64) in a separate compound – both east of Khrustalnyi – an anti-tank gun (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) near Rovenky (54km south of Luhansk), ten self-propelled howitzers (2S1), 12 towed howitzers (D-30), three surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10) and 11 tanks (T-64) south of Sadovyi; 16 tanks (type undetermined) in Manuilivka (65km east of Donetsk) and 34 tanks (type undetermined) south-east of Ternove. On 14 August, the SMM observed two tanks (T-64) on flatbed trailers traveling south-west of Nahirne (44km south of Luhansk).

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles and an anti-aircraft gun[3] in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 13 August, an SMM long-range UAV spotted two infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP-2) north of Shumy (41km north of Donetsk), and an SMM mini-UAV spotted an IFV (BMP-1) near Orikhove (26km north-east of Donetsk). On 13 August, the SMM observed a self-propelled anti-aircraft gun (ZSU-23-4 Shilka) and an armoured personnel carrier (MT-LB) near Sopyne (16km east of Mariupol).

In non-government-controlled areas, on 13 August, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted a probable IFV (BMP-1) near Bila Kamianka (51km south of Donetsk).

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire. Positioned in areas near the DFS, the SMM heard ceasefire violations, despite explicit security guarantees (see table below).

The SMM also continued to facilitate and monitor repairs and maintenance works to water systems near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), Obozne (non-government-controlled, 18km north of Luhansk), Novotoshkivske (government-controlled, 53km west of Luhansk) and Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk), as well as to a water channel junction near Stanytsia Luhanska.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Coordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a checkpoint 800m north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations again stopped the SMM and denied it passage westward to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) and southward to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol).
• At a checkpoint 2.5km west of Bezimenne (non-government-controlled, 30km east of Mariupol), three armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage.
• At a border crossing point near Novoazovsk, two armed members of the armed formations again told the SMM they could not proceed, citing an “ongoing operation in the area”.
• A member of the armed formations stopped the SMM south-east of Oleksandrivske (formerly Rozy Liuksemburgh, non-government-controlled, 90km south-east of Donetsk) and said it could not proceed due to an “ongoing exercise”.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO: 
• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that he had no information about demining activities in the disengagement area. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by telephone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.5
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

[1]     Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[2]     Due to presence of mines, including those on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited; thus, the review of the camera footage may take place days later.

[3]    This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4]     The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

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CHISINAU, 15 August 2018 – The OSCE Mission to Moldova expresses its concern regarding the river-crossing military exercise conducted in the Security Zone by the Operational Group of Russian Forces on 14 and 15 August.

In accordance with its mandate, the OSCE Mission deployed its team to the area of the Security Zone on 14 and 15 August, but the team was obstructed from fully monitoring the exercises. In compliance with the Principles of Co-operation between the Joint Control Commission (JCC) and the OSCE Mission to Moldova from 2004, the Mission shared its observations with all the delegations to the JCC through the established channels.

According to the Agreement on Principles of a Peaceful Settlement of the Armed Conflict in the Transdniestrian Region of the Republic of Moldova from 21 July 1992, military exercises in the Security Zone are required to be authorized by the JCC, which was not done in this instance. The Mission reports its findings to the participating States of the OSCE, including the host country, through the established channels.

The OSCE Mission urges all parties involved in the fulfilment of the 1992 Agreement on Principles of a Peaceful Settlement to fully respect its provisions and the regime of the Security Zone, as well as the relevant JCC decisions and regulations. This is in the interest of all parties. 

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This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and a sharp increase in Luhansk region, compared with the previous reporting period. A member of the armed formations pointed his rifle at an SMM patrol near Smile. The SMM assessed that small-arms fire was directed at its unmanned aerial vehicle near Holubivske. The SMM observed damage caused by shelling near residential areas of Donetskyi. The SMM’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas and again near Zaichenko, Bezimenne and Voznesenivka, near the border with the Russian Federation.* The SMM observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line. The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station, as well as repairs and maintenance works to critical water infrastructure near Obozne, Novotoshkivske and Zolote-5/Mykhailivka, as well as in Stanytsia Luhanska.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations[1], including about 200 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 60 explosions).

During the evening of 12 August, the SMM camera 1km south-west of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol) recorded 12 undetermined explosions, about 160 projectiles in flight and five illumination flares in vertical flight, all 2-4km east, east-south-east and south-east.

During the evening and night of 12-13 August, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Pyshchevyk recorded nine undetermined explosions, 220 projectiles in flight and an illumination flare in vertical flight, all 3-5km in directions ranging from east-south-east to south.

During the same evening and night, the SMM camera 1km south-west of Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) recorded eight undetermined explosions and about 100 projectiles in flight, all 1-6km north, north-north-east and north-east.

During the same evening and night, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk) recorded 11 undetermined explosions, two illumination flares in vertical flight and about 50 projectiles in flight, all 2-4km in directions ranging from north-north-east to east-south-east.

While in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk) on the evening of 12 August, the SMM heard 52 undetermined explosions and about 150 shots and bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 4-5km south-east and south-west.   

While in Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk) on the evening of 12 August, the SMM heard about 80 undetermined explosions and about 125 shots and bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, as well as heard and saw about 80 bursts of anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) fire, all 2-6km north and in directions ranging from south-west to north-west.  

Positioned near Berezove (government-controlled, 31km south-west of Donetsk) during the day on 13 August, the SMM heard seven undetermined explosions and heard and saw four explosions assessed as impacts, all 1-3km east and south-east.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded a sharp increase in ceasefire violations, including about 470 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (20 explosions).

Positioned near Kalynove-Borshchuvate (non-government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) for about one hour and 15 minutes, the SMM heard over 260 undetermined explosions and about 150 shots and bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire about 10km west-south-west, as well as 20 undetermined explosions and about 15 bursts of fire from undetermined weapons 3-5km west.  

Positioned on the southern edge of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk), for about five minutes, the SMM heard about 20 explosions assessed as mortar rounds (15 as impacts and five as outgoing) and 25 bursts of small-arms fire, all 1.5-5km south-south-east and south. About five minutes later, the SMM was positioned on the south-western edge of Popasna for about 40 minutes and heard about 100 explosions assessed as mortar rounds (50 as impacts and 50 as outgoing) and 75 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 5-10km south-south-east.

While in Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, non-government-controlled, 50km west of Luhansk) on the evening of 12 August, the SMM heard about 60 undetermined explosions 10-14km north-north-west.

The SMM observed damage caused by shelling near residential areas of Donetskyi (non-government-controlled, 49km west of Luhansk). On 12 August, an SMM mini-unmanned-aerial-vehicle (UAV) spotted damage on the roof of a non-functional school building (not visible in imagery from 17 June 2018) (see SMM Daily Report 12 June 2018).

A member of the armed formations pointed his rifle at the SMM outside a compound near Smile (non-government-controlled, 31km north-west of Luhansk)(see SMM Spot Report 13 August 2018). As two SMM patrol members walked to the compound’s gate to meet with a member of the armed formations, one of 15 men present (seven armed) positioned himself next to a truck, 4m from the SMM, and disengaged the safety off his rifle (AK-variant). The man watched the SMM vehicles for the rest of its stay. When the SMM was leaving, the man dropped to his knee, pointing the rifle toward the departing SMM vehicles from about 5m away. The patrol arrived safely at its base in Luhansk city.

While conducting a UAV flight near Holubivske (non-government-controlled, 51km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 12 shots of small-arms fire 0.6-1km north-west of its position, assessed as aimed at the UAV. The SMM landed the UAV, which was undamaged, and then departed the area.     

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk)[2], as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in a government-controlled area, on 11 August, an SMM mini-UAV spotted four self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) about 160m from a non-functional school and residential buildings near Tarasivka (43km north-west of Donetsk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 14 June 2018).

In violation of withdrawal lines in a non-government-controlled area, on 12 August, an SMM mini-UAV again spotted three mortars (type undetermined) south of Donetskyi (see SMM Daily Report 28 July 2018).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in a government-controlled area, on 11 August, an SMM mini-UAV spotted a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10) about 80m from a non-functional school  and residential buildings near Tarasivka (see above).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. The SMM revisited three heavy weapons holding areas in government-controlled areas of Donetsk region, whose locations were beyond the respective withdrawal lines and noted that 28 mortars (15 2B11 Sani, 120mm; 12 M-120-15 Molot, 120mm; and one BM-37, 82mm), 23 self-propelled howitzers (2S1), 24 towed howitzers (18 2A65 Msta-B, 152mm and six D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) and 13 anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) remain missing.                                     

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles[3] in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 11 August, an SMM long-range UAV spotted nine armoured personnel carriers (APC) (one BTR-60 and the remainder BTR 70 and BTR-80) near Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk), two infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) (BMP variant) south-east of Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk), an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) near Nevelske (18km north-west of Donetsk), an APC (BTR-70) near Krasnohorivka (21km west of Donetsk) and an IFV (BMP-1) moving north near Taramchuk (29km south-west of Donetsk).

On 11 August, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted two new firing positions and two trench extensions totalling about 160m (not visible from imagery on 1 June 2018), assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces, as well as fresh damage to a shed assessed as from 152mm artillery about 4km south-east of Avdiivka.

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS), including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire. Positioned in areas near the DFS, the SMM heard ceasefire violations, despite explicit security guarantees (see table below).

The SMM also continued to facilitate and monitor repairs and maintenance works to water systems near Obozne (non-government-controlled, 18km north of Luhansk),   Novotoshkivske (government-controlled, 53km west of Luhansk) and Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), as well as to a water channel junction and fibre-optic cable near Stanytsia Luhanska.

The SMM visited border areas outside government control. While at a border crossing point near Dovzhanske (84km south-east of Luhansk) for about 25 minutes, the SMM saw six cars (four with Ukrainian and one with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as one with “LPR” plates), a truck (open cargo with timber) with Ukrainian licence plates and three women and two men entering Ukraine. The SMM also saw 12 cars (five with Ukrainian, three with Russian Federation and one with Georgian licence plates, as well as two with “LPR” and one with “DPR” plates) exiting Ukraine. 

While at a border crossing point near Voznesenivka (formerly Chervonopartyzansk, 65km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw 25 cars (13 with Ukrainian, six with Russian Federation and one with Georgian licence plates, as well as three with “LPR” and two with “DPR” plates) queuing to exit Ukraine. After five minutes, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

At the Chervona Mohyla railway station near Voznesenivka, the SMM saw about 100 carriages, all stationary on railcars, designated for transporting coal.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Coordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a checkpoint 800m north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations again stopped the SMM and denied it passage westward to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) and southward to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol).
• At a checkpoint 2.5km west of Bezimenne (non-government-controlled, 30km east of Mariupol), three armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage.
• At a border crossing point near Voznesenivka, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that he had no information about demining activities in the disengagement area. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by telephone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.5
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.
• The SMM did not travel north towards the bridge near governmentcontrolled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk) due to the possible presence of mines. A member of the armed formations said that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours.

Conditional access:

• At a checkpoint in Horlivka, while the SMM attempted to pass towards Maiorsk, a member of the armed formations wearing a militarystyle uniform again allowed the SMM to proceed only after inspecting the SMM patrol vehicle trunks.
• Approximately 45 minutes after the abovementioned restriction, while the SMM attempted to pass back through the same checkpoint towards Horlivka, two members of the armed formations wearing militarystyle uniforms demanded to inspect the contents of the SMM patrol vehicles trunks, as well as open up boxes. The SMM opened the trunks but did not open the boxes, and the patrol was delayed by members of the armed formations for three hours before it was allowed to pass. During the delay, a member of the armed formations who introduced himself as “the commander” told the SMM that all cars passing through the checkpoint must have their trunks and boxes checked due to an “order”. While attempting to notify the JCCC of the situation, an SMM staff member was threatened by the “commander” to end the call or risk confiscation of the phone due to prohibition of phone usage at the checkpoint.  

Other impediments:

• Near Holubivske, while conducting a miniUAV flight, the SMM heard small-arms fire 0.6km-1km north-west, assessed as aimed at the UAV. The SMM landed the UAV safely and departed the area. 

[1]    For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

*   Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2]    Due to presence of mines, including those on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited; thus, the review of the camera footage may take place days later.

[3]    This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4]    The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

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This report is for the media and the general public.

SUMMARY

Kamensk-Shakhtinskiy, Russian Federation. The Observer Mission (OM) continues to operate 24/7 at both Border Crossing Points (BCPs). The overall number of border crossings by persons increased at both BCPs compared to the previous week.

OPERATIONAL REMARKS

The OM is currently operating with 21 permanent international staff members, including the Chief Observer (CO). The Mission is supported administratively by a Vienna-based staff member.

OBSERVATIONS AT THE BORDER CROSSING POINTS

Persons crossing the border                                                                                                                                                                                      

The profile of the people crossing the border can be categorized as follows:

1. Adults travelling on foot or by car with little or no luggage;
2. Persons in military-style outfits;
3. Families (often including elderly people and/or children) travelling on foot or by car with a significant amount of luggage.

The average number of entries/exits increased from 12,341 to 12,999 per day at both BCPs compared to last week[1].

During the reporting period, the majority of border crossings occurred into the Russian Federation, with an average net flow of plus 100 for both BCPs.

The Donetsk BCP continued to experience more traffic than the Gukovo BCP.

Persons in military-style outfits

During the reporting period, the number of persons in military-style outfits crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs increased to 66 persons (compared to 32 last week); 31 of them crossed into the Russian Federation, and 35 into Ukraine (42 per cent of this category’s crossings occurred at the Donetsk BCP). They continued to cross the border individually or in groups. Most individuals crossed on foot, however, some made use of private vehicles, buses or minivans, making it more difficult for the observer teams (OTs) to observe their movement across the border, especially since some of the private vehicles have tinted windows, and buses and minivans have drawn curtains.

Families with a significant amount of luggage

The OTs continued to report on families crossing the border, sometimes with elderly people and/or children, at both BCPs with a significant amount of luggage, or travelling in heavily loaded cars. During this reporting week, six families were observed crossing into the Russian Federation and another eight into Ukraine, compared to the previous reporting period when seven families were observed crossing the border into the Russian Federation and another three into Ukraine.

Bus connections                                        

Regular local and long-distance bus connections continued to operate between Ukraine (mostly from/to the Luhansk region) and the Russian Federation. In addition to regular bus connections, the OTs continued to observe bus connections on irregular routes. Often the buses do not state their route; instead they have a sign on the windshield stating “irregular”.

During the reporting period the OTs observed an increase in the number of buses crossing the border at both BCPs (505 compared to 468 observed during the previous week). There were 266 buses bound for the Russian Federation and 239 bound for Ukraine.

Among the bus connections observed by the OTs, the following “irregular” routes or destinations were noted: Kyiv; Stakhanov-Sevastopol, Luhansk-Simferopol, and Luhansk-Kyiv.

On some occasions, the OTs noticed the bus drivers removing the itinerary signs from the windshields of their buses, while some buses do not display their route at all. The majority of long-distance buses commuting between the Luhansk region and cities in the Russian Federation have Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region.

Trucks

During the reporting period the OM observed an increase in the overall number of trucks crossing the border in both directions and at both BCPs. Compared to the previous week, the total number of trucks went from 807 to 830 (237 at the Gukovo BCP and 593 at the Donetsk BCP); 471 of these trucks crossed into the Russian Federation and 359 crossed into Ukraine. Most of the trucks observed by the OTs had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region.                                                                                     

Among them, the OTs also continued to observe tanker trucks crossing the border in both directions. During the reporting week, the number of tanker trucks increased to 95 (compared to 53 during the previous reporting period). These trucks were observed crossing the border at both BCPs. The trucks had the words “Propane” and “Flammable” written across the tanks in either Russian or Ukrainian. The majority of tanker trucks had hazard signs, indicating that they were transporting propane or a mix of propane and butane.

All trucks undergo systematic inspection by Russian Federation officials, which may include an X-ray check. Due to the unfavourable observation position at the Gukovo BCP, the OTs continued to be unable to observe any X-ray checks.

Compared to the previous week, the total number of X-ray checks at the Donetsk BCP slightly increased from 116 to 118: out of the total number of trucks scanned, 79 trucks (67 per cent) were bound for Ukraine; the remaining 39 trucks (33 per cent) crossed into the Russian Federation.

Minivans

The OM continued to observe passenger and cargo minivans[2] crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs. The OTs observed minivans predominantly with Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, the OTs also frequently saw minivans registered in the Russian Federation. As compared to the previous week, the number of cargo minivans decreased from 176 to 165 vehicles; 76 crossed into the Russian Federation and another 89 into Ukraine.

Trains           

The OTs continued to pick up the sound of trains running on the railway tracks located approximately 150 metres south-west of the Gukovo BCP. During the reporting week, the OTs heard trains on 26 occasions, compared to 30 last week; the OTs assessed that 13 trains were travelling to the Russian Federation and the rest of same number to Ukraine. The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine was regularly informed about the trains bound for Ukraine.

Visual observation was not possible because of the line of trees located between the train tracks and the BCP.

Other observations

The majority of vehicles crossing the border had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region, or Russian Federation licence plates. A significant number of vehicles with “LPR” plates were also observed crossing the border in both directions on a daily basis, as were vehicles with Belarusian and Lithuanian licence plates. 

During the reporting week, the OTs at the Donetsk BCP observed two ambulances. On both occasions, (7 and 11 August respectively) the ambulances had Russian Federation licence plates and entered the BCP from the Russian Federation side and parked close to the BCP’s main building. On one occasion two medical staff were observed getting out of an ambulance and entering the BCP’s main building. After a short stay and without crossing the border to Ukraine, both vehicles were observed returning to the Russian Federation. No other observation was made.

On 7 August at 09:38, the OT at the Donetsk BCP observed a Ritual Service van with Ukrainian licence plates and sign “Funeral Service” written in Russian. Two persons were observed in the van. Later, on the same day at 12:19 the same van was observed crossing back to the Ukraine direction.

On 12 August at 07:50, the OT at the Donetsk BCP observed the arrival of 24 motorbikes accompanied by four vehicles from the Russian Federation side at the customs control area. While undergoing border formalities performed by the Russian Federation officials, the OT observed two persons dressed in Cossack uniform and flags of some countries hung on the rear sides of the motorbikes; the OT observed French, Russian and “DPR” flags. After border checks, they all departed in the direction of Ukraine.  

For trends and figures at a glance covering the period from 3 July to 7 August 2018, please see the attachement here.

[1] Based on data received from the Regional Representation of the the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation.

[2] Cargo minivans: light commercial vehicles with a maximum authorized mass of more than 3.5 t and not more than 7.5 t; with or without a trailer with a maximum mass of less than 750 kg (small cargo vehicles which correspond to driving licence C1).

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From 10 to 14 August 2018 the OSCE Programme Office in Astana and the Embassy of Kazakhstan in Poland co-organized a study visit to Warsaw for four representatives of the National Centre for Human Rights (Ombudsman’s Office).

Head of the National Centre for Human Rights Serik Ospanov led the delegation which studied effective tools and best practices in handling citizens’ complaints submitted to the Ombudsperson institution in Poland.

The Deputy Commissioner for Human Rights (Ombudsman) of Poland, Hannah Makhińska, presented information on the mandate, duties, legal framework, working principles, as well as existing challenges in her institution’s activities. Participants exchanged experiences with their counterparts from the Department for the National Preventive Mechanism and Department for Equal Treatment. They discussed issues of countering torture and ill-treatment, discrimination and hate speech.

The delegation also met with representatives of the Foreign Ministry, members of the Polish Sejm (lower chamber of parliament), academia and non-governmental organizations, including the Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights.

In order to get acquainted with the National Preventive Mechanism against torture activities in Poland, the delegation of Kazakhstan participated in a monitoring visit to a detention facility in Warszawa-Białołęka. Senior representatives of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR) met with the delegation to discuss issues of legislative development of National Human Rights Institutions, gender and diversity mainstreaming in the OSCE participating States on the last day of the visit.

The study visit is part of the Programme Office’s long-standing activities to support national human rights institutions in the host country.

This report is for the media and the general public.

At 10:50 on 13 August, an SMM patrol consisting of five members and two armoured vehicles arrived at a logistical compound on the western edge of Smile (non-government-controlled, 31km north-west of Luhansk). The SMM saw two stationary covered cargo trucks (KAMAZ) outside the compound and 15 men, seven of whom were armed (AK variants), standing between the trucks and the compound’s gate. Two patrol members stepped out of the SMM vehicles and walked to the compound’s gate to meet with a member of the armed formations there. At the same time one of the trucks left. When the two SMM patrol members were passing the other stationary truck, on their way to the gate, one of the men (in his forties) positioned himself next to that truck, about four metres from the SMM vehicles, and disengaged the safety of the rifle (AK-variant) he was holding close to his body at a waist level. The man watched the SMM vehicles for the rest of its stay. At 11:03, when the SMM was leaving the area, it saw the man dropping on his knee and pointing the rifle towards the departing SMM vehicles. At that time the vehicles were approximately five metres from him. The patrol arrived safely at its base in Luhansk city at 12:02.

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This report is for the media and the general public.

Between the evenings of 10 and 11 August, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region compared with the previous reporting period. Between the evenings of 11 and 12 August, the SMM again recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region compared with the previous 24 hours. The SMM observed the bodies of two men, one who appeared to be deceased, at separate checkpoints near the contact line. The SMM observed an armed man inside the Zolote disengagement area and ordnance disposal activity in the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area. Its access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas and again near Zaichenko, Bezimenne and Novoazovsk, near the border with the Russian Federation.* The SMM observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line. It also observed hundreds of crates of ammunition and rockets at a compound in Khrustalnyi. The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station as well as repairs and maintenance works to critical water infrastructure in Obozne.

In Donetsk region, between the evenings of 10 and 11 August, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations[1], including, however, more explosions (about 90), compared with the previous reporting period (about 70 explosions). Between the evenings of 11 and 12 August, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 60 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours.

On the evening and night of 10-11 August, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded an incoming explosion and two projectiles in flight, all 100-500m west-south-west, as well as about 60 undetermined explosions and about 180 projectiles in flight, all 0.5-3km at directions ranging from east to south-west.

On 11 August, positioned near Lebedynske (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM heard 21 undetermined explosions at undetermined distances north-north-east, five shots of small-arms fire 1km east and another shot of small-arms fire at an undetermined distance east.

On the evening and night of 11-12 August, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard about 20 explosions and about 280 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 3-10 kilometres east-south-east, south-east, south-west and north-east.

In Luhansk region, between the evenings of 10 and 11 August, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, compared with the previous reporting period. Between the evenings of 11 and 12 August, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including 20 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours. All 20 explosions were heard between 01:40 and 02:00 on 12 August while in Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, non-government-controlled, 50km west of Luhansk), 12-16km north-north-west.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk)[2], as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On 11 August, in Katerynivka (government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk), inside the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM saw an armed man in a military uniform.

The same day, in the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, the SMM observed that no civilians were present in the area between the Ukrainian Armed Forces and armed formation checkpoints and that an explosive ordnance disposal team of the Ukrainian Armed Forces had entered the disengagement area. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer later told the SMM that the disposal team had removed a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) tailfin attached to a plastic bottle that had been painted to look like an RPG.

In the evening of 11 August, while in Stanytsia Luhanska, the SMM heard four shots of small-arms fire 3-4km east, assessed as outside the disengagement area.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas, an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) again spotted six multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) in a compound north of Khrustalnyi (formerly Krasnyi Luch, 56km south-west of Luhansk) on 10 August, which were not seen earlier during the day when an SMM mini-UAV flew over the same area (for SMM mini-UAV observations from the same day and area, see below). On 11 August, the SMM saw four MLRS (BM-21) near Novoamvrosiivske (56km east of Donetsk).

In government-controlled areas, the SMM saw 14 towed howitzers (D-20, 152mm) and six MLRS (BM‑21) in Kostiantynivka (60km north of Donetsk) on 10 August and a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10) north of Sopyne (101km south of Donetsk) on 12 August.

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in a non-government-controlled area, on 10 August, an SMM mini-UAV spotted in total 18 towed howitzers (eight 2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm and ten 2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) in the abovementioned compound north of Khrustalnyi (for previous observations see SMM Daily Report 1 August 2018). About 1km north-west, at another compound, the same SMM mini-UAV spotted an artillery reconnaissance vehicle (PRP-4 Nard) and 775 ammunition crates (some of which were assessed as new), as well as 118 crates of MLRS (BM-21) rockets.

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. At three such sites in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region, the SMM verified the presence of 19 towed howitzers (13 D-30 Lyagushka,122mm and six 2A65) and five self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm). It noted that the following weapons remained missing: two towed howitzers (D-30) and two self-propelled howitzers (2S1).

The SMM revisited permanent storage sites whose locations were beyond the respective withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region and noted that 21 tanks (11 T-64 and ten T-72) were again missing.                            

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles and anti-aircraft weapons[3] in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on the night of 10 August, an SMM long-range UAV spotted two infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP variants) north-east of Hladosove (51km north-east of Donetsk), an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) mounted in the rear of a truck near Vershyna (63km north-east of Donetsk) and an IFV (BMP-1) near Novoluhanske (53km north-east of Donetsk). The following day, the SMM saw a tracked armoured combat vehicle (undetermined variant) in Troitske (69km west of Luhansk) and an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) in Popasna (69km west of Luhansk). On 12 August, the SMM saw an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (MT-LB) in Trokhizbenka (32km north-west of Luhansk), a self-propelled anti-aircraft system (ZSU-23-4 Shilka, 23mm) near Sopyne and an APC (BTR-80) near Berezove (31km south-west of Donetsk).

The SMM observed demining activities. Near Nikishyne (non-government-controlled, 60km north-east of Donetsk), on 11 August, the SMM observed – at a distance – eight people wearing protective clothes with “MChS” written on them (in Cyrillic) appearing to dig in a marked mine field. Near government-controlled Berezove, on 12 August, the SMM observed seven sappers of the Ukrainian Armed Forces conducting demining activities along road H-20. The SMM observed the de-miners retrieve an unused 152mm artillery shell.

The SMM observed the bodies of two men lying on the ground, one who appeared to be deceased, at two separate checkpoints near the contact line. On 11 August, at the entry-exit checkpoint in Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM observed the body of a man (in his sixties) who appeared to be deceased lying on the asphalt while pedestrians and vehicles passed through the checkpoint less than 5m away. An officer of the Ukrainian State Border Guard Service told the SMM that the man had been travelling via bus toward non-government-controlled areas and that he had died after disembarking from the bus at the checkpoint, about an hour before the SMM arrived. On the same day, approximately 200m west of a checkpoint of the armed formations south of Kreminets (non-government-controlled, 16km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM observed a woman in a uniform with “MChS” written on the back in Cyrillic performing chest compressions on a man (in his sixties) lying on the road between cars waiting to pass the checkpoint.

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire. Positioned in areas near the DFS, the SMM heard ceasefire violations, despite explicit security guarantees (see above and the table below).

The SMM also continued to facilitate and monitor repairs and maintenance works to a water pipe near Obozne (non-government-controlled, 18km north of Luhansk) on 12 August.

The SMM continued monitoring in Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report of 8 August 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• On 9 August, at a crossing point near Chaplynka (90 km south east of Kherson), a member of the Ukrainian State Border Guard Service told the SMM it could not enter the crossing point, saying the SMM lacked “proper written communication.”
• On 11 August, at a checkpoint 800m north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), an armed member of the armed formations again stopped the SMM and denied it passage westward to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) and southward to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol).
• On 11 August, at a checkpoint 2.5km west of Bezimenne (non-government-controlled, 30km east of Mariupol), three armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage.
• On 11 August, at a checkpoint near Novoazovsk (non-government-controlled, 102km south-east of Donetsk), three armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage.
• On 12 August, at a checkpoint 800m north of Zaichenko, two armed members of the armed formations again stopped the SMM and denied it passage westward to Pikuzy and Sakhanka (see above).
• On 12 August, at a checkpoint 2.5km west of Bezimenne, four armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage (see above).
• On 12 August, at a checkpoint near Novoazovsk, three armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage (see above).

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• On 11 and 12 August, the SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that he had no information about demining activities in the disengagement area. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[4]
• On 11 and 12 August, the SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by telephone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.5
• On 11 and 12 August, the SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

Conditional access:

• In Horlivka (nongovernment controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), members of the armed formations wearing uniforms with “police” written on them allowed the SMM to proceed only after inspecting the contents of SMM patrol vehicle trunks.

Other impediments:

• On two occasions on 10 August, the SMM temporarily lost communication with its miniUAV while flying north of Horlivka, assessed as due to signal interference[5].

[1]     For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

*    Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2]     Due to presence of mines, including those on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited; thus, the review of the camera footage may take place days later.

[3] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4]     The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

[5]     The interference could have originated from anywhere in a radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position.

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The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region compared with the previous reporting period, and for the third day in a row, no ceasefire violations in Luhansk region. The SMM observed damage to a residential house in Yasynuvata as the result of shooting. The SMM observed at least two armed probable Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel inside the Zolote disengagement area. Its access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas and again near Zaichenko and Bezimenne, as well as Izvaryne, Sievernyi, and Novoazovsk, near the border with the Russian Federation.* The SMM observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines in Lobacheve. An SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle spotted for the first time four electronic warfare systems in Chornukhyne. The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station, including through monitoring the security situation around the station, as well as repairs and maintenance works to critical water and electrical infrastructure in Luhansk region.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations[1], including, however, a similar number of explosions (68 explosions), compared with the previous reporting period (70 explosions).

On the evening and night of 9-10 August, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded 160 projectiles in flight (110 from north-north-west to south-south-east, 28 from north to south, 15 from north-east to south-west, five from north-west to south-east and two from west to east) and two muzzle flashes, all 1-3km south and south-south-west.

The SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol) recorded two undetermined explosions and 52 projectiles in flight (32 from west to east and 20 from east to west), all 2-4km south.

The SMM camera 1km south-west of Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) recorded two undetermined explosions east-south-east and 222 projectiles in flight (137 and south-east to north-west, 84 from north-west to south-east and one in vertical flight), all 3-5km north-east.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded no ceasefire violations. In the previous reporting period, the SMM also recorded no ceasefire violations.

The SMM followed up on reports of fresh damage of a residential house. In Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk), a man (72 years old) showed the SMM the damaged roof and gate of his house at 7 Timiriazieva Street. The SMM saw a hole in the roof assessed as caused by a 12.7mm round fired from the north. The Mission also saw a round embedded in a gatepost in front of the house assessed as a 12.7mm incendiary round fired from the north and saw soot assessed as from a fire around where the round was embedded. The man told the SMM that the shooting had happened during the evening on 9 August.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk)[2], as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

In Katerynivka (government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk), inside the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM saw two armed probable Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel walking toward a Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint and later observed a mini-van on three occasions and car on one occasion, both with military plates, driving inside the disengagement area with military personnel inside. There was one man on two occasions in the mini-van and two men on another occasion, and three men and one woman in the car.

Positioned in the Stanytsia Luhanska and Zolote disengagement areas and near the Petrivske disengagement area, the SMM observed calm situations.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas, on 9 August an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted a tank and a probable tank (both T-64) near military-type positions in Lobacheve (13km east of Luhansk) and five tanks (partially dismantled and covered with white canvas) in Luhansk city.

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites in a government-controlled area, an SMM mini-UAV spotted four surface-to-air missile systems (S-300) near Nikolske (formerly Volodarske, 97km south of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites in non-government-controlled areas, aerial imagery revealed the presence of 21 tanks (type undetermined), 26 pieces of towed artillery, a multiple launch rocket system and four surface-to-air missile systems near Buhaivka (37km south-west of Luhansk) on 7 August and three tanks (type undetermined) near Boikivske (formerly Telmanove, 67km south-east of Donetsk) on 9 August.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles (ACV)[3] in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 9 August, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-1) near Novhorodske (35km north of Donetsk), an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) near Nevelske (18km north-west of Donetsk), two ACVs (type undetermined) near Berezove (31km south-west of Donetsk), a probable armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) and a probable IFV (BMP-1) near Mykolaivka (40km south of Donetsk), two IFVs (BMP-1) near Bohdanivka (41km south-west of Donetsk), a  target acquisition radar system (Parol-4) near Shevchenko (59km south of Donetsk), an IFV (BMP-2) and two probable armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-2 ) near Pyshchevyk (84km south of Donetsk) and two IFVs (BMP-2) near Hnutove (90km south of Donetsk). The SMM observed an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-60) near Vodiane (24km north-east of Mariupol) and an APC (BTR-70) near Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk).

In non-government-controlled areas, on 28 July, an SMM mini-UAV spotted four distinct electronic warfare systems (a Leer-3 RB-341V, a 1L269 Krasukha-2 and RB-109A Bylina, and an anti-UAV system, Repellent-1) near Chornukhyne (64km south-west of Luhansk), all seen for the first time by the SMM. On 2 August, during a flight over the same area, the UAV did not spot the same systems. On 9 August, an SMM mini-UAV spotted an armoured recovery vehicle (BREM-1) and an APC (BTR-80) near Luhansk city and three ACVs (type undetermined) near Lobacheve.

The SMM observed mine hazard signs. About 3km south-east of Fedorivka (non-government-controlled, 34km north-east of Donetsk) the SMM saw three wooden signs laying on the ground about 2m from the road with “Mines” written in Russian in white paint; one of the signs had vehicle track marks on it.

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire. Positioned in areas near the DFS, the SMM heard ceasefire violations, despite explicit security guarantees (see the table below).

The SMM also continued to facilitate and monitor repairs and maintenance works to water distribution infrastructure near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), Novotoshkivske (government-controlled, 53km west of Luhansk) Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 61km north-west of Luhansk) and Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), and to electrical infrastructure in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka.

The SMM visited border areas outside of government control.* At a border crossing point near Izvaryne (52km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM observed a bus with about 50 passengers (Ukrainian licence plates with a route sign: Moscow – Alchevsk – Stakhanov) entering Ukraine, and two buses (one with Ukrainian licence plates, one with plates not visible) exiting Ukraine. After five minutes at the crossing, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

While at the pedestrian border crossing near Verkhnoharasymivka (57km south-east of Luhansk) for about 40 minutes, the SMM saw 22 pedestrians (mixed gender, age) queuing to leave Ukraine. 

At the border crossing point near Sievernyi (50km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM observed four pedestrians enter Ukraine. About five minutes after arrival, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report of 8 August 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• On the eastern edge of Patriotychne (non-government-controlled, 35km north-east of Mariupol), two men, one in civilian clothing who refused to identify himself to the SMM, and an armed man in military-style clothing approached the SMM while preparing for a mini-UAV flight and asked what the SMM was doing. The man in civilian clothing told the SMM that he had not received any instructions regarding a UAV flight and that he would not communicate with his “superiors” or other members of the armed formation for clarification, and that the SMM could not fly the UAV and had to leave the area.
• At a checkpoint 800m north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations again stopped the SMM and denied it passage westward to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) and southward to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), citing “security reasons”.
• At a checkpoint 2.5km west of Bezimenne (non-government-controlled, 30km east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage, claiming that “it was for the SMM’s safety and security”.
• Three armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage through a checkpoint near Novoazovsk (non-government-controlled, 102km south-east of Donetsk), citing “orders from their superiors”.
• At the border crossing point near Sievernyi (50km south-east of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.
• At the border crossing point near Izvaryne (52km southeast of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area, citing a decision by his “superiors”.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by telephone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[2] Due to presence of mines, including those on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited; therefore, the review of the camera footage may take place days later.

[3] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

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The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region compared with the previous reporting period, and no ceasefire violations in Luhansk region. The Mission observed fresh damage from gunfire to a garage door in a residential area of Yasynuvata. It continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske. The SMM observed ceasefire violations near the Zolote disengagement area and Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel inside the area, on the northern side of the road bridge. Its access remained restricted in all three areas and again near Bezimenne and Zaichenko.* The SMM observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line. The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station, including through monitoring the security situation around the station, as well as repairs and maintenance works to critical water and electrical infrastructure in Luhansk region.

In Donetsk region the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations[1], including about 70 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (160 explosions).

On the evening and night of 8-9 August, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, three projectiles in flight from west to east, two projectiles from north-north-west to south-south-east and an undetermined explosion, followed by a total of one explosion assessed as an outgoing mortar round, two explosions assessed as impacts of rounds of undetermined weapons, seven undetermined explosions, 211 projectiles in flight and six muzzle flashes, all 0.5-4km south-south-east to south-west. Two explosions assessed as impacts of mortar rounds were also recorded 100-400m south-east.

The SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol) recorded, in sequence, three projectiles in flight from north-west to south-east, two projectiles from east to west and two projectiles from north-north-west to south-south-east, followed by a total 197 projectiles in flight and one burst, all 2-4km south-south-east and south.

The SMM camera at Oktiabr mine (non-government-controlled, 9km north-west of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, 12 undetermined explosions and a projectile in flight from west to east, followed by a total of 22 explosions assessed as airbursts of anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) rounds, five projectiles, two bursts and ten muzzle flashes, all 3-5km north-east.

The SMM camera 1km south-west of Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) recorded, in sequence, 14 projectiles in flight from west to east, 17 projectiles from west-north-west to east-south-east and eight projectiles from east-south-east to west-north-west, followed by a total of 87 projectiles, all 1-5km north-east.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded no ceasefire violations. In the previous reporting period the SMM recorded six ceasefire violations (all were explosions)

The SMM observed fresh damage from gunfire in a residential area of Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk). At 33 Hoholia Street, the SMM saw a bullet hole in the upper left corner of the west-south-west-facing door of a brick garage that stands next to a residential building. The SMM also saw that two bricks left of the garage door were chipped. A woman (in her fifties) who introduced herself as resident of the house told the Mission that the door had been damaged around 20:30 on 8 August during nearby shelling.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk)[2], as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On the evening of 8 August, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded two bursts in vertical flight assessed as anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) rounds 1-1.5km south-east (unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area).

On 9 August, inside the Zolote disengagement area, an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted two people assessed as probable Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel on the northern side of the road bridge. (For previous observations, see SMM Daily 19 July 2018.)

Positioned near the Petrivske disengagement area and inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, the SMM observed a calm situation.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in a government-controlled area, on 8 August, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted an anti-tank gun (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) in Oleksandro-Kalynove (47km north of Donetsk).

In violation of withdrawal lines in a non-government-controlled area, on 8 August, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted two self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) near Starolaspa (51km south of Donetsk). On 9 August, the SMM saw a multiple launch rocket system (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) moving in a north-westerly direction near Minkivka (78km north of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in a government-controlled area, on 8 August, an SMM long-range UAV spotted four tanks (T-64) on railway flatbeds at the railway station in Kostiantynivka (60km north of Donetsk).

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles[3] in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 8 August, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (SNAR-10) near Troitske (69km west of Luhansk) and two infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP-1) near Krymske (42km north-west of Luhansk). On the same day, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted two IFVs (BMP-1 and BMP-2) near Novohryhorivka (55km south of Donetsk). On 9 August, the SMM saw an armoured personnel carrier (BTR-4) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk).

The SMM observed the presence of anti-tank mines. On 8 August, an SMM mid-range UAV again spotted 12 anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid in three rows across a road approximately 3km east of Starohnativka (government-controlled, 51km south of Donetsk). The same UAV also again spotted 12 anti-tank mines (TM-62) (eight laid in two rows across and four scattered on the same road) on the north-western edge of Bila Kamianka (non-government-controlled, 51km south of Donetsk). On 9 August, an SMM mini-UAV again spotted a total of 18 anti-tank mines (TM-62) on road H21 leading to the Shchastia bridge, 14 about 1.8km north-east and four about 2.3km east-north-east of Vesela Hora (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Luhansk) respectively.

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire. Positioned in areas near the DFS, the SMM heard ceasefire violations, despite explicit security guarantees (see the table below).

The SMM also continued to facilitate and monitor repairs and maintenance works to water distribution infrastructure near Obozne (non-government-controlled, 18km north of Luhansk), Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 61km north-west of Luhansk) and Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk); to electrical infrastructure in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka; and to a parking lot at the railway station in Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk). In addition, in Luhansk region, the Mission monitored and facilitated a transfer of funds in relation to a water payment from non-government to government-controlled areas.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report of 8 August 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a checkpoint 800m north of Zaichenko (nongovernment-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), a member of the armed formations again stopped the SMM and denied it passage westward to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, nongovernment-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) and southward to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), citing “security reasons”.
• At a checkpoint 2.5km west of Bezimenne (nongovernment-controlled, 30km east of Mariupol), three armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage, claiming that “it was for the SMM’s safety”.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by telephone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by telephone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC. [4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[2] Due to presence of mines, including those on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited; therefore, the review of the camera footage may take place days later.

[3] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

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VIENNA, 10 August 2018 – Following the recent blocking of news websites due to allegations of defamation in Azerbaijan, the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media Harlem Désir today urgently called on the authorities to reform the laws and regulations affecting media and to encourage pluralistic debate on all issues of public importance, both off– and online.

“Blocking websites is an extreme measure which may stifle critical voices, particularly when instigated by highly problematic defamation claims. It impedes on the public’s right to access information and negatively impacts media pluralism and free expression,” Désir said.

According to reports, on 7-8 August, upon the request of the Ministry for Transportation, Communications and New Technologies, the district courts in Baku ruled to block four news websites, namely az24saat.org, xural.com, arqument.az and monitortv.info. Reportedly, the authorities claim that certain articles published and reproduced on these online platforms contain defamatory statements, including with regard to high-level officials.   

“Any restrictive measure affecting media can only be justified in accordance with international standards, based on clear, strictly precise, legally predictive and non-discriminatory criteria. In the absence thereof, such measures and practices would impinge on a wide array of rights, including those closely associated with freedom of expression and media freedom,” Désir said.

Earlier, on 22 December 2017, the Representative shared his concern with the authorities regarding the continued state blocking of the websites of newspaper Azadliq (azadliq.info), the Azerbaijan service of RFE/RL (azadliq.org), as well as the news portals Azerbaycan Saati (azerbaycansaati.com and azerbaycansaati.tv), Meydan TV (meydan.tv) and Turan TV (kanalturan.com) in the country.

On 23 July, Désir requested that the authorities clarify the reasons and legal grounds for the recent blocking of the online platforms Bastainfo.com, Criminalaz.com, Topxeber.az and Fia.az. He also expressed concern about the fact that several online media outlets belonging to APA holding, one of the biggest media groups in the country, simultaneously went offline as of August 2018 (see tweet: twitter.com/OSCE_RFoM/status/1026413313830342657).

“I call on government officials to restore access to all blocked news websites and reform the laws and regulations affecting the freedom of expression,” Désir said.

The Representative’s previous statements calling for the decriminalization of defamation in Azerbaijan are available at: https://www.osce.org/fom/282286 and https://www.osce.org/fom/102413.

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom.

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VIENNA, 12 August 2018 – Special Representative of the Italian Chairperson-in-Office for the South Caucasus, Ambassador Günther Bächler, today made the following statement on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the ceasefire in the 2008 war in Georgia:

“Ten years ago, the August war in Georgia created a far-reaching human tragedy and its consequences continue to be severely felt today. The ceasefire agreement of 12 August 2008 stopped the military hostilities. But for the people affected, the main problems remain: the security situation on the ground; the deepening of the dividing lines between communities because of disruption to means of communication such as roads, railways, and trade facilities; large scale displacement; missing persons; lost or destroyed property; access to water and land; freedom of movement, and many other humanitarian and human rights issues. For the young generation, there are often no future prospects as young people lack socio-economic and educational opportunities. People are forced to live in poverty or to migrate.

A comprehensive settlement of all open issues in the region, solving all the status-related, political, and humanitarian questions may not be reached soon. However, all those in a position to influence the situation can and should do everything to create an atmosphere of reconciliation, to build trust in pragmatic problem-solving, and to improve the living conditions for the local population on all sides of the dividing lines.

Ten years after the hostilities of August 2008 it is high time that full use is made of the well-established dialogue formats – such as the Geneva International Discussions (GID) and the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanisms (IPRM) – in order to solve outstanding issues in a pragmatic, professional and non-confrontational manner, and in a spirit of trust and confidence. Finding a solution to one issue may facilitate progress on other pressing topics. Only a robust process of dealing with past and present grievances will ensure lasting peace and reconciliation for future generations. Civil society on all sides of the dividing lines has a vital role to play.  

October 2018 will mark the tenth anniversary of the GID. I call upon all participants to use the forthcoming 45th round to reflect on how to strengthen the Geneva talks and the IPRMs. It is the responsibility of all participants to contribute to an atmosphere conducive to meaningful discussions and to propose solutions to security-related and humanitarian issues. It may be an appropriate moment to return to the aim of the original GID co-chairs that participants should consider a more flexible and participatory agenda-setting, the establishment of result-oriented expert groups, as well as the preparation of high-level meetings to promote peace and address major legal and political issues. All those who lost their loved ones ten years ago and those who suffer daily under the hardships created by the conflict would be grateful for such responsible leadership.”

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The OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe organized a workshop on border re-demarcation best practices for 21 border officials from Uzbekistan and Tajikistan from 6 to10 August 2018 in Dushanbe.

International experts from Belarus, the European Union and a representative of the OSCE Secretariat conducted the workshop, presented and compared international experiences and best practices, and provided recommendations for improving joint activities.   

Border officials from border delimitation and demarcation commissions learned about the legal frameworks of international boundaries and specific national and bilateral experiences of co-operation related to practices from across the OSCE region.

“The OSCE is helping to build the capacity of Tajik and Uzbek border officials by providing high-quality training courses in a number of key areas,” said Vyacheslav Abramets, OSCE Border Management Officer. “This workshop provided essential human and technical skills for border officials for a conflict prevention and confidence building measures in disputed border areas.”

The event was organized as a follow-up to the OSCE-wide seminar on re-demarcation practices in the OSCE area that took place in November 2017 in Minsk, Belarus.

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region compared with the previous reporting period. An explosion occurred less than 150m from an SMM patrol at the entry-exit checkpoint near Marinka. The Mission continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske, and observed ceasefire violations near the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area. The SMM’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas as well as in Novolaspa and, again, in Novoazovsk, Bezimenne and Zaichenko.*The Mission’s long-range unmanned aerial vehicle spotted convoys of trucks entering and exiting Ukraine via a dirt track where there are no border crossing facilities in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region in the middle of the night. The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station, including through monitoring the security situation around the station, as well as repairs and maintenance works to critical civilian infrastructure in Luhansk region. 

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations[1], including about 160 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 140 explosions).[2]

On the evening and night of 7-8 August, the SMM camera 1km south-west of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol) recorded 29 undetermined explosions, 167 projectiles in flight, a muzzle flash and two illumination flares, all 2-5km at easterly directions.

On 8 August, positioned on the eastern edge of Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard 19 undetermined explosions and 14 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire 3km north-north-east as well as ten undetermined explosions and 26 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire 1km south-east.

While passing through the entry-exit checkpoint 2km south-east of Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) at 14:47, the SMM heard an explosion and felt a shock wave emanating from a field just north-west of the checkpoint, 100-150m north-west of the SMM’s position. The SMM observed checkpoint personnel taking cover, but noted that pedestrians queuing at the checkpoint remained in place. A member of the Ukrainian State Border Guard Service at the checkpoint did not provide the SMM with further information. According to media reports, the explosion was caused by the detonation of a hand grenade.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations (six explosions) compared with the previous reporting period (eight explosions).

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk)[3], as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

In the early morning of 8 August, the SMM camera at the Prince Ihor Monument south-east of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk) recorded six explosions 2-6km north-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

Positioned near the Petrivske and Zolote disengagement areas, the SMM observed calm situations. 

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines, an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted two tanks (T‑72),  one probabletank and three towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) near Novohryhorivka (non-government-controlled, 33km west of Luhansk) on 8 August.Also on 8 August, the SMM saw three multiple launch rocket systems (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) in violation of withdrawal lines near Bakhmut (formerly Artemivsk, government-controlled, 67km north of Donetsk). 

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites, in non-government-controlled areas, the SMM saw a tank (T-72) in the south-eastern outskirts of Luhansk city, and six towed howitzers (D-30) and five self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) near Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk).

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles[4] and other signs of military presence in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, the SMM saw an armoured personnel carrier (BTR-80) near Volnovakha (53km south of Donetsk),an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BTR-4) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk) and an IFV (undetermined BMP variant) near Zolote-4/Rodina (59km west of Luhansk). 

An SMM long-range UAV spotted convoys of trucks entering and exiting Ukraine via a dirt track where there are no border crossing facilities in the middle of the night. At 22:15 on 7 August, an SMM long-range UAV spotted a convoy of eight canvas-covered six-wheeled cargo trucks (five KamAZ-4310 and the rest undetermined) travelling east along a road near Chystiakove (non-government-controlled, 62km east of Donetsk). Near Manych (non-government-controlled, 76km east of Donetsk), approximately 3.5km before reaching Ukraine’s border with the Russian Federation, the convoy turned east onto a dirt track that leads across the border. The UAV then spotted a second convoy (consisting of an off-road vehicle (UAZ) leading six canvas-covered six-wheeled KamAZ cargo trucks and a box body truck) travelling westwards from the border with the Russian Federation along the same dirt track. The two convoys passed each other about five minutes after the second convoy entered Ukraine. At around 23:25, the UAV spotted the first convoy exiting Ukraine via the same dirt track. The second convoy was later joined by two additional KamAZ cargo trucks also coming from the direction of the border with the Russian Federation. Each of the convoys separately stopped for about three minutes next to an off-road vehicle that was parked in a field along the above-mentioned dirt track, 1.7km from the border, and again next to two trucks parked at the intersection of the dirt track and the paved road (3.5km from where the convoys crossed the border). At both spots, the occupants of the parked vehicles (the off-road vehicle in the field and the two trucks at the intersection) can be seen interacting with the drivers of each convoy’s lead vehicle. The convoy seen heading westward into Ukraine was observed driving west and finally parking at the southern outskirts of Khrustalnyi (formerly Krasnyi Luch, non-government-controlled, 56km south-west of Luhansk) at 01:16 on 8 August.

On 7 August, the SMM for the first time observed what it assessed to be an improvised camp consisting of six armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM variants) and 15 military-type trucks (two KamAZ variants, four Ural variants, two KrAZ variants, six ZIL variants and one of undetermined manufacture, all painted in shades of green), one bearing white-on-black licence plates with the prefix “DK” in Cyrillic letters, 2km east of Cheremshyne (non-government-controlled, 59km south-east of Luhansk). The vehicles were parked close to one another and camouflage netting was strung from one of them. About 1.6km east of the camp, there is an unguarded road crossing into the Russian Federation which is barricaded with a metal bar. 

The SMM saw a previously unobserved mine hazard sign. In Popasne (government-controlled, 59km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM for the first time saw a red, 20x20cm square sign reading “Stop mines” in Russian near a house on Lenina Street, in the front yard of which it observed five soldiers of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. One of the soldiers told the SMM that the sign had been placed there to deter local residents from approaching the premises. 

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire. Positioned in areas near the station, the SMM heard ceasefire violations, despite explicit security guarantees (see table below).

The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor repair works to a water pumping station near Artema, to water distribution infrastructure near Obozne (non-government-controlled, 18km north of Luhansk), Stanytsia Luhanska, Nyzhnie (government-controlled, 56km north-west of Luhansk) and Novotoshkivske (government-controlled, 53km west of Luhansk), electrical infrastructure in Obozne and Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk) and Berezivske (non-government-controlled, 53km north-west of Luhansk) and a parking lot in Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk).  

In Kyiv, on 7 August, the SMM observed about 70 men (in their twenties), many with the insignia of groups such as Sich, National Corps and Natsionalni Druzhyny,gathered in a courtroom of the Kyiv Court of Appeals (2A Solomianska Street) for the hearing of a petition by a senior member of Sichto modify the terms of his house arrest. The SMM also saw ten media crews and about ten national police officers and 50 National Guards. The court changed the terms of the appellant’s house arrest from 24 hours a day to night hours only.

In Odessa on 7 August, the SMM followed up on investigations related to recent incidents of defamatory graffiti (see SMM Daily Report 27 July 2018). A representative of the regional police department told the SMM that three recent incidents, as well as similar incidents from winter 2018, were under investigation and suspects had been identified and questioned by police. 

In Dnipro on 6 August, the SMM followed up on conditions of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in a dormitory in Zaporizhzhia (69km south of Dnipro). The SMM saw small, non-air-conditioned rooms with mould and fungus inside, and was told by an interlocutor that 68 families lived in the dormitory which, they said, had no heating in winter. Some residents of the dormitory told the SMM that they had met the criteria for financial aid from the Zaporizhzhia City Aid Centre but had not received such aid, possibly based on their communal utilities debts. In response to the difficult living conditions and lack of aid, the same interlocutor said that about ten IDPs at the dormitory had commenced a hunger strike on 25 July 2018 that has since ceased.  

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Coordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report of 7 August 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations

Denials of access:

• At a checkpoint 2.5km west of Bezimenne (non-government-controlled, 30km east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage to road E58.
• At a checkpoint 800m north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), armed members of the armed formations again stopped the SMM and denied it passage westward to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non‑government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) and southward to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol).
• The SMM was able to pass through a checkpoint near Novoazovsk (non-government-controlled, 102km south-east of Donetsk) towards Novoazovsk, where its passage has been denied on numerous occasions (see SMM Daily Report of 4 August 2018) but, upon its return to the checkpoint, was told by five armed men that it could not travel east (toward a nearby crossing point on the border with the Russian Federation) nor turn around back towards Novoazovsk. The SMM was able to travel north through the checkpoint. (The SMM spoke with a member of the armed formations in Bezimenne regarding the frequent restrictions to its freedom of movement near Novoazovsk and was told that the armed formations were undertaking these actions in order to “safeguard” persons taking summer holidays in the area. He added that once the holiday season ends, the impediments of the SMM’s patrols to Novoazovsk will likely cease.)
• At a checkpoint on the eastern edge of Novolaspa (non-government-controlled, 50km south of Donetsk), five men in military-style clothing (two armed) prevented the SMM from entering the village.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by telephone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[5]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by telephone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

Other impediments:

• At a hospital in Boikivske (formerly Telmanove, non-government-controlled, 67km south-east of Donetsk), where the SMM was attempting to follow up on reports of a civilian casualty, a doctor aggressively stated that the SMM was not allowed to enter the hospital without first receiving permission from local armed formations members and refused to provide the SMM with any information regarding the reported casualty.

[1]  For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. 

[2]  Further review of imagery from SMM cameras at the DFS indicated that the projectiles, initially assessed in the SMM Daily Report of 7 August 2018 as multiple launch rocket system rounds, werefired from undetermined weapons.

[3]  Due to presence of mines, including those on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remained limited; thus, the review of the camera footage may take place days later.

[4]  This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[5]  The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

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Mine risk awareness, human rights, gender mainstreaming and the importance of local population involvement in border protection were the focus of three 14-day mobile training courses, that were organized by the OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe and concluded on 9 August 2019.

129 Tajik boarder officials participated in the courses, held in Khatlon, Sugd and the Kuhistani Badakhshan Autonomous region of Tajikistan.

Tajik border troops’ graduates of the 2017 OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe train-the-trainer course conducted this year’s courses.  In addition, the OSCE hired local experts with extensive experience, to monitor and provide support for the border troops’ instructors in delivering high quality training.

This course was organized within the framework of the Programme Office Border Management Unit and is part of the successful implementation of the Tajik National Border Management Strategy.

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region, compared with the previous reporting period. The Mission’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas; it was also restricted at a checkpoint near Khreshchatytske.* The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station, including through monitoring the security situation around the station, as well as repairs and maintenance works to critical civilian infrastructure near Artema, Stanytsia Luhanska, Novotoshkivske and Popasna. In Kherson, the SMM monitored the court hearing of the former RIA Novosti Ukraine editor-in-chief.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations[1], including about 140 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 90 explosions).

On the evening of 6 August, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard three undetermined explosions and about 44 bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 3-8km south and south-east. During the day on 7 August, it heard about 85 undetermined explosions and about 70 bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 5-7km south-east and south-west.

On the evening and night of 6-7 August, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded an explosion assessed as an impact of a mortar round 100-500m east, as well as 15 undetermined explosions, 60 projectiles in flight (mostly from west to east and north-west to south-east), two bursts of undetermined weapons and an illumination flare, all 0.5-3km east, south-east and south-west.[2]

The SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk) recorded 13 undetermined explosions, 73 projectiles in flight (mostly from north to south) and four illumination flares in vertical flight, all 2-6km north-east and east.

The SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) recorded three undetermined explosions, 30 projectiles in flight (mostly from west to east), two bursts of undetermined weapons, two illumination flares in flight from west to east and a muzzle flash, all 1-4km north-east.

The SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol) recorded an undetermined explosion and 74 projectiles in flight (mostly from west to east), all 1-5km south-east and south.

The SMM camera 1km south-west of Pyshchevyk recorded four undetermined explosions, about 100 projectiles in flight (mostly from north-north-west to south-south-east) and three illumination flares in vertical flight, all 1-5km at directions ranging from north-east to south-east.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, however, more explosions (eight), compared with the previous reporting period (no explosions).

During the day on 7 August, positioned in Holubivka (formerly Kirovsk, non-government-controlled, 51km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard eight undetermined explosions 8-10km north.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk)[3], as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On 6 August, inside the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM saw a Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier carrying an assault rifle (AK-47) in Katerynivka (government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk) and walking north-east towards Zolote-4/Rodina (59km west of Luhansk). On 7 August, on two occasions in the same area, the SMM saw a Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier carrying an assault rifle (AK-47) and walking north-east towards Zolote-4/Rodina.

Positioned near the Stanytsia Luhanska and Petrivske disengagement areas, the SMM observed a calm situation.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in non-government-controlled areas, on 6 August, a long-range SMM unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted 14 tanks (T-72) near Ternove (57km east of Donetsk) and ten tanks (T-72) near Pokrovka (36km east of Donetsk). On 5 August, aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of 21 tanks (type undetermined) near Ternove.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles, anti-aircraft guns[4] and other military-type presence in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, the SMM saw an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BTR-4) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk) and an IFV (BMP-1) in Vrubivka (72km west of Luhansk).

In non-government-controlled areas, on 6 August, a long-range SMM UAV spotted a surveillance and acquisition radar (P-19) near Rozivka (37km north-east of Donetsk), as well as an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-80) and an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BDRM-2) near Kalmiuske (formerly Komsomolske, 42km south-east of Donetsk). On 7 August, the SMM saw three APCs (MT-LB) (two of which with an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) mounted on top) near Pervomaisk (58km west of Luhansk).

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire. Positioned in areas near the DFS, the SMM heard ceasefire violations, despite explicit security guarantees (see table below).

The SMM also continued to facilitate and monitor repair works to a water pumping station near Artema, to water distribution infrastructure in Stanytsia Luhanska and near Novotoshkivske (government-controlled 53km west of Luhansk), and to a railway station in Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk). 

In Kherson, the SMM monitored an appellate hearing on the extension of pretrial detention of the former editor-in-chief of RIA Novosti Ukraine, arrested in Kyiv on 15 May on charges of high treason under Art. 111.1 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine (see SMM Daily Report 18 May 2018 and SMM Daily Report 13 July 2018). The court ruled that the defendant would remain in custody until the next hearing scheduled for 8 September 2018. Inside the courtroom, the Mission saw four National Guard officers.

The SMM continued monitoring in Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Coordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report of 7 August 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations

Denials of access:

• At a checkpoint near Khreshchatytske (nongovernment-controlled, formerly Krasnoarmiiske, 86km south of Donetsk), three armed members of the armed formations denied the SMM passage, saying that “special operations” were underway in the area. The SMM noted cars passing through the checkpoint.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by telephone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[5]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by telephone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.
• The SMM did not travel north towards the bridge near governmentcontrolled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk) due to the possible presence of mines. A member of the armed formations said that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours.

Conditional access:

• At a checkpoint near Horlivka (nongovernment-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), members of the armed formations allowed the SMM to proceed only after checking the interior of its vehicles.

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

[2] Further review of imagery from SMM cameras at the DFS indicated that the projectiles, initially assessed in the SMM Daily Report of 6 August 2018 as multiple launch rocket system rounds, were fired from undetermined weapons.

[3] Due to presence of mines, including those on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remained limited; thus, the review of the camera footage may take place days later.

[4] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[5]     The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

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KYIV, 08 August 2018 – Principal Deputy Chief Monitor of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine Alexander Hug will hold his regular news briefing on Thursday, 9 August, in Kyiv.

He will talk about the security situation throughout Ukraine and the Mission’s recent activities.

Journalists are invited to attend the news briefing tomorrow, 9 August, at 13:30 (Kyiv time), at the Ukrainian Crisis Media Centre, at the Ukrainian House, 2 Khreshchatyk Street.

Live streaming of the news briefing will be available at http://uacrisis.org/ru/stream/#eng

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