OSCE

VIENNA, 25 September 2018 – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, today criticized the Austrian Interior Ministry’s instruction to boycott and restrict the flow of information to certain media outlets, and called on the Ministry of Interior to refrain from attacking the media.

The instructions set out new guidelines aimed at limiting information to certain media outlets, in particular Der Standard, Falter, and Kurier, to only the most necessary, legally required, degree. The Interior Ministry criticized these media outlets for their “one-sided and negative coverage” and urged police departments to no longer grant them any “privileges”.

"While the Interior Ministry subsequently described the instruction as a ‘suggestion’, I urgently call on the Interior Ministry to immediately and officially revoke this instruction. I recall that protection of media freedom is key to democracy. Access to information must be provided to all media equally regardless of their editorial orientation,” Désir said.

The Representative noted with satisfaction comments by the President of Austria, Alexander Van der Bellen, who stated that “freedom of expression and freedom of the media are the cornerstones of a liberal democracy, and that discrimination against any single media outlet must not occur”, and the statement by the Chancellor, Sebastian Kurz, which noted that “any restriction on press freedom is unacceptable” and that “the exclusion or boycott of any select media outlet is not permitted in Austria”.

Désir also recalled that the Minister of Interior, Herbert Kickl, in a recent broadcast on ORF in June, suggested that certain journalists may be under investigation for their reporting on the work of the Austrian intelligence services.

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom.  

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ROME, 25 September 2018 – How to lower the risks of conflict and misunderstandings between states in cyberspace through emerging technological features, policy engagement, public-private partnerships and other innovative measures is the focus of the 2018 OSCE-wide Conference on Cyber/ICT Security, which will be opened in Rome on Friday by Italy’s Deputy Foreign Minister Guglielmo Picchi.

Organized by Italy’s 2018 OSCE Chairmanship with the support of the Transnational Threats Department of the OSCE Secretariat, the conference will facilitate face-to-face interaction between policy makers, the technical community and private sector representatives on how to mitigate the risks of conflict stemming from the use of information and communications technologies (ICTs).

The opening session of the conference will be moderated by the Co-ordinator for Cyber Security Issues at Italy’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Co-operation, Francesco Maria Talò, and feature addresses by:

Guglielmo Picchi, Italy’s Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Co-operation;
Oleg Khramov, Deputy Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation;
Karoly Dan, Permanent Representative of Hungary to the OSCE and Chair of the Informal Working Group on developing confidence-building measures to reduce the risks of conflict stemming from the use of ICTs;
Christopher Painter, Former Co-ordinator for Cyber Issues at the United States State Department and Commissioner for the Global Commission on the Stability of Cyber Space.

Media are invited to attend the opening session of the conference from 10:00-11:30 on Friday, 28 September 2018 at the Parco dei Principi Grand Hotel & Spa, Via G. Frescobaldi 5, Rome.

Media representatives wishing to attend the conference can register in one of the following ways by sending an email to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Co-operation’s Institutional Press and Communication Service at: accreditamentostampa@esteri.it (telephone 06/3691.3432-8573-8210), and attaching the letter from their media organization (or press card for journalists) and, for members of the foreign press, a Note Verbale issued by the Rome embassy of the media organization’s country.

Media representatives should apply for accreditation by 15:00, Thursday, 27 September 2018. 

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PODGORICA, 25 September 2018 – Some 50 participants from the police, border and customs services, and the Ministries of Justice and Culture from South-east Europe and the South Caucasus are taking part in a five-day regional workshop in Podgorica next week on combating the illicit cross-border trafficking in cultural property.

The workshop will feature sessions on the structures and capacities required for the fight against the illicit trafficking in cultural property, the international legal framework and best practices in criminal justice responses, co-operation, and the monitoring of archaeological sites and museums. It will draw heavily on case studies and be led by international experts from a wide range of security, police and cultural bodies.

The initiative also aims at fostering co-ordination and co-operation among relevant agencies, international organizations, the private sector, and educational institutions.

The workshop, which begins on 1 October, is organized by the Italian OSCE Chairmanship, in co-ordination with the Border Security and Management Unit of the OSCE Secretariat’s Transnational Threats Department, the OSCE Mission to Montenegro and the Ministry of Culture of Montenegro.

Opening the workshop will be Minister of Culture of Montenegro, Aleksandar Bogdanović; Deputy Permanent Representative of Italy to the OSCE, Ambassador Luca Fratini; Head of the OSCE Mission to Montenegro, Ambassador Maryse Daviet; and the Co-ordinator of Activities to Address  Transnational Threats, Rasa Ostrauskaite.

Media representatives are invited to cover the workshop’s opening session from 09:45 to 10:30 on Monday, 1 October, at the Conference Room of the Centerville Hotel, Podgorica. Media representatives wishing to attend are required to send an e-mail confirming their attendance to Karen.Gainer@osce.org and Marina.Zivaljevic@osce.org, no later than 15:00, 28 September 2018.

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This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region between the evenings of 21 and 22 September. Between the evenings of 22 and 23 September, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region, compared with the previous 24 hours. The SMM followed up on a civilian casualty in Popasna. The SMM observed damage as a result of shelling in residential areas in Yasynuvata, Pikuzy and Uzhivka. The SMM continued to observe civilians facing hardships crossing the contact line. The SMM saw military-type presence inside the Zolote disengagement area. The Mission’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas; it was also restricted again near Zaichenko and Bezimenne, as well as near Novolaspa and Voznesenivka, near the border with the Russian Federation.* The SMM observed weapons in violation of agreed withdrawal lines in Sakhanka. The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station. It also facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs and maintenance works to water infrastructure in Avdiivka, Yasynuvata and Stanytsia Luhanska, and to power lines in Zolote, as well as demining in Pishchane. The SMM observed a protest in Odessa and followed up on reports of an activist being shot later the same day.

In Donetsk region, between the evenings of 21 and 22 September, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations,[1] including 124 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (115 explosions). Between the evenings of 22 and 23 September, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 110 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours.    

On the evening and night of 21-22 September, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded an undetermined explosion, 20 projectiles in flight (mostly from west to east) and two illumination flares in vertical flight, all 1-4km south-south-east, south-south-west and south-west. The following evening and night, the same camera recorded an undetermined explosion and 28 projectiles, all 1-4km north-east, south-south-east and south-west.

On the evening of 21 September, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 23 undetermined explosions and about 80 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 4-7km south-east and south-south-east. On the evening of 22 September, from the same location, the SMM heard 14 undetermined explosions, five bursts of infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-2) cannon (30mm) fire as well as heavy-machine-gun fire, all 2-6km south-south-east. During the day on 23 September, the SMM heard 66 undetermined explosions and heavy-machine-gun fire, all 2-5km south-east, south and south-west.

During the night on 22 September and into the morning of 23 September, while in Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 15 undetermined explosions and 25 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 5-8km west and north-west.

During the day on 22 September, positioned 1.6km south-south-east of Kamianka (government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard about 90 explosions (43 assessed as outgoing rounds of IFV (BMP-1) cannon (73mm) fire and the remainder undetermined) and almost 200 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 2-5km at directions ranging from north-east to south-east and west.

In Luhansk region, between the evenings of 21-22 September, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including four explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 30 explosions). Between the evenings of 22-23 September, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including 16 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours.

On the evening of 21 September, the SMM camera in Kriakivka (government-controlled, 38km north-west of Luhansk) recorded four undetermined explosions and 20 projectiles in flight, all 2-5km south and south-south-west. The following evening, the same camera recorded three undetermined explosions and three projectiles, all 2-4km south-south-west. 

The SMM followed up on a civilian casualty. On 23 September, at a hospital in Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk), the SMM saw a man (47 years old) with bandages on the upper left side of his torso. The man told the SMM that on the morning of 18 September, he had been grazing goats on the eastern outskirts of Novooleksandrivka (65km west of Luhansk) when one of the goats had activated a tripwire and he had heard and felt an explosion. The head of the hospital told the SMM that the man had sustained shrapnel injuries to his chest, left lung and shoulder, and would remain in the hospital for several days.

The SMM followed up on reports of shelling and shooting in residential areas. On 22 September, at 2 Vorovskoho Street in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM saw a hole in the outer pane of a north-west-facing double-paned window and a bullet lying between the two panes of glass. The SMM assessed that it was a 7.62mm bullet fired from a westerly direction. A resident (36 year old man) told the SMM that he had been at home when the bullet had hit the window in the early morning hours of 22 September.

On 22 September, at 2 Akhmatovoi Street in Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM saw a 1.5-2.5m hole in the roof of a cultural centre. At 6 Peremohy Street, the SMM observed numerous holes in the metal fence and metal yard doors in front of a house. At both locations, the SMM could not make more detailed assessments due to security considerations. At a local shop at 1 Peremohy Street, the SMM observed holes about 1cm in diameter, which it assessed as caused by small-arms fire originating from a westerly direction. A local resident told the SMM that shelling had taken place during the early evening of 21 September.

On 23 September, on the eastern edge of Uzhivka (formerly Leninske, non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM observed two fresh craters on the eastern side of a road leading south to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), both assessed as caused by mortar rounds (calibre undetermined) fired from a south-south-westerly direction. About 30m south-east, inside a power substation compound, the SMM observed three fresh craters, all of which the SMM assessed were caused by 82mm mortar rounds fired from a south-south-westerly direction, as well as shrapnel damage to the westerly wall of a nearby metal equipment container and to a nearby large transformer.

At 79/1 Serhiivska Street, the SMM observed a hole in the roof of a house, which had been covered in a plastic sheet and was being repaired by workers. From inside the house, the SMM saw that the hole was in the ceiling of the living room and that there was debris all over the room. The SMM also saw an impact in the floor of the living room and two shattered south-facing windows. About 8m north-east of the house, the SMM saw a large fresh crater and a tail fin of a 120mm mortar round near the crater. The SMM saw a hole in the glass of a north-facing window of the house as well. The SMM assessed that the crater and damage were caused by a 120mm mortar round fired from a south-south-westerly direction. The SMM observed that a nearby tree had been hit on its south-west facing side by a projectile, which caused shrapnel damage to a brick barn located about 2m south of the tree. The SMM assessed that the damage to the house was caused by at least one 120mm mortar round fired from a south-south-westerly direction. A local resident (male, in his forties) told the SMM that shelling had taken place on 22 September at around 16:00.

The SMM continued to observe civilians facing hardships crossing the contact line. On 23 September, at a government checkpoint in Berezove (government-controlled, 31km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM saw a body lying on the ground, partially covered with a white cloth. A woman (in her fifties) present told the SMM that her husband (58 years old) had collapsed suddenly while they had been waiting to cross the checkpoint and had then died. She said that he had suffered from heart problems. Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint personnel said that the man had been waiting to travel to Donetsk. The SMM saw a morgue vehicle arrive to collect the body.

The SMM continued to monitor and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske[2] (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On 21 September, an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted building materials (wooden planks and poles) near a position of the armed formations in a tree line about 400m west of road T1316 and about 750m north of the southern edge of the disengagement area, as well as a person assessed as a member of the armed formations walking near a position about 1km east of the same road, both inside the Zolote disengagement area.

During the day on 22 and 23 September, positioned near the Petrivske disengagement area as well as near and inside the Stanytsia Luhanska and Zolote disengagement areas, the SMM observed calm situations.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in a non-government-controlled area, on 22 September, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted two mortars (2B14 Podnos, 82mm) in a defensive position of the armed formations with their barrels oriented west as well as two ammunition crates, one next to each mortar, on the western edge of Sakhanka.

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. At such sites in government-controlled areas of Donetsk region, the SMM observed eight self-propelled howitzers (2S19 Msta-S, 152mm), including two for the first time, as well as four multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-30 Smerch-M, 300mm), and noted that two self-propelled howitzers (2S19) were missing for the first time and that four MLRS (BM-30), 32 towed howitzers (18 2A65 Msta-B, 152mm, eight 2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm and six D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm), 23 self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm), ten anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) and 28 mortars (15 2B11 Sani, 120mm; 12 M-120 Molot 120mm; and one BM-37 82mm) continued to be missing.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles (ACV) and an anti-aircraft gun[3] in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 21 September, an SMM mini-UAV spotted four Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel, two recoilless guns (SPG-9 Kopye, 73mm) and four rounds of ammunition laid out on a tarpaulin, as well as a probable armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) parked nearby in the eastern outskirts of Zolote and an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (MT-LB) in Zolote-4/Rodina (59km west of Luhansk). The same day, an SMM mini-UAV spotted an ACV (variant undetermined) near Vrubivka (72km west of Luhansk). On 22 September, the SMM saw an APC (BTR-4) on road H20 near Kamianka and an APC (BTR-4) 3km west of Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk).

In non-government-controlled areas, on 21 September, an SMM mini-UAV spotted an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) mounted on a truck at an industrial facility near Brianka (46km south-west of Luhansk).

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential infrastructure. The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire. It also facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to water infrastructure in Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk), Yasynuvata and Stanytsia Luhanska, as well as power lines near Zolote-4/Rodina.

The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor demining in Pishchane (government-controlled, 22km north of Luhansk) (see SMM Daily Report 19 September 2018). The SMM also saw a group of 15 people wearing the logo of an international demining organization and surveying the area on the side of the road near Lomakyne (government-controlled, 15km north-east of Mariupol) for mines.

The SMM visited three border areas outside of government control.* While at a pedestrian border crossing point near Verkhnoharasymivka (57km south-east of Luhansk) for about 35 minutes on 22 September, the SMM saw four pedestrians entering Ukraine and four pedestrians exiting Ukraine. The SMM did not observe any members of the armed formations operating the border crossing point in Ukraine.

While at the pedestrian border crossing point near Popivka (50km south-east of Luhansk) for about 35 minutes on 22 September, the SMM did not observe pedestrians entering or exiting Ukraine and or members of the armed formations operating the border crossing point in Ukraine.

While at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for about 30 minutes on 23 September, the SMM saw two cars (both with Ukrainian licence plates) exiting Ukraine and a bus (with Ukrainian licence plates and about 15 passengers) entering Ukraine.

In Odessa, on 22 September, the SMM observed a protest of about 300 people on the southern edge of Shevchenko Park, about 250 of which were wearing clothing with National Corps insignia as well as displaying affiliations with other activist groups known to the SMM as members of Svoboda, Sokil, Power to the People, Street Front and Automaidan. Some of the people wore masks or balaclavas and five people carried large hammers. The group marched to a construction site on Lanzheron Beach and proceeded to tear down the external metal fence (about 200m long) around the site. After the group tore down the fence, the SMM saw about 300 police officers, about 60 of which were in riot gear, form a cordon around the construction site. Shortly afterwards, the group dispersed.

The same evening, the SMM followed up on reports that a man known to the SMM as a member of the group Power to the People had been shot at his home the same day. Police in Odessa told the SMM that the man had been shot twice in the chest and once in the forearm and was being treated at hospital no. 1. The police said they had initiated an investigation under article 15/115 (Attempted Murder).  

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• On 22 September, at a checkpoint about 1km north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations again stopped the SMM and denied it passage south to Zaichenko and southward to Sakhanka. The SMM observed civilian traffic passing through the checkpoint.
• On 22 September, at a checkpoint on road E58 north-west of Bezimenne (non-government-controlled, 30km east of Mariupol), three armed members of the armed formations again stopped the SMM and denied it passage. The SMM observed civilian traffic passing through the checkpoint.
• On 22 September, at a checkpoint on the eastern edge of Novolaspa (non-government-controlled, 50km south of Donetsk), two armed members of the armed formations denied the SMM passage, citing the risk of presence of snipers in the area.
• On 23 September, at a heavy weapons holding area in a government-controlled area of Donetsk region, a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer denied the SMM access to the site.
• On 23 September, at a heavy weapons holding area in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region, three members of the armed formations (two visibly armed) denied the SMM access to the area, citing ‘orders’ from their superiors.
• On 23 September, at the Chervona Mohyla railway station in Voznesenivka (formerly Chervonopartyzansk, non-government-controlled, 65km south-east of Luhansk), two members of the armed formations, one visibly armed, told the SMM to leave the area. 

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• On 22 and 23 September, the SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC on both occasions.[4]
• On 22 and 23 September, the SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC on both occasions.5
• On 22 and 23 September, the SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

Other impediments:

• On 23 September, an SMM long-range UAV experienced jamming north of Kalynove (non-government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), Stare (formerly Chervonyi Prapor, non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk) and Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 30km north-east of Donetsk).[5]

[1]     For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. 

[2]     Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[3] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC withdrew from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

[5] The interference could have originated from anywhere within the radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position. 

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ASTANA, 24 September 2018 – An OSCE-organized week-long simulation exercise on how to identify and rescue victims of human trafficking kicks off today at the Regional Hub for Countering Global Threats in Astana. More than 50 professionals from law enforcement, labour inspectorates, financial investigative units, prosecutorial offices, NGOs and social services from 14 OSCE participating States and Partners for Co-operation are participating in the live-action training.

Delivered for the first time in the Russian language, this pioneering training exercise offers front-line responders the opportunity to simulate real-life anti-trafficking responses, using live actors to create trafficking scenarios. Fictitious brothels, a construction site and an agricultural field have been re-created to simulate cases of labour and sexual exploitation, including of child victims.

“By gathering experts from different fields, including financial investigation units, social and migration services, lawyers and NGOs, we are working toward bringing together a multi-agency and multi-disciplinary network of professionals across the OSCE region,” said Valiant Richey, OSCE Acting Co-ordinator for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings. “Our simulation exercises are realistic, practical and cross-dimensional to effectively enhance participating States’ ability to identify victims, investigate suspected trafficking cases and prosecute exploiters and perpetrators.”

Previous training courses have left participants, including Italy’s Public Prosecutor David Mancini, praising the approach as “truly unique” and the results as “genuinely extraordinary” with enhanced learning outcomes as “the border between reality and simulation becomes increasingly blurred for all participants”.

Andrey Lukin, Deputy Prosecutor General of Kazakhstan, said: “International co-operation is extremely important. The efficiency of the anti-trafficking response depends on the co-ordinated and coherent work of practitioners from different countries. The goal of this simulation training, involving participants from 14 countries, is to rally all of us and to unite our efforts to combat this crime.”

This project is part of ongoing efforts by the Office of the OSCE Special Representative for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings to facilitate better identification and assistance of trafficking victims through a new, multi-national and cross-sectoral approach.

The simulation exercise in Astana, supported by the OSCE field operations, including the Programme Office in Astana, follows four similar exercises in Vicenza, Italy. A further exercise will be conducted in Vicenza in December 2018.

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VIENNA, 24 September 2018 - The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, today denounced the arrest of three journalists from the Greek daily newspaper Fileleftheros on defamation charges and welcomed that the prosecutor decided not to immediately press charges, a move that led to their release. He called on authorities to decriminalize defamation.

“I denounce the detention of journalists for several hours following criminal defamation charges by the Minister of Defence relating to a story about the alleged misuse of European Union funds,” said Désir. “Political leaders should refrain from bringing criminal charges against journalists for their investigative reporting and need to display a higher tolerance for criticism and scrutiny from the press. Such intimidation of journalists is unacceptable.”

The publisher, editor-in-chief and political editor of Fileleftheros spent a night in jail after being accused of defamation by Greece’s Minister of Defence, Panos Kammenos. The Minister filed charges against them and four other journalists from the newspaper following the front-page article, published on 21 September, on the alleged mismanagement of European Union funds linked to the Defence Ministry.

“I welcome that the three journalists were released and that no immediate charges were pressed by the Prosecutor,” Désir continued. “Defamation should be decriminalized in line with international standards on freedom of expression. I call on the authorities to use this incident as a way to revise the current laws and to decriminalize defamation.”

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom.

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397118 Željka Šulc

The OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), in co-ordination with the BiH Agency for the Prevention of Corruption and Co-ordination of the Fight against Corruption, organized a one-day workshop for the Herzegovina-Neretva Canton (HNC) Anti-corruption Team and anti-corruption focal points within the ministries of the Herzegovina-Neretva cantonal government on 20 September 2018 in Mostar.

The aim of the workshop was to assist the anti-corruption team with the monitoring and implementation of the cantonal anti-corruption strategy and the effective planning and co-ordination of its anti-corruption activities.

The training was facilitated by the state-level anti-corruption agency personnel who focused on addressing the above-named priorities and strengthening the anti-corruption team’s capacities.

The OSCE Mission to BiH is committed to supporting anti-corruption efforts and activities and strengthening capacities of anti-corruption teams at all levels in BiH.

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, compared with the previous reporting period. The SMM saw military presence inside the Zolote disengagement area. The Mission’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas; it was also restricted near Betmanove and, again, near Verkhnoshyrokivske.* The SMM observed weapons in violations of agreed withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line. The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station. It also facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs and maintenance works to water infrastructure in Stanytsia Luhanska, Avdiivka and near Artema.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations,[1] including 115 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (15 explosions).

On the evening and night of 20-21 September, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded about 45 explosions, 36 projectiles in flight (mostly from west to east) and two illumination flares in vertical flight, all 0.6-4km south and south-south-west.

On the evening of 20 September, the SMM camera in Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk) recorded nine explosions (one assessed as an impact, six undetermined and two assessed as airbursts) and three projectiles in flight, all 2-4km south-east and south-south-east.

On the evening of 20 September, the SMM camera 1.5km north-east of Hnutove (government-controlled, 20km north-east of Mariupol) recorded four undetermined explosions, about 80 projectiles in flight (mostly from north to south) and two illumination flares in vertical flight, all 2-4km east-north-east and east.

During the day on 21 September, positioned 2km south-east of Lebedynske (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM heard about 30 undetermined explosions and four bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 2-4km at northerly directions.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including a similar number of explosions (about 30), compared with the previous reporting period.

On the evening of 20 September, the SMM camera in Kriakivka (government-controlled, 35km north-west of Luhansk) recorded 13 undetermined explosions, 2-4km south-west and south-south-west.

During the day on 21 September, positioned 1.5km north-west of Troitske (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 12 explosions (of which some were assessed as outgoing rounds of self-propelled grenade or rocket-propelled grenade launchers and others as impacts of the same weapon systems), all 2-3km north-east. The SMM assessed all of the above-mentioned explosions as live-fire training in the security zone, in violation also of the decision of the Trilateral Contact Group of March 2016 that prohibits the conduct of live-fire training (exercises) in the security zone as described in the Addendum to the Package of Measures.

Positioned on the south-eastern edge of Berezivske (non-government-controlled, 53km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard ten undetermined explosions 2-3km north-north-east.

The SMM continued to monitor and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske[2] (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On 21 September, the SMM saw a military truck (Kamaz) loaded with wood entering the Zolote disengagement area (travelling west from the government checkpoint north of the disengagement area towards Katerynivka (government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk)). The same day, the SMM saw three people (two men and a woman) wearing uniforms inside the disengagement area travelling on board of a black car with military licence plates from Katerynivka towards the government checkpoint.

During the day on 21 September, positioned near the Petrivske disengagement area, as well as near and inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, the SMM observed a calm situation.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in a non-government-controlled area, on 21 September, an SMM mid-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted a tank (a possible T-72) in the yard of a house on the eastern edge of Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, 23km north-east of Mariupol).

In violation of withdrawal lines in a government-controlled area, on 21 September, the SMM saw a multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) near Topolyne (19km north-west of Mariupol).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in a non-government-controlled area, on 21 September, the SMM saw a tank (a probable T-64) loaded on a flatbed trailer near Mykhailivka (31km west of Luhansk) heading west on road T0504.

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in a government-controlled area, on 20 September, an SMM long-range UAV spotted four surface-to-air missile systems (9K33 Osa) (of which two were assessed as probable) near Pobieda (55km north of Luhansk).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. In non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region beyond the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM noted that six MLRS (BM-21) and12 mortars (11 PM-38, 120mm and one 2B11 Sani, 120mm) continued to be missing. The SMM noted that six self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) were missing for the first time.

The SMM revisited permanent storage sites in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region, whose locations were beyond the respective withdrawal lines, and noted that 18 tanks (eight T-64 and ten T-72), nine mortars (2B14 Podnos, 82mm) and 15 anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 82mm) continued to be missing.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles (ACV) and an anti-aircraft gun[3] in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 20 September, an SMM long-range UAV spotted six infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (five BMP-1 and one BMP-2) and two armoured personnel carriers (APC) (BTR-70) near Muratove (51km north-west of Luhansk) and an APC (MT-LB) near Troitske.

In non-government-controlled areas, on 20 September, an SMM mini-UAV spotted a probable APC (BTR-80) near Pryvitne (11km north of Luhansk) and an ACV (type undetermined) near Vesela Hora (16km north of Luhansk). The same day, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an APC (BTR-70) and an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) at a compound in a residential area of Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, 50km west of Luhansk).

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential infrastructure. The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire. It also facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to water infrastructure in Avdiivka, Stanytsia Luhanska and near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk).

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 17 September) The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• On two occasions, at a checkpoint west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), two members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage, citing risks to the SMM’s security.
• At a checkpoint near Betmanove (formerly Krasnyi Partyzan, 23km north-east of Donetsk), two armed members of the armed formations denied the SMM passage, thus preventing the SMM from accessing a school located about 50m from the checkpoint.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC. [4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.
• The SMM did not travel across the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk) due to the presence of mines. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC said there were mines on the road south of the bridge. The SMM informed the JCCC. [4]

Other impediments:

• At a school in Petrovenky (non-government-controlled, 40km west of Luhansk), a woman who introduced herself as a school representative said that she could not provide information to the SMM, citing “orders” from senior members of the armed formations.
• The SMM temporarily lost communication with its mid-range UAV flying over Pikuzy, assessed as due to jamming. The SMM landed the UAV safely.[5]

[1]   Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[2]   Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[3] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC withdrew from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

[5] The interference could have originated from anywhere within the radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position. 

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This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions compared with the previous reporting period. The SMM saw military presence inside the Zolote disengagement area. The Mission’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas as well as again near Verkhnoshyrokivske.* Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of a multiple launch rocket system in violation of withdrawal lines near Buhaivka. The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station. It also facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs and maintenance works to critical water infrastructure in Stanytsia Luhanska and Slovianoserbsk and to the Krasnohorivka gas distribution station between Marinka and Oleksandrivka, as well as demining in Pishchane. In Kyiv, the SMM monitored a gathering regarding the status of non-Ukrainian ATO veterans.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations,[1] including 15 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (58 explosions).

On the night of 19-20 September, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded two explosions assessed as impacts of 30mm grenades 0.5-1.5km south as well as four explosions (one assessed as an impact and three undetermined) and 22 projectiles in flight (mostly from west to east), all 2-5km at southerly directions.

During the day on 20 September, positioned about1km north-west of the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk) the SMM heard six undetermined explosions and two shots of small-arms fire, all 2-4km at directions ranging from south-south-west to north.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including 30 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (41 explosions).

During the day on 20 September, positioned about 2km east-north-east of Myrne (non-government-controlled, 28km south-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 11 artillery explosions over a period of 15 minutes, 1km north-east, assessed as live-fire training outside the security zone. (See observations from training area near Myrne below.)              

During the day on 20 September, positioned near Malomykolaivka (non-government-controlled, 36km south-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard seven artillery explosions over a period of about 15 minutes, 6km north-east, assessed as live-fire training outside the security zone.

The SMM continued to monitor and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske[2] (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

South of the railway bridge crossing road T1316 in the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM saw two soldiers of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, each carrying an automatic rifle, walking south along the road.

Near but outside the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM saw an ambulance with military licence plates and a green Volkswagen Transporter minivan with Ukrainian civilian licence plates driving from the checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces north of the disengagement area towards Zolote-4/Rodina (government-controlled, 59km west of Luhansk). Five minutes later, the SMM observed another ambulance with military licence plates and a dark green minivan driving through Zolote‑1/Soniachnyi (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) towards the aforementioned checkpoint at high speed. Through the window of this ambulance, the SMM was able to see two persons holding intravenous bags.                                                                                                                        

Positioned north of Petrivske, the SMM heard an explosion assessed as an impact and saw a cloud of black smoke emanating from 2-3km north-west (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas, aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of a multiple launch rocket system (type undetermined) in a training area near Buhaivka (37km south-west of Luhansk) on 18 September.

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in government-controlled areas, at the railway station in Rubizhne (84km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM saw four self-propelled howitzers (2S5 Giatsint-S, 152mm), five towed howitzers (2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm) and five anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) loaded on a train. (Loaded on the same train, the SMM saw ten armoured personnel carriers (APC), one command and fire control vehicle and more than ten military trucks. [3]) Later the same day, the SMM saw two self-propelled howitzers (2S5) loaded on trailers near the same railway station.

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in non-government-controlled areas, aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence, on 18 September, of 26 tanks (undetermined types) in a training area near Buhaivka, 20 tanks (undetermined types) in a training area near Shymshynivka (27km south-west of Luhansk) and 18 tanks (undetermined types) 14 pieces of towed artillery (undetermined types) in a training area near Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk). On 20 September, the SMM saw a tank (type undetermined) and seven towed howitzers (undetermined types) near the same training area near Myrne.

Also on 18 September, aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of 26 pieces of towed artillery (undetermined types) and four surface-to-air-missile systems (undetermined types) in a training area near Buhaivka (in the same area, aerial imagery also revealed the presence of 75 armoured combat vehicles) and a probable piece of towed artillery in a training area near Shymshynivka (in the same area, aerial imagery also revealed the presence of 27 armoured combat vehicles).

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles and an anti-aircraft gun[4] in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 19 September, the SMM saw an APC (BTR-4) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk). On 20 September, the SMM saw an APC (BTR‑4) near Novobakhmutivka, an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) being towed near Myrne (40km north-east of Mariupol) and an APC (BTR-4) being towed in Artema (26km north of Luhansk).

In non-government-controlled areas on 20 September, the SMM saw an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) near Boikivske (formerly Telmanove, non-government-controlled, 67km south-east of Donetsk).

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential infrastructure. The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire. It also facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the Krasnohorivka gas distribution station between Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) and Oleksandrivka (non-government-controlled, 20km south-west of Donetsk), to water infrastructure in Stanytsia Luhanska, where workers installed water pipes to sanitary facilities about 100m south of the nearby entry-exit checkpoint, and Slovianoserbsk (non-government-controlled, 28km north-west of Luhansk) and demining in Pishchane (government-controlled, 22km north of Luhansk).

The SMM visited a border area outside of government control. While at a pedestrian border crossing point near Novoborovytsi (79km south of Luhansk) for about 20 minutes, the SMM observed no pedestrians entering or exiting Ukraine.

In Kyiv, the SMM monitored a large gathering regarding the status of non-Ukrainian ATO veterans. Gathered in front of the national parliament building at 5 Hrushevskoho Street, the SMM observed about 500 individuals (90 per cent men between 16 and 35 years old), some displaying flags of National Corps, Natsionalni Druzhyny, Svoboda, Veterans Brotherhood and Right Sector, chanting “passports to volunteers” and carrying a large banner reading “Citizenship for Volunteers.” According to speeches being given at the gathering, the group was demanding that all non-Ukrainian ATO veterans be granted Ukrainian citizenship. The SMM saw about 800 National Guard and riot police officers, some carrying anti-riot shields, standing between the national parliament building and the crowd. At one point, the SMM observed some members of the gathering throw fireworks and attempt to break through a police cordon protecting the entrance to the national parliament building.  Later, about 100 people broke off from the crowd and proceeded to the entrance of the Presidential Administration Building at 1 Bankova Street (where about 200 National Guard and riot police officers were stationed), where some of them chained themselves to a fence. The participants subsequently dispersed without further incidents.

In Kherson, the SMM attempted to follow up further on reports of the hazardous pollution emanating from a chemical plant on the Crimean peninsula (see SMM Daily Report 14 September 2018). Representatives of the State Consumer Service of Kherson told the SMM that tests had been conducted on air, water, soil and food chain samples, and all had fallen within acceptable limits but that monitoring would continue.

The SMM continued monitoring in Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 17 September) The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a checkpoint west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), three members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage, citing risks to the SMM’s security. The SMM saw civilian cars crossing the checkpoint.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[5]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.5
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

[1]   Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[2]   Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[3]   This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4]   This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[5]   The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC withdrew from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

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Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights Turkey, Early Presidential and Parliamentary Elections, 24 June 2018: Final Report

The final report by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) on Turkey’s 24 June early presidential and parliamentary elections, published on 21 September 2018, recommends a review of legislation to bring it in line with international obligations and standards for conducting democratic elections. The report also recommends lowering the threshold for parties to qualify for seat allocation and ensuring equality of the vote across constituencies. It further recommends making eligibility requirements for political parties to run in elections less restrictive.

The report notes that the authorities need to take necessary measures to ensure that the campaign is conducted in an atmosphere free from intimidation and fear of retribution, and to ensure a clear separation between the state and party.

To improve transparency, the report recommends that meetings of electoral boards be open to media and observers, and that preliminary election results be published immediately. An additional recommendation is to amend legislation to explicitly provide for the presence of observers, both international and citizen.

The report reiterates an earlier ODIHR recommendation that the authorities refrain from applying anti-terrorism legislation to prosecute journalists based solely on the content of their reporting, and that media outlets should be able to operate free from intimidation or pressure. In addition, the report recommends that laws and regulations be brought in line with international obligations on freedom of expression and media freedom.

To provide for an effective means of redress, the report recommends that decisions by the Supreme Board of Elections be subject to judicial review.

It also recommends training election commission members in the area of counting procedures and completion of protocols. To ensure that voters are able to vote freely, the report recommends that the police presence be limited to ensuring public order, and that only commission chairpersons have the authority to call the police into polling stations.

For election day observation, ODIHR joined efforts with the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.

BELGRADE, 21 September 2018 – Beginning his second visit to the region since his appointment in July, the OSCE PA’s Special Representative on South East Europe, Mark Pritchard (United Kingdom), has met in Belgrade the past two days with a range of governmental and parliamentary leaders, as well as representatives of the international community and civil society.

In meetings with Chairperson of the National Assembly’s Foreign Affairs Committee Žarko Obradović, Director of the Office for Kosovo and Metohija Government of the Republic of Serbia Marko Durić and the Serbian Delegation to the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, key topics of discussions have included regional co-operation, the EU-facilitated Belgrade-Pristina dialogue, parliamentary oversight, and the OSCE’s role in the region.

“I look forward to continuing my substantive discussions with key figures in the region on a range of topics,” said Pritchard today. “Parliamentary diplomacy is a vital component of enhancing regional dialogue on all of the challenges facing Serbia and the region as a whole.”

Pritchard is accompanied by Ambassador Andreas Nothelle, the OSCE PA’s Special Representative in Vienna. In meetings Thursday with Ambassador Andrea Orizio, Head of Mission of the OSCE Mission to Serbia, and representatives of civil society, the OSCE PA delegation heard about OSCE activities as well as Belgrade’s achievements and remaining challenges.

Pritchard praised Serbia for remaining actively committed to bilateral relations and regional co-operation. He also commended the OSCE Mission to Serbia for the valuable expertise and assistance it continues to offer the country. Special Representative Pritchard will continue his visit to Pristina. Last month, he was in Albania and Montenegro in his first visit to the region since being appointed Special Representative in July.

He welcomed in particular the progress that Serbia has made in its European Union accession bid and urged continued commitment to the process. He also highlighted relevant resolutions adopted by the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly and encouraged follow-up to election-related recommendations made by the OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights.

For more information on the Special Representative on South East Europe, please click here.

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PRISHTINË/PRIŠTINA, 21 SEPTEMBER 2018 - The OSCE Mission in Kosovo will organize an event on Monday, 24 September 2018, to launch two reports on bilingual legislation and on language compliance in the Kosovo Police, as one of numerous activities to mark the European Day of Languages. All activities are organized with the support of the Office of the Language Commissioner.

The first report presents the progress made by Kosovo institutions in the implementation of the legal framework governing language rights, while the second analyses the implementation of this framework by one of these institutions in particular – the Kosovo Police.

The European Day of Languages – 26 September – was declared by the Council of Europe in 2001, to be marked annually. It is celebrated across Europe with the goal of promoting the values of multilingualism, cultural diversity and lifelong language learning.

As part of its mandate, the OSCE Mission in Kosovo monitors the compliance of institutions with human rights standards, including language rights, and supports those institutions through means that are tailored to further improve that compliance.

Media are invited to attend the event on Monday, 24 September 2018, at Swiss Diamond Hotel in Prishtinë/Priština, starting from 10:30 hrs.

The Head of the OSCE Mission in Kosovo, Ambassador Jan Braathu; General Director of Kosovo Police, Rashit Qalaj; Language Commissioner, Slaviša Mladenović; Legal Director in the Office of Prime Minister, Mentor Borovci, and Member of the Assembly of Kosovo,  Duda Balje, will speak at the event. 

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Ioanna Lachana, OSCE Mission to Skopje Mirvete Islam, OSCE Mission to Skopje

Representatives of twenty municipal councils were introduced to an OSCE training programme designed to promote democratic governance through improved work of local elected officials during promotional events that took place in Ohrid and Skopje on 19, 20 and 21 September.

These events were organized by the OSCE Mission to Skopje in co-operation with the Association of Local Self-Government Units (ZELS) and the State Inspectorate for Local Self- Government.

“The OSCE Mission to Skopje has been providing continuous support to efforts to build the capacities of municipal councils since the start of the decentralization process,” said Ninoslav Vasiljević, the Chief of the Mission’s Democratic Governance and Social Cohesion Unit. “We remain committed to strengthening the capacities of municipal councillors in order to help them improve the quality of life in local communities.”

OSCE staff will deliver the training course in October and November.

COPENHAGEN, 21 September 2018 – Several leaders of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly have actively participated over the past two weeks in the Human Dimension Implementation Meeting, organized by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights and the Italian OSCE Chairmanship, speaking at working sessions on democracy, fundamental freedoms, rights of migrants, human trafficking, and freedom of the media.

In an address at the opening of the HDIM in Warsaw on 10 September, OSCE PA President George Tsereteli (Georgia) stressed that open dialogue on controversial issues must continue and opposing views must be heard by all in order to successfully work together towards implementing OSCE commitments.

“Our primary goal is to better the lives of the more than one billion people of the OSCE area,” he said. “Our duty is to respond to their desire to live in a free society, where democratic debate is encouraged and not stifled, where journalists are respected and not jailed or killed, where a simple citizen can trust that his or her voice counts and is not discarded.”

President Tsereteli was joined at the HDIM by OSCE PA human rights committee Rapporteur Kyriakos Hadjiyianni (Cyprus), who spoke at the working session on democratic institutions and elections, and again the following day during discussions on freedom of the media.In his remarks, Hadjiyianni stressed that the OSCE and civil society must work together to defend journalists from persecution, promote quality journalism and guarantee that efforts to address “fake news” comply with international standards for free media. Ensuring an informed electorate in a democratic society requires that governments refrain from all forms of censorship or intimidation, but also requires higher standards in journalism, he said.

The OSCE PA was also represented by Vice-Presidents Isabel Santos (Portugal) and Kari Henriksen (Norway), and human rights committee Chair Margareta Kiener Nellen (Switzerland), who spoke at several working sessions of the meeting. Kiener Nellen noted that parliamentarians have an important role to play in promoting tolerance and non-discrimination.

“Through the enacting of relevant legislation aimed at combating hate crimes and hate speech, and promoting equal rights and opportunities, parliaments have a strong tool at their disposal to improve the situation qualitatively,” she said.

Santos spoke on the rights of migrants, noting that the main question is whether we will be able to meet together the challenges of increased migration flows and continue to honor the commitments made globally.“Migratory movements constitute a constant mark in the history of mankind and it will never be possible to stop those who are driven by the despair generated by persecution or by war nor those nourished by the hope of a new opportunity of life with safety and dignity,” Santos said.In working sessions on fundamental freedoms, rights of migrants, and human trafficking, Henriksen focused on promoting opportunities and protections for women and children. She noted that promoting the integration of migrant women by facilitating their access to the labour market contributes to general prosperity.

“In my country, Norway, the participation of women in the work place has contributed more to our prosperity and GDP surplus than oil revenues,” Henriksen said. “We offer introduction programmes for migrant women to give them the necessary language skills as this is a basic precondition for entry in the labour market.”

Europe’s largest annual human rights and democracy conference, the HDIM is organized every year by the OSCE/ODIHR. It serves as a platform for the OSCE, other international organizations and civil society to assess the implementation of OSCE human dimension commitments, share best practices and make recommendations for further improvement.

It took place in Warsaw at the Sofitel Hotel on 10-21 September.For more information, please visit ODIHR's website.

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Vienna, 21 September 2018 – In a letter to the authorities of the Russian Federation the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, expressed his concern regarding the proposed amendments to the country’s Code of Administrative Offences and the Criminal Code, which were adopted yesterday in the final reading by the lower house of parliament, the State Duma. The amendments, among other things, strengthen the penalties for the dissemination of ‘false’ information related to defamation and information that affects privacy protection.

“I am concerned about the introduction of criminal responsibility, punishable by up to one year of imprisonment, for non-compliance with court decisions ordering the takedown or retraction of content in the civil defamation domain. As such, the amendments have a high potential to undermine the freedom of expression, including the free flow of information and access to information,” said Désir.

“The international standards related to civil defamation laws stipulate that any sanctions should not be so significant as to exert a chilling effect on freedom of expression and should be strictly proportionate, as well as designed to restore reputation. Imprisonment is never an appropriate penalty for such offences.”

The Representative noted that while additional and adequate measures to protect minors, as stipulated in the explanatory note to the amendments, can be legitimate and necessary, the statutory provision, which would apply criminal responsibility for civil offences related to defamation, can represent a threat to freedom of expression.

“I call on the members of the upper chamber of the Russian Parliament to reject these amendments and stop initiatives which would represent a serious setback for, and negatively affect the right to, freedom of expression and access to information of public interest,” Désir said.

Désir also encouraged the authorities to fully decriminalize defamation as was the case in 2011 (https://www.osce.org/fom/85154), in order to end the chilling effect of such legislation on freedom of the media.

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom.

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396818 Munira Shoinbekova, OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe

A five-day training course on emergency first aid concluded on 21 September 2018 at the OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe.

The course brought together some 25 Tajik border officials, of which 14 were female participants. It was delivered by experienced trainers from Tajikistan.   

During the five-day course border officials learned basic lifesaving skills. They were taught how to respond to combat accident-related injuries as well as to heat, cold, altitude and other environment-related injuries and illnesses. They also learned how to remain calm in emergency situations.

Other topics covered in the course included protecting the casualty against further injury without creating a risk for oneself; the location and use of rescue equipment and observing and interpreting the victim's general condition. Participants were also provided with first aid kits.

Vyacheslav Abramets, Border Management Adviser in the OSCE Office’s Politico-Military Department, congratulated the participants on the completion of the course .“The Office is helping to build the capacity of Tajik border officials by providing high-quality training courses in a number of key areas,” Abramets said.

SDGs SDGs:  6 - Clean water and sanitation 7 - Affordable and clean energy 11 - Sustainable cities and communities 13 - Climate action 16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions 17 - Partnerships for the goals

ISSYK-KUL, Kyrgyzstan, 20 September 2018 - The Aarhus Centres and Public Environmental Information Centres from 15 countries concluded today in Issyk-Kul a two-day meeting on the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and its goals.

“The Aarhus Centres represent a bridge between government authorities and civil society and offer a platform for dialogue on various issues in the field of environmental protection,” said Arsen Ryspekov, the Deputy Director of the State Agency for Environment Protection and Forestry of Kyrgyzstan.

Referring to the role of Aarhus Centres in implementing the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, the Head of the OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek, Pierre von Arx said:  “The Aarhus Centres provide a solid framework for governments to engage the public effectively to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals. Their contribution to promoting peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development deserves special recognition.”

Esra Buttanri, Senior Environmental Affairs Adviser at the Office of the Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities, said that the Aarhus Centres and Public Environmental Information Centres are instrumental in turning global environmental commitments into concrete action on the ground. “Their support for stakeholder engagement in uranium legacy remediation in Central Asia or their activities in reinforcing community-based disaster risk reduction are some examples of the Aarhus Centres’ accomplishments towards several SDGs.”

Maryna Yanush, the representative of the UNECE Aarhus Convention Secretariat, said: “The work of the Aarhus Centres, which includes promotion of effective and inclusive engagement of the public, local communities, academia and other stakeholders in environmental and sustainable development matters, can strengthen and complement the ability of the governments to achieve SDGs.”

The meeting concluded with a visit to the site of a successful example of a clean-up campaign conducted jointly by the local authorities and the Aarhus Centre in Issyk-Kul with the support of the Finnish Water Institute. 

The OSCE has been supporting the establishment and operation of a network of Aarhus Centres since 2002. Currently, a wide network of Aarhus Centres in 14 OSCE participating States disseminate environmental information, ensure public participation in decision-making, and facilitate access to justice. They also provide platforms to engage citizens, governments and the private sector in a dialogue on environmental challenges.

The 2018 Aarhus Centres Annual Meeting was organized jointly by the OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek and the Office of the Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities.

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This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer ceasefire violations in Luhansk region, compared with the previous reporting period. The SMM observed damage as a result of gunfire in a residential area of Dokuchaievsk. The SMM saw two new military positions inside the Zolote disengagement area,as well as military and military-type presence inside the Petrivske disengagement area. The Mission’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas as well as again near Bezimenne and Zaichenko.* The SMM observed weapons in violation of the respective withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line. The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station. It also facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs and maintenance works to critical water infrastructure in Luhansk region, as well as repairs to houses in Avdiivkaanddemining in Pishchane. In Kyiv, the SMM monitored two public gatherings related to customs clearance, road maintenance and the use of biometric passports. 

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations,[1]including 58 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (30 explosions).

On the evening of 18 September, the SMM camera in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk) recorded 77 projectiles in flight (mostly from south-south-west to north-north-east) 3-6km south-east and south-south-east. 

On the evening of 18 September, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded 15 undetermined explosions, 50 projectiles in flight (mostly from west to east) and six muzzle flashes, all 0.5-2km at directions ranging from east-south-east to south-west.  

During the day on 19 September, positioned about 1.5km south-south-east of Kamianka (government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk) for about four hours, the SMM heard 21 undetermined explosions 2-6km north-north-west and south-south-west.

On the evening and night of 18-19 September, the SMM camera in Berezove (government-controlled, 31km south-west of Donetsk) recorded 82 projectiles in flight (41 from north-west to south-east and 41 from south-east to north-west) 1-3km east-north-east and east. 

On the same evening and night, the SMM camera about 1.5km north-east of Hnutove (government-controlled, 20km north-east of Mariupol) recorded 130 projectiles in flight (mostly from north to south) 2-4km at directions ranging from north-east to south-east.  

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, however more explosions (41), compared with the previous reporting period (11 explosions).

On the evening of 18 September, the SMM camera in Kriakivka (government-controlled, 38km north-west of Luhansk) recorded ten undetermined explosions and two projectiles in flight from west to east, all 2-4km south-south-west. 

During the day on 19 September, while in Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, non-government-controlled, 50km west of Luhansk) the SMM heard 33 undetermined explosions 10-16km north-north-east. 

The SMM observed fresh damage as a result of gunfire in a residential area. At 100 Lenina Street in Dokuchaievsk (non-government-controlled, 30km south of Donetsk), the SMM saw a fresh hole in the outer pane of a double-paned west-south-west facing second floor apartment window in a five-storey building. The SMM also saw a 5.45mm bullet lodged between the two window panes and assessed that it was fired from a westerly direction. The resident of the apartment (woman, 71 years old) told the SMM that on 16 September at about 14:00, she had been in the living room and had heard the sound of glass breaking. Three other residents of the building separately told the SMM that they had heard “a lot of shooting” on 16 September.

The SMM continued to monitor and to pursue full access to the disengagement areasnear Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske[2] (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

The SMM saw for the first time two freshly dug south-facing military positions at the southern end of the railway bridge, one on either side of the road, as well as a man in camouflage clothing inside one of the positions which were assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces.  

In non-government-controlled areas near the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, the SMM saw about 15 civilians wearing orange jackets removing vegetation and cleaning the verges along the road from the Prince Ihor monument to the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge. 

On 10 September, inside the Petrivske disengagement area, an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted two members of the armed formations inside a position on the north-eastern edge of the disengagement area. On 12 September, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted three members of the armed formations near previously observed trenches on the south-eastern edge of the disengagement area. 

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas on 18 September,an SMM long-range UAV spotted a self-propelled howitzer (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) near Vrubivka (72km west of Luhansk) and three self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) near Vidrodzhennia (66km north-east of Donetsk). On 19 September, the SMM saw nine multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) near Vasiukivka (82km north of Donetsk). 

In violation of withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas, on 18 September, an SMM mini UAV spotted three towed mortars (2B11 Sani, 120mm) near Donetskyi (49km west of Luhansk). 

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in government-controlled areas, on 18 September, an SMM long-range UAV spotted two self-propelled anti-aircraft systems (2K22 Tunguska) and five tanks (T-64) near Spirne (96km north of Donetsk), five self-propelled howitzers (2S3) near Zolotarivka (85km north-west of Luhansk) and a surface-to air missile system (9K35 Strela-10) near Zamulivka (75km north-west of Luhansk). 

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in non-government-controlled areas, aerial imagery available to the SMM on 18 September revealed the presence of 39 tanks (undetermined variants) at a training area near Kruhlyk (31km south-west of Luhansk). 

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. At one such site in a government-controlled area of Donetsk region, the SMM noted that 12 anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira,100mm), 30 mortars (2B11), four surface-to-air missile systems (9K35), three towed howitzers (D-44, 85mm), 40 self-propelled howitzers (20 2S1 and 20 2S3) remained missing (11 of the abovementioned 12 anti-tank guns (MT-12) were missing for the first time).

The SMM revisited a heavy weapons permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region whose location corresponded with the withdrawal lines and noted that two MLRS (BM-21) remained missing. The SMM also noted that additional weapons were present for the first time. 

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles[3]and other indications of military-type presence in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 15 September, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted two IFVs (BMP-2) near Vodiane (94km south of Donetsk).[4]

In non-government-controlled areas, on 18 September, an SMM mini-UAV spotted two armoured personnel carriers (APC) (MT-LB) in Kalynove (60km west of Luhansk) and again spotted three APCs (two BTR-80 and an MT-LB) near a non-functional school occupied by the armed formations in Donetskyi, and a mid-range UAV spotted four IFVs (BMP-1) and an APC (BTR variant) in close vicinity to inhabited civilian houses in Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, 23km north-east of Mariupol). 

On 19 September, on the road between Bezimenne (non-government controlled, 30km east of Mariupol) and Roza (non-government-controlled, 36km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM saw fresh tracks assessed as at least six APCs (MT-LB). The same day, on the road between Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol) and Kulykove (non-government-controlled, 30km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM saw fresh tracks assessed as of a tank (T-64). (Both abovementioned sets of tracks are near areas where the SMM has encountered regular freedom of movement restrictions, see below). 

On 15 September, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted for the first time at least 100 fresh craters assessed as impacts of 82mm and 120mm mortar rounds between Vodiane (government-controlled, 94km south of Donetsk) and Azov (formerly Dzerzhynske, non-government-controlled, 96km south of Donetsk). On 18 September, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted 20m of new trenches near Krymske (government-controlled, 42km north-west of Luhansk), which are not visible in imagery from 11 August 2018, as well as about 20 fresh craters assessed as impacts of 82mm and 120mm mortar rounds, all less than two weeks old, near an IFV (BMP-1) (see above) near Vodiane. The same UAV also spotted a 50m extension of trenches near Pikuzy, not visible in imagery from 16 August 2018.

Aerial imagery available to the SMM on 17 September revealed the presence offour military-type trucks inside three compounds in Siedove (non-government-controlled, 106km south of Donetsk), a city to which the SMM has been denied access by the armed formations since April 2017.

The SMM observed the presence of mines and UXO. On 15 September, near Vodiane, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted more than 50 anti-tank mines (TM-62) in a field, part of a larger set of 500 previously observed mines, laid in two latitudinal rows south of road T0519 running south (see SMM Daily Report 1 September 2018). On 19 September, the SMM again observed a tailfin on the ground, assessed as from a 120mm mortar in Tavrycheske (non-government-controlled, 35km north-east of Mariupol).  

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire.

The SMM also facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to residential houses in Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk) and to water infrastructure in Stanytsia Luhanska and near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), as well as demining in Pishchane (government-controlled, 22km north of Luhansk), in an area where an anti-tank mine had reportedly exploded on 7 April 2018 (see SMM Daily Report 12 April 2018).

The SMM followed up on two public gatherings in Kyiv. The SMM saw about 350 people (mostly men, 20-50 years old) in front of the Cabinet of Ministers building at 12/2 Mykhayla Hrushevskoho Street after parking their cars (all with non-Ukrainian licence plates – most with licence plates from the Baltic states) along Hrushevskoho Street, impeding the flow of vehicular traffic. The men were carrying flags associated with “EuroAutoPower”, and several were holding signs in Ukrainian in support of more affordable customs clearance procedures. The SMM observed about 30 police and National Guard officers at the entrance of the building as well as a dozen police and National Guard buses and minivans. The event concluded without any incidents. 

The SMM saw about 350 people (mostly women, 60-70 years old) in front of the Supreme Court of Ukraine at 8 Pylypa Orlyka Street, praying, singing religious hymns and carrying banners against biometric passports, alleging that the passports violated their religious beliefs. The SMM observed about ten riot police officers and three National Guard and police buses nearby. The gathering was peaceful. 

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 17 September) TheSMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a checkpoint on road E58 north-west of Bezimenne, two armed members of the armed formations again stopped the SMM and denied it passage.
• At a checkpoint north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations stopped the SMM and again denied it passage westward to Pikuzy and southward to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol) citing “shooting in progress”. 

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by phone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[5]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by phone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.4
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

Other impediments

• Following up on access to education at six schools in Holubivka (formerly Kirovsk, non-government-controlled, 51km west of Luhansk) and a school in Sentianivka (formerly Frunze, non-government-controlled, 44km west of Luhansk), staff refused to provide information to the SMM without prior written permission from the armed formations. 

 

[1]For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. 

[2]Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[3]This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4]On 12 September, a mid-range UAV spotted four IFVs (BMP variants) near Bohdanivka (government-controlled, 41km south-west of Donetsk), not Bohdanivka (non-government-controlled, 44km west of Luhansk) (see SMM Daily Report 14 September 2018.)

[5]The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC withdrew from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

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SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

VIENNA, 20 September 2018 – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media Harlem Désir today expressed his condolences following the news of a tragic death of a young journalist, who died yesterday while filming a police operation at a protest near Aachen in Germany.

“I am shocked and saddened by the sudden and tragic death of a young journalist. My sincere condolences go out to his family, friends and colleagues,” the Representative said. “I understand that the death was accidental and hope that all the circumstances linked to this tragedy will be swiftly clarified.”

The journalist was killed on 19 September while filming the police who were dismantling treehouses set up by protesters in their protest against logging in the Hambacher Forest. The journalist reportedly fell 15 metres to his death when the planks of a makeshift suspended bridge collapsed. The police have started an investigation into the accident.

The journalist’s name has not been disclosed.

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom.

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396317 Munira Shoinbekova, OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe

Two OSCE-supported training courses for lawyers on development of professional competences and moral compensation for victims of torture and their relatives concluded on 18 September 2018 in Tajikistan. The first course was conducted on 14 and 15 September in Dushanbe, and the second was held on 17 and 18 September 2018 in the town of Guliston.

The two-day training courses for 45 practising defence lawyers from the Sughd and Dushanbe regions focused on national and international legislation and practice regarding the protection of torture victims and their relatives. They also aimed to strengthen the skills and expertise of the lawyers with regard to legal consultations and representation in courts.

National and international experts provided an overview of how to conduct investigations of torture cases, collect evidence and document the findings in accordance with international standards. Lessons learned from United Nations Committee Against Torture and European Court of Human Rights cases, as well as Tajikistan best practices were discussed at the training courses.

“I was impressed by the lawyers’ confidence that the legislation of Tajikistan allows all possibilities for non-pecuniary damage compensation and by their readiness to use these possibilities to develop the judiciary practice in such cases,” said Ukrainian human rights expert Olena Volochay, who was one of the trainers.   

“Such training is very important for lawyers, as newly gained knowledge motivates us to work better with our clients and achieve a fair judicial decision for victims,” said Firuza Usmanova, a lawyer from Khujand city.

The event was jointly organized by the OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights’ (OHCHR) Regional Office for Central Asia, the public fund Notabene and the Union of Lawyers of Tajikistan.