OSCE

Munira Shoinbekova, OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe

A three-day training course on juvenile justice aimed at raising awareness about the rights of children in contact with the criminal justice system concluded on 31 August 2018 in Romit, Tajikistan (40 km north-east of Dushanbe). The course was organized by the OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe.

Eighteen mid- to senior-level officials from Tajikistan’s Interior Ministry and five members of the Tajik Inter-Agency Working Group on Justice for Children System Reform took part in the event.

The training course focused on international norms and standards as well as domestic legislation concerning children’s rights as applied to juvenile justice and the psychological characteristics of children in contact with the law. It included discussion and interactive exercises on communicating with child suspects, victims and witnesses.

Olga Korzhova, a trainer from Kyrgyzstan, said: “Standards of communication with child victims, witnesses of crimes and children in conflict with the law are an important element of child-friendly justice. The participants in the seminar are professionals who demonstrated a high level of motivation to implement the international standards on the rights of the child in their practical work.”

“Learning about worldwide practices and studying international standards relevant to justice for children will help the participants to improve their professional skills,” said Gulchehra Rakhmanova, a local trainer from Tajikistan. “They will apply the obtained knowledge in their day-to-day activities and share their experience with colleagues in their respective agencies.”

The training course complements Activity 11 of the Tajik National Action Plan on Juvenile Justice Reform 2017-2021, which provides for training of employees of the Interior Ministry, prevention police, investigators and police officers on Justice for Children.

392399 Kunduz Rysbek

The Sixth Annual Anti-Terrorism Expert Meeting organized by the OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek in close co-operation with the Secretariat’s Action against Terrorism Unit and with the direct support of the Kyrgyz State Committee on National Security’s Anti-Terrorist Centre took place from 3 to 4 September 2018 in Issyk-Kul.

This year’s meeting focussed on criminal justice responses to terrorism and internationally recognized good practices that align effective prevention and responses to terrorism with rule of law considerations.

The Meeting gathered 25 representatives of national agencies working in the counter-terrorism field. Representatives of relevant ministries, law enforcement agencies, prosecutor’s offices, judges and penitentiary facilities discussed handling cases related to terrorism in an efficient, timely and law abiding manner. They also discussed how to enhance co-ordination mechanisms between national government agencies, and stressed the importance of international co-operation, particularly when confronted with terrorism.

Good practices listed in the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) Rabat Memorandum on Effective Counterterrorism Practice in the Criminal Justice Sector were discussed by experts from Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, the United States and the Anti-Terrorism Center of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

The GCTF Rabat Memorandum offers insights into effective terrorism prevention and prosecution methods, while emphasizing the need to respect human rights and other applicable international law.

The Annual Anti-Terrorism Expert Meeting organized by the Programme Office in Bishkek has become a platform for information exchange and discussion regarding all aspects of preventing and countering terrorism, including the prevention of terrorist financing. The Annual Meeting contributes to the development and refinement of counterterrorism practices in Kyrgyzstan and beyond, in line with related UN strategies and binding requirements listed in UN Security Council resolutions.

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and a similar number of ceasefire violations in Luhansk region between the evenings of 31 August and 1 September, compared with the previous reporting period. Between the evenings of 1 and 2 September, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, compared with the previous 24 hours. In Donetsk city, the SMM saw a gathering relating to the reported death of Aleksandr Zakharchenko and at least one hundred members of the armed formations securing the area. The SMM recorded a ceasefire violation inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area. The Mission’s access remained restricted in the disengagement area as well as near Yasynuvata.* The SMM observed a weapon in violation of withdrawal lines near Ozarianivka. The Mission observed anti-tank mines near Popasna. The SMM saw that the entry-exit checkpoint near Stanytsia Luhanska was closed and observed that checkpoints in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region had been re-opened. The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station. The SMM’s observations were limited during the reporting period for security considerations.

In Donetsk region, between the evenings of 31 August and 1 September, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations,[1] including nine explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (18 explosions). Between the evenings of 1 and 2 September, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including, however, fewer explosions (seven), compared with the previous 24 hours.

Following the explosion that reportedly killed Aleksandr Zakharchenko and injured another member of the armed formations and at least nine other people on 31 August, the SMM observed a calm situation in Donetsk city centre (non-government-controlled). (See SMM Daily Report 1 September 2018.) On 2 September, the SMM saw several thousand people (men and women, aged 18-60) gathered in front of the opera house at 82 Artema Street for a pre-announced “lying-in-state ceremony” relating to the death of Zakharchenko. The Mission also saw a large poster of Zakharchenko on the façade of the opera house. There were at least one hundred members of the armed formations, some of whom were armed with assault rifles and pistols, securing the area. The SMM also observed at least one hundred members of the armed formations, some of whom were armed with assault rifles, on Pushkina Boulevard where the explosion had occurred. Some of them told the Mission that their presence on Pushkina Boulevard was related to “anti-terrorist attack drills”.

On the evening of 31 August, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded six projectiles in flight (all from north-west to south-east) and four illumination flares in vertical flight, all 2-4km south-south-west.

On the evening and night of 31 August-1 September, the SMM camera 1km south-west of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol) recorded 12 projectiles in flight (six from south to north, five from north to south and one from north-west to south-east), all 3-3.5km east-north-east. On the evening and night of 1-2 September, the camera recorded 80 projectiles in flight (64 from south to north, 14 from north to south and two from north-west to south-east) and two undetermined explosions, all 3-3.5km at directions ranging from east-north-east to south-south-east. 

In Luhansk region, between the evenings of 31 August and 1 September, the SMM recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations (two explosions), compared with the previous reporting period (three explosions). Between the evenings of 1 and 2 September, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including five explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours.

The SMM continued to monitor and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On the night of 31 August-1 September, the SMM camera in Stanytsia Luhanska recorded an undetermined explosion 2-4km south-east, assessed as outside the disengagement area. On the evening of 1 September, while on the eastern edge of Stanytsia Luhanska, the SMM heard an undetermined explosion 3-4km south-east, assessed as outside the disengagement area. On the evening and night of 1-2 September, the SMM camera in Stanytsia Luhanska recorded an  undetermined explosion 1-2km south-south-east (assessed as inside the disengagement area), followed by an undetermined explosion 1-2km west-south-west (assessed as outside the disengagement area) and a projectile in flight from east to west 1-2km west-south-west (assessed as outside the disengagement area). On the morning of 2 September, positioned about 650m north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM heard two explosions assessed as artillery rounds 3km south-west (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of the withdrawal lines in a government-controlled area, on 31 August, an SMM mid-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10) west of Ozarianivka (formerly Pershe Travnia, 52km north of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in a government-controlled area, on 1 September, the SMM observed nine self-propelled howitzers (2S5 Giatsint-S,152mm) and five towed howitzers (2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm), all stationary at the train station in Rubizhne (84km north-west of Luhansk).

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles (ACV), an anti-aircraft gun[2] and other indications of military-type presence in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 31 August, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (MT-LB variant) near Ozarianivka and an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) near Popasna (69km west of Luhansk). On 2 September, the SMM saw two infantry fighting vehicles (BMP-1), a combat engineering vehicle (IMR-2) and an armoured recovery vehicle (BREM-Ch) near Popasna.

In non-government-controlled areas, on 31 August, the SMM saw an ACV (type undetermined) near Smile (31km north-west of Luhansk). The same day, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted 22 craters, assessed as probably caused by 122mm artillery rounds fired from west-north-westerly, north-westerly and northerly directions (not visible in imagery from 22 August 2018), near well-maintained trenches, assessed as belonging to the armed formations, in the north-western outskirts of Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk).

The SMM continued to observe mines. On 31 August, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted for the first time nine anti-tank mines (probable TM-62) in a field north-east of Popasna about 550m north of road T0504 (not visible in imagery from 21 August 2018) which appeared to have been damaged, assessed as possibly due to a fire.

The SMM continued to follow up on reports of the temporary closure of the entry-exit checkpoint near Stanytsia Luhanska from 2 to 7 September (see SMM Daily Report 1 September 2018). On 1 September, at the entry-exit checkpoint north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM saw about 15 pedestrians in a queue to travel towards government-controlled areas and no pedestrians in the opposite direction. At the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the bridge, the SMM saw about 50 pedestrians in a queue to travel towards government-controlled areas and no pedestrians in the opposite direction. Five people (men and women, aged 40-60) told the SMM that the opening of entry-exit checkpoints near Zolote and Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk) and the replacement of wooden ramps of the broken section of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge with a straight bridge installation were needed. On 2 September, the SMM saw both checkpoints closed and did not observe any pedestrians queuing at either of the checkpoints. The same day, at the entry-exit checkpoint north of the bridge, the SMM saw a crane, an excavator and three trucks and observed a container module arrive at the site. A representative of the water company Popasna Vodokanal onsite told the SMM that new facilities, including a civilian shelter and 16 sanitary facilities (two for disabled people), would be installed at the checkpoint.

The SMM followed up on reports of temporary closures of checkpoints in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region, following the reported death of Aleksandr Zakharchenko (see above). On the evening of 31 August, members of the armed formations told the SMM that checkpoints of the armed formations near Horlivka, Oleksandrivka (20km south-west of Donetsk), Olenivka (23km south-west of Donetsk) and Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, 85km south of Donetsk) in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region had been closed. On the afternoon of 1 September, they said that the checkpoints had been re-opened. During the same afternoon, the SMM cameras at the entry-exit checkpoints in Maiorsk (45km north-east of Donetsk), Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk) and Pyshchevyk – across the contact line from Horlivka, Oleksandrivka and Verkhnoshyrokivske, respectively – recorded pedestrians and vehicles travelling in both directions. Later in the day, an SMM long-range UAV spotted civilian vehicles passing through the entry-exit checkpoints near Maiorsk and Berezove (31km south-west of Donetsk, across the contact line from Olenivka) as well as the checkpoint near Horlivka.

On 2 September, the SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 31 August 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• On 1 and 2 September, the SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC both times.[3]

Conditional access:

• On 2 September, two armed members of the armed formations allowed the SMM passage through a checkpoint north of Yasynuvata (nongovernment-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk) only after inspecting the SMM vehicle trunks.

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. The SMM cameras in Kriakivka and on the northern edge of Popasna were not operational during the reporting period.

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[3] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

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JAHORINA, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 3 September 2018 – More than 100 journalists and media professionals from Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) and the region gathered to discuss media and terrorism at a conference organized by the OSCE Mission to BiH, which concluded yesterday in Jahorina.

The discussion focused on the latest trends, challenges and standards in reporting on violent extremism and terrorism in the modern media landscape.

“Journalists and editors face many challenges when approaching sensitive subjects such as terrorism.  One of those challenges is how to respond to the right of the general public to be informed while remaining objective and avoiding the pitfall of adding to the atmosphere of fear that often surrounds these issues,” said Head of the OSCE Mission to BiH Bruce G. Berton.  

UNESCO Assistant Director-General for Communication and Information Moez Chakchouk said that media development is essential for the development of a country. “Ethical and professional reporting means informing the public without giving in to exaggeration or sensationalism.  This is essential since sensationalism offers the heightened visibility that terrorists desire and that could inadvertently inform copycat attacks. Through balanced and pluralistic coverage, the media can help to bridge ethnic, political, religious, and social boundaries.  Professional and ethical journalism help to make peace, dialogue and mutual understanding a reality,” said Chakchouk.

Unwilling or inadvertent amplification of the violent extremist narrative is an extremely difficult dilemma faced by journalists, highlighted Terri Judd, a consultant on countering violent extremism and strategic communication: “This is why forums such as this one are vital to empower the media with the knowledge and skills to counter the message, build resilience and support communities that may have individuals vulnerable to destructive terrorist propaganda,” she said.  

Serving as a platform for the exchange of experiences and best practices in preventing intolerance and societal divisions when reporting on terrorism, the conference contributed to the professional development of the journalists and media professionals who participated and helped to promote stability in BiH. It was a part of ongoing programmes being implemented by the OSCE Mission to BiH aimed at promoting freedom of the media and countering violent extremism in BiH.

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This report is for the media and the general public.

Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and the same number of ceasefire violations in Luhansk region. At 17:27 on 31 August, the Mission heard an undetermined explosion less than 200m north-north-east from its residence on Pushkina Boulevard in Donetsk city. A senior member of the armed formations told the SMM that in the explosion Aleksandr Zakharchenko had suffered fatal injuries, another member of the armed formations had been severely wounded and nine other people had sustained injuries. The Mission followed up on reports of a civilian casualty in Verkhnotoretske. It saw a trench that had been recently fortified and Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers inside the Zolote disengagement area, and heard ceasefire violations near the Petrivske and the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area. Its access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas, as well as near Luhanske and Shchastia.* The SMM observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines near Prychepylivka and Novoamvrosiivske. The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station. It facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable demining and repairs to water infrastructure in Luhansk region, at a gas distribution station in Krasnohorivka and the South Donbas water pipeline between Avdiivka and Yasynuvata. In Kyiv, the SMM followed up on reports of a protest outside the consulate of the Russian Federation on 30 August.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations[1], including 18 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 80 explosions).

At 17:27 on 31 August in Donetsk city, the SMM heard an undetermined explosion less than 200m north-north-east from the Mission’s residence on Pushkina Boulevard. The explosion occurred in Separ restaurant located in a park next to 13 Pushkina Boulevard. The Mission saw that the area around the restaurant had been fenced off. A senior member of the armed formations told the SMM that in the explosion Alexandr Zakharchenko had suffered fatal injuries, another member of the armed formations had been severely wounded and nine other people had sustained injuries. SMM staff was not harmed.

On the evening and night of 30-31 August, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard seven undetermined explosions and four shots of small-arms fire, all 2-5km south-east. On 31 August, at the same location, the Mission heard 50 bursts and shots of small-arms fire 2-3km west.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded the same number of ceasefire violations (three explosions) as in the previous reporting period.

The SMM followed up on reports of a civilian casualty. On 31 August, in Verkhnotoretske (government-controlled, 23km north-east of Donetsk), a woman (in her twenties) told the SMM that on the afternoon of 27 August, when she had been standing outside the kindergarten at 75 Zaliznichna Street with her daughter, she had heard a sound, felt a sharp pain and seen blood on her right forearm and a bullet on her foot. On the woman’s forearm the SMM saw a haematoma with a small, scabbed wound in the centre. On the same day, staff at the military medical point in Verkhnotoretske told the Mission that on 27 August they had treated a woman (in her twenties) for a small-arms wound to her right forearm.

The SMM continued to monitor and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk)[2], as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On 30 August, inside the Zolote disengagement area, an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted a previously observed trench fortified with sandbags, about 120m south of the railway bridge (see SMM Daily Report 31 August 2018). On 31 August, inside the disengagement area, the SMM saw a 4x4 car with a Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier driving, as well as two armed Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers on foot.

On the same day, the SMM saw eight armed members of the armed formations next to a vehicle with a machine gun mounted on its frame at a checkpoint on the southern edge of the Zolote disengagement area. About 700m north from the disengagement area’s southern edge and 20m west of road T1316 it saw a wire-guided missile (a probable 9K111 Fagot). The Mission also saw previously observed concrete positions about 200m north from the disengagement area’s southern edge and 90m west of road T1316, assessed as belonging to the armed formations, and, on the side of the road, a piece of barbed wire.

During the day on 31 August, positioned about 2km north of Petrivske, the SMM heard three undetermined explosions 2-5km south-south-west (unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area) and 20 bursts of small-arms fire 1km south-south-west (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

On the same day, while in Stanytsia Luhanska, the SMM heard an undetermined explosion 3-4km south-west, assessed as outside the disengagement area.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in a government-controlled area, on 30 August, an SMM mini-UAV spotted two towed howitzers (D-30) near Prychepylivka (50km north-west of Luhansk).

In violation of withdrawal lines in a non-government-controlled area, on 31 August, the SMM saw four multiple launch rocket systems (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) near Novoamvrosiivske (56km east of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in government-controlled areas, on 30 August, an SMM long-range UAV spotted a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10) north-west of Klishchiivka (60km north of Donetsk). On the same day, the SMM saw two self-propelled howitzers (2S5 Giatsint-S, 152mm) at the railway station in Rubizhne (84km north-west of Luhansk).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. In non-government-controlled areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM saw six towed howitzers (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) and five self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm), and noted that two self-propelled howitzers (2S1) were again missing.

The SMM revisited a permanent storage site whose location was beyond withdrawal lines in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region and noted that 11 tanks (four T-64 and seven T-72) remained missing.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles (ACVs) and anti-aircraft guns[3] in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 30 August, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted two infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP-1) near Vodiane (78km south of Donetsk). On the same day, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an IFV (BMP-1) and an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (MT-LB) near Zolote-4/Rodina (59km west of Luhansk), five IFVs (BMP variants), five armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-2) and two anti-aircraft guns (ZU-23, 23mm) near Prychepylivka, two ACVs (type undetermined) near Krymske (42km north-west of Luhansk), an APC (MT-LB), an IFV (BMP-1) and an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) near Trokhizbenka (32km north-west of Luhansk), two probable artillery command vehicles (BTR-60PB), four IFVs (two BMP-1 and two BMP-2) and an APC (BTR variant) near Muratove (51km north-west of Luhansk). On 31 August, the SMM saw an IFV (BMP-1) near Popasna (69km west of Luhansk) and an IFV (BMP variant) near Nyzhnie (56km north-west of Luhansk).

In non-government-controlled areas, on August 30, an SMM mini-UAV spotted a probable armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) about 20m from a non-functional school building in Donetskyi (49km west of Luhansk) where the Mission had previously observed damage caused by shelling (see SMM Daily Report 14 August 2018).

The SMM observed craters assessed to have been caused by mortar rounds near Zholobok (non-government-controlled, 47km west of Luhansk) and Prychepylivka, in an area where the SMM had previously recorded at least 500 explosions (see SMM Daily Report 24 August 2018). On 30 August, about 3km south-east of Prychepylivka, an SMM long-range UAV spotted 30 recent craters, assessed to have been caused by artillery rounds (122mm) coming from a southerly direction. On the same day, an SMM mini-UAV spotted a well-maintained trench system and four recent craters assessed as probably caused by mortar rounds (120mm) about 200m north-east of Zholobok, four recent craters assessed as probably caused by mortar rounds (120mm) on the southern edge of Zholobok, as well as over 30 recent craters assessed as probably caused by mortar rounds (120mm) about 1km south-east of Zholobok. The SMM assessed that the mortar craters were caused by fire coming from a northerly direction. (On 17 August, an SMM long-range UAV had spotted at least 16 houses engulfed in fire in the eastern part of Zholobok; see SMM Daily Report 20 August 2018.)

The SMM continued to observe the presence of mines. On 30 August, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted for the first time over 500 anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid in a field (not visible in imagery from 24 July 2018) north of Vodiane. Some of the mines appeared to have been damaged, assessed as possibly due to a fire. (On 27 August, the SMM saw plumes of smoke emanating from the direction of Vodiane.)

The SMM continued to follow up on the situation of civilians at entry-exit checkpoints along the contact line. On 31 August, at the Stanytsia Luhanska entry-exit checkpoint the SMM saw three cranes, four trucks and workers conducting construction works, as well as about 100 people in a queue to cross. At various places throughout the entry-exit checkpoint, the Mission saw notes advising of the checkpoint’s temporary closure from 2 to 7 September (see SMM Daily Report 30 August). A paramedic from the Ukrainian Ministry for Emergencies told the SMM that at around 10:00 on 31 August a man (in his seventies) had collapsed on the bridge and died despite medical assistance provided.

On the same day, a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer in the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) informed the Mission that the entry-exit checkpoint in Novotroitske (government-controlled, 36km south-west of Donetsk) and the checkpoint in Berezove (government-controlled, 31km south-west of Donetsk) had been re-opened on the morning of 31 August. (The checkpoints were previously closed; see SMM Daily Report 30 August 2018).

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire. Positioned in areas near the station, the SMM recorded ceasefire violations, despite explicit security guarantees (see the table below).

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair and maintenance works to water pipelines near Zolote and Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), as well as demining and repairs to a gas distribution station near Krasnohorivka (government-controlled, 21km west of Donetsk) and the South Donbas water pipeline between Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north-west of Donetsk) and Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk).

In Kyiv, the SMM followed up on reports of a protest on 30 August outside the consulate of the Russian Federation (3-5 Volunteer Battalions Street). At the address, pasted on a wall opposite of the consulate building, the Mission saw at least 50 posters containing images and messages critical of the Russian Federation and “#FREESENTSOV” hashtags. The SMM also saw that a gate adjacent to the wall had been painted in blue and yellow with black stencilling reading “FREESENTSOV”. While present, the Mission observed a calm situation.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 31 August 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• Two Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers stopped the SMM near Luhanske (government-controlled, 59km north-east of Donetsk) and denied it passage, citing “security reasons” and the presence of mines on the road ahead.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by telephone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.
• The SMM did not travel across the bridge in governmentcontrolled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk) due to the possible presence of mines. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.5

Other impediments:

• While conducting a miniUAV flight near Roza (non-government-controlled, 36km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM lost contact with the UAV due to signal interference[5]. The SMM was unable to recover the UAV.

 

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

[2] Due to the presence of mines, including those on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited; thus, the review of the camera footage may take place days later.

[3] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

[5] The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position.

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VIENNA - The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media Harlem Désir expressed serious concern today about arrests of two journalists and search of their property in Northern Ireland.

Trevor Birney and Barry McCaffrey were arrested on Friday morning in connection with an investigation into alleged theft of documents from the office of the Police Ombudsman of Northern Ireland. The journalists produced a documentary about the murder of six men at Loughinisland in County Down. The documents relate to a police investigation into the 1994 murders.

“I am seriously concerned by the arrest of two journalists in Northern Ireland. Journalists have the right to use any confidential information for reporting on stories of public interest,” said Désir. 

Birney and McCaffrey were released on bail the same evening and the material seized during the investigation will not be examined pending the outcome of a legal challenge brought by the film company behind the documentary to the validity of the search warrant.

“It is positive that independent judiciary will decide whether journalists’ property can be examined since it is essential that journalists' privilege to confidential sources is protected andthat journalists are free to do their work,” said Désir.

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom.

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This report is for the media and the general public.

Following a recommitment to the ceasefire as of 00:01 on 29 August, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions compared with the previous reporting period, however 85 per cent of violations in Donetsk region were attributed to training in non-government-controlled areas. The Mission followed up on reports of a civilian fatality near Dokuchaievsk. It heard ceasefire violations near the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area. TheSMM’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas, as well as again in Zaichenko and near Novoazovsk, near the border with the Russian Federation.* The Mission observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines near Horlivka, Starolaspa and Dokuchaievsk. The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station. It facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enabledemining and repairs to water infrastructure in Luhansk region, at a gas distribution station in Krasnohorivka and the South Donbas water pipeline between Avdiivka and Yasynuvata. The SMM continued to see a fire near Berezove and noted that the entry-exit checkpoint near Novotroitske remained closed; it facilitated adherence to the ceasefire to enable firefighting activity near Berezove. In Kyiv the SMM monitored a gathering in front of the Embassy of the Russian Federation. The SMM monitored gatherings in commemoration of the “Ilovaisk battle” in Lviv and Chernivtsi.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations[1], including, however, fewer explosions (about 80), compared with the previous reporting period (about 120 explosions). Eighty-five per cent of all violations in Donetsk region were attributed to live-fire training exercises within the security zone in Yenakiieve (non-government-controlled, 41km north-east of Donetsk) (see below).

On the evening and night of 29-30 August, the SMM camera in Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol) recorded 17 explosions (nine assessed as airbursts, five assessed as outgoing and three undetermined) and about 70 projectiles in flight, all 1-4km south-east and south.

On the evening and night of 29-30 August, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 31 undetermined explosions and 16 shots of small-arms fire, all 2-7km in directions ranging from south-east to south.

Positioned 1km north-west of the railway station in Yasynuvata  (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard nine undetermined explosions and five bursts of small-arms fire, all 2-5km east, south-east and south-west.

Positioned in Yenakiieve, over the course of about one and a half hours, the SMM heard six undetermined explosions and about 1,250 shots of small-arms fire, all 1-3km west, assessed as live-fire training inside the security zone, in violation of the decision of the Trilateral Contact Group of 3 March 2016 that prohibits the conduct of live-fire training in the security zone.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded three ceasefire violations (all explosions),compared with the previous reporting period (two explosions). 

The SMM followed up on a report of a civilian fatality. An employee of the company told the SMM that at around 10:00 on 28 August, he had heard small-arms fire followed by an explosion at the premises of the Vitiazcompany at 42 Tsentralna Street in the western outskirts of Dokuchaievsk (non-government-controlled, 30km south-west of Donetsk). A few minutes later he was informed that a colleague who had been working at a nearby quarry had been injured by the explosion. He told the SMM that when he had reached his colleague, he found him dead and said that his body had been severely burned. Medical staff at a morgue in Dokuchaievsk told the SMM that on 28 August, parts of a charred corpse of an employee of the Vitiazcompany had been brought to the morgue. The wife of the deceased told the SMM by telephone that her husband (aged 57) had been killed while at the quarry near Dokuchaievsk in the morning of 28 August.

The SMM continued to monitor and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk)[2], as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardwareo f 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On 29 August, inside the Zolote disengagement area, an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted a 5m extension of a 25m-long trench running from west to east 120m south of the railway bridge (not visible in imagery from 29 August 2018), assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces (for previous observations in the area, see SMM Daily Report 20 August 2018). The UAV also spotted an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-1) south of the railway line and about 440m north-east of the bridge.

During the day on 30 August, on the north-eastern edge of the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM saw a minivan driving with five men in military uniforms followed by a car driven by a man in military uniform traveling from inside the disengagement area in the direction of Katerynivka (government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk). Later, the SMM saw a military truck mounted with a heavy-machine-gun driving from Katerynivka east across the disengagement area and a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer armed with an assault rifle (AK-74) walking from Katerynivka north-east through the disengagement area. 

During the same day, positioned at the Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint north of the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM saw white smoke and a fire in a field about 400m south which was spreading on the western side of road T1316 as well as two Ukrainian Armed Forces officers armed with hand-gun (Makarov-type pistol, 9mm) walking south-west in the direction of a fire inside the disengagement area.

While on the eastern edge of Stanytsia Luhanska, during the night of 30 August, the SMM heard an undetermined explosion 5-7km south-south-west, assessed as outside the disengagement area. 

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas, on 29 August, an SMM long-range UAV spotted two anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) in Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk), seven self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) with barrels raised to the firing position near Starolaspa (51km south of Donetsk) and three towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) in firing positions east of Dokuchaievsk.

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in a government-controlled area, the SMM saw nine towed howitzers (2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm) near Khlibodarivka (65km south-west of Donetsk).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. In government-controlled areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM saw eight multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-27 Uragan, 220mm) and noted that 11 MLRS (one BM-21 Grad, 122mm and ten BM-27) were missing, including four (BM-27) for the first time. 

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles[3]in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 29 August, an SMM long-range UAV spotted eight IFVs (six BMP-2 and two BMP variants) near Zaitseve (62km north-east of Donetsk), two IFVs (BMP-2) near Starohnativka (51km south of Donetsk) and two IFVs (BMP-2) near Hranitne (60km south of Donetsk). On 30 August, the SMM saw an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM variant) near Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk) and an IFV (BMP-2) in Nyzhnie (56km north-west of Luhansk).   

In non-government-controlled areas, on 29 August, an SMM long-range UAV spotted two armoured personnel carriers (MT-LB) in Horlivka and an APC (BTR-80) near Lukove (72km south of Donetsk). On 30 August, the SMM saw an IFV (BMP-2) near Horlivka.

The SMM continued to observe the presence of mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO). On road H20, about 1km south-west of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS), the SMM observed an unexploded 82mm mortar shell on the road, three projectiles embedded in the tarmac several hundred metres apart and assessed as MLRS (BM-21) missiles, as well as several tailfins of mortar rounds (82mm) and remnants of rocket-propelled-grenade projectiles. The SMM noted that the area was highly contaminated with UXO.

The SMM continued to follow-up on the situation of civilians at entry-exit checkpoints along the contact line. The Ukrainian Armed Forces notified the SMM that it would be closing the entry-exit checkpoint at Stanytsia Luhanska bridge from 2-7 September in order to complete construction works related to the checkpoint. On the non-government-controlled side of the entry-exit checkpoint, the SMM observed a posted notice that read that as of 2 September the Ukrainian Armed Forces would be closing the entry-exit checkpoint.

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire. Positioned in areas near the station, the SMM recorded ceasefire violations, despite explicit security guarantees (see the table below).

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable demining and repair works to a water channel junction in Stanytsia Luhanska, a water pipeline near Zolote,a gas distribution station near Krasnohorivka (government-controlled, 21km west of Donetsk) and to the South Donbas water pipeline between Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north-west of Donetsk) and Yasynuvata. 

The SMM continued to facilitate adherence to the ceasefire to enable firefighting activity near Berezove (government-controlled, 31km south-west of Donetsk) (see SMM Daily Report 30 August 2018). Positioned in Vodiane (government-controlled, 42km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM could see smoke in the direction of Berezove. The Mission also noted that the nearby entry-exit checkpoint at Novotroitske (government-controlled 36km south-west of Donetsk) remained closed. 

In Kyiv, the SMM monitored a pre-announced public gathering in front of the Embassy of the Russian Federation (27 Povitroflotskyi Avenue) marking the International Day of Victims of Enforced Disappearances. The Mission saw about 25 people (mixed genders and ages), some of them holding posters with the names of Ukrainian citizens from Crimea who have reportedly gone missing. The SMM saw 18 National Guard officers, two police officers and one police car present and observed a calm situation. 

On 29 August, the SMM monitored public gatherings in Lviv and Chernivtsi commemorating “Ilovaisk battle” that took place in August 2014 (see SMM Daily Report 30 August 2018). In Chernivtsi, at the Central Square, the SMM saw about 70 people (mostly women, mixed ages). The Mission saw eight police officers present. At the square in front of the Taras Shevchenko monument on Svobody Avenue in Lviv, the Mission saw about 250 people (mixed genders and ages) including several holding flags with the emblems of Right Sector and Azov battalions. The SMM saw two police officers present. Throughout both events, the Mission observed calm situations. 

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv and Dnipro.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a checkpoint 800m north of Zaichenko (non/government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations again stopped the SMM and denied it passage westward to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non/government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) and southward to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), citing “the SMM’s security”.
• At a checkpoint near Novoazovsk (non/government-controlled, 40km east of Mariupol) two armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage, citing “an ongoing operation in the area”. As a result of this denial, the SMM was unable to follow up on reports of civilian casualty.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by telephone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.5
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

Other impediments:

• While conducting a miniUAV flight near a checkpoint of the armed formations on the southern edge of the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM lost contact with the mini-UAV due to signal interference. The SMM later retrieved the UAV about 1km north-east of the southern edge of the disengagement area, where it was laying in the middle of an asphalt road. (For recent UAV-related impediments in this area, see SMM Daily Report 29 August 2018.)

[1]For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

[2]Due to presence of mines, including those on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited; thus, the review of the camera footage may take place days later.

[3]This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4]The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

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392243 Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights Training Against Hate Crimes for Law Enforcement (TAHCLE): Programme Description

Strengthening skills in recognizing and investigating hate crimes was at the centre of a train-the-trainer workshop for women police officers organized by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and the European Network of Police Women (ENP) from 29 to 31 August 2018. The event was hosted by the Scottish Police College in Kincardine, the United Kingdom.

The workshop brought together 20 trainees from eight countries. Participants learned about ODIHR's definition of hate crime, international obligations related to hate crimes and techniques to recognize and investigate such crimes. 

"This training course is intended to further empower women police officers and help improve their knowledge and skills to ensure a robust response to hate crimes," said ODIHR Programme Officer Yulia Korysheva. "The workshop was also an opportunity for participants to share their expertise, personal experiences and best practises in addressing hate crimes."

ENP President Montserrat Pina said: "I am proud that our network was able to secure the participation of policewomen from countries across Europe, as well as officers from organizations representing minorities in law enforcement. Hate crime is now, more than ever, a matter of great concern in policing all over Europe. Training police officers and instructors who can then train members of their own forces is important to effectively deal with this growing problem."

The workshop was based on the curriculum of the Training against Hate Crime for Law Enforcement (TAHCLE) programme, which has been implemented in 15 countries across the OSCE region.

392237 Course participants discuss good practices for human rights-compliant assembly policing. Kyiv, 30 August 2018. Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

International human rights standards guaranteeing the freedom of peaceful assembly and good assembly policing practices were the focus of a train-the-trainer workshop for representatives of Ukrainian law enforcement training institutions and police, which took place in Kyiv from 27 to 31 August 2018. The training was organized by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR).  

The workshop brought together 15 participants (8 women and 7 men) from the National Academy of Internal Affairs, the State University of Internal Affairs in Dnipro, Lviv, Odesa and Kharkiv, and the National Police. The training was based on the ODIHR Human Rights Handbook on Policing Assemblies.

“Upholding the right to freedom of peaceful assembly is vital for any democracy as it allows people, including groups with little or no political power or influence on public life, to call attention to their concerns,” said Anita Danka, ODIHR’s Human Rights Adviser and a trainer at the course. “Facilitating assemblies in a human rights-compliant way is not only an obligation of the police, but also an opportunity to increase public confidence in police work and thus make it more efficient.” 

“The training underlined how crucial it is to facilitate people’s freedom to assemble peacefully, a topic which is extremely relevant in Ukraine,” said Vasyl Polyvaniuk, Senior Lecturer at the Dnipro State University of Internal Affairs. “I am looking forward to sharing with my students the key components of the course, such as the applicable human rights framework, the planning and decision-making model and the human rights assessment of various crowd management tactics.”

The workshop was the latest in a series of similar capacity-building events for Ukrainian law enforcement officers organized by ODIHR over the past two years.

CHISINAU/TIRASPOL, 1 September 2018 – Two Vehicle Registration Offices were opened in the left-bank cities of Tiraspol and Ribnita today by the Chief Negotiators in the Transdniestrian Settlement Process, from Moldova and Transdniestria, respectively. This event marks the beginning of the implementation of the so-called “licence plate” agreement signed by the Sides on 24 April 2018 to establish a mechanism for allowing for access of vehicles from Transdniestria to international road traffic.

The opening is the result of the joint efforts and resources dedicated by the Sides to set up and make the Vehicle Registration Offices operational by the 1 September deadline agreed upon by the Sides in the 30 May 5+2 Rome Protocol. Staffed by 30 officials from Moldova and Transdniestria, the Vehicle Registration Offices will issue internationally recognized Moldovan neutral-design licence plates to vehicles from Transdniestria to allow for their participation in international traffic. 

“I commend the Sides for their continuous local ownership and leadership. Their close collaboration to address technical and practical issues together was the key to meeting this ambitious deadline of 1 September,” Acting Head of the OSCE Mission to Moldova Lajos Karakas said following the opening ceremony. “This agreement and other agreements signed and implemented by the Sides contribute to reaching the end state of the settlement process endorsed by all 57 OSCE participating States, as they affirm rights that need to exist throughout a reintegrated Moldova and reflect the essence of a special status for Transdniestria within Moldova.”

The Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office for the Transdniestrian Settlement Process, Franco Frattini, will visit the Vehicle Registration Office in Tiraspol on 10 September to hand over the first neutral-design licence plates.

The “licence plate” agreement is the fifth of the “package of eight” to have been signed and implemented by the Sides since the end of 2017. This approach affirms the new norm of the negotiation process, where the Sides reach agreements with structured timelines and mechanisms that guide the ensuing implementation. 

In addition to this agreement, on 1 August Moldovan farmers regained access to their farmlands in the Dubasari district for the first time since 2014. This year the Sides have also ensured the functioning of Latin-script schools on the left bank, initiated the apostilization of Transdniestrian university diplomas and opened the Gura Bicului – Bychok bridge. 

Currently, Chisinau and Tiraspol are in the process of finalizing the steps to implement the agreement on the reintegration of telecommunication networks between the two banks. 

With the resolution of the issues related to the freedom of movement, criminal cases and the implementation of the telecommunication agreement, the Sides will have met their commitment, documented in the 30 May 5+2 Rome Protocol, to have fully finalized the “package of eight” by the end of 2018.

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A two-day train-the-trainers course for Kyrgyz government officials on countering terrorist financing was organized in Vienna on 30 and 31 August by the OSCE’s Transnational Threats Department, in co-operation with the OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime's Global Programme against Money Laundering (UNODC/GPML) and the Eurasian Group on Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism (EAG).  

The aim of the course was to assist Kyrgyzstan in countering terrorism financing, in line with relevant FATF standards and OSCE commitments. The five participants in the course will deliver training courses for local government officials upon their return to Kyrgyzstan, together with OSCE, UNODC/GPML, EAG international experts, and a terrorist financing specialist from the Federal Financial Monitoring Service of the Russian Federation (ROSFINMONITORING).

The course, which took place on the premises of the OSCE Secretariat, was led by international experts and included sessions on inter-agency co-operation, investigation, case management, financial disruption and prevention of abuse of non-profit organizations for terrorist financing. The training process focused on localized scenarios based on real-life cases.

The course strengthened the participants’ understanding of how improving inter-agency co-operation can help to identify and disrupt terrorist financial networks and highlighted specific instruments and techniques that could significantly improve  the ability to counter terrorist financing. Part of a comprehensive capacity-building programme to support efforts to counter terrorism financing in Central Asia, the course follows similar train-the-trainer courses organized for Kyrgyz officials in June, July and September 2017.

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392201 Edita Buçaj

The OSCE Mission in Kosovo concluded a five-day ‘train-the-trainer’ course on identification of domestic violence for community policing units. The course  was held from 27 to 31 August 2018 at the Kosovo Academy for Public Safety in Vushtrri/Vučitrn.

The course focused on early indicators such as physical evidence and psychological signs of the victims; the first police response and assistance to the victims of domestic violence and sexual abuse; and on ensuring the safety of police officers and victims involved. 

“The fight against domestic violence is a priority for the Mission,” said Kilian Wahl, Deputy Head of the OSCE Mission in Kosovo. “Prevention is crucial to effectively reduce cases of domestic violence. We support the Kosovo Police in expanding the knowledge and skill sets of police officers on the prevention aspect. This will enable them to properly identify early indicators for domestic violence and react before something happens.”

Ramadan Krasniqi, police sergeant, said that the course was an excellent opportunity to learn new approaches in dealing with cases of domestic violence. “Along with such training activities in the future, we need to also focus on raising the awareness of the public about domestic violence and enhancing our co-operation with them, in order to minimize this negative phenomenon.”

Following the course, the participants will become certified trainers and will develop similar training course to be delivered in turn to their fellow patrol officers in their police stations. 

The OSCE Mission in Kosovo is mandated with the protection and promotion of human and community rights, as well as with democratization and public safety sector development. It regularly delivers advanced and specialized training courses for law enforcement agencies to further improve their capacities.

This report is for the media and the general public.

Following a recommitment to the ceasefire on the occasion of the beginning of the school year which began at 00:01 on 29 August 2018, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions compared with the previous reporting period. The Mission heard ceasefire violations near the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area. The SMM’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas, as well as again in Zaichenko and near Novoazovsk, near the border with the Russian Federation.* The Mission observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines near Vasiukivka and Malynivka. The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station. It facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to water infrastructure in Luhansk region, at a gas distribution station in Krasnohorivka, the Bakhmut Agrarian Union’s pig farm in Novoluhanske and to residential houses in Avdiivka. The SMM saw a fire near Berezove and noted the closure of the entry-exit checkpoint near Novotroitske; it facilitated adherence to the ceasefire to enable firefighting activity near Berezove. In Kyiv and Dnipro, the SMM monitored gatherings in commemoration of the “Ilovaisk battle” and noted calm situations.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations[1], including, however, more explosions (about 120), compared with the previous reporting period (about 110 explosions). About 35 per cent of the ceasefire violations recorded, including about 20 explosions, were recorded after the start of the recommitment to the ceasefire at 00:01 on 29 August.

On the evening of 28 August, the SMM camera at Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded 11 undetermined explosions, about 60 projectiles in flight and two illumination flares, all 0.3-4km south and south-south-west.

On the evening of 28 August, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol) recorded about 40 undetermined explosions, about 85 projectiles in flight, three illumination flares and a muzzle flash, all 3-5km at directions ranging from south-east to south.

On the evening of 28 August, the SMM camera east of Lomakyne (government-controlled, 15km north-east of Mariupol) recorded 21 undetermined explosions, about 70 projectiles in flight, two illumination flares and a muzzle flash, all 2-4km north-east and east-north-east.

On the evening and night of 28-29 August, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk) the SMM heard about 30 undetermined explosions and 15 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 3-8km south-east and south. During the day on 29 August, while at the same location, the SMM heard four undetermined explosions 3-4km east.

During the day on 29 August, positioned at the entry-exit checkpoint near Novotroitske (government-controlled, 36km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM heard and saw an explosion assessed as the impact of a mortar (120mm) round 1km south-east.

Positioned 1km north-west of the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard about 30 shots and bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire 0.5-3km south and north-north-west. The SMM also heard about 80 shots and bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire 2-3km south, assessed as live-fire training inside the security zone, in violation of the decision of the Trilateral Contact Group of 3 March 2016 that prohibits the conduct of live-fire training in the security zone.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations (two explosions, both recorded after the recommitment to the ceasefire), compared with the previous reporting period (about 40 explosions).

The SMM continued to monitor and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk)[2], as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On 28 August, inside the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM saw, for the first time, two rows of white sandbags covered with foliage 20m south of the railway bridge and another set of white sandbags covered with foliage about 20m further west (see also SMM Daily Report 28 August 2018). The SMM saw, for the first time, the remnant of a tailfin of a recoilless-gun, 5m west of the road, 300-500m north of an armed formations’ checkpoint on the southern edge of the disengagement area.

On 29 August, positioned on the north-eastern edge of Katerynivka (government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk), the SMM observed two military trucks with military licence plates and four people in military-style clothing, assessed as Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel, in Katerynivka, inside the Zolote disengagement area, entering and exiting the village.

Positioned on the eastern edge of Stanytsia Luhanska, the SMM heard an undetermined explosion 5-7km south-west and an undetermined explosion 3-4km south-south-east, both assessed as outside the disengagement area.

Positioned near the Petrivske disengagement area, the SMM noted a calm situation.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines, in a government-controlled area, the SMM saw eight multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM21 Grad, 122mm) near Vasiukivka (82km north of Donetsk) and nine MLRS (BM-21) near Malynivka (82km north of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in a government-controlled area, the SMM saw a surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) near Selidove (41km north-west of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in a non-government-controlled area, on 28 August, an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted three self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) and ten tanks (T-72) in a training area near Pokrovka (36km east of Donetsk).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. In government-controlled areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM noted that 12 anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm), 30 mortars (2B11 Sani, 120mm), four surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10), three towed howitzers (D-44, 85mm), 42 self-propelled howitzers (20 2S1 and 22 2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) and an MLRS (BM-21) continued to be missing and three MLRS (BM-21) were missing for the first time.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles (ACVs)[3] in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 28 August, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted two ACVs (type undetermined) near Krymske (42km north-west of Luhansk). On the same day, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP variant) and two armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-2) near Nevelske (18km north-west of Donetsk), two ACVs (type undetermined) near Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk), two IFVs (a BMP-1 and a BMP variant) near Slavne (26km south-west of Donetsk) and an IFV (BMP-1) near Taramchuk (29km south-west of Donetsk). On 29 August, the SMM saw an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR variant) near Zolote, an APC (BTR-70) near Myrna Dolyna (67km north-west of Luhansk) and an APC (BTR-70) near Stanytsia Luhanska.

In non-government-controlled areas, on 28 August, a long-range SMM UAV spotted nine APCs (two BTR-70 and seven MT-LB), an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2), nine IFVs (BMP-1), a combat engineer vehicle (IMR-2) and a trench digger (MDK-3) in Donetsk city. On 29 August, the SMM saw an IFV (BMP-2) near Sentianivka (formerly Frunze, 44km west of Luhansk).

The SMM continued to observe the presence of mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO). On 28 August, an SMM mid-range UAV again spotted 16 anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid in three rows on the road between Holmivskyi (49km north-east of Donetsk) and Travneve (government-controlled, 51km north-east of Donetsk), and, about 1km further north, an additional 13 anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid across the same road.

On 29 August, in the eastern outskirts of Tavrycheske (non-government-controlled, 76km south of Donetsk), the SMM again saw a tailfin, assessed as part of a mortar (120mm) round, protruding from the tarmac. On the road between the entry-exit checkpoint in Pyshchevyk and the checkpoint 700m west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM observed, for the first time, the remnants of 12 anti-tank mines 1m south of the road (11 of which were completely burned).

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire. Positioned in areas near the station, the SMM recorded ceasefire violations, despite explicit security guarantees (see the table below).

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to a water channel junction in Stanytsia Luhanska, a water pipeline near Zolote, the Bakhmut Agrarian Union’s pig farm near Novoluhanske (government-controlled, 53km north-east of Donetsk) and a gas distribution station near Krasnohorivka (government-controlled, 21km west of Donetsk). The Mission continued to facilitate and monitor adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to residential houses in Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk) and it facilitated the transfer of Vodafone mobile telecommunications parts from Debaltseve (non-government-controlled, 58km north-east of Donetsk) to Luhansk city (non-government-controlled).

The SMM facilitated adherence to the ceasefire to enable firefighting activity near Berezove (government-controlled, 31km south-west of Donetsk). From about 13:00 on 29 August until the end of the reporting period, the SMM camera 1km north-east of Berezove recorded large plumes of smoke at easterly directions. At about 15:00, the SMM noted that the entry-exit checkpoint near Novotroitske had been closed. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer told the SMM that the closure was due to a wildfire nearby and the risk of explosions from mines and UXO. The SMM saw smoke in the distance, north of the entry-exit checkpoint in the direction of Berezove. Positioned about 3km south-west Olenivka (non-government-controlled, 27km south-west of Donetsk), an area north-east of Berezove, the SMM heard three undetermined explosions 2-3km south (see the table below).

The SMM visited a railyard in an area not under government control. At the Chervona Mohyla railway station in Voznesenivka (formerly Chervonopartyzansk, 65km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM observed around 37 open freight wagons (contents not visible), six covered freight wagons and nine cisterns.

The SMM monitored gatherings in Kyiv and Dnipro in commemoration of the “Ilovaisk battle” that took place in August 2014. In Kyiv, the Mission monitored two gatherings. In front of the Embassy of the Russian Federation (27 Povitroflotskyi Avenue, the SMM saw about 500 people (mostly men, mixed ages), including around 300 people assessed to be veterans, about 20 Ukrainian flags as well as banners and posters with messages critical of the Russian Federation. On the street in front of the embassy building, the SMM saw white crosses with red paint splashed at their bases and the names and photographs of people who died in the battle. The Mission saw about 90 National Guard and 20 police officers securing the area. On Mykhailivska Square in Kyiv, the SMM monitored a gathering of about 600 people (mixed genders and ages) and saw two police cars nearby. In Dnipro, the SMM monitored a gathering of about 250 people (men and women, mixed ages) at the Heroes Square (2 Oleksandra Polia Avenue). The Mission saw about ten law enforcement officers present. All gatherings ended without incidents.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a checkpoint 800m north of Zaichenko (nongovernment-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations again stopped the SMM and denied it passage westward to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, nongovernment-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) and southward to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), citing “the SMM’s security”.
• At a checkpoint near Novoazovsk (nongovernment-controlled, 40km east of Mariupol) two armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage, citing “an ongoing operation in the area”.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by telephone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.5
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] Due to presence of mines, including those on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited; thus, the review of the camera footage may take place days later.

[3] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

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VIENNA, 30 August 2018 - The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media Harlem Désir today issued his strong condemnation of a shooting with automatic weaponry at the family home of News 24 TV channel journalist Klodiana Lala in Albania.

“I am deeply concerned about the shooting, which took place at the house of the journalist’s parents. This attack is a direct threat and unacceptable intimidation against the journalist which contributes to a climate of fear and insecurity for the press in the region,” Désir said. “There must be no impunity for such attacks against journalists” he added.

Today, early in the morning hours, the home of investigative journalist Klodiana Lala’s parents was fired upon multiple times with automatic weaponry. According to media reports nobody was injured.

“I trust that the authorities will swiftly investigate the motive behind the assault and ensure that the perpetrators are brought to justice,” Désir said, noting that an investigation has already been launched.

The Representative highlighted and welcomed the condemnation of the attack expressed by the authorities, including the President of the Republic Ilir Meta, the Prime Minister Edi Rama, as well as several journalists’ associations in Albania.

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom.

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Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

The situation of human rights defenders in Montenegro was the main topic of discussion during a roundtable event organized by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) on 30 August 2018 in Podgorica.

The event brought together 37 participants (23 women and 14 men) from state institutions, leading civil society organizations working on human rights issues and intergovernmental organizations. Participants examined the current challenges facing human rights defenders and discussed recommendations on addressing them in a gender-sensitive, inclusive and sustainable manner.

“At today’s event participants discussed how the standards enshrined in the ODIHR Guidelines on the Protection of Human Rights Defenders are being implemented in practice, enabling human rights defenders to carry out their important work,” said Omer Fisher, Head of the ODIHR Human Rights Department. The Guidelines offer guidance to OSCE participating States on how to implement their obligations on the protection of human rights defenders in line with international standards and OSCE commitments.

“Human rights defenders, whose role is to protect all against human rights violations, are vulnerable to human rights abuses too. We also need protection,” said Fana Delija, Executive Coordinator at the Center for Roma Initiative Niksic (CRINK). “This meeting is important to raise awareness about our risks and vulnerabilities and discuss ways to overcome them.”

Blanka Radošević Marović, Director General for Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Freedoms at Montenegro’s Ministry for Human and Minority Rights, said: “Ensuring workable and efficient protection and promotion of human rights and freedoms is the focus of our Ministry. It is our obligation to continuously evaluate the efficiency of our legal framework and policies in this area and create enabling conditions for human rights defenders.”

The event was organized on the margins of a country visit ODIHR undertook to monitor the implementation of its Guidelines. The findings of this and other similar country visits will be published in a report in 2019. The report will highlight challenges and good practices in the protection of human rights defenders in OSCE participating States.

VIENNA, 30 August 2018 – In his first address to the OSCE Permanent Council since his appointment as Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Co-operation on 1 June 2018, OSCE Chairperson-in-Office Enzo Moavero Milanesi reaffirmed the strong commitment of his Government to enhance the organization’s role as a forum for political dialogue.  

“The OSCE is an instrument of fundamental importance, particularly in this historic phase, which allows for channels of communication regarding major regional crises to remain open.”

Moavero Milanesi reaffirmed the determination of the 2018 Italian OSCE Chairmanship to rekindle the spirit of Helsinki, but also to promote a “new Helsinki” that offers an effective platform for constructive dialogue between East and West and contributes to a climate of trust and co-operation.

The Chairperson-in-Office stressed that while the old idea of security was based on the acquisition and ownership of information, modern security and the fight against today’s global challenges relies on a continuous exchange and sharing of information between states.

Referring to the main areas of focus of the Italian 2018 Chairmanship, Moavero Milanesi highlighted the importance of the Mediterranean dimension and the challenges stemming from migration flows.  “Working in partnership with others, our Organization has the potential to play an enhanced role in the development of global migration governance, by fostering close collaboration between the countries of origin, transit and destination, and by encouraging shared responsibility without any misgivings, without national caveats."

“The search for a sustainable solution to the crisis in and around Ukraine is among the main priorities of the Italian OSCE Chairmanship,” said the Chairperson. “The sides have to assume their responsibility, based on full respect of the ceasefire and on a relaunch of the political process within the Trilateral Contact Group and the Normandy format.”

Referring to protracted conflicts in the OSCE area, Moavero Milanesi expressed satisfaction that dialogue between Armenia and Azerbaijan was not discontinued as a result of recent elections in the two countries.  He also noted the recent progress in the Transdniestrian settlement process, namely the Rome Protocol, which reflects commitments by the sides to timelines and mechanisms to ensure the rapid finalization of outstanding issues from the “package of eight” priorities.

The Chairperson stressed the importance of co-operation to combat transnational threats such as terrorism, cybercrime, organized crime and trafficking in human beings. “We call these global challenges. But these are global scourges.  We must join forces and act together.  We will invest our efforts in all three dimensions of security, politico-military, economic and environmental as well as human – including the rule of law, democracy and respect for the fundamental rights of the individual.”

“Our OSCE Chairmanship is inspired by a positive and long-term vision that will enhance the Organization’s role, in which we firmly believe.  But, for this vision to be translated into concrete and successful action, it is essential that it is supported by the efforts of each of the 57 participating States to live up to our responsibility to reduce tensions through dialogue, by using all the tools of co-operative security that we share.”

Follow the Italian Chairmanship on Twitter at @ItalyatOSCE

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KYIV, 30 August 2018 – Principal Deputy Chief Monitor of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine Alexander Hug will hold his regular news briefing on Friday, 31 August, in Kyiv.

He will talk about the security situation throughout Ukraine and the Mission’s recent activities.

Journalists are invited to attend the news briefing tomorrow, 31 August, at 13:30 (Kyiv time), at the Ukrainian Crisis Media Centre, at the Ukrainian House, 2 Khreshchatyk Street.

Live streaming of the news briefing will be available at http://uacrisis.org/ru/stream/#eng 

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VIENNA/PRAGUE, 31 August 2018 – The concluding meeting of the 26th OSCE Economic and Environmental Forum , which will focus on economic progress and security in the OSCE area through innovation, human capital development and good public and corporate governance, will open on 5 September in Prague.

During the three-day Forum, senior government officials, experts from academia, NGOs, international organizations and the private sector will discuss a multi-stakeholder approach to leveraging the opportunities of the digital economy; digital security in the business sector; digital innovation as a tool to strengthen good public and corporate governance; innovative business models and economic connectivity in the digital area; and challenges for human capital development.

The Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister of the Czech Republic, Tomáš Petříček, and the Co-coordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities, Vuk Žugić, will deliver opening remarks.

Keynote speeches will be given by Guglielmo Picchi, the Italian Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Co-operation representing the 2018 OSCE Italian Chairmanship, and Roberto Viola, the European Commission Director General for Communications Networks, Content and Technology.

OSCE Secretary General Thomas Greminger and Ambassador Vinicio Mati, 2018 Italian Chairmanship Co-ordinator, will present concluding remarks on 7 September, Friday.

At the conclusion of the Forum, the 2019 OSCE Slovak Chairmanship will present its priorities in the economic and environmental dimension.

The Economic and Environmental Forum builds on the results of two preparatory meetings held in Vienna and Venice (Italy) earlier this year. Its main objective is to stimulate political dialogue and generate recommendations for OSCE participating States in dealing with economic and environmental challenges.

Media wishing to attend the opening session on 5 September, 14:30 to 16:30, or the closing session on 7 September, 11:30 to 13:00, at the Czernin Palace, Loretánské nam. 5, Prague, or interested in an interview or background briefing are requested to send an e-mail to the OSCE Communication and Media Relations Section at press@osce.org and/or Iveta Dzurikova, OSCE Documentation Centre in Prague, at Iveta.Dzurikova@osce.org by Tuesday, 4 September, 16:00.

Follow the Forum via @OSCE Twitter, #EEFOSCE.

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392159 OSCE Centre in Ashgabat

Representatives of government institutions and public organizations discussed topical issues of migration and the role of the OSCE in migration governance at an OSCE-organized roundtable discussion that took place in Ashgabat from 29 to 30 August 2018.

The Centre in Ashgabat, in co-operation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkmenistan, the Office of the Co-ordinator of the OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities (OCEEA) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM), organized the workshop to contribute to the implementation of national migration-related initiatives of Turkmenistan in line with relevant OSCE’s commitments.

The event brought together officials from law-enforcement bodies, the Ministry of Labour and Social Protection, the Mejlis (Parliament), the Ombudsman and the Justice Ministry as well as representatives of other relevant institutions and public organizations.

Teresa Albano, Economic Affairs Officer/OCEEA, elaborated on the OSCE’s best practices and regional and national activities in the area of migration. Special emphasis was laid on appropriate measures to support well-governed labour migration in line with international standards and OSCE commitments.  

“OSCE participating States have adopted a number of decisions which highlight economic and social aspects of migration and have contributed to the development of the mandate of the OSCE in the area of migration,” said Head of the Centre in Ashgabat Natalya Drozd.

“The workshop offered the OSCE`s unique approach to tackling the phenomena of economically motivated migration and provided an opportunity for national policymakers, practitioners and civil society organizations to discuss case studies of labour migration and identify areas for enhanced action-oriented co-operation.”

Albano said that the idea of this workshop is to link the “know-what” – the knowledge of facts – with the “know-how” – discussing ways to implement activities that are considered most suitable for the context of Turkmenistan. “It is our firm belief that the seminar will contribute to the building of capacities of Turkmenistan’s officials to formulate actions that allow the country to benefit from well-managed labour migration,” she said.

A representative from the IOM’s Office in Turkmenistan presented the mandate and activities of the IOM in the country. The participants and experts shared views on the national priorities and plans for future co-operation between the OSCE and Turkmenistan in the area of labour migration.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, compared with the previous reporting period. Small-arms fire was directed at an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) near Khrystove and another SMM mini-UAV experienced jamming near Muratove. The Mission saw fresh damage from shelling to a civilian property in Kriakivka. The SMM heard ceasefire violations inside the Zolote disengagement area, including 200-500m from the SMM. The SMM’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas and elsewhere, including in Novolaspa, as well as again in Zaichenko, Bezimenne, and near Novoazovsk and Izvaryne, both near the border with the Russian Federation.* The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station. It facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to water infrastructure in Luhansk region and repairs to residential houses in Avdiivka. The Mission also facilitated dialogue for repair work assessments at the gas distribution station in Krasnohorivka, South Donbas water pipeline between Avdiivka and Yasynuvata and the Bakhmut Agrarian Union pig farm in Novoluhanske.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations[1], including, however, fewer explosions (about 110 explosions), compared with the previous reporting period (about 120 explosions).

On the evening and night of 27 August, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded about 35 undetermined explosions, about 150 projectiles in flight, three illumination flares and a muzzle flash, all 0.5-4km at directions ranging from south-east to south-west.

On the evening of 27 August and early morning of 28 August, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 62 explosions (ten assessed as outgoing and the remainder undetermined) and about 120 shots and bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 2-6km south-east and south.

On the evening and night of 27-28 August, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk) recorded 26 projectiles in flight and three illumination flares, all 1-4km east-north-east, east an east-south-east.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 40 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (no explosions).

Positioned in north-western Khrystove (non-government-controlled, 18km north of Luhansk) while conducting a mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) flight, the SMM heard 15 shots of small-arms fire, which it assessed as aimed at the UAV, from a southerly direction.* The SMM mini-UAV was flying 2.2km south of the patrol at an altitude of about 77m when the SMM heard the small-arms fire and then recalled the UAV safely. At a nearby checkpoint of the armed formations, an armed man apologized for the incident.

The SMM observed fresh damage to a civilian property in Kriakivka (government-controlled, 38km north-west of Luhansk). At 25 Haharina Street, the SMM saw a fresh large hole on the western side of a roof of a single-storey house and a number of asbestos roof-tile pieces on the ground. The SMM saw large holes on the south-facing wall of a nearby chicken coop and the southern side of the roof of a nearby wooden barn. About 250m north of the house, the SMM observed trees with branches that had been freshly severed, assessed as by shrapnel. The SMM assessed that all of the damage was caused by undetermined weapon(s) fired from a southerly direction. A resident of the house (male, 52 years old) told the SMM that he had been working outside his house around 18:45 on 26 August when he had heard shelling with rounds flying over his head and impacting north of his house. He said that he had run to the cellar and then had heard a projectile hit his house.

The SMM continued to monitor and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk)[2], as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

Positioned on the southern edge of the Zolote disengagement area near a checkpoint of the armed formations and preparing to launch for a second time an SMM mini-UAV, the SMM heard a shot of small-arms fire, approximately 0.2-1km north followed by three shots and two bursts of small-arms fire 200-500m north, all assessed as fired from within the disengagement area. The SMM collected the mini-UAV and left the area.

Positioned on the western edge of Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard four undetermined explosions 4-6km north-north-east of its position, assessed as inside the Zolote disengagement area.

Positioned in the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area and near the Petrivske disengagement area, the SMM noted calm situations.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in government-controlled areas, on 27 August, an SMM long-range UAV spotted eight self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) near Novoolenivka (48km north-west of Donetsk) and four surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10) near Tarasivka (43km north-west of Donetsk) in a residential area about 100m from an abandoned school building (see SMM Daily report 14 June 2018). On the same day, an SMM mini-UAV spotted five towed howitzers (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) south-east of Novomaiorske (64km south-west of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in a non-government-controlled area, the SMM saw four tanks (T-64) near a training area in Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk).

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles and an anti-aircraft gun[3] in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 27 August, an SMM long-range UAV spotted four armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-2) south-east of Bila Hora (54km north of Donetsk), an infantry fighting vehicle (BMP-2) near Toretsk (formerly Dzerzhynsk, 43km north of Donetsk), two armoured personnel carriers (APC) (MT-LB) and a military truck with a probable anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) in the rear of the truck near Vershyna (63km north-east of Donetsk) and three APCs (BTR variants) north of Shumy (41km north of Donetsk).

The SMM observed the recent expansion of trenches at forward positions. On 28 August, an SMM mini-UAV spotted a new 110m trench extension running east to west about 3km north of Sentianivka (formerly Frunze, non-government-controlled, 44km west of Luhansk) and about 5km south of Krymske (government-controlled, 42km north-west of Luhansk), (not visible on imagery from 16 August 2018), as well as another new 50m trench about 400m west of the previous trench (not visible in imagery from 6 August 2018). Both new trenches are south of road T1303 in a non-government-controlled area. On the northern side of road T1303, the SMM spotted a new 170m extension of an existing trench assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces (not visible on imagery from 16 August 2018). The positions of the sides in this area are within 500m of each other.

The SMM observed the presence of mines. On 26 August, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted for the first time 38 probable anti-tank mines (TM-62) surface laid on the northern, eastern, and southern sides of a fuel station near forward positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces south of Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk), which are an extension of 170 previously observed anti-tank mines (see SMM Daily Report 10 April 2018). The same mid-range UAV spotted 15 anti-tank mines (TM-62) just north of a Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint on road H-15.

The SMM observed demining-related activities. Positioned in Kamianka (government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk), the SMM observed Ukrainian State Emergency Services personnel demine about 100m of road H20 up to the DFS. Near Lomakyne (government-controlled, 15km north-east of Mariupol) the SMM saw three men wearing clothes with the logo of an international demining organization surveying the side of the road. One of the men told the SMM that they would conduct mine clearance of the nearby field starting on 1 September.

The SMM followed up on the situation at the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk), which had been closed since 23 August. Over the course of one hour, the SMM observed that the entry-exit checkpoint was open and saw about 40 vehicles and approximately 350 pedestrians traveling in both directions. (See SMM Daily Report 28 August 2018.)

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire. Positioned in areas near the station, the SMM recorded ceasefire violations, despite explicit security guarantees (see the table below).

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), a water channel junction in Stanytsia Luhanska and a water pipeline near Zolote. The Mission continued to facilitate and monitor adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to residential houses in Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk) and facilitated dialogue in support of assessments on repair works at the Bakhmut Agrarian Union’s pig farm near Novoluhanske (government-controlled, 53km north-east of Donetsk), a gas distribution station near Krasnohorivka (government-controlled, 21km west of Donetsk) and the South Donbas water pipeline between Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north-west of Donetsk) and Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Donetsk).

The SMM visited two border areas not under government control.* While at a border crossing point near Dovzhanske (84km south-east of Luhansk) for about 50 minutes, the SMM saw five cars exiting Ukraine (all with Russian Federation licence plates) and three cars entering Ukraine (all with Russian Federation licence plates).

While at a border crossing point near Izvaryne (52km south-east of Luhansk) for almost 20 minutes, two members of the armed formations separately told the SMM to leave the area.*

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a checkpoint 800m north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations again stopped the SMM and denied it passage westward to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) and southward to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), citing “the SMM’s security”.
• At a checkpoint near Novoazovsk (non-government-controlled, 40km east of Donetsk) two armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage, citing “an ongoing operation in the area”.
• At a checkpoint about 3km west of Bezimenne (non-government-controlled, 30km east of Mariupol) on road E58, five armed members of the armed formations again prevented the SMM from continuing west, citing an “ongoing operation”.
• In Novolaspa (non-government-controlled, 50km south of Donetsk), the SMM was prevented by an armed member of the armed formations to patrol in the area.
• At a border crossing point near Izvaryne two members of the armed formations separately told the SMM to leave the area, citing “instructions” that the SMM is required to seek permission prior to monitoring in the area.
• On 27 August, at a security post along the ABL near Syvash (163km southeast of Kherson), a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer told the SMM that it could not access the area, citing orders from his commander.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by telephone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.5
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

Other impediments:

• While conducting a miniUAV flight near Khrystove, the SMM heard 15 shots of small-arms fire, assessed as fired in the direction of the UAV. The SMM safely recalled the UAV and left the area.
• While conducting a midrange UAV flight near Muratove (government-controlled, 50km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM temporarily lost control of the UAV due to signal interference. While conducting an SMM mini-UAV flight in the same area shortly after, the SMM lost contact with and control of the UAV due to signal interference, assessed as due to jamming. The SMM launched another mini-UAV in order to locate the lost asset.[5]
• A representative of a company in Alchevsk (non-government-controlled, 40km west of Luhansk) told the SMM that they would only meet with the SMM following written permission from the armed formations in Luhansk as well as attendance by the armed formations at the meeting.

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

[2] Due to presence of mines, including those on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited; thus, the review of the camera footage may take place days later.

[3] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

[5] The interference could have originated from anywhere in a radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position.

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