OSCE

Colin McCullough, OSCE Programme Office in Astana

An OSCE-supported five-day training seminar on risk profiling techniques to ensure public safety at transportation facilities concluded on 14 September 2018 in Aktobe, Kazakhstan. The event was co-organized by the OSCE Programme Office in Astana and the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

18 transport police officers from across Kazakhstan and instructors from the Aktobe Law Institute of the country’s Internal Affairs Ministry took part in the event.

Experts from the Association of Psychologists of Kazakhstan and a national law enforcement expert discussed the history and foundation of risk profiling for individuals, ways to analyse patterns and behaviour of passengers, techniques for interviewing passengers and diffusing potential conflicts involving passengers.

The experts organized a set of practical exercises that provided the participants with the opportunity to apply their newly-acquired skills.

The event is part of the OSCE Programme Office in Astana’s activities to enhance security, increase accountability, and promote best practices related to security in the host country.

Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

Experts from the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) visited Vienna on 12 and 13 September 2018 to present ODIHR’s final report on the 15 October 2017 early parliamentary elections in Austria.

The report’s findings and recommendations were presented at an expert discussion organized by the Parliament, with the participation of around 100 representatives from political parties, the Interior Ministry, other government and municipal agencies and civil society.

The ODIHR representatives noted that the elections reflected Austria’s vibrant democracy and were administered in an efficient and professional manner. They drew attention to recommendations on citizens’ right of access to information on all aspects of elections, the effective oversight of campaign finance, timely and comprehensive access for electoral dispute resolution and safeguarding the impartiality of the election administration.

“The holding of a parliamentary meeting to consider improvements to electoral legislation is a positive step that demonstrates good practice in the follow-up of ODIHR’s electoral recommendations,” said Alexey Gromov, ODIHR Election Adviser. “Today’s inclusive discussions provide a sound platform to further improve electoral processes in Austria, and ODIHR is ready to support such efforts.”

The participants discussed a number of other topics, including election observation by civil society, postal voting and election-day procedures, and lifting criminal liability for defamation.

Discussions in a separate meeting with representatives of Interior Ministry, the principal agency in charge of administering elections, focused on the possible engagement of ODIHR in providing legal and technical expertise during the electoral reform process.

All OSCE participating States have committed themselves to promptly following up on ODIHR election assessments and recommendations.

394727 Cristina Finch, Head of ODIHR's Tolerance and Non-Discrimination Department, introduces the topic of the event. Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

Good practices for promoting tolerance and non-discrimination and the challenges that civil society may face in this work were the subject of an event held on 13 September 2018 by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) on the margins of the Human Dimension Implementation Meeting in Warsaw.  

Civil society plays an important role in addressing hate crime and bridging the gap between victim communities and the authorities. Civil society carries out a broad range of activities, from monitoring hate incidents to supporting victims and advocating methods to prevent hate crime. When civil society organizations form coalitions, they can significantly boost the impact of their work.

"Coalitions can achieve things that individual civil society groups cannot necessarily accomplish alone. Our recently published guide shows the practical steps activists can take to amplify their work through cohesive and sustainable coalitions," said Cristina Finch, Head of ODIHR's Tolerance and Non-Discrimination Department. "Coalitions are most effective when they are built around specific activities, such as monitoring hate crime."

Delia-Luiza Nita, Human Rights Officer at the Centre for Legal Resources (CLR) in Romania, shared her experience of coalition building during the event: "One of the main difficulties for civil society organizations in addressing hate crime is our diminishing ability to properly support victims. Building a coalition of diverse communities allows us to assist victims more effectively."

The event raised awareness of ODIHR's work on coalition building, including the new publication Coalition Building for Tolerance and Non-Discrimination: A Practical Guide prepared as part of ODIHR's Words into Action to Address Anti-Semitism project.

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, compared with the previous reporting period. The Mission recorded ceasefire violations near the Zolote and Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement areas. It observed multiple launch rocket systems in violation of agreed withdrawal lines near Khrustalnyi. The Mission’s access remained restricted in the disengagement areas, as well as again near Verkhnoshyrokivske.* The SMM continued to facilitate the process of restarting operations at the Donetsk Filtration Station, following a power outage. The SMM continued to monitor repairs and maintenance work to water infrastructure in Stanytsia Luhanska and near Zolote, Artema and Krasnyi Lyman. In Kyiv, the SMM monitored a trial hearing of five former “Berkut” members accused of murder related to events at Maidan in 2014.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations,[1] including about 130 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (24 explosions).

On the evening and night of 11-12 September, the SMM camera in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk) recorded six undetermined explosions, about 170 projectiles in flight (most from south-west to north-east) and seven muzzle flashes, all 1-4km in south-easterly directions. On the same evening and night, while in Svitlodarsk, the SMM heard 57 undetermined explosions and about 95 bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 2-6km south-east. On the morning of 12 September, at the same location, the SMM heard two undetermined explosions and four bursts of small-arms fire, all 2-4km south-east and south-west.  

On the same evening and night, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded 43 undetermined explosions, 54 projectiles in flight (most from east to west) and 45 muzzle flashes, all 0.3-3km in southerly directions.

During the day on 12 September, positioned about 1.5km south-east of Kamianka (government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk) for about three hours, the SMM heard two undetermined explosions and about 110 shots and bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 1-3km south-south-east.

During the day on 12 September, positioned about 1km north-west of the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk) for about seven hours, the SMM heard ten undetermined explosions and about 105 shots and bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 1.5-3km south-east and south-west.

On the same evening and night, the SMM camera in Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol) recorded about 140 projectiles in flight (most from north-north-west to south-south-east) 2-4km south-east.

On the same evening and night, the SMM camera 1km south-west of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol) recorded an undetermined explosion, 195 projectiles in flight (most from north to south) and four muzzle flashes, all 1-3km in easterly directions.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including 85 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (six explosions).

Positioned on the western edge of Kriakivka (government-controlled, 38km north-west of Luhansk) for about ten minutes, the SMM heard 21 undetermined explosions and 50 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 2-3km south-south-west.   

The SMM continued to monitor and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske[2]  (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

In the early morning of 12 September, while on the eastern edge of Stanytsia Luhanska, the SMM heard an undetermined explosion 5-6km south-west (unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area).

During the day on 12 September, positioned on the south-western edge of Zolote for about an hour and a half, the SMM heard and saw 21 explosions (20 undetermined and one assessed as an impact) and heard 19 undetermined explosions and seven shots and bursts, including of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 3-5km at directions ranging from north-east to east-south-east, all assessed as outside the disengagement area.

The same day, the SMM saw two infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP-1) about 300m north of the northern edge of the Zolote disengagement area. 

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in a non-government-controlled area, the SMM saw ten multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) near Khrustalnyi (formerly Krasnyi Luch, 56km south-west of Luhansk). 

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in non-government-controlled areas, on 11 September, an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted 20 tanks (undetermined variants) in a training area near Ternove (57km east of Donetsk). On 12 September, the SMM saw three towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) and five tanks (type undetermined) in a training area near Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk). 

The SMM revisited a heavy weapons permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region and noted that four MLRS (BM-21), three self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) and six towed howitzers (one 2A65 Msta-B, 152mm and five D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) remained missing. 

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles and an anti-aircraft gun[3] in the security zone. In non-government-controlled areas, on 11 September, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) mounted on an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (MT-LB) near Vilkhivka (40km north-east of Donetsk).

In government-controlled areas, on 12 September, the SMM saw an APC (MT-LB) and an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM variant) near Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk).

The SMM observed mine hazard signs. On the north side of a road adjacent to a small wooded area near Blyzhnie (government-controlled, 48km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM saw for the first time several rectangle-shaped mine hazard signs with “Mines” written on them in white Ukrainian letters on a red background.

The SMM continued to facilitate the process of restarting operations at the DFS, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire, following a power outage at the station on 6 September. Positioned in areas near the station, the SMM recorded ceasefire violations nearby, despite explicit security guarantees (see above and the table below). 

The SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair and maintenance works to water infrastructure in Stanytsia Luhanska and near Zolote, Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk) and Krasnyi Lyman (non-government-controlled, 30km north-west of Luhansk).   

In Kyiv, the SMM monitored a hearing in the ongoing trial of five former “Berkut” members accused of murder related to the events of Maidan in Kyiv in 2014. At Sviatoshynskyi District Court of Kyiv, the court heard testimony from family of one of the victims, and the jury examined forensic reports, photographs and videos related to the events.  

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 12 September 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• At a checkpoint of the armed formations west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), members of the armed formations denied the SMM passage for the fifth consecutive day (see SMM Daily Report 12 September 2018). The SMM observed civilian vehicles passing through the checkpoint in both directions. 

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by telephone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.5
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

Other impediments:

• In Holmivskyi (non-government-controlled, 49km north-east of Donetsk), staff at a school refused to provide the Mission with information, citing the need for prior permission from the armed formations.

[1]     For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

[2]     Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[3]     This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4]     The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC withdrew from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

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NICOSIA, 13 September 2018 – OSCE Acting Co-ordinator for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings Valiant Richey conducted an official visit to Cyprus this week, praised Cyprus for its progress in combating human trafficking and encouraged more multi-agency co-ordination.

During his three-day visit, Richey headed an OSCE delegation in meetings with the parliament, law enforcement officials, welfare services, labour inspectors, prosecutors, judges, and international and civil society representatives, where the country’s implementation of OSCE anti-trafficking commitments was discussed.

Richey noted that action by parliament as well as the commitment of officials in agencies such as the anti-trafficking unit has set Cyprus on the right path for the future. At the same time, stalled co-ordination efforts across agencies could undermine the progress being made.

“Full implementation of the national referral mechanism is crucial to ensure that perpetrators are held accountable and victims get the services they are entitled to,” said Richey. “Anti-trafficking policies and activities should be designed based on clear evaluation criteria.”

“We welcome the efforts of the Justice Ministry to identify victims, the robust shelter services for victims, as well as the planned revision of the National Action Plan toward an evidence-based, strategically focused set of priorities,” said Richey. “There are good opportunities to advance co-ordination at the highest level and mobilize a system of assistance to support trafficked persons.”

The OSCE delegation also met with the National Commissioner for the Rights of the Child and the Ombudsperson and visited the state-run victims’ shelter in Nicosia as well as the reception centre for asylum seekers in Kofinou.

“We encountered dynamic and engaged front-line responders who are truly remarkable,” said Richey. “Identification and referral procedures at the early stage of migrant registration are now as vital as ever to avoid asylum-seekers falling into the hands of exploitative enterprises.”

The OSCE Office of the Special Representative regularly conducts goal-oriented, high-profile country visits to strengthen the capacity of OSCE participating States to address human trafficking in a comprehensive and effective manner, as well as to share knowledge and collect best practices in the fight against this serious crime. An OSCE report of the visit containing a discussion of promising practice and recommendations will be published in the upcoming months.

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383319 Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

Existing regional processes to control the trade of equipment that was designed or can be used for torture or other ill-treatment was the focus of an event organized by the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and the Omega Research Foundation on 12 September 2018, during the OSCE Human Dimension Implementation Meeting in Warsaw.

Expert speakers, representing the European Union, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), OSCE participating State delegations, and other participants discussed existing measures to prevent the manufacture, supply and use of inherently abusive equipment and to control equipment that is frequently used inappropriately in violation of human rights.

“This is an area which for many years received little attention compared to other aspects of torture prevention,” said Stephanie Selg, the ODIHR Adviser on Torture Prevention. “We are glad to start a constructive dialogue with OSCE participating States and civil society organizations in our region on the issue of trade in tools of torture and existing processes to regulate the trade of such tools on the regional and international level. This discussion is important to further assist participating States in fulfilling their commitment to preventing and eradicating torture.”

The event sought to encourage participating States and civil society to elaborate on actions and activities already underway in this area, and to explore how OSCE participating States could add to the regional and global movement to restrict trade in torture tools, including the global Alliance for Torture-Free Trade.

“The Omega Research Foundation has documented the manufacture, trade and use of tools of torture in the OSCE region,” said Matthew Mcevoy, Research Associate at the Omega Research Foundation. “We encourage OSCE participating States to continue engaging with ODIHR and civil society to establish more effective means of controlling this trade.”

YEREVAN, 13 September 2018 – Concluding a two-day visit to Armenia, OSCE Parliamentary Assembly President George Tsereteli (MP, Georgia) welcomed the ongoing efforts to implement electoral reforms in the country, urging broad political consensus for any changes to the electoral system. He reiterated the OSCE and the Parliamentary Assembly’s commitment to supporting Armenia’s continued democratic development.

OSCE PA President Tsereteli and Secretary General Roberto Montella met with President Armen Sarkissian, Parliament President Ara Babloyan, Foreign Minister Zohrab Mnatsakanyan, parliamentary leaders, civil society representatives, members of the international community, as well as students and faculty from Yerevan State University.

“Following a dramatic change of government earlier this year, the Armenian political system has been put to a new test. I’m pleased to see a willingness for political forces to work together constructively, and with planned reforms to electoral processes, broad consensus is doubly important,” said President Tsereteli. “The responsibility for this process lies clearly in the hands of Armenia’s people and authorities, and the OSCE and the Parliamentary Assembly remain committed to supporting this process for the best possible outcome.”

In his first presidential visit since being elected to the position at the OSCE PA’s Annual Session in July this year, the President welcomed the opportunity to consult with colleagues in the Armenian parliament regarding their priority concerns within the OSCE.In his meetings with officials, President Tsereteli discussed a range of issues including economic development, electoral reform, anti-corruption efforts, regional relations, and Armenia’s work within the OSCE. He reiterated the OSCE PA’s support for the work of the OSCE Minsk Group and its Co-Chairs on Nagorno-Karabakh, but stressed that the ultimate responsibility on delivery of concrete results and progress lies with the political leaderships of the parties involved.

“Coming from the South Caucasus region myself, I understand the challenges and sensitivities impacting Armenia. I hope that the authorities will make full use of the range of tools that the OSCE has to offer, to help the country fully live up to the expectations of its people,” said Tsereteli.

Noting that both the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office, Enzo Moavero Milanesi and OSCE Secretary General Thomas Greminger have visited Armenia in recent months, the President stressed the strong commitment of the Organization to Armenia’s continued development.

To contribute to Assembly activities in the region, the President is expected to appoint a new Special Representative of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly on the South Caucasus region.

The President and Secretary General welcomed the active participation of Armenian parliamentarians in all OSCE PA activities. The OSCE PA will hold its annual Autumn Meeting from 3-6 October in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan.

Photos of the presidential visit to Armenia are available on Flickr. 

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Colin McCullough, OSCE Programme Office in Astana

The 10th annual OSCE regional workshop on explosive hazards reduction and response in Central Asia concluded in Astana on 13 September 2018. This year, the event focused on the emerging threat posed by Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and best practices in countering them.

Some 60 military and civilian officials from Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan presented their strategies and identified challenges in dealing with explosive hazards and steps they have taken to raise awareness of the threats posed by IEDs.

Experts from the United Kingdom, the United States and United Nations organizations shared best practices and discussed emerging challenges in the field. Topics included regional co-operation in promoting explosive hazards reduction, the types of threats posed by IEDs, the challenges associated with IEDs in humanitarian mine action and the emerging threat from the use of small unmanned aircraft (drones) as a delivery mechanism and opportunities to use them in addressing IED threats.  

“The Republic of Kazakhstan has always been and continues to be a consistent and active participant in international co-operation in the area of arms control,” said Deputy Defence Minister Lieutenant General Talgat Mukhtarov. “Raising awareness and strengthening confidence and security-building measures in the OSCE region is certainly an important component of this interaction.”

The Head of the OSCE Programme Office in Astana, György Szabó, said: “It is important to build the capacity of military personnel, security officials and civil sector specialists to counter the threat of IEDs. The exchange of experience between experts, particularly at the regional level, is an effective tool in this effort.”

Johan Dahl, Demining  Officer at the OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe , said: “In Central Asia, mine action and explosive hazards risk reduction have long been areas of co-operation, through capacity building as well as through the sharing of experiences and best practices among governments, ministries and institutions. This 10th regional workshop is testimony to that tradition.”

The event was organized by Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Defence, the OSCE Programme Office in Astana and the OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe.

The workshop is part of the OSCE’s long-term support to the development of a co-operative mechanism among states in Central Asia to address concerns and challenges stemming from the disposal of explosive hazards.

394166 Helen Duffy, the lead consultant for the research and drafting of the publication, speaks at its launch event, held on the sidelines of the 2018 Human Dimension Implementation Meeting, as Omer Fisher, Head of the ODIHR Human Rights Department, listens. Warsaw, 12 September 2018. Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

Human rights-compliant approaches to addressing threats and challenges posed by “foreign terrorist fighters” are the focus of a new publication presented by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) at an event on 12 September 2018, during the annual Human Dimension Implementation Meeting in Warsaw.

The new publication, Guidelines for Addressing the Threats and Challenges of “Foreign Terrorist Fighters” within a Human Rights Framework, provides recommendations, supporting facts and analysis of international and national practice. It also highlights some of the key issues that states must grapple with as they seek to respond to the challenges posed by ‘foreign terrorist fighters’ and those associated with them while respecting and promoting human rights and the rule of law.

“The constantly evolving dynamics of ‘foreign terrorist fighters’ relocating and returning from conflict zones require states to continuously identify new strategies to overcome these challenges,” said Omer Fisher, Head of the ODIHR Human Rights Department. “What remains unchanged is the need for human rights and rule of law-based approaches to all aspects of ‘foreign terrorist fighter’ flows in countries of departure, transit and relocation. This is a prerequisite for the effectiveness of states’ responses to those challenges.”

Following the presentation of the publication, a panel discussion with experts from the Netherlands, Belgium, the United Kingdom and the United States highlighted human rights risks, as well as experiences and lessons learnt for human rights-compliant responses to this multi-dimensional issue.

“Although the United Nations Security Council called on states to meet the ‘foreign terrorist fighter’ challenge consistently with human rights and humanitarian law, evolving practice suggests otherwise,” said Helen Duffy, the lead consultant for the research and drafting of the publication. “Expansive and unclear definitions of crimes of ‘travel’ or ‘support’, administrative measures without due process of law, discriminatory treatment and stigmatizing effects on specific communities are among the many developments that raise concerns for their long term impact on human rights, the principle of legality, and the effectiveness of the measures themselves.”

The event gathered some 30 participants, including representatives of OSCE participating States and civil society. It marked the conclusion of the multi-year project for the development of the Guidelines, which involved a broad range of professionals with expertise on human rights and counter-terrorism issues.

“It is our hope that the publication and today’s event will facilitate further dialogue between state and non-governmental actors engaged in counter-terrorism efforts and serve as a useful basis for follow-up activities to promote comprehensive, coherent and human rights-compliant responses,” said Fisher.

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region, compared with the previous reporting period. The Mission recorded ceasefire violations near the Zolote disengagement area. In the Petrivske disengagement area, the SMM spotted two soldiers and an infantry fighting vehicle of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Its access remained restricted in the disengagement areas, near Leonove near the border with the Russian Federation, in an area of Luhansk region beyond government control, as well as, again, near Verkhnoshyrokivske and Zaichenko.* The Mission monitored electrical repairs near the Donetsk Filtration Station and continued to monitor repairs to water infrastructure in Stanytsia Luhanska. The SMM continued to monitor the situation south-east of Kherson following reports of hazardous air pollution.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations,[1] including 24 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 100 explosions).

On the evening and night of 10-11 September, the SMM camera 1km south-west of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol) recorded about 55 projectiles in flight 2-4km east-north-east, east and east-south-east. In the early morning hours on 11 September, the same camera recorded about 48 projectiles 2-4km east-north-east.

On the same evening and night, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Pyshchevyk recorded 14 undetermined explosions, six projectiles in flight and a muzzle flash, all 2-4km south-south-east and south.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including six explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (no explosions).

The SMM continued to monitor and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske[2]  (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On 10 September, inside the Petrivske disengagement area, an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted two Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers, about 500m south of the area’s northern edge and about 2km of its western edge, near previously seen positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces (see SMM Daily Report 21 May 2018), as well as a probable infantry fighting vehicle (BMP-1) about 900m north of the area’s southern edge and 1.2km east of its western edge, assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces. (See also SMM Daily Report 11 September 2018.)

Positioned in the northern outskirts of Zolote during the day on 11 September, the SMM heard two undetermined explosions 2-3km east, both assessed as outside the disengagement area.

Positioned near the Petrivske and inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement areas, the SMM observed calm situations.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in government-controlled areas, on 10 September, an SMM long-range UAV spotted a surface-to-air missile system (9K37) near Hnativka (39km north of Donetsk). On 11 September, the SMM saw a tank (T-64) loaded on a transporter in Kostiantynivka (60km north of Donetsk).

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles and an anti-aircraft gun[3] in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 9 September, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted four armoured personnel carriers (APC) (BTR-70), an IFV (BTR-3) and an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) south of Kamianka (20km north of Donetsk). On 10 September, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted an IFV (BMP-1) and an armoured command vehicle (BMP-1Ksh Potok-2) near Vodiane (94km south of Donetsk). On the same day, an SMM long-range UAV spotted a probable self-propelled anti-aircraft system (ZSU-23-4 Shilka, 23mm) near Vynohradne (10km east of Mariupol). On 11 September, the SMM saw an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (type undetermined) and an APC (MT-LB) in Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk).

The SMM continued to observe the presence of mines. On 10 September, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted for the first time nine anti-tank mines (probable TM-62) laid out in a row across a road 1.7km north-east of Vodiane. The same UAV again spotted at least 12 mines laid out in two rows across road T0519 on the western edge of Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol).

The SMM saw that construction works at the entry-exit checkpoint near Stanytsia Luhanska continued following its re-opening on 8 September. The Mission observed workers erecting a metal chain-link fence along the east side of the road leading to the forward position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. During its presence, the SMM observed a smooth flow of pedestrian traffic through the entry-exit checkpoint and through the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the bridge.

The Mission monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable electrical repair works near the Donetsk Filtration Station following a power outage at the station on 6 September and to enable repair and maintenance works to water infrastructure in Stanytsia Luhanska. The SMM also saw a crane, two trucks and about 20 Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers conducting repair works at a broken bridge on road T0504 south-west of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 16 July 2018).

The SMM continued to monitor the situation following reports of hazardous chemical air pollution in the area of Pershokostiantynivka (93km south-east of Kherson) and Preobrazhenka (90km south-east of Kherson) (see SMM Daily Report 10 September 2018). On 11 September, a representative of the Kherson State Administration told the SMM that on 30 August they had been informed about hazardous pollution from a nearby chemical plant. He said that on 11 September the level of air contamination was below the alarm levels according to the available testing equipment. A representative of the State Emergency Service told the Mission that following the information about hazardous pollution people had been advised to stay indoors in particular in the mornings due to the assessed higher risk associated with fog. The representative also told the SMM that the Emergency Service was using specialised equipment to decontaminate polluted locations.

The SMM continued monitoring in Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• On two occasions, at a checkpoint of the armed formation west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), members of the armed formations denied the SMM passage for the fourth consecutive day (see SMM Daily Report of 11 September 2018).
• At a checkpoint near Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations again prevented the SMM from accessing Pikuzy and Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol).
• Two members of the armed formations did not allow the SMM to pass through a checkpoint 5km north of a border crossing point in Leonove (formerly Chervonyi Zhovten, non-government-controlled, 82km south of Luhansk).

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by telephone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.5
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

Conditional access:

• At a checkpoint near Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), members of the armed formations allowed the SMM passage only after inspecting the SMM vehicles’ trunks.

Other impediments:

• In Horlivka, the SMM was denied access to one school, and at three other schools their staff refused to provide the SMM information.

[1]    For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

[2]    Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited; thus, the review of the camera footage may take place days later.

[3]    This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4]    The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC withdrew from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

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Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights Slovenia, Early Parliamentary Elections, 3 June 2018: Final Report

The final report on Slovenia’s 3 June 2018 parliamentary elections issued by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) on 12 September 2018 concludes that the elections were administered in a professional and efficient manner, with a high level of confidence among stakeholders in the work of the election commissions. It notes that procedures were in place to make polling stations accessible for voters with physical disabilities.

The report also notes that voters had the opportunity to make an informed choice from a variety of political options, that all political parties were able to campaign freely, and that the freedoms of speech, movement and association were respected. However, public interest and participation in the elections remained low, according to the report, and the campaign environment featured disinformation tactics and instances of negative campaigning and hate speech. The report recommends that authorities consider the introduction of an effective mechanism to counter instances of intolerant rhetoric, including xenophobic and inflammatory language, in the campaign period.

According to the report, prior amendments to the legal framework for political and campaign finance addressed several previous ODIHR recommendations. The report recommends that the capacities of the oversight bodies need to be enhanced to ensure effective implementation of the political and campaign finance provisions, and to address concerns over possible illegal foreign financing.

While noting that the deadlines in place for election dispute resolution encourage timely legal remedy, the report highlights a lack of clear and hierarchical structures with regard to complaints before election administration bodies, and recommends that the law be amended to establish clarity regarding election day disputes.

The election administration enforced the legal requirements for gender representation in the candidate lists, but the report notes that no aggregated data were available on the number of female candidates nationally.

WARSAW, 12 September 2018 – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, said that today’s decision of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation to uphold the sentencing of Ukrainian journalist Roman Sushchenko is deeply disappointing.

“I reiterate my call on the Russian authorities to release Roman Sushchenko from prison. Journalists in the OSCE region should be able to work without fear of intimidation or imprisonment,” Désir said.

On 4 June 2018, the Moscow City Court sentenced Sushchenko, a journalist with the Ukrainian National News Agency Ukrinform, to 12 years in a high security prison on espionage charges. He has been under arrest in Moscow since 30 September 2016.

The Representative raised the case on several occasions in the past, including during his official visits to Kyiv and Moscow in 2017 (see: https://www.osce.org/representative-on-freedom-of-media/383433, https://www.osce.org/fom/351561 and https://www.osce.org/fom/358456).

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, twitter @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom.

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WARSAW, 12 September 2018 - The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, today strongly condemned the arrest of Austrian journalist Max Zirngast and the continued prosecution of journalists in Turkey.

Max Zirngast, a contributor to several Austrian magazines and a student of political science, was detained in Ankara on Tuesday morning, along with several other people. According to media reports, it is widely believed that he was arrested on terrorism charges for articles and political publications he had written.

“I strongly condemn this arrest and call on the Turkish authorities to immediately take action and release him. This is an additional example of the severe conditions and constraints faced by journalists in Turkey for simply carrying out their professional activities and reporting on the situation in the country,” Désir said.

The Representative recalled that anti-terrorism legislation that is widely used to restrict media freedom puts the media at risk and needs to be changed to correspond to international standards.

“I will continue insisting that journalists must be able to work without fear of being detained or in any way intimidated. This worrying trend of arresting journalists, including foreign journalists, must be reversed. Freedom of the media and access to diverse sources of information must be respected in line with Turkey's OSCE commitments,” Désir said.

Désir expressed his hope that Zirngast will be freed soon, without sharing the same fate as other foreign journalists such as French journalist Loup Bureau and German-Turkish journalist Deniz Yücel. Both were released after strong international appeals  with Bureau imprisoned for seven weeks and Yücel spending a year in pre-trial detention. Yücel, who still faces a prison sentence if convicted, was accused of propaganda in support of a terrorist organization and inciting the public to violence.  For previous statements, see https://www.osce.org/representative-on-freedom-of-media/372521.

The Representative is currently in Warsaw attending the Human Dimension Implementation Meeting (HDIM), Europe's largest annual human rights and democracy conference.

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom.

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TASHKENT, 12 September 2018 – OSCE Parliamentary Assembly Vice-President Azay Guliyev (Azerbaijan) is in Tashkent where he spoke today at the seminar on the “Role of Parliaments in engaging Afghanistan into Central Asian Cooperation Frameworks through Preventive Diplomacy” by the UN Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia.

In his speech on the role of regional parliamentary co-operation in implementation of preventive diplomacy and the role of Afghanistan in the political development of Central Asia, Vice-President Guliyev noted that the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly is well positioned to exert preventive diplomacy.

Parliamentarians, he said, can open doors which only politicians can open and the PA has a variety of instruments at its disposal to increase engagement with particular countries or regions and to promote parliamentarism. “MPs also enjoy a greater degree of freedom to launch public debates or make public statements on sensitive topics, thus testing public opinion and leading the way, before governments are ready to take an official stance,” Guliyev said.

Stressing the unique role played by members of parliament in the political decision-making process and public life in their respective countries, Guliyev noted MPs possess a broad range of tools and mechanisms to address the various types of crises and to contribute to post-conflict rebuilding and promote political dialogue at the level of parliaments, political parties and civil society.

Guliyev drew the attention of the participants to the fact that Afghanistan has been an Asian Partner for Co-operation of the OSCE and the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly since 2003 and borders three OSCE participating States (Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan). A special debate on Afghanistan was held in 2010 as well.

He also talked about mutual activities of the Central Asian States and the Assembly, noting that parliamentarians from these countries are very active in Assembly activities, including in election observation. There have also been several positive tendencies regarding co-operation, including the visit by then-President of the PA Christine Muttonen to Tashkent in May 2017, which was the first visit to Uzbekistan by a PA President in more than a decade.

Guliyev informed the participants on the relevant ad hoc groups, Special Representatives and also Assembly resolutions regarding Afghanistan adopted by the Assembly.

“Afghanistan also participated in a number of statutory meetings of the OSCE PA, starting in 2009,” Guliyev said. He noted that the OSCE provided assistance in the fields of border security, police training and combating drug trafficking for Afghanistan starting in 2007 and agreed to widen its engagement with Afghanistan, from the politico-military dimension to also include the economic and environmental dimension and the human dimension in 2011.

The Vice-President concluded his speech by noting that “the entire OSCE family stands ready to continue its support in promoting greater co-operation and integration among the countries of Central Asia and Afghanistan which have a common geography and history, as well as strong cultural ties and enormous economic potential for mutually beneficial joint projects toward achieving the goals of peace, sustainable development, stability and security.”

In Tashkent, OSCE PA Vice-President Guliyev held meetings with the leadership of Uzbek Parliament and discussed the enhancing of future co-operation between the OSCE PA and the Parliament of Uzbekistan.

For Azay Guliyev's full remarks in Tashkent, please click here

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This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region compared with the previous 24 hours. The SMM recorded ceasefire violations inside the Petrivske and Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement areas, and noted that trenches in the Petrivske disengagement area had been recently extended. The Mission’s access remained restricted in the disengagement areas as well as, again, near Verkhnoshyrokivske, and near Izvaryne on the border with the Russian Federation.* The SMM continued to monitor repairs to water infrastructure in Stanytsia Luhanska and Pervomaisk.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations,[1] including about 100 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours (155 explosions).

On the evening of 9 September, the SMM Camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, about 20 projectiles in flight, eight explosions (two airbursts, the remainder undetermined), an illumination flare, five projectiles, three undetermined explosions and about ten projectiles, all 0.2-5km south-south-west.

On the evening and night of 9-10 September, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard about 40 undetermined explosions and about 130 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 2-5km south and south-east.

During the day on 10 September, positioned near the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard an undetermined explosion and about 240 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 2-3km at southerly directions.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations (but no explosions), compared with the previous 24 hours (three explosions).

The SMM continued to monitor and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske[2]  (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On 8 September, an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) in the south-western part of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area. On the evening of 9 September, the SMM camera at the Prince Ihor Monument south-east of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk) recorded three muzzle flashes, 1‑2km north-east assessed as inside the disengagement area. While on the eastern edge of Stanytsia Luhanska on the same evening, the SMM heard 15 shots of small-arms fire 3-5km west-south-west, assessed as inside the disengagement area.

During the day on 10 September, positioned north of Petrivske, the SMM heard and saw an explosion assessed as an impact 2-3km south-west, assessed as inside the disengagement area. It also heard two undetermined explosions and about 60 shots and bursts of small-arms fire, all 2-6km south and south-east, assessed as outside the disengagement area.

On 10 September, the SMM observed an armoured vehicle (KrAZ Cougar) travelling within the Zolote disengagement area, near Katerynivka (government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk).

Aerial imagery of 5 September available to the SMM revealed that trenches assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces within the Petrivske disengagement area had been extended by approximately 65m in southerly directions, and firing positions in the trenches had been upgraded with sandbags, compared with imagery taken on 23 August.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites, the SMM saw a tank (T-64) at a military compound near Zatyshne (government-controlled, 64km south-west of Donetsk).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. Beyond the respective withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas in Donetsk region, the SMM saw six self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm), nine towed mortars (2B9 Vasilek, 82mm) and four multiple launch rocket systems (BM-30 Smerch, 300mm).

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles and an anti-aircraft gun[3] in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 8 September, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted three infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (probable BMP-1) parked near civilian houses and two armoured personnel carriers (APC) (type undetermined) in Kamianka (20km north of Donetsk). On 10 September, the SMM saw two APCs (a BRDM and an MT-LB) in the yard of a house in Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk).

In non-government-controlled areas, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an APC (MT-LB) in Stare (58km west of Luhansk) and an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) near Veselohorivka (64km west of Luhansk).

The SMM again saw demining activity near Lomakyne (government-controlled, 15km north-east of Mariupol). The SMM saw people were wearing clothing bearing the logo of an international demining organization carrying out demining activities.

The SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair and maintenance works to water infrastructure in Stanytsia Luhanska and Pervomaisk.

The SMM visited two border areas not under government control. While at a border crossing point near Izvaryne (52km south-east of Luhansk) for about 15 minutes, the SMM observed no cross-border traffic before being told by members of the armed formations to leave the area.* While at a border crossing point near Sievernyi (50km south-east of Luhansk) for about 45 minutes, the SMM observed three men and a woman (30-60 years old) exiting Ukraine, as well as 12 men and 11 women (30-60 years old) entering Ukraine.

The SMM observed freight wagons in non-government-controlled areas. At a railyard in Sukhodilsk (38km south-east of Luhansk), an SMM long-range UAV spotted 61 empty freight wagons (50 open and 11 boxcars) and two tank wagons. At a railyard near Novosimeikine (33km south-east of Luhansk), the same UAV spotted a train connected to 31 loaded freight wagons (contents could not be identified).

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• On two occasions, at a checkpoint of the armed formations west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), members of the armed formations denied the SMM passage for the third consecutive day (see SMM Daily Report of 10 September 2018).
• At a border crossing point near Izvaryne, members of the armed formations again told the SMM to leave the area.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.5
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

Other impediments:

• An SMM long-range UAV was jammed while flying near Komisarivka (non‑government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), Azarivka (non-government-controlled, 32km south-west of Luhansk) and Teple (formerly Krasnodon, non‑government-controlled, 33km south-east of Luhansk). [5]

[1]    For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

[2]    Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited; thus, the review of the camera footage may take place days later.

[3]    This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4]    The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

[5]    The interference could have originated from anywhere in a radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position.

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This report is for the media and the general public.

SUMMARY

Kamensk-Shakhtinskiy, Russian Federation. The Observer Mission (OM) continues to operate 24/7 at both Border Crossing Points (BCPs). The overall number of border crossings by persons decreased at both BCPs compared to the previous week. 

OPERATIONAL REMARKS

The OM is currently operating with 22 permanent international staff members, including the Chief Observer (CO). The Mission is supported administratively by a Vienna-based staff member.

OBSERVATIONS AT THE BORDER CROSSING POINTS

Persons crossing the border                                                                                                                                                                                          

The profile of the people crossing the border can be categorized as follows:

1. Adults travelling on foot or by car with little or no luggage;
2. Persons in military-style outfits;
3. Families (often including elderly people and/or children) travelling on foot or by car with a significant amount of luggage.

The average number of entries/exits decreased from 11,694 to 10,827 per day at both BCPs compared to last week[1].

During the reporting period, the majority of border crossings were to the Russian Federation, with an average net flow of plus 242 for both BCPs.

The Donetsk BCP continued to experience more traffic than the Gukovo BCP.

Persons in military-style outfits

During the reporting period, the number of persons in military-style outfits crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs decreased to 21 persons (compared to 49 last week); 13 of them crossed into the Russian Federation, and eight into Ukraine (90 per cent of this category’s crossings occurred at the Donetsk BCP). They continued to cross the border individually or in groups. Most individuals crossed on foot, however, some made use of private vehicles, buses or minivans, making it more difficult for the observer teams (OTs) to observe their movement across the border, especially since some of the private vehicles have tinted windows, and buses and minivans have drawn curtains.

Families with a significant amount of luggage

The OTs continued to report on families crossing the border, sometimes with elderly people and/or children, at both BCPs with a significant amount of luggage, or travelling in heavily loaded cars. During this reporting week, eight families were observed crossing into the Russian Federation and six were observed crossing into Ukraine, compared to the previous reporting period when seven families were observed crossing the border into the Russian Federation and four into Ukraine.

Bus connections                                         

Regular local and long-distance bus connections continued to operate between Ukraine (mostly from/to the Luhansk region) and the Russian Federation. In addition to regular bus connections, the OTs continued to observe bus connections on irregular routes. Often the buses do not state their route; instead they have a sign on the windshield stating “irregular”.

During the reporting period the OTs observed an increase in the number of buses crossing the border at both BCPs (453 compared to 441 observed during the previous week). There were 243 buses bound for the Russian Federation and 210 bound for Ukraine.

Among the bus connections observed by the OTs, the following “irregular” routes or destinations were noted: Kyiv and Rovenky- Kyiv.

On some occasions, the OTs noticed the bus drivers removing the itinerary signs from the windshields of their buses, while some buses do not display their route at all. The majority of long-distance buses commuting between the Luhansk region and cities in the Russian Federation have Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region.

Trucks

During the reporting period the OM observed an increase in the overall number of trucks crossing the border in both directions and at both BCPs. Compared to the previous week, the total number of trucks went from 753 to 848 (287 at the Gukovo BCP and 561 at the Donetsk BCP); 475 of these trucks crossed into the Russian Federation and 373 crossed into Ukraine. Most of the trucks observed by the OTs had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region.                                                                                            

Among them, the OTs also continued to observe tanker trucks crossing the border in both directions. During the reporting week, the number of tanker trucks slightly decreased to 50 (compared to 52 during the previous reporting period). These trucks were observed crossing the border at both BCPs. The trucks had the words “Propane” and “Flammable” written across the tanks in either Russian or Ukrainian. The majority of tanker trucks had hazard signs, indicating that they were transporting propane or a mix of propane and butane.

All trucks undergo systematic inspection by Russian Federation officials, which may include an X-ray check. Due to the unfavourable observation position at the Gukovo BCP, the OTs continued to be unable to observe any X-ray checks.

Compared to the previous week, the total number of X-ray checks at the Donetsk BCP slightly decreased from 121 to 100: out of the total number of trucks scanned, 63 trucks were bound for Ukraine; the remaining 37 trucks crossed into the Russian Federation.

Minivans

The OM continued to observe passenger and cargo minivans[2] crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs. The OTs observed minivans predominantly with Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, the OTs also frequently saw minivans registered in the Russian Federation. As compared to the previous week, the number of cargo minivans decreased from 180 to 139 vehicles; 66 crossed into the Russian Federation and another 73 into Ukraine.

Trains

The OTs continued to pick up the sound of trains running on the railway tracks located approximately 150 metres south-west of the Gukovo BCP. During the reporting week, the OTs heard trains on 26 occasions, compared to 24 last week; the OTs assessed that 17 trains were travelling to the Russian Federation and the rest to Ukraine. The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine was regularly informed about the trains bound for Ukraine.

Visual observation was not possible because of the line of trees located between the train tracks and the BCP.

Other observations

The majority of vehicles crossing the border had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region, or Russian Federation licence plates. A significant number of vehicles with “LPR” plates were also observed crossing the border in both directions on a daily basis, as were vehicles with Lithuanian and Belarusian licence plates.

[1] Based on data received from the Regional Representation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation.

[2] Cargo minivans: light commercial vehicles with a maximum authorized mass of more than 3.5 t and not more than 7.5 t; with or without a trailer with a maximum mass of less than 750 kg (small cargo vehicles which correspond to driving licence C1).                       

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393683 Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

The Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) held a presentation on its use of digital pen technology in observing elections at an event on 11 September 2018, during the annual OSCE Human Dimension Implementation Meeting in Warsaw.

The event, held within the context of ODIHR’s evolving observation methodology, highlighted how the Office equips election observers with digital pens to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of recording election day data, as well as to expedite analysis.

Participants received an introduction to the use of the digital pens and were then able to test them to understand how data is transmitted, received and analysed.

The pens are equipped with a camera that scans information from the special paper on which  observation forms are printed. Observers are then able to transmit the data via a linked cell phone to mission headquarters, for immediate use by election experts and statistical analysts.

“Digital pens allow observation missions to receive and analyse data in real-time,” said Alexander Shlyk, Head of the ODIHR Election Department. “Observers are also able to spend more time in polling stations following procedures. All this contributes to a deeper and more comprehensive assessment of election day.”

The ODIHR election observation methodology is widely recognized for its professional and systematic approach and serves as guidance for other international and citizen observer organizations.

393470 Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights Guidance Document on the Nelson Mandela Rules

The OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and Penal Reform International (PRI) presented their new publication on implementing the revised United Nations rules for the treatment of prisoners at an event in Warsaw on 11 September 2018. The presentation took place on the margins of the annual OSCE Human Dimension Implementation Meeting.

The practical tool, Guidance Document on the Nelson Mandela Rules – Implementing the United Nations revised Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, is designed to assist OSCE participating States in improving conditions of detention and the treatment of prisoners, with a focus on preventing torture and other ill-treatment.

“The effective implementation of the Nelson Mandela Rules in all 57 OSCE participating States will mark a considerable achievement for the prevention of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,” said Stephanie Selg, ODIHR Adviser on Torture Prevention. “We are convinced that this publication will assist prison administrations, penitentiary staff, monitoring bodies and policymakers in implementing standards for the treatment of prisoners and ensuring human dignity for all.”

The Guidance Document incorporates existing international legal standards and practical tools, “soft law” principles and opinions of authoritative bodies, as well as promising national practice examples that provide guidance for the interpretation and effective implementation of the revised Rules.

During the event, ODIHR and PRI representatives, prison administration officials and monitoring experts discussed experiences in implementing the Rules and shared examples of how prison administrations and staff may benefit from the Guidance Document, which is designed to complement other available implementation tools.

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region between the evenings of 7 and 8 September, compared with the previous reporting period. Between the evenings of 8 and 9 September, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk and fewer in Luhansk region, compared with the previous 24 hours. The SMM followed up on reports of fresh damage caused by gunfire in a residential area of Maiorsk. The Mission observed that the entry-exit checkpoint near Stanytsia Luhanska re-opened following construction and repair works and civilians have resumed crossing. The SMM saw multiple launch rocket systems in violation of withdrawal lines near Khrustalnyi. It saw, for the first time, a mine and a hand grenade near Verkhnoshyrokivske. The SMM recorded ceasefire violations inside and near the Zolote disengagement area and near the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area. The Mission’s access remained restricted in the disengagement areas as well as near Verkhnoshyrokivske, Yuzhna-Lomuvatka and Khrustalnyi.* The Mission continued to monitor the situation around the Donetsk Filtration Station, which has been non-operational since 6 September due to a power outage. In Lviv, the SMM monitored a public gathering outside the regional court of appeals. The SMM continued to follow up on reports of hazardous air pollution south-east of Kherson that had reportedly originated from a nearby chemical plant.

In Donetsk region, between the evenings of 7 and 8 September, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations,[1] including 57 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 90 explosions). Between the evenings of 8 and 9 September, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 155 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours.

On the evening of 7 September, the SMM camera in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk) recorded two undetermined explosions and about 65 projectiles in flight from south to north, all 3-5km at directions ranging from east-north-east to south-east. On the same evening, while in Svitlodarsk, the SMM heard ten undetermined explosions (five assessed as outgoing rounds and five undetermined) and 125 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 2-5km south-east.

On the evening of 8 September, the SMM camera in Svitlodarsk recorded 11 explosions (nine undetermined and two assessed as outgoing rounds), about 110 projectiles in flight (mostly from north to south and from south to north) and an illumination flare in vertical flight, all 1-18km at directions ranging from east-north-east to south-east. While in Svitlodarsk on 8 September, the SMM heard about 150 undetermined explosions and about 835 shots and bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, as well as 50 rounds assessed as from infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-2) cannon (30mm) fire, all 3-6km east-south-east, south-east and south-south-east.    

On the evening and night of 7-8 September, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded an undetermined explosion and about 75 projectiles in flight from north-west to south-east, all 1.5-4km south-south-west.

On the evening and night of 7-8 September, the SMM camera 1km south-west of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol) recorded 18 undetermined explosions, about 220 projectiles in flight (mostly from north to south and south to north) and seven muzzle flashes, all 1-5km in directions ranging from north-east to south-east.

In Luhansk region, between the evenings of 7 and 8 September, the SMM recorded more ceasefire, including 27 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (two explosions). Between the evenings of 8 and 9 September, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including three explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours.

During the day on 8 September, positioned on the north-eastern edge of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk) for about 40 minutes, the SMM heard 26 undetermined explosions 5-7km east-south-east.

The SMM followed up on reports of fresh damage caused by gunfire in a residential area of Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk). On 7 September, at 15 Maiorska Street, the SMM observed a fresh hole in the south-facing wall and a broken south-facing window on the third floor of a five-storey building, assessed by the SMM as caused by an undetermined weapon fired from a south-easterly direction. A male resident (60-70 years old) showed the SMM a 12.7mm bullet that he claimed had caused the above-mentioned damage to the window. Three other residents of the building told the SMM that they had heard gunfire on the evening of 6 September.   

The SMM continued to monitor and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske[2]  (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

In the early morning of 9 September, while on the eastern edge of Stanytsia Luhanska, the SMM heard an undetermined explosion 4-6km west-south-west, assessed as outside the disengagement area.

During the day on 8 September, positioned on the southern edge of the Zolote disengagement area for about 20 minutes, the SMM heard 20 shots of small-arms fire 1-1.5km north and north-north-west, assessed as inside the disengagement area.

On the same day, the SMM observed a fire inside the Zolote disengagement area, about 50m inside the southern edge and about 1.4km west of the eastern edge of the disengagement area, 20-30m north-west of the checkpoint of the armed formations. The SMM saw two fire trucks and five members of the armed formations extinguishing the fire.  

During the day on 9 September, positioned in Zolote 4 (government-controlled, 59km north-west of Luhansk) about 800m north of the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM heard nine bursts of small-arms fire 1-2km east-south-east , assessed as outside the disengagement area.

Positioned near the Petrivske disengagement area and in the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area on 8 September, the SMM observed a calm situation. Positioned near the Petrivske disengagement area on 9 September, the SMM observed a calm situation.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of the withdrawal lines in a non-government controlled area, on 8 September, the SMM saw eight multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) at a compound near Khrustalnyi (formerly Krasnyi Luch, 56km south-west of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in government-controlled areas, on 8 September, the SMM saw eight MLRS (BM-21) in a military compound near Peredove (68km south-west of Donetsk) and eight self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) and a surface-to-air missile system (9K35, Strela-10) at a military compound near Kalynove (formerly Kalinine, 65km south-west of Donetsk).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. Beyond the respective withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas in Donetsk region, the SMM saw 12 MLRS (BM-21), nine towed mortars (2B9 Vasilek, 82mm), six self-propelled howitzers (2S1), four anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm), three anti-tank guided missile systems (9P149, Shturm-S, 130mm) and a surface-to-air missile system (9K35), and noted that 23 MLRS (BM-21), four anti-tank guns (MT-12), two surface-to-air missile systems (9K35) and a self-propelled howitzer (2S1) continued to be missing.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles[3] and a helicopter in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 7 September, the SMM saw an IFV (BMP-variant) 1.5km west of Pylypchatyne (76km north-east of Donetsk). On 9 September, the SMM saw a military helicopter (MI-8) flying south-west to north-east near Viktorivka (74km west of Luhansk) and an IFV (BMP-2) being towed by an armoured recovery vehicle (BTS-3) in Novoselivka (37km north-east of Mariupol).

In non-government-controlled areas, on 7 September, the SMM saw an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (MT-LB) at a checkpoint of the armed formations near Staromykhailivka (15km west of Donetsk). On 9 September, the SMM saw six APCs (BTR-variants) moving west on Illicha Avenue in Donetsk city centre.

The SMM again saw demining activity. On 8 and 9 September, in a field about 1.5km south-east of Lomakyne (government-controlled, 15km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM saw people who were wearing clothing bearing the logo of an international demining organization carrying out demining activities.

The SMM continued to observe mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO). On 9 September, the SMM saw for the first time a partially buried mine (type undetermined) 2-3m south of a road and a nearby hand grenade (F-1 variant) with the pin still attached about 0.5m south of the road, about 2km west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol) (not seen on 8 September 2018).

The SMM observed that the entry-exit checkpoint near Stanytsia Luhanska re-opened on 8 September following construction and repair works from 2-7 September (see SMM Daily Report 8 September 2018). On the morning of 8 September, in the area around the Ukrainian Armed Forces entry-exit checkpoint, the SMM saw continued construction works and repairs to shelters, offices and the road, as well as up to 1,000 people queuing to cross towards non-government-controlled areas. The same morning, at the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the bridge, the SMM observed about 300 people return from the closed entry-exit checkpoint. At 11:50, the SMM observed that the entry-exit checkpoint was opened and crossing had resumed. Later in the day, a Ukrainian Border Guard Service member present told the SMM that on 8 September 2,287 people had entered government-controlled areas through the checkpoint and 2,306 people had exited.

The SMM visited three border areas not under government control. On 7 September, while at a border crossing point near Marynivka (78km east of Donetsk) for about 30 minutes, the SMM saw nine cars (four with Russian Federation licence plates and five with “DPR” plates), one motorcycle with “DPR” plates and one pedestrian exiting Ukraine, as well as four cars (three with Russian Federation licence plates and one with “DPR” plates) entering Ukraine.

On 9 September, while at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for about an hour and ten minutes, the SMM saw 32 cars (12 with Ukrainian, eight with Russian Federation, one with Belarusian and one with Georgian licence plates and ten with “DPR” plates), 32 covered trucks (24 with Ukrainian and two with Russian Federation licence plates and six with “DPR” plates) and two buses with “DPR” plates queuing to exit Ukraine. During the same time, the SMM saw seven cars (one with Ukrainian licence plates and six with “DPR” plates) entering Ukraine.

On the same day, at a border crossing point near Ulianivske (61km south-east of Donetsk) for about 20 minutes, the SMM saw three pedestrians entering Ukraine and seven parked cars (two with Ukrainian and one with Russian Federation licence plates and four with “DPR” plates).

On 8 and 9 September, the SMM continued to monitor the security situation around the DFS. The SMM saw no repair works around the site and no workers traveling to or leaving the DFS. A representative of Voda Donbassa told the SMM that a power outage at the station since 6 September have left the station without electricity and thus non-operational, adding that no workers had been present at the DFS on 8 and 9 September. Four residents (at three locations) in Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk) separately told the SMM that their water supply has been interrupted since 6 September.

The SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair and maintenance works to water infrastructure in Stanytsia Luhanska on 8 September.

In Lviv, the SMM monitored a public gathering related to an incident between citizens and police in the city on 31 August. On 6 September, the SMM saw about 50 people (mostly men, 15-30 years old), including some wearing C14 t-shirts, in front of the Lviv regional court of appeals at 7 Soborna Square. The SMM noted that 45 police officers, including 30 dressed in riot gear, were also present. Early in the morning, some participants threw several smoke grenades towards the building. Shortly after, some participants entered the building to attend a planned public hearing on the 31 August case related to an incident between citizens and police. The SMM observed that the remainder of the event stayed calm. 

The SMM continued to follow up on reports of hazardous chemical air pollution in the area of Pershokostiantynivka (93km south-east of Kherson) and Preobrazhenka (90km south-east of Kherson) that had reportedly originated from a nearby chemical plant. The SMM visited the Chonhar crossing point on 9 September and observed heavy traffic with long processing times. On the same day the SMM visited areas about 25km from the Kalanchak and Chaplynka crossing points, and noted a calm situation. On 7 September, a representative of the Border Guard Service told the SMM that the crossing points at Kalanchak and Chaplynka were closed, except for emergencies. The same day, a representative of the Regional State Emergency Service in Kherson told the SMM that workers and machines had been sent from Kherson to Kalanchak and Chaplynka districts to wash off the dust brought by rains from the chemical plant’s acid ponds. The SMM will continue to monitor the situation.

The SMM continued monitoring in Odessa, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 31 August 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• On three occasions (two on 8 September and one on 9 September) at a checkpoint of the armed formations west of Verkhnoshyrokivske, members of the armed formations denied the SMM passage. While present at the checkpoint, the SMM observed civilian vehicles passing through in both directions.
• A member of the armed formations on 8 September denied the SMM passage through a checkpoint in Yuzhna-Lomuvatka (non-government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk).
• Armed formations’ members denied the SMM access on 8 September to three compounds near Khrustalnyi, citing hazardous works they said were ongoing at the sites that might pose a risk to SMM staff safety.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• On 8 and 9 September, the SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by telephone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC on both occasions.[4]
• On 8 and 9 September, the SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by telephone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC on both occasions.5
• On 8 and 9 September, the SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. The SMM cameras in Kriakivka and on the northern edge of Popasna were not operational during the reporting period.

[2] Due to the presence of mines, including those on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access   to its camera in Petrivske remains limited; thus, the review of the camera footage may take place days later.

[3] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

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WARSAW, 10 September 2018 – The need to address today’s security challenges means the defence and promotion of human rights are more important than ever, speakers said today at the opening of the OSCE Human Dimension Implementation Meeting in Warsaw.

In a direct reference to the three special themes of the conference, they said that the fact that times are difficult cannot be used to justify infringements on fundamental freedoms, nor to provide an excuse for racism, intolerance and discrimination. Instead, a human rights focus is more important than ever to ensure effective policies and solutions.

“We live in an increasingly unpredictable environment. The OSCE has also been confronted with many challenges,” said Jacek Czaputowicz, Foreign Minister of Poland. “In this difficult time, we should not forget what the OSCE’s comprehensive security concept is all about. Human rights are the foundation on which we should build global peace and security.”

Ingibjörg Sólrún Gísladóttir, Director of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, which is responsible for the annual organization of the event, said: “There is a need for participating States to renew their efforts to counter rising trends of intolerance and discrimination. Once we go down the slippery slope of allowing intolerance and discrimination to thrive, no group – and I repeat, no group – can assume that they are immune once the principle has been eroded.”

Some 1,800 government representatives, human rights activists and experts are gathering in Warsaw for the two-week meeting, where they will review the progress made by governments in implementing their commitments in the fields of human rights and fundamental freedoms, democratic institutions and governance, and tolerance and non-discrimination.

“HDIM shall remind us that the protection of human rights goes beyond mere domestic considerations. On the contrary, it is an essential factor for the development of co-operation between States and for their peaceful coexistence,” said Alessandro Azzoni, Chairperson of the OSCE Permanent Council and Italy’s Permanent Representative to the OSCE.

George Tsereteli, President of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, highlighted that civil society participation was a vital characteristic for the Warsaw meeting.

"All of us gathered here today must recognize that a pluralistic and strong civil society is indispensable to a functioning democracy and vital to promoting and protecting human rights,” Tsereteli said. “This open dialogue on controversial issues must continue and opposing views must be allowed to be heard by all in order to successfully work together towards implementing our OSCE commitments."

In his keynote address, Michael O’Flaherty, Director of the European Union Fundamental Rights Agency, further stressed the central role of civil society.

“Any comments on truly effective responses to our human rights challenges must make reference to the important role of civil society. Without NGOs and other civil society actors operating on the ground and in networks, within and across borders, there would be much less information and input available to decision makers,” O’Flaherty said. “Similarly, the activity of such groups is vital to the effective implementation of human rights, as they often take the lead in providing supportive action, including for victims.”

In addition to regular working sessions, almost 90 independent side events will be held, focusing on specific human rights concerns and country situations.

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