OSCE

398231 Communication and Media Relations Section Giovanni Davoli

Persisting challenges within and beyond the OSCE area with regard to the meaningful participation of women to international peace and security efforts were the focus of discussions at the OSCE-wide conference “Women in the Security Sector: Challenges for the OSCE Area and Beyond”, held in Vienna on 1 October 2018. The event was organized by the Italian OSCE Chairmanship in co-operation with the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and the OSCE Gender section.

A wide range of stakeholders from OSCE participating States, OSCE executive structures and institutions and other international organizations, as well as military personnel, peace-building and politico-military advisers, gender experts, and academics discussed how increasing women’s participation in the security sector makes it more diverse and effective.

“We strongly advocate and support the need for an increased participation of women in the security sector,” said Alessandro Azzoni, Chairperson of the OSCE Permanent Council, in his opening speech. “Women’s participation in military and peace-keeping activities is a force multiplier in operational planning and mission implementation. It also contributes to situational awareness and improves the perception of the peace operation, thus increasing its acceptance by the local population,” he added.

OSCE Secretary General Thomas Greminger said: “Gender equality and women’s rights are essential elements of the OSCE’s concept of comprehensive security. We need further constructive dialogue to advance women in the traditionally male-dominated security sector”.

Despite UN Security Council Resolutions and national action plans addressing and mandating women’s participation in the security sector, it is often discounted or overlooked, both in the field and at the decision-making level. Nevertheless, positive models of inclusivity do exist within the OSCE area and beyond.

"Integrating a gender perspective throughout all ranges of military activities can significantly boost their effectiveness,” said Captain of the Italian Airforce Stefania Palmiero. “The Italian Military Forces are highly committed towards a full implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, peace and security and subsequent resolutions. Over the last few years, gender has been mainstreamed across all levels and branches of the military, reflecting Italy’s traditional focus on responding to the different needs of men, women, boys and girls, especially in military operations."

Within the framework of the Italian OSCE Chairmanship’s effort to further advance the Organization’s efforts in this domain, the conference built on existing OSCE commitments with regard to women’s contribution to international peace and security and the legacy of the former Austrian OSCE Chairmanship.

398318 Anna Vorobeva OSCE Mission to Moldova

More than 25 representatives of the Agency for Interethnic Relations, the Ombudsman’s office and the Council for Preventing and Eliminating Discrimination and Ensuring Equality completed a two-day training course on national minority issues on 2 October 2018 in Chisinau. Organized by the OSCE Mission to Moldova, the course aimed at enhancing the capacity and co-operation among the state actors involved in implementing the National Strategy for Consolidation of Interethnic Relations for 2017‒2027.

Under the guidance of the international expert, Professor Frederick John Packer, Director of the Human Rights Research and Education Centre at the University of Ottawa, the participants discussed international conventions and treaties in the area of national minorities. They also learned about best practices of national minorities’ rights protection employed by international human rights bodies and worked on case studies. During the training course, the representatives of state bodies jointly identified ways to boost co-operation in the field of minority rights protection and elaborated upon a mechanism jointly to identify and address drawbacks in the state policies on national minorities.

“Promotion of interethnic harmony is a way forward to promoting inclusivity and tolerance in societies. Both are important preconditions for achieving the end state of the Transdniestrian settlement process,” the Head of the OSCE Mission to Moldova Claus Neukirch said.

Ian Feldman, President of the Council for Prevention and Elimination of Discrimination and Ensuring Equality, said: “This training is of utmost importance for the Equality Council and other state institutions dealing with the protection of the rights of national and linguistic minorities. It highlights state-of-the-art international standards presented by a well-known international expert and serves as an effective team building exercise.”

Moldova is a home to different ethnic and linguistic groups. According to the 2014 census, out of all people interviewed more than 75 per cent identified themselves as Moldovans, with the rest identifying themselves as Romanians (seven per cent), Ukrainian (6.6 per cent), Gagauz (4.6 per cent), Russians (4.1 per cent), Bulgarian (1.9 per cent), and other ethnic groups (less than one per cent). To promote intercultural dialogue and interethnic harmony in the country, in 2016 the Government adopted the National Strategy for Consolidation of Interethnic Relations, which was developed with the support of the OSCE High Commissioner for National Minorities.

The training course is the first in a series of events planned by the OSCE Mission to Moldova for 2018 to establish a coalition of government actors promoting and protecting the rights of national minorities in Moldova. To this extent, the OSCE Mission to Moldova is facilitating the signing of a Memorandum of Co-operation among the Agency for Interethnic Relations, the Ombudsman’s office and the Council for Preventing and Eliminating Discrimination and Ensuring Equality.

VIENNA, 2 October 2018 – How to advance, streamline and ensure an effective OSCE approach to the non-proliferation of Small arms and light weapons (SALW) and in strengthening the safety and security of Stockpiles of conventional ammunition is the focus of a two-day meeting which opened today in Vienna.

More than 120 representatives of OSCE participating States, Partners for Co-operation and other partnering organizations have gathered for the Biennial Meeting to Assess the Implementation of the OSCE Documents on Small Arms and Light Weapons and Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition.

Opening the meeting, Chairperson of the OSCE Forum for Security Co-operation and Sweden’s Permanent Representative to the OSCE  Ambassador Ulrika Funered said that the issues of SALW proliferation and the stockpile management of conventional ammunition, explosive materials and detonating devices continues to pose serious threats to safety and security in the OSCE region and globally.

“Thousands of people are killed every year with Small arms and light weapons, leading to the deterioration of security, escalation of violence, economic slowdown and affect other factors constituting the framework for regional, national and individual security,” she said.

Nonetheless, she added, it was reassuring to see continuing improvements in efforts to obtain data on the gender aspects of the problem and in mainstreaming gender in relation to SALW.“For too long have we been missing a comprehensive account and approach to the different effects of violence involving the use of Small arms and light weapons on women and men. Equal participation in security and proliferation analyses, negotiations and decision-making processes will increase the legitimacy, quality and effectiveness of our work,” said Ambassador Funered.

Director of the OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre, Ambassador Marcel Peško, further highlighted innovative projects conducted under the OSCE’s Assistance Mechanism where participating States request support and expertise on SALW-related measures.

“The OSCE works on 10 to 12 projects each year, with annual funding of around three million euros,” he said. “Moreover, the demand for assistance is steadily growing. It is a sign of increased confidence in the OSCE’s capability to provide effective and result-oriented support.”

“Most recently, an overarching project on strengthening OSCE action against the illicit proliferation of SALW and Stockpiles of conventional ammunition has been launched. This is designed to assist the participating States in more effective planning, implementing and, where necessary, strengthening of their work in the area of combating the illicit proliferation of weapons as well as excessive accumulation of conventional ammunition, explosive material and detonating devices,” said Ambassador Peško.

Over the course of the meeting participants will examine the outcomes of the UN’s Third Review Conference on the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the illicit trade in SALW in all its aspects and its International Tracing Instrument, which was held from 18 to 29 June 2018 in New York. Later, the objectives of the meeting’s working sessions will be to launch an inventory of the OSCE’s existing tools and seek ways to streamline them to current developments, lessons learned and upgrades, where and if necessary.

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Colin McCullough, OSCE Programme Office in Astana

The implementation of the Aarhus Convention’s principles in Kazakhstan was the focus of an OSCE-supported roundtable discussion held on 2 October 2018 in Astana.

The event was organized by the OSCE Programme Office in Astana, the country’s Energy Ministry and the Information and Analytical Centre of Environment Protection for some 60 representatives from government entities, local Aarhus Centres, environmental NGOs, the private sector and expert community.

Participants discussed a draft concept paper on the Environmental Code, prospects for the national ratification of the Aarhus Convention’s Protocol on Pollutant Release and Transfer Registers as well as the Amendment on Genetically Modified Organisms. They also reviewed the 2018-2020 Aarhus Centres’ development plan for Kazakhstan and outlined current challenges that preclude access to information, public participation in decision-making and access to justice in environmental matters.

The Aarhus Convention is a key UN document adopted in 1998 on access to environmental information, public participation in decision-making and access to justice in environmental matters. Aarhus Centres provide platforms to engage citizens, governments and the private sector in a dialogue on environmental challenges at national and local levels.

The event is part of the Programme Office’s multi-year activities to promote good environmental governance and to assist the host country in meeting its commitments under the Aarhus Convention.

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region between the evenings of 28 and 29 September, compared with the previous reporting period. Between the evenings of 29 and 30 September, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions, compared with the previous 24 hours. The SMM followed up on reports of children killed and injured by an explosion in Horlivka, as well as a person injured and damage caused by an explosion in Donetsk city. The Mission recorded a ceasefire violation inside the Petrivske disengagement area. Its access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas as well as near Zaichenko, Novoazovsk, Tavrycheske, Bezimenne, Yuzhna-Lomuvatka and Izvaryne.* The SMM observed weapons in violation of agreed withdrawal lines in the Petrivske disengagement area and near Dokuchaievsk. The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station and also facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs and maintenance to the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne. The Mission monitored public gatherings in Mariupol, and followed up on reports of water contamination in Makiivka.

In Donetsk region, between the evenings of 28 and 29 September, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations,[1] including, however, more explosions (265), compared with the previous reporting period (about 240 explosions). Between the evenings of 29 and 30 September, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 100 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours.

On the evening and night of 28-29 September, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded a projectile in flight from north to south, 200-400m south-south-west, about 80 explosions (one outgoing, the remainder undetermined) and about 30 projectiles (one from north-west to south-east, the remainder from west to east), all 0.5-3km at southerly directions. On the following evening and night, the same camera recorded 17 explosions (two assessed as impacts, one airburst and the remainder undetermined), about 80 projectiles in flight (mainly from west to east) and six illumination flares, all 0.3-4km at southerly directions

On the evening of 28 September, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard about 50 undetermined explosions and about 60 bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 2-7km at southerly directions. The following evening, from the same location, the SMM heard about 100 undetermined explosions and about 30 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 2-7km at southerly directions.

In Luhansk region, between the evenings of 28 and 29 September, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including six explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (five explosions). Between the evenings of 29 and 30 September, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including, however, about 30 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours.

The SMM followed up on reports of children killed and injured by an explosion in Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk). At a hospital in Horlivka, a doctor told the SMM that on 29 September a ten-year-old boy had been admitted to the hospital with shrapnel injuries (scratches) to his face and abdomen. Also at the hospital, the boy’s grandfather told the SMM he believed the boy had been injured by an explosion from a mine or other explosive device while near a railway station in Horlivka. The doctor, the grandfather and a member of the armed formations in Horlivka, told the SMM separately that three other children had been killed by the same incident. Reportedly, the three killed children were 12, 13 and 14 years old.

The SMM followed up on media reports of civilian casualties and damage caused by an explosion at the office of the “communist party” in non-government-controlled Donetsk city on 29 September. On 30 September, a doctor at Hospital no. 24 in Donetsk city told the SMM that a woman (about 50 years old) had been admitted the previous day with bruises and burns; the SMM saw numerous bruises and red spots on the woman’s back and legs. She told the SMM that on 29 September, after about 13:00, she had been standing in the entrance hall of the building housing the party’s office at 107 Khlibodarna Street in Donetsk city, talking to the head of the party, when she heard an explosion from a lamp directly above her head.

The SMM continued to monitor and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On the evening and night of 28-29 September, while on the eastern edge of Stanytsia Luhanska, the SMM heard ten bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire 2-3km south, assessed as outside the disengagement area. On the evening of 29 September, from the same location, the SMM heard 17 undetermined explosions 5-7km south, assessed as outside the disengagement area. On the evening of 30 September, from the same location, the SMM heard about ten bursts and shots of small-arms fire 3-4km south-south-east, assessed as outside the disengagement area.

On the evening of 28 September, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded an undetermined explosion, four projectiles in flight and a burst, all 2-3km east and east-south-east, assessed as outside the disengagement area

On 30 September, positioned about 2km north of Petrivske, the SMM heard two shots of heavy-machine-gun fire 2-3km south-west, assessed as inside the disengagement area.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas, on 28 September, an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted a mortar (probable 82mm) within a known position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the Petrivske disengagement area. The same day, an SMM mini-UAV spotted two towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) in firing positions near Dokuchaievsk (30km south-west of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in government-controlled areas, an SMM long-range UAV spotted two surface-to-air missile systems (9K33 Osa) in Kalynove (35km north of Donetsk) on 28 September. On the same day, an SMM mini-UAV spotted three surface-to-air missile systems (9K37) at the railway station in government-controlled Rubizhne (84km north-west of Luhansk). On 29 September, the SMM saw a surface-to-air missile system (9K37) at the same railway station and, later the same day, a surface-to-air missile system (9K37) loaded on a flatbed truck near the same railway station. On 30 September, the SMM saw three self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) and two multiple launch rocket systems (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) at the railway station in Kramatorsk (83km north of Donetsk).

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles (ACVs)[2] in the security zone.[3] In government-controlled areas, on 28 September, an SMM long-range UAV spotted five infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP-1) near Taramchuk (29km south-west of Donetsk), two IFVs (undetermined variants) near Krasnohorivka (21km west of Donetsk), two armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-2) near Nevelske (18km north-west of Donetsk), as well as an IFV (BMP-2) and an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-70) in Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk). On the same day an SMM mid-range UAV spotted six IFVs (BMP-2) near Pyshchevyk (25km north-east of Mariupol) and three IFVs (two BMP-2 and one probable BMP-1) near Hnutove (90km south of Donetsk). On 30 September, the SMM saw an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) in Petrivka (27km north of Luhansk) as well as an armoured reconnaissance vehicle and an IFV (undetermined variants) in a residential area of Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk).

In non-government-controlled areas, on 28 September, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) in Kamianka (24km south of Donetsk) and an IFV (BMP-1) in Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk).

The SMM observed construction at the entry-exit checkpoint near Novotroitske (government-controlled, 36km south-west of Donetsk). The SMM observed the installation of new containers and sanitary facilities, as well as the paving of new lanes of travel. According to a representative of the State Border Guard Service, the construction works are expected to last three weeks and will temporarily limit the capacity of the checkpoint, which he said he expects will lead to long queues.

In Mariupol, the SMM observed approximately one thousand people gathered in Teatralna Square listening to speakers demanding improvements to air quality in Mariupol. Many of the participants were wearing white overalls and gas masks, while others were carrying banners stating “I want to breathe” in Russian. The SMM saw about 100 police officers in the area and no security incidents.

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne (government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk) and continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire.

The SMM visited three border areas outside of government control.* While at a pedestrian border crossing point near Verkhnoharasymivka (57km south-east of Luhansk) for about 30 minutes on 29 September, the SMM saw a woman and three men exiting Ukraine and four men and two women entering Ukraine. The SMM noted that the wooden bridge traversing the Velyka Kamianka river, which pedestrians must cross to enter or exit Ukraine, was missing a few planks and was, in general, in very poor condition.

While at a border crossing point near Izvaryne (52km south-east of Luhansk) for about five minutes on 30 September, the SMM saw seven women and two men exiting Ukraine and eight women and four men entering Ukraine before the SMM was told by a member of the armed formations to leave the area.* The same day, while at a pedestrian border crossing point near Popivka (50km south-east of Luhansk) for about 20 minutes, the SMM saw a man entering Ukraine.

On 30 September, at the train station in Fashchivka (non-government-controlled, 60km south-west of Luhansk), the SMM observed around 60 wagons of coal and 20 wagons of iron ore, all stationary.

At a hospital in Makiivka (non-government-controlled, 12km north-east of Donetsk), two staff members told the SMM that they were currently treating 21 persons for ailments resultant of contaminated tap water, including 12 suffering from an undetermined infectious disease.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• On 29 and 30 September, at a checkpoint north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), armed members of the armed formations again stopped the SMM and denied it passage westward to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) and southward to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), citing “security reasons”.
• On 29 and 30 September, at a checkpoint north of Novoazovsk (non-government-controlled, 40km east of Mariupol), armed members of the armed formations again prevented the SMM from proceeding to the city or towards the border with the Russian Federation.
• On 29 September, at a checkpoint north of Tavrycheske (non-government-controlled, 35km north-east of Mariupol), armed members of the armed formations prevented the SMM from entering the village.
• On 29 September, at a checkpoint near Bezimenne (non-government-controlled, 30km east of Mariupol), an armed member of the armed formations prevented the SMM from entering the village.
• On 30 September, at a checkpoint near Yuzhna-Lomuvatka (non-government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations prevented the SMM from passing through the checkpoint.
• On 30 September, at a border crossing point near Izvaryne, a member of the armed formations again told the SMM to leave the area.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• On 29 and 30 September, the SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC both times.[4]
• On 29 and 30 September, the SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC both times.5
• On 29 and 30 September, the SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

[1]    For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

[2]    This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[3]    On 27 September an SMM long-range UAV spotted an armoured personnel carrier (MT-LB) near Sofiivka (formerly Karlo-Marksove, non-government-controlled, 40km north-east of Donetsk), not Sofiivka (government-controlled), as originally reported in SMM Daily Report 29 September 2018.

[4]    The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC withdrew from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

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Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

The situation of human rights defenders in Mongolia was the topic of discussion during a roundtable event organized by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) on 28 September 2018 in Ulaanbaatar.

The event brought together 43 participants (25 women and 18 men) from state institutions, the National Human Rights Commission of Mongolia (NHRCM), civil society organizations working on human rights issues, individual human rights defenders and representatives of intergovernmental organizations. The participants examined issues affecting the work of human rights defenders in Mongolia and proposed recommendations for addressing existing challenges in a gender-sensitive, inclusive and sustainable manner.

“Open dialogue between state institutions and human rights defenders is important to reach a common understanding about the current situation of human rights defenders and potential challenges they may face in their work,” said Jennifer Croft, Deputy Head of the ODIHR Human Rights Department. “We welcome the willingness of stakeholders in Mongolia to engage in this crucial dialogue and to discuss what role ODIHR can play to facilitate their co-operation.” 

Byambadorj Jamsran, Chief Commissioner of the NHRCM, said: “Bringing together state representatives and civil society organizations in a roundtable event such as this is important as it allows for the development of recommendations on protecting human rights defenders. The Commission appreciates and respects human rights defenders’ work and stands ready to support their efforts in promoting and protecting human rights in Mongolia.”

Anaraa Nyamdorj, co-founder of Mongolia’s LGBT Center NGO, said: “More young people in Mongolia are becoming active in different civic spaces on various issues, ranging from environmental protection to sustainable human development. Civil society is making the best of the situation, often utilizing international legal instruments to promote change. However, structural challenges remain, which could be partially addressed by granting NGOs tax-exempt status and by allocating dedicated state funds to civil society organizations through a transparent and fair process, including for projects focusing on youth, gender and LGBTI issues.”

The event was organized on the margins of a country visit ODIHR undertook to assess the situation of human rights defenders in Mongolia. The findings of this and other similar country visits will be published in a report in 2019. The report will highlight challenges and good practices in the protection of human rights defenders in OSCE participating States, including by examining the implementation of ODIHR’s Guidelines on the Protection of Human Rights Defenders.

VIENNA, 1 October 2018 - The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, today welcomed the entry into force of a new law in the Netherlands which provides enhanced protection for the confidentiality of journalists’ sources.

The law enshrines the right of journalists and other publicists to protect their sources, even if these sources do not explicitly demand confidentiality.

"I welcome this important step to protect journalists in the Netherlands. The fact that it covers a broad definition of 'journalists', which includes publicists, is significant in safeguarding investigative reporting," said Désir. “It is also very positive that the law is accompanied by a clear set of instructions to prosecutors and law enforcement bodies. These will hopefully help to avoid any future cases of infringements of journalists’ rights to protect their sources in the Netherlands.”

The law offers to journalists the same rights to confidentiality as to other professions, such as lawyers.

In June this year, the Representative raised a case of an undue breach of confidentiality in the Netherlands, where the authorities openly acknowledged that law enforcement bodies should have acted differently.

For the statement on this case, see: https://www.osce.org/representative-on-freedom-of-media/383931

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, twitter @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom.

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398192 Anna Vorobeva OSCE Mission to Moldova

Thirty-five legal professionals and civil society activists from both banks of the Dniester/Nistru River participated in an OSCE-supported training workshop in Ribnita on 28 September 2018 on the legal aspects of providing assistance to survivors of domestic violence.

During the workshop, the trainers presented existing international standards and best practices of providing assistance to victims of domestic violence, as well as effective courses of actions available to victims. The participants were sensitised to the psycho-social aspects of working with victims of domestic violence. The format of the workshop included small group work on case studies, during which time the participants shared views about domestic violence on both banks of the Dniester/Nistru River. 

“The discussions during the training allowed us to exchange information about legal instruments available to the victims of domestic violence on both banks of the river. The participants also commended the recent opening of a shelter for victims in Transdniestria,” said Iuliana Abramova from the left-bank Resonance Centre for support and development of civic initiatives.

This is the second workshop on domestic violence organized by the Mission this year. These workshops build upon Human Rights Club meetings, which were organized by the OSCE Mission to Moldova from 2013 to 2018 to serve as a communication platform and a confidence-building measure between legal and civil society professionals on both banks of the Dniestr/Nistru River. In 2018, these meetings evolved into professional workshops with a greater focus on international law and case studies. At least one more workshop is planned for 2018 in Chisinau. 

Combating domestic violence is one of the priorities of the joint Moldovan and Transdniestrian Human Rights Sub-Working Group within the settlement process. This Sub-Working Group reconvened this year after a five-year break.

SKOPJE, 1 October 2018 – Although the legal framework did not sufficiently cover all aspects of the process, the 30 September referendum in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia was administered impartially and fundamental freedoms were respected, the international observers concluded in a statement today. The absence of an organized “Against” or boycott campaign meant the media struggled to provide balanced coverage, although they did convey extensive information and a diverse range of views to voters.

Voters were asked “Are you in favour of EU and NATO integration by accepting the agreement between the Republic of Macedonia and the Republic of Greece?”, with implementation of the agreement considered a precondition for EU and NATO integration. The Constitutional Court received three challenges to the parliament’s decision to hold the referendum and the formulation of the question, all of which were rejected.

“The fundamental freedoms of assembly, association and expression were respected throughout the process and, although the lack of an official ‘Against’ campaign meant the views of the ‘For’ campaign dominated, the media provided extensive information and a broad spectrum of opinions,” said Ambassador Jan Petersen, Head of the ODIHR referendum observation mission. “The State Election Commission issued regulations to fill gaps in the legal framework, which raised questions about their legal authority to do so.”

While the authorities made some efforts to provide public information related to the agreement, its content was insufficiently explained, the statement says. The parliament, primarily through the ruling parties, led the “for” campaign, which also featured a high degree of engagement by foreign leaders and representatives of the EU, NATO and the United States. Although there was no active ‘Against’ campaign, a coalition of civic associations and two smaller political parties advocated a boycott through rallies and on social media, often featuring inflammatory, nationalistic rhetoric, the observers said.

“If we respect those who chose not to vote, we definitely must also respect those – more than half a million – who took the referendum seriously and decided to cast their ballot for the future of the country. They expressed their will, on this occasion, in a calm environment,” said Stefan Schennach, head of the delegation from the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. “Looking forward, we hope the issue of the accuracy of the voters’ lists will ultimately be solved.”

The State Election Commission administered the referendum impartially and held efficient and collegial public meetings, although these lacked substantive debate on key issues, the statement says. Lower level commissions generally worked in a professional manner and despite minor irregularities, voting on referendum day was assessed positively in 98 percent of polling stations visited by international observers.

The campaign finance rules do not include spending limits and lack clear disclosure and auditing requirements or related sanctions, the observers said. The government allocated some 1.3 million euros to the parliament to spend on television advertising, but the opposition declined, so only the “For” portion of public funds was spent.

The legal framework provides for monitoring by international and citizen observers. The “proposer” of the referendum – in this case the parliament – had the right to appoint representatives to observe in polling stations, but declined to do so.

For further information, contact:

Thomas Rymer, OSCE/ODIHR, +389 72 443 791 or +48 609 522 266, thomas.rymer@odihr.pl

Bogdan Torcatoriu, PACE, +33 6 50 39 29 40, bogdan.torcatoriu@coe.int

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398090 Željka Šulc

The OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) handed over to the Gender Centre of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) software for an electronic database on domestic violence cases, at a ceremony held on 1 October 2018 in Sarajevo.

In 2014, the Mission supported the development of a database on domestic violence cases in the FBiH, which helped the authorities to respond to such cases, while also easing the social and psychological burden of victims.

“Data collection, as an invaluable and essential part of the process of prevention of domestic violence, is the only way to ensure effective analysis of policy implementation, assess the quality of support services, and meet international standards,” said Head of the OSCE Mission to BiH Bruce G. Berton.

Director of the FBiH Gender Center, Ana Vuković, highlighted the significance of the electronic database as it will connect police, social welfare centres, safe houses and SOS help lines. “The electronic database will ease the work of professionals and reduce the additional burden of victims of domestic violence as this software will ensure that victims only once answer the set of questions in the process of seeking assistance and protection.”

Colin McCullough, OSCE Programme Office in Astana SDGs SDGs:  7 - Affordable and clean energy 12 - Responsible consumption and production 13 - Climate action

The OSCE-supported ninth annual Central Asian Leadership Programme (CALP) on Environment for Sustainable Development involving young leaders from the Central Asia and Afghanistan concluded on 23 September 2018 in Almaty, Kazakhstan.

The seven-day event was co-organized by the OSCE Programme Office in Astana in partnership with the Regional Environmental Centre for Central Asia, the Government of Norway and the US Agency for International Development.

Some 30 young representatives from the state, academic, business and non-governmental sectors of Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan focussed on understanding the trends and efforts required to promote sustainable development and to address environmental challenges.

Participants learned about issues including integrated water resources management, protected areas governance, global platforms for co-operation on protection of the environment, Agenda 2030 (a Kazakhstan government development programme) and the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals. Participants were encouraged to use the opportunity of the event to network with potential future partners to help promote regional co-operation.

“During the last decade, CALP has developed into a unique platform where the voices of young environmental leaders can be heard,” said Iskandar Abdullaev, Executive Director of the Regional Environmental Centre for Central Asia. “CALP participants not only develop their professional skills but also build long-lasting connections that will help them in their professional life.”

György Szabó, Head of the OSCE Programme Office in Astana said: “The OSCE highly values the role of youth in addressing environmental challenges. By supporting the CALP, we are building a network of young leaders who will contribute to promoting mutual trust and addressing environmental challenges.”                                                                                           

The event is part of the Programme Office’s long-standing efforts to engage youth and promote environmental leadership in the Central Asia region and Afghanistan.

WASHINGTON D.C., 1 October 2018 – The limited election observation mission from the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) to observe the 6 November mid-term congressional elections in the United States will hold a press conference in Washington D.C. on Wednesday, 3 October, at 12:00.

Tana de Zulueta, the head of the ODIHR limited election observation mission, will introduce the role of the mission and its upcoming activities.

Journalists are invited to attend the press conference at 12:00, Wednesday, 3 October, at the The National Press Club, 529 14th Street NW, 13th floor, Washington D.C.

For further information, please contact Pietro Tesfamariam, Mission Media Analyst, at (+1) 202 553 1247 or pietro.tesfamariam@odihr-elections.us

or

Thomas Rymer, ODIHR Spokesperson, at +48 609 522 266 or Thomas.Rymer@odihr.pl.

Additional information on the observation mission for the elections in the United States elections can be found at: http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/usa.

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VIENNA, 30 September 2018 – On the second anniversary of the detention of Ukrainian National News Agency Ukrinform’s journalist Roman Sushchenko, OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media Harlem Désir repeated his call to the Russian authorities to release the journalist from prison. 

“Journalists in the OSCE region should be able to work without fear of intimidation or imprisonment,” Désir said, “Sushchenko’s 12-year sentence is exceptionally harsh, and I hope his conviction will be overturned on appeal.”

Suchshenko was detained on 30 September 2016 in Moscow. On 4 June 2018, the Moscow City Court sentenced him to 12 years in a high security prison on espionage charges.

The Representative raised the case on several occasions in the past, including during his official visits to Kyiv and Moscow in 2017 (see: https://www.osce.org/representative-on-freedom-of-media/394064, https://www.osce.org/representative-on-freedom-of-media/383433, https://www.osce.org/fom/351561 and https://www.osce.org/fom/358456).

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, twitter @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom.

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This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, compared with the previous reporting period. In Pikuzy, the Mission followed up on reports of civilian casualties and observed fresh damage caused by shelling. In Pervomaisk, the SMM observed fresh damage caused by shelling. The Mission recorded a ceasefire violation inside the Zolote disengagement area. Its access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas as well as near Zaichenko, Novolaspa, Siedove and Novoazovsk near the border with the Russian Federation.* The SMM observed weapons in violation of agreed withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line. The Mission again observed anti-tank mines near Travneve and Holmivskyi. The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station. The Mission also facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs and maintenance to the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne, to the Krasnohorivka gas distribution station and to water infrastructure in Stanytsia Luhanska and near Artema. In Lviv, the SMM followed up on reports of an attack against civil activists. The Mission monitored public gatherings in Kyiv, Kharkiv and Lviv in relation to attacks against activists in recent months.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations,[1] including about 240 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 100 explosions).

On the evening of 27 September, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded three undetermined explosions, five projectiles (four from west to east and one from east to west) and a muzzle flash, all 0.5km-1.5km south-east, south-south-east and south. The camera also recorded ten undetermined explosions, about 70 projectiles in flight (mostly from west to east, from west-north-west to east-south-east and from west-south-west to east-north-east), a muzzle flash and an illumination flare in vertical flight, all 1-5km at directions ranging from south-east to south-south-west.

On the evening and night of 27-28 September, the SMM camera in Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol) recorded over 100 projectiles (mostly from west-south-west to east-north-east and from north-west to south-east) and four bursts, all 1-5km at directions ranging from south-east and south-south-west.

On the evening and night of 27-28 September, the SMM camera 1.5km north-east of Hnutove (government-controlled, 20km north-east of Mariupol) recorded an undetermined explosion and about 50 projectiles in flight (the majority from south to north), all 2-5km at directions ranging from north-east to east-south-east.

On the evening of 27 September, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard about 30 undetermined explosions and about 80 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 2-6km south-west and west-south-west.

During the day on 28 September, positioned about 1km north-west of the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard ten undetermined explosions and about 130 shots and bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 1-3km north, as well as an undetermined explosion and about 170 shots and bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 1-3km south-west.

The same day, positioned about 1km north-north-west of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM heard about 100 undetermined explosions and about 40 shots and bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 0.7-4km at directions ranging from north-north-east to south-south-west.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including five explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (four explosions).

On the evening and night of 27-28 September, the SMM camera in Kriakivka (government-controlled, 38km north-west of Luhansk) recorded four undetermined explosions and about 70 projectiles in flight (mostly from north-north-west to east-south-east), all 2-4km south-west and south-south-west.

The SMM followed up reports of civilian casualties and fresh damage caused by shelling in Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol). On 26 September, near Kulykove (non-government-controlled, 30km northeast of Mariupol), a couple (in their fifties) told the SMM that they had sustained shrapnel injuries due to shelling in Pikuzy earlier that day. The SMM saw a bandage on the man’s abdomen and did not see a visible wound to his wife. The man said that they had attempted to travel to a hospital in Mariupol (government-controlled, 102km south of Donetsk) but their passage had been denied at a checkpoint in Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol). Later, the SMM’s paramedic provided first aid to the man, and an ambulance arrived and picked up the couple. The following day, medical staff at a hospital in Novoazovsk (non-government-controlled, 40km east of Mariupol) told the SMM that the couple had been admitted on 26 September and that the man had undergone surgery. At the hospital, the injured woman told the SMM that two pieces of shrapnel remained in her leg and neck. (The SMM visited the hospital only upon being escorted by members of the armed formations. See SMM Daily Report 28 September 2018.)

In Pikuzy, on 27 September, a woman in her sixties, who introduced herself as a relative of the wounded couple (see above), told the SMM that at around 12:40 on 26 September when she and the couple had been in front of her house at 34 Akhmatova Street, an explosion had occurred nearby, injuring the three of them. The SMM saw a wound to her right arm. About 50m south-east of the house, the SMM saw fresh remnants of a round (consistent with a VOG-17 grenade) embedded in the tarmac in a vertical fashion, assessed as fired vertically from an undetermined weapon (with calibre no greater than 30mm). About 50m further east, within a 20m-radius, the SMM saw three more similar impacts in a field, assessed as fired from an undetermined weapon (with calibre no greater than 30mm) probably in a vertical manner.

At 24 Akhmatova Street, the SMM saw fresh shrapnel damage to the west-north-west-facing side of a house and a nearby window, as well as two fresh craters about 10m west of the house assessed as caused by rounds of an automatic grenade launcher fired from a west-north-westerly direction.

At 17 Akhmatova Street, the SMM saw a fresh crater just south of a house, fresh shrapnel damage to a south-facing nearby fence, and fresh remnants of a grenade (PG-7) round, assessed as fired from a westerly direction. The SMM also saw two fresh small-arms casings nearby, assessed as remnants of rounds fired from the area.

At 15 Akhmatova Street, the SMM observed three fresh holes in the south-west-facing roofs of a storage building and another fresh hole in the north-east-facing roof. Inside the building, the SMM saw fresh remnants of at least four grenade (PG-7 and PG-9) rounds. The SMM assessed that the damage had been caused by rounds of an automatic grenade launcher fired from a direction between south and west.

Residents of the houses (a man and a woman in their fifties) at 17 and 24 Akhmatova Street told the SMM that they had heard explosions between 17:00 and 17:15 on 25 September. (The SMM had recently observed a tank (a possible T-72) on the eastern edge of Pikuzy, about 500m north-east of the abovementioned impact sites. See SMM Daily Report 22 September 2018.)

On 27 September, the SMM observed fresh damage caused by shelling in Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk). At 31 Vinnytska Street, the SMM saw a fresh crater about 10m east of a house as well as two shattered east-facing windows of the house. The SMM was unable to determine the direction of fire or the type of weapon used. Three neighbours (women in their sixties) told the SMM that they had heard explosions at around 20:00 on 26 September.

At 27 Luhova Street, the SMM saw a fresh crater and a tailfin inside the crater 1m south-south-east of a house, as well as two damaged west-facing windows (one shattered) of the house. The SMM assessed that the damage had been caused by a recoilless-gun (SPG-9, 73mm) round fired from an undetermined direction. A resident of the house (a woman in her fifties) told the SMM that she had heard explosions at around 19:55 on 26 September.

The SMM continued to monitor and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

During the day on 28 September, positioned in Zolote-4/Rodina (government-controlled, 59km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard a shot of small-arms fire 2-3km south-west, assessed as inside the Zolote disengagement area.

The same day, positioned near the Stanytsia Luhanska and Petrivske disengagement areas, the SMM observed clam situations.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas, on 27 September, an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10) on the north-western edge of Shumy (41km north of Donetsk). The same day, the SMM saw three towed howitzers (2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm) each towed by a military truck travelling north-east about 5km south-west of Lysychansk (75km north-west of Luhansk).

In violation of withdrawal lines in a non-government-controlled area, on 27 September, an SMM long-range UAV spotted two anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) near Sofiivka (formerly Karlo-Marksove, 40km north-east of Donetsk).

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles (ACVs)[2] in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 27 September, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-1) on the north-western edge of Shumy (see above), two armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-2) north of Shumy, an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) near Maiorsk (45km north-east of Donetsk), two IFVs (BMP-2) near Luhanske (59km north-east of Luhansk), four IFVs (BMP-1) near Troitske (69km west of Luhansk) and an armoured personnel carrier (MT-LB) near Sofiivka. On 28 September, the SMM saw an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) near Petrivka (27km north of Luhansk).

In a non-government-controlled area, on 28 September, the SMM saw three ACVs (BMP variants) near Dovhe (22km north-west of Luhansk).

The SMM continued to observe the presence of mines. On 27 September, an SMM long-range UAV again spotted 27 anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid out in four rows near Travneve (government-controlled, 51km north-east of Donetsk) and 11 anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid out in two rows near Holmivskyi (non-government-controlled, 49km north-east of Donetsk).

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne (government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk) and Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), the Krasnohorivka gas distribution station between Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) and Oleksandrivka (non-government-controlled, 20km south-west of Donetsk) and to water infrastructure in Stanytsia Luhanska and near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk). The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire.

In Lviv, on 28 September, the SMM followed up on reports of an attack against civil activists. A man and a woman (in their twenties) told the SMM that on the evening of 23 September they had been in a football field of the school no. 34 at Zamknena Street with two other people (a man and a woman), when 20-30 other people, some of them wearing balaclavas and scarves, physically assaulted them with maces, small hammers, knives and telescopic batons for five minutes, and shouted “Sieg heil! This is revenge for the National Corps!” and gave Nazi salutes. (The SMM saw National Corps denounce the attack on its social media page.) The SMM saw scrapes on the woman’s hands and arms, and bruises on the back of the man’s head. They said that the other woman had suffered wounds to her legs and arms and that the other man had a knife wound to his lungs and leg. A representative of Lviv police told the SMM that four people (two men and two women) had been attacked on 23 September and admitted to a hospital.  

On 27 September, the SMM monitored public gatherings in different cities in relation to attacks against activists in recent months (see, for example, SMM Daily Report 2 August 2018). In Kyiv, the SMM observed about 300 people (both men and women) on Instytutska Street at the entrance to the presidential administration building. The SMM saw some participants holding banners that read “Where are the authorities?” and “Activists are not a target”. The SMM saw also some members of Right Sector, National Corps and C14 among the crowd. The SMM saw about 20 police officers present. In Kharkiv, in front of the national police building at 5 Zhon Myronosyts Street, the SMM saw about 120 people (mostly men, 20-40 years old) participants, many from civil society organizations, and about 50 police officers present. In Lviv, at 1 Rynok Square, the SMM saw 70 people (mostly young men), some of whom were members of National Corps and C14. The SMM saw 20 police officers present. The SMM did not observe any incidents. 

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Ivano-Frankivsk, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a checkpoint north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations again stopped the SMM and denied it passage westward to Pikuzy and southward to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), saying that it would not be safe for the SMM.
• An armed member of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage at a checkpoint on the eastern edge of Novolaspa (non-government-controlled, 50km south of Donetsk).
• At the north-western entrance to Siedove (non-government-controlled, 106km south of Donetsk), an armed member of the armed formations again prevented the SMM from entering the village.
• At a checkpoint north of Novoazovsk, six members of the armed formations (four visibly armed) prevented the SMM from proceeding to the city, citing “anti-terrorist activities in the western part of the city”.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by phone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[3]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by phone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.4
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.
• The SMM did not travel across the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk) due to the presence of mines. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC said there were mines on the road south of the bridge. The SMM informed the JCCC.4

Other impediments:

• The SMM temporarily lost communication with its mini-UAV due to signal interference while flying near Mykolaivka (government-controlled, 40km south of Donetsk).[4]
• The SMM temporarily lost communication with its long-range UAV on several occasions due to signal interference while flying in a government-controlled area between Rybynske (49km south of Donetsk), Mykolaivka(40km south of Donetsk) and Krasnohorivka (21km west of Donetsk), in a government-controlled area Krasnohorivka (21km west of Donetsk), Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk) and Krasnohorivka (24km north of Donetsk), as well as in an area between Rozdolne (non-government-controlled 46km south-east of Donetsk) and Heorhiievka (government-controlled, 27km south-west of Donetsk).
• A staff member of the “city administration” in Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 56km south of Luhansk) refused to provide information, citing the need for prior permission from the armed formations. The staff member also demanded to see the SMM’s patrol map, which the SMM refused to show.
• A staff member at a school in Mykhailivka refused to provide the SMM information, citing the need for prior permission from the armed formations. The staff member also demanded to see the SMM’s patrol plan, which the SMM refused to show.

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[3] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC withdrew from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

[4] The interference could have originated from anywhere in a radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position. 

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This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region, compared with the previous reporting period. The Mission observed ceasefire violations near the Zolote disengagement area. Its access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas; it was also restricted near Hranitne, Novolaspa and Novoazovsk, near the border with the Russian Federation.* The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station. It also facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs and maintenance to the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne, to the Krasnohorivka gas distribution station and to water infrastructure in Stanytsia Luhanska and near Artema.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations[1], including about 100 explosions, as in the previous reporting period (about 90 explosions).           

On the evening and night of 26-27 September, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded 34 projectiles in flight (mostly from north-north-west to south-south-east), all 0.5-4km south-south-east, south and south-south-west.

On the evening and night of 26-27 September, the SMM camera 1.5km north-east of Hnutove (government-controlled, 20km north-east of Mariupol) recorded about 160 projectiles in flight (mostly from south to north), 21 undetermined explosions, five muzzle flashes and one illumination flare in flight, all 3-5km east-north-east, east and south-east.

On the evening of 26-27 September, the SMM camera in Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol) recorded 98 projectiles (mostly from west-south-west to east-north-east), one undetermined explosion, two muzzle flashes and nine bursts, all 2-4km east-south-east, south-east and south-south-west.

On the evening of 26 September, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 11 undetermined explosions 3-7km south-east and south. During the day on 27 September, while at the same location, the SMM heard 18 undetermined explosions and about 20 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 2-6km south-east and south.

During the day on 27 September, positioned about 1km north-west of the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard two undetermined explosions and 40 shots of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 1-4km south-south-west, west-north-west and north-north-west.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including four explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (two explosions).

On the evening of 26 September, the SMM camera in Kriakivka (government-controlled, 38km north-west of Luhansk) recorded 22 projectiles in flight (from north-west to south-east) and two muzzle flashes, all 2-4km south-south-west.

The SMM continued to monitor and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske[2] (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

During the evening and night of 26-27 September, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded one burst and five projectiles in flight (four from north to south and one from south to north), all 2-4km east and east-south-east (unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area), as well as three projectiles 2-4km east-north-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

Positioned near the Stanytsia Luhanska and Petrivske disengagement areas, the SMM observed a calm situation.  

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in government-controlled areas, an SMM mini unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted on 24 September two surface-to-air missile systems (9K37 Buk) near railway cars in Mariupol (102km south of Donetsk) (for previous observation at the same site, see SMM Daily Report 26 September 2018). On 27 September, the SMM saw a surface-to-air missile system (9K37) near Rubizhne (84km north-west of Luhansk).

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles[3] and other indications of military presence in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 26 September, on a ridge north-east of Zolote-4/Rodina (59km west of Luhansk), an SMM mid-range UAV spotted three new military positions (not visible in imagery from 25 September 2018), four men working in a 20m-long trench, as well as another four men doing trench work nearby (both trenches not visible in imagery from 25 September 2018). (For previous observations in the area, see SMM Daily Report 26 September 2018.) On 27 September, the SMM saw an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BTR-4) and a command vehicle (undetermined variant) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk), an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) near Petrivka (27km north of Luhansk) and an IFV (BMP-1) near Muratove (51km north-west of Luhansk).

In a non-government-controlled area, on 26 September, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted a 30m-long trench (not visible in imagery from 29 August 2018) near residential houses in a northern part of Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (58km west of Luhansk).

The SMM observed the presence of mine hazard signs. The SMM observed for the first time about 20 mine hazard signs reading “Danger Mines” (in Ukrainian and English) near Zolote-2/Karbonit (government-controlled, 62km north-west of Luhansk), consisting of red and white square boards attached to 1.5m-high wooden poles, placed on the northern side of a road.

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne (government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk) and Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), the Krasnohorivka gas distribution station between Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) and Oleksandrivka (non-government-controlled, 20km south-west of Donetsk) and to water infrastructure in Stanytsia Luhanska and near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk). The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire.

The SMM observed a convoy of trucks marked “Humanitarian Aid from the Russian Federation” in Luhansk region. In non-government-controlled Luhansk city, a senior member of the armed formations refused to provide information to the SMM on reports of the arrival of a humanitarian convoy from the Russian Federation, citing the need for the SMM to write a letter in advance to the members of the armed formations. Later the SMM saw a convoy of ten white covered cargo trucks with “Humanitarian aid from the Russian Federation” in Cyrillic written on them heading south-east on road M04 (for previous observations of a similar convoy, see SMM Daily Report 24 August 2018). The convoy was followed by two technical support trucks and four cars (all with “LPR” plates). Later in the day, the SMM also saw a convoy of trucks in Sorokyne (formerly Krasnodon, non-government-controlled, 43km south-east of Luhansk), assessed to be the same convoy, heading east towards the border with the Russian Federation.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 25 September 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• A Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier denied the SMM access to a military compound near Hranitne (government-controlled, 60km south of Donetsk), citing orders from his superiors not to allow access to anyone.
• Two armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage at a checkpoint on the eastern edge of Novolaspa (non-government-controlled, 50km south of Donetsk).

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by phone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by phone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.5
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

Conditional access:

• At a checkpoint near Novoazovsk (non-government-controlled, 40km east of Mariupol) five members of the armed formations (three visibly armed) stopped the SMM and allowed it to proceeded into the town only upon being escorted by another four armed members of the armed formations in a military-type van.

Other impediments:

• The SMM temporarily lost communication with its mini-UAV due to signal interference while flying near Lebedynske (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Mariupol).[5]
• The SMM temporarily lost communication with its long-range UAV due to signal interference while flying in a government-controlled area between Petrivka (43km north of Donetsk) and Novhorodske (35km north of Donetsk), and later while flying in a non-government-controlled area between Fedorivka (34km north-east of Donetsk) and Shyroka Balka (34km north-east of Donetsk).

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

[2] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[3] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC withdrew from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

[5] The interference could have originated from anywhere in a radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position. 

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SDGs SDGs:  5 - Gender equality

VIENNA, 28 September 2018 – The correlation between the security sector’s effectiveness and the inclusion of women and ways to overcome operational and institutional challenges in increasing women’s participation in the security sector will be the focus of a conference on 1 October in Vienna.

The conference, entitled Women in the Security Sector: Challenges and Opportunities in the OSCE Area and Beyond, is organized by Italy’s 2018 OSCE Chairmanship and supported by the OSCE Secretariat’s Gender Section.

Expert-level discussions will involve senior politico-military experts, gender advisers and peace mediators from participating States, Partners for Co-operation and other international organizations as well as representatives from OSCE field operations.

The opening session of the conference will be addressed by:

Alessandro Azzoni, Chairperson of the OSCE Permanent Council

Thomas Greminger, OSCE Secretary General

Stefania Palmiero, Captain of the Italian Air Force.

Media are invited to cover the opening session, set to begin at 10:00 on 1 October 2018 at the Hofburg’s Neuer Saal, 2nd floor.

Journalists wishing to attend are required to send an e-mail confirming their attendance to press@osce.org, no later than 30 September at 17:00.

More information about the conference can be found here

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SKOPJE, 28 September 2018 – The international observers monitoring the 30 September referendum in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia will present their preliminary post-referendum statement at a news conference on Monday, 1 October, in Skopje.

The mission is a joint undertaking of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE).

The statement will be delivered by Ambassador Jan Petersen, Head of the ODIHR referendum observation mission, followed by Stefan Schennach, Head of the PACE delegation.

The international referendum observation mission comprises a total of 206 observers from 33 countries, including 198 long-term and short-term observers deployed by ODIHR and eight parliamentarians and staff from PACE.

Journalists are invited to attend the press conference on Monday, 1 October, at 15:00 in Ballroom 1 of the Skopje Marriott Hotel, Plostad Makedonija 7, Skopje.

The press conference will be live streamed at: www.facebook.com/osce.odihr

For further information, contact:

Thomas Rymer, OSCE/ODIHR, +389 72 443 791 or +48 609 522 266, thomas.rymer@odihr.pl

Bogdan Torcatoriu, PACE, +33 6 50 39 29 40, bogdan.torcatoriu@coe.int

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397838 Željka Šulc

The third annual edition of the Extracurricular Workshop on International Criminal Law and Transitional Justice, organized by the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, for law students was held between 23 and 28 September 2018 in Sarajevo.

Students from five universities in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) had an opportunity to gain practical experience in applying the principles of international criminal law and in tackling particular issues arising in war crimes cases.  The students, who will shortly graduate from law school and enter the judiciary, learned about the investigation, prosecution and adjudication of war crimes cases from judges, prosecutors, attorneys, witness support officers, and investigators.

“I am continuously impressed by the commitment of law students I meet in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” said Bruce G. Berton, Head of the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina. “These students, through their engagement and learning, have gained new skills that will have a positive impact in their forthcoming careers as legal professionals and help them contribute to the achievement of truth and justice in this country.”

Selma Kunic, a fourth year law student at the University of Tuzla said: “This workshop is a successful amalgam of theory and practice of international criminal law. It is workshops like this that enable us to learn more and expand our existing knowledge, since they offer a wealth of experience one cannot get within our institutions of higher education, especially given the fact that the system of education in Bosnia and Herzegovina is not organized in a way that fosters the adequate application of lessons learned in practice.”  

The concluding activity of the workshop was a mock trial held at the Court of BiH, where students practiced their trial advocacy skills and demonstrated the knowledge they gained during the workshop in front of senior members of judiciary.  

Ioanna Lachana, OSCE Mission to Skopje Mirvete Islam, OSCE Mission to Skopje

Enhancing the capacities of law enforcement officers to counter religiously motivated terrorist organizations in line with international best practices was the aim of a five-day training course for some 20 counter-terrorism officers from the Interior Ministry, which concluded on 28 September 2018. The course was organized by the OSCE Mission to Skopje, in co-operation with the Turkish National Police.

“It is encouraging for the OSCE to see that the officers are willing to enhance their capacity in the area of countering terrorist organizations abusing religion. Sharing experiences and best practices in this area is of vital importance to the fight against terrorism,” said Serkan Serin, the Mission’s Adviser on Counter-Terrorism/Violent Extremism.

The course participants were trained on better identifying terrorist individuals and movements, defining terrorist ideologies and radicalization processes, and understanding recruitment and propaganda methods, which would have a long-term impact on public safety.

ROME, 28 September 2018 - Innovative measures to lower the risks of conflict between states in cyberspace such as emerging technological features, policy engagement, public-private partnerships are the focus of the 2018 OSCE-wide Conference on Cyber/ICT Security taking place in Rome today.

The conference, which opened yesterday with a hands-on scenario-based discussion for senior government officials and their policy and technical advisors, is organized by Italy’s 2018 OSCE Chairmanship with the support of the Transnational Threats Department of the OSCE Secretariat.

More than 170 representatives of the OSCE’s 57 participating States, the OSCE’s Partners for Co-operation, international and non-governmental organizations, academia, as well as representatives of the private sector have gathered to discuss how to mitigate the risks of conflict stemming from the use of information and communications technologies (ICTs).

"This conference is very timely considering how relevant these topics are becoming in the agendas of world leaders. We may not exactly have the same ideas on how to tackle this challenge posed by the digital revolution, but this is actually why it is important to talk about it today and confirm the importance of this Organization," said Guglielmo Picchi, Italy’s Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Co-operation, representing the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office and Italy's Foreign Minister Enzo Moavero Milanesi, as he opened the conference.

Through the adoption of 16 Confidence Building Measures (CBMs), the OSCE has come to play a unique and pioneering role in reducing the risks of conflict stemming from the use of ICTs.

Currently, a key priority for participating States is the implementation of the CBMs and an Informal Working Group chaired by Ambassador Karoly Dan, Permanent Representative of Hungary to the OSCE, has intensified efforts to operationalize the CBMs.

“Through full implementation of the CBMs, the OSCE will contribute to preventing and resolving conflicts stemming from the use of ICTs and show the way forward for other regional organizations. The OSCE is a shining example for organizations like the ASEAN Regional Forum and the Organization of American States who are facing the same cyber/ICT security challenges and threats,” said Dan.

Oleg Khramov, Deputy Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, said: “The OSCE cyber CBMs are practical measures and our future work at the OSCE shall focus on creating conditions for their full implementation to continue reducing the risks of conflict stemming from the use of ICTs.”

Christopher Painter, Former Co-ordinator for Cyber Issues at the United States State Department and Commissioner for the Global Commission on the Stability of Cyber Space, said: “The negotiations of the two sets of the cyber CBMs were ahead of time. With its long and successful history of negotiating and implementing military Confidence and Security Building Measures, the OSCE is the best suited international forum for the full implementation of the cyber CBMs.”

Over the course of the conference, participants will have an opportunity to present their national views on various aspects of national and transnational threats to and in the use of ICTs, and will later discuss desirable goals to strive for that might help to address current international cyber/ICT security challenges.

The conference’s third and final session will focus on enhancing cyber resilience

through public-private partnerships and cover areas such as working with small businesses and start-ups to more effectively improve and retain cyber/ICT security expertise; establishing secondment schemes between national agencies and cyber/ICT security companies; and filling cross-border gaps in cyber/ICT security expertise.

The conference was preceded by a scenario-based discussion on 27 September, which provided national delegations with an opportunity to experience and be actively involved in a simulated, escalating high-impact cyber/ICT security incident.

Each delegation was handed a tablet and asked to choose responses to questions coming up in the scenario. Responses by delegations were anonymized, aggregated and later presented as overall percentages, with the aim of highlighting what participants perceived as effective emergency responses and procedures.

“What better way is there to reduce the risks of possible tensions than to practice the mechanisms that were designed to prevent them?,” asked Rasa Ostrauskaite, Co-ordinator of OSCE Activities to Address  Transnational Threats, at the start of yesterday’s discussion. The activity, she added, was “an opportunity for national representatives from policy and technical backgrounds to identify common approaches and whole-of-government responses to a major cyber/ICT security incident. The speed and ability of such cross-sectoral interaction is a core requirement when it comes to effectively applying the CBMs.”

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