OSCE

395771 Igor Ličina, Human Rights Officer at the Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina (l), Anita Danka, ODIHR’s Human Rights Adviser (c) and Andrea Judit Tóth (r), Program and Communication Manager at the European Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ECNL). 17 September 2018. Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

Challenges and good practices in ensuring human rights-compliant assembly policing in the Western Balkans region and related available resources were explored and presented at an event in Warsaw on 17 September 2018, during the Human Dimension Implementation Meeting.

Some 40 representatives of civil society and state bodies took part in the event, which was organized by the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and the European Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ECNL).

“Assemblies take place in public spaces and often carry messages of great public concern,” said Anita Danka, ODIHR’s Human Rights Adviser. “The way assemblies are policed, therefore, creates a visible manifestation of how a state is committed to and capable of facilitating the exercise of fundamental freedoms.”

Igor Ličina, Human Rights Officer at the Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, said: “The key task of upholding human rights while facilitating assemblies can only be effectively dealt with if both the legal framework and policing practices are in line with international human rights standards. The Mission and ODIHR have been successfully co-operating in providing assistance to the authorities in improving both the laws and their application.”

Based on ODIHR’s Human Rights Handbook on Policing Assemblies, the Office has been assisting OSCE participating States in the region in building the skills of law enforcement authorities in policing assemblies in line with internationally recognized good practices. During the event, the Bosnian, Croatian, Serbian and Macedonian-language versions of the Handbook were presented to the participants.

ODIHR’s expertise in the area builds upon its work on monitoring assemblies in participating States. The Office also provides tools to support the work of independent observers.

“Accountability to the public is an essential element of human rights-friendly policing,” said Andrea Judit Tóth, Program and Communication Manager at ECNL. “Independent monitoring of the exercise of the freedom of peaceful assembly provides a valuable contribution to achieving accountability and is an important diagnostic tool for informed discussions on how to improve the protection of human rights.”

395744 Augusta Featherston, ODIHR’s Youth Focal Point, moderating the event. Warsaw, 14 September 2018. Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

New, youth-specific tools and research aimed at assisting policymakers and youth stakeholders working to enhance youth wellbeing and political engagement in the OSCE region were introduced at an event in Warsaw on 14 September 2018. Youth experts and practitioners, as well as representatives of governments and civil society organizations from OSCE participating States took part.

The event, which took place on the margins of the OSCE Human Dimension Implementation Meeting, was co-organized by the OSCE Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and the Consortium for Elections and Political Process Strengthening (CEPPS) represented by the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES).

During the discussion, expert panelists presented findings from a recent survey on youth attitudes in Poland, Hungary, and Slovakia, highlighting trends across the three countries with regard to young peoples’ attitudes towards political participation and social identity. They also shared findings from research exploring the efficacy of pro-youth legal instruments, intra-party policies and other public measures that are increasingly employed by governments, political parties and other electoral stakeholders to encourage youth engagement.

“As the presenters at the event highlighted, there is a need for both meaningful civic education and youth-specific data. In their presentations they suggested that effective strategies for young peoples’ participation in political and public life encompass both traditional approaches and initiatives designed using current information,” said Augusta Featherston, ODIHR’s Youth Focal Point.  “This, in turn, can lead to increasing trust in democratic institutions.”

The event also included a presentation of the Youth Progress Index, a collaborative project initiated in 2016 by ODIHR, Deloitte, the European Youth Forum, the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) and the Social Progress Imperative. The goal of the initiative is to provide reliable data across a wide spectrum of indicators on how countries are progressing in terms of offering favourable conditions to their young people. The index is intended to provide an evidence base for youth-friendly policymaking for all youth stakeholders, including youth themselves, policymakers and business leaders.

“It is our sincere hope that the Youth Progress Index is used to inform policy decisions with respect to young people,” said John Lisney, Policy and Advocacy Coordinator at the European Youth Forum.

395798 Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

Experts and representatives of armed forces, defence ministries, military trade unions and professional associations from a range of OSCE participating States shared experiences and good practices in protecting armed forces’ right to freedom of expression while ensuring operational effectiveness at an event held on 17 September 2018, on the margins of the Human Dimension Implementation Meeting.

Organized by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) in co-operation with the European Organisation of Military Associations (EUROMIL), the event provided participants with the opportunity to discuss international standards and practices related to freedom of speech and expression in the armed forces and how this right is regulated in different states.

”Because freedom of speech is about self-expression, communication and interaction, the armed forces can benefit from its promotion as it can bring about improvements to morale and increase transparency within the institution,” said Graziella Pavone, Human Rights Officer at ODIHR.

The event, a component of ODIHR’s long-term engagement on the issue of the protection and promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the armed forces, also focused on modern tools to promote freedom of expression and speech.

“New technologies facilitate and encourage the sharing of information and opinions for all citizens, including military personnel. Regulating this new situation in a way that respects human rights and fundamental freedoms, while at the same time preserving operational effectiveness and security, is a balancing act,” stressed Emmanuel Jacob, EUROMIL President. “Today’s event has clearly shown that military trade unions, professional associations and ombuds institutions can play an important role in finding the right balance.”

KYIV, 17 September 2018 – The Principal Deputy Chief Monitor of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, Alexander Hug, is travelling to eastern Ukraine from 17 to 21 September to assess the security situation and its impact on civilians.

He will meet local authorities in Luhansk and Donetsk regions as well as interact with civilians on both sides of the contact line. He will also encourage all concerned to work towards normalization of the situation. Hug will also visit Kharkiv and Dnipro regions towards the second half of the week.

Hug will hold press briefings, the exact time and location of which will be communicated via social media (@OSCE_SMM, www.facebook.com/oscesmm).

Journalists interested in covering the visit should contact Tetiana Tesliuchenko: +38 050 334 14 54; tetiana.tesliuchenko@osce.org; smm-press@osce.org.

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SKOPJE, 17 September 2018 – Ambassador Clemens Koja of Austria, appointed by the Italian OSCE Chairmanship as the Head of the OSCE Mission to Skopje, took office today. He succeeds Nina Suomalainen who completed her term as Head of Mission in April.

“I am happy to be taking up this important post in the midst of an ongoing reform process in the country in many key areas, such as the rule of law, media, public administration and the police,” said Koja. “I look forward to working with representatives of the institutions and civil society, as well as all stakeholders to further deepen the well-established co-operation with the Mission."

Koja has over 29 years of professional experience in the Foreign Service. Previously, he served as the Permanent Representative of Austria to the OSCE in Vienna, Austria's Ambassador in Belgrade and Ljubljana, Deputy Head of the Austrian Embassy in Madrid and Director of the Southern European Department at Austria's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He has studied law at the Universities of Salzburg and Vienna and holds a Master's degree in Catholic theology.

The key priorities of the OSCE Mission to Skopje are advancing constructive inter-ethnic relations and supporting the further implementation of the 2001 Ohrid Framework Agreement and its essential pillars: anti-discrimination, education, decentralization, equitable representation, smaller communities and the use of languages. The Mission works with the host country to implement reforms in areas such as elections, democratic policing, local governance, media and the judiciary.

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395486 Munira Shoinbekova, OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe

The OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe handed over technical equipment as a donation to the Media Academy of Tajikistan’s State Television and Radio Committee. The handover ceremony took place in the premises of the Media Academy in Dushanbe on 15 September 2018.

The technical equipment is intended for creating a multimedia studio for the Media Academy and it includes eleven items of radio and television equipment such as video and photo cameras, an audio and video mixer, printer, desktop computer and editing block.

The equipment will enable the Media Academy to provide professional training courses for employees of state and independent mass media and help to strengthen the quality of their work in keeping the public informed about important developments in the country.

“Freedom of expression is a fundamental and basic component of a democratic society. In this regard, the independence and pluralism of media are guiding principles that are essential to all free and open societies. I am glad that we can work together to safeguard this right both in principle and  through  donation such as today’s handover of equipment to the Media Academy,” said Tuula Yrjölä, Head of the OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe.

The donation of equipment is part of the assistance that the OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe provides to the civil society and government of Tajikistan to improve the capacity of the media to report and inform people in Tajikistan.

Communication and Media Relations Section OSCE Programme Office in Astana

A two-day train-the-trainer course for Kazakh government officials on countering terrorist financing was organized by the OSCE’s Transnational Threats Department, in partnership with the OSCE Programme Office in Astana, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime's Global Programme against Money Laundering (UNODC/GPML) and the Eurasian Group on Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism (EAG), from 14 to 15 September 2018, at the OSCE Secretariat in Vienna.  

The aim of the course was to assist Kazakhstan in countering terrorism financing, in line with relevant FATF standards and OSCE commitments.

The seven participants in the course from the Internal Affairs Ministry, the National Security Committee, the General Prosecutor’s Office, the Committee for Financial Monitoring, and the Academy of Law Enforcement Agencies will deliver training courses for local government officials upon their return to Kazakhstan, together with OSCE, UNODC/GPML and EAG international experts.

OSCE, UNODC and EAG commended the gender balance of the group of Kazakh local trainers, with four male and three female trainers.

The course was led by international experts and included sessions on terrorist finance funding cycle, sources of information, use of financial intelligence, inter-agency co-operation, international co-operation, private-public sector working and the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, vulnerabilities analysis, the analysis process/cycle, strategic analysis.  The training process focused on localized scenarios based on real-life cases.

The course strengthened the participants’ understanding of how improving inter-agency co-operation can help to identify and disrupt terrorist financial networks and highlighted specific instruments and techniques that could significantly improve the ability to counter terrorist financing. Part of a comprehensive capacity-building programme to support efforts to counter terrorism financing in Central Asia, the course follows similar train-the-trainer courses organized for Kazakh officials in December 2017.

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region compared with the previous reporting period. The Mission recorded ceasefire violations near all three disengagement areas. The SMM’s access remained restricted in the disengagement areas, as well as again near Verkhnoshyrokivske and Yuzhna-Lomuvatka.* The Mission observed weapons in violation of agreed withdrawal lines near Myrne. The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor repairs and maintenance work at the Donetsk Filtration Station as well as to water infrastructure in Stanytsia Luhanska, Slovianoserbsk and between Avdiivka and Yasynuvata, and to facilitate demining and repairs at a gas distribution station between Marinka and Oleksandrivka.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations,[1] including about 50 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 80 explosions).

On the evening and night of 13-14 September, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded 22 undetermined explosions, 58 projectiles in flight (mainly from west to east), 31 muzzle flashes and an illumination flare, all 0.5-2km south and south-south-west.

On the evening and night of 13-14 September, the SMM camera 1km south-west of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol) recorded three undetermined explosions, 104 projectiles in flight, 12 muzzle flashes and a burst, all 1-3km in easterly directions.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including 34 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (16 explosions).

The SMM continued to monitor and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske[2] (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

While on the eastern edge of Stanytsia Luhanska, the SMM heard 33 undetermined explosions and about 40 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 5-6km south-west (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

Positioned on the southern edge of the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM heard about ten shots of small-arms fire 3-5km north-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area). About 500m north-north-west of a checkpoint of the armed formations on the southern edge of the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM observed remnants of various types of rocket-propelled grenades scattered on and along road T1316 for the first time. About 400m south of the northern edge of the disengagement area, the SMM observed remnants of another rocket-propelled grenade for the first time. At a checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces just north of the disengagement area, the SMM observed two portable rocket-launchers (RPO-A Shmel, 93mm). Recent fires have cleared vegetation in the disengagement area, allowing for explosive remnants of war previously obscured by foliage to be seen.

Positioned about 2km north of Petrivske, the SMM heard 15 minutes of uncountable overlapping shots of small-arms fire 1-1.5km east-south-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines, the SMM saw three stationary self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) in a compound near Myrne (government-controlled, 40km north-east of Mariupol).

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles and an anti-aircraft gun[3] in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 13 September, an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted two armoured personnel carriers (APC) (BTR variants) and two armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-2) near Troitske (30km north of Donetsk), an APC (BTR variant) near Novokalynove (29km north-west of Donetsk), four infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP-2) near Novozvanivka (70km west of Luhansk), three armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-2) and an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) mounted on a military truck near Prychepylivka (50km north-west of Luhansk) and two IFVs (BMP-1) near Zolote.

In non-government-controlled areas, on 13 September, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an IFV (BMP-1) near Lobacheve (13km east of Luhansk) and, on 14 September, the SMM saw an APC (MT-LB) near Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk).

The SMM continued to observe mines. On 13 September, an SMM long-range UAV spotted that 11 anti-tank mines (TM-62) remain laid out in two rows across road H20 near Novokalynove.

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire. The Mission recorded ceasefire violations in the area near the station, despite explicit security guarantees (see table below).

The SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair and maintenance works to water infrastructure in Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Slovianoserbsk (non-government-controlled, 28km north-west of Luhansk) the South Donbas water pipeline between Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk) and Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk). The SMM also monitored adherence to the ceasefire and facilitated the repair of the Krasnohorivka gas distribution station between Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) and Oleksandrivka (non-government-controlled, 20km south-west of Donetsk).

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 12 September 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• At a checkpoint of the armed formations west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage.
• At a checkpoint of the armed formations in Yuzhna-Lomuvatka (non-government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), members of the armed formations denied the SMM passage.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.5
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.
• North of the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk), an officer of the Ukrainian Armed Forces informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.5

Other impediments:

• An SMM long-range UAV experienced jamming for two minutes near Shyroka Balka (non-government-controlled, 34km north-east of Donetsk).[5]

[1]     For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

*    Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2]     Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[3]     This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4]     The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC withdrew from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

[5]     The interference could have originated from anywhere in a radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position.

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CHISINAU, 14 September 2018 – The OSCE Mission to Moldova expresses its concern with regards to a pontoon bridge laying military exercise conducted by the so-called Transdniestrian Armed Forces (TDAF) in the Security Zone near Tiraspol on 14 September.

The Mission deployed its team to the respective area of the Security Zone on 14 September and could observe part of an exercise on the river section close to Tiraspol. It was able to monitor the activities without any restrictions by the TDAF. The OSCE Mission to Moldova immediately shared its observations with all the delegations to the JCC through established channels, in compliance with the Principles of Cooperation between the Joint Control Commission (JCC) and the OSCE Mission to Moldova of 2004.

Military exercises in the Security Zone are required to be authorized by the JCC per the Agreement on Principles of a Peaceful Settlement of the Armed Conflict in the Transdniestrian Region of the Republic of Moldova of 21 July 1992. In this instance this was not done.

The OSCE Mission urges all parties involved in the fulfilment of the 1992 Agreement on Principles of a Peaceful Settlement to fully respect the provisions of said agreement and the regime of the Security Zone, as well as relevant JCC decisions and regulations. This is in all parties’ interest.

In compliance with the above-mentioned 2004 Principles of Cooperation and its mandate, the OSCE Mission shares its observations with all the delegations to the JCC and all participating States of the OSCE, including the host country, through established channels.

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Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights Thomas Rymer

The OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) teamed up with other organizations working in the area of promoting democracy today in publishing an agenda to focus attention on the constructive and concrete steps that different actors can take to respond to populism by strengthening democracy.

Published in co-operation with International IDEA, the Westminster Foundation for Democracy (WFD), the Netherlands Institute for Multi-party Democracy (NIMD) and the Research Centre for the Study of Parties and Democracy (REPRESENT), the proposals contained in Renewal of Representation – A Proposed Global Agenda were distilled from discussions among participants from politics, academia, civil society, business and international organizations from different regions at an event organized in Brussels in June.

“The quality of democracy worldwide depends on the five priority areas outlined in the agenda – equalizing political opportunity, defeating corruption, opening governments to citizen influence, building responsive governance and creating information responsibility,” said Marcin Walecki, Head of the Democratization department at OSCE/ODIHR. “This resource proposes ways forward to improve the quality, transparency and functioning of democratic institutions.”

“The agenda is extremely important today, ahead of tomorrow’s International Day of Democracy, particularly given that the theme this year is ‘democracy under strain’, said Tiina Kukkamaa-Bah, Chief of the Democratic Governance and Gender Unit at ODIHR. “It is also important more generally today, as representative democracy is increasingly under pressure."

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, compared with the previous reporting period. The Mission recorded ceasefire violations inside the Zolote disengagement area. It observed multiple launch rocket systems in violation of agreed withdrawal lines near Khrustalnyi, Miusynsk and Malynivka. The Mission’s access remained restricted in the disengagement areas, as well as again near Zaichenko and Novoazovsk, near the border with the Russian Federation.* The SMM continued to facilitate the process of restarting operations at the Donetsk Filtration Station, following a power outage. The SMM continued to monitor repairs and maintenance work to water infrastructure in Stanytsia Luhanska and Artema, and to facilitate demining and repairs at the Krasnohorivka gas distribution station between Marinka and Oleksandrivka and houses in Avdiivka. The SMM followed up on reports that protective masks had been distributed in southern Kherson region in response to hazardous chemical air pollution from a chemical plant on the Crimean peninsula.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations,[1] including about 80 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 130 explosions).

On the evening of 12 September, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk) the SMM heard 48 undetermined explosions and about 40 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 3-6km south-east, south, south-west and west.

On the evening and night of 12-13 September, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded five undetermined explosions, five projectiles in flight (all from north-west to south-east) and 16 muzzle flashes, all 1-3km south and south-south-west.

During the day on 13 September, positioned about 1km north-west of the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard six undetermined explosions and about 100 shots and bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, as well as four minutes of uncountable overlapping heavy-machine-gun fire, all 1-4km south-west and west-south-west.

On the evening and night of 12-13 September, the SMM camera 1km south-west of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol) recorded an undetermined explosion, 56 projectiles in flight (most from northerly to southerly directions) and two muzzle flashes, all 1-3km in easterly directions.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including 16 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (85 explosions).

The SMM continued to monitor and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske[2]  (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

During the day on 13 September, positioned about 250m south of the bridge in Stanytsia Luhanska, the SMM heard six undetermined explosions 8-10km north-north-west, assessed as outside the disengagement area.

On 12 September, inside the Zolote disengagement area near Katerynivka (government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk), an SMM mid-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted 12 recent impact craters (not visible in imagery from 29 August 2018) as well as a new military position (not visible in imagery from 17 August 2018).

During the day on 13 September, positioned on the north-eastern edge of Katerynivka while flying an SMM mini-UAV east of the railway bridge inside the disengagement area, the SMM heard ten shots of small-arms fire 0.5-1km south, assessed as in the area where the UAV was flying at an altitude of 100m.*

Later the same day, positioned on the southern edge of the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM heard three bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire 3-4km west, assessed as outside the disengagement area.

In the Petrivske disengagement area, on 12 September, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted two infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) – one (BMP variant) near a position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and one (BMP-1) near positions of the armed formations.       

On 13 September, positioned about 2km north of Petrivske, the SMM heard 14 shots of small-arms fire 2km east, assessed as outside the disengagement area.

An SMM mid-range UAV again spotted 37 anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid across the road north of the Petrivske disengagement area between Bohdanivka (government-controlled, 41km south-west of Donetsk) and Viktorivka (non-government-controlled, 42km south-west of Donetsk).

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in non-government controlled areas, on 12 September, an SMM long-range UAV spotted 14 multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) near Khrustalnyi (formerly Krasnyi Luch, 56km south-west of Luhansk) and seven MLRS (BM-21) near Miusynsk (62km south-west of Luhansk).

In violation of withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas, the SMM saw eight MLRS (BM-21) near Malynivka (82km north of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in non-government-controlled areas, on 12 September, an SMM long-range UAV spotted a tank (type unknown), 23 towed howitzers (four 2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm; four D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm; and 15 2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) and ten self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) near Khrustalnyi and 15 tanks (undetermined variant), ten self-propelled howitzers (2S1), 12 towed howitzers (D-30) and four surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10) near Miusynsk. 

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in government-controlled areas, the SMM observed four MLRS (BM-21) near Rivnopil (86km west of Donetsk).

The SMM revisited heavy weapons holding areas in government-controlled areas of Donetsk region and saw nine self-propelled howitzers (2S1), four anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm), and three anti-tank guided missile systems (9P149 Shturm-S, 130mm). It noted that 13 self-propelled howitzers (2S1) were missing (including three for the first time) and also noted that 18 towed howitzers (2A36), 12 MLRS (BM-21), 11 self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm), six towed howitzers (D-20, 152mm) and four anti-tank guns (MT-12) continued to be missing.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles[3] and evidence of military presence in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 12 September, an SMM mini-UAV spotted two IFVs (BMP-1 and BMP variant), two armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRM-1k) and an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (MT-LB) near Orikhove (57km north-west of Luhansk). Also on 12 September, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an armoured combat vehicle (undetermined variant) near Zalizne (42km north-east of Donetsk). On 13 September, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted an IFV (BTR-4) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk). On 13 September, in Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (61km north-west of Luhansk, outside the disengagement area), the SMM observed two camouflaged IFVs (BMP type), one parked near an abandoned school building, and a new 300m extension of a trench running parallel with road T0512 on the western edge of Andriivka (61km south of Donetsk).

In non-government-controlled areas, on 12 September, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted four IFVs (BMP variant) near Bohdanivka (44km west of Luhansk). On 13 September, the SMM saw two APCs (MT-LB) driving east on road E-58 near Bezimenne (30km east of Mariupol).

The SMM continued to facilitate the process of restarting operations at the DFS, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire, following a power outage at the station on 6 September. Positioned in areas near the station, the SMM recorded ceasefire violations nearby, despite explicit security guarantees (see above and the table below). 

The SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair and maintenance works to water infrastructure in Stanytsia Luhanska and Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk). The SMM also monitored adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate the repair of houses in Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk) as well as the Krasnohorivka gas distribution station located between Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) and Oleksandrivka (non-government-controlled, 20km south-west of Donetsk), where it also facilitated demining.

The SMM followed up on reports that 20,000 protective masks had been distributed in southern Kherson region by a national chapter of an international organization in response to the hazardous chemical air pollution from a chemical plant on the Crimean peninsula. In Kalanchak (67km south-east of Kherson), the head of the Kalanchak district administration told the SMM that they had received masks for civilians in the affected communities. The SMM did not see anyone wearing masks.

The SMM continued monitoring in Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 12 September 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• At a checkpoint about 1km north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), an armed member of the armed formations again stopped the SMM and denied it passage to Zaichenko, westward to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) and southward to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol).
• At a checkpoint near Novoazovsk (non-government-controlled, 40km east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage, citing “orders” not to allow the SMM to enter the town.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by telephone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.5
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.
• South of the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations told the SMM that no demining had taken place in the area. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

Other impediments:

• An SMM long-range UAV experienced jamming for two minutes near Dmytrivka (non-government-controlled, 85km east of Donetsk).[5]
• Positioned on the north-eastern edge of Katerynivka while flying an SMM mini-UAV inside the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM heard ten shots of small-arms fire 0.5-1km south, assessed as warning shots fired at the UAV inside the disengagement area. The SMM recalled the UAV safely and departed the area.

 

[1]     For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

*    Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2]     Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[3]     This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4]  The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC withdrew from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

[5]  The interference could have originated from anywhere in a radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position.

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VIENNA, 14 September 2018 – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, welcomed yesterday’s highly significant decision by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), which found that the United Kingdom’s Investigatory Powers Act threatened the confidentiality of journalists’ sources. The Representative previously warned of the potential threat to journalists posed by this law.

The Court determined, in particular, that the bulk collection of communications data from communications service providers violated Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights related to Freedom of Expression, as there were “insufficient safeguards in respect of confidential journalistic material”.

“I welcome the Court’s decision, which reinforces the importance of protecting freedom of expression and the media,” said Désir. “This law provided the intelligence services with an overbroad capability to search journalists’ records and sources without judicial oversight. It is imperative that any legislation that allows government surveillance includes guarantees that the confidentiality of journalists’ sources is maintained.”

The Representative expressed his wish that this decision of the ECtHR, which is binding for the UK, would set the legal standard for other states seeking to implement or adopt legislation on surveillance.

“It is of utmost importance to ensure that with any security measures, fundamental freedoms and media freedom, including journalistic communications, are preserved and protected through strong safeguards. Without such protections there is a risk of creating a chilling effect on the media,” Désir concluded.

The legal challenge was brought to the Court by 14 human rights groups and privacy organizations, as well as journalists, following the disclosure of confidential information by whistleblower Edward Snowden.

The Representative previously expressed reservations about the Investigatory Powers Act in 2016. His statement is available at: https://www.osce.org/fom/282521

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, twitter @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom.

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VIENNA, 14 September 2018 - The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, today sent a letter to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of Italy, Enzo Moavero Milanesi, to express his concerns about the seizure of a journalist’s phone and computer, as well as to recall the necessity to respect the protection of journalistic sources and to enquire whether the seizure respected national and international standards.

On 13 September the home of La Repubblica journalist Salvo Palazzolo was searched at the request of the prosecutor of Catania as part of an investigation related to a case of alleged leak of information and violation of confidentiality of a judicial procedure after the journalist published a report on the via D'Amelio bombing, an attack by the Sicilian Mafia in which magistrate Paolo Borsellino was killed with five policemen in 1992.

“The seizure and search of Palazzolo’s mobile phone and computer undermines the protection of sources of the journalist and the right of the press not to disclose confidential sources, which is essential for the exercise of reporting on issues of public interest,” Désir said.

Désir recalled that in General Comment No 34, the authoritative interpretation of Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the UN Human Rights Committee has clearly indicated that freedom of expression includes the protection of journalistic sources (paragraph 45).

The Representative also cited the recommendation made by the UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of opinion and freedom of expression, David Kaye, in his 2015 report the UN General Assembly, that “any restrictions on confidentiality must be genuinely exceptional and subject to the highest standards, and implemented by judicial authorities only” (A/70/361, para 62).

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, twitter @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom.

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WARSAW, 13 September 2018 – More must be done to promote the participation of under-represented groups in political decision making if we are to ensure effective, truly democratic governance and societies, Ingibjörg Sólrún Gísladóttir, Director of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), said today, ahead of tomorrow’s International Day of Democracy.

Making sure that all members of hitherto marginalized or excluded groups have a genuine say in how they are governed is the most effective way to strengthen democracies, she said.

“Ensuring the participation of representatives from all segments of and groups in society is the surest way to strengthen both the effectiveness of and the support for democratic systems,” the ODIHR Director said. “First, the broader the nature of participation in decision-making, the greater the pool of talent and ideas available, and this benefits us all. Second, increasing the breadth of inclusion in real decision-making can only increase the level of buy-in among all members of society.”

Noting that that this year marks the 70th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Gísladóttir highlighted that the document enshrined the principle that we all have the right to take part in the government of our countries. But the further promotion of these rights is dependent on removing barriers to participation by groups that have suffered from being sidelined in the past. The inclusion of under-represented groups should go beyond numbers, she said, and focus on creating real space and opportunities to have a genuine impact.

“Current barriers to political participation must be swept away. Meaningful access to decision-making processes must be guaranteed for Roma and Sinti, who have long suffered from discrimination and exclusion in our societies; for women, who remain under-represented in democratic decision-making bodies, to the detriment of all; for young people, who must be given the opportunity to contribute and buy in to the democratic systems they are inheriting,” the ODIHR Director said. “Ensuring the ability of all segments of society, of all groups, to participate makes our societies more truly democratic, and so can only make them stronger.”

Gísladóttir said that indicators suggest, for example, that today’s youth – the largest young generation ever by numbers – are less engaged in political processes than previous generations, and are beginning to question democratic systems at an alarming rate. Unresponsive institutions and systemic barriers to youth participation and influence are often cited as major contributors to this decline in participation.

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395114 Karen Gainer Marina Živaljević

The OSCE Mission to Montenegro donated a forensic workstation set and two polygraphs, €52.000 worth, to the Montenegrin Police Directorate within the Interior Ministry on 14 September 2018 in Podgorica.

This donation is a part of an OSCE project to improve the capacities of the Criminal Police and Forensic Centre in Montenegro.

“This project provides significant assistance to Montenegro on their way towards establishing a comprehensive approach to meeting the requirements of tackling crimes within Montenegro,” said Head of Mission to Montenegro Maryse Daviet. “It is also a good example of strategic and horizontal co-operation between the OSCE and Montenegrin law enforcement agencies.”

The Chief of the Police Veselin Veljović thanked the Mission for the “The equipment will be used in the fight against crime and I am confident that it will contribute to improved results in the fight against modern security challenges that have a regional and international dimension.”

The Forensic Section received a digital evidence analysis workstation and the criminal police received two polygraphs with laptop computers for use in an internal investigation to strengthen police integrity systems.

OSCE supports capacity building of the Forensic Centre since 2004. The purpose is to strengthen the capacity of the laboratory in the Forensic Centre by providing equipment and training on the use of equipment.

In previous years, the Mission also supported the Interior Ministry - the Police - to enhance its capacity in the investigating organized crime cases through conducting training courses for cyber-crime investigations and networking with police officers in the region.

OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities assesses inter-ethnic relations and education issues in Ukraine’s Zakarpattia region OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities discusses language law and other national minority issues in Ukraine OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities says he is actively engaged on education issues in Ukraine Language and identity in Ukraine

The OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, Lamberto Zannier, visited Ukraine from 11 to 14 September 2018, as a follow-up to his previous visits to Kyiv in December 2017 and the Zakarpattia region in February 2018. 

During the meetings with the Government and the Verkhovna Rada in Kyiv, Zannier discussed several legislative developments related to national minorities, including in the sphere of education, language, and diversity management. 

“There is a need for prior inclusive consultations on legislative development in order to increase ownership and to reach a broad consensus, which is important for minority issues not being politicized in the context of the upcoming elections in Ukraine,” said Zannier.

Zannier urged the authorities to ensure that the upcoming legislation related to the use of languages and possibly on national minorities is considered in parallel. Minority issues in Ukraine’s bilateral relations with its neighbours were discussed as well. “My Institution offers further assistance and co-operation in this process,” said Zannier. 

Zannier also visited Ukraine’s Kherson region to assess the situation with inter-ethnic relations. Zannier met with the representatives of regional and district authorities and other relevant stakeholders. He also met with civil society and national minority representatives, including Crimean Tatars, who described the situation in the region and on the Crimean peninsula.

“Co-operation with Ukraine’s authorities on strengthening the integration of the country’s diverse society remains high on my agenda,” said Zannier.

395081 Dan Pavel Doghi, Chief of the ODIHR Contact Point for Roma and Sinti Issues (l), Katarzyna Gardapkhadze, ODIHR's First Deputy Director (c) and Anja Reuss, Political Adviser at the Central Council of German Sinti and Roma (r). Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

The very limited progress in implementing government strategies and policies for Roma inclusion remain major obstacles to their inclusion, participants said at an event in Warsaw on 14 September 2018. The lack of progress is coupled with negative public and political discourse, persistent discrimination and growing manifestations of intolerance and racially motivated violence against Roma and Sinti in the OSCE area.

The event was co-organized by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), the European Roma Rights Center (ERRC) and the Central Council for German Sinti and Roma during the annual Human Dimension Implementation Meeting.

“We continue to receive worrying reports about hostile and inflammatory anti-Roma discourse and racially motivated crimes against Roma and Sinti, which widens social distance and deepens inter-ethnic tensions, especially when such crimes are perpetrated in a climate of impunity,” said Dan Pavel Doghi, Chief of the ODIHR Contact Point for Roma and Sinti Issues. “It is crucial that state authorities step up their efforts to counter racism and discrimination in a systematic way and protect Roma and Sinti from violence, by vigorously investigating racially-motivated crimes and bringing perpetrators to justice.”

Đorđe Jovanović, ERRC President, said: “The most disturbing fact is that in most cases when Roma in Europe are attacked, we see, firstly, police negligence in failing to protect Romani citizens and, secondly, a failure to investigate the attacks properly. In certain cases this can only be described as a sort of complicity in the attacks.”

Participants expressed concern that Roma and Sinti, as well as other minorities in the OSCE area, are facing new dimensions of violent nationalism and racism.

“It is worrisome to witness how nationalist and right-wing populist movements continue to push for a division of Europe and undermine European values,” said Anja Reuss, Political Adviser at the Central Council of German Sinti and Roma. “We call on all OSCE participating States and political leaders to recognize antigypsyism as the root cause of hatred, discrimination and social exclusion of Roma and Sinti, and to take a clear political stand against antigypsyism.”

In the Action Plan on Improving the Situation of Roma and Sinti within the OSCE Area, participating States committed to combating racism and discrimination against Roma and Sinti. They have also agreed to unequivocally and publicly condemn any violence targeting Roma and Sinti and to take all necessary measures to ensure their access to effective remedies.   

ERGNETI, 14 September 2018 - The 89th Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM) meeting took place in Ergneti.

Erik Høeg, Head of the European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM), and Ambassador Rudolf Michalka, Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office for the South Caucasus, co-facilitated the proceedings. Høeg welcomed ambassador Rudolf Michalka as the new OSCE co-facilitator.

Following the opening remarks, different views were expressed concerning the provisional agenda and participants were unable to continue discussions.

The co-facilitators expressed their regret that it was impossible to discuss the agenda items. They encouraged a pragmatic approach as previously demonstrated by participants, even on challenging issues.  

The EUMM and the OSCE reiterated their strong commitment to the IPRM format as the only valuable mechanism to address security for the conflict-affected population living in the vicinity of the administrative boundary line.

The co-facilitators will continue their efforts to have the IPRM meetings resume as soon as possible on a date to be agreed by all participants.

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394943 Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

How educational policy and practice can address anti-Semitism was at the centre of discussions at an event held on 14 September 2018 on the margins of the OSCE's Human Dimension Implementation Meeting in Warsaw. The event was co-organized by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), the Italian Chairmanship of the OSCE, the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) and the delegations of Austria, Germany, Luxembourg, Slovakia and Switzerland to the OSCE.

Participants first highlighted the importance of well-designed and supportive policies for ensuring that good educational practices are taken up across the sector. Cristina Finch, Head of ODIHR's Tolerance and Non-Discrimination department, highlighted the dual role governments have to play in this process.

"Policymakers need to ensure that anti-Semitism and other forms of prejudice are addressed through education that builds students’ resilience to it,” she said. “At the same time, governments need to ensure effective responses when anti-Semitism occurs in educational settings."

Counsellor Silvia Santangelo, Deputy Head of Mission for the Human Dimension of the Italian Chairmanship, added: "Combating anti-Semitism, along with other forms of intolerance and discrimination, is a priority for the Italian Chairmanship. Education is the most potent tool we have to build more inclusive and open societies, as well as for protecting the memory of the Holocaust from being distorted or erased.”

Attendees also discussed how education that promotes human rights and critical thinking and deconstructs conspiracy theories can play a crucial role in empowering young people to reject intolerance.

"Slovakia will continue to support the OSCE’s work in this area in 2019," said Counsellor Juraj Kubla, Deputy Head of the 2019 OSCE Chairmanship Task Force and Human Dimension Co-ordinator. "Tolerance, non-discrimination and respect for diversity are very important for peaceful co-existence in every society. It is our duty to listen to the voices of young people if we want to transform the experiences and recommendations we have heard today into successful educational policies and interventions that really address anti-Semitic attitudes or incidents. "

Participants also discussed the recent joint OSCE/ODIHR and UNESCO publication Addressing Anti-Semitism through Education - Guidelines for Policymakers, which assists government officials and educators in understanding, recognizing and challenging anti-Semitism. The guidelines were published as part of ODIHR's Turning Words into Action to Address Anti-Semitism project, which is funded by the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Colin McCullough, OSCE Programme Office in Astana

An OSCE-supported training seminar on corruption risks management in the public sector concluded on 14 September 2018 in Astana.

The four-day event was organized by the OSCE Programme Office in Astana in partnership with the Civil Service and Anticorruption Agency for some 50 representatives from academia, the municipalities and the central government. The seminar covered topics such as best practices in analyzing and managing the corruption risks involving but not limited to planning the process, determining objectives, identifying the reasons and assigning responsible individuals for administering the process. 

The Programme Office supported the participation of experts from Kazakhstan and Lithuania who discussed internal and external factors in corruption risks, the importance of risks assessment and methods of doing so. The participants took part in a group exercise to identify the risk factors that involved provision of various public services.

The training seminar is part of the Programme Office’s multi-year efforts to promote good governance by focusing on anti-corruption activities in Kazakhstan.