OSCE

VIENNA, 28 September 2018 – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, welcomed today the arrest of eight persons in Slovakia in connection with the murders of journalist Ján Kuciak and his fiancée, Martina Kušnírová in February 2018.

“I welcome the important progress in the investigation on the murder of Jan Kuciak and his fiancée, and the arrest of eight persons allegedly linked to this crime. I hope that this will lead to the identification and prosecution of the perpetrators and all involved, especially those who ordered this horrendous assassination,” said Désir “There must be no impunity for killing journalists.”

Kuciak was an investigative reporter who contributed to the news portal aktuality.sk.

The OSCE Representative met with Slovakia’s Prime Minister and Minister of Interior just after the murders to urge the authorities to pursue a full, transparent and swift investigation.

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom.

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VIENNA, 28 September 2018 – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, in a letter to the authorities of the United Kingdom today, conveyed his concerns regarding the draft Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill currently under consideration by the country’s Parliament. While the draft law sets out additional powers to help tackle terrorism, Désir said he was concerned about the potential impact of the proposed legislation on media freedom.

“I fully understand the importance and the need for governments to counter terrorism and terrorist propaganda through security legislation. However, it is necessary that any new security norms will not hinder or undermine the work of journalists or impact the freedom of expression and access to information,” said Désir.

The Representative drew attention to Clause 2 of the Bill, regarding the ‘publication, by a person, of an image of an item of clothing or an article in such a way as to arouse reasonable suspicion that the person is a member or supporter of a proscribed organization’.

“I recommend that the UK government adopt more narrow definitions to ensure that journalistic work in particular will not fall within the scope of this provision, including that ‘reasonable suspicion of being a member or supporter of a proscribed organization’ is more clearly defined,” said Désir. “As it stands, the law could have an impact on the freedom of the media. I am concerned that the provision has the potential to criminalize a too broad range of behaviour, and risks creating a chilling effect on journalistic freedom to report on the concerned organization.”

Désir expressed reservations regarding Clause 3, related to obtaining or viewing proscribed material online, noting that, while an excuse defence is included in the bill, this clause could criminalize too broadly the searching of material, including for journalistic purposes or other research.

The Representative also conveyed his concerns regarding the expansion of border control powers to obtain evidence. “New powers to search and question individuals entering the UK should include a specific provision which respects the protection of confidential journalistic sources. Any new powers must be governed by strict and independent judicial oversight along with adequate safeguards against their abuse,” said Désir.

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VIENNA, 28 September 2018 – A genuine willingness is required if a full sustainable ceasefire is to be achieved in eastern Ukraine, the Chief Monitor of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), Ertugrul Apakan, said in his address to the OSCE Permanent Council in Vienna yesterday.

The Chief Monitor pointed out that there had been three attempts to cease fire through seasonal recommitments since the beginning of the year, the latest happening on 29 August. Although initially resulting in a decrease in the level of recorded violence, each attempt invariably failed as weapons remained in place and little progress was made on the disengagement of forces and hardware.

“Commitments already made have to be translated into concrete action on the ground,” the Ambassador said.

Meanwhile, Apakan said, civilians continue to be killed and injured, and infrastructure providing gas, electricity and water – upon which civilians on both sides of the contact line depend – remains vulnerable. With the support of the SMM, long-stalled repairs were finally made possible on a number of key infrastructure facilities, benefitting hundreds of thousands of people.

“Local solutions only work in the short term,” Apakan said. “Political will is needed to find more long-lasting solutions.”

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397712 Karen Gainer Marina Živaljević

Considering the Regional Youth Co-operation Office (RYCO) as a key partner for promoting the spirit of reconciliation among the region’s youth, the OSCE Mission to Montenegro, with the RYCO Local Branch Office, organized a three-day capacity-building training for 23 potential RYCO applicants between 25 and 28 September 2018.

Opening the workshop, Deputy Head of the OSCE Mission to Montenegro Siv-Katrine Leirtroe said: “We see RYCO as very important because it works on enhancing youth mobility and social inclusion. This is crucial for the future of young people as this is their chance to change the view on their neighbours through the opportunities that the RYCO offers to them.”

RYCO Local Branch Officer in Montenegro, Edin Koljenović, said: “This training course was created as a result of the recognition of the clear need to work on strengthening the capacity of non-governmental organizations and high schools to write project proposals.”

Praising the results achieved by the RYCO in its first year of operation, the General Director for Youth in the Ministry of Sports and member of the RYCO Steering Board Nenad Koprivica said that the Government of Montenegro supports the establishment and functioning of RYCO and its local office in Podgorica. Montenegro was the first country in the Western Balkans to meet all conditions provided by the Agreement on the establishment of an RYCO local office.

RYCO was founded in 2016 at the Western Balkans Sixth Summit in Paris as an independent institutional mechanism to promote the spirit of reconciliation and co-operation among youth in the region through exchange programmes.

NEW YORK, 28 September 2018 - The first-ever memorandum of understanding between the OSCE and the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN Women) was signed on 27 September by OSCE Secretary General Thomas Greminger and UN Women Deputy Executive Director Yannick Glemarec.

”Gender equality is a prerequisite to achieving comprehensive security, and we need to combine our forces to fight gender inequality in all dimensions of security,” said OSCE Secretary General Thomas Greminger. “We have always highly valued our co-operation with UN Women.”

The Memorandum of Understanding provides a strong framework for co-operation between the organizations to address key gender equality challenges in the OSCE region, including at the national level between OSCE field operations and UN Women Country Offices.

It aims to improve information sharing and the seeking of synergies, but also to facilitate the exchange of knowledge, good practices and lessons learned, in order to support OSCE participating States in implementing their international commitments to promote gender equality.  

“UN Women and the OSCE are strong allies in the pursuit of a safer and more just world for women globally. We are confident that today’s signature will lead to a fruitful cooperation,” said UN Women Deputy Executive Director Yannick Glemarec.

Eleven joint areas of work are included in the memorandum of understanding, ranging from the implementation of the women, peace and security agenda to ending violence against women and girls, combating trafficking in human beings, especially women and girls, and preventing violent extremism and countering terrorism.

It also includes joint efforts to advocate for achieving gender parity in the UN system and the OSCE, and building capacity for gender mainstreaming in all sectors relevant to politico-military, economic and environmental and human dimensions of security.   

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397673 Communication and Media Relations Section OSCE Guidebook Intelligence-Led Policing

The Arabic version of the OSCE Guidebook on Intelligence-Led Policing was published in Vienna on 28 September 2018.

A launching event of the Arabic version will be jointly organized between the OSCE and the League of Arab States in its Headquarters in Cairo on 14 November 2018.

The guidebook, first published in English in July 2017, presents intelligence-led policing (ILP) as a modern and proactive law enforcement model and a realistic alternative for OSCE participating States to traditionally reactive forms of policing.

It aims to promote a common understanding of the terminology related to criminal intelligence, thereby enhancing trust, co-operation and sharing of information between agencies and countries.

ILP, which has already been adopted in a number of countries in recent years with promising results, combines intelligence gathering, evaluation and analysis with informed decision-making procedures and mechanisms, therefore providing more efficient and effective management of national law enforcement services.

The Arabic translation follows the Albanian, Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian and Macedonian versions of the handbook, which were published in September 2017, and a Russian version published in November of that year. 

NEW YORK CITY, United States of America, 27 September 2018 – The Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group (Igor Popov of the Russian Federation, Stephane Visconti of France, and Andrew Schofer of the United States of America) met separately and jointly with the Foreign Minister of Armenia, Zohrab Mnatsakanyan, and the Foreign Minister of Azerbaijan, Elmar Mammadyarov, between 25 and 27 September on the margins of the UN General Assembly.  The Co-Chairs were joined in their meetings by the Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office, Andrzej Kasprzyk.  They also met with the OSCE Secretary General, UN Under-Secretary General for Political Affairs, and a representative of the Italian OSCE Chairmanship.

The Ministers continued negotiations on the peaceful settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

The Co-Chairs and the Ministers discussed the situation in the region and sought clarification with respect to several recent statements and incidents of concern.  The Co-Chairs expressed deep regret over the continuing and unnecessary loss of life.  They cautioned the Ministers about the dangers of escalation, called on the parties to engage constructively in a positive atmosphere, and to avoid inflammatory rhetoric.  The Co-Chairs underscored that a comprehensive settlement will require compromises on all sides.

In this context, the Ministers confirmed the importance of taking measures to intensify the negotiation process and to take additional steps to reduce tensions.  The Ministers agreed to meet again before the end of the year.

The Co-Chairs plan to visit the region in the near future and will then brief the OSCE Minsk Group and the Permanent Council on the status of negotiations.

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VIENNA, 27 September 2018 – Yesterday's attack on another investigative journalist in Bulgaria is unacceptable, the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, said in Vienna today.

Dimitar Varbanov, of the television show “Gospodari na Efira” (Lords of the Airwaves), was severely beaten in Veliko Tarnovo on 26 September by several assailants working at the warehouse which he had investigated. The journalist, who was investigating the sale of expired products, sustained several injuries and was hospitalized.

“Investigative journalists carry out an important and dangerous duty of informing society on issues of public interest, often risking their health, and sometimes their lives, in the search for truth. Perpetrators of this attack must be identified and face justice. The journalists must be protected from such unacceptable violence,” Désir said.

The Representative noted the reaction by the Prime Minister of Bulgaria, Boyko Borissov, who reportedly commented on this case earlier today, saying that “the bullies must be punished with the full force of the law.”

The Representative recently condemned the attack on Khristo Geshov, producer of the ‘Targeted’ television programme  (see: https://www.osce.org/representative-on-freedom-of-media/381145) and threats against Georgi Ezekiev of Zov News  (see: https://www.osce.org/fom/358966).

He also wrote to the authorities regarding the detention of investigative journalists Dimitar Stoyanov of Bivol and Atilla Biro of Rise Romania.

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom.

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This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region, compared with the previous reporting period. The SMM observed impact sites in Horlivka. The SMM recorded an explosion inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area. The Mission’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas; it was also restricted again near Zaichenko.* The SMM observed weapons in violation of agreed withdrawal lines in Bezimenne. The SMM observed long queues of civilians travelling across the contact line at the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge. The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station. It also facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs and maintenance to the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne, to the Krasnohorivka gas distribution station between Marinka and Oleksandrivka and to water infrastructure in Stanytsia Luhanska and near Artema, as well as demining in Pishchane.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations[1], including, however, fewer explosions (about 90), compared with the previous reporting period (about 100).           

On the evening of 25 September, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 12 undetermined explosions and about 115 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 2-5km south-west and south.

On the evening and night of 25-26 September, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded four undetermined explosions, a muzzle flash and 16 projectiles in flight (mostly from north-north-west to south-south-east), all 0.5-4km south, south-south-west and south-west.

On the evening and night of 25-26 September, the SMM camera 1.5km north-east of Hnutove (government-controlled, 20km north-east of Mariupol) recorded five undetermined explosions and about 150 projectiles in flight (mostly from north to south), all 2-4km east-north-east and east.

On the evening and night of 25-26 September, the SMM camera in Krasnohorivka (government-controlled, 21km west of Donetsk) recorded about 30 projectiles in flight (mostly from north-north-west to south-south-east) 2-4km south-east and south-south-east as well as a muzzle flesh 2-4km south-south-west.

During the day on 26 September, positioned about 1km north-west of the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard three undetermined explosions and about 40 shots and bursts of small-arms fire, all 1-4km north, south-west and west.

Positioned on the north-western outskirts of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard about 30 undetermined explosions and about 40 bursts and shots of small-arms and heavy-machine-gun fire, all 1-4km north, west, north-west and north-north-west.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including two explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (34 explosions).

During the day on 26 September, positioned 2km south-east of Muratove (government-controlled, 51km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard an undetermined explosion 7-9km south-east.

The SMM observed impact sites in Horlivka. At 13 Nansena Street in Horlivka’s Shakhta Haharina neighbourhood, the SMM saw shrapnel damage to the west-north-west-facing outer wall of a two-storey apartment building. The SMM also saw a west-north-west-facing shattered window on the second floor of the same building. The SMM saw a crater in a yard about 25m west-south-west of a two-storey apartment building at 11 Nansena Street. The SMM could not assess the weapon used or direction of fire. A group of residents in the same area (two women and four men) told the SMM that shelling had occurred in the early morning hours of 23 September.

The SMM continued to monitor and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske[2] (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

During the day on 26 September, positioned about 250m south-east of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM heard an undetermined explosion 300-500m north-east (assessed as inside the disengagement area). Positioned about 1km south-east of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM heard three shots of small-arms fire 300-500m north-east (unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area) and four shots of small-arms fire 2-3km north-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

Positioned near the Petrivske and Zolote disengagement areas, the SMM observed a calm situation.  

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in a non-government-controlled area, on 26 September, an SMM mid-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted five tanks (three T-64 and two T-72) in Bezimenne (30km east of Mariupol).

The SMM revisited a permanent storage site in an area outside government control in Luhansk region, whose location was beyond the respective withdrawal lines, and noted that five tanks (three T-64 and two T-72) continued to be missing.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicle[3] and other indications of military presence in the security zone. In a government-controlled area, on 26 September, an SMM long-range UAV spotted three armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-2) about 1km west of Shumy (41km north of Donetsk) and  an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (MT-LB) near Oleksandro-Kalynove (47km north of Donetsk). On 26 September, the SMM saw an APC near Novotroitske (36km south-west of Donetsk) and an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) in Orikhove-Donetske (44km north-west of Luhansk).

In non-government-controlled areas, on 24 September, an SMM mini-UAV spotted an armoured recovery vehicle (BTS-4A), an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) and two amphibious transporters (PTS-2) in a compound in Luhansk city. At an airfield in the south-eastern outskirts of Luhansk city, the same UAV spotted a recently flattened field surrounded by berms, assessed as a newly built shooting range and part of a training area (inside the security zone). At about 100m south-east of the shooting range, the SMM UAV also spotted a man, assessed as a member of the armed formations.   

While conducting an SMM mid-range UAV flight near Orikhove (government-controlled, 57km north-west of Luhansk) the SMM saw, in a field approximately 200m south of its position, a group of five people wearing balaclavas and unidentified uniforms (two of them had a flag of the United Kingdom attached to the arm), launching an unmarked UAV flight. The SMM saw that they recalled the UAV after about a minute. The same group of people approached the SMM and asked in Russian to see identification of the SMM patrol members. The SMM did not comply with the request. About an hour later, at the same location, the SMM observed an unmarked UAV flying north to south at an altitude of about 300m above the SMM’s position.

The SMM observed the presence of mines. On 22 September, an SMM mid-range UAV again spotted at least 300 anti-tank mines (AT-62) in a field about 4km south-east of Nelipivka (government-controlled, 40km north-east of Donetsk). (See SMM Daily Report of 17 July 2018.)

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential infrastructure, including demining, to the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne (government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk) and Horlivka, and to the Krasnohorivka gas distribution station between Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) and Oleksandrivka (non-government-controlled, 20km south-west of Donetsk). The SMM saw that a demining team had removed anti-tank mines from an area between road H15 and the entrance to the Krasnohorivka gas distribution station. The Mission also facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to water infrastructure in Stanytsia Luhanska and near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk). The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire. A representative of the State Emergency Services of Ukraine told the SMM that demining activities in Pishchane (government-controlled, 22km north of Luhansk) were completed on 26 September.

The SMM continued to monitor the situation of civilians travelling across the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge. On 26 September, at a checkpoint of the armed formations south of the bridge, at 09:45 the SMM saw about 1,200 people queuing to travel towards government-controlled areas and about 50 people queuing in the opposite direction. Approximately two hours later, the SMM saw about 1,000 people queuing to travel towards government-controlled areas and about 50 people queuing in the opposite direction.

The SMM visited a border area outside of government control. While at a border crossing point near Marynivka (78km east of Donetsk) for 50 minutes, the SMM saw 18 cars (five with Ukrainian, six with Russian Federation and seven with “DPR” plates), ten covered cargo trucks (five with Ukrainian licence plates and five with “DPR” plates), two minibuses (one with Ukrainian licence plates and one with “DPR” plates) and a bus with “DPR” plates exiting Ukraine. The SMM saw 16 cars (five with Ukrainian, six with Russian Federation and five with “DPR” plates) and a covered cargo truck with Russian Federation licence plates entering Ukraine.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 25 September 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a checkpoint north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), two members of the armed formations (one visibly armed) again stopped the SMM and denied it passage westward to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol) and southward to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), citing “orders from their superior” and “poor road conditions”.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC. [4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.
• At a checkpoint of the armed formations on the southern side of the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations told the SMM that mines had not been cleared on the road leading north toward Shchastia. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[2] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[3] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC withdrew from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

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This report is for the general public and the media. 

SUMMARY

On 27 September at 06:33 (Moscow time), the seventy-ninth[1] Russian convoy arrived at the Donetsk Border Crossing Point (BCP). A total of 16 vehicles were checked by Russian Federation border guards and customs officers prior to their crossing into Ukraine. All 16 vehicles had crossed back into the Russian Federation by 14:01 on 27 September.

DETAIL

Leaving the Russian Federation

On 27 September at 06:33, the Observer Mission observed the arrival of a Russian convoy at the gate of the Donetsk BCP. A Russian Ministry of Emergency Situations (MES) team co-ordinated and led the movements of the convoy. The convoy consisted of ten cargo trucks and six support vehicles, including one ambulance. Five out of ten cargo trucks bore the inscription “Humanitarian help from the Russian Federation” (in Russian). The ambulance bore the inscription “Don Rescue Centre” (in Russian).

At 06:33 the vehicles entered the customs control area and queued in three lines. Once the convoy arrived, the vehicles were visually checked from the outside by Russian Federation border guards and customs officers. The Russian MES staff rolled up/opened the tarpaulins of the trucks and the border guards and customs officials performed a visual observation from the outside.

Three Ukrainian border guards and one customs officer were observed accompanying their Russian counterparts; they also performed a visual observation of the vehicles from the outside (without entering the trucks’ cargo space). They had clipboards in their hands and were taking notes. One service dog was present during the procedure. By 06:47 all of the vehicles had left the BCP towards Ukraine.

Returning to the Russian Federation

At 13:49 the convoy returned and queued in the customs area. The tarpaulins of the trucks were opened and Russian Federation border guards and customs officers visually checked the returning convoy from the outside. Ukrainian representatives – three border guards and two customs officers – were present during this check. The Ukrainian officials also performed visual checks of the opened trucks from the outside. By 14:01 all 16 vehicles had crossed back into the Russian Federation.

[1]According to the statement of the Russian Federation officials, this convoy is considered to be the eighty-first Russian convoy which was sent to Ukraine. As two of these convoys did not cross through the “Donetsk” or “Gukovo” BCPs, the Observer Mission did not record them. Hence, based on the Observer Mission’s counting, this convoy is considered the seventy-ninth convoy that has crossed into Ukraine.

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397628 Željka Šulc

The OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) presented its spot report on the implementation of the National War Crimes Processing Strategy in Sarajevo on 27 September 2018.

The report, “Observations on the National War Crimes Processing Strategy and its 2018 Draft Revisions, including its relation to the Rules of the Road Category A cases”, reviews the progress achieved by the BiH judiciary since the introduction of the National War Crimes Processing Strategy in 2008 and identifies challenges and obstacles in its implementation that the Revised Strategy aims to address. 

The OSCE Mission to BiH urged the BiH Council of Ministers to adopt the Revised National War Crimes Processing Strategy without further delay. “While delivering justice and ending impunity for these terrible crimes will continue to require a great deal of effort by the entire justice sector, it also requires political will and support. This support should come from ordinary citizens as well as the highest levels of government,” said the Head of the OSCE Mission to BiH, Bruce G. Berton.

The Revised National War Crimes Processing Strategy addresses the challenges that remain in ensuring that these cases are processed efficiently. By building on the progress achieved since the adoption of the original strategy, it will help secure justice for war crimes victims and will support the country as it moves forward towards reconciliation and lasting peace. 

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, compared with the previous reporting period. The SMM heard ceasefire violations near the Zolote disengagement area. The Mission’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas; it was also restricted in Pikuzy and Kozatske.* The SMM observed weapons in violation of agreed withdrawal lines in Dyliivka and Kalynove. The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station. It also facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs and maintenance works to the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne, water pipelines near Maiorsk and Horlivka, the Krasnohorivka gas distribution station between Marinka and Oleksandrivka, and water infrastructure in Slovianoserbsk and near Artema, as well as to enable demining in Pishchane. The SMM observed a calm situation at the ABL near Chonhar in Kherson region.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations[1], including, however, a similar number of explosions (about 100), compared with the previous reporting period.           

On the evening and night of 24-25 September, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded three undetermined explosions, a muzzle flash and 54 projectiles in flight (mostly from west to east), all 1-2km south-south-east, south and south-south-west, including a projectile that was fired 430m south-south-west, which passed as close as 10m below the SMM camera.

On the evening of 24 September, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 18 undetermined explosions and about 115 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 2-6km south-east, south and west-south-west.

On the evening and night of 24-25 September, the SMM camera 1.5km north-east of Hnutove (government-controlled, 20km north-east of Mariupol) recorded two undetermined explosions and about 165 projectiles in flight (just over half from north to south and the remainder from south to north) and a muzzle flash, all 2-4km east-north-east and east.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including 34 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (11 explosions).

On the evening and night of 24-25 September, the SMM camera in Kriakivka (government-controlled, 38km north-west of Luhansk) recorded two undetermined explosions and 34 projectiles in flight (about half from north-east to south-west and half from south-west to north-east), all 2-5km east-south-east and south-east.

The SMM continued to monitor and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske[2] (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

Positioned in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard seven outgoing explosions of recoilless-gun (SPG-9, 73mm), 15 shots of automatic grenade-launcher fire and 35 shots of small-arms fire, all 1-1.5km north-west (assessed as outside the disengagement area). Shortly thereafter, positioned in Zolote-4/Rodina (government-controlled, 59km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard three undetermined explosions 2km south-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas, on 24 September, an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted four towed howitzers (D-20, 152mm) near Dyliivka (49km north of Donetsk).

In violation of withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas, on 24 September, an SMM long-range UAV spotted a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10) near Kalynove (60km west of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in government-controlled areas, on 24 September, an SMM mini-UAV spotted two surface-to-air missile systems (9K37) and 16 missiles (9M317) loaded on railway cars in Mariupol (102km south of Donetsk). On 25 September, on the outskirts of Kostiantynivka (60km north of Donetsk), the SMM saw two surface-to-air missile systems (9K37) and four more surface-to-air missile systems (9K37) at the railway station in Kostiantynivka.  

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles (ACV), anti-aircraft guns[3] and other indications of military presence in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 23 September, an SMM mini-UAV spotted two armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-2) near Staryi Aidar (20km north-west of Luhansk). On 24 September, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) mounted on a truck near Ozarianivka (formerly Pershe Travnia, 52km north of Donetsk) and an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) mounted on a truck near Bila Hora (54km north of Donetsk). On 25 September, the SMM saw an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BTR-4) near Kamianka (20km north of Donetsk).

On 24 September, an SMM mini-UAV spotted five Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel standing next to a building with a Ukrainian flag, speaking to eight civilians in a residential area east of Zolote-4/Rodina. Nearby, the same UAV spotted a 50m-long trench, which six Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel were digging in the backyards of two residential houses, as well as another 20m-long new trench 250m east, also in the backyard of a residential house. The same UAV also spotted a new military position on a ridge with five Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel present near Zolote 4/Rodina, at a location where an SMM mid-range UAV had spotted two recoilless guns and four Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel two days prior (see SMM Daily Report 24 September 2018). While conducting the UAV flight, the SMM heard approximately 15 shots of small-arms fire 1-2.5km east of Zolote-4/Rodina. Footage from the SMM mini-UAV shows a Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier firing a shot of small-arms fire in the direction of the UAV.

On 24 September, in Hranitne (government-controlled, 60km south of Donetsk), an SMM mini-UAV spotted three firing positions on the roof of a building about 50m north-west of a functional school across the street. Near the school, the same UAV spotted four persons in camouflage clothing, assessed as Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers, one of whom was armed with a long-barreled weapon.

In non-government-controlled areas, on 24 September, an SMM long-range UAV spotted five IFVs (BMP-1) and an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (probable MT-LB) near Sokilnyky (38km north-west of Luhansk) and five IFVs (BMP variants) near Kalynove.

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential infrastructure, including water pipelines between the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk) and Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), as well as to enable repairs at the Krasnohorivka gas distribution station between Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) and Oleksandrivka (non-government-controlled, 20km south-west of Donetsk), where works were interrupted due to ceasefire violations (see table below for ceasefire violations in the area), and demining at and repairs to the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne (government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk) and Horlivka. The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire.

The Mission also facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to water infrastructure in Slovianoserbsk (non-government-controlled, 28km north-west of Luhansk) and near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), as well as demining in Pishchane (government-controlled, 22km north of Luhansk).

In Kherson region, on 24 September, the SMM monitored the ABL at the checkpoint near Chonhar (163km south-east of Kherson) and observed both vehicular and pedestrian traffic traveling in both directions, without delays.

The SMM continued monitoring in Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 25 September 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• In Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol), five members of the armed formations (two visibly armed) denied passage to the SMM to proceed to an abandoned school in the village, citing risks to the “security and safety of the SMM patrol and scattered UXO around the school area.”
• At a checkpoint in Kozatske (non-government-controlled, 36km north-east of Mariupol), two members of the armed formations (one visibly armed) denied the SMM passage towards Porokhnia (non-government-controlled, 40km north-east of Mariupol), citing orders not to allow the SMM to pass through the checkpoint.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC. [4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

Other impediments:

• In Perevalsk (non-government-controlled, 38km west of Luhansk), a representative of the “city administration” told the SMM that it needed permission from the armed formations in order to gather information.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[2] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[3] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC withdrew from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

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VIENNA, 26 September 2018 – OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, today said he had taken note of the resolution by the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, which aims at improving judicial practice in cases of alleged online extremist content.

At its plenary session on 20 September 2018, the Supreme Court introduced amendments complementing its own Decree “On Judicial Practice in Criminal Cases on Crimes of an Extremist Nature” of June 2011. The amendments suggest to the courts to carefully distinguish between crimes of extremist nature and publicly harmless offences. The Supreme Court also underlined that restrictions must be based on narrowly-defined evidence, while simple posting or re-posting of online content, including content that may contain signs of criminal activity but has no direct intent and/or purpose of inciting hatred or enmity, should not be qualified as extremism.

“This decision goes in the right direction and will, hopefully, prevent citizens of the Russian Federation from being unduly prosecuted,” Désir said. “This is why I call on the authorities to continue further on this path and follow the recommendations made by the Presidential Council on the Development of Civil Society and Human Rights regarding the improvement of legislation on countering extremism and the practice of its application. Any restrictions on expression must be carefully applied and based on legality, necessity and the legitimacy of the objective.”

Earlier, on a number of occasions, the Representative has raised his concern with the authorities regarding the problematic trend noted by his Office in recent years of disproportionate responses to online expressions in the country on the basis of countering extremism.

“While fully respecting the need to address security concerns in the OSCE region, I would like to reiterate my call on the authorities to reform the legislation on countering extremism and ensure that the need to protect public safety and order do not conflict with the fundamental human right to freedom of expression,” Désir said.

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom.

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Colin McCullough, OSCE Programme Office in Astana

An OSCE-supported three-day training seminar on climate change adaptation measures concluded on 26 September 2018 in Almaty.

The event was organized by the OSCE Programme Office in Astana in partnership with the Kazakh-German University and the Regional Environmental Centre for Central Asia for some 35 officials and decision makers from Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan responsible for water management at the national level.

The training seminar was a follow-up to an earlier event of the Central Asia Leadership Programme that aimed to strengthen capacities of young leaders in the context of the changing climate.

Participants learned best practices in using financial instruments to foster environmentally sound investments through legal and governance mechanisms and identified local challenges in implementing the Paris Climate Agreement. The training also focussed on the effects of climate change globally and in the Central Asia context and advanced climate change mitigation measures.

This event is an example of the regional co-operation in the environmental governance sector and falls in line with the 2003 Maastricht Ministerial Council decision on the OSCE Strategy Document for Economic and Environmental Dimension, which emphasizes the importance of promoting sustainable development and addressing environmental degradation in the host country. 

CHISINAU / BOLZANO, Italy, 26 September 2018 - Best practices for developing and implementing bilingual and multilingual education programmes and curricula were the focus of a three-day study visit by a group of representatives from Moldova’s state and civil society institutions to the Autonomous Province of Alto Adige/South Tyrol in northern Italy, which concluded today. The visit was organized by the OSCE Mission to Moldova and the Office of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) with the support of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Italian Embassy in Moldova.

The study group, led by Moldova’s Minister of Education, Culture and Research, Monica Babuc, included representatives from the Executive Committee of the Autonomous Territorial Unit (ATU) of Gagauzia, Taraclia District Council, as well as the National Association of European Trainers in Moldova (ANTEM).  

In meetings with senior officials of the Provincial Government of Alto Adige/South Tyrol and local minority rights and linguistic experts, the Moldovan delegation learned about Alto Adige/South Tyrol’s successes in developing and implementing multilingual education programmes and language testing criteria. The province is home to three language communities –Italian, German and Ladin, a minority community with a language spoken by five percent of the population. While Italian and German can both be used for official purposes, all three languages of instruction are used in the education system of Ladin-speaking communities.

Upon the conclusion of the visit, the Head of the OSCE Mission to Moldova, Claus Neukirch, expressed his hope that the experiences gained during the trip will translate into policies that promote multilingual education and send a strong signal for a truly inclusive Moldovan society. “Effective multilingual education contributes to making diversity a tangible strength,” he said.

"Although the national linguistic legislation is permissive enough, there are still challenges in promoting state and minority languages in the education system. I hope very much that Alto Adige/South Tyrol 's experience will help us overcome these challenges and take relevant examples to promote multilingualism and sustainable language policies at national  level," said Minister Babuc.

"We look towards Alto Adige/South Tyrol's economic development and language policies as we promote the Gagauz language and build our knowledge of the state language for our own development," said Deputy Chairperson of ATU Gagauzia Olesea Tanasoglo.

Since 2017, the OSCE Mission to Moldova and HCNM are supporting the Government of Moldova in implementing an action plan for the National Strategy on the Consolidation of Interethnic Relations, elaborated with the support from HCNM. The action plan foresees the development of state policies on national minorities’ access to teaching of the state language and to education in minority languages. Under the direction of the Ministry of Education, Culture and Research, these language-related policies will benefit minority groups in Moldova, including those of the ATU Gagauzia and Taraclia. According to the 1994 law On the Special Legal Status of Gagauzia, the state language, Gagauz and Russian are the official languages of the autonomy. However, multilingual education institutions in Gagauzia are few.

In recent years, the HCNM has been facilitating bilingual education in state language and Gagauz at pre-school institutions in Gagauzia through ANTEM, and has funded programmes for teaching civil servants the state language nationwide. This year, the OSCE is supporting the Government’s efforts to take over the responsibility of promoting bilingual education through implementing the action plan.

The study trip is a follow-up to last year’s visit to the Autonomous Province of Alto Adige/South Tyrol, during which representatives from the Executive Committee of Gagauzia and the People’s Assembly of Gagauzia gained an insight into the province’s competencies and its methods of communicating with the central authorities. 

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MINSK, 26 September 2018 – How to utilize the Internet in preventing and countering terrorism, including the financing of terrorism, is the focus of a high-level international conference for foreign ministers and senior representatives of OSCE participating States and Partners for Co-operation taking place in Minsk, Belarus on 9 and 10 October 2018.

The conference, organized by the Foreign Ministry of Belarus and the Transnational Threats Department of the OSCE Secretariat, will take stock of developments of the actions against terrorism by OSCE participating States and OSCE Partners for Co-operation in the digital age.

Participants will exchange national experiences and perspectives on recent trends and measures, and discuss challenges, responses and best practices on how to prevent and counter the misuse of the Internet by violent extremists and terrorists, while respecting fundamental rights and freedoms.

The discussions will focus on the legal framework for addressing terrorism, fostering public-private-partnerships in identifying and detecting the movement of terrorists, preventing and suppressing the financing of terrorism, and protecting critical infrastructure.

The conference will be opened by Minister of Foreign Affairs of Belarus Vladimir Makei; OSCE Secretary General Thomas Greminger; Under-Secretary-General of the UN and Head of the UN Counter-Terrorism Office Vladimir Voronkov; and Executive Director of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime Yuri Fedotov.

Media representatives are invited to cover the opening of the conference starting at 14:30, 9 October 2018, as well as the closing session on 10 October, at the President Hotel, Kirova Street 18, Minsk, 220030.

Media representatives wishing to attend must apply for accreditation directly with the Foreign Ministry of Belarus. Details of the accreditation procedure can be found on the Ministry’s website here: http://mfa.gov.by/en/press/news_mfa/cfa0d19d31071259.html

Please note that the Foreign Ministry of Belarus will accept accreditation requests by representatives of foreign media up to and including 3 October 2018.

For further information, please contact:

Lyubov Mayorova
MFA Belarus
Department of  Information and Digital Diplomacy
tel. +(375 17) 327 51 54
e-mail: press@mfa.gov.by

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KYIV, 26 September 2018 – Principal Deputy Chief Monitor of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine Alexander Hug will hold his regular news briefing on Thursday, 27 September, in Kyiv.

He will talk about the security situation throughout Ukraine and the Mission’s recent activities.

Journalists are invited to attend the news briefing tomorrow, 27 September, at 13:30 (Kyiv time), at the Glavkom Press Centre, 8/20 Shovkovychna Street.

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This report is for the media and the general public.

SUMMARY

Kamensk-Shakhtinskiy, Russian Federation. The Observer Mission (OM) continues to operate 24/7 at both Border Crossing Points (BCPs). The overall number of border crossings by persons slightly increased at both BCPs compared to the previous week.

OPERATIONAL REMARKS

The OM is currently operating with 22 permanent international staff members, including the Chief Observer (CO). The Mission is supported administratively by a Vienna-based staff member.

OBSERVATIONS AT THE BORDER CROSSING POINTS

Persons crossing the border                                                                                                                                                                        

The profile of the people crossing the border can be categorized as follows:

1. Adults travelling on foot or by car with little or no luggage;
2. Persons in military-style outfits;
3. Families (often including elderly people and/or children) travelling on foot or by car with a significant amount of luggage.

The average number of entries/exits slightly increased from 10,798 to 10,836 per day at both BCPs compared to last week[1].

During the reporting period, the majority of border crossings were to Ukraine, with an average net flow of minus 56 for both BCPs.

The Donetsk BCP continued to experience more traffic than the Gukovo BCP.

Persons in military-style outfits

During the reporting period, the number of persons in military-style outfits crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs remained the same (26 persons like last week); 11 of them crossed into the Russian Federation, and fifteen into Ukraine (77 per cent of this category’s crossings occurred at the Donetsk BCP). They continued to cross the border individually or in groups. Most individuals crossed on foot, however, some made use of private vehicles, buses or minivans, making it more difficult for the observer teams (OTs) to observe their movement across the border, especially since some of the private vehicles have tinted windows, and buses and minivans have drawn curtains.

Families with a significant amount of luggage

The OTs continued to report on families crossing the border, sometimes with elderly people and/or children, at both BCPs with a significant amount of luggage, or travelling in heavily loaded cars. During this reporting week, six families were observed crossing into the Russian Federation and four were observed crossing into Ukraine, compared to the previous reporting period when seven families were observed crossing the border into the Russian Federation and six into Ukraine.

Bus connections                                         

Regular local and long-distance bus connections continued to operate between Ukraine (mostly from/to the Luhansk region) and the Russian Federation. In addition to regular bus connections, the OTs continued to observe bus connections on irregular routes. Often the buses do not state their route; instead they have a sign on the windshield stating “irregular”.

During the reporting period, the OTs observed a decrease in the overall number of buses crossing the border at both BCPs (391 compared to 425 observed during the previous week). There were 201 buses bound for the Russian Federation and 190 bound for Ukraine.

Among the bus connections observed by the OTs, the following “irregular” routes or destinations were noted: Kyiv; Luhansk-Kharkiv; Luhansk-Kharkiv-Kyiv; Luhansk-Kyiv-Moscow; Luhansk-Sevastopol; Pervomaisk -Kyiv; Rovenky- Kyiv.

On some occasions, the OTs noticed the bus drivers removing the itinerary signs from the windshields of their buses, while some buses do not display their route at all. The majority of long-distance buses commuting between the Luhansk region and cities in the Russian Federation have Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region.

Trucks

During the reporting period, the OM observed an increase in the overall number of trucks crossing the border in both directions and at both BCPs. Compared to the previous week, the total number of trucks went from 838 to 880 (310 at the Gukovo BCP and 570 at the Donetsk BCP); 509 of these trucks crossed into the Russian Federation and 371 crossed into Ukraine. Most of the trucks observed by the OTs had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region.                                                                                             

Among them, the OTs also continued to observe tanker trucks crossing the border in both directions. During the reporting week, the number of tanker trucks decreased to 75 (compared to 87 during the previous reporting period). These trucks were observed crossing the border at both BCPs. The trucks had the words “Propane” and “Flammable” written across the tanks in either Russian or Ukrainian. The majority of tanker trucks had hazard signs, indicating that they were transporting propane or a mix of propane and butane.

All trucks undergo systematic inspection by Russian Federation officials, which may include an X-ray check. Due to the unfavourable observation position at the Gukovo BCP, the OTs continued to be unable to observe any X-ray checks.

Compared to the previous week, the total number of X-ray checks at the Donetsk BCP increased from 84 to 95: out of the total number of trucks scanned, 72 trucks (76 per cent) were bound for Ukraine; the remaining 23 trucks (24 per cent) crossed into the Russian Federation.

Minivans

The OM continued to observe passenger and cargo minivans[2] crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs. The OTs observed minivans predominantly with Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, the OTs also frequently saw minivans registered in the Russian Federation. Compared to the previous week, the number of cargo minivans increased from 164 to 191 vehicles; 98 crossed into the Russian Federation and another 93 into Ukraine.

Trains

The OTs continued to pick up the sound of trains running on the railway tracks located approximately 150 metres south-west of the Gukovo BCP. During the reporting week, the OTs heard trains on 24 occasions, compared to 25 last week; the OTs assessed that 11 trains were travelling to the Russian Federation and the rest to Ukraine. The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine was regularly informed about the trains bound for Ukraine.

Visual observation was not possible because of the line of trees located between the train tracks and the BCP.

Other observations

The majority of vehicles crossing the border had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region, or Russian Federation licence plates. A significant number of vehicles with “LPR” plates were also observed crossing the border in both directions on a daily basis, as were vehicles with “DPR” plates and with Lithuanian, Georgian and Belarusian licence plates.

On 20 September at 10:06 at the Donetsk BCP, a vehicle, coming from the Russian Federation side, with an inscription and flag of the “National Liberation Movement” (Национально́-освободи́тельное движе́ние - НОД) crossed into Ukraine. The car had  a Russian registration plate and the inscription “To Donbass!” (in Russian).

For trends and figures at a glance covering the period from 28 August to 25 September 2018, please see the attachment here. 

[1] Based on data received from the Regional Representation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation.

[2] Cargo minivans: light commercial vehicles with a maximum authorized mass of more than 3.5 t and not more than 7.5 t; with or without a trailer with a maximum mass of less than 750 kg (small cargo vehicles which correspond to driving licence C1).

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This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region, compared with the previous 24 hours. The SMM corroborated reports of civilian casualties and observed impact sites in Sakhanka. The SMM saw military presence inside the Petrivske and Zolote disengagement areas. The Mission’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas; it was also restricted close to Dovzhanske, near the border with the Russian Federation.* The SMM observed weapons in violation of agreed withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line. The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station. It also facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs and maintenance works to the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne and to water infrastructure in Stanytsia Luhanska, Slovianoserbsk and near Artema, as well as demining in Pishchane. The SMM observed a protest in Odessa and followed up on reports of the explosion of a grenade in Kyiv.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations[1], including about 100 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours (about 110 explosions).   

On the evening and night of 23-24 September, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded nine undetermined explosions and 17 projectiles in flight (mostly from west-north-west to east-south-east), all 1-4.5km south-south-east and south-south-west.

On the evening and night of 23-24 September, the SMM camera 1.5km north-east of Hnutove (government-controlled, 20km north-east of Mariupol) recorded three undetermined explosions and about 110 projectiles in flight (mostly from north-north-west to south-south-east), all 2-4km east-north-east and east.

On the evening of 23 September, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 33 undetermined explosions and about 70 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 1-7km south-east and south.

During the day on 24 September, positioned about 1km north-west of the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 20 undetermined explosions and about 20 shots and bursts of small-arms fire, all 1-6km at westerly directions.

Positioned on the south-western outskirts of Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard seven undetermined explosions 2-6km at southerly directions.

Positioned about 2km south-south-east of Kamianka (government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard eight undetermined explosions and about ten bursts and shots of small-arms fire, all 0.5-5km at southerly and northerly directions.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including, however, fewer explosions (11), compared with the previous 24 hours (16 explosions).

Positioned 2.5km north-west of Mykolaivka (government-controlled, 77km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard five explosions assessed as outgoing rounds of recoilless gun (SPG-9, 73mm) fire and their subsequent impacts, as well as four bursts of small-arms fire, all 1-1.4km south (all assessed as live-fire training outside the security zone).  

The SMM followed up on reports of civilian casualties. On 24 September, at a hospital in Novoazovsk (non-government-controlled, 40km east of Mariupol), the SMM saw a man (aged 50-60) wearing bandages on his chest, legs and arms. He told the SMM that on 23 September at around 9:00, while he had been outside his house in Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol) with his wife, he had heard an explosion nearby, after which he felt pain and sought help (see below). He also said that his wife had been wounded in the same explosion. Medical staff at the same hospital told the SMM that a man (aged 56) and his wife (aged 46) had been admitted to the hospital on 23 September, adding that the man had sustained shrapnel wounds to his legs, chest, arms and lower back and that his wife had sustained shrapnel wounds to her lower leg and arm. Medical staff added that the woman had been discharged the same day.

The SMM observed impact sites in Sakhanka. On 23 September, at 2 Zhovtneva Street, the SMM observed two fresh craters: the first one was in a yard, about 2m north-west of a one-storey house; the second crater was in the same yard, about 6m west of the house. The SMM saw blood stains on the western-facing steps of the front of the house (see above).The SMM assessed that both craters were caused by an automatic grenade launcher round but was unable to assess the direction of fire.

The SMM continued to monitor and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske[2] (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On 22 September, an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted, inside the Petrivske disengagement area, five people, including one digging an extension of a previously observed trench, about 1-2km east of the western edge of the disengagement area (all assessed as Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel).

During the night of 23-24 September, while on the eastern edge of Stanytsia Luhanska, the SMM heard three undetermined explosions 6-10km south-south-west and an undetermined explosion 3-4km west (all assessed as outside the disengagement area).

On 24 September, the SMM saw three armed Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel entering the Zolote disengagement area. On the same day, positioned on the northern edge of Zolote-4/Rodina (government-controlled, 59km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 15 shots of small-arms fire 1-2.5km north (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas, on 23 September, an SMM long-range UAV spotted a towed howitzer (D-20, 152mm) in Dyliivka (49km north of Donetsk) and a self-propelled howitzer (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) near Ozarianivka (52km north of Donetsk).

In violation of withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas, on 23 September, an SMM long-range UAV spotted two self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) near Perevalsk (38km west of Luhansk) and two anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) near Sofiivka (40km north-east of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in government-controlled areas, on 22 September, an SMM long-range UAV spotted a surface-to-air-missile-system (9K33 Osa) near Kalynove (35km north of Donetsk). On 24 September, the SMM saw a surface-to-air missile system (9K37) near Zachativka (74km south-west of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in a non-government-controlled area, on 23 September, an SMM long-range UAV spotted a self-propelled mortar (2S9 Nona-S, 120mm), three tanks (T-64) and three towed mortars (PM-38, 120mm) near Perevalsk (see above).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. In a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region beyond the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM observed two towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm).

The SMM revisited a permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region whose location was beyond the respective withdrawal lines and noted that eight tanks (seven T-72 and one T-64) continued to be missing.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles (ACV), an anti-aircraft gun[3] and other indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 22 September, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted four infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP-1) and two armoured personnel carriers (APC) (BTR-70) near Katerynivka (64km west of Luhansk). On the same day, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an ACV near Taramchuk (29km south-west of Donetsk), a probable ACV near Berezove (31km south-west of Donetsk), an ACV and three IFVs (two BMP-1 and one probable BMP-1) near Starohnativka (51km south of Donetsk), an IFV (a probable BMP-1) near Novohryhorivka (55km south of Donetsk) and an APC (BTR-70) near Chermalyk (77km south of Donetsk). On 23 September, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) near Ozarianivka and an ACV near Troitske (69km west of Luhansk). On 24 September, the SMM saw an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) near Vodiane (24km north-east of Mariupol).

On 22 September, an SMM long-range UAV spotted a 50m-long newly built extension of a previously observed trench near Krasnohorivka (21km west of Donetsk). On 23 September, an SMM long-range UAV spotted a fresh 70m-long trench on the eastern edge of Novooleksandrivka (65km west of Luhansk), assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

In non-government-controlled areas, on 22 September, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an IFV (BMP-1) near Tavrycheske (76km south of Donetsk) and, on 23 September, four IFVs (one BMP-2, two BMP-1 and one undetermined variant), three APCs (MT-LB) and an ACV near Kalynove (60km west of Luhansk); eight APCs (one BTR-80 and seven MT-LB) near Pervomaisk (58km west of Luhansk), as well as an IFV (BMP-1) near Veselohorivka (64km west of Luhansk). On 22 September, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an excavator digging new trenches near Novolaspa (50km south of Donetsk) as well as five APCs (one MT-LB and four BTR undetermined variant) near Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, 50km west of Luhansk) and an IFV (BMP-1) near Yenakiieve (41km north-east of Donetsk).

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential infrastructure. It facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne (government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk) and Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), as well as to water infrastructure in Stanytsia Luhanska, Slovianoserbsk (non-government-controlled, 28km north-west of Luhansk) and near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk). The SMM facilitated access for Vodafone employees from Horlivka to Debaltseve (non-government-controlled, 58km north-east of Donetsk). The SMM also continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire, as well as demining in Pishchane (government-controlled, 22km north of Luhansk) (see SMM Daily Report of 24 September 2018).

The SMM visited two border areas outside of government control.* While at a border crossing point near Novoazovsk (40km east of Mariupol) for 25 minutes, the SMM saw seven cars (two with Ukrainian and three with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as two with “DPR” plates) exiting Ukraine. The SMM saw 12 cars (four with Ukrainian, five with Russian Federation and one with Georgian licence plates, as well as two with “DPR” plates) entering Ukraine.

While at a border crossing point near Dovzhanske (84km south-east of Luhansk) for 20 minutes, the SMM saw a covered cargo truck with “LPR” plates and four cars (three with Russian Federation licence plates and one with “LPR” plates) exiting Ukraine. The SMM saw a bus with Russian Federation licence plates, two cars (one with Ukrainian and one with Russian Federation licence plates) and a pedestrian (man, aged 30-40) entering Ukraine. While present, two members of the armed formations, one of whom was armed, told the SMM to leave the area.*

In Odessa, the SMM saw about 100 people gathered in front of the police headquarters at 12 Yevreiska Street. From there, they moved to the Regional Prosecutor’s Office of Odessa Region at 13 Pushkinska Street, where some of the participants addressed the crowd, denouncing, among other things, the increase in attacks against civil activists. The SMM observed approximately 20 police officers securing the event. After about one and a half hours, the gathering dispersed peacefully. (See SMM Daily Report of 24 September 2018.)

In Kyiv, about 10m west of the entrance of a 12-storey building at 7 Revutskoho Street, the SMM saw a fresh crater in the tarmac road, assessed as caused by the impact of a grenade. The SMM also saw four broken ground-floor windows and one broken window on the first floor. According to media reports, an explosion occurred in the area at about 02:00 on 22 September.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a border crossing point near Dovzhanske, two members of the armed formations, one of whom was armed, told the SMM to leave the area.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.5
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

Conditional:

• At a checkpoint near Novoazovsk, three armed members of the armed formations allowed the SMM to proceed only after conducting a visual inspection of the interior and trunk of the SMM vehicles.

Other impediments:

• An SMM long-range UAV experienced jamming near Smile (non-government-controlled, 31km north-west of Luhansk).[5]

 

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. 

[2] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[3] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC withdrew from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

[5] The interference could have originated from anywhere within the radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position. 

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VIENNA, 25 September 2018 – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, today expressed his concern about the termination of the analogue distribution of public service broadcaster UA:PBC in Ukraine and repeated his call to the authorities to urgently resolve difficulties with funding the broadcaster’s activities.

“Expectations of the public service media to provide reliable, high-quality and informative programming are only possible when it is independent and financially viable,” Désir said.

On 25 September, UA:PBC announced that the Broadcasting, Telecommunications and Television Company of Ukraine had terminated its analogue distribution throughout the country, with the exception of six border regions, because of the broadcaster’s debts. The broadcaster cites significant budget cuts by the state as the main reason for its continuous financial difficulties.

“The important work of a public service broadcaster must not be interrupted at any time, particularly ahead of upcoming presidential and parliamentary elections in Ukraine. A public service broadcaster is vital to ensuring that citizens are informed about election matters, including how to exercise the right to vote and the policy positions of the various parties and candidates contesting the elections,” Désir added.

“It is the responsibility of the state to ensure the continuity of public service broadcasting. I call on the authorities to urgently and fully restore the transmission of the broadcaster’s signal to all regions of the country, and finally secure sufficient funding for its activities.”

Désir also noted concerns of UA:PBC regarding the future of its digital broadcasting due to similar arrears in payment to a digital network operator.

The Representative previously highlighted the public service broadcaster’s problems in November 2017, and urged the Ukrainian authorities to take action (see: https://www.osce.org/fom/357316).

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom.

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