OSCE

TBILISI, 16 July 2018 – Media professionals, government, civil society, renowned international experts and journalists will gather for the 15th OSCE South Caucasus Media Conference (SCMC) in Tbilisi to discuss quality journalism for trustworthy and credible information.

Six expert panels will address the following topics at the event: digital transformation of the media industry and its effects on the practice and quality of journalism; quality of information in the age of “fake news” and disinformation; regulation and self-regulation in the digital era; latest media freedom developments in the South Caucasus; countering hate speech and protecting freedom of expression.  

Journalists are invited to cover the 15th SCMC, a two-day conference organized by the Office of the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media.

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, will open the conference, together with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Georgia, David Zalkaliani; the President of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, George Tsereteli; and the Head of the OSCE Division at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of Italy, Antonino Maggiore, (on behalf of the OSCE Chairmanship), starting at 10:00 am on Wednesday, 18 July, at Radisson Blu Iveria Hotel (Rose Revolution Square, 1).

Journalists wishing to report on the conference are required to send an e-mail of confirmation to nicolas.ebnother@osce.org no later than Tuesday, 17 July, 17:00. The presentation of a valid ID is required for accreditation at the venue.

Please send all requests for interviews during the event to deniz.yazici@osce.org or call +43 664 859 0956.

A detailed agenda and biographies of speakers in English and Russian can be accessed here.

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BERLIN, 13 July 2018 – An OSCE Parliamentary Assembly seminar held this week in Berlin, Germany, focused on how to prevent ethnic conflicts through law and the exchange of best practice, notably through the protection of national minorities and accommodating ethnic diversity. The participants discussed in an informal setting the central role which parliamentarians could play in forming government policy towards national minorities and in promoting legislation that can protect the rights of national minorities. 

OSCE PA President George Tsereteli opened the seminar on Wednesday, noting that entrenched positions and nationalist rhetoric as well as unilateral actions which run contrary to the founding principles of the OSCE have threatened to undermine trust in the Organization’s ability to find common ground. 

“History has taught us that intolerance and discrimination, a failure to accommodate diversity and the politicization of minority issues are the first steps down a slippery slope towards tremendous human suffering,” Tsereteli said. “In reality, minorities should be seen as an asset for OSCE countries, where they can serve as a bridge in inter-state relations, in particular in border areas”.   

Bringing together more than 20 Members of Parliament from 12 countries, the Leinsweiler seminar included the participation of German parliamentarians representing areas where minorities live, the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, the President of the Federal Union of European Nationalities, as well as representatives from the Advisory Committee of the Council of Europe’s Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and a number of minority associations. 

Noting that there are few examples of truly homogenous states, President Tsereteli underlined the importance of accommodating ethnic, religious and linguistic diversity, and cautioned participants not to become complacent and underestimate the potential for renewed conflict in the OSCE region. He also recalled the provisions of the OSCE’s 1990 Copenhagen Document which emphasizes that questions relating to national minorities can only be satisfactorily resolved in a democratic political framework based on the rule of law, with a functioning independent judiciary. 

President Tsereteli also commended the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, Ambassador Lamberto Zannier, for his effective work in the area of developing guidelines for states, such as the Bolzano/Bozen Recommendations on National Minorities in Inter-State Relations, which were adopted ten years ago. In her opening remarks, OSCE PA Treasurer and Head of the German Delegation Doris Barnett stressed the need for dialogue on potential ethnic conflicts and national minorities. This includes an exchange of good practices, an analysis of the effects on state structure and on conflicts on the existing security framework. “Minorities are a sensitive and often an emotional issue,” Barnett said. “Being able to live together in a meaningful way is the only way in which the potential of every human will fully express itself.” 

The seminar examined a number of cases of best practice in countries across the OSCE region, including Germany, Switzerland, the Åland islands in Finland, and South East Europe, with participation by OSCE parliamentarians from Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Croatia, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Georgia, Hungary, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Romania, and Sweden. 

OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities Lamberto Zannier delivered the keynote speech on early intervention and protection of minority rights, especially in the area of education as a means of preventing ethnic conflicts, highlighting the importance of integration as a means of building resilient societies, and emphasising the key role which parliamentarians can play in influencing legislation. 

The seminar, entitled “Addressing potential ethnic conflicts through law and good practices” was the fourth of a series of OSCE PA seminars organized by the Delegation of Germany to the OSCE PA and supported by the German Foreign Ministry. The first three were held in the French-German border region of Leinsweiler, in March 2015, April 2016 and May 2017 and were dedicated to considering parliamentary contributions to OSCE efforts in addressing conflicts.

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​​KYIV, 14 July 2018 – Concluding a two-day visit to Kyiv, the OSCE PA Special Representative on Gender Issues, Dr. Hedy Fry (MP, Canada) underlined the need for greater equality between women and men to fully exploit Ukraine’s reform agenda and conflict-resolution efforts.

“Armed conflicts have a tendency to reinforce traditional gender roles and the situation in Ukraine is no different,” Dr. Fry said. “But more equality is necessary to unlock Ukraine’s full potential and guarantee that all Ukrainians, no matter their gender, take part in rebuilding their country.

”Discussions centered on Kyiv’s efforts to promote the participation of women in public life and to combat domestic violence. They also revealed the extent to which the conflict in Ukraine had exacerbated human trafficking in the country, including trafficking of women for sexual and labour exploitation.

Dr. Fry met with a wide-range of government officials, including the Deputy Prime Minister for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration, Ms. Ivanna Klympush-Tsyntsadze, the Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs, Ms. Tetyana Kovalchuk, the Deputy Minister of Social Policy, Ms. Natalia Fedorovych, and the Ombudsman of Ukraine, Ms. Liudmyla Denisova. She also met with representatives of the parliamentary caucus “Equal Rights”, the Office of the Government Commissioner for Gender Policy, and a wide range of non-governmental organizations.

“I was pleased to see that Ukrainian officials are committed to gender equality and are working with international partners and the OSCE to achieve this goal,” said Fry.

As part of her visit, Dr. Fry also met with the Head of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission in Ukraine, Ambassador Ertugrul Apakan, and his Deputy Aleska Simkic, as well as staff from the OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine.

Earlier this week in Berlin, the OSCE PA adopted a resolution on “Preventing and Combating Gender-Based Violence” which requests the OSCE to assist participating States in preventing sexual violence in armed conflict situations and encourages the OSCE and its Parliamentary Assembly to exchange best practices and training materials to combat gender-based violence.

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This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region, compared with the previous reporting period, and no ceasefire violations in Luhansk region. Small-arms fire was directed at an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) near Lozove and at an SMM long-range UAV near Sakhanka. The SMM continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske; it again observed military presence inside the Zolote disengagement area and saw a white signal flare fired near a checkpoint south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge. The SMM’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas.* It was also restricted in areas of Donetsk region outside government control near Lozove, Zaichenko and Bezimenne.* The Mission observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line. An SMM long-range UAV recorded outgoing explosions and impacts close to a position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces near Sakhanka, while a position of the armed formations was only about 260m away. The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station, including through monitoring the security situation around the station, as well as repairs and maintenance works to other essential civilian infrastructure near Zalizne, Zaitseve, Novotoshkivske, Zhovte and Stanytsia Luhanska.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations,[1] including about 20 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 300 explosions).

On the evening and night of 12-13 July, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard three undetermined explosions and 24 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 3-5km south-east and south-south-east. During the day on 13 July, while at the same location, the SMM heard four undetermined explosions 2-8km at directions ranging from south-south-east to west.

During the day on 13 July, positioned on the south-eastern edge of Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard ten undetermined explosions and four bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 2-4km south-east and south, as well as ten bursts of small-arms fire at undetermined distances east-south-east.

Positioned on the north-western outskirts of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard about 60 shots and bursts of small-arms fire 300-400m north-west.

On the evening and night of 12-13 July, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, an undetermined explosion, two projectiles in flight from north-north-west to south-south-east and a muzzle flash, followed by totals of an undetermined explosion, 44 projectiles (20 from north-north-west to south-south-east, 13 from east-north-east to west-south-west, eight from north-east to south-west, two from east to west and one from north-west to south-east), four muzzle flashes and five illumination flares (three in vertical flight and two from north-east to south-west), all 0.1-3km at directions ranging from south to south-west.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded no ceasefire violations.[2] In the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded ceasefire violations in the region, including about 15 explosions.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk)[3], as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On 12 July, inside the Zolote disengagement area, an SMM mini-UAV again spotted a 20m-long trench (assessed as a firing position) emerging from a tree line on the southern side of the railway line (see SMM Daily Report of 9 June 2018). The same UAV also spotted fresh vehicle tracks and footpaths leading from the southern edge of Katerynivka (government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk) – where the SMM had previously observed infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) and a member of the Ukrainian Armed Forces (see SMM Daily Report 14 June 2018) – to the aforementioned trench. 

During the day on 13 July, positioned on the north-eastern edge of Katerynivka, inside the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM saw a green van with military licence plates and two people in military clothing on board; the van exited the disengagement area and headed north towards a government checkpoint north of the disengagement area. About three minutes later, the SMM saw the same vehicle with only one person in military clothing on board travelling back along the same route (entering the disengagement area and heading toward Katerynivka). Approximately two hours later, positioned at the same location on the north-eastern edge of Katerynivka, the SMM saw a blue car with military licence plates with a man in military clothing and a woman on board exiting Katerynivka and heading north towards the government checkpoint north of the disengagement area.

Positioned on both ends of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM observed a white signal flare fired by members of the armed formations near a checkpoint south of the bridge. They told the SMM that the flare had been launched to indicate readiness to disengage.

Positioned near the Petrivske disengagement area, the SMM observed a calm situation.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas, on 13 July, the SMM saw 12 stationary multiple launch rocket systems (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) near Poltavka (54km north-west of Donetsk). On 12 July, an SMM long-range UAV spotted two self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) travelling south-west near Illinka (38km west of Donetsk). In a non-government-controlled area, on 13 July, an SMM mini-UAV spotted four stationary tanks (T-64) in Novohryhorivka (33km west of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in a government-controlled area, on 13 July, the SMM saw a tank (T-64) loaded on a tank transporter on road H-20 near Oleksandro-Kalynove (47km north of Donetsk) heading north.

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. In a government-controlled area, beyond the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM noted that four towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) were missing for the first time. It also noted that four towed howitzers (D-30) and 20 self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) continued to be missing.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles (ACV), an anti-aircraft gun[4] and military presence in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, the SMM saw an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (MT-LB) near Popasna (69km west of Luhansk), as well as two armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-2) and two APCs (BTR-70) near Voitove (33km north-west of Luhansk). On 12 July, an SMM long-range UAV spotted three ACVs near Nevelske (18km north-west of Donetsk), an ACV near Taramchuk (29km south-west of Donetsk), two IFVs (BMP variants) near Berezove (31km south-west of Donetsk), an ACV near Starohnativka (51km south of Donetsk), two ACVs near Novohryhorivka (55km south of Donetsk), three ACVs near Talakivka (90km south of Donetsk), an IFV (BMP variant) and an ACV near Pyshchevyk (84km south of Donetsk), as well as four IFVs (BMP-2) near Mykolaivka (40km south of Donetsk). On the same day, an SMM mini-UAV spotted an IFV (BMP-1) near Vrubivka (72km west of Luhansk) and a fire control vehicle (1VXX variant) near Druzhba (76km west of Luhansk).

In non-government-controlled areas, on 12 July, an SMM long-range UAV spotted six ACVs near Bohdanivka (41km south-west of Donetsk). On 13 July, an SMM mini-UAV spotted an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) mounted on an APC (MT-LB) and an APC (BTR-80) near Dovhe (22km north-west of Luhansk).

On the evening of 12 July, an SMM long-range UAV spotted a military position, assessed as an Ukrainian Armed Forces position, in a field about 1km north-west of Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol). About 260m north-east of the aforementioned position, the UAV spotted another position, assessed as belonging to the armed formations. At the Ukrainian Armed Forces position, the UAV recorded, in sequence: an explosion assessed as an outgoing round of a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) fired in a north-easterly direction; an explosion assessed as an impact of automatic grenade launcher (AGS-17) round fired from a north-easterly direction (from the position of the armed formations); an explosion assessed as an outgoing RPG round fired in a north-easterly direction; three explosions assessed as impacts of AGS-17 rounds fired from a north-easterly direction (from the armed formations position). Near the Ukrainian Armed Forces position, the UAV also spotted eight Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers along a treeline; three of them fired bursts of small-arms and machine-gun fire in a north-easterly direction. While the UAV was flying away from the location, it recorded a Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier aiming a weapon and shooting in the direction of the UAV. (The SMM landed the UAV safely.)* The same UAV also spotted a burning house in Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol).

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire. Positioned in areas near the DFS, the SMM heard ceasefire violations, despite explicit security guarantees (see above and table below for details).

The SMM also continued to facilitate and monitor repairs to the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne (formerly Artemove, government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk), to a water pipeline near the non-government-controlled part of Zaitseve (50km north-east of Donetsk), to a water pipeline in Novotoshkivske (government-controlled, 53km west of Luhansk), to a power line near Zhovte (non-government-controlled, 17km north-west of Luhansk) and to a water pipeline near Stanytsia Luhanska. The SMM also monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable the exhumation of human remains near Pankivka (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Luhansk).

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (see SMM Daily Report of 13 July 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• On a street in a residential area of Molochny, 3km south of Lozove (nongovernment-controlled, 52km north-east of Donetsk), two armed members of the armed formations stopped the SMM and denied it passage further into the village. Thereafter, the SMM launched a mini-UAV flight over the area. While it was flying the UAV, it heard small-arms fire, assessed as directed at its UAV (see below).
• On two occasions, at a checkpoint north of Zaichenko (nongovernment-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations stopped the SMM and denied it passage westward to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), and southward to Sakhanka. 
• At a checkpoint on road E58 north-west of Bezimenne (non-government-controlled, 30km east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations stopped the SMM and denied it passage. The SMM noted cars passing through the checkpoint.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[5]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by phone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. An unarmed formation member positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.
• The SMM did not travel across the bridge in governmentcontrolled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk) due to the presence of mines. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC said there were mines on the road south of the bridge. The SMM informed the JCCC.

Conditional access:

• At a checkpoint on road H15 east of Kreminets (nongovernment-controlled, 16km south-west of Donetsk), an unarmed member of the armed formations allowed the SMM to proceed only after checking its trailer.

Other impediments:

• Positioned about 3km south of Lozove, the SMM heard ten bursts of smallarms fire in an area where it was flying a mini-UAV, assessed as directed at the UAV. The SMM landed the mini-UAV and left the area (see above).
• While an SMM longrange UAV was flying over a position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces near Sakhanka, it spotted a soldier shooting at the SMM UAV (see above). The SMM landed the UAV safely.
• The SMM temporarily lost communication with its longrange UAV flying over an area close to Lebedynske (governmentcontrolled, 30km east of Mariupol), assessed as due to jamming.[6] The SMM landed the UAV safely.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[2] Due to presence of mines, including those on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remained limited; therefore, the review of the camera footage may take place days later.

[3] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

[]5 The interference could have originated from anywhere in a radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position.

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This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, compared with the previous reporting period. The SMM followed up on reports of civilian casualties in Krasnohorivka and Zoria. The SMM continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske; it recorded ceasefire violations near the Petrivske disengagement area. The SMM’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas as well as near Zaichenko and near Dovzhanske, near the border with the Russian Federation.* The Mission observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines near Muratove and Kreminna. The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station, including through monitoring the security situation around the station, as well as repairs and maintenance works to other essential civilian infrastructure near Zalizne, Zaitseve, Novotoshkivske, Raivka and Stanytsia Luhanska. The SMM monitored a court hearing in Kherson and a gathering in Kyiv.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations,[1] including about 300 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 25 explosions).

On the evening and night of 11-12 July, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, five projectiles in flight from north-west to south-east, a projectile from north-north-west to south-south-east and a projectile from north-west to south-east, followed by totals of 51 projectiles (24 from east to west, nine from south-east to north-west, seven from south-south-east to north-north-west, seven from north-north-west to south-south-east, two in vertical flight, one from west to east and one from north-west to south-east), all 0.5-3km south.

On the evening and night of 11-12 July, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, 38 undetermined explosions, a burst from north to south and a burst from south to north, followed by totals of ten undetermined explosions, a burst from south to north and six projectiles in flight (four from west-north-west to east-south-east and two from south to north), all 1-6km east.

On the evening and night of 11-12 July, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 38 undetermined explosions and about 480 bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 3-5km south-south-east. On the following day, while at the same location, the SMM heard 11 undetermined explosions and three bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 3-5km south-east.

During the day on 12 July, positioned 1.1km north-west of the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard and saw two explosions assessed as impacts 3-4km south-west and heard 29 undetermined explosions 2-8km south-south-west and south-west.

Positioned 1.6km south-east of Kamianka (government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard 18 undetermined explosions and two shots of small-arms fire, all 1-6km south-east, south-west and west.

Positioned about 2km north-west of Debaltseve (non-government-controlled, 58km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard and saw 62 explosions assessed as impacts of undetermined weapon rounds and heard 32 explosions (22 assessed as undetermined, eight as outgoing rounds and two as impacts of undetermined weapon rounds) and two bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 5-12km at directions ranging from south-south-west to north-west.

Positioned in the south-eastern outskirts of Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard 20 undetermined explosions and about 60 shots and bursts of small-arms fire, all 0.5-5km at directions ranging from north-east to south.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations[2], including about 15 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (no ceasefire violations).

During the day on 12 July, positioned in Kapitanove (government-controlled, 50km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 12 explosions assessed as mortar rounds 5-7km south-west.

The SMM followed up on reports of civilian casualties. On 12 July, at a hospital in Kurakhove (government-controlled, 40km west of Donetsk), a 60-year-old man told the SMM that on 10 July he had gone to visit his house which was damaged at the beginning of the conflict and is located at 6 Chaikovskoho Street in Krasnohorivka (government-controlled, 21km west of Donetsk) and at around 09:30 he had been hit in the groin by a bullet while in front of the house. He added that after receiving first aid at the hospital in Krasnohorivka, he had been taken to the hospital in Kurakhove where he underwent an operation. Medical staff at the hospital in Kurakhove told the SMM that the man had been admitted around 12:30 on 10 July and that the wound had been caused by a bullet.

On 3 July, medical staff at a hospital in Kostiantynivka (government-controlled, 60km north of Donetsk) told the SMM that a 16-year old boy  had been admitted on 1 July with injuries consistent with an explosion of a piece of unexploded ordnance (UXO), and had been transferred to the Kharkiv regional children’s hospital on 2 July. On 4 July, at the Kharkiv regional children’s hospital, medical staff told the SMM that the boy had lost his left hand and right eye and had sustained shrapnel injuries to his brain. On 6 July, the boy’s mother (aged 50) told the SMM that on the evening of 1 July she had found her son lying on the floor of her apartment in Zoria (government-controlled, 40km north-west of Donetsk) and that on 5 July the boy had successfully undergone surgery at the Okhmatdyt National Children’s Specialized Hospital in Kyiv. On 10 July, a police officer in Kostiantynivka  told the SMM that the boy had been injured in Zoria on 1 July after a piece of UXO that he had found in a wooden area near the village exploded in his hands at his mother’s apartment in Zoria.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk) , as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

Positioned in Petrivske for about an hour, the SMM heard 20 undetermined explosions 5-8km north-west and a shot of small-arms fire 2km south, all assessed as outside the disengagement area.

Positioned near the Stanytsia Luhanska and Zolote disengagement areas, the SMM observed calm situations.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum. In violation of withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas, the SMM saw a surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) near Muratove (51km north-west of Luhansk) and a multiple launch rocket system (BM-27 Uragan, 220mm) moving west in Kreminna (97km north-west of Luhansk).

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles[3] in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 11 July, an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle spotted three infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (two BMP-2 and a BMP-1) near Nelipivka (40km north-east of Donetsk). On 12 July, the SMM saw an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BRDM variant) near Heivka (27km north-west of Luhansk). In a non-government-controlled area, on 12 July, the SMM saw an IFV (BMP-1) in Debaltseve.

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire. Positioned in areas near the DFS, the SMM heard ceasefire violations, despite explicit security guarantees (see above and table below for details). The SMM also continued to facilitate and monitor repairs to the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne (formerly Artemove, government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk), to a water pipeline near the non-government-controlled part of Zaitseve (50km north-east of Donetsk), to a water pipeline in Novotoshkivske (government-controlled, 53km west of Luhansk), to a power line near Raivka (non-government-controlled, 16km north-west of Luhansk) and to a fibre optic cable near Stanytsia Luhanska.

The SMM visited a border area not under government control. While at a border crossing point near Dovzhanske (84km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw a bus (with Ukrainian licence plates), four cars (licence plates not visible) and ten pedestrians exiting Ukraine, and a bus (with Ukrainian licence plates), a covered cargo truck (with “LPR” plates), two cars (one with Ukrainian licence plates and one with “LPR” plates) and two pedestrians entering Ukraine. After 30 minutes, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

In Kyiv, the SMM continued to monitor a gathering (see SMM Daily 12 July 2018). The Mission saw about 500 people (mostly men, 30-60 years old) in front of the Parliament building at 5 Hrushevskoho Street and about 700 cars (mostly with foreign licence plates)  blocking Hrushevskoho Street from Kriposnyi Lane to Shovkovychna Street, as well as yellow flags with “Auto Euro Power” written on them. It heard protestors calling for a draft law related to the registration of cars with foreign licence plates to be rejected. It saw about 50 police officers in front of the Parliament building as well as 15 police buses nearby. Around 16:00, the number of protestors increased to about 2,000 and the SMM saw about 250 police officers. The SMM saw protestors trying to block the exits of the Parliament. The protest ended around 20:00.

In Kherson, the SMM monitored a court hearing for Kyrylo Vyshynskyi, the editor-in-chief of RIA Novosti Ukraine arrested in Kyiv on 15 May (see SMM Daily Report 18 May 2018). At the Kherson city court, Vyshynskyi was charged under Article 263(1) of the Criminal Code (unlawful handling of weapons, ammunition or explosives), in addition to the previous charges under Article 111 (high treason). After hearing the arguments of the prosecution and the defence, the judge extended the existing detention order by 60 days. The SMM observed a calm situation around the court.

The SMM continued monitoring in Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a border crossing point near Dovzhanske, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.
• Three armed members of the armed formations at a checkpoint near Zaichenko (nongovernment-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol) again prevented the SMM from accessing Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) and Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol). (See SMM Daily Report 12 July 2018.)

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by phone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.4
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. An unarmed formation member positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

[1] TPlease see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report. he SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Marinka was not operational during the reporting period.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. The SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Marinka was not operational during the reporting period.

[3] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

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BISHKEK, 12 July 2018 - The OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek and United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) co-organized a seminar on Central Asia-Afghanistan policy partnership. The purpose of the event was an exchange of views on establishing policy partnerships at the expert-analytical level and deepening ties among researchers in the region.

The discussion took place at the initiative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kyrgyz Republic, and gathered 40 participants representing the OSCE, the UN, international development and government institutions and think-tanks from Central Asian countries and Afghanistan.

In his opening remarks, the Head of the Programme Office in Bishkek, Ambassador Pierre von Arx, noted: “The OSCE and UNAMA are making sure this initiative is anchored locally in the region and provides a neutral and open platform for discussions.”

Highlighting the importance of this gathering, the Director for Political Affairs at UNAMA, Scott Smith, said: “Afghans are increasingly interested in and capable of conducting analytical research on their country. We see a real necessity to build on the potential in the region in this field.”

The participants discussed the recent trend towards increased co-operation between the region’s countries and Afghanistan. They also explored common approaches towards security and research on development issues.

The Head of the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to the OSCE in Vienna, Ambassador Khojesta Fana Ebrahimkhel, said: “None of our countries can achieve prosperity on its own. Afghanistan fully acknowledges the importance of co-operation with its neighbours and is ready to nurture it further.”

Ensuring the full support of his country, Kyrgyz Deputy Foreign Minister Nurlan Abdrakhmanov said: “Kyrgyzstan has been providing assistance to Afghanistan for a long time and we have been offering to establish a permanent expert platform focusing on peaceful resolution of the conflict.”

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387800 Munira Shoinbekova, OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe

The OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe completed its activities aimed at building community resilience against terrorist radicalization and violent extremism at grassroots level in the Sughd region on 12 July 2018.

The activities commenced on 2 July with training courses for local teachers on preventing and countering violent extremism and radicalization leading to terrorism (P/CVERLT) among youth. Four one-day training courses involved 80 local teachers and educators on P/CVERLT issues in Konibodom, Spitamen, Jabbor Rasulov, and Zafarobod towns of the Sughd region. The courses were organized following a training course for teachers on preventing violent extremism in close co-operation with the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) in May 2018.

Similarly, the Office organized four one-day training courses for 120 grassroots citizens of the towns Isfara, Asht, Panjakent, and Istarafshan in the Sughd region. The courses were based on the OSCE handbook Preventing Terrorism and Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalisation Leading to Terrorism (VERLT): A Community Policing Approach, and aimed at improving the understanding of this complex issue among local communities. The activities also included receiving feedback from grassroots citizens on how to prevent and counter VERLT from their perspective.

“We are thankful to the OSCE for bringing these issues up, since the topic is very relevant and complex,” said Khalil Sharipov, a parent from Isfara. He also added that he and other parents are very much eager to disseminate the knowledge gained among their families and communities.

The community resilience activities are part of the OSCE Programme Office’s project on assisting the Government of Tajikistan in implementing its National Strategy and Action Plan on Preventing Violent Extremism and Terrorism by 2020.

VIENNA, 12 July 2018 - Co-operation between the OSCE’s participating States and role of public-private partnerships in enhancing cyber stability between States was the focus of today’s OSCE Permanent Council meeting in Vienna.

Opening the meeting, Ambassador Alessandro Azzoni, Permanent Representative of Italy to the OSCE and Chairperson of the OSCE Permanent Council, welcomed the contribution that the private sector can bring to ongoing discussions on measures to reduce the risk of conflict stemming from ICTs.

“When it comes to cybersecurity, public-private partnerships between governments and business are essential. In the current cyber domain, along with governmental actors, global tech companies are exploring interesting ways to contribute to boosting security, transparency and safety,” he said.

John Edward Frank, Vice President of EU Government Affairs at Microsoft, said: “The risk to our society is greatly increased by rising nation-state cyber offenses.Global technology companies have the first responsibility to respond to nation-state cyber actions against civilians, but it is a responsibility that must be shared across the entire technology sector, civil society and governments. Only collectively can we better protect and defend citizens.”

The contributions of the private sector to inter-state cyber stability have been recognized by the OSCE as essential since the private sector owns and operates most of the ICT infrastructure that would be targeted during cyber incidents that could lead to tensions between States.

Ambassador Azzoni also underlined the pioneering role of the OSCE in the area of cybersecurity and the organization’s contribution to reducing the risks stemming from the use of Information Communication Technologies (ICTs).

“The OSCE is the regional security organization with the most advanced toolbox to reduce potential risks of conflict stemming from the use of cyber capabilities,” said Ambassador Azzoni. “Italy, as 2018 Chair of the OSCE, is deeply committed to their implementation.”

Since 2013, OSCE participating States have adopted 16 confidence-building measures in the area of cyber/ICT security. They have established, among other things, official contact points and communication lines to prevent possible tensions resulting from cyber activities, and focused on further enhancing co-operation between States — including, for example, to effectively mitigate cyberattacks on critical infrastructure.

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VIENNA, 12 July 2017 – Strategic and innovative approaches to reducing the supply and demand of illicit drugs is the focus of this year’s annual OSCE-wide Conference on Combating the Threat of Illicit Drugs and the Diversion of Chemical Precursors, which takes place on 16 and 17 July at the Hofburg, Vienna. The meeting will bring together experts of OSCE participating States, Partners for Co-operation, international organizations and civil society.

The Conference is organized by the Italian OSCE Chairmanship and the Strategic Police Matters Unit of the OSCE Secretariat’s Transnational Threats Department.

During the Conference, participants will look at integrated and mutually reinforcing programmes to reduce supply and demand of illicit drugs; the relationship between drug control policy, security and development; prevention, early intervention and education as alternative strategies for today’s current practices; and the workings and possible shortcomings of the international drug control system.

The conference will be opened by Permanent Representative of Italy to the OSCE and Chairperson of the OSCE Permanent Council Alessandro Azzoni, UNODC Executive Director Yury Fedotov, OSCE Secretary General Thomas Greminger, and Director for Anti-drug Services at Italy’s Interior Ministry Giuseppe Cucchiara.

Representatives of the media are invited to cover the opening of the conference from 10:30 to 11:00 on Monday, 16 July 2017 in the Neuer Saal of the Hofburg Conference Centre. Please send an e-mail to press@osce.org by 09:00, Monday 16 July to confirm attendance.

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UDINE, Italy, 12 July 2018 – How to address concerns related to national minorities between states while promoting peaceful and good neighbourly relations will be the focus of a conference organized by the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) and the Italian 2018 OSCE Ch­airmanship in Udine, Italy on Monday, 16 July.

The conferenceis being held to mark ten years since the launch of the HCNM’s Bolzano/Bozen Recommendations on National Minorities in Inter-State Relations: New Challenges and Lessons Learned.

Introductory remarks will be made by the OSCE High Commissioner, Lamberto Zannier, the Italian OSCE Chairmanship Co-ordinator, Vinicio Mati, the President of Italy’s Friuli Venezia Giulia Region, Massimiliano Fedriga, and the Mayor of Udine, Pietro Fontanini. Following the keynote speech by the former President of Slovenia, Danilo Türk, representatives of participating States and experts will engage in discussion.

The event will be open to the media from 9:00 to 10:30 and there will be an opportunity for media representatives to meet the key speakers from 10:30 to 11:00. Journalists are invited to Sala Ajace, Palazzo D’Aronco, entrance from Piazza della Libertà 10, Udine. Media representatives should register by Sunday, 15 July, 18:00, by sending their name, contact details and the name of the media outlet they represent to Elisabetta Pozzetto, elisabetta.pozzetto@regione.fvg.it.

Further information and the agenda are available here.

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This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region, compared with the previous reporting period, and no ceasefire violations in Luhansk region. The SMM continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske; it again observed military presence inside the Zolote disengagement area. The SMM’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas.* Its access was also restricted near Khrustalnyi, Zaichenko and Kozatske, as well as near Izvaryne and Sievernyi, near the border with the Russian Federation, and near Druzheliubivka in Kherson region.* The Mission observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines near Starolaspa, Novooleksandrivka and Khrustalnyi. The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station, including through monitoring the security situation around the station, as well as repairs and maintenance works to other essential civilian infrastructure near Zalizne, Artema, Stanytsia Luhanska, Novotoshkivske and Raivka. The SMM monitored two gatherings in Kyiv, a gathering in Dnipro and followed up on court cases in Kharkiv region related to the fishing ship Nord.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations[1], including about 25 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 90 explosions).

On the evening and night of 10-11 July, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, an illumination flare in vertical flight, three projectiles in flight from east to west and five undetermined explosions, all 2-6km south.

On the evening and night of 10-11 July, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, 16 projectiles in flight from south-east to north-west and five projectiles from north-west to south-east, followed by totals of eight undetermined explosions and 134 projectiles (82 from south-east to north-west and 52 from north-west to south-east), all 6-10km north-east.

On the evening of 10 July, while in Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 14 shots of small-arms fire 1-1.5km west. During the day on 11 July, while at the same location, the SMM heard about 75 shots and bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire 1-1.5km north-west. Positioned in the north-western outskirts of Horlivka, the SMM heard about 100 shots and bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire 0.2-3km north-west.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded no ceasefire violations. In the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded ceasefire violations, including about 50 explosions.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk)[2], as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

Positioned in the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM saw a van with military licence plates, a red cross on a white background on both sides of the vehicle, and three people in military clothing inside enter the disengagement area from its northern edge and travel south-west in the direction of Katerynivka (government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk). About 15 minutes later, the SMM saw the same vehicle with three people in military clothing inside travel back along the same route and exit the disengagement area.

Positioned in the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, the SMM observed a calm situation.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas, on 10 July, an SMM mid-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted four probable self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) near Starolaspa (51km south of Donetsk) (see SMM Daily Report 6 July 2018). On 11 July, the SMM saw 13 stationary towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) west of Novooleksandrivka (75km south-east of Donetsk) and three stationary multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) near Khrustalnyi (formerly Krasnyi Luch, 56km south-west of Luhansk).*

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. In non-government-controlled areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines in Donetsk region, the SMM noted that a towed howitzer (D-30) and 15 mortars (PM-38, 120mm) were again missing.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles (ACVs) and anti-aircraft guns[3] in the security zone. In government-controlled-areas, on 10 July, an SMM mini-UAV spotted an infantry fighthing vehicle (IFV) (BMP-1) and two anti-aircraft guns (ZU-23-2), one of which was mounted on an armoured personel carrier (APC) (MT-LB), near a residential area of Trokhizbenka (32km north-west of Luhansk). On the same day, an SMM long-range UAV spotted two IFVs (BMP variants) near Pivnichne (formerly Kirove, 44km north-east of Donetsk), three IFVs (a BMP-2 and two BMP variants), an APC (BTR-80), an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRM-1K) and an artillery reconnaissance vehicle (PRP-4 Nard) near Novhorodske (35km north of Donetsk), as well as an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRM-1K), an IFV (BMP variant) near Krasnohorivka (21km west of Donetsk), two APCs (BTR-80) near Verkhnotoretske (23km north-east of Donetsk) and an ACV near Pisky (11km north-west of Donetsk).

In non-government-controlled areas, on 10 July, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted two IFVs (BMP-2) near Starolaspa and three IFVs (BMP-1) near Bila Kamianka (51km south of Donetsk).

The SMM continued to observe mines. On 10 July, an SMM mid-range UAV again spotted 12 anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid in two rows on a road about 800m north-west of Bila Kamianka (see SMM Daily Report 2 July 2018) and again spotted eight anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid across a road about 2km east of Starohnativka (government-controlled, 51km south of Donetsk) (see SMM Daily Report 4 April 2018).

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire. Positioned in areas near the DFS, the SMM heard ceasefire violations, despite explicit security guarantees (see above and table below for details). The SMM also continued to facilitate and monitor repairs to the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne (formerly Artemove, government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk), to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), a water channel in Stanytsia Luhanska, a water pipeline in Novotoshkivske (government-controlled, 53km west of Luhansk) and a power line near Raivka (non-government-controlled, 16km north-west of Luhansk).

The SMM continued to monitor the situation of civilians living close to the contact line. In Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the SMM saw about 15 people (11 women and four men, aged 55-70) waiting to collect water from a plastic reservoir in the centre of the village. A man (aged 60-70) told the SMM that many residents rely on public reservoirs for potable water.

The SMM also noted 15 Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel repairing a broken bridge south-west of Popasna on road T0504. (See SMM Daily Report 15 June 2018.)

The SMM visited two border areas not under government control. While at a border crossing point near Izvaryne (52km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw 30 cars (14 with Ukrainian and 13 with Russian Federation licence plates, and three with “LPR” plates), two covered cargo trucks (with Ukrainian licence plates) and 16 pedestrians in a queue to exit Ukraine. The SMM also saw three cars (one with Ukrainian and two with Russian Federation licence plates), a bus (with Ukrainian licence plates) and 13 pedestrians entering Ukraine. After ten minutes, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

While at a border crossing point near Sievernyi (50km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw eight pedestrians entering Ukraine. After about 15 minutes, an armed member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

The SMM monitored two gatherings in Kyiv. It saw a group of about 4,000 people (mostly men, mixed ages) and about 700 cars (all with foreign licence plates, mostly Polish and Lithuanian) blocking the street between the Parliament building at 5 Mykhaila Hrushevskoho Street and the Cabinet of Ministers building at 12/2 Mykhaila Hrushevskoho Street, as well as about 500 yellow-and-blue and black-and-white “Auto Euro Power” flags and posters related to a “lack of affordable cars in Ukraine”. In the area, the SMM saw about 360 police and 90 National Guard officers, nine military trucks, a police van, an ambulance, a fire truck, as well as ten police and National Guard buses parked nearby. In front of the Cabinet of Ministers building, the SMM saw a group of male protestors burning flares and a smoke-canister and, later in the day, the SMM observed that some of the protesters threw smoke flares in the direction of the National Guard officers. Around 14:00, the SMM noted that many people had started to disperse. No further incidents were observed while the SMM was present.

In a separate gathering in front of the Cabinet of Ministers building, the SMM saw about 600 people (mostly men, mixed ages), many of whom were wearing orange plastic work helmets and some were holding Ukrainian flags. The SMM heard those gathered expressing their support for the continued operation of a chemical factory in Ukraine. The gathering ended peacefully.

The SMM monitored a gathering in Dnipro of about 70 people (men and women, mixed ages), including representatives of religious communities, in a park near the Regional Council building at 2b Oleksandra Polia Avenue. The SMM heard speakers expressing support for freeing prisoners of war detained in the Russian Federation. The SMM also saw five young men (aged 14-20) wearing clothing with C-14 (Sich) insignia. The SMM did not see any police present and the gathering ended peacefully.

The SMM followed up on court cases related to the fishing ship Nord at a district court in Kharkiv region. According to the district court in Dergachi (16km north-west of Kharkiv) informed the SMM that the court cases related to the eight crew members of the fishing ship Nord had been closed on procedural grounds in accordance with Articles 38(2) and 247(7) of Code of Administrative Offences of Ukraine. (For previous reports, see SMM Daily Report 10 April 2018.)

The SMM continued monitoring in Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a border crossing point near Izvaryne, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.
• At a border crossing near Sievernyi, an armed member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.
• A member of the armed formations denied the SMM access to a compound near Khrustalnyi. From the outside, the SMM saw three MLRS inside the compound (see above).
• Two armed members of the armed formations at a checkpoint near Zaichenko (nongovernment-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol) again prevented the SMM from accessing Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) and Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol) citing “security concerns” and an “ongoing anti-terrorist operation”.
• At a checkpoint east of Kozatske (nongovernment-controlled, 36km north-east of Mariupol), two members of the armed formations, one of whom was armed, denied the SMM passage towards Porokhnia (non-government-controlled, 40km north-east of Mariupol), citing that authorization was needed from their “superiors”.
• At a checkpoint south of Druzheliubivka (121km southeast of Kherson), while monitoring the administrative boundary line between Kherson region and Crimea, a member of the Ukrainian Armed Forces prevented the SMM from accessing the dam citing orders “not to allow the OSCE to pass”.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by phone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by phone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. An unarmed formation member positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report. The SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Marinka was not operational during the reporting period.

[2] Due to presence of mines, including those on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remained limited; therefore, the review of the camera footage may take place days later.

[3] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

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BRUSSELS, 12 July 2018- ‎ The Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group (Igor Popov of the Russian Federation, Stephane Visconti of France and Andrew Schofer of the United States of America) hosted an introductory meeting between Foreign Minister of Armenia Zohrab Mnatsakanyan and Foreign Minister of Azerbaijan Elmar Mammadyarov on 11 July in Brussels. Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office Andrzej Kasprzyk also participated in the meeting. This was the first high-level meeting between the sides in this format since elections in Armenia and Azerbaijan.

The Ministers exchanged views regarding the situation on the ground and discussed next steps and parameters for re-engaging in substantive negotiations. The sides considered several issues for future meetings, including a range of possible confidence-building measures.

The Co-Chairs ‎stressed the importance of reducing tensions and avoiding inflammatory rhetoric. The Co-Chairs also reiterated their commitment to helping the sides find a peaceful solution to the conflict based on the core principles of the Helsinki Final Act, including the non-use or threat of force, territorial integrity, and the equal rights and self-determination of peoples.

The Ministers agreed to meet again in the near future under the auspices of the Co-Chairs.

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387659 Liana Khorovytska

More than 500 officials and civil society representatives from across Ukraine were trained on how state-funded social services can be delivered by non-governmental organizations, in a series of eight seminars organized by the OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine from May to July. The last workshop in the series, which took place in Poltava, ended on 12 July 2018. The others were held in Kyiv, Odesa, Vinnitsa, Chernivtsi, Lviv, Kramatorsk and Dnipro.

The Project Co-ordinator is supporting Ukrainian partners in contracting out social servicesto NGOs as a way of providing sustainable funding to the organizations and making the services more efficient and innovative. The approach was piloted with the outsourcing of palliative care in Kyiv and Cherkasy. The training seminars were intended to expand the practice to other social services and regions.

The participants included NGOs experienced in providing social services or aspiring to do so. Representatives of social policy and social protection departments at the regional, municipal and districts levels as well as regional territorial social services centres and respective units from amalgamated territorial communities also took part.

Civil society trainers, as well as speakers from the Ministry of Social Policy of Ukraine, the Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights and the Kyiv City Administration, focused on international and national legislation in the field. They also discussed effective mechanisms of engaging civil society organizations in the delivery of state-funded social services. Practical exercises helped participants to improve their skills in conducting social procurement procedures, with due regard to risks of potential conflicts of interest, and in calculating the cost of services. Other topics covered good practices in accounting, reporting, monitoring and evaluation.

The OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Uzbekistan supported a study visit for six representatives of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Uzbekistan to the Russian Federation and France, which took place from 29 June to 6 July 2018. The delegation consisted of judges and experts and was headed by the Deputy Chairperson of the Court, Askar Gafurov.

The purpose of the visit was to provide Uzbek counterparts with a better understanding of the constitutional oversight activities of state bodies in respective countries. The participants held several meetings with representatives of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, the Constitutional Legislation and State Development Committee of the Federation Council and State Duma of the Russian Federation`s Parliament, as well as the Institute of Legislation and Comparative Jurisprudence under the Government of the Russian Federation. They were familiarized with the procedures for submission and consideration of individual complaints to the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation.

During the study visit to France, the delegation took part in meetings organized at the National School of Magistrates, the Constitutional Council, the State Council, the Senate, the National Assembly and the European Court of Human Rights. The study tour participants familiarized themselves with constitutional oversight functions. In addition, special emphasis was put on the interaction between the Constitutional Council and the legislative and other judicial bodies in France.

Uzbek delegation head, Gafurov, informed the Russian and French counterparts about current developments in Uzbekistan and underlined the priority directions of the country's development for 2017-2021, which were set in the Uzbek Government’s the Strategy of Actions on Further Development of Uzbekistan.

The study visit was organized in co-operation with the embassies of the Russian Federation and France in Tashkent. The Project Co-ordinator in Uzbekistan supported this activity within the framework of its project “Assistance in improving the activities of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Uzbekistan: Phase II”. This study tour is a continuation of joint efforts by the Project Co-ordinator and the Constitutional Court to strengthen the latter’s important role within the judicial system.

387635 Communication and Media Relations Section

A workshop on how to set up an Advance Passenger Information (API) system in Moldova was organized by the Border Security and Management Unit (BSMU) of the OSCE’s Transnational Threats Department (TNTD) from 10 to 12 July in Chisinau. The aim of establishing an API system is to better regulate exit, entry, and transit of air passengers.

An API system is an electronic system through which biographic data from a traveller’s passport and flight details are collected by airlines and transmitted to the relevant national authorities at the border before the departure or arrival of a specific flight. By checking the data against law enforcement watch lists, such as those of INTERPOL, border officials can know in advance whether FTFs or other suspicious profiles are attempting to enter their country.

The workshop brought together 30 representatives from all agencies involved in aviation security in the country. They included the General Inspectorate of the Border Police, the Civil Aviation Authority, the Customs Service, the Security and Intelligence Service, the National Centre for Personal Data Protection, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the Ministry for Economy and Infrastructure.

The participants drafted a tailored action plan outlining the main steps that Moldova needs to take for setting up an API system. They worked together with border control officers from Hungary, Luxembourg and the United States, as well as experts from some of the OSCE’s international partners, like the European Union (EU), INTERPOL, and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). Commercial service providers and representatives from Lufthansa also contributed to the discussion by sharing their experience in transmitting API data to national governments.

Particular importance was given to ensuring proper communication with airlines and to the adoption of national laws allowing for the collection and storage of passenger data while fully respecting citizens’ right to privacy. Moldova’s Law on the State Border includes certain legal requirements related to API. However, some essential provisions are still missing, namely a reference to the law enforcement agencies that should have access to passenger data.

The path for the establishment of an API system in Moldova was paved by the creation in April 2017 of an inter-agency working group that will be responsible for formulating recommendations on the best way of setting up a passenger

The event in Moldova was the ninth workshop on API organized by TNTD/BSMU since December 2016. The workshops are being followed up with technical and legal consultations aimed at assisting local authorities in implementing API action plans.

MINSK, 11 July 2018 – The Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office in Ukraine and in the Trilateral Contact Group (TCG), Ambassador Martin Sajdik, made the following statement to the press after the meeting of the TCG ‎and its Working Groups in Minsk on 11 July 2018:

“As you remember, two weeks ago, the Trilateral Contact Group re-affirmed its full commitment to a comprehensive, sustainable and unlimited ceasefire, starting from1 July, 2018.

I am glad that the agreed cessation of fire is bringing results. Since it has entered into force, the number of ceasefire violations has significantly dropped, even though a certain increase could be observed over the past two days.

Also, according to the latest data provided by the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM), only one civilian casualty, an injury, has been registered. On behalf of the TCG, I would like to express my gratitude to, and support the efforts of, those committed to the ceasefire. Also, on behalf of the TCG, I call upon strict adherence to the ceasefire in the future.

Despite the reduction in the number of civilian casualties this year – less than half compared to the previous one – the population in the conflict area continues to suffer.

In this regard, the recommitment to the ceasefire needs to be matched by a concrete set of actions, namely the withdrawal of heavy weapons, disengagement, and demining. These particular aspects were addressed by the Co-ordinator of the Security Working Group and Chief Monitor of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, Ambassador Ertugrul Apakan.

The Economic Working Group continued its discussion of further steps to restore and improve the mobile communication of Vodafone-Ukraine in certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions (CADR and CALR, respectively). The issue of water deliveries in the "Karbonyt" and "Voda Donbassa" supply systems were also duly considered.

The Working Group on Political Issues further considered the implementation of the so-called ‘Steinmeier formula’, amnesty and modalities of local elections in CADR and CALR.

No meeting of the Working Group on Humanitarian Issues was scheduled for today and, accordingly, it did not convene. The Working Group will meet in the TCG framework on 25 July 2018.”

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KYIV, 11 July 2018 – Principal Deputy Chief Monitor of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine Alexander Hug will hold his regular news briefing on Thursday, 12 July, in Kyiv.

He will talk about the security situation throughout Ukraine and the Mission’s recent activities.

Journalists are invited to attend the news briefing tomorrow, 12 July, at 14:30 (Kyiv time), at the Ukrainian Crisis Media Centre, at the Ukrainian House, 2 Khreshchatyk Street.

Live streaming of the news briefing will be available at http://uacrisis.org/ru/stream/#eng

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Joana Karapataqi, OSCE Presence in Albania OSCE Presence in Albania

From 4 June to 11 July 2018, the OSCE Presence in Albania, together with the Albanian School of Public Administration, trained 200 public officials on issues of good governance, integrity and anti-corruption. The public officials of mid- and lower management level came from 20 municipalities from the regions of Tirana, Durrës, Elbasan, Gjirokastra and Dibra, with half of them coming from the Tirana Municipality alone.

The two-day training – tailored to the needs of the local municipality staff – was developed by the Presence, in co-operation with the Albanian and the Italian schools of public administration. It focused on the officials’ public responsibility, the need for effective oversight and enforcement of legal and sub-legal acts as a guarantee for preventing corrupt behavior, and the strengthening of the integrity of public officials.

The training sessions were part of the OSCE Presence’s project Support Anti-Corruption Measures in Albania, which is supported by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the Italian Development Co-operation Agency. The Presence’s contribution to anti-corruption efforts in Albania can be grouped under three main components: policy design and monitoring; capacity-building; and, provision of prevention, education and awareness-raising tools.

VIENNA, 11 July 2018 – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, today expressed his concern about an excessive sentence of 12 years in a penal colony handed down to Khayrullo Mirsaidov by a court in Tajikistan.

Mirsaidov, a former contributor to the Asia Plus news agency and the Deutsche Welle, who also led the satirical comedy show KVN, has been in custody since December 2017. Today he was found guilty of embezzlement of public funds, forgery of documents and dissemination of false information. Mirsaidov admitted to some of the charges, but maintains that his arrest and trial are retribution for an article he wrote on corruption among local authorities in November 2017.

“I am alarmed by the stringent and disproportionate sentence handed down to the journalist, especially given the sum of 124,000 Somoni (approx. 11,521 EUR) he is accused of embezzling,” the Representative stated.

“I call on the authorities to immediately release Khayrullo Mirsaidov and to ensure that journalists in Tajikistan are free to report on all matters of public interest without fear of reprisal,” Désir said.

The Representative previously intervened in the case of Khayrullo Mirsaidov in a letter to the authorities of Tajikistan in March 2018 and in a public statement in April 2018 (https://www.osce.org/representative-on-freedom-of-media/377761) expressing concern that the journalist's detention is a result of his professional activities.

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom.

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The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, compared with the previous reporting period. The Mission followed up on reports that a 14-year-old boy had been injured by the explosion of an object, which he had picked up in Zlatoustivka. It also followed up on reports of recent damage caused by shelling in a residential area of Zolote-4/Rodina. The SMM continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske; it recorded ceasefire violations near the Stanytsia Luhanska and Zolote disengagement areas and again observed military presence inside the Zolote disengagement area. The SMM’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas, as well as near Markyne, Nova Marivka and Bezimenne.* The Mission observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line. The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station, including through monitoring the security situation around the station, as well as repairs and maintenance works to other essential civilian infrastructure near Zalizne, Artema, Novotoshkivske and Raivka.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations[1], including more explosions (about 90), compared with the previous reporting period (15 explosions).

On the evening and night of 9-10 July, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, 11 projectiles in flight from north-north-west to south-south-east, three projectiles from west to east and ten projectiles from east-north-east to west-south-west, followed by totals of 11 undetermined explosions, about 190 projectiles (60 from west to east, 60 from east to west, 50 from west-north-west to east-south-east, 20 from north-west to south-east) and an illumination flare in vertical flight, all 1-3km south.

On the evening of 9 July, the SMM camera in Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, 28 projectiles in flight from south-west to north-east, two undetermined explosions, four projectiles from south-west to north-east and seven projectiles from north-east to south-west, followed by a total of 20 projectiles (16 from south-west to north-east and four from south-east to north-west), all 6-8km south-east. The following day, positioned on the south-eastern edge of Avdiivka, the SMM heard three undetermined explosions and about 60 shots of small-arms fire, all 0.5-3km at directions ranging from north-east to south-east.

On the evening of 9 July, the SMM camera at the Oktiabr mine (non-government-controlled, 9km north-west of Donetsk city centre) recorded four projectiles in flight from south-east to north-west, followed by 11 projectiles from north-west to south-east, all 3-5km north-east.

On the night of 9-10 July, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, four projectiles in flight from south to north, 15 projectiles from south-south-east to north-north-west, an illumination flare in vertical flight and six undetermined explosions, all 2-5km east-north-east and east.

On the evening and night of 9-10 July, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol) recorded, in sequence, a projectile in flight from west to east, eight undetermined explosions and two projectiles from east-north-east to west-south-west, followed by about 30 projectiles (20 from east to west and ten from west to east), all 2.5-7km south.

During the day on 10 July, positioned in the north-western outskirts of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard an undetermined explosion and 35 shots and bursts of small-arms fire 100-800m west, north-west and west, as well as about 20 undetermined explosions 5-6km north.

On the evening of 9 July, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard about 30 undetermined explosions, about 40 shots and bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, as well as about 20 minutes of uncountable and overlapping shots and bursts of small-arms fire, all 2-5km south and south-east.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including 50 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (four explosions).

During the day on 10 July, positioned 3.5km west of Orikhove-Donetske (government-controlled, 44km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard about 140 bursts of small-arms fire, assessed as live-fire training inside the security zone, in violation of the decision of the Trilateral Contact Group as of 3 March 2016 that prohibits the conduct of live-fire training in the security zone.

The SMM followed up on reports of a civilian injured by the explosion of an object in Zlatoustivka (government-controlled, 66km south-west of Donetsk). On 3 July, medical staff at a hospital in Mariupol (government-controlled, 102km south of Donetsk) told the SMM that on 2 July a 14-year-old boy had been admitted after having been injured by the explosion of an object and had undergone surgery. At the same hospital, the mother of the boy told the SMM that on 2 July, the boy had picked up an object in Zlatoustivka and brought it to their house on Tsentralna Street. She added that the object had exploded while he had been handling it in the yard of the house. On 4 July, staff at the village council in Zlatoustivka and local police in Volnovakha (government-controlled, 53km south of Donetsk) told the Mission that a boy had been admitted to the abovementioned hospital after having been injured by the explosion of an object in Zlatoustivka.

The SMM followed up on reports of damage caused by shelling in a residential area of Zolote-4/Rodina (government-controlled, 59km west of Luhansk). Accompanied by military-civil administration staff from the Ukrainian Armed Forces, the SMM observed a fresh hole in the north-facing roof of a single-storey house at 5-2 Zlatoustivska Street, assessed as caused by a recoilless gun (SPG-9) round fired from an undetermined direction. Inside the house, the SMM saw a fresh hole in the ceiling and shrapnel damage to the wall and floor. The owner of the house (man in his forties) told the SMM that the damage had occurred at around 02:00 on 10 July when his wife and his son had been in a room 1m away from the abovementioned damage to the floor.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote and Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk)[2], as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On the evening and night of 9-10 July, the SMM camera in Stanytsia Luhanska recorded 17 undetermined explosions 1.8-4km at directions ranging from south-south-east to south-west (unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area), as well as 15 undetermined explosions 2-8km at directions ranging from east-south-east to south (assessed as outside the disengagement area). On the night of 9-10 July, the SMM camera near the Prince Ihor monument south-east of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk) recorded seven undetermined explosions 4-8km south (assessed as outside the disengagement area). The same night, while on the eastern edge of Stanytsia Luhanska, the SMM heard four shots of small-arms fire 1-1.5km south (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

On the evening and night of 9-10 July, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded, in sequence, two projectiles in flight from north-north-west to south-south-east, an undetermined explosion, seven projectiles from east to west and ten undetermined explosions, all 4-10km at directions ranging from east-south-east to south (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

During the day on 10 July, positioned on the north-western edge of Katerynivka (government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk) inside the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM observed a black car with military licence plates and a Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier inside drive out of the disengagement area and travel east towards Zolote-4/Rodina.

During the day on 10 July, positioned in the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area and near the Petrivske disengagement area, the SMM observed calm situations.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in a government-controlled area, on 9 July, an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted again a surface-to-air missile system (9K35, Strela-10) parked in the yard of a house in Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (61km west of Luhansk) (see SMM Daily Report 21 June 2018).

In violation of withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas, on 9 July, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted again a tank (T-72) in the south-eastern residential area of Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, 23km north-east of Mariupol) (see SMM Daily Report 7 July 2018). The same day, an SMM long-range UAV spotted four towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) in Sofiivka (formerly Karlo‑Marksove,40km north-east of Donetsk). On 10 July, an SMM mini-UAV spotted three tanks (T-64) about 1km north-west of Lobacheve (13km east of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in non-government-controlled areas, aerial imagery revealed the presence on 8 July of 53 tanks (type undetermined) in a training area about 3km west of Manuilivka (65km east of Donetsk), where on 21 June the SMM had observed 49 tanks (type undetermined) (see SMM Daily Report 27 June 2018). On 10 July, the SMM observed three towed howitzers (D-30) and three tanks (T-72), all stationary at a training area in Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk).

The SMM revisited a permanent storage site whose location was beyond the respective withdrawal lines in areas of Luhansk region outside government control and noted that four tanks (three T-64 and one T-72) were again missing.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles (ACV)[3] in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 9 July, an SMM long-range UAV spotted two infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP-2) parked in the yard of a house in Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (see above), seven IFVs (two BMP-1, two BMP-2, and three BMP variants) near Zolote, three IFVs (one BMP-2 and two BMP variants) near Popasna (69km west of Luhansk) and five IFVs (BMP variants) near Troitske (69km west of Luhansk). The same day, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted an ACV (type undetermined) near Vodiane (94km south of Donetsk). On 10 July, the SMM saw an IFV (BTR-4) near Vesele (21km north of Donetsk), an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (MT-LB variant) near Trokhizbenka (32km north-west of Luhansk) and a probable IFV (BMP variant) on the south-western edge of Zolote-4/Rodina.

In non-government-controlled-areas, aerial imagery revelead the presence on 8 July of an ACV (type undetermined) north of Oleksandrivka (20km south-west of Donetsk). On 9 July, an SMM long-range UAV spotted eight APCs (MT-LB) and an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) in Kalynove-Borshchuvate (61km west of Luhansk), an APC (MT-LB variant) near Veselohorivka (64km west of Luhansk) and an APC (MT-LB) in Stare (formerly Chervonyi Prapor, 58km west of Luhansk). The same day, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted five IFVs (BMP-1) and an APC (BTR-80) in the Kirpoty neighbourhood of eastern Pikuzy. On 10 July, an SMM mini-UAV spotted four IFVs (BMP-1), an APC (MT-LB) and an ACV (type undetermined) near Lobacheve (see above).

The SMM continued to observe mines and mine hazard signs. On 9 July, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted for the first time 51 anti-tank mines (TM-62) on the south-eastern edge of Vodiane. The same day, an SMM mini-UAV spotted again 41 anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid out in three rows across road H-21 about 200m east-south-east of the bridge south of Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk). (See SMM Daily Report 19 March 2018.)

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire. Positioned in areas near the DFS, the SMM heard ceasefire violations, despite explicit security guarantees (see above and table below for details). The SMM also continued to facilitate and monitor repairs to the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne (formerly Artemove, government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk), to the Petrivske pumping station in Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), a water pipeline in Novotoshkivske (government-controlled, 53km west of Luhansk) and a power line in Raivka (non-government-controlled, 16km north-west of Luhansk).

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (see, for example, SMM Daily Report 7 July 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• Two armed members of the armed formations again stopped the SMM at a checkpoint east of Oleksandrivske (formerly Rozy Liuksemburh, nongovernment controlled, 90km south of Donetsk) and prevented it from travelling further west in the direction of Markyne (non-government-controlled, 94km south of Donetsk), where a training area is located. They said that they had orders not to allow the SMM to pass through the checkpoint. (The SMM’s freedom of movement had been recently restricted in the same area. See SMM Daily Report 4 July 2018.)

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by phone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by phone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.5
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. An unarmed formation member positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.
• The SMM was again prevented from accessing Nova Marivka (nongovernment-controlled, 64km south of Donetsk) due to the presence of three visible UXOs near a tree which was lying across the road about 3km east of the village. (See SMM Daily Report 25 June 2018.)

Other impediments:

• On three occasions, the SMM temporarily lost communication with its miniUAV flying over the centre of Bezimenne (non-government-controlled, 30km east of Mariupol), assessed as due to jamming. The SMM landed the UAV safely.[5]
• On the evening of 9 July, the SMM temporarily lost communication with its longrange UAV flying over an area near Sofiivka, assessed as due to jamming. The SMM landed the UAV safely.6

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report. The SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Marinka was not operational during the reporting period.

[2] Due to presence of mines, including those on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remained limited; therefore, the review of the camera footage may take place days later.

[3] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

[5] The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position.

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