OSCE

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions between the evenings of 2 and 3 November, compared with the previous reporting period. Between the evenings of 3 and 4 November, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and a sharp increase in ceasefire violations in Luhansk region, compared with the previous 24 hours. The SMM recorded ceasefire violations inside the Stanytsia Luhanska and Zolote disengagement areas. On 4 November, the Mission heard an explosion 300-400m north of its location in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka as well as at least 15 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire 500m from its location in the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area. It saw weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line. The Mission’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas. It was also restricted in Holmivskyi, near Novoazovsk – an area close to the border with the Russian Federation – and Verkhnoshyrokivske, and again near Zaichenko and Bezimenne.* The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable demining near Zolote-2/Karbonit and Nyzhnoteple. In Kyiv, the SMM monitored a public gathering organized in memory of Kateryna Handziuk, a Kherson city council official and civil society activist who died on 4 November after having suffered severe acid injuries in an attack on 31 July 2018.

In Donetsk region, between the evenings of 2 and 3 November, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations,[1] including about 370 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 230 explosions). Between the evenings of 3 and 4 November, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 260 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours.[2]

On the evening and night of 2-3 November, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded an explosion assessed as an incoming round, seven undetermined explosions and about 200 projectiles in flight (mostly from westerly to easterly directions), all at an assessed range of 1-5km at southerly directions. On the following day, the same camera recorded 12 explosions assessed as impacts of rounds of undetermined weapons 1-2km south, as well as 37 undetermined explosions and about 40 projectiles in flight (mostly from westerly to easterly directions), all at an assessed range of 1-5km at southerly directions. On the evening and night of 3-4 November, the same camera recorded three undetermined explosions and 19 projectiles in flight (mostly from north-westerly to south-easterly directions), all at an assessed range of 1-2km at south-westerly directions.

During the day on 3 November, positioned 1km north-west of the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 56 undetermined explosions and about 300 shots and bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all at an assessed range of 1-6km at directions ranging from south to north-north-west. On the following day, at the same location, the Mission heard 23 undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 1-5km north-north-east and south-west.

On the same day, positioned on the eastern edge of Kamianka (government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard 14 undetermined explosions and ten bursts of small-arms fire, all at an assessed range of 3-5km south-south-east. The following day, positioned on the eastern edge of Kamianka, the SMM heard 22 explosions (16 assessed as outgoing rounds, two as impacts and the remainder undetermined) and ten bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all at an assessed range of 2-4km north-north-east and south-south-west.

During the day on 4 November, positioned at the central railway station in Donetsk city (non-government-controlled, 6km north-west of Donetsk city centre), the SMM heard 22 undetermined explosions and about 50 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all at an assessed range of 1-4km north-east and north-north-west.

On the evening of 2 November, while in Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard about 90 undetermined explosions and about 40 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all at an assessed range of 5-7km west-south-west and north-west. On the evening and night of 3-4 November, at the same location, the Mission heard 110 undetermined explosions and about 160 bursts of infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) cannon (30mm), anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) and heavy-machine-gun fire, all at an assessed range of 3-6km south-west, west-north-west and north-west.

On the evening of 2 November, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 23 undetermined explosions and about 300 shots and bursts of automatic grenade launcher, heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all at an assessed range of 3-4km south-south-east. The following day, the SMM heard about 90 undetermined explosions and 42 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all at an assessed range of 3-7km south.

In Luhansk region, between the evenings of 2 and 3 November, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including, however, fewer explosions (ten), compared with the previous reporting period (about 70 explosions). Between the evenings of 3 and 4 November, the SMM recorded almost twice as many ceasefire violations (about 1,000), including about 420 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours. Most ceasefire violations were recorded in areas near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and between Sentianivka (formerly Frunze, non-government-controlled, 44km west of Luhansk) and Zholobok (non-government-controlled, 47km west of Luhansk).

During the day on 4 November, positioned in Sentianivka, the SMM heard about 220 undetermined explosions and about 330 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all at an assessed range of 3-6km west-north-west and north-west.

On the same day, while in Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, non-government-controlled, 50km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard about 110 explosions at an assessed range of 10-15km north-north-east and north-north-west.

On the same day, positioned in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard an explosion (assessed as an airburst ) 300-400m north, six bursts of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 300-500m north-west, as well as seven undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 1-2km north.

The SMM continued to monitor and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote and Petrivske[3] (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On the evening of 2 November, the SMM camera at Prince Ihor Monument south-east of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk) recorded two outgoing explosions at an assessed range of 0.3-1km north-north-west (assessed as inside the disengagement area), as well as an undetermined explosion and 30 projectiles in flight (mostly from north-easterly to south-westerly directions) at an assessed range of 0.3-1.5km north-west, north-north-west and north (assessed as inside the disengagement area). On the same evening, the SMM camera in Stanytsia Luhanska recorded 12 projectiles in flight (five from west to east and seven from northerly to southerly directions), all at an assessed range of 0.5-1km south and south-south-west (all assessed as inside the disengagement area).

On the same evening, while on the eastern edge of Stanytsia Luhanska, the SMM heard four undetermined explosions and about 120 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all at an assessed range of 1.5-6km south-south-west and south-west, assessed as outside the disengagement area. The Mission also heard four undetermined explosions and about 300 shots and bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all at an assessed range of 2-6km south-south-west and south-west (unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area).

During the day on 4 November, positioned 250m south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM heard at least 15 bursts of small-arms fire 500m north-north-west, assessed as inside the disengagement area. On the same day, positioned 1km south-south-east of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the Mission heard two bursts of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 1-2km north-west, assessed as inside the disengagement area.

On the evening and night of 2-3 November, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded four projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 1-3km south-east, assessed as inside the disengagement area, and six projectiles in flight 2-5km east-north-east, assessed as outside the disengagement area. During the day on 3 November, positioned on the northern edge of Zolote, the SMM heard two undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 2-3km south-south-east, assessed as outside the disengagement area. On the same day, the SMM saw a tanker truck painted in camouflage colours driven by a Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier entering the disengagement area from the north-eastern outskirts of Katerynivka (government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk).

During the day on 4 November, positioned in Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the Mission heard 20 bursts of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 2-3km north-north-east, assessed as inside the disengagement area, as well as 32 undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 5-7km north-north-east and 12 bursts and shots of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 1-2km north-north-east, all assessed as outside the disengagement area. The same day, positioned in Zolote, the SMM heard 40 shots and bursts of automatic grenade launcher, heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire at an assessed range of 2-3km south-west, all assessed as outside the disengagement area.

During the day on 3 November, positioned north of Petrivske, the SMM heard two bursts of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 3-4km south-south-east, assessed as outside the disengagement area. On 4 November, at the same location, the Mission observed a calm situation.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of the withdrawal lines in a government-controlled area, on 2 November, an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted again a towed howitzer (2A36 Giatsint-B, 152 mm) near Druzhba (76km west of Luhansk).

In violation of the withdrawal lines in a non-government-controlled area, on 2 November, an SMM long-range UAV spotted a surface-to-air missile system (9K31, Strela-1) and a probable mortar south of Kalynove (60km west of Luhansk).

Beyond the respective withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in a government-controlled area, on 2 November, an SMM mini-UAV spotted ten towed howitzers (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) near Novomaiorske (64km south-west of Donetsk).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. On 4 November, in government-controlled areas of Donetsk region, the SMM saw a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10), eight multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) and two tanks (T-64), and noted that two surface-to-air missile systems (9K35), 27 MLRS (BM-21) and a self-propelled howitzer (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) were again missing.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles, anti-aircraft guns as well as new trenches and firing positions in the security zone.[4] In government‑controlled areas, on 2 November, an SMM mini-UAV spotted an IFV (BMP variant) and an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) parked near houses, as well as in total 100m of trenches (not seen in imagery from 29 August 2018) in Novozvanivka (70km west of Luhansk). On the same day, an SMM long-range UAV spotted two IFVs (BMP variants) near Hladosove (51km north-east of Donetsk), three IFVs (BMP-2) near Novotoshkivske (53km west of Luhansk), two IFVs (BMP variants) near Katerynivka, three IFVs (BMP-1) near Vershyna (63km north-east of Donetsk) and two IFVs (BMP-1) east of Bila Hora (54km north of Donetsk). On 3 November, the SMM saw three armoured personnel carriers (APC) (BTR-70) in Novoselivka Druha (36km north-east of Mariupol).

In non-government-controlled areas, on 2 November, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an IFV (BMP-1) near Lozove (52km north-east of Donetsk); an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRM-1K), an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) mounted atop an APC (MT-LB) and three probable IFVs (BMP-1) south of Kalynove (at the same location as the above-mentioned probable mortar and surface-to-air missile system) and six APCs (MT-LB), one with an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23), and four probable IFVs (BMP variants) near Kalynove-Borshchuvate (61km west of Luhansk). The same day, an SMM long-range UAV spotted new trenches totalling 400m on the eastern side of the road between Dolomitne (53km north-east of Donetsk) and Novoluhanske (government-controlled, 53km north-east of Donetsk) (not seen in imagery from 29 August 2018) about 500m south from previously observed trenches (see SMM Daily Report 5 July 2018) and a 50m-long trench extension about 2.5km north-west from Nyzhnie Lozove (59km north-east of Donetsk). The same day, the SMM saw a probable IFV (BMP variant) in Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk). On 4 November, the Mission saw an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) loaded on the back of a military-type truck in Donetsk city.

On 3 November, an SMM mini-UAV spotted ten new firing positions next to previously observed trenches on the eastern edge of Zolote-4/Rodina (government-controlled, 59km west of Luhansk). The mini-UAV also spotted ongoing upgrades of previously spotted trenches on the north-eastern edge of Zolote-5/Mykhailivka, broken cupboards and closets used to fortify and cover them and six armed persons in camouflage clothes nearby. (For previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 1 November 2018).

On 2 November, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted at least 38 craters assessed as caused by artillery rounds: 18 on the western edge of Zholobok and 20 about 1km south-east of Zholobok (all not seen in imagery from 15 October 2018). The Mission assessed that the rounds had been fired from north-north-westerly and north-westerly directions.

The SMM saw demining activities. On 4 November, the Mission saw 12 people (six men, six women) wearing clothing bearing the logo of an international demining organization conducting demining activities in a field east of road T1309 3km north of Shyrokyi (government-controlled, 38km north-east of Luhansk). A representative of the demining team told the SMM that the area being cleared of mines was about 28,000m2 in size and that it would take up to five months to complete mine clearance (for previous observations from this area, see SMM Daily Report 17 October 2018). The Mission also saw people wearing clothing bearing the logo of an international demining organization conducting demining activities in a forested area and an agricultural field about 4km north-east of Krasna Talivka (government-controlled, 51km north-east of Luhansk).

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable demining activities in Zolote-2/Karbonit (government-controlled, 62km west of Luhansk) and Nyzhnoteple (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk). The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS.

On 4 November, the SMM saw heavy engineering equipment and about 20 Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers conducting repair works at a bridge on road T0504 south-west of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 12 September 2018).

The SMM continued to monitor the situation of civilians living near the contact line. On 3 November, two women (in their sixties) in Zolote-4/Rodina told the SMM that the security situation in the village was very tense and heavy shelling and shooting occurred on a daily basis. According to the women, about 40 people remain in Volnyi Hutor, the neighbourhood of Zolote-4/Rodina closest to the contact line, which, they said, was completely without electricity. 

On 2 and 3 November, the SMM saw a billboard on the northern side of the entry-exit checkpoint in Stanytsia Luhansk reading in Ukrainian: “The SBU warns: participating in the CALO elections constitutes a high treason”.

The SMM visited two border areas outside government control. On 3 November, while at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for about 60 minutes, the SMM saw 44 cars (eight with Ukrainian, 18 with Russian Federation and two with Georgian license plates, and 16 with “DPR” plates) exiting Ukraine. During the same time, the Mission saw three minivans (one with Ukrainian and one with Russian Federation license plates, and one with “DPR” plates) entering Ukraine. The same day, while at a pedestrian border crossing point in Novoborovytsi (79km south of Luhansk) for about 30 minutes, the SMM saw no cross-border traffic.

On 4 November, in Kyiv, the SMM monitored a public gathering organized in commemoration of Kateryna Handziuk, a 33-year-old Kherson city council official and civil society activist who died on 4 November. She had suffered severe injuries in a 31 July acid attack (see SMM Daily Report 2 August 2018). The Mission saw about 400 people (60 per cent men, 40 per cent women, 20-60 years old), including representatives of political parties and civil society, attending the commemoration in front of the building of the Ministry of Interior Affairs of Ukraine at 10 Akademika Bohomoltsia Street. It observed at least 20 people (ten men, ten women, 25-45 years old) holding banners with messages “She was killed!” and “Who killed Kateryna Handziuk” written in Ukrainian. The participants paid tribute by observing a minute of silence and laying flowers and candles. The SMM observed police officers in riot gear standing around the corner of Pylypa Orlyka Street and that Akademika Bohomoltsia Street was blocked off at both ends by three police cars.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• On 3 and 4 November respectively, at a checkpoint about 1km north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), two members of the armed formations again stopped the SMM and denied it passage to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) and to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), citing risks “to the SMM’s security” on 3 November and “ongoing shelling in the area” on 4 November.
• On 3 and 4 November, at a checkpoint near Bezimenne (non-government-controlled, 30km east of Mariupol), three armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage west along road M14, citing “orders from their supervisors” on 3 November and “ongoing shelling in the area” on 4 November.
• On 3 and 4 November, at a checkpoint near Novoazovsk (non-government-controlled, 40km east of Mariupol), near the border with the Russian Federation, members of the armed formations again prevented the SMM from passing through to the city. On both days, the SMM observed cars proceeding through the checkpoint.
• On 3 November, in Holmivskyi (non-governmentcontrolled, 49km north-east of Donetsk), an armed member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area, saying it “was dangerous for the SMM”.
• On two occasions on 4 November, at a checkpoint about 600m west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), a member of the armed formations prevented the SMM from traveling east after the SMM refused to show its patrol plan. The Mission saw cars passing through the checkpoint.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• On 3 and 4 November, the SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC on both occasions.[5]
• On 3 and 4 November, the SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC on both occasions.5
• On 3 November, the SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

Other impediments:

• On the night of 3 and 4 November, an SMM long-range UAV temporarily lost its GPS signal, assessed as due to signal interference, while flying over areas near Temriuk (non-government-controlled, 18km south-east of Donetsk), Slavne (government-controlled, 26km south-west of Donetsk) and Syhnalne (non-government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk).[6]

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. 

[2] Between the evenings of 2 and 3 November, the SMM cameras in Krasnohorivka and in Svitlodarsk were not operational. Between the evenings of 3 and 4 November, the SMM camera in Krasnohorivka was not operational.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[5] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC withdrew from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

[6] The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position.

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402050 Kunduz Rysbek "Development of E-business & E-commerce in Central Asia"

How to promote economic prosperity and growth through e-business and e-commerce was the focus of an international conference in Bishkek held on 1 and 2 November 2018, which was organized jointly by the Ministry of Economy of the Kyrgyz Republic and the OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek.

The conference brought together more than 130 participants from across the Central Asian region, countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States, and Europe. They included representatives of the private sector, specifically tech companies and financial institutions, academia and a number of international organizations such as the World Customs Organization as well as the 2018 Italian OSCE Chairmanship.

The participants highlighted the benefits of e-business and e-commerce and how to develop these in the Central Asian region, such as the role of governments in introducing relevant legal measures and simplifying customs and tax procedures.

Ambassador Pierre von Arx, Head of the OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek, noted the need for countries in the region to harmonize legislation and administrative and customs procedures.

“The development of sustainable e-business and e-commerce naturally requires international co-operation, including addressing the challenges they face. The OSCE has a role here as a platform for dialogue,” he said.

Eldar Abakirov, Deputy Economy Minister of the Kyrgyz Republic, said digital markets offer great potential in providing new opportunities for the private sector in reaching new customers, various business partners for co-operation, and expanding their markets.

The conference provided attending government representatives with a fresh outlook on the legal framework necessary to encourage e-business and support small and medium-sized enterprises, thereby enhancing their knowledge in the development of digital business.

Participants also discussed their experiences and shared good practices in building sustainable e-businesses and in improving data and privacy protection strategies, as well as cybersecurity, in digital markets.

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more ceasefire violations in Luhansk region, compared with the previous reporting period. The SMM saw weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line. The SMM recorded ceasefire violations near the Stanytsia Luhanska and Zolote disengagement areas. The Mission’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas; it was also restricted near Novoazovsk and Sievernyi – areas close to the border with the Russian Federation – as well as Zaichenko and Bezimenne.* The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne, damaged houses in Marinka and Krasnohorivka and the Petrivske water pumping station near Artema, as well as to enable demining near Novotroitske, Zolote-2/Karbonit and Nyzhnoteple.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations[1], including, however, more explosions (about 230), compared with the previous reporting period (about 200 explosions).  

On the evening and night of 1-2 November, the SMM camera 1.5km north-east of Hnutove (government-controlled, 20km north-east of Mariupol) recorded about 115 projectiles in flight (mostly from west-south-west to east-north-east) at estimated ranges of 2-4km east and east-south-east.

On the same evening and night, the SMM camera east of Lomakyne (government-controlled, 15km north-east of Mariupol) recorded three explosions (one assessed as an outgoing round of an undetermined weapon and two undetermined) and about 120 projectiles in flight (mostly from north-west to south-east and from south-east to north-west), all at estimated ranges of 2-5km north-east and east-north-east.

On the same evening and night, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol) recorded an undetermined explosion and about 160 projectiles in flight (mostly from east to west and from west to east), all at estimated ranges of 1-4km east, south-south-east and south.

During the day on 2 November, positioned about 1km north-west of the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk) for about five hours, the SMM heard and saw three explosions assessed as outgoing mortar rounds 1km west-south-west, nine explosions assessed as impacts: one of an artillery round 1km south-west, one of an automatic grenade launcher (AGL) round 1-2km south, seven of undetermined weapons rounds 2-4km south-west, as well as an undetermined explosion 3-5km south-west. It also heard four explosions assessed as outgoing AGL rounds 1-3km south and south-west, an explosion assessed as the impact of a mortar round 3-4km south-west, as well as three explosions assessed as impacts of undetermined weapons rounds and about 65 undetermined explosions and about 390 bursts and shots of infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-2) cannon (30mm), heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all at estimated ranges of 1-6km at easterly, southerly and northerly directions. On the same day, positioned in the same location, it also heard two shots of small-arms fire 200m south-west.

During the day on 2 November, positioned on the eastern edge of Kamianka (government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk) for about three hours, the SMM heard an undetermined explosion and eight shots of small-arms fire 400-500m east and east-south-east, as well as 25 undetermined explosions at estimated ranges of 1-7km at directions ranging from east to south.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including, however, fewer explosions (about 70), compared with the previous reporting period (about 100 explosions).

On the morning of 2 November, positioned in Veselohorivka (non-government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 21 undetermined explosions at estimated ranges of 4-5km west-south-west.

On 1 November, while it was flying a mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) near Zhovte (non-government-controlled, 17km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM had heard 40 shots of small-arms fire 2.4km north-north-west of its position (see SMM Daily Report 2 November 2018). Further analysis of the UAV footage shows a man between Zhovte and Lopaskyne (government-controlled, 23km north-west of Luhansk), in an area under government control, firing a rifle at the UAV.

The SMM continued to monitor and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske[2] (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

During the day on 2 November, while at the eastern edge of Stanytsia Luhanska, the SMM heard an undetermined explosion at an estimated range of 2.5-3km south-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

On the morning of 2 November, positioned on the southern edge of the Zolote disengagement area for about 15 minutes, the SMM heard five undetermined explosions at estimated ranges of 3-5km north-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area). On the same morning, positioned in the southern outskirts of Zolote for about 20 minutes, the SMM heard six explosions assessed as outgoing rounds of undetermined weapons and five shots of small-arms fire, all 2km south-south-east (all assessed as outside the disengagement area). On the same morning, positioned in Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) for about ten minutes, the SMM heard four explosions assessed as outgoing rounds of undetermined weapons 10km south-south-east and a shot of small-arms fire 1-2km south, all assessed as outside the disengagement area.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas, on 1 November, an SMM mini-UAV spotted a probable mortar (2B14 Podnos, 82mm) near Lopaskyne. On the same day, an SMM long-range UAV spotted four tanks (T-72) near Prychepylivka (50km north-west of Luhansk) and a towed howitzer (2A36 Giatsint-B, 152 mm) near Druzhba (76km west of Luhansk).

In violation of withdrawal lines in a non-government-controlled area, on 1 November, an SMM mini-UAV spotted a probable mortar (type undetermined) near Zhovte. 

Beyond the respective withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in government-controlled areas, on 1 November, an SMM long-range UAV spotted a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10) in Chervonyi Zhovten (40km north of Luhansk) and a surface-to-air missile system (9K35) near Novoaidar (49km north-west of Luhansk). On the same day, the SMM saw seven surface-to-air missile systems (9K33 Osa) in Rubizhne (84km north-west of Luhansk) – four of them without missiles or covers. On 2 November, the SMM saw two surface-to-air missile systems (9K33): one near Selidove (41km north-west of Donetsk) and one near Kasianivka (22km north of Mariupol).

The SMM visited areas previously holding weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. In non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region, the SMM noted that 11 multiple launch rocket systems (BM-21 Grad, 122mm), eight anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) and nine self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) were again missing.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles (ACV), anti-aircraft guns [3] and other indications of military-type presence in the security zone. In government‑controlled areas, on 1 November, an SMM mini-UAV spotted three ACVs (type undetermined), a modified armoured personnel carrier (APC) (MT-LB) with an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm), an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23-2) and a probable modified APC (MT-LB) with an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) near Lopaskyne. On the same day, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an APC (MT-LB), an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) and two IFVs (BMP-2) near Krymske (42km north-west of Luhansk); three IFVs (BMP-1) near Novotoshkivske (53km west of Luhansk); three IFVs (one BMP-1 and two BMP-2) near Zolote-4/Rodina (60km west of Luhansk); four IFVs (three BMP-1 and one BMP-2) and two APCs (one MT-LB and one BTR variant) near Prychepylivka; three IFVs (BMP-1), three APCs (one BTR-70, one BTR-60 and one MT-LB6M with an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) mounted on top) and an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) near Heivka (27km north-west of Luhansk); and an APC (BTR-70) near Hirske (63km west of Luhansk). On 2 November, an SMM mini-UAV spotted an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23-2) mounted on a military truck and an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) in a military compound near Novhorodske (35km north of Donetsk). On the same day, the SMM saw two IFVs (BMP-1) near Popasna (69km west of Luhansk), an APC (BTR-80) in Zolote-3/Stakhanovets and an IFV (BTR-4) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk).

In non-government-controlled areas, on 1 November, an SMM mini-UAV spotted an ACV (type undetermined) and an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) near Dovhe (22km north-west of Luhansk) as well as 50 metres of new trenches running from north-east to south-west between residential houses in Zhovte (not visible in imagery from 9 October 2018). On 2 November, the SMM saw an APC (BTR-70) near Zaichenko (26km north-east of Mariupol) and 11 APCs (MT-LB) – three of which had mounted anti-aircraft guns (ZU-23-2) – near Pervomaisk (58km west of Luhansk).

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to the Petrivske water pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), damaged houses in Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) and Krasnohorivka (government-controlled, 21km west of Donetsk) and the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne (government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk). It also facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable demining activities near Novotroitske (government-controlled, 36km south-west of Donetsk), Zolote-2/Karbonit (government-controlled, 62km west of Luhansk) and Nyzhnoteple (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk). The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) and recorded about 740 ceasefire violations within a 15km radius around the DFS, including about 150 explosions (see ceasefire table below).

The SMM visited a border area outside government control. While at a border crossing point near Sievernyi (50km south-east of Luhansk) for about five minutes, the SMM saw six pedestrians (one man around 70 years old and five women around 50 years old) entering Ukraine. A member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• At a checkpoint about 1km north of Zaichenko, an armed member of the armed formations again stopped the SMM and denied it passage to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) and to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), citing risks “to the SMM’s security”.
• At a checkpoint near Bezimenne (non-government-controlled, 30km east of Mariupol), three armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage west along road M14, citing “orders from their supervisors”. At the same time, the SMM observed civilian vehicles passing through the checkpoint.
• At a checkpoint near Novoazovsk (non-government-controlled, 40km east of Mariupol), near the border with the Russian Federation, two members of the armed formations again prevented the SMM from passing through to the city and accessing Siedove (non-government-controlled, 106km south of Donetsk). The SMM observed cars proceeding through the checkpoint.
• At a border crossing point near Sievernyi, a member of the armed formations again told the SMM to leave the area.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.5
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.
• The SMM did not travel across the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk) due to the presence of mines. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by phone that there were mines on the road south of the bridge. The SMM informed the JCCC.5

Other impediments:

• An SMM mini-UAV temporarily lost its GPS signal due to signal interference while flying near Zernove (non-government-controlled, 70km south of Donetsk).[5]

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. 

[2] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[3] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC withdrew from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

[5] The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position.

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This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions compared with the previous reporting period. The Mission heard small-arms fire assessed as directed at its mini-unmanned aerial vehicle flying near Zhovte. The SMM recorded ceasefire violations near the Zolote disengagement area, including an impact explosion 200-500m from its positon. The Mission’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas; it was also restricted near Novoazovsk and Voznesenivka – areas close to the border with the Russian Federation – Luhansk city and again near Zaichenko.* The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne, to damaged houses in Marinka and Krasnohorivka and to critical civilian infrastructure in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, as well as to enable demining near Nyzhnoteple.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations[1], including about 200 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 130 explosions).  

On the evening and night of 31 October, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard about 80 explosions and nearly 500 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 2-7km at southerly directions.

The same evening, while in Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard about 30 explosions (23 assessed as outgoing, the remainder undetermined) and seven bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 5-7km at north-westerly directions.

Also on the evening of 31 October, the SMM camera 1.5km north-east of Hnutove (government-controlled, 20km north-east of Mariupol) recorded four undetermined explosions and about 160 projectiles in flight (mostly from westerly to easterly directions), all 2-4km at easterly directions.

During the day on 1 November, positioned on the eastern edge of Kamianka (government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard an undetermined explosion 1-2km south-east followed by another undetermined explosion less than 500m east of its position. The SMM immediately departed the area.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 100 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (three explosions).

On the night of 31 October, while in Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, non-government-controlled, 50km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 56 undetermined explosions 4-6km north-north-east and north-east and 26 undetermined explosions 10-17km north-north-east.

Small arms fire was again assessed as directed at an SMM unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV). While conducting a mini-UAV flight in the southern outskirts of Zhovte (non-government-controlled, 17km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 40 shots of small-arms fire about 2km north-north-west of its position, in the area where the UAV was flying, and assessed it as aimed at the UAV. The SMM landed the UAV without damage and left the area.*

The SMM continued to monitor and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske[2] (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

In the late afternoon of 31 October, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded an explosion 1-2km east-south-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area) and seven projectiles in flight 1-2km south-east (unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area).

During the day on 1 November, positioned in Zolote-4/Rodina (government-controlled, 59km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard two undetermined explosions 4-8km east-north-east and south-west, respectively, followed by an explosion assessed as an impact 200-500m east of its position (all assessed as outside the disengagement area). The SMM felt the shock wave from the impact explosion and immediately departed the area. While in Zolote‑4/Rodina, the SMM had been told by two residents that they face shelling and shooting on a daily basis.

On 1 November, positioned on the north-eastern edge of Katerynivka (government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard three undetermined explosions 3-5km east-south-east (assessed as outside the Zolote disengagement area).

On the same day, positioned on the northern edge of Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard five undetermined explosions 7-10km north-east (assessed as outside the Zolote disengagement area).

On the morning of 1 November, the SMM camera in Stanytsia Luhanska recorded the muzzle flash of a mortar round (type undetermined) 200-300m south-south-west (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

During the day on 1 November, positioned in Bohdanivka (government-controlled, 41km south-west of Donetsk), near the Petrivske disengagement area, the SMM observed a calm situation.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Beyond the respective withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites, near Smolianynove  (government-controlled, 61km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM saw two surface-to-air missile systems (9K33 Osa).

The SMM visited areas previously holding weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. In government-controlled areas of Donetsk region, the SMM noted as missing 23 self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm), six towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm), 28 mortars (12 M-120 Molot, 120mm; 15 2B11 Sani, 120mm; and one BM-37, 82mm) and three anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm).

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles[3] in the security zone. In government‑controlled areas, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted three probable infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP-1) and a probable armoured command vehicle (BMP-1 Ksh Potok 2) near Travneve (51km north-east of Donetsk) on 31 October. On 1 November, the SMM saw an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-80) near Zolote‑2/Karbonit (62km west of Luhansk) and an IFV (BMP-1) near Zolote.

In non-government-controlled Luhansk city, on 1 November, the SMM saw two APCs (undetermined types).

In Myrne (government-controlled, 63km south of Donetsk), the SMM noted that two covered wooden boxes mounted on pillars of a railway bridge (see SMM Daily Report of 19 October 2017) had been removed. National Guard personnel had previously told the SMM that the boxes contained explosives.

The SMM observed demining activities near Lomakyne (government-controlled, 15km north-east of Mariupol). On the southern side of road T0519, the SMM observed two Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers using portable metal detectors and a tractor with mine sweeping equipment in its rear.

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to the Petrivske water pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), the water pipeline near Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk), damaged houses in Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) and Krasnohorivka (government-controlled, 21km west of Donetsk) and the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne (government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk). It also facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable demining activities near Nyzhnoteple (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk). The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station.

The SMM visited a border area outside government control. While at a border crossing point near Voznesenivka (formerly Chervonopartyzansk, 65km south-east of Luhansk) for about five minutes, the SMM saw no cross-border traffic. A member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.* At the Chervona Mohyla railway station in Voznesenivka, the SMM observed a train consisting of two locomotives and 40 cargo wagons heading west.*

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• At a checkpoint about 1km north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations again stopped the SMM and denied it passage to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) and to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), claiming ongoing demining in the area. The SMM observed a car proceeding through the checkpoint towards Pikuzy.
• At a checkpoint near Novoazovsk (non-government-controlled, 40km east of Mariupol), near the border with the Russian Federation, three members of the armed formations again prevented the SMM from passing through to the city and accessing Siedove (non-government-controlled, 106km south of Donetsk), citing orders from their superiors. The SMM observed nine cars proceeding through the checkpoint.
• A member of the armed formations prevented the SMM from accessing certain areas within a compound in Luhansk city where the SMM observed armoured combat vehicles.
• At a border crossing point near Voznesenivka, a member of the armed formations again  told the SMM to leave the area.
• At the Chervona Mohyla railway station in Voznesenivka, two members of the armed formations again prevented the SMM from entering the railway station and told the SMM to leave the area.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

Other impediments:

• While it was flying a mini-UAV in the southern outskirts of Zhovte, the SMM heard 40 shots of small-arms fire 2.4km north-north-west of its position, assessed as aimed at the mini-UAV. The SMM was able to land the UAV safely and departed the area.
• A member of the armed formations prohibited the SMM from taking cameras and telephones into a compound in Luhansk city where the SMM observed armoured combat vehicles (see above) and insisted on accompanying the SMM at all times while it was within the compound.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[2] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[3] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC withdrew from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

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Colin McCullough, OSCE Programme Office in Astana

The role of new technologies in the electoral process was the focus of an international conference organized by the Central Election Commission of Kazakhstan with support from the OSCE Programme Office in Astana, in Kazakhstan’s capital on 1 and 2 November 2018. The conference was held on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the Commission.

The event brought together some 120 experts and representatives of the Central Election Commission, the parliament, state agencies, political parties, NGOs, diplomatic missions and international organizations, as well as central election bodies from 15 countries.

The conference provided a platform to discuss the use of modern technologies during elections, building public trust in political processes and improvements to the administration of elections. International experts and the members of central election bodies from Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Estonia, Georgia, India, Jordan, Korea, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan and Turkey shared experiences and best practices in the administration of elections in their countries.

Berik Imashev, Chairperson of the Central Election Commission, noted possible challenges and risks associated with the use of digital technologies in the election process and said that the international community should develop norms and standards in order to protect national elections from manipulation in cyberspace. He stressed the OSCE’s special role in this regard.

György Szabó, Head of the OSCE Programme Office in Astana, said: “Today new technologies are used in nearly all stages of the electoral process. In order to build public trust in new technologies used during elections, it is important that the principles of universality, equality, transparency, vote secrecy, accountability and fairness of elections are guaranteed and applied regardless of the type of deployed modern technologies.”

The event is part of the Programme Office’s continuous efforts to enhance the transparency and accountability of electoral processes and strengthen democratic institutions in compliance with OSCE principles and commitments.

YEREVAN / BAKU, November 2, 2018 - The Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group (Igor Popov of the Russian Federation, Stéphane Visconti of France, and Andrew Schofer of the United States of America), together with the Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office Andrzej Kasprzyk, visited the region from 29 October to 2 November. 

The main purpose of the visit was to discuss the results of the conversation between the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan on the margins of the CIS summit in Dushanbe in September, outline next steps in the Nagorno-Karabakh peace process, and review the overall evolution of the situation on the ground.

The Co-Chairs met with Acting Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan in Yerevan on 29 October and with President Ilham Aliyev in Baku on 1 November.  In both capitals, they held consultations with the respective foreign ministers and defense ministers.  On October 30-31, Co-Chairs met with the de facto authorities in Nagorno-Karabakh and visited the districts of Kelbajar and Agdam.  On October 31, they participated in an OSCE ceasefire monitoring mission along the Line of Contact near Agdam.  In Baku, the Co-Chairs met with representatives of Azerbaijani communities affected by the conflict.  While in the region, the Co-Chairs discussed the situation with representatives from the ICRC and UNHCR.

In their meetings with the Co-Chairs, the leaders in both capitals confirmed that the level of violence has fallen significantly since they reaffirmed in Dushanbe their commitment to reduce tensions.  In their consultations, the Co-Chairs received additional details about the implementation of the Dushanbe understanding, including with regard to the establishment of direct communication links.  The Co-Chairs welcomed these developments, commended the sides for implementing constructive measures in good faith, and expressed support for the leaders’ readiness to continue their dialogue.

The Co-Chairs stressed the importance of sustaining a climate of trust for intensive negotiations on the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. 

The Foreign Ministers agreed to meet again before the end of the year. 

The Co-Chairs will soon travel to Vienna to brief the OSCE Permanent Council and the members of the Minsk Group.

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Marina Živaljević

A second meeting of the Regional Youth Co-operation Office (RYCO) Advisory Board, supported by the OSCE Mission to Montenegro in an effort to strengthen the Board’s role and visibility, was held on 31 October 2018 in Podgorica.

Some 20 members of the Advisory Board discussed the body’s rules and regulations, terms of reference and procedures. They assessed the work already done and discussed improvements of the forthcoming RYCO call for project proposals.  RYCO Advisory Board has a structure with a unique diversity of skills being that its members come from different backgrounds and professions which resulted in the proposal to establish specific working groups that would reflect RYCO’s key aspects, such as working group in action, advocacy, in mobilizing resources, working group in Youth in RYCO structures.

The Head of the OSCE Mission to Montenegro, Maryse Daviet, congratulated the Board for the outstanding results delivered so far and assured it of the Mission’s continuous and stable future support to RYCO and its structure.

The Mission to Montenegro assists the RYCO Montenegro Office in many aspects, including capacity building, outreach and visibility. The Mission has had a sound partnership with the RYCO branch since its establishment.

RYCO was founded in July 2016 as an independent institutional mechanism to promote a spirit of reconciliation and co-operation among youth through youth exchange programmes.

401903 Communication and Media Relations Section

More than 150 experts and law enforcement officials from OSCE participating States and Partners for Co-operation took part in the OSCE’s Second OSCE-wide Seminar on Passenger Data Exchange organized by the OSCE Transnational Threats Department’s Border Security and Management Unit on 1 and 2 November 2018 in Vienna.

The seminar aimed at helping participants better understand their international obligations related to border management included in United Nations Security Council Resolution 2396, to identify their technical assistance needs and determine how the OSCE can support states in implementing their obligations.

Resolution 2396, which was adopted in 2016 amid an increased risk of returning foreign terrorist fighters following the loss of territory by terrorist groups in conflict zones, mandates states to strengthen border security by establishing passenger data exchange systems and developing systems to collect biometric data, and by sharing this information bilaterally and multilaterally.

“Implementing Resolution 2396 will be a challenge for us all,” said Rasa Ostrauskaite, Co-ordinator of Activities to Address Transnational Threats. “However, we cannot stand still and hope that the threats around us disappear. We must meet the challenge, co-operate more effectively and fully utilize all available tools to deal with the threat posed by terrorists and their networks.”

Experts from OSCE participating States and commercial service providers delivered presentations on the Advance Passenger Information (API) and Passenger Name Record (PNR) systems, and also highlighted the financial and technical support available from donor states and international organizations in implementing these systems.

The Biometrics Institute and the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism discussed their work in supporting states in collecting and processing biometric information, while representatives of INTERPOL, the European Agency for the operational management of large-scale IT systems in the area of freedom, security and justice (eu-LISA), and the United States highlighted how the effective use of regional and international databases can enhance information sharing between states.

The seminar also functioned as the Sixth Thematic Meeting of the OSCE Border Security and Management National Focal Point Network. The Network, which is comprised of 103 contact points from 53 OSCE participating States, was established in 2006 to facilitate the exchange of information and best practices between national borders services.

Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights Thomas Rymer

Sixteen OSCE participating States invoked the OSCE’s Moscow Mechanism on 1 November 2018 to look into alleged human rights violations in the Chechen Republic, Russian Federation.

The Moscow Mechanism, last invoked in 2011 in relation to Belarus, provides the opportunity for participating States to send missions of experts to assist in the resolution of a particular question or problem relating to the human dimension. For further information, please see: https://www.osce.org/odihr/human-dimension-mechanisms

Any information relevant to the work of the Moscow Mechanism can be sent to the following email address: moscowmechanism2018@odihr.pl. The information will then be forwarded to the expert mission, once established.

The sixteen countries who have invoked the Moscow Mechanism in this case are Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States.

SKOPJE, 2 November 2018 – The OSCE Mission to Skopje marked the International Day to End Impunity for Crimes against Journalists in Skopje today by launching a guidebook on safety of journalists while covering critical events.

The guidebook aims to bridge the communications gap between journalists and the authorities and includes recommendations for increasing the safety of journalists.

The event is co-organized with the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Association of Journalists, whose president, Naser Selmani, stated that “Impunity for violence against journalists incites self-censorship of media.”

Head of the OSCE Mission to Skopje Clemens Koja said that all too often in the OSCE region, journalists face retribution for simply doing their jobs, while crimes against them go unpunished: “Impunity is poisonous and unacceptable - it leads to self-censorship, limiting the space for free media and ideas and opinions to be shared widely.”

“As a Mission but also as the OSCE as a whole, we will continue to call upon state authorities to uphold their international obligations and OSCE commitments to protect journalists and media workers, and to promptly, thoroughly, impartially and effectively investigate alleged crimes against them and bring the perpetrators to justice,” said Koja.

The Minister of Internal Affairs, Oliver Spasovski, said: “The evident commitment of the Interior Ministry since June 2017 to clear the cases of attacks on journalists must be emphasized. During this period all registered physical attacks on journalists were cleared. Precisely, clearing of the cases is a basic prerequisite for dealing with this phenomenon.”

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401816 Communication and Media Relations Section

A one-week training course for 15 Serbian border guards to enhance their skills in detecting forged and fraudulent documents as well as imposters was held from 29 October to 2 November 2018 in Belgrade. The course was organized by the Border Security and Management Unit of the OSCE’s Transnational Threats Department.

The course examined the latest trends in counterfeiting and the methodologies of identifying forgeries. Practical exercises focused on differences between original, forged and false documents, and the effective use of equipment such as magnifying lenses to identify forged document.

The OSCE also donated equipment, including professional magnifying lenses, which could be used for passport control exercises during training activities.

Danilo Stevanovic, Assistant Head of the Border Police Directorate within Serbia’s Interior Ministry, opened the course by thanking the OSCE for organizing the course and the donation of equipment. The course was conducted by two experts from the Directorate using training materials approved by the OSCE and the European Union’s border agency FRONTEX.

Alessandro Nanni, Border Adviser at the OSCE Border Security and Management Unit, said:  “The OSCE welcomes the opportunity to provide the necessary skills to the Serbian border guards, in the current global context characterized by transnational threats. The guards need to know the new methods adopted by criminals to forge and counterfeit documents; the criminals are continuously evolving their operations to skip border controls.” 

Umberto Severini, Senior Organized Crime Adviser within the OSCE Mission to Serbia, said: “The training course complements the work of the OSCE Mission to Serbia in supporting the local authorities in combating transnational threats, and supporting the border guards in updating their detection methods.”

The course follows a series of several courses on the detection of forged travel documents organized by the OSCE Border Security and Management Unit since 2015 in different countries, especially in South-Eastern Europe.

VIENNA/ROME, 2 November 2018 – At the invitation of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office, Italian Foreign Minister Enzo Moavero Milanesi, the 25th Ministerial Council of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) will take place on 6 and 7 December 2018 in Milan, Italy.

The Ministerial Council is the central decision-making and governing body of the OSCE. The annual meeting provides the Foreign Ministers of the 57 OSCE participating States an important opportunity to review and assess the security situation in the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian area as well as the organization's action in all its fields of activity.

Journalists are invited to cover the event, which will be held at the Milano Convention Center (MiCo), Via Gattamelata, 20149 Milan.

Advance accreditation of media representatives is mandatory. Accreditation takes place on a self-registration basis via https://osce-2018.org/mi/mediahome.aspx. The deadline for media registration is Tuesday 4 December 2018.

Please note that journalists already accredited for regular OSCE coverage need a separate accreditation for the Ministerial Council.

Detailed information about media facilities, instructions for accreditation, booking of hotels and the visa application procedure is available at https://osce-2018.org/mi/mediahome.aspx.

Media representatives shall make their own travel and accommodation arrangements. If desired, accommodations can be found through the dedicated email osce@bcdme.it handled by a private agency.

Visa requirements must be met before arrival in Italy. Accredited journalists are invited to make their own visa arrangements as soon as possible.

The official website of Milano Congressi: https://www.micomilano.it/Home_it.html.

Follow the Hashtag #OSCEMC18 for further information.

Contacts

OSCE Communication and Media Relations Section

OSCE Secretariat

Office: + 43 1 514 36 6756 (From 8:30-17:30 Vienna time, weekdays)

Mobile: + 43 676 71 74 592 (For urgent and out of office hours requests) press@osce.org

Press Accreditation Office

Ministry for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation - Rome

Office: +39 0636913432/8573

stampa-oscemilano18@esteri.it

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Op-ed by George Tsereteli and Isabel SantosThe Hill, 1 November 2018

On a frigid December morning in 1993, 40 parliamentarians from some 20 countries fanned out across Russia for the first-ever election observation deployed by the Parliamentary Assembly of the then-Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

Twenty-five years and 170 election observation missions later, the Parliamentary Assembly of the now-Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe is deploying some 71 members of parliament to observe the midterm elections in the United States.

In one sense, the mission is routine for us – having observed elections in the U.S. a half-dozen times since 2004 – but we are also keenly aware that this election is taking place in a context of deep polarization, concerns over election security, and an ongoing investigation into foreign interference in the 2016 presidential contest.

Our job as international observers is to bring a critical but fair eye to this process, assessing the elections for adherence to democratic commitments laid out in the OSCE’s Copenhagen Document of 1990. As in previous U.S. elections, we will focus closely on issues such as cybersecurity, gerrymandering, voting rights, and transparency in campaign financing. Observing in the U.S. demonstrates the importance of not only observing in developing democracies but also in established democracies – both “east and west of Vienna,” as we say in the OSCE.

Beyond our mandate to uphold the democratic standards to which the U.S. has agreed – and indeed took a lead role in formulating nearly three decades ago – we also understand that this exercise in election observation helps to build trust, both within countries and between countries. In times of heightened international tensions, these confidence-building measures are more important than ever.

Observation in the United States poses unique challenges. In keeping with the decentralized electoral system that places much of the responsibility for administering elections in the hands of state and local officials rather than a Central Election Commission – as is the case in most of our countries – international observers must contend with a multitude of state laws that provide varying and sometimes contradictory guidelines on international election observation. We work in close consultation with relevant authorities to ensure access to polling places on election day and always make sure to be in full compliance with local laws.

Attention in the U.S. has focused on the fact that the observation team includes some Russian nationals. We understand that in a political climate that for the past two years has been dominated by news of alleged Russian meddling, it might come as a surprise to Americans that Russians are involved in monitoring U.S. elections. It should be understood, however, that as members of the OSCE, both the Russian Federation and the United States have for decades welcomed each other’s citizens into their countries as international observers. Of the 139 total OSCE observers this election, ten will be from Russia, and we consider it useful that within that, our Parliamentary Assembly team will be joined by two members of the Russian parliament.

Americans should also understand that as members of parliament and as representatives of the world’s largest regional security organization, OSCE parliamentarians bring a unique perspective to every election that we observe.

We have competed in elections ourselves, so we personally understand the importance of a clear understanding of the rules of the game. We also recognize the changing character of elections, and in particular the rise of new voting technologies and the challenges, as well as opportunities, that computerized elections pose for voters, administrators and observers alike.

We welcome the increased attention by federal, state and local authorities in the United States to election security in recent years. Ensuring the integrity of elections is a matter of crucial importance and is something that we will look at closely.

As the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly embarks on its next 25 years of observation, we can think of no better place to be than the United States for these important elections.

George Tsereteli, a member of parliament from Georgia, is President of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly and has been appointed Special Co-ordinator of the OSCE short-term observer mission to the United States. Isabel Santos, a member of parliament from Portugal, is Vice-President of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly and is serving as Head of the OSCE PA observation mission.

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VIENNA, 1 November 2018 – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, today expressed his disappointment after a court decision in Ukraine extended for the third time the pre-trial detention of bureau chief of the RIA Novosti Ukraine news agency, Kirill Vyshinsky.

“I reiterate my call on the Ukrainian authorities to expedite the investigation on Vyshinsky, and to release the journalist,” Désir said. “Journalists have the right to express dissenting views and to report on issues that could be considered controversial, sensitive or offensive without any fear of retaliation.”

On 1 November, the Kherson City Court extended Vyshinsky’s pre-trial detention until 28 December 2018. It had previously been extended twice in July and in September 2018. He was arrested on 15 May 2018.

The Representative has earlier raised his concern on this case, see: https://www.osce.org/representative-on-freedom-of-media/401453 and https://www.osce.org/representative-on-freedom-of-media/381370 

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This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, compared with the previous reporting period. At a hospital in Donetsk city, the Mission saw a man with two legs amputated, reportedly due to a mine explosion. The SMM observed a weapon in violation of the agreed withdrawal lines near Voitove. It recorded ceasefire violations near the Petrivske and the Zolote disengagement areas. The SMM’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas; it was also restricted near Novoazovsk – an area close to the border with the Russian Federation – Staromykhailivka, Novolaspa, and again near Zaichenko and Bezimenne.* The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne and to critical civilian infrastructure in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, as well as to enable demining near Nyzhnoteple, Zolote-2/Karbonit and Novotroitske. In Kyiv, the SMM monitored a public gathering related to utility prices.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations[1], including about 130 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 610 explosions).

On the evening and night of 30-31 October, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded 28 undetermined explosions and 20 projectiles in flight, all 0.5-3km south and south-west.

On the evening of 30 October, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard about 50 undetermined explosions and 75 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 3-7km at southerly directions.

On the evening of 30 October, the SMM camera in Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol) recorded six undetermined explosions and about 170 projectiles in flight (mostly from easterly to westerly directions), all 2-5km at directions ranging from south-east to south.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including three explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 30 explosions).

The Mission followed up on reports of a civilian casualty in Donetsk city. At a trauma hospital in Donetsk city, the SMM saw a man (in his thirties) with both lower legs missing and bandages covering his knees and left hand, as well as multiple injuries on his body and face. He told the Mission that on the afternoon of 19 October he had been walking on soft ground towards his neighbour’s yard at 121 Zeleny Gai in the Trudivski area of Donetsk city’s Petrovskyi district (non-government-controlled, 15km south-west of Donetsk city centre) when he had heard crackling sounds and explosions, and that when he had looked down he had realized he had lost a leg. Medical staff at the hospital told the SMM the man had been admitted on 19 October after a mine explosion and had had both his legs amputated below the knees.

The SMM continued to monitor and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske[2] (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

During the day on 31 October, positioned in Petrivske, the SMM heard a burst of small-arms fire 1-2km south-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

On the same day, positioned on the southern edge of the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM heard an explosion assessed as an impact of a round of an undetermined weapon 2-3km north-north-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area). The Mission saw a black Volkswagen Passat, with military licence plates and a man in military uniform inside, driving inside the Zolote disengagement area.

Positioned inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, the SMM observed a calm situation.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of the agreed withdrawal lines in a government-controlled area, the SMM saw a surface-to-air-missile-system (9K33 Osa) west of Voitove (33km north-west of Luhansk).

Beyond the respective withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in government-controlled areas, on 30 October, an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted 12 towed howitzers (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) on trucks near Novomaiorske (64km south-west of Donetsk). On 31 October, an SMM mini-UAV spotted a surface-to-air missile system (9K31 Strela-1) near Mariupol (102km south of Donetsk). On the same day, the SMM saw a surface-to-air missile system (9K33) near Novoaidar (49km north-west of Luhansk).

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles, an anti-aircraft gun[3] and other indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 30 October, the SMM observed two armoured personnel carriers (APC) (a BTR-60 and a BTR-80A) in Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk), an APC (BTR-4) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk), two infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP-1) and an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) on a truck near Popasna (69km west of Luhansk) and four armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM variants): two near Makarove (19km north-east of Luhansk) and two near Stanytsia Luhanska. On 30 October, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted two new trench extensions totalling about 35 metres, one connected to a residential house, and an IFV (BMP-2) on the eastern edge of Zolote-4/Rodina (59km north-west of Luhansk), as well as two new trenches totalling about 70m in length north of Zolote-4/Rodina about 1km north of the aforementioned trench extensions (all not visible in imagery from 10 October 2018).

In non-government-controlled areas, 200m east of the abovementioned trenches on the eastern edge of Zolote-4/Rodina, on 30 October, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted three new trenches (in total about 75m), two of which were connected to a house, on the northern edge of Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (58km west of Luhansk). The UAV also spotted six new firing positions and a new 30m-long trench about 300m north of these trenches (all not visible in imagery from 10 October 2018).

The SMM observed demining activities. In a field about 2.5km south from Lomakyne (government-controlled, 15km north-east of Mariupol), on the northern side of road T0519, the SMM observed four Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers using probing sticks and a tractor with mine sweeping equipment in its rear. On the western side of road H20, about 4.5km north-east of Volnovakha (government-controlled, 53km south-west of Donetsk), the Mission saw a square-shaped red-and-white sign saying “Distance to a mine field 300 metres” in Ukrainian. In the field, it saw wooden sticks connected by white tape, as well as fresh vehicle tracks.

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to the Petrivske water pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), the water distribution channel in Donetskyi (non-government-controlled, 49km west of Luhansk) and the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne (government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk), as well as to enable demining activities near Nyzhnoteple (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), Zolote-2/Karbonit (62km west of Luhansk) and Novotroitske (government-controlled, 36km south-west of Donetsk). The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS.

The SMM continued to monitor the situation of civilians at entry-exit checkpoints. At the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the Mission saw the body of an elderly man lying on the ground next to a container of an international organization. A representative of the organization told the SMM that earlier in the morning the man’s body had been left near their container, after the man (in his seventies) reportedly had died from a heart attack on the wooden ramps connecting the broken parts of the bridge, and that the corpse would be taken to a morgue.

In Kyiv, the SMM monitored a public gathering in front of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine building at 12/2 Mykhaila Hrushevskoho Street. The Mission saw about 350 people (mostly young men and elderly women) protesting rising utility prices, some holding flags of a political party and some expressing statements critical of the government. It saw 40 police officers in riot gear and 20 National Guard officers present. The Mission observed the protest end peacefully.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• At a checkpoint about 1km north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations again stopped the SMM and denied it passage to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) and southward to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), saying the armed formations had not received information about the SMM’s intention to visit the area.
• At a checkpoint on the eastern edge of Novolaspa (non-government-controlled, 50km south of Donetsk), an armed member of the armed formations denied the SMM passage after the Mission had refused to share its patrol plan.  
• At a checkpoint 2.5km west of Bezimenne (non-government-controlled, 30km east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage west toward road E58, citing “orders from superiors not to let the SMM pass through”.
• At a checkpoint near Novoazovsk (non-government-controlled, 40km east of Mariupol), near the border with the Russian Federation, three members of the armed formations again prevented the SMM from passing through to the city, citing an “ongoing operation”.
• At a checkpoint near Staromykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 15km west of Donetsk), an armed member of the armed formations denied the SMM passage, citing risks to “the SMM’s security”.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

Conditional access:

• At a checkpoint on road H15 east of Kreminets (non-government-controlled, 16km south-west of Donetsk), members of the armed formations allowed the SMM to pass only after they had inspected the SMM vehicle’s trailer.

 

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[2] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[3] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC withdrew from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

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401834

Protecting private property and improving legislation on business entities’ rights were the focus of an international roundtable discussion hosted by Uzbekistan’s Supreme Court with the support of the OSCE Project Co-ordinator and in co-operation with UNDP, USAID and the German Agency for International Co-operation on 1 November 2018 in Samarkand, Uzbekistan.

The event brought together around 100 participants, including the Chairperson of the country’s Supreme Court, the Head of the Senate Committee on Legislation and Judicial and Legal Issues, and the Chairperson of the Association of Arbitration Courts. Other participants included representatives from prominent international and local law firms, a variety of local businesses and delegates from a range of different development organizations active in Uzbekistan.

The participants shared best practices and discussed the challenges currently faced in the Central Asian region and beyond. They examined how to improve national legislation aimed at increasing the quality and efficiency of proceedings, and how to implement effective protection mechanisms and develop the institutional capacity to ensure the rights and interests of entrepreneurs. A separate panel focused on alternative methods of dispute resolution between entrepreneurs, which discussed topics such as mediation and the potential conflicts between investment arbitration and international treaty obligations.

The Project Co-ordinator in Uzbekistan supported the roundtable discussion as part of its project on supporting improvements to policies and practices on the legal protection of private property rights in Uzbekistan.

Marina Živaljević

Strategic planning and quality written project proposals enable NGOs to access European Union and other important donors’ funds. With that in mind, the OSCE Mission to Montenegro provided a series of training courses during October 2018 to the NGO Bona Fide from Pljevlja, Montenegro.

The director of Bona Fide, Sabina Talović, said that the courses, for nine members of the NGO, were far more useful than any grant, donation or one-off assistance. The trainees were organized into two groups: one group concentrated on economic empowerment issues, and the other on gender-based violence.

“When one receives a donation, a grant or some other tangible asset, although useful especially when one struggles to cover the utility costs, it is still a short-term solution.  The OSCE Mission gave us the opportunity to learn how to approach large donors and access funds, which are the skills we truly need,” said Talović.

Talovic said that the capacity of the NGO has increased and its mindset regarding fundraising changed as a result of the training: “We now understand how to prepare a project and report on project results. We have the skills to expand funding initiatives and this process will result in enhancing our capacity to lobby and advocate on behalf of our clients.”

Open Center Bona Fide in Pljevlja is an organization that offers shelter to the victims of domestic violence in the northern part of Montenegro and supports the economic empowerment of women (entrepreneurship, handcrafts, and agricultural activities).

The Mission has a long-term dedication to the promotion of gender equality principles and socio-economic empowerment of women in Montenegro. This exercise is part of these efforts and was tailor-made to support Bona Fide in developing strategic documents. Ultimately, this should enable them to access new donors and funds, creating more opportunities to implement new project ideas and serve a wider group of the NGO’s beneficiaries.

Mirvete Islam, OSCE Mission to Skopje

Hate speech in the media was the focus of a two-day OSCE Mission to Skopje-supported discussion with representatives of media organizations, national human rights institutions, state and regulatory bodies, criminal justice agencies and civil society organizations, which concluded on 1 November 2018 in Mavrovo.

The discussion, co-organized with the Council of Media Ethics, considered the establishment of an informal network tackling hate speech, aimed to improve co-ordination and apply a more strategic approach to dealing with hate speech in the media.

“As the first of its kind in the country, such a network could address the problem of hate speech in the media in a systematic way through co-operation among all relevant actors,” said the Deputy Head of the OSCE Mission to Skopje Jeff Goldstein.

Colin McCullough, OSCE Programme Office in Astana

An OSCE-supported two-day training seminar for employees of Kazakhstan’s Central Bank on the application of a risk-based approach to anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) supervision of financial organizations concluded on 1 November 2018 in Almaty, Kazakhstan.

Experts from Guernsey and Lichtenstein led the event and familiarized some 20 participants from the National Bank of Kazakhstan with AML/CFT supervision in compliance with international standards.

Participants learned the key characteristics of risk-based AML/CFT supervision, ways of identifying potential risks and taking preventive measures for mitigating them.

The training seminar also involved a discussion on the current practice of implementing AML/CFT supervision by the National Bank of Kazakhstan, including aspects related to risk monitoring and follow-up actions.

The event was organized by the OSCE Programme Office in Astana in partnership with the National Bank of Kazakhstan.

It is part of the Programme Office’s multi-year efforts to promote good governance and combat money laundering and terrorism financing.

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region, compared with the previous reporting period. The SMM observed weapons in violation of agreed withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line. It recorded ceasefire violations and saw Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel inside the Zolote disengagement area. The SMM’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas; it was also restricted near Novoazovsk, an area close to the border with the Russian Federation, and again near Yuzhna-Lomuvatka and Bezimenne.* The SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable demining activities near Nyzhnoteple and Zolote-2/Karbonit. It facilitated repairs to civilian infrastructure near Artema and in Krasnohorivka, as well as to residential houses in Marinka and Krasnohorivka.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations[1], including about 610 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 230 explosions).

On the evening and night of 29-30 October, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded 11 undetermined explosions, an illumination flare and about 15 projectiles in flight (mostly from northerly to southerly directions), all 2-6km at directions ranging from south-east and south-west.

On the evening of 29 October, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard about 70 undetermined explosions and about 185 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 3-8km at southerly directions. During the day on 30 October, while in the same location, the SMM heard about 215 undetermined explosions and about 420 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 3-5km south-east and south-south-east.

On the evening of 29 October, while in Debaltseve (non-government-controlled, 58km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard about 40 undetermined explosions 3-6km north-north-east.

During the day on 30 October, positioned about 1km north-west of the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk) for about four hours, the SMM heard and saw two explosions assessed as impacts of rounds from undetermined weapons 3-4km south-west and two explosions assessed as outgoing mortar rounds 300m west-north-west and north-west. It heard about 160 explosions 1-6km at directions ranging from south to north (of which six assessed as outgoing mortar rounds 1-2km south-west, seven as impacts of rounds from undetermined weapons 2-4km at directions ranging from south-west to north, as well as one assessed as an impact of a mortar round 3-4km south-west). It also heard about 70 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun, small-arms and automatic grenade launcher fire, all 1-6km at directions ranging from south to north.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including, however, more explosions (about 30), compared with the previous reporting period (25 explosions).

On the evening of 29 October, the SMM camera in Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk) recorded three undetermined explosions and two projectiles in flight (one from north to south and one from south to north), all 4-9km east and east-south-east.

During the day on 30 October, positioned 3km north-west of Trokhizbenka (government-controlled, 32km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 18 undetermined explosions 10-15km south-south-west.

Positioned north of Orikhove (government-controlled, 57km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard nine undetermined explosions 6-7km east-south-east.

The SMM continued to monitor and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske[2] (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

During the day on 30 October, positioned on the eastern edge of Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard about 30 bursts and shots of small-arms and heavy-machine-gun fire, all 2.5-4km south-south-east (assessed as inside the Zolote disengagement area).

On the same day, inside the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM saw two Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel (one of whom was armed) walking in a field from Katerynivka (government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk) towards the railway bridge, as well as a Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel member next to a military position just south of the railway bridge. About an hour and a half later, the SMM saw two Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel entering the disengagement area from its northern edge.

Positioned on the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw a blue laser light firmly pointing north from a known military-type position of the armed formations on a hilltop south of the bridge and west of the Prince Ihor Monument. (The SMM observed similar lights at the same location on 4 October 2018 (see SMM Daily Report of 5 October 2018).)

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas, on 27 October, an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted two anti-tank guided missile systems (one 9P148 Konkurs, 135mm and one 9P149 Shturm-S, 130mm) near Bila Hora (54km north of Donetsk). On 29 October, an SMM long-range UAV spotted a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10) near residential houses in Pobeda (27km west of Donetsk). On 30 October, the SMM saw a self-propelled howitzer (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) heading south on road H20 near Oleksandro-Kalynove (47km north of Donetsk) and a self-propelled howitzer (2S3) heading west on road T0511 near Novokalynove (29km north-west of Donetsk).

In violation of withdrawal lines in a non-government-controlled area, on 29 October, an SMM mini-UAV spotted a probable mortar (type undetermined, 82mm) near Donetskyi (49km west of Luhansk).

Beyond the respective withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in government-controlled areas, on 29 October, an SMM long-range UAV spotted a surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) near Valerianivka (51km south-west of Donetsk). On 29 October, the SMM saw a towed howitzer (D-20, 152mm), two anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) and six surface-to-air missile systems (9K33) at a railway station in Rubizhne (84km north-west of Luhansk) and a surface-to-air missile system (9K33) in Verkhnokamianka (84km north-west of Luhansk).

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles (ACV), anti-aircraft guns[3] and other indications of military presence in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 27 October, an SMM mini-UAV spotted four infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (one BMP-1, one BMP-2 and two BMP variants), an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (MT-LB), four armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-2) and two anti-aircraft guns (ZU-23, 23mm) mounted on trucks near Bila Hora. On 29 October, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an ACV (type undetermined) and a recently dug 400m-long extension of trenches in a southern direction, assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces about 3km south-east of Krasnohorivka (21km west of Donetsk), as well as an IFV (BMP-1) near Trudivske (47km south of Donetsk). On 30 October, the SMM saw an IFV (BMP variant) in Zolote-3/Stakhanovets, an IFV (BTR-4) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk) and an IFV (BTR-80) near Zolote-2/Karbonit (62km west of Luhansk).

The SMM is continuing to follow up on its long-range UAV lost while flying over an area south-east of Nyzhnokrynske (non-government-controlled, 66km east of Donetsk) (see SMM Spot Report 30 October 2018).  

The SMM observed the presence of a new mine hazard sign – a white and red square with “Dangerous. Stop Mines” written in Russian – next to road T0504, about 1.3km north-west of Kalynove-Borshchuvate (non-government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk).  

The SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to the Petrivske water pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), to damaged houses in Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) and Krasnohorivka (government-controlled, 21km west of Donetsk) and to the Krasnohorivka gas distribution station. It also monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable demining activities near Nyzhnoteple (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk) and Zolote-2/Karbonit. The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS.

The SMM visited a border area not under government control. While at a border crossing point near Novoazovsk (non-government-controlled, 40km east of Mariupol) for about 15 minutes, the SMM observed two cars (one with Russian Federation licence plates and one with “DPR” plates) entering Ukraine. The SMM saw two cars (one with Russian Federation licence plates and one with “DPR” plates) exiting Ukraine.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• At a checkpoint about 2km east of Novoazovsk, near the border with the Russian Federation, two armed members of the armed formations denied the SMM passage south towards Siedove (non-government-controlled, 106km south of Donetsk), citing “ongoing military training” in the area. At the same time, the SMM observed civilian vehicles passing through the checkpoint.
• At a checkpoint near Novoazovsk, two members of the armed formations (one of which was armed) again prevented the SMM from passing through to the city, citing an “ongoing operation”. At the same time, the SMM observed civilian vehicles passing through the checkpoint.
• At a checkpoint in Yuzhna-Lomuvatka (non-government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage, citing “demining activities” in the area.
• At a checkpoint near Bezimenne (non-government-controlled, 30km east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage west along road M14, citing “ongoing shelling and demining activities”. At the same time, the SMM observed civilian vehicles passing through the checkpoint.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC. [4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

Other impediments:

• An SMM mid-range UAV temporarily lost its GPS signal due to signal interference while flying near Mykolaivka (government-controlled, 40km south of Donetsk). On two occasions, an SMM mini-UAV lost its GPS signal due to signal interference near Hranitne (government-controlled, 60km south of Donetsk).[5]

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[2] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[3] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC withdrew from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

[5] The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position.

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