OSCE

TBILISI, 20 September 2018 – The OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) yesterday formally opened an election observation mission (EOM) for the 28 October presidential election in Georgia. The mission’s deployment follows an invitation from the Georgian authorities.

The mission is led by Ambassador Geert-Hinrich Ahrens, and consists of a core team of 14 experts based in Tbilisi and 28 long-term observers, who will be deployed throughout the country in teams of two from 26 September. In addition, ODIHR will request that OSCE participating States provide 350 short-term observers, who will arrive several days before election day.

The mission will assess the presidential election for its compliance with OSCE commitments and other international obligations and standards for democratic elections, as well as with national legislation. Observers will closely monitor candidate registration, campaign activities, the work of the election administration and relevant governmental bodies, election-related legislation and its implementation, the media environment, and the resolution of election-related disputes.

In the course of its observation, the mission will meet with representatives from state authorities and political parties, as well as with candidates, and with representatives from civil society, the media and the international community. The mission will publish an interim report in the course of its work.

On election day, observers will monitor the opening of polling stations, voting, the counting of ballots and the tabulation of results.

The day after the elections, the mission, together with its partners from the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, the European Parliament and the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, will issue a statement of preliminary findings and conclusions at a press conference in Tbilisi. ODIHR will issue a final report on the observation approximately eight weeks after the end of the electoral process.

For further information, please contact Egor Tilpunov, Media Analyst with the election observation mission, at: +995 591 176 496 (Tbilisi mobile), or egor.tilpunov@odihreom.ge.

or

Thomas Rymer, OSCE/ODIHR Spokesperson, at +48 609 522 266 (Warsaw mobile), or at Thomas.Rymer@odihr.pl.

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KYIV, 20 September 2018 – The Principal Deputy Chief Monitor of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), Alexander Hug, will hold a news briefing on Friday via video link from eastern Ukraine.

Hug will talk about the Mission’s recent activities and the general security situation throughout Ukraine.

Journalists are invited to attend the news briefing tomorrow, 21 September, at 15:00 (Kyiv time), at the Ukrainian Crisis Media Centre, at the Ukrainian House, 2 Khreshchatyk Street.

Live streaming of the news briefing will be available at http://uacrisis.org/ru/stream#eng

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396740 Viktor Kundrak, ODIHR's Hate Crime Officer, addressing event participants. Warsaw, 20 September 2018. Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

Techniques to improve states’ support for victims of hate crime were the focus of an event organized by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) on 20 September in Warsaw on the margins of the Human Dimension Implementation Meeting.

The discussions focused on how participating States can best support victims of hate crimes throughout the criminal justice process. After discussing the needs of hate crime victims and the existing support mechanisms provided by civil society organizations, participants were introduced to the underlying principles and recommendations of a forthcoming ODIHR publication on victim support, which is aimed at criminal justice system bodies and other government agencies. ODIHR’s new publication will offer guidance on providing comprehensive support to victims of hate crime, as well as good practice examples from various states.

“We want to respond to gaps in the implementation by OSCE participating States of their commitments on hate crime. Most states focus on the punitive aspect of their responses to hate crimes, leaving the victims with insufficient protection and support," said Cristina Finch, Head of ODIHR’s Tolerance and Non-Discrimination Department. "ODIHR is working closely with states and civil society to overcome this challenge, put victims first, and complements ODIHR’s set of tools to support states in addressing hate crimes.”

During the event the preliminary findings of ODIHR’s 2017 hate crime reporting were presented. The findings will be published on 16 November.

VIENNA, 20 September 2018 - The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, today denounced prison sentences handed out to the executives of the Hayatın Sesi TV channel in Turkey.

Istanbul’s 13th High Criminal Court yesterday sentenced the owners of the Hayatın Sesi TV channel, Mustafa Kara and İsmail Gökhan Bayram, and the channel’s general director, Gökhan Çetin, to three years and nine months in prison each. They were convicted of spreading terrorist propaganda for different terrorist groups in Turkey, reportedly related to several broadcasts by the channel in 2015 and 2016 on bombing attacks and military operations in the country’s south-east.

“Journalists must not be imprisoned for their work, even for reporting on conflict or expressing dissenting views. Far too many journalists in Turkey have been accused of spreading terrorist propaganda based on their reporting about issues of public interest,” Désir said.

Hayatın Sesi TV, together with several other TV channels, was closed down by a government decree in September 2016.

“I hope that they will be freed on appeal and I stand ready to assist Turkey in addressing all media freedom-related issues and restoring the previously very vibrant media landscape in the country,” Désir said.

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom.

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396539 Communication and Media Relations Section SDGs SDGs:  5 - Gender equality

Experts and practitioners on gender equality and migration discussed the challenges facing women migrants and good practices to promote their rights at a side event organized by the OSCE Gender Section during the Human Dimension Implementation Meeting in Warsaw on 18 September 2018.

The moderator of the side event, OSCE Senior Gender Adviser Amarsanaa Darisuren introduced the topic highlighting that the OSCE and international commitments provide a framework for non-discrimination and combating trafficking in human beings.

Ambassador Luca Fratini, Deputy Head of the Mission of Italy to the OSCE, stated that migration is a priority area of the Italian Chair of the OSCE. He stressed the importance of data collection, including sex-disaggregated data, in order to develop evidence-based policies that take into account the needs of women migrants.

Anna Rostocka, the Head of the International Organization for Migration in Warsaw, explained that a person’s gender shapes all migration experiences: “Gender determines the reasons for migration, how people migrate, the networks they use and the resources they have available at the country of destination.”  Rostocka noted that focusing on women’s empowerment is just as important as combating discriminatory practices facing women migrants.

Anna Zobnina, representing the European Network of Women Migrants, called for the inclusion of women in the design of migration policies and programmes, from the highest political to the grassroots level.  As an organization representing women’s grassroot movements, Zobnina explained, the European Network of Women Migrants has found that the flow of refugees and migrants is in many ways driven by women and that gender inequality is an important root cause of migration.

Pablo Rojas Coppari of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) drew the participants’ attention to OSCE publications on gender-sensitive labour migration: “We often talk about the vulnerability of women, while it is the migration policies that put them in situations of vulnerability,” he stated.

The final speaker, Heidi Meinzolt, highlighted the specific challenges faced by women throughout the whole cycle of migration, stating that women are exposed to different threats when they are on the move and in the country of arrival. She pointed to the necessity of co-operation between decision-makers, institutions and civil society to promote and protect the rights of women migrants.

Participants in the event made several recommendations to the OSCE, including the suggestion to increase assistance to participating States in mainstreaming gender in migration policies; to ensure the protection of women is combined with their active and meaningful participation; to develop strategies which focus on women’s empowerment and capacity building; to establish comprehensive and effective partnerships between all stakeholders to combat trafficking in women and girls; to improve data collection in order to develop evidence-based policies that take into account needs of women; and to combat discriminatory migratory practices and increase understanding of how gender shapes migration patterns.

MINSK, 20 September 2018 – The Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office in Ukraine and in the Trilateral Contact Group (TCG), Ambassador Martin Sajdik, made the following statement to the press after the meeting of the TCG ‎and its Working Groups in Minsk on 19 September 2018:

“As you know, today is the fourth anniversary of the Minsk Memorandum – the second document of the Minsk agreements providing basis for our activities.

Today the Security Working Group discussed the topics of ceasefire implementation, disengagement of forces and hardware, as well as demining.

Noting that the east of Ukraine has become one of the most densely mined areas in the world, the Coordinator of the Group Ambassador Ertugrul Apakan stressed the importance of the so-called "humanitarian demining" and a systematic approach to it.

The Economic Working Group continued its discussion of further steps to improve the quality of the Vodafone Ukraine mobile communication network in certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions (CADR and CALR respectively), as well as current issues of water deliveries in the "Karbonyt" and "Voda Donbasa" supply systems.

I would like to note some good news. Yesterday, the first stage of repair works of Yuzhnodonbasska water pipeline in Avdiivka industrial zone has been accomplished. In this regard, I would like express my gratitude to Mr Per Fischer, Coordinator of the Economic Working Group. I also thank the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) for its support in providing for “windows of silence” necessary for the repair works.

Pensions and social transfers to conflict zone residents was also a topic of discussions in the Working Group.

Coordinator of the Humanitarian Working Group, Ambassador Toni Frisch informed about his field trip to the conflict-affected areas on both sides of the contact line.

During the field trip, the Coordinator visited eleven detention places – in Kharkiv, Starobilsk, Donetsk, Luhansk and Bakhmut. There he met thirty-six detainees, five of them being not conflict-related.

The Working Group on Political Issues further considered questions related to the implementation of the so-called ‘Steinmeier formula’, amnesty and modalities of local elections in CADR and CALR as foreseen by the Minsk agreements”.

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396464 Kevin Hyland, Chief Executive of ChildFund Ireland (l), Tatiana Kotlyarenko, ODIHR Advisor on Anti-Human Trafficking Issues (c), and Valiant Richey, OSCE Acting Co-ordinator for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings (r). Warsaw, 19 September 2018. Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights SDGs SDGs:  5 - Gender equality

Trafficking in human beings is often gender-specific, as are its consequences, including the harm it causes and the recovery process for survivors, said participants in an event co-organized by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and the OSCE Office of the Special Representative and Co-ordinator for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings (OSR/CTHB) in Warsaw on 19 September 2018.

Assistance to survivors, therefore, needs to be gender-sensitive and tailored, as well as mainstreamed in all other aspects of combating human trafficking, including prevention, protection and prosecution, they said.

The event took place during the annual OSCE Human Dimension Implementation Meeting.

“All of the OSCE participating States have unanimously committed to ensuring that all female victims of violence will be provided with full, equal and timely access to justice and effective remedies,” said Tatiana Kotlyarenko, ODIHR Advisor on Anti-Human Trafficking Issues.

The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime estimates that 71 per cent of detected trafficked persons are women and girls, as are 96 per cent of all detected individuals trafficked for the purposes of sexual exploitation.

Participants stressed that the identification of victims of trafficking is often hampered by a number of factors, including lack of adequate training or functioning referral mechanisms. At the same time, other factors, such as bias, prejudice and gender stereotypes may negatively impact assistance efforts.

“From its disproportionate effects on women and girls to gender stereotypes hindering the identification of male victims, human trafficking is pervaded by gendered practices,” said Valiant Richey, OSCE Acting Co-ordinator for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings. “This event provides a unique forum to discuss how we can better integrate the needs of men and women, boys and girls into our responses to human trafficking.”

Taina Bien-Aimé, Executive Director of the Coalition Against Trafficking in Women, said: “The exponential growth of the global multi-billion dollar sex trade and its impact in both fostering sex trafficking and influencing our cultural narratives is flourishing with impunity. We applaud ODIHR and OSR/CTHB for their leadership in urging participating States to find effective solutions, from the grassroots to high-level decision makers, to end the trafficking in persons as egregious human rights violations.”

Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

Election experts from the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) visited Bucharest from 17 to 19 September 2018 to discuss the status of follow-up on ODIHR’s electoral recommendations with officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Permanent Electoral Authority, the Parliament’s legal committee, the National Audiovisual Council, as well as with representatives of civil society.

As part of this mid-term review visit, the ODIHR experts discussed a number of key changes introduced following the final report of the election expert team ODIHR sent for the 2012 parliamentary elections in Romania. These addressed a number of the Office’s recommendations and included provisions to improve voter and candidate registration processes, refine the recruitment of polling staff, introduce postal voting for citizens abroad, further elaborate political and campaign finance rules and amend deadlines for the review of complaints and appeals.

The experts also examined how remaining ODIHR recommendations could be integrated into an inclusive electoral reform process in advance of the next elections, scheduled for 2019. The Romanian authorities indicated that a number of additional amendments to the election legislation are currently being reviewed in the parliament.

“While Romania has a robust electoral framework, continual attention is needed to ensure its applicability,” said Steven Martin, ODIHR Senior Adviser on New Voting Technologies. “We look to the authorities to continue their efforts to further consolidate the legal framework in an inclusive and timely manner.”

During the meetings, the authorities expressed interest in receiving ODIHR support through expert advice and comparative examples of good practice related to topical electoral issues and, over the longer term, through the consideration of requests for legal reviews of draft legislation.

All OSCE participating States have committed themselves to following up on ODIHR's election assessments and recommendations. In addition to follow-up visits after the release of election reports, ODIHR’s methodology also provides for return to a country for a mid-term review visit to assess the degree to which recommendations have been implemented and, where necessary, encourage steps to promote further implementation.

396440 Left to right: Azamat Shambilov, Regional Director for Central Asia at Penal Reform International (PRI); Nadia Stefaniv, Justice at the Supreme Court of Ukraine; Andrea Huber, Deputy Chief of the Rule of Law Unit at the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR); and Jypara Rakisheva, National Co-ordinator of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Programme in Central Asia. Warsaw, 19 September 2018. Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

The under-representation of women in justice system institutions and its impact on justice system outcomes were the focus of a Women’s Power Breakfast in Warsaw on 19 September 2018, during the OSCE Human Dimension Implementation Meeting.

The event was co-organized by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and Penal Reform International (PRI) to promote women’s equal representation among staff of justice institutions and to advocate for gender-sensitive justice systems.

“The question of the extent to which women are represented among the police, prosecutors, judges and prison staff is not just one of numbers,” said Ingibjörg Sólrún Gísladóttir, ODIHR Director. “It has an impact on how women are treated in the justice system, whether they are victims, suspects, defendants, witnesses or prisoners. What’s more, it can have a bearing on the outcome of procedures.”

Participants elaborated on how the under-representation of women in justice system institutions, as is the case in many countries, has a negative impact on numerous aspects of justice proceedings and contributes to gender discrimination. The experiences of female victims of gender-based violence in a predominantly male justice and penitentiary system were highlighted by many participants in the discussion.

“Given the sensitive nature of gender-based violence and the fear of stigmatization, female victims may be more comfortable telling their stories to female police officers,” said Jypara Rakisheva, UNODC National Co-ordinator in Central Asia, who shared lessons learned from UNODC’s work with the Interior Ministry of Kyrgyzstan. “Gender-sensitive policing includes policies to increase the representation of women in the police, enhancing policing skills of female officers and collecting sex-disaggregated data.”

Azamat Shambilov, Regional Director of PRI’s Central Asia Office, noted that prison systems are usually male-dominated, and female staff frequently face harassment and barriers to promotion to managerial posts.

“International standards require that female prisoners are supervised by female staff. This is essential to achieving gender-sensitive treatment of female detainees, including the prevention of gender-based violence in prisons," he said.

The event saw the presentation by ODIHR of a discussion paper examining  gender and diversity among justice system actors in terms of recruitment and workplace equality, as well as in terms of the fairness of outcomes, as perceived by end users of the justice system. The paper is part of ODIHR’s work to support participating States in implementing OSCE commitments relating to the rule of law and the comprehensive gender mainstreaming strategy of the organization.

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more ceasefire violations in Luhansk region, compared with the previous reporting period. The SMM observed damage as a result of shelling in residential areas of Zolote-5/Mykhailivka. The Mission’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas as well as again near Verkhnoshyrokivske.* The SMM observed weapons in violation of the respective withdrawal lines in Kremenivka. The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station. It also facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs and maintenance works to critical water infrastructure in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, as well as demining and repairs at the Krasnohorivka gas distribution station between Marinka and Oleksandrivka. The SMM followed up on the situation of civilians living near and crossing the contact line in Maiorsk and Horlivka. In Kherson region, the Mission monitored the ABL in Chonhar.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations,[1] including 30 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 80 explosions).

On the evening and night of 17-18 September, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded ten undetermined explosions and 88 projectiles in flight (mostly from west to east), all 0.5-4km at directions ranging from south-south-east to south-south-west.

On the same evening and night, the SMM camera 1km south-west of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol) recorded two undetermined explosions, about 85 projectiles in flight (mostly from north to south and south to north) and a muzzle flash, all 2-4km from east-north-east to east-south-east.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including 11 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (seven explosions).

On the evening of 17 September, the SMM camera in Kriakivka (government-controlled, 38km north-west of Luhansk) recorded five undetermined explosions, 34 projectiles in flight (mostly east-south-east to west-north-west) and four muzzle flashes, all 2-4km south-west.

On 18 September, positioned near Kruhlyk (non-government-controlled, 31km south-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard four undetermined explosions 8-10km north-west and over 400 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire 1-1.5km north-north-west, all assessed as live-fire training exercises outside the security zone.

The SMM observed fresh damage as a result of shelling in residential areas. In Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km north-west of Luhansk) at 2 Myru Street, the SMM saw a large impact in the western wall of an inhabited three-storey residential building and three shattered west-facing windows. The SMM assessed that the damage was caused by a projectile fired from a north-westerly direction. A female resident (70 years old) told the SMM that shelling had occurred between 15:00 and 17:00 on 16 September.

At 4 Myru Street, in the second-floor of a three-storey residential building, the SMM saw cracked north-facing windows in two separate apartments and a hole in the wooden frame of one of the windows, and assessed that the damage was caused by small-arms fire originating from a north-westerly direction. A female resident (65 years old) told the SMM that she had been in the same room when the window had been hit.

At 6 Myru Street, the SMM saw a broken window in a second-floor apartment of a four-storey residential building. Residents from both buildings told the SMM separately that shelling had happened during the afternoon of 16 September.

At 11 Lizy Chaikinoi Street, the SMM observed that a section of the western side of the roof of a two-storey residential building had been damaged or was missing entirely and that the supporting wooden rafters were damaged. The SMM assessed that the damage was caused by a mortar round impact but could not assess the direction of fire. The SMM observed at 8 Lizy Chaikinoi Street that 12 windows on the north-western side of a two-storey residential building were broken or shattered and at 20 Lizy Chaikinoi Street that a second-floor window on the north-facing side of an inhabited two-storey building was shattered. Residents from all three buildings told the SMM that the shelling had taken place on the afternoon of 16 September.

At 2 Dundycha Street, the SMM saw that three first-floor apartment windows were all broken and there was damage to the north-facing outer wall of the building, which the SMM assessed as caused by shrapnel. The SMM assessed that the damage was caused by a projectile fired from a north-westerly direction.

At a power substation in a residential area of Zolote-5/Mykhailivka, the SMM observed a hole in the roof of the substation and a 30mm wide crack along its south-facing wall. The SMM assessed that the damage was caused by an impact of a projectile fired from a northerly direction. Two female residents of the area (55-60 years old) told the SMM that the shelling had taken place on 16 September.

The SMM continued to monitor and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske[2] (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

Inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, the SMM observed an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-70) driving east near the government checkpoint.

Positioned in the Zolote disengagement area and in Bohdanivka (government-controlled, 41km south-west of Donetsk), near the Petrivske disengagement area, the SMM observed calm situations.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in a government-controlled area, the SMM saw ten self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) north-east of Kremenivka (27km north-west of Mariupol).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in government-controlled areas, on 17 September, an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted four surface-to-air missile systems (9K33 Osa) near residential homes in Maksymivka (53km west of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in non-government-controlled areas, aerial imagery available to the SMM on 17 September revealed the presence of 51 tanks (type undetermined) in a training area near Manuilivka (65km east of Donetsk). On 18 September, the SMM saw five tanks (two T-64 and three variants undetermined) in a training area near Kruhlyk (see above and the Ceasefire Table below for information on ceasefire violations observed at the training area).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. At one such site in a government-controlled area of Donetsk region, the SMM observed 11 self-propelled howitzers (2S1) present for the first time.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles, an anti-aircraft gun[3] and other signs of military-type presence in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 16 September, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-2) in the courtyard of a non-functional school in Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk). The next day, an SMM long-range UAV spotted two armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-2) and an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) about 3km south of Novhorodske (35km north of Donetsk), seven APCs (four BTR-70 and three BTR variants) near Avdiivka  (17km north of Donetsk) and two IFVs (BMP-1) near Berezove (31km south-west of Donetsk). On 18 September, the SMM saw an APC (BTR-4) near Kamianka (20km north of Donetsk), an APC (MT-LB) near Sartana (15km north-east of Mariupol), an APC (MT-LB) near Starohnativka (51km south of Donetsk), an APC (MT-LB) in Trokhizbenka (32km north-west of Luhansk) and an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) in Bobrove (56km north-west of Luhansk).

On 16 September, between the DFS and road M04, about 600m south-east of the DFS, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted a new trench 200m in length from north to south connecting two existing positions as well as a recently upgraded firing position about 600m south of the DFS. The same UAV spotted a 40m extension of existing trenches about 2km south-west of the DFS. (All developments were assessed as belonging to the armed formations, all not seen in imagery from 4 September 2018).

The same UAV spotted about 20 fresh craters assessed as impacts of probable mortar (82mm) rounds (not seen on imagery from 4 September 2018) about 1.5km south-west of the DFS, on road H20 at the junction of road M04.

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire.

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable demining and repair and maintenance works to a water pipeline between Zolote and Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk), the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), a water channel junction in Stanytsia Luhanska and at the Krasnohorivka gas distribution station between Marinka and Oleksandrivka (non-government-controlled, 20km south-west of Donetsk). The SMM also facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable demining and repairs to the South Donbas water pipeline between Avdiivka and Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk). A representative of Voda Donbassa told the SMM that the repairs to the South Donbas water pipeline had been completed and that water supply should improve for up to 1.3 million residents on both sides of the contact line in Donetsk region.

The SMM facilitated and monitored demining in Pishchane (government-controlled, 22km north of Luhansk), in an area where an anti-tank mine had reportedly exploded on 7 April 2018 (see SMM Daily Report 12 April 2018).

The SMM continued to followup on the situation of civilians living near and crossing the contact line. At the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk), ten civilians (men and women, aged 60-80 years old) told the SMM that crossing the contact line takes many hours, but due to the fact that toilets are either unavailable or in poor condition, they try to consume as little food or drink as possible. In Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM conducted an outreach event with 15 civilians, many of whom highlighted the difficulties of crossing the contact line as well as hardship conditions at checkpoints along the contact line.

On 17 September, the SMM monitored the ABL at the checkpoint near Chonhar (163km south-east of Kherson) and observed that the checkpoint was open and traffic was traveling in both directions.

The SMM continued monitoring in Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 17 September) The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a checkpoint west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), five members of the armed formations (one visibly armed) again denied the SMM passage, citing risks to “the SMM’s security”. The SMM saw civilian cars crossing the checkpoint.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.5
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

Conditional access:

• At two separate checkpoints in Horlivka, members of the armed formations insisted on opening the trunks of the SMM vehicles before allowing the SMM to pass through the checkpoints.

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

[2] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[3] This hardware is not prescribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC withdrew from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

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VIENNA, 19 September 2018 – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, welcomed yesterday’s decision by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) on an interim measure which indicates to the Ukrainian authorities to abstain from accessing the mobile telephone data of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) investigative reporter Natalya Sedletska.

“I welcome the swift action of the European Court of Human Rights to protect mobile phone data of an investigative journalist, pending full complaint to the court. Investigative journalism plays the essential role of a watchdog in societies and journalists must be able to protect their sources,” said Désir.

On August 27, a court in Kyiv approved a request from the Prosecutor-General's Office to allow investigators to review any data from Sedletska's mobile telephone from 1 July 2016 through to 30 November 2017. This is part of a criminal investigation into the alleged disclosure of state secrets to journalists in 2017 by a high-level public official.

At the beginning of September the Representative expressed concern about this decision and issued a public call to the Ukrainian authorities to ensure that all steps in line with international standards and OSCE commitments are taken to respect Sedletska’s privilege to keep her sources confidential (see: https://www.osce.org/representative-on-freedom-of-media/392555).

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom.

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396212 Karen Gainer Marina Živaljević SDGs SDGs:  5 - Gender equality

In an effort to ensure that gender equality is a core component in legislative drafting, the OSCE Mission, in co-operation with the Parliamentary Committee for Gender Equality in Montenegro, held a training course on gender mainstreaming on 18 and 19 September 2018 in Podgorica.

Members of Parliament and parliamentary committee staff discussed how to analyse legislation from a gender perspective, strategize to mainstream gender in state institutions and develop gender equality policy consistent with international standards.

“We want to support the parliament in its efforts to translate its legislative commitments into good practices, to become more and more a gender-sensitive parliament,” says Ana Krušić, Senior Programme Assistant at the OSCE Mission to Montenegro.

The OSCE Mission to Montenegro has been working in partnership with the parliament for many years on projects which, in addition to the promotion of gender mainstreaming, have included capacity building of committees, working with administrative staff and supporting exchanges of regional experiences.

Gender expert Karolina Leaković, who led the training course, said: “Co-operation with the parliament and its service is important because the parliament is at the centre of the legislative process and has an important role in developing gender-sensitive legislation and promoting principles of gender equality.”

The training course is a part of the education on gender equality and gender mainstreaming envisaged by the Action Plan for a Gender Sensitive Parliament, which was developed and adopted by the Committee with the support of the Mission and the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. The first course was organized in April this year.

396608 Communication and Media Relations Section

An OSCE project to support criminal justice systems in Eastern Europe in their fight against gender-based violence, developed by the Strategic Police Matters Unit of the OSCE Transnational Threats Department (TNTD/SPMU), was launched on 20 and 21 September 2018 in Vienna.

The project, Effective Criminal Justice Strategies and Practices to Combat Gender-based Violence in Eastern Europe, addresses all criminal justice system actors (police, prosecutors and judges) at all levels (senior management, mid-level management and first responders) who are involved in combating gender-based violence in Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania. It also addresses civil society organizations, social workers and academia.

National steering committees, working groups and reference groups will be established in all three countries in order to secure local ownership and engagement of high-level managers. This will be followed by regional train-the-trainer courses and awareness-raising activities, targeting both criminal justice actors and civil society.

“Gender-based violence knows no social or economic boundaries and damages individuals of all socio-economic backgrounds,” said the Director of the Office of the OSCE Secretary General, Paul Bekkers. “All participating States are affected by this crime and should take concrete measures to address it at all levels. We stand ready to assist in their endeavours to fight gender-based violence and to protect potential victims.”

The representatives of the European Union Delegation to the International Organizations in Vienna said that this project is particularly interesting because it addresses not only criminal justice responses to gender-based violence but also those by other groups, including civil society.

These responses are crucial because they determine whether the victim chooses to pursue legal action or withdraws accusations due to fear of secondary victimization. “By targeting not only criminal justice practitioners but also civil society and risk groups, the project ensures a comprehensive approach to gender-based violence,” said Ambassador Ioannis Vrailas, Permanent Representative of the European Union to the OSCE.

Participants stressed that more attention and resources should be dedicated to fighting gender-based violence as this type of violence continues to occur at disturbingly high rates, in the entire OSCE area as well as at the global level. According to the World Health Organization, one in three women worldwide experiences physical or sexual violence in their lifetime.

The launch event gathered representatives of all three beneficiary countries, the Institute of Police Education at the Linnaeus University of Sweden, the OSCE Gender Section and the Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, offering the opportunity to discuss project activities and expected results.

The project is funded by the European Union’s Justice Programme (2014-2020) and Austria.

396344 Karen Gainer Marina Živaljević

Strengthening rule of law-compliant criminal justice responses to terrorism was the aim of a two-day seminar for over 30 Montenegrin practitioners from relevant government agencies, which concluded on 19 September 2018 in Budva.

Organized by the OSCE Secretariat’s Action against Terrorism Unit in close co-operation with the OSCE Mission to Montenegro, the seminar focused on good practices detailed in the Global Counterterrorism Forum’s Rabat Memorandum, listing effective terrorism prevention and prosecution measures, while emphasizing respect for human rights and other applicable international law.

Experts in the criminal justice field presented the legal parameters and practices developed in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, as well as the work of the private financial sector in this area.

Head of the OSCE Mission to Montenegro Maryse Daviet, said: “We are pleased to be able to help bring together the Montenegrin law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, and judges, as well as representatives of the corrections authorities and ministries, to engage with the issue of terrorism across the justice sector, so that cases can move in an efficient, timely and law abiding way.”

Among other topics, experts and participants discussed effective co-ordination mechanisms among domestic government agencies and the importance of protecting sensitive information in terrorism cases. The seminar also highlighted the need to ensure the protection of all parties involved in terrorism cases, as well as for the development of policies for the effective incarceration and reintegration of convicted terrorists.

The event in Budva was the ninth in a series, which is mainly funded through extra-budgetary contributions by the United States of America. Seminars previously took place in Nicosia (2014), Skopje, Sofia, Tashkent (2015), Sarajevo (2016), Pristina, Astana (2017), and Issyk-Kul/Kyrgyzstan (2018).

396179 Ingibjörg Sólrún Gísladóttir, Director of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), speaking during the event. Warsaw, 18 September 2018. Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

The role of national referral mechanisms (NRMs) in protecting the rights of trafficked persons was addressed in an event organized by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) in Warsaw on 18 September 2018, on the margins of the Human Dimension Implementation Meeting.

Participants explored how to design, implement and monitor sustainable mechanisms and structures to combat human trafficking and support its survivors. The meeting was also an opportunity to discuss good practices in countering human trafficking.

“The importance of establishing effective national referral mechanisms has been confirmed by participating States in numerous OSCE commitments and documents,” said Ingibjörg Sólrún Gísladóttir, Director of ODIHR.  “ODIHR stands ready to support OSCE participating States in implementing NRMs and tackling human trafficking in a manner that puts a rights-based approach at the heart of the process.”

“NRMs must provide access to professional support for survivors of human trafficking and modern slavery. Support should meet the needs of the individual and include access to health and psychological care, legal advocacy, financial support and aftercare, including education and employment,” said Kevin Hyland, the Executive Director of the Irish Children’s Fund. “NRMs often provide victims with their only real opportunity to regain their freedom and recover.

The event was a component of ODIHR’s assistance to OSCE participating States in fulfilling their commitments to take a comprehensive human rights-based approach to combating all forms of trafficking in human beings. This assistance focuses on the establishment and strengthening of NRMs, promoting redress for survivors of human trafficking and ensuring a human rights-based approach in the process of returning victims to their countries of origin.

This report is for the media and the general public.

SUMMARY

Kamensk-Shakhtinskiy, Russian Federation. The Observer Mission (OM) continues to operate 24/7 at both Border Crossing Points (BCPs). The overall number of border crossings by persons slightly decreased at both BCPs compared to the previous week.

 OPERATIONAL REMARKS

The OM is currently operating with 22 permanent international staff members, including the Chief Observer (CO). The Mission is supported administratively by a Vienna-based staff member.

OBSERVATIONS AT THE BORDER CROSSING POINTS

Persons crossing the border                                                                                                                                                                                       

The profile of the people crossing the border can be categorized as follows:

1. Adults travelling on foot or by car with little or no luggage;
2. Persons in military-style outfits;
3. Families (often including elderly people and/or children) travelling on foot or by car with a significant amount of luggage.

The average number of entries/exits slightly decreased from 10,827 to 10,798 per day at both BCPs compared to last week[1].

During the reporting period, the majority of border crossings were to Ukraine, with an average net flow of minus 59 for both BCPs.

The Donetsk BCP continued to experience more traffic than the Gukovo BCP.

Persons in military-style outfits

During the reporting period, the number of persons in military-style outfits crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs increased to 26 persons (compared to 21 last week); 14 of them crossed into the Russian Federation, and twelve into Ukraine (73 per cent of this category’s crossings occurred at the Donetsk BCP). They continued to cross the border individually or in groups. Most individuals crossed on foot, however, some made use of private vehicles, buses or minivans, making it more difficult for the observer teams (OTs) to observe their movement across the border, especially since some of the private vehicles have tinted windows, and buses and minivans have drawn curtains.

Families with a significant amount of luggage

The OTs continued to report on families crossing the border, sometimes with elderly people and/or children, at both BCPs with a significant amount of luggage, or travelling in heavily loaded cars. During this reporting week, seven families were observed crossing into the Russian Federation and six were observed crossing into Ukraine, compared to the previous reporting period when eight families were observed crossing the border into the Russian Federation and six into Ukraine.

Bus connections                                         

Regular local and long-distance bus connections continued to operate between Ukraine (mostly from/to the Luhansk region) and the Russian Federation. In addition to regular bus connections, the OTs continued to observe bus connections on irregular routes. Often the buses do not state their route; instead they have a sign on the windshield stating “irregular”.

During the reporting period, the OTs observed a decrease in the overall number of buses crossing the border at both BCPs (425 compared to 453 observed during the previous week). There were 222 buses bound for the Russian Federation and 203 bound for Ukraine.

Among the bus connections observed by the OTs, the following “irregular” routes or destinations were noted: Kyiv; and Rovenky- Kyiv; Stakhanov-Kyiv and Luhansk-Yalta.

On some occasions, the OTs noticed the bus drivers removing the itinerary signs from the windshields of their buses, while some buses do not display their route at all. The majority of long-distance buses commuting between the Luhansk region and cities in the Russian Federation have Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region.

Trucks

During the reporting period, the OM observed a slight decrease in the overall number of trucks crossing the border in both directions and at both BCPs. Compared to the previous week, the total number of trucks went from 848 to 838 (337 at the Gukovo BCP and 501 at the Donetsk BCP); 469 of these trucks crossed into the Russian Federation and 369 crossed into Ukraine. Most of the trucks observed by the OTs had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region.

Among them, the OTs also continued to observe tanker trucks crossing the border in both directions. During the reporting week, the number of tanker trucks increased to 87 (compared to 50 during the previous reporting period). These trucks were observed crossing the border at both BCPs. The trucks had the words “Propane” and “Flammable” written across the tanks in either Russian or Ukrainian. The majority of tanker trucks had hazard signs, indicating that they were transporting propane or a mix of propane and butane.

All trucks undergo systematic inspection by Russian Federation officials, which may include an X-ray check. Due to the unfavourable observation position at the Gukovo BCP, the OTs continued to be unable to observe any X-ray checks.

Compared to the previous week, the total number of X-ray checks at the Donetsk BCP decreased from 100 to 84: out of the total number of trucks scanned, 59 trucks (70%) were bound for Ukraine; the remaining 25 trucks (30%) crossed into the Russian Federation.

Minivans

The OM continued to observe passenger and cargo minivans[2] crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs. The OTs observed minivans predominantly with Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, the OTs also frequently saw minivans registered in the Russian Federation. Compared to the previous week, the number of cargo minivans increased from 139 to 164 vehicles; 87 crossed into the Russian Federation and another 77 into Ukraine.

Trains

The OTs continued to pick up the sound of trains running on the railway tracks located approximately 150 metres south-west of the Gukovo BCP. During the reporting week, the OTs heard trains on 25 occasions, compared to 26 last week; the OTs assessed that 11 trains were travelling to the Russian Federation and the rest to Ukraine. The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine was regularly informed about the trains bound for Ukraine.

Visual observation was not possible because of the line of trees located between the train tracks and the BCP.

Other observations

The majority of vehicles crossing the border had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region, or Russian Federation licence plates. A significant number of vehicles with “LPR” plates were also observed crossing the border in both directions on a daily basis, as were vehicles with Georgian and Belarusian licence plates.

On 17 September at 13:16, an ambulance arrived at the Gukovo BCP from the Russian Federation and parked close to the main building. The OT could observe a driver and medical personnel. A paramedic was accompanied by a customs officer inside the main building. He came out at 13:35 and went back on board the ambulance. They left the BCP without any patient.

For trends and figures at a glance covering the period from 21 August to 18 September 2018, please see the attachment here.

[1] Based on data received from the Regional Representation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation.

[2] Cargo minivans: light commercial vehicles with a maximum authorized mass of more than 3.5 t and not more than 7.5 t; with or without a trailer with a maximum mass of less than 750 kg (small cargo vehicles which correspond to driving licence C1).                      

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This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, compared with the previous 24 hours. On the night of 16-17 September, the Mission heard small-arms fire 30-50m from its position. The SMM recorded ceasefire violations near the Zolote and the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement areas. Inside the Petrivske disengagement area, the SMM saw Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers and a recent extension of a trench assessed as belonging to the armed formations. The Mission’s access remained restricted in the disengagement areas, as well as in Bohdanivka and again near Verkhnoshyrokivske.* The SMM observed weapons in violation of the respective withdrawal lines near Ocheretyne, Shyroke, Novoamvrosiivske and Khrustalnyi. The Mission continued to facilitate and monitor the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station. It also facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs and maintenance works to critical water infrastructure in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, as well as demining and repairs at the Krasnohorivka gas distribution station between Marinka and Oleksandrivka and repairs to houses in Avdiivka. In Kyiv, the SMM monitored a protest in front of the General Prosecutor’s Office, where it saw protestors clash with police officers.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations,[1] including, however, more explosions (about 80), compared with the previous 24 hours (75 explosions).

Between 22:25 and 00:18 on the night of 16-17 September, while in Debaltseve (non-government-controlled, 58km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 17 shots of small-arms fire near its position. The Mission assessed the shots as having originated from a residential area approximately 30-50m west.

On the evening and night of 16-17 September, the SMM camera in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk) recorded 41 projectiles in flight (mostly from west-south-west to north-north-east), 11 bursts and three muzzle flashes, all 2-4km east and east-south-east. During the day on 17 September, while in Svitlodarsk, the SMM heard eight undetermined explosions 5-6km east-south-east and south-south-east.

On the evening of 16 September, while in Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 16 undetermined explosions and 11 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 6-9km north-north-west. On 17 September, at the same location, the SMM heard 35 shots of small-arms fire 2-3km south-west.

On the evening and night of 16-17 September, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded 18 undetermined explosions, two explosions assessed as airbursts, 75 projectiles in flight (mostly from west to east), three muzzle flashes, two illumination flares in vertical flight and a burst, all 0.2-4km at directions ranging from south-south-east to south-west.

On the same evening and night, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) recorded seven undetermined explosions, 66 projectiles in flight (the majority from east-south-east to west-north-west) and four illumination flares in vertical flight, all 2-4km north and north-north-east.

On the same evening and night, the SMM camera 1km south-west of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol) recorded three explosions assessed as impacts of rounds of undetermined weapons, about 115 projectiles in flight (mostly from south-south-west to north-north-east and from west-north-west to east-south-east), two bursts and four muzzle flashes, all 2-4km east-north-east, east and south.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including seven explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours (about 215 explosions).

The SMM continued to monitor and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske[2] (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On the morning of 17 September, the SMM camera near the Prince Ihor Monument south-east of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk) recorded an undetermined explosion 2-4km north. On the same day, positioned south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM heard an undetermined explosion 2-3km east. The SMM assessed both explosions as having occurred outside the disengagement area.

On 17 September, positioned on the southern edge of Zolote-4/Rodina (government-controlled, 59km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard an explosion assessed as an outgoing round of an undetermined weapon 1-1.5km west-south-west. Positioned on the western edge of Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard an undetermined explosion 2-3km north. The SMM assessed both explosions as having occurred outside the disengagement area.

On 16 September, an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP variant) 100m north of the northern edge of the Zolote disengagement area.

On 15 September, an SMM long-range UAV spotted two Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers near a bunker inside the Petrivske disengagement area, about 200m from its northern edge and 550m from its western edge. On the same day, the same long-range UAV spotted an 8m extension of a previously observed trench (see SMM Daily Report 16 August 2018) protruding into the disengagement area through its northern edge, about 350m from its eastern edge, assessed as belonging to the armed formations.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in a government-controlled area, on 15 September, an SMM long-range UAV spotted a self-propelled howitzer (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) near Ocheretyne (31km north-west of Donetsk).

In violation of withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas, on 16 September, an SMM long-range UAV spotted 12 self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) on the western outskirts of Shyroke (33km east of Donetsk). On 17 September, the SMM saw four multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) near Novoamvrosiivske (56km east of Donetsk) and 16 MLRS (BM-21) near Khrustalnyi (formerly Krasnyi Luch, 56km south-west of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in government-controlled areas, on 15 September, an SMM long-range UAV spotted two surface-to-air missile systems (9K37): one near Hnativka (39km north of Donetsk) and one near Klishchiivka (60km north of Donetsk), and two surface-to-air missile systems (9K33 Osa) near Stupochky (60km north of Donetsk). On 17 September, the SMM saw seven anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) loaded on a train at the train station in Khlibodarivka (65km south-west of Donetsk).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. At two such sites in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region, the SMM observed five self-propelled howitzers (2S1) and six towed howitzers (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm), and noted that two self-propelled howitzers (2S1) remained missing.

The SMM revisited a permanent storage site, the location of which was beyond the respective withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region, and noted that 11 tanks (seven T-72 and four T-64) remained missing.

The SMM revisited a heavy weapons permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region and noted that four MLRS (BM-21), three self-propelled howitzers (2S1) and six towed howitzers (one 2A65 and five D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) remained missing. The Mission also saw new weapons present.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles and an anti-aircraft gun[3] in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 15 September, an SMM long-range UAV spotted three armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-2) and an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23-2, 23mm) mounted on a truck near Dyliivka (52km north of Donetsk), as well as four armoured combat vehicles (type unknown) near Pivnichne (formerly Kirove, 44km north-east of Donetsk). On 16 September, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an IFV (BMP-1) and an armoured personnel carrier (MT-LB) near Bila Hora (54km north of Donetsk). On 17 September, an SMM mini-UAV spotted two IFVs (BMP-1) near Berezove (31km south-west of Donetsk). On the same day, the SMM saw four IFVs (two BMP-1 and two BMP-2) near Luhanske (59km north-east of Donetsk).

In a non-government-controlled area, on 17 September, the SMM saw an IFV (BMP-1) near Ivanivka (33km east of Luhansk).

The SMM visited a border area not under government control. On 17 September, while at a border crossing point near Marynivka (78km east of Donetsk) for about one hour, the SMM saw 18 cars (four with Ukrainian and seven with Russian Federation licence plates, and seven with “DPR” plates), a covered cargo truck with “DPR” plates and a bus with Polish licence plates exiting Ukraine. During the same time, the SMM saw 11 cars (two with Ukrainian and five with Russian Federation licence plates, and four with “DPR” plates) and a bus with “DPR” plates and about 30 people on board entering Ukraine.

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire.

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair and maintenance works to a water pipeline between Zolote and Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk), the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), a water channel junction in Stanytsia Luhanska, water wells in Krasnyi Lyman (non-government-controlled, 30km north-west of Luhansk) and the South Donbas water pipeline between Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk) and Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk).

The Mission also facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs at the Krasnohorivka gas distribution station between Marinka and Oleksandrivka (non-government-controlled, 20km south-west of Donetsk), and to houses on Lermontova Street in Avdiivka

In Kyiv, the SMM monitored a public protest in front of the building of the General Prosecutor’s Office at 13/15 Riznytska Street, purportedly organized following reports of the extradition of a Russian citizen from Ukraine. The Mission saw about 400 people (mostly men, mixed ages), some of them holding flags of Svoboda, Pravyi Sektor and Rukh Novykh Syl and wearing T-shirts with National Corps insignia. About 100 police and National Guard officers were present. The SMM saw protesters burn tires, throw smoke flares, paint and eggs; break windows, damage the entrance door to the building and destroy the building’s plaque. At one point, the Mission saw protesters throw pieces of pavement towards the building and at the police and clash with police officers, who responded by spraying them with water from a fire hose and diffusing pepper spray. During the clashes, the SMM saw a female journalist being escorted out of the crowd by three police officers, after she had reportedly been physically assaulted by a protester and had eggs thrown at her.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 17 September) The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a checkpoint west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage, citing risks to “the SMM’s security”. The SMM saw civilian cars crossing.
• Armed members of the armed formations denied the SMM access to a military-type facility in Bohdanivka (non-government-controlled, 44km west of Luhansk), citing “a lack of authorization from their commander”.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by telephone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.5
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

Other impediments:

• Staff at two schools in Oleksandrivsk (non-government-controlled, 10km west of Luhansk) and in Metalist (non-government-controlled, 7km north-west of Luhansk) said they could not provide the SMM with information without permission from senior members of the armed formations.
• Staff at a nursery in Vesela Hora (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Luhansk) said they could not provide the SMM with information without permission from senior members of the armed formations.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[2] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[3] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC withdrew from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

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395900 OSCE Centre in Ashgabat SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

Representatives from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan participated in an OSCE-supported two-day regional seminar “Combatting financing of terrorism: best practices within the OSCE region”. The event concluded in Ashgabat on 18 September 2018.

The seminar organized by the OSCE Centre in Ashgabat aimed to share international standards and best practices in the area of combating the financing of terrorism. The participants also discussed further strengthening of international and interagency co-operation between relevant state authorities.

National experts from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan presented their countries’ experiences in combating the financing of terrorism and the financing of foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs), highlighting the importance of the relevant legislative framework and of conducting national risk assessments. They also shared best practices in interagency interaction in the detection of the financing of terrorism and FTFs and stressed the role of international co-operation in the detection of transboundary financial flows.

“The OSCE calls on its participating States to apply a coordinated approach to combating terrorism at all levels while promoting interagency and interstate co-operation as well as interaction with relevant international and regional organizations,” said Natalya Drozd, Head of the OSCE Centre in Ashgabat.

“As regional co-operation is particularly important to efficiently combat financing of terrorism and extremism, we initiated this workshop to promote interaction among Central Asian states in countering this serious challenge to security,” Drozd noted.

The seminar was facilitated by an international expert from Lithuania who elaborated on the assessment of risks related to financing of terrorism and other methods of detection and suppression of terrorist financing channels. The expert also touched upon the distribution schemes to finance terrorism and FTFs and best practices in the detection of transboundary financial flows. The seminar also addressed analytical methods to detect suspicious transactions and funding sources in the area of the financing of FTFs.

During the practical exercises, participants worked in groups to review cases related to the investigation of terrorist financing cases by financial and criminal intelligence units.

396095 Colin McCullough, OSCE Programme Office in Astana

An OSCE-supported two-day training seminar on applying a risk-based approach to counter money laundering and the financing of terrorism for some 80 representatives from the National Bank of Kazakhstan, the Financial Monitoring Committee and the second-tier banks concluded on 18 September 2018 in Almaty, Kazakhstan.  

International experts from Austria, the Netherlands and the United States of America familiarized participants with the concept of a methodological framework and quantitative and qualitative indicators to carry out risk-based supervision over financial institutions. They also discussed the mechanisms to assess risks associated with customers’ remote identification, the application of a risk-based approach and the fulfilling of the requirement of the Financial Action Task Force (an inter-governmental body) to combat money laundering and terrorism financing. During the event, the participants reviewed best practices in collecting evidence and investigating cybercrime incidents as well as addressing information security, including protection of personal data and practical aspects of complying with the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation.

The event was organized by the OSCE Programme Office in Astana in partnership with Kazakhstan’s National Bank and the United States Embassy in Astana.

The event is part of the Programme Office’s multi-year efforts to promote good governance and combat money laundering and terrorism financing.

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and none in Luhansk region between the evenings of 14 and 15 September, compared with the previous reporting period. Between the evenings of 15 and 16 September, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and Luhansk regions, compared with the previous 24 hours. The SMM observed a fresh crater caused by shelling near Dovhe. It recorded ceasefire violations near the Zolote and Petrivske disengagement areas. The Mission’s access remained restricted in the disengagement areas as well as again near Verkhnoshyrokivske, Yuzhna-Lomuvatka and Zaichenko, and in Novoazovsk and Dovzhanske, near the border with the Russian Federation in non-government-controlled areas.* The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station as well as to water infrastructure in Artema and between Avdiivka and Yasynuvata.

In Donetsk region, between the evenings of 14 and 15 September, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations,[1] including 89 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 50 explosions). Between the evenings of 15 and 16 September, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, however, fewer explosions (75), compared with the previous 24 hours.

On the evening and night of 14-15 September, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 29 undetermined explosions and about 25 bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 3-6km south-east. On the evening of 15-16 September, at the same location, the SMM heard about 40 undetermined explosions and about 40 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 2-5km south-east and south.

On the evening and night of 15-16 September, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration System (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded six undetermined explosions, about 30 projectiles in flight (most from west to east) and an illumination flare, all 1-3km in southerly directions.

During the day on 15 September, positioned on the south-eastern edge of Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk) for about 6.5 hours, the SMM heard 14 undetermined explosions and about 45 shots and bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 1-4km in southerly directions.   

On the evening and night of 14-15 September, the SMM camera 1km south-west of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol) recorded four undetermined explosions, about 300 projectiles in flight (mostly from north to south) and an illumination flare, all 1-5km in easterly directions. On the evening and night of 15-16 September, the same camera recorded nine undetermined explosions, about 245 projectiles in flight (most from north to south), eight muzzle flashes and three bursts of undetermined weapons, all 1-4km east-north-east and east.

During the day on 15 September, positioned near Pavlopil (government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol) for about three hours, the SMM heard eight undetermined explosions and three bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all at unknown distances south and south-east, as well as two undetermined explosions and eight minutes of uncountable shots of small-arms fire followed by about 20 shots and bursts of small-arms fire, all 1-2km north-east.

On the same day, positioned 1km south-west of Lebedynske (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Mariupol) for about 45 minutes, the SMM heard eight undetermined explosions and about 50 shots and bursts of small-arms fire, all 1-2km east-north-east. Later that day, positioned in Lebedynske for about ten minutes, the SMM heard five explosions assessed as outgoing rounds and their subsequent impacts and about five shots and bursts of small-arms fire, all 2-3km north-east and east-north-east.

On the evening and night of 15-16 September, the SMM camera 1km south-west of Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) recorded about 170 projectiles in flight (most from west to east), 26 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire and two illumination flares, all 2-4km in northerly directions.

In Luhansk region, between the evenings of 14 and 15 September, the SMM recorded no ceasefire violations, compared with 85 in the previous reporting period (34 explosions). Between the evenings of 15 and 16 September, the SMM recorded about 320 ceasefire violations, including about 215 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours.

During the day on 16 September, positioned on the eastern edge of Toshkivka (government-controlled, 60km north-west of Luhansk) for about 30 minutes, the SMM heard 215 undetermined explosions and 100 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 8-10km east-south-east.

The SMM observed a fresh crater caused by shelling on the south-eastern edge of Dovhe (non-government-controlled, 22km north-west of Luhansk). On 15 September, led by members of the armed formations, the SMM saw a fresh crater with a protruding 82mm mortar tailfin, assessed as caused by a mortar round fired from a north-north-westerly direction. The crater was in a field in the south-eastern edge of the village, about 300m north-east of an armed formations position and about 350m from the nearest residential house. Four residents of Dovhe told the SMM that they had heard fire from unknown weapons near their houses on 14 September.

The SMM continued to monitor and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske[2]  (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

During the day on 15 September, positioned about 2km north of Petrivske for about 75 minutes, the SMM heard 15 bursts and shots of small-arms fire 1-2km south-east, all assessed as outside the disengagement area. Positioned near the Petrivske disengagement area on 16 September, the SMM observed a calm situation.

During the day on 16 September, positioned about 3km north of Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk) for about 40 minutes, the SMM heard four undetermined explosions 3-5km north-east, assessed as outside the Zolote disengagement area.

Positioned near the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area on 15 and 16 September, the SMM observed calm situations.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. At two such sites in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region, on 14 September, the SMM observed 13 towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) and noted that 15 mortars (PM-38, 120mm) remained missing.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles[3], a helicopter and other signs of military presence in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 14 September, an SMM mid-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted three armoured combat vehicles (ACVs) (type undetermined) near Novozvanivka (70km west of Luhansk) and an SMM mini-UAV spotted three ACVs in a military compound east of Zaitseve (62km north-east of Donetsk). The next day, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-variant) in Vodiane (94km south of Donetsk).  

On 15 September, the SMM saw a military helicopter (type undetermined) flying east to west at a height of about 200m near government-controlled Pylypchatyne (76km north-east of Donetsk). On 16 September, the SMM saw for the first time a freshly dug trench 40m in length near Hranitne (government-controlled, 60km south of Donetsk).

On 15 September, an SMM-mid range UAV spotted at least 40 craters, including six craters assessed as impacts of probable 120mm mortar rounds near positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces east of Vodiane.   

The SMM visited two border areas not under government control. On 15 September, while at a border crossing point near Marynivka (78km east of Donetsk) for about 30 minutes, the SMM saw 49 cars (14 with Ukrainian, 20 with Russian Federation, one with Belorussian and one with Lithuanian licence plates and 13 with “DPR” plates) waiting to exit Ukraine, as well as five cars (two with Ukrainian licence plates and three with “DPR” plates) entering Ukraine.

On 16 September, while at a border crossing point near Dovzhanske (84km south-east of Luhansk) for about 15 minutes, the SMM saw three cars with Ukrainian licence plates, three covered cargo trucks (two with Ukrainian licence plates and one with “LPR” plates) three buses (with Ukrainian licence plates) and four pedestrians waiting to exit Ukraine. After 15 minutes, an armed member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave.*

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire.

It also facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair and maintenance works on 15 and 16 September in Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk) and to the South Donbas water pipeline between Avdiivka and Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk).

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below) The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• On 15 and 16 September, at a checkpoint west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage. On both days, the SMM saw other civilians crossing.
• On 15 and 16 September, at a checkpoint near Novoazovsk (non-government-controlled, 40km east of Mariupol), members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage, citing a “special forces operation” ongoing in the area. On both days, the SMM saw other civilians crossing.
• On 15 September, at a checkpoint of the armed formations in Yuzhna-Lomuvatka (non-government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage through a road barrier, citing an order that the road had been closed for all vehicle traffic due to ongoing demining and engineering works.
• On 16 September, an armed member of the armed formations at a checkpoint near Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol) prevented the SMM from accessing Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) or Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), citing security concerns.
• On 16 September, while present at a border crossing point near Dovzhanske, a member of the armed formations demanded that the SMM leave the area.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• On 15 and 16 September, the SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC on both occasions.[4]
• On 15 and 16 September, the SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by telephone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC on both occasions.
• On 15 and 16 September, the SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

Conditional access:

• At a checkpoint in Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), on 16 September, while the SMM attempted to pass towards Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk), two members of the armed formations wearing military-style attire allowed the SMM to proceed only after inspecting the SMM patrol vehicle trunks.

Other Impediments:

• On evening and night of 15-16 September, an SMM long-range UAV was temporarily jammed while flying over Kostiantynivka (government-controlled, 60km north of Donetsk), Krasnohorivka (government-controlled, 21km west of Donetsk), Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk), Petrivske, Katerynivka (government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk), Zoria (government-controlled, 40km north-west of Donetsk) and Netailove (government-controlled, 22km north-west of Donetsk)[5].

 

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

[2] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[3] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

[5] The interference could have originated from anywhere within the radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position.

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